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THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

HENRY FROWDE, M.A.

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THE
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
TRANSLATED

BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MÜLLER

VOL. XXXVI



Oxford

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
THE QUESTIONS
OF
KING MILINDA

TRANSLATED FROM THE PÂLI

BY

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS

PART II



Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1894

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38.19

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INTRODUCTION.

I HAVE first to notice a few points as to the history of the Milinda book which have either come to light since the former Introduction was written, or which I then omitted to notice.

Mr. Bunyiu Nanjio in his Catalogue of Chinese Buddhist Books¹ mentions a Chinese book called Nā-sien Pikhiu K'in (that is 'The Book of the Bhikshu Nāgasena' Sūtra)². I have been so fortunate as to receive detailed information about this book both from Dr. Serge d'Oldenbourg in St. Petersburg and from M. Sylvain Lévi in Paris. Professor Serge d'Oldenbourg forwarded to me, in the spring of 1892, a translation into English (which he himself had been kind enough to make) from a translation into Russian by Mr. Ivanovsky, of the Chinese Introduction, and of various episodes in the Chinese which seemed to differ from the Pāli. This very valuable aid to the interpretation of the Milinda, which the unselfish courtesy of these two Russian scholars intended thus to place at my disposal, was most unfortunately lost in the post; and I have only been able to gather from a personal interview with Professor d'Oldenbourg that the Introduction was a sort of Gātaka story in which the Buddha appeared as a white elephant³.

By a curious coincidence this regrettable loss has been

¹ Called on the title-page 'Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka.' But this must surely be a mistake. It includes a number of works which are not translations at all, and translations of a large number of others which do not belong to the Piṭakas.

² No. 1358 in the Catalogue. Translated under the Eastern Tsin Dynasty, 317-420.

³ As there is nothing about this curious Introduction in either of M. Specht's papers to be mentioned immediately, it seems possible that there are really three Chinese books on the same subject.

since made good by the work of two French scholars. Mons. Sylvain Lévi forwarded to the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists, held in London in the autumn of 1892, a careful study on the subject by M. Edouard Specht, preceded by an introductory essay by himself.

It appears from this paper, which excited much interest when it was read, that there are, not one, but two separate and distinct works extant in China under the name of Nā-sien Pikkhiu Kin, the one inserted in the Korean collection made in that country in 1010 A.D., and the other printed in the collection of Buddhist books published under the Sung in 1239. Neither the date nor the author of either version seems to be known, but Mr. Bunyiu Nanjio states of his work, which is probably one of the two, that it was composed between 317 and 420 A.D.¹ The Korean book gives much less of the matter contained in our books II and III than the later work in the Sung collection, the former containing only 13,752 characters while the latter has 22,657. In the matter of the order of the questions also the later of the two Chinese books follows much more closely the order found in the present translation than does the work found in the Korean collection.

This paper has since been published in the Proceedings of the Congress², and it gives translations of several episodes on questions in which the Chinese is said to throw light on the Pāli. Both M. Specht and M. Sylvain Lévi seem to think that the two Chinese books were translations of older recensions of the work than the one preserved in Pāli. This argument does not seem to me, as at present advised, at all certain. It by no means follows that a shorter recension, merely because it is shorter, must necessarily be older than a longer one. It is quite as possible that the longer one gave rise to the shorter ones.

¹ It would be very interesting to have this point decided; namely, whether the volume in the India Office Library is identical with either of the two very different books in Paris. If not, we have, then, still another Chinese book on Milinda.

² Vol. i. pp. 520-529.

The story of a discussion between Nāgasena and Milinda is no doubt, if the arguments in the Introduction to Part I are of any avail, an historical romance with an ethical tendency. In constant repetition, after it had become popular, it is precisely those parts which do not appeal so easily to the popular ear (because they deal, not with ordinary puzzles, but with dilemmas or with the higher mysteries of Arahatsip), that would be naturally omitted. I do not go so far as to say that it must have been so. But I venture to think that for a critical judgment as to the comparative dates of the three works on the same subject, now known to exist, we must wait till translations of the whole of the two independent Chinese versions are before us. And further that the arguments must then turn on quite other considerations than the very ambiguous conclusions to be drawn merely from the length or shortness of the different treatment in each case. It is very much to be hoped therefore that M. Specht will soon give us complete versions of the two Chinese works in question.

At present it can only be said that we have a very pretty puzzle propounded to us, a puzzle much more difficult to solve than those which king Milinda put to Nāgasena the sage. If the shorter version (or rather paraphrase, for it does not seem to be a version at all in our modern sense)—that from the Korea—be really the original, how comes it that the other Chinese book, included in a collection made two centuries later, should happen to differ from it in the precise parts in which it, the supposed original, differs from the Pāli? Surely the only probable hypothesis would be that of the Chinese books, both working on the same original, the later is more exact than the earlier: and that we simply have here one more instance of an already well-known characteristic of Chinese reproductions of Indian books—namely, that the later version is more accurate than the older one. The later a Chinese ‘translation’ the better, in the few cases where comparison is possible, it has proved to be (that is, the nearer to our idea of what a translation should be);

and Tibetan versions are better, as a rule, than the best of the Chinese.

Since the publication of this very interesting paper, M. Sylvain Lévi has had the great kindness to send me an advance proof of a more complete paper, to be published in Paris, in which M. Specht and himself have made a detailed analysis of the three versions, setting out over against the English translation of each question (as contained in the first volume of the present work) the translations of it as they appear in each of the Chinese versions. I have not been able by a study of this analysis to add anything to the admirable summary of the conclusions as to the relations of these two books to one another and to the Pāli which are given by M. Specht in his article in the Proceedings of the Ninth Congress. The later version is throughout much nearer to the Pāli; but neither of the two give more than a small portion of it, the earlier does not seem to go much further than our Volume I, page 99 (just where the Pāli has the remark, 'Here end the questions of king Milinda'), and the later, though it goes beyond this point, apparently stops at Volume I, page 114.

These details are of importance for the decision of the critical question of the history of the Milinda. The book starts with an elaborate and very skilful introduction, giving first an account of the way in which Nāgasena and Milinda had met in a previous birth, then the life history, in order, of each of them in this birth, then the account of how they met. Throughout the whole story the attention is constantly directed to the very great ability of the two disputants, and to the fact that they had been specially prepared through their whole existence for this great encounter, which was to be of the first importance for religion and for the world. This introductory story occupies in my translation thirty-nine pages. Is it likely that so stately an entrance hall should have really been built to lead only into one or two small rooms?—to two chapters occupying only sixty pages more? Is it not more probable that the original architect had a better sense of proportion? As an Introduction to the book as we have it in these

volumes the story told in those thirty-nine pages is very much in place ; as an Introduction to the first two chapters only, or to the first two and a portion of the third, it is quite incongruous. And accordingly we find in the very beginning of the Introduction a kind of table of contents in which the shape of the whole book, as we have it here, is foreshadowed in detail, and in due proportion. This will have to be taken into account when, with full translations of the two Chinese books before us, we shall have to consider whether they are really copies of the original statue, or whether they are interesting fragments.

I ought not to close this reference to the labours of MM. Lévi and Specht without calling attention to a slip of the pen in one expression used by M. Sylvaïn Lévi regarding the *Milinda*¹. He says, 'La science ne connaissait jusqu'ici de cet ouvrage qu'un texte écrit en Pali et incorporé dans le canon Singhalais?' Now there is, accurately speaking, no such thing as a Sinhalese canon of the Buddhist Scriptures, any more than there is a French or an English canon of the Christian Scriptures. The canon of the three *Pitakas*, settled in the valley of the Ganges (probably at Patna in the time of Asoka), has been adhered to, it is true, in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam. But it cannot properly be called either a Ceylonese or a Burmese or a Siamese canon. In that canon the *Milinda* was never incorporated. And not only so, but the expression used clearly implies that there is some other canon. Now there has never been any other canon of the Buddhist Scriptures besides this one of the three *Pitakas*. Many Buddhist books, not incorporated in the canon, have been composed in different languages—Pāli, Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, Japanese, Sinhalese, Burmese, Siamese, &c.—but no new canon, in the European meaning of the phrase, has ever been formed.

One meets occasionally, no doubt, in European books on Buddhism allusions or references to a later canon

¹ 'Transactions of the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists,' vol. i, p. 518.

supposed to have been settled at the Council of Kanishka. The blunder originated, I believe, with Mr. Beal. But in the only account of that Council which we possess, that of Yuan Tshang¹, there is no mention at all of any new canon having been settled. The account is long and detailed. An occurrence of so extreme an importance would scarcely have escaped the notice of the Chinese writer. But throughout the account the canonicity of the three Piṭakas is simply taken for granted. The members of the Council were chosen exclusively from those who knew the three Piṭakas, and the work they performed was the composition of three books—the Upadesa, the Vinaya Vibhāṣā, and the Abhidharma Vibhāṣā. The words which follow in the Chinese have been differently interpreted by the European translators. Julien says:

‘They (the members of the Council) thoroughly explained the three Piṭakas, and thus placed them above all the books of antiquity².’

Beal, on the other hand, renders:

‘Which (namely, which three books) thoroughly explained the three Piṭakas. There was no work of antiquity to be compared with (placed above) their productions³.’

It is immaterial which version best conveys the meaning of the original. They both clearly show that, in the view of Yuan Tshang, the Council of Kanishka did not establish any new canon. Since that time the rulers of China, Japan, and Tibet have from time to time published collections of Buddhist books. But none of these collections even purports to be a canon of the Scriptures. They contain works of very various, and some quite modern, ages and authors: and can no more be regarded as a canon of the Buddhist Scriptures than Migne’s voluminous collection of Christian books can be called a new canon of the Christian Scriptures.

¹ Julien’s translation, vol. i, pp. 173–178, and Mr. Beal’s own translation, i, 147–157. There are two or three incidental references to the Council in other works. See my ‘Buddhism,’ p. 239.

² St. Julien, ‘Voyages des Pèlerins Bouddhistes,’ vol. i, pp. 177, 178.

³ Beal, ‘Buddhist Records of the Western World,’ vol. i, p. 155.

This was already pointed out in my little manual, 'Buddhism,' published in 1877, and it is a pity that references in subsequent books to a supposed canon settled at Kanishka's Council have still perpetuated the blunder. M. Sylvain Lévi, for whose genius and scholarship I have the profoundest respect, does not actually say that there was such a canon; but his words must lead readers, ignorant of the facts, to imply that there was one.

I have also to add that M. Barth has called attention¹ to the fact that M. Sylvain Lévi has added another service to those already mentioned as rendered by him to the interpretation of the Milinda, by a discussion of the reference to our book in the Abhidharma-kosa-vyākhyā, referred to in my previous Introduction, p. xxvi. This discussion was published in a periodical I have not seen². But it seems that M. Lévi, with the help of two Chinese translations, has been able to show that the citation is not only in the commentary, but also in the text, of Vasubandhu's work. M. Léon Feer has been kind enough to send me the actual words of the reference, and they will be found published in the 'Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society' for 1891, p. 476.

Professor Serge d'Oldenbourg has also been good enough to point out to me that the two Cambridge MSS. of Kshemendra's Bodhisattvavadāna-kalpalatā read Milinda (not Millinda as given by Rājendra Lal Mitra³) as the name of the king referred to in the 57th Avadāna, the Stūpāvadāna. I had not noticed this reference to the character in our historical romance. It comes in quite incidentally, the Buddha prophesying to Indra that a king Milinda would erect a stūpa at Pāṭaligrāma. There is no allusion to our book, and the passage is only interesting as showing that the memory of king Milinda still survived in India at the time when Kshemendra wrote in the eleventh century A.D.

Another reference to one of the characters in the Milinda

¹ In the 'Revue de l'Histoire des Religions' for 1893 (which has only just reached me), p. 258.

² The 'Comptes rendus des Séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres,' 1893, p. 232.

³ 'Nepalese Buddhist Literature,' p. 65.

which has come to notice since the publication of part i, is in the closing words of the Attha-Sālinī-Atthayogaṇā (a *ṭīkā* on Buddhaghosa's first work, his commentary on the Dhamma Saṅgaṇī), which was written in Siam after the twelfth century by Ñānakitti, and edited in 1890 at Galle, by Paññāsekhara Unnānsē. On page 265 we read :

Vattaniya-senāsane ti Viñghātaviyaṃ Vattaniya-senāsane. Tena vuttam Mahāvamsa :

Assagutta-mahāthero pabhinna-Paṭisambhido
Sattī-bhikkhū sahaṣṣāni Viñghattaviyaṃ ādiya
Vattaniya-senāsanaṃ nabhasā tattha-motarīti.

'The words Vattaniya-senāsane mean, "in the Vattaniya Hermitage in the Vindhya Desert." Therefore it is said in the Mahāvamsa :

"The great Thera Assagutta, who knew so well the Paṭisambhidā, bringing sixty thousand brethren from the Vattaniya Hermitage in the Vindhya Desert through the sky, descended there."

This quotation is very interesting. It follows that in the original text of the Attha Sālinī there is something about the Vattaniya Hermitage. And also that the author of this *Ṭīkā* must have had before him some text of our Mahāvamsa differing from ours, or perhaps some other Mahāvamsa. For the lines quoted do not occur in our text. The nearest approach to them is one line in the description of the assembly that came together at the consecration of the Mahā Thūpa at Anurādhapura in the year 157 B.C. It runs¹ :

Viñghātavi-Vattaniya-senāsanaṃ² tu Uttaro
Thero sattī-sahaṣṣāni bhikkhū ādāya āgamā.

'The thera Uttara came up bringing with him sixty thousand Bhikshus from the Vattaniya Hermitage [not Uttania Temple as Turnour translates] in the Vindhya Desert.'

The resemblance of the passages is striking. But all

¹ Chapter XXIX, p. 171, of Turnour's edition.

² Turnour has Vattaniyā-senāsanaṃ.

that can be concluded is that the author of our *Mahāvamsa*, Mahânâma, who wrote in the middle of the fifth century, knew of the Vattaniya Hermitage; and that the author of the text quoted by *Ñānakitti* (in a passage probably describing the same event) mentions an Assagutta as having come to the festival from his hermitage at Vattaniya.

Both these references are entirely legendary. In order to magnify the importance of the great festival held in Ceylon on the occasion referred to, it is related that certain famous members of the Buddhist order came, attended by many followers, through the sky, to take part in the ceremony. A comparison of this list with the previous list, also given in the *Mahāvamsa*¹, of the missionaries sent out nearly a hundred years before, by Asoka, will show that the names in the second list are in great part an echo of those in the first. But in selecting well-known names, Mahânâma in his second, fabulous, list has, according to the published text, also included that of the Vattaniya Hermitage, and, according to the new verse in the other text, has associated with that place the name of Assagutta, not found elsewhere except in the *Milinda*. In that book the residence of Assagutta is not specified—it is his friend Rohana who lives at the Vattaniya, and the locality of the Vattaniya is not specified—it would seem from the statement at I, 25 (part i, p. 20 of this translation) that it was a day's journey from 'the Guarded Slope,' that is, in the Himālayas. But geographical allusions are apt to be misleading when the talk is of Bhikshus who could fly through the air. And it seems the most probable explanation that the authors of these verses, in adopting these names, had the *Milinda* story in their mind.

[Turnour's reading of the name as Uttara, and not Assagutta, is confirmed by the *Dipavamsa*, chap. XIX, verses 4–6, where all the fourteen names of the visitors from India are given (without any details as to the districts whence they came), and the corresponding name is also Uttara there.]

¹ Turnour, pp. 71–73.

The above sets out all the new information I have been able to glean about the Milinda since the publication of the Introduction to the first volume of this translation. I had hoped in this Introduction to discuss the doctrines, as apart from the historical and geographical allusions, of our author—comparing his standpoint with that of the earliest Buddhists, set out in the four great Nikāyas, with that of later books contained in the Piṭakas, and with that of still later works not included in the canon at all. I have to express my regret that a long and serious illness, culminating in a serious accident that was very nearly a fatal one, has deprived me altogether of the power of work, and not only prevented me from carrying out this perhaps too ambitious design, but has so long delayed the writing of this Introduction.

Only one of the preliminary labours to the intended Introduction was completed. I read through the Kathā Vatthu, which has not yet been edited, with a view of ascertaining whether, at the time when that book was written, that is, in the time of Asoka, the kind of questions agitating the Buddhist community bore any relation to the kind of questions discussed by the author of our Milinda. As is well known, the Kathā Vatthu sets out a number of points on which the orthodox school, that of the Theravādins, differed in Asoka's time from the other seventeen schools (afterwards called collectively the Hīnayāna) which had sprung up among the Buddhists between the time of the Buddha and that of Asoka. I published in the 'Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society' for 1892 a statement, both in the original Pāli and in English, of all the points thus discussed by the author of the Kathā Vatthu, Moggali-putta Tissa Thera, giving (from the commentary) the names of the various schools against whom, in each instance, his remarks were directed.

It is now possible to judge from this analysis of the questions proposed, what were the subjects on which differences obtained among the early Buddhists. There are a number of points raised in Tissa's discussions which are also discussed by the author of the Milinda. In every

instance the two authors agree in their views, Nāgasena in the *Milinda* always advocating the opinion which Tissa puts forward as that of the Thera-vādins. This is especially the case with those points which Moggali-putta Tissa thinks of so much importance that he discusses them at much greater length than the others.

His first chapter, for instance, by far the longest in his book, is on the question whether, in the high and truest sense of the word, there can be said to be a 'soul'¹. It is precisely this question which forms also the subject of the very first discussion between Milinda and Nāgasena, the conversation leading up to the celebrated simile of the chariot by which Nāgasena apparently convinces Milinda of the truth of the orthodox Buddhist view that there is really no such thing as a 'soul' in the ordinary sense². On leaving the sage, the king returns to his palace, and the next day the officer who escorts Nāgasena there to renew the discussion, occupies the time to raise again the same question, and is answered by the simile of the musicians³. Not content with these two expositions of this important doctrine, the author of the *Milinda* returns again soon afterwards to the same point, which he illustrates by the simile of the palace⁴, and further on in the book he takes occasion to discuss and refute the commonly held opinion that there is a soul in inanimate things, such as water⁵.

It cannot be doubted that the authors of the *Kathā Vatthu* and the *Milinda* were perfectly justified in putting this crucial question in the very forefront of their discussion—just as the Buddha himself, as is well known, made it the subject of the very first discourse he addressed to his earliest converted followers, the *Anatta-lakkhaṇa Sutta*, included both in the *Vinaya* and in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*⁶.

The history of ideas about the 'soul' has yet to be

¹ *Kathā Vatthu* I, 1.

² *Milinda*, i, p. 48.

³ *Milinda*, ii, pp. 85-87.

⁴ *Vinaya Texts* (S. B. E. XIII), part i, pp. 100, 101, and *Aṅguttara Nikāya*.

⁵ *Milinda*, i, pp. 40-41.

⁶ *Milinda*, i, pp. 86-89.

written. But the outlines of it are pretty well established, and there is nothing to show that the Indian notions on the subject, apart perhaps from the subsidiary beliefs in Karma and transmigration, were materially different from those obtaining elsewhere. Already in prehistoric times the ancestors of the Indian peoples, whether Aryan by race or not, had come to believe, probably through the influence of dreams, in the existence inside each man of a subtle image of the man himself. This weird and intangible form left the body during sleep, and at death it continued in some way to live. It was a crude hypothesis found useful to explain the phenomena of dreams, of motion, and of life. And it was applied very indiscriminately to the allied phenomena in external things—the apparent life and motion, not only of animals, but also of plants and rivers, of winds and celestial bodies, being explained by the hypothesis of a soul within them. The varying conditions and appearances of the external world gave rise to the various powers and qualities ascribed to these external souls, and hence to whole systems of polytheism and mythology. And just as the gods, which never had any existence except in the ideas of their worshippers, were born and grew and changed and passed away with those ideas, so also the hypothesis of internal souls had, no less in India than elsewhere, a continual change, a continual development—and this not only as to ideas on the nature and origin of the internal human souls, but as to their relation to the external souls or gods. And when speculation, which loved to busy itself with these mysterious and fanciful hypotheses, had learnt to conjecture a unity behind the variety of external spirits, the relation of men's souls to the one great first cause, to God, became the subject of endless discussions, of varying views invented to harmonise with varying preconceived conceptions.

When Buddhism arose these hypotheses as to 'souls,' internal and external, formed the basis of all the widely differing, and very living and earnest, religious and philosophical speculations in the valley of the Ganges, where there then obtained that marvellous freedom of thought

on all such subjects which has been throughout its history a distinguishing characteristic of the Indian people. Now there is one work, of more importance than any other in Buddhism, the collection of the Dialogues of Gotama the Buddha, brought together in the *Dīgha* and *Magghima Nikāyas*. It contains the views of the Buddha set out, as they appeared to his very earliest disciples, in a series of 185 conversational discourses, which will some day come to hold a place, in the history of human thought, akin to that held by the Dialogues of Plato. Is it a mere chance, or is it the actual result of the necessities of the case, that this question of 'souls' is put into the forefront of this collection, just as it is the point treated first and at the greatest length in the *Kathā Vatthu*, and put first also in the *Milinda*?

The first of these 185 dialogues is the *Brahmagāla Suttanta*, the discourse called the Perfect Net, the net whose meshes are so fine that no folly of superstition, however subtle, can slip through—the clearing away of the rubbish before the foundations are laid for the new palace of good sense. In it are set out sixty-two varieties of existing hypotheses, and after each and all of them has been rejected, the doctrine of Arahatsip is put forward as the right solution. The sixty-two heresies are as follows:

- 1-4. **SASSATA-VĀDĀ.** People who, either from meditation of three degrees, or fourthly through logic and reasoning, have come to believe that both the external world as a whole, and individual souls, are eternal.
- 5-8. **EKAḌḌA-SASSATIKĀ.** People who, in four ways, hold that some souls are eternal, while others are not.
 - a. Those who hold that God is eternal, but not the individual souls.
 - b. Those who hold that all the gods are eternal, but not the individual souls.
 - c. Those who hold that certain illustrious gods are eternal, but not the human souls.

- d.* Those who hold that while the bodily forms are not eternal, there is a subtle something, called Heart or Mind, or Consciousness, which is.
- 9-12. ANTÂTIKÂ. People who chop logic about finity and infinity.
 - a.* Those who hold the world to be finite.
 - b.* Those who hold it to be infinite.
 - c.* Those who hold it to be both.
 - d.* Those who hold it to be neither.
- 13-16. AMARA-VIKKHEPIKÂ. People who equivocate about virtue and vice—
 - a.* From the fear that if they express a decided opinion grief at possible mistake will injure them.
 - b.* That they may form attachments which will injure them.
 - c.* That they may be unable to answer skilful disputants.
 - d.* From dullness and stupidity.
- 17, 18. ADHIKKA-SAMUPPANIKÂ. People who think that the origin of things can be explained without a cause.
- 19-50. UDDHAMA-ÂGHATANIKÂ. People who believe in the future existence of human souls.
 - a.* Sixteen different phases of the hypothesis of a conscious existence after death.
 - b.* Eight different phases of the hypothesis of an unconscious existence after death.
 - c.* Eight different phases of the hypothesis of an existence between consciousness and unconsciousness after death.
- 51-57. UKKHEDA-VÂDÂ. People who teach the doctrine that there is a soul, but that it will cease to exist on the death of the body here, or at the end of a next life, or of further lives in higher and ever higher states of being.
- 58-62. DITTHA-DHAMMIKA-NIBBÂNA-VÂDÂ. People who hold that there is a soul, and that it can attain to perfect bliss in this present world, or in whatever world it happens to be—

- a.* By a full, complete, and perfect enjoyment of the five senses.
- b.* By an enquiring mental abstraction (the First Dhyāna).
- c.* By undisturbed mental bliss, untarnished by enquiry (the Second Dhyāna).
- d.* By mental peace, free alike from joy and pain and enquiry (the Third Dhyāna).
- e.* By this mental peace plus a sense of purity (the Fourth Dhyāna).

Professor Garbe, in his just published 'Sankhya Philosophie'¹, holds that the first persons attacked in this list are the followers of the Sāṅkhya. The double view of the Sassata-vādā is no doubt the basis of the Sāṅkhya system. But the system contains much more, and it would be safer to say that we have here a warning against the philosophical view which afterwards developed into the Sāṅkhya, or rather which became afterwards a fundamental part of the Sāṅkhya. The Vedānta, in either of its forms, is not, it will be noticed, referred to in any one of the sixty-two divisions; but philosophical views forming part of the Vedānta may be traced in Nos. 5, 8, 10, 20, &c. The scheme is not intended as a refutation of the views, as a whole, held by any special school or individual, but as a statement of erroneous views on two special points, namely, the soul and the world. However this may be, we find an ample justification in this comprehensive and systematic condemnation of all current or possible forms of the soul-theory for the prominence which the author of the Milinda gives to the subject.

The other points on which the Milinda may be compared with the Kathā Vatthu will need less comment. The discussion in the Milinda as to the manner in which the Divine Eye can arise in a man², is a reminiscence of the question raised in the Kathā Vatthu III, 7 as to whether the eye of flesh can, through strength of dhamma, grow into the Divine Eye. The discussion in the Milinda as to

¹ Introduction, p. 57.

² Milinda, i, pp. 179-185.

how a layman, who is a layman after becoming an Arahāt, can enter the Order¹, is entirely in accord with the opinion maintained, as against the Uttarāpathakā, in the Kathā Vatthu IV, 1. Our Milinda ascribes the verses,

‘Exert yourselves, be strong, and to the faith,’ &c., to the Buddha². In the note on that passage I had pointed out that they are ascribed, not to the Buddha, but to Abhibhū in certain Piṭaka texts, and to the Buddha himself only in late Sanskrit works. In the exposition of Kathā Vatthu II, 3 the verses are also ascribed to the Buddha. The proposition in the Kathā Vatthu II, 8 that the Buddha, in the ordinary affairs of life, was not transcendental, agrees with Nāgasena’s argument in the Milinda, part ii, pp. 8–12. The discussion in the Milinda as to whether an Arahāt can be thoughtless or guilty of an offence³ is foreshadowed by the similar points raised in the Kathā Vatthu I, 2; II, 1, 2, and VIII, 11. And the two dilemmas, Nos. 65 and 66, especially as to the cause of space, may be compared with the discussion in Kathā Vatthu VI, 6, as to whether space is self-existent.

The general result of a comparison between these two very interesting books of controversial apologetics seems to me to be that the differences between them are just such as one might expect (*a*) from the difference of date, and (*b*) from the fact that the controversy in the older book is carried on against members of the same communion, whereas in the Milinda we have a defence of Buddhism as against the outsider. The Kathā Vatthu takes almost the whole of the conclusions reached in the Milinda for granted, and goes on to discuss further questions on points of detail. It does not give a description of Arahātship in glowing terms, but discusses minor points as to whether the realisation of Arahātship includes the Fruits of the three lower paths⁴, or whether all the qualities of an Arahāt are free from the Āsavas⁵, or whether the knowledge of his

¹ Milinda, ii, pp. 96–98 (compare 57–59).

² Milinda, ii, p. 60.

³ Kathā Vatthu IV, 9.

⁴ Milinda, ii, pp. 98 foll.

⁵ Kathā Vatthu IV, 3.

emancipation alone makes a man an Arahāt¹, or whether the breaking of the Fetters constitutes Arahātship, and whether the insight into Arahātship suffices to break all the Fetters², and so on.

The discussion of these details gives no opportunity for the enthusiastic eloquence of the author of our *Milinda*, and the very fact of his eloquence argues a later date. But there can be no doubt as to the superiority of his style. And I still adhere to the opinions expressed in the former Introduction that the work, as it stands in the Pāli, is of its kind (that is, as a book of apologetic controversy) the best in point of style that had then been written in any country; and that it is the masterpiece of Indian prose.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

TEMPLE,

May, 1894.

¹ Kathā Vatthu V, 1.

² Kathā Vatthu V, 10, and X, 1.

THE QUESTIONS
OF
KING MILINDA.

BOOK IV.

THE SOLVING OF DILEMMAS.

CHAPTER 5.

[DILEMMA THE FORTY-FIRST.

ON DWELLING-PLACES.]

I. [211] 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said :

" In friendship of the world anxiety is born,
In household life distraction's dust springs up,
The state set free from home and friendship's ties,
That, and that only, is the recluse's aim ¹."

¹ This is the opening verse of the Muni Sutta (in the Sutta Nipâta I, 12). It is quoted again below, p. 385 of the Pâli text. The second line is, in the original, enigmatically terse, and runs simply, 'From a home dust arises.' This Fausböll renders (in the S. B. E., vol. x, part ii, p. 33), 'From household life arises defilement,' the word for dust (*rago*) being often used figuratively in the sense of something that disfigures, is out of place in the higher life. It is the distracting effect of household cares that the recluse has to fear.

‘ But on the other hand he said :

“ Let therefore the wise man,
Regarding his own weal,
Have pleasant dwelling-places built,
And lodge there learned men ¹. ”

‘ Now, venerable Nāgasena, if the former of these two passages was really spoken by the Tathāgata, then the second must be wrong. But if the Tathāgata really said : “ Have pleasant dwelling-places built,” then the former statement must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.’

2. [212] ‘ Both the passages you have quoted, O king, were spoken by the Tathāgata. And the former is a statement as to the nature of things, an inclusive statement, a statement which leaves no room for anything to be supplemented to it, or to be added to it in the way of gloss ², as to what is seemly and appropriate and proper for a recluse, and as to the mode of life which a recluse should adopt, the path he should walk along, and the practice he should follow. For just, O king, as a deer in the forest, wandering in the woods, sleeps wherever he desires, having no home and no

¹ This is a very famous verse, found first in the Vinaya (*Kullavagga* VI, 1, 5), and quoted in the Introduction to the *Gāthakas* (Fausbøll, vol. i, p. 93 ; compare vol. iv, p. 354), translated in my ‘Buddhist Birth Stories,’ vol. i, p. 132. *Hīnaī-kumburē* adds the context :

‘ Then shall they preach to him the Truth,
The Truth dispelling every grief,
Which Truth when here a man perceives,
He’s freed from stains, and dies away.’

² On these expressions compare above, p. 170 (p. 113 of the text).

dwelling-place, so also should the recluse be of opinion that

“ In friendship of the world anxiety is born,
In household life distraction’s dust springs up.”

3. ‘ But when the Blessed One said :

“ Have pleasant dwelling-places built,
And lodge there learned men,”

that was said with respect to two matters only. And what are those two? The gift of a dwelling-place (Wihâra) has been praised and approved, esteemed and highly spoken of, by all the Buddhas. And those who have made such a gift shall be delivered from rebirth, old age, and death. This is the first of the advantages in the gift of a dwelling-place. And again, if there be a common dwelling-place (a Wihâra) the sisters of the Order will have a clearly ascertained place of rendezvous, and those who wish to visit (the brethren of the Order)¹ will find it an easy matter to do so. Whereas if there were no homes for the members of the Order it would be difficult to visit them. This is the second of the advantages in the gift of a dwelling-place (a Wihâra). It was with reference to these two matters only that it was said by the Blessed One :

“ Have pleasant dwelling-places built,
And lodge there learned men.”

[213] ‘ And it does not follow from that that the sons of the Buddha² should harbour longings after the household life.’

¹ The words in brackets are added from Hîna/i-kumburê.

² That is, the members of the Order.

‘Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to dwelling-places.]

[DILEMMA THE FORTY-SECOND.

MODERATION IN FOOD.]

4. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, the Blessed One said :

“Be not remiss as to (the rules to be observed) when standing up (to beg for food). Be restrained in (matters relating to) the stomach¹.”

‘But on the other hand he said :

“Now there were several days, Udāyin, on which I ate out of this bowl when it was full to the brim, and ate even more².”

‘Now if the first rule be true, then the second statement must be false. But if the statement be true, then the rule first quoted must be wrong.

¹ This verse has not yet been traced. The first half of it occurs in a different connection at Dhammapada, verse 168, which I have rendered (at ‘Buddhism,’ p. 65), ‘Rise up and loiter not!’ without any reference at all to food. This was in accordance with the view taken of the passage, both by Prof. Fausböll, who renders it (p. 31 of his edition of the Pāli), ‘Surgat, ne sit socors,’ and by Prof. Max Müller, who renders it (S. B. E., vol. x, part i, p. 47), ‘Rouse thyself, do not be idle!’ And I still think (especially noting such passages as Dhammapada, verses 231, 232, and the verse quoted in the Commentary, p. 126 of Fausböll, from Gāṭaka IV, 496, &c.) that this was the original meaning in that connection. But here the words must clearly be taken as referring to food,* and it is very remarkable that the commentator on the Dhammapada (see p. 335 of Fausböll’s edition) takes them in that sense also even in the other connection. It is a striking instance of the way in which commentators impart a purely technical sense into a general ethical precept.

² From the Mahā Udāyi Sutta (Magghima Nikāya, No. 77).

This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.'

5. 'Both the passages you have quoted, O king, were spoken by the Blessed One. But the former passage [214] is a statement as to the nature of things, an inclusive statement, a statement which leaves no room for anything to be supplemented to it, or added to it in the way of gloss, a statement of what is true and real and in accordance with the facts, and that cannot be proved wrong, a declaration made by the prophets, and sages, and teachers, and Arahats, and by the Buddhas who are wise for themselves alone (*Paṭṭheka-Buddhas*), a declaration made by the Conquerors, and by the All-wise Ones, a declaration made too by the Tathāgata, the Arahāt, the Supreme Buddha himself. He who has no self-control as regards the stomach, O king, will destroy living creatures, will take possession of what has not been given to him, will be unchaste, will speak lies, will drink strong drink, will put his mother or his father to death, will slay an Arahāt, will create a schism in the Order, will even with malice aforethought wound a Tathāgata. Was it not, O king, when without restraint as to his stomach, that Devadatta by breaking up the Order, heaped up for himself karma that would endure for a kalpa¹? It was on calling to mind this, O king, and many other things of the same kind, that the Blessed One declared :

" Be not remiss as to (the rules to be observed)

¹ See above, p. 164 (p. 109 of the Pāli text). These passages show that Dr. Morris's note in the 'Journal of the Pāli Text Society,' 1885, requires modification. See also below, IV, 8, 88, and the passages quoted by him in the 'Journal' for 1886.

when standing up (to beg for food). Be restrained in (matters relating to) the stomach."

6. 'And he who has self-control as regards the stomach gains a clear insight into the Four Truths, realises the Four Fruits of the life of renunciation¹, and attains to mastery over the Four Discriminations², the Eight Attainments³, and the Six Modes of Higher Knowledge⁴, and fulfils all that goes to constitute the life of the recluse. Did not the parrot fledgling, O king, by self-restraint as to his stomach, cause the very heaven of the great Thirty-Three to shake, and bring down Sakka, the king of the gods, to wait upon him⁵? It was on calling to mind this, O king, and many other things of a similar kind, that the Blessed One declared :

"Be not remiss as to (the rules to be observed) when standing up (to beg for food). Be restrained in (matters relating to) the stomach."

7. 'But when, O king, the Blessed One said : "Now there were several days, Udâyi, on which I ate out of this bowl when it was full to the brim, and ate even more," that was said by him who had completed his task, who had finished all that he had to do, who had accomplished the end he set before him, who had overcome every obstruction, by the self-dependent⁶ Tathâgata himself about himself.

¹ Sâmañña. ² Pañisambhidâ. ³ Samâpatti. ⁴ Abhiññâ.

⁵ This story will be found in the two Suka Gâtakas (Nos. 429 and 430 in Fausböll). I had not succeeded in tracing it when the list at vol. i, p. xxvi, was drawn up; it should therefore be added there.

⁶ Sayambhunâ, 'whose knowledge is not derived from any one else.' (Sayambhu-ñâna-wû says Hīnāśi-kumburê.) Burnouf's proposition ('Lotus,' p. 336) to take it in the sense of 'who has no other substratum or raison d'être than himself' cannot be accepted, in spite of Childers's approbation.

Just, O king, as it is desirable that a sick man to whom an emetic, or a purge, or a clyster has been administered, should be treated with a tonic ; [215] just so, O king, should the man who is full of evil, and who has not perceived the Four Truths, adopt the practice of restraint in the matter of eating. But just, O king, as there is no necessity of polishing, and rubbing down¹, and purifying a diamond gem of great brilliancy, of the finest water, and of natural purity; just so, O king, is there no restraint as to what actions he should perform, on the Tathâgata, on him who hath attained to perfection in all that lies within the scope of a Buddha².

‘Very good, Nâgasena ! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to restraint in eating.]

¹ Nighamsanâ. Compare the use of nighamsati at *Kullavagga* V, 27, 2.

² This is much more than a mere injunction not to gild refined gold. It comes very near to the enunciation of the dangerous doctrine that the holy man is above the law, and that nothing he does can be wrong. It is curious how frequently one finds this proposition cropping up in the most unexpected places, and the history of religious belief is full of instances of its pernicious effect on the most promising movements. When one considers the great influence of our author’s work, it becomes especially interesting to note how the doctrine has never, among the orthodox Buddhists, who read the Pâli Scriptures, been extended from the Buddha himself to his followers, and from moderation in food to matters of more vital import in the life of a church. And this is the more remarkable as the Tantra works of the corrupt Buddhism of Nepal and Tibet show how fatal has been the result of the doctrine among those Buddhists who had lost the guiding support of the older Scriptures.

[DILEMMA THE FORTY-THIRD.]

BAKKULA'S SUPERIORITY TO THE BUDDHA.]

8. 'Venerable Nāgasena, it was said by the Blessed One :

"A Brahman am I, O brethren, devoted to self-sacrifice¹, pure-handed at every time ; this body that I bear with me is my last, I am the supreme Healer and Physician²."

'But on the other hand the Blessed One said :

"The chief, O brethren, among those who are disciples of mine, in the matter of bodily health, is Bakkula³."

'Now it is well known that diseases arose several times in the body of the Blessed One. So that if, Nāgasena, the Tathāgata was supreme, then the statement he made about Bakkula's bodily health must be wrong. But if the Elder named Bakkula was really chief among those who were healthy, then that statement which I first quoted must be

¹ *Yâkayogo*. See Sutta Nipāta III, 5, 1 ; Aṅguttara Nikāya III, 79, 2 ; and below, p. 225 (of the Pāli text).

² This passage has not yet been traced in the Piṭakas, and the context is therefore unknown. But the word Brahman must of course be applied to the Buddha here in the sense, not of one belonging to the Brahman caste, but of Arahāt. *Hīnaśi-kumburē* adds, as a gloss, *bāhita-pāpa-brāhmaṇayek*, 'brahman because he has suppressed evil in himself.' On this explanation see my note to the forty-eighth dilemma, which is devoted to the discussion of this difficulty.

On the Buddha as the Great Physician see Sutta Nipāta III, 7, 13 ; *Magghima* Nikāya I, 429 ; *Sumaṅgala* Vilāsinī, 67, 255 ; and *Milinda*, pp. 110, 169 (of the Pāli text).

³ Aṅguttara Nikāya I, 14, 4. The reading adopted by our author agrees with that of the Sinhalese MSS. put by Dr. Morris into the text.

wrong. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.'

9. 'Both the quotations you have made, O king, are correct¹. But what the Blessed One said about Bakkula was said of those disciples who had learnt by heart the sacred words, and studied them, and handed down the tradition, which in reference to the characteristics (each of them in some one point) had in addition to those which were found in him himself². [216] For there were certain of the disciples of the Blessed One, O king, who were "meditators on foot," spending a whole day and night in walking up and down in meditation. But the Blessed One was in the habit of spending the day and night in meditation, not only walking up and down but also sitting and lying down. So such, O king, of the disciples as were "meditators on foot"³ surpassed him in that particular. And there were certain of the disciples of the Blessed One, O king, who were "eaters at one sitting," who would not, even to save their lives, take more than one meal a day. But the

¹ Here, as always, they are repeated in full in the text.

² This passage is very ambiguous. *Hīnaśi-kumburē* renders it: 'with reference to what was found in himself, and besides that (with reference) to the disciples who had learnt &c. . . . tradition.' He translates *agamānaṃ* and the two following words, as relative compounds, by *āgama-dhāri-wū*, &c., and in this I have followed him. But he supplies an 'and' after the last, thus taking them as accusatives in dependence on *sandhāya*, and that cannot be right. It seems forced to separate *bāhirānaṃ* so much from the other genitives with which it stands in the text, and yet it is so impossible to make sense of the passage in any other way, that one would like to know the readings of all the MSS.

³ 'Kakkhupāla and others' adds *Hīnaśi-kumburē*. (For the story of *Kakkhupāla*, see the commentary on the *Dhammapada*, verse 1.)

Blessed One was in the habit of taking a second, or even a third. So such, O king, of the disciples as were "eaters at one sitting" surpassed him in that particular. And in a similar way, O king, a number of different things have been told, each one of one or other of the disciples. But the Blessed One, O king, surpassed them all in respect of uprightness, and of power of meditation, and of wisdom, and of emancipation, and of that insight which arises out of the knowledge of emancipation, and in all that lies within the scope of a Buddha. It was with reference to that, O king, that he said :

"A Brahman am I, O brethren, devoted to self-sacrifice, pure-handed at every time ; this body that I bear with me is my last, I am the supreme Healer and Physician."

10. 'Now one man, O king, may be of good birth, and another may be wealthy, and another full of wisdom, and another well educated, and another brave, and another adroit ; but a king, surpassing all these, is reckoned supreme. Just in that way, O king, is the Blessed One the highest, the most worthy of respect, the best of all beings. And in so far as the venerable Bakkula was healthy in body, that was by reason of an aspiration (he had formed in a previous birth)¹. For, O king, when Anoma-dassī, the Blessed One, was afflicted with a disease, with wind in his stomach, and again when Vipassī, the Blessed One, and sixty-eight thousand of his disciples, were afflicted with a disease, with greenness of blood², he,

¹ See, for other instances of such aspirations, above, vol. i, p. 5.

² *Tiṇa-pupphaka-roga*. There is a flower called *tiṇa-puppha*, and this may be a skin disease named after it. But *pupphaka* at *Gāṭaka* III, 541, means blood, and the disease may

being at those times an ascetic, had cured that disease with various medicines, and attained (thereby) to such healthiness of body (in this life) that it was said of him :

“ The chief, O brethren, among those who are disciples of mine, in the matter of bodily health, is Bakkula.”

11. ‘ But the Blessed One, O king, whether he be suffering, or not suffering, from disease ; whether he have taken, or not taken, upon himself the observance

be so called because the blood was turned by it to the colour of grass (*tina*). *Hīnañ-kumburē* (who gives these legends of the previous births of Bakkula at much greater length, adding others from the time of the Buddhas *Padumuttara* and *Kassapa*, and giving the story also of his present birth) says that the disease arose from contact with wind which had been poisoned through blowing over a *Upas* tree (p. 296 of the *Sinhalese* version). But he does not explain the name of the disease, which occurs only here.

In his present birth Bakkula is said to have been born at *Kosāmbī*, in a wealthy family. His mother, understanding that to bathe a new-born child in the *Jumna* would ensure him a long life, took him down to the river. Whilst he was there being bathed, a huge fish swallowed him. But the fish, caught at *Benares*, was sold to a wealthy but childless man there, and on being cut open, the babe was found in it unhurt.

The mother hearing the news of this marvel, went in great state and with haste to *Benares* and claimed the child. Thereupon an interesting lawsuit arose, and the king of *Benares*, thinking it unjust to deprive the purchaser of a fish of anything inside it, and also unjust to deprive a mother of her child, decided that the child belonged equally to both. So he became the heir of both families, and was therefore called *Bak-kula*, ‘ the two-family-one ’ (*Bak* = *Bā* = *Dvā*). On the real derivation of *Bakkula*, see Dr. Morris in the ‘ *Journal of the Pāli Text Society*,’ 1886, pp. 94-99. We need not quarrel with a false etymology which shows us so clearly the origin of the legend. Then *Bakkula* enjoys great prosperity in the orthodox three palaces, and at eighty years of age, being still in vigorous health, enters the Order.

of special vows¹,—there is no being like unto the Blessed One. [217] For this, O king, has been said by the Blessed One, the god of gods, in the most excellent *Samyutta Nikāya*²:

“Whatsoever beings, O brethren, there may be—whether without feet, or bipeds, or four-footed things, whether with a body, or without a body, whether conscious or unconscious, or neither conscious nor not—the Tathâgata is acknowledged to be the chief of all, the Arahata, the Buddha Supreme.”

‘Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say³.’

[Here ends the problem as to the superiority of
Bakkula to the Buddha.]

¹ The Dhutangas, enumerated below, p. 351 (of the Pâli text).

² *Samyutta Nikāya* XLIV, 103.

³ This piece of casuistry is not so entirely at variance with the context of the second passage (quoted from the *Âṅguttara* I, 14) as would seem at first sight. The answer practically amounts to this, that though each of many disciples may be superior to the Buddha in certain bodily qualities, or even in the special vows known as Dhutangas, yet he surpasses them in the ‘weightier matters of the law.’ It is true that one of the instances given, that of the *Īhâna-kāṇkamikâ*, is not included in the list of Dhutangas, and in the long enumeration in the *Âṅguttara* of those of the disciples who were ‘chief’ in any way, ‘weightier matters of the law’ are not overlooked. But ‘meditation on foot’ is of the same nature as the acknowledged Dhutangas, and none of the five special points in which Nâgasena places especially the superiority of the Buddha (uprightness, &c.), is mentioned in the *Âṅguttara*. Nevertheless the logical reply to the problem proposed would have been that in the *Âṅguttara* the superiority spoken of is over other disciples, and not over the Buddha.

[DILEMMA THE FORTY-FOURTH.

THE ORIGINALITY OF THE BUDDHA'S TEACHING.]

12. 'Venerable Nāgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One :

"The Tathāgata, O brethren, the Arahāt, the Buddha supreme¹, is the discoverer of a way that was unknown²."

'But on the other hand he said :

"Now I perceived, O brethren, the ancient way, the ancient path, along which the previous Buddhas walked²."

'If, Nāgasena, the Tathāgata be the discoverer of a way not previously found out, then it must be wrong that it was an ancient way that he perceived, an ancient path along which previous Buddhas walked. But if the way he perceived were an ancient way, then the statement that it was unknown must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.'

13. 'Both the quotations you make, O king, are accurate. And both the statements so made are correct. When the previous Tathāgatas, O king, had disappeared, then, there being no teacher left, their way too disappeared. And it was that way—though then broken up, crumbled away, gone to ruin, closed in, no longer passable, quite lost to view—[218] that the Tathāgata, having gained a

¹ Supreme, that is, in comparison with the Paṭṭeka Buddhas, 'Buddhas for themselves alone:' whereas the 'altogether Buddha' can not only see the truth for himself, but also persuade others of it.

² These two quotations are from the *Samyutta Nikāya* XXI, 58 and X, 2, 65, says Mr. Trenckner, but I cannot trace them in M. Feer's edition.

thorough knowledge of it, saw by the eye of his wisdom¹, (and knew it) as the way that previous Buddhas trod. And therefore is it that he said :

“Now I perceived, O brethren, the ancient way, the ancient path along which previous Buddhas walked.”

‘And it was a way which—there being, through the disappearance of previous Tathâgatas, no teacher left—was a way then broken up, crumbled away, gone to ruin, closed in, and lost to view, that the Tathâgata made now passable again. And therefore is it that he said :

“The Tathâgata, O brethren, the Arahât, the Buddha supreme, is the discoverer of a way that was unknown.”

14. ‘Suppose, O king, that on the disappearance of a sovran overlord, the mystic Gem of Sovranty lay concealed in a cleft on the mountain peak, and that on another sovran overlord arriving at his supreme dignity, it should appear to him. Would you then say, O king, that the Gem was produced by him²?’

‘Certainly not, Sir! The Gem would be in its original condition. But it has received, as it were, a new birth through him.’

‘Just so, O king, is it that the Blessed One, gaining a thorough knowledge of it by the eye of

¹ ‘The wisdom arising from the perception of the Four Noble Truths’ is Hīnaśi-kumburê’s gloss.

² The wondrous Gem-treasure of the king of kings (the Ve/uriya, etymologically the same as beryl, but probably meaning cat’s-eye) is supposed, like the other mystic treasures, to come to him of its own accord, on his becoming sovran overlord. See my ‘Buddhist Suttas,’ p. 256 (S. B. E., vol. xi).

his wisdom, brought back to life and made passable again the most excellent eightfold way in its original condition as when it was walked along by the previous Tathâgatas,—though that way, when there was no teacher more, had become broken up, had crumbled away, had gone to ruin, was closed in, and lost to view. And therefore is it that he said :

“The Tathâgata, O brethren, the Arahata, the Buddha supreme, is the discoverer of a way that was unknown.”

15. ‘It is, O king, as when a mother brings forth from her womb the child that is already there, and the saying is that the mother has given birth to the child. Just so, O king, did the Tathâgata, having gained a thorough knowledge of it by the eye of his wisdom, bring into life, and make passable again, a way that was already there, though then broken up, crumbled away, gone to ruin, closed in, and lost to view.

‘It is as when some man or other finds a thing that has been lost, and the people use the phrase : “He has brought it back to life.” [219] And it is as when a man clears away the jungle, and sets free¹ a piece of land, and the people use the phrase : “That is his land.” But that land is not made by him. It is because he has brought the land into use that he is called the owner of the land. Just so, O king, did the Tathâgata, having gained a thorough knowledge of it by the eye of his wisdom, bring back to life, and make passable again, a way that was already there, though then broken up, crumbled

¹ Nîharati. Âvaranaya kara ganneya says Hîna/i-kumburê.

‘Now, Nâgasena, if it is true what the Buddha said, that, in his former births as a man, he inflicted no hurt on living beings, then the saying that, as Lomasa Kassapa, he had hundreds of living creatures slain must be false. But if he had, then the saying that he inflicted no hurt on living beings must be false. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.’

17. ‘The Blessed One did say, O king, that already in former births, when he was a man, he had acquired the habit of inflicting no hurt on living beings. And Lomasa Kassapa, the Rishi, did have hundreds of living creatures slain, and offered the great sacrifice, the “Drink of Triumph.” [220] But that was done when he was out of his mind through lust, and not when he was conscious of what he was doing.’

‘There are these eight classes of men, Nâgasena, who kill living beings—the lustful man through his lust, and the cruel man through his anger, and the dull man through his stupidity, and the proud man through his pride, and the avaricious man through his greed, and the needy man for the sake of a livelihood, and the fool in joke, and the king in the way of punishment. These, Nâgasena, are the eight classes of men who kill living beings. The Bodisat, venerable Nâgasena, must have been acting in accordance with his natural disposition when he did so.’

‘No, it was not, O king, an act natural to him that the Bodisat did then. If the Bodisat had been led, by natural inclination, to offer the great sacrifice, he would not have uttered the verse :

of king Lomapâda’s sacrifice (*Râmâyana* I, 8, 11 foll.) it is the arva-medha, the horse sacrifice, which is offered.

“Not the whole world, Sayha, the ocean girt,
With all the seas and hills that girdle it,
Would I, desire to have, along with shame¹.”

‘But though, O king, the Bodisat had said that, yet at the very sight of *Kandavatī* (Moon-face), the princess², he went out of his mind and lost command of himself through love. And it was when thus out of his mind, confused and agitated, that he, with his thoughts all perplexed, scattered and wandering, thus offered the great sacrifice, the “Drink of Triumph,”—and mighty was the outpour of blood from the necks of the slaughtered beasts!

‘Just, O king, as a madman, when out of his senses, will step into a fiery furnace, and take hold of an infuriated venomous snake, and go up to a rogue elephant, and plunge forwards into great waters, the further shore of which he cannot see, and trample through dirty pools and muddy places³, and rush into thorny brakes, and fall down precipices, and feed himself on filth, and go naked through the streets, and do many other things improper to be done—just so was it, O king, that at the very sight of *Kandavatī*, the princess, the Bodisat went out of his mind, and then only acted as I have said⁴.

18. [221] ‘Now an evil act done, O king, by one out of his mind, is even in this present world not considered as a grievous offence, nor is it so in

¹ This verse is found not only in the 433rd *Gāṭaka* (loc. cit.), but also in the *Sayha Gāṭaka*, No. 310, a shorter recension of the same story.

² *Hīnaśi-kumburē* here summarises the whole story.

³ *Kandanikā* and *oḷigalla*. See *Anguttara* III, 57, 1; *Magghima* I, 11, 448; *Thera Gāthā* 567; *Kullavagga* V, 17, 1. *Hīnaśi-kumburē* spells the second word with an ordinary l.

⁴ The text repeats the last paragraph.

respect of the fruit that it brings about in a future life. Suppose, O king, that a madman had been guilty of a capital offence, what punishment would you inflict upon him ?'

'What punishment is due to a madman ? We should order him to be beaten and set free. That is all the punishment he would have.'

'So then, O king, there is no punishment according to the offence of a madman. It follows that there is no sin in the act done by a madman, it is a pardonable act. And just so, O king, is it with respect to Lomasa Kassapa, the Rishi, who at the mere sight of *Kandavati*, the princess, went out of his mind, and lost command of himself through love. It was when thus out of his mind, confused and agitated, that he, with his thoughts all perplexed, scattered and wandering, thus offered the great sacrifice, the "Drink of Triumph,"—and mighty was the outpour of blood from the necks of the slaughtered beasts ! But when he returned again to his natural state, and recovered his presence of mind, then did he again renounce the world, and having regained the five powers of insight, became assured of rebirth in the Brahma world.'

'Very good, *Nāgasena* ! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma about Lomasa Kassapa ¹.]

¹ It is very instructive to notice the way in which our author looks upon the historical Buddha and the various heroes of the *Gātaka* Stories as so absolutely identical that he feels obliged to defend the conduct of all the 'types' as earnestly as he would that of the Buddha himself. There is no such conception in the *Piṭakas*, and the whole tone of our author's argument reveals the lateness of his date as compared with the *Piṭakas*.

[DILEMMA THE FORTY-SIXTH.]

THE MOCKING OF THE BUDDHA.]

19. 'Venerable Nāgasena, it was said by the Blessed One of Six-tusks, the elephant king,
 "When he sought to slay him, and had reached him
 with his trunk,

He perceived the yellow robe, the badge of a recluse,

Then, though smarting with the pain, the thought possessed his heart,—

'He who wears the outward garb the Arahats wear
 Must be scatheless held, and sacred, by the good¹.'

'But on the other hand it is said :

"When he was Gotipāla, the young Brahman, he reviled and abused Kassapa the Blessed One, the Arahāt, the Buddha supreme, with vile and bitter words, calling him a shaveling and a good-for-nothing monk²."

'Now if, Nāgasena, the Bodisat, even when he was an animal, respected the yellow robe, [222] then the statement that as Gotipāla, a Brahman, he reviled and abused the Blessed One of that time, must be false. But if as a Brahman, he reviled and abused the Blessed One, the statement that when he was Six-tusks, the elephant king, he respected the yellow robe, must be false. If when the Bodisat was an animal, though he was suffering severe and cruel and bitter pain, he respected the yellow robe

¹ From the *Kāḍḍanta Gāṭaka*, No. 514 (Fausböll, vol. v, p. 49); with which compare the *Kāsāva Gāṭaka*, No. 221 (vol. ii, p. 196).

² This has not been found in these words, but Mr. Trenckner refers to *Magghima Nikāya*, No. 81. Compare also *Gāṭaka I*, 43.

which the hunter had put on, how was it that when he was a man, a man arrived at discretion, with all his knowledge mature, he did not pay reverence, on seeing him, to Kassapa the Blessed One, the Arahāt, the Buddha supreme, one endowed with the ten powers, the leader of the world, the highest of the high, round whom effulgence spread a fathom on every side, and who was clad in most excellent and precious and delicate Benares cloth made into yellow robes? This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.'

20. 'The verse you have quoted, O king, was spoken by the Blessed One. And Kassapa the Blessed One, the Arahāt, the Buddha supreme, was abused and reviled by Gotipāla the young Brahman with vile and bitter words, with the epithets of shaveling and good-for-nothing monk. But that was owing to his birth and family surroundings. For Gotipāla, O king, was descended from a family of unbelievers, men void of faith. His mother and father, his sisters and brothers, the bondswomen and bondsmen, the hired servants and dependents in the house, were worshippers of Brahmā, reverers of Brahmā; and harbouring the idea that Brahmans were the highest and most honourable among men, they reviled and loathed those others who had renounced the world. It was through hearing what they said that Gotipāla, when invited by Ghaṭikāra the potter to visit the teacher, replied: "What's the good to you of visiting that shaveling, that good-for-nothing monk?"

[223] 21. 'Just, O king, as even nectar when mixed with poison will turn sour, just as the coolest water in contact with fire will become warm, so was

it that Gotipâla, the young Brahman, having been born and brought up in a family of unbelievers, men void of faith, thus reviled and abused the Tathâgata after the manner of his kind. And just, O king, as a flaming and burning mighty fire, if, even when at the height of its glory, it should come into contact with water, would cool down, with its splendour and glory spoilt, and turn to cinders, black as rotten blighted¹ fruits—just so, O king, Gotipâla, full as he was of merit and faith, mighty as was the glory of his knowledge, yet when reborn into a family of unbelievers, of men void of faith, he became, as it were, blind, and reviled and abused the Tathâgata. But when he had gone to him, and had come to know the virtues of the Buddhas which he had, then did he become as his hired servant; and having renounced the world and entered the Order under the system of the Conqueror, he gained the fivefold power of insight, and the eightfold power of ecstatic meditation, and became assured of rebirth into the Brahma heaven.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma about Gotipâla.]

¹ *Niggundi*, which *Hīnaśī-kumburē* merely repeats. See *Gâtaka* III, 348; IV, 456; *Dhammapada Commentary*, p. 209; *Âṅguttara* IV, 199; and Dr. Morris's restoration of *Dīpavamsa* XII, 32, in the Introduction to vol. ii of his *Âṅguttara*.

[DILEMMA THE FORTY-SEVENTH.]

THE HELPLESSNESS OF A BUDDHA.]

22. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this too has been said by the Blessed One :

"Ghaṭṭikâra the potter's dwelling-place remained, the whole of it, for three months open to the sky, and no rain fell upon it¹."

'But on the other hand it is said :

"Rain fell on the hut of Kassapa the Tathâgata¹."

'How was it, venerable Nâgasena, that the hut of a Tathâgata, the roots of whose merits were so widely spread², got wet? One would think that a Tathâgata should have the power to prevent that. If, Nâgasena, Ghaṭṭikâra the potter's dwelling was kept dry when it was open to the sky, it cannot be true that a Tathâgata's hut got wet. But if it did, then it must be false that the potter's dwelling was kept dry. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.'

23. 'Both the quotations you have made, O king, are correct. [224] Ghaṭṭikâra the potter was a good man, beautiful in character, deeply rooted in merit, who supported his old and blind mother and father. And when he was absent, the people, without so much as asking his leave, took away the thatch from his dwelling to roof in with it the hut of the Tathâgata. Then, unmoved and unshaken at his thatch being thus removed, but filled rather

¹ Both these quotations are from the *Magghima Nikâya*, No. 31 (the *Ghaṭṭikâra Suttanta*).

² *Ussanna-kusala-mûla*. See *Gâtaka I*, 145.

with a well-grounded and great joy the like of which cannot be found, an immeasurable bliss sprang up in his heart at the thought: "May the Blessed One, the chief of the world, have full confidence in me." And thereby did he obtain merit which brought forth its good result even in this present life.

24. 'And the Tathâgata, O king, was not disturbed by that temporary inconvenience (of the falling rain). Just, O king, as Sineru, the king of the mountains, moves not, neither is shaken, by the onslaught of innumerable gales¹—just as the mighty ocean, the home of the great waters, is not filled up, neither is disturbed at all, by the inflow of innumerable great rivers—just so, O king, is a Tathâgata unmoved at temporary inconvenience.

'And that the rain fell upon the Tathâgata's hut happened out of consideration for the great masses of the people. For there are two circumstances, O king, which prevent the Tathâgatas from themselves supplying (by creative power) any requisite of which they may be in need². And what are the two? Men and gods, by supplying the requisites of a Buddha on the ground that he is a teacher worthy of gifts, will thereby be set free from rebirth in states of woe. And lest others should find fault, saying: "They seek their livelihood by the working of miracles." If, O king, Sakka had kept that hut dry, or even Brahmâ himself, even then that action would have been faulty, wrong, and worthy of censure. For people might then say: "These Buddhas by

¹ Aneka-sata-sahassa-vâta-sampahârena. Perhaps 'by the battle (raging round it) of innumerable gales,' the onslaught of the winds being not against it, but against one another.

² Literally 'from receiving any self-created requisite.'

their dexterity¹ befool and lord it over the world." That is the reason why such action would have been better left undone. The Tathâgatas, O king, do not ask for any advantage; and it is because they ask for nothing that they are held blameless.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma about Ghaṭikâra the potter.]

[DILEMMA THE FORTY-EIGHTH.

WHY GOTAMA CLAIMED TO BE A BRAHMAN.]

[225] 25. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this too was said by the Blessed One :

"A Brahman am I, O brethren, devoted to self-sacrifice²."

'But on the other hand he declared :

"A king am I, Sela³."

'If, Nâgasena, the Blessed One were a Brahman, then he must have spoken falsely when he said he was a king. But if he were a king, then he must have spoken falsely when he said he was a Brahman. He must have been either a Khattiya or a Brahman. For he could not have belonged, in the same birth, to two castes. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.'

¹ Vibhûsam katvâ. Daksha-kriyâ koṭa says Hînaśi-kumburê. The expression has not been found elsewhere.

² This passage has already been quoted above (IV, 4, 55). It has not been traced in the Piṭakas.

³ These words from the Sela Sutta (Sutta Nipâta III, 7, 7) have also been already discussed above (IV, 3, 33, 34).

26. 'Both the quotations you have made, O king, are correct. But there is good reason why the Tathâgata should have been both Brahman and also king.'

'Pray what, Nâgasena, can be that reason?'

'Because all evil qualities, not productive of merit, are in the Tathâgata suppressed, abandoned, put away, dispelled, rooted out, destroyed, come to an end, gone out, and ceased, therefore is it that the Tathâgata is called a Brahman¹. A Brahman², O king, means one who has passed beyond hesitation, perplexity, and doubt. And it is because the Tathâgata has done all this, that therefore also is he called a Brahman. A Brahman, O king, means one who has escaped from every sort and class of becoming, who is entirely set free from evil and from stain, who is dependent on himself³, and it is because the Tathâgata is all of these things, that therefore also is he called a Brahman. A Brahman, O king, means one who cultivates within himself the highest and best of the excellent and supreme

¹ This argument is based on the false etymology that *brâhmaṇo* = *bâhita-pâpo* ('he in whom evil is suppressed'), adopted by Hīnaśī-kumburê above at IV, 4, 55. Buddhaghosa, in the *Sumaṅgala*, p. 244, has another derivation: *Brahmam anatīti brâhmaṇo*. As *Brahmam* has not been found elsewhere except as the accusative of *Brahmâ* the name of the god, and as *anatī* only occurs in this passage, it might be contended that Buddhaghosa means an 'invoker of *Brahmâ*.' But I think he is correct in his etymology, and intends to interpret the word Brahman as 'intoner of prayer.'

² The Arahāt-Brahman says Hīnaśī-kumburê.

³ *Asahāyo*, literally 'has no friend.' I am not sure that I have rightly understood this term, which I have not found elsewhere applied to the Arahāt. Hīnaśī-kumburê merely repeats the word.

conditions of heart¹. And it is because the Tathâgata does this that therefore also is he called a Brahman. A Brahman, O king, means one who carries on the line of the tradition of the ancient instructions concerning the learning and the teaching of sacred writ, concerning the acceptance of gifts, concerning subjugation of the senses, self-control in conduct, and performance of duty. And it is because the Tathâgata carries on the line of the tradition of the ancient rules enjoined by the Conquerors² regarding all these things, that therefore also is he called a Brahman. [226] A Brahman, O king, means one who enjoys the supreme bliss of the ecstatic meditation. And it is because the Tathâgata does this, that therefore also is he called a Brahman. A Brahman, O king, means one who knows the course and revolution of births in all forms of existence. And it is because the Tathâgata knows this, that therefore also is he called a Brahman. The appellation "Brahman," O king, was not given to the Blessed One by his mother, nor his father, not by his brother, nor his sister, not by his friends, nor his relations, not by spiritual teachers of any sort, no, not by the gods. It is by reason of their emancipation that this is the name of the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones. From the moment when, under the Tree of Wisdom, they had overthrown the armies of the Evil One, had suppressed in themselves all evil qualities not productive of merit, and had attained to the knowledge of the Omniscient

¹ Dibba-vihâro; rendered *divya-viharana* by Hînaś-kumburê. It cannot mean here 'state of being a deva in the *kamaloka*' as rendered by Childers.

² That is, of course, the previous Buddhas.

Ones, it was from the acquisition of this insight, the appearance in them of this enlightenment, that this true designation became applied to them,—the name of “Brahman.” And that is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a Brahman¹.

27. ‘Then what is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king?’

‘A king means, O king, one who rules and guides the world, and the Blessed One rules in righteousness over the ten thousand world systems, he guides the whole world with its men and gods, its evil spirits and its good ones², and its teachers, whether Samanas or Brahmans. That is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king. A king means, O king, one who, exalted above all ordinary men, making those related to him rejoice, and those opposed to him mourn; raises aloft the Sunshade of Sovranty, of pure and stainless white, with its handle of firm hard wood³, and its many hundred ribs⁴,—the symbol of his mighty fame and glory. And the Blessed One, O king, making the army of the Evil One, those given over to false doctrine, mourn; filling the hearts of those, among gods or men, devoted to sound doctrine, with joy; [227] raises aloft over the ten thousand world systems the Sunshade of his Sovranty, pure and stainless in the whiteness of emancipation,

¹ This is a striking instance of argument in a circle. The word Brahman is first interpreted in its technical Buddhist sense of Arahant, and then the Buddha, as Arahant, is called a Brahman. The only paragraph based on the real transition of meaning in the term is that referring to the holding up of tradition.

² Samârakam sabrahmakam, ‘with its Mâras and Brahmans.’

³ Araṭu, says Hīnaś-kumburê; that is wood from the heart of the tree.

⁴ Salâkâ, which Hīnaś-kumburê repeats, adding ‘of the highest wisdom.’

with its hundreds of ribs fashioned out of the highest wisdom, with its handle firm and strong through long suffering,—the symbol of his mighty fame and glory. That too is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king. A king is one who is held worthy of homage by the multitudes who approach him, who come into his presence. And the Blessed One, O king, is held worthy of homage by multitudes of beings, whether gods or men, who approach him, who come into his presence. That too is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king. A king is one who, when pleased with a strenuous servant, gladdens his heart by bestowing upon him, at his own good pleasure, any costly gift the officer may choose¹. And the Blessed One, O king, when pleased with any one who has been strenuous in word or deed or thought, gladdens his heart by bestowing upon him, as a selected gift, the supreme deliverance from all sorrow,—far beyond all material gifts². That too is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king. A king is one who censures, fines³, or executes the man who trans-

¹ *Varitam varam*. 'A gift appropriate to the service approved of' says Hînaśi-kumburê. And the word is not in Childers. But compare the use of *varam* *varati* at *Gâtaka* III, 493.

² *Asesa-kâma-varena*, for which Hînaśi-kumburê has *asesa-kâmâvaṭṭarāyem*. Mr. Trenckner adds a *ka*, which, as being entirely superfluous, he puts in brackets. There can be but little doubt that the corrected reading is *asesa-kâmâvaṭṭarena*, and that the literal rendering would be 'gladdens him by that which has left in it nothing connected with (life in) the world of sense; to wit, deliverance from all sorrow' (that is deliverance from *samsara*).

Parimutti, which I have not found in the *Piṭakas*, and which is not in Childers, occurs above (p. 112 of the Pâli text) in the same connection.

³ *Gâpeti*. See my notes above on vol. i, p. 240, and below on VII, 5, 10. The Sinhalese has here *dhana-dânaya karanneya*, where *dânaya* must be *gâni*.

gresses the royal commands. And so, O king, the man who, in shamelessness or discontent, transgresses the command of the Blessed One, as laid down in the rules of his Order, that man, despised, disgraced and censured, is expelled from the religion of the Conqueror. That too is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king. A king is one who in his turn proclaiming laws and regulations according to the instructions laid down in succession by the righteous kings of ancient times, and thus carrying on his rule in righteousness, becomes beloved and dear to the people, desired in the world, and by the force of his righteousness establishes his dynasty long in the land. And the Blessed One, O king, proclaiming in his turn laws and regulations according to the instructions laid down in succession by the Buddhas of ancient times, and thus in righteousness being teacher of the world,—he too is beloved and dear to both gods and men, desired by them, and by the force of his righteousness he makes his religion last long in the land. That too is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king.

‘Thus, O king, so many are the reasons why the Tathâgata should be both Brahman and also king, that the ablest of the brethren could scarcely in an æon enumerate them all. Why then should I dilate any further? Accept what I have said only in brief.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to the Buddha
belonging to two castes.]

[DILEMMA THE FORTY-NINTH.
GIFTS TO THE BUDDHA.]

[228] 28. 'Venerable Nāgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One :

" Gifts chaunted for in sacred hymns
Are gifts I must not take.
All those who see into the Truth
Do this their practice make.
The Buddhas all refused to chaunt for wage ;
This was their conduct still
Whene'er the Truth prevailed
Through every age¹."

' But on the other hand the Blessed One, when preaching the Truth, or talking of it, was in the habit of beginning with the so-called " preliminary discourse," in which giving has the first place, and goodness only the second². So that when gods and men heard this discourse of the Blessed One, the lord of the whole world, they prepared and gave gifts, and the disciples partook of the alms thus brought about. Now if, Nāgasena, it be true what the Blessed One said, that he accepted no gifts earned by the chaunting of sacred words, then it was wrong that the Blessed One put giving thus

¹ This stanza occurs no less than five times in those portions of the *Piṭakas* already published. See *Sutta Nipāta* I, 4, 6 and III, 4, 27, and *Samyutta Nikāya* VII, 1, 8, VII, 1, 9, and VII, 2, 1. The rhythm of the Pāli is strikingly beautiful, and is quite spoilt in the rendering.

² See, for instance, *Dīgha Nikāya* V, 28 ; *Mahāvagga* I, 7, 5 and 10 ; V, 1, 9 ; VI, 26, 8 ; and *Kullavagga* VI, 4, 5. As there is a doubt about the spelling, Fausbøll at *Gātaka* I, 8, and I, 30, and our MSS. of the *Dīgha* reading *ānupubbi-kathā*, whereas Childers and Oldenberg read *anupubbi-kathā*, it is perhaps worth mentioning that the *Sinhalese* has the short *a*.

into the foreground. But if he did rightly in so emphasizing the giving of gifts, then it is not true that he accepted no gifts earned by the utterance of sacred words. And why so? Because if any one worthy of offerings should praise to the laity the good results to them of the bestowal of alms, they, hearing that discourse, and pleased with it, will proceed to give alms again and again. And then, whosoever enjoy that gift, they are really enjoying that which has been earned by the utterance of sacred words. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.'

29. 'The stanza you quote, O king, was spoken by the Blessed One. And yet he used to put the giving of alms into the forefront of his discourse. But this is the custom of all the Tathāgatas—first by discourse on almsgiving to make the hearts of hearers inclined towards it, and then afterwards to urge them to righteousness. This is as when men, O king, give first of all to young children things to play with—[229] such as toy ploughs¹, tip-cat sticks², toy wind-mills³, measures made of leaves⁴, toy carts,

¹ All these articles are mentioned in the *Dīgha Nikāya* I, 1, 14. Buddhaghosa explains the first word (*vaṅkakaṃ*) as toy ploughs. Hoops the Indian children do not have, probably for want of suitable roads.

² *Ghaṭikāṃ*, which is, according to Buddhaghosa, a game played by striking a short stick with a long one; and according to *Hīnaṭi-kumburē* the game called in *Siṃhalese* *kalli*. Clough has this word, but simply explains it as a game so called.

³ *Kingulakāṃ*, which is, according to Buddhaghosa, a little wheel made of cocoa-nut leaves, which is set turning by the impact of the wind. *Hīnaṭi-kumburē* says 'an *cembaruwa* (twirling thing) made of cocoa-nut leaves.'

⁴ *Pattāḥakāṃ*. Buddhaghosa and the *Siṃhalese* agree in rendering this 'toy measures.'

and bows and arrows—and afterwards appoint to each his separate task. Or it is as when a physician first causes his patients to drink oil for four or five days in order to strengthen them, and to soften their bodies; and then afterwards administers a purge. The supporters of the faith, O king, the lordly givers, have their hearts thus softened, made tender, affected. Thereby do they cross over to the further shore of the ocean of transmigration by the aid of the boat of their gifts, by the support of the causeway of their gifts. And (the Buddha), by this (method in his teaching), is not guilty of “intimation¹.”

30. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, when you say “intimation” what are these intimations?’

‘There are two sorts, O king, of intimation—bodily and verbal. And there is one bodily intimation which is wrong, and one that is not; and there is one verbal intimation which is wrong, and one that is not. Which is the bodily intimation which is wrong? Suppose any member of the Order, in going his rounds for alms, should, when choosing a spot to stand on, stand where there is no room², that is a bodily intimation which is wrong. The true members of the Order will not accept any alms so asked for, and the individual who thus acts is despised, looked down upon, not respected, held blameworthy, disregarded, not well thought of, in the religion of the Noble Ones; he is reckoned as

¹ *Viññatti*. It is a breach of rules for a member of the Order to ask, in words, for an alms. For a Buddha to lay stress, in a discourse, on the advantages of almsgiving does not, Nāgasena means, make him guilty of this offence.

² And thus cause an obstruction, and attract attention to the fact that he is there. I do not know of any such prohibition in the Vinaya.

one of those who have broken their (vows as to) means of livelihood. And again, O king, suppose any member of the Order, in going his round for alms, should stand where there is no room, and stretch out his neck like a peacock on the gaze, in the hope: "Thus will the folk see me"—that too is a bodily intimation which is wrong. True brethren will not accept an alms so asked for, and he who thus acts is regarded like the last. And again, O king, suppose any member of the Order should make a sign with his jaw, or with his eyebrow, or with his finger—[230] that too is a bodily intimation which is wrong. True brethren will not accept an alms so asked for, and he who thus acts is regarded the same way.

31. 'And which is the bodily intimation which is not wrong? If a brother, on going his round for alms, be self-possessed, tranquil, conscious of his acts; if he stand, wherever he may go, in the kind of spot that is lawful; if he stand still where there are people desirous to give, and where they are not so desirous, if he pass on¹;—that is a bodily intimation which is not wrong. Of an alms so stood for the true members of the Order will partake; and the individual who thus asks is, in the religion of the Noble Ones, praised, thought highly of, esteemed, and reckoned among those whose behaviour is without guile, whose mode of livelihood is pure. For thus has it been said by the Blessed One, the god over all gods:

"The truly wise beg not, for Arahats scorn to beg.

¹ The author has *Kullavagga* VIII, 5, 2 in his mind, where the signs (of their being willing or not) are specified.

The good stand for their alms, thus only do they beg¹."

32. 'Which is the verbal intimation which is wrong? In case, O king, a brother intimate his wish for a number of things, requisites of a member of the Order—robes and bowls and bedding and medicine for the sick—that is a verbal intimation which is wrong. Things so asked for the true members of the Order (Ariyâ) will not accept; and in the religion of the Noble Ones the individual who acts thus is despised, looked down upon, not respected, held blameworthy, disregarded, not well thought of—reckoned rather as one who has broken his (vows as to) means of livelihood. And again, O king, in case a brother should, in the hearing of others, speak thus: "I am in want of such and such a thing;" and in consequence of that saying being heard by the others he should then get that thing—that too is a verbal intimation which is wrong. True members of the Order will not use a thing so obtained, and he who acts thus is regarded like the last. And again, O king, in case a brother, dilating in his talk², give the people about him to understand: "Thus and thus should gifts be given to the Bhik-

¹ From *Gâtaka* III, 354. The words are there ascribed, not to the Buddha, but to the Bodisat in the story.

The word translated Arahats is Ariyâ, which is taken here, as elsewhere, as a dissyllable, and pronounced Aryâ. It is the same as our word Aryans, and is rendered above Noble Ones. I do not think that it is applied exclusively to Arahats.

² *Vaḥī-vipphârena*. The expression has not been found elsewhere, nor is it in Childers. The *Sinhalese* has: 'dilating on the words obtaining in this religion.' I presume it means, that not content with praising almsgiving in general, he particularises. Compare *Mahāvagga* VI, 37.

khus," and in case they, on hearing that saying, should bring forth from their store anything so referred to—that too is a verbal intimation which is wrong. True members of the Order will not use a thing so obtained, and he who acts thus is regarded like the last. [231] For when Sâriputta, the Elder, O king, being ill in the night-time, after the sun had set, and being questioned by Moggallâna, the Elder, as to what medicine would do him good, broke silence; and through that breach of silence obtained the medicine—did not Sâriputta then, saying to himself: "This medicine has come through breach of silence; let not my (adherence to the rules regarding) livelihood be broken," reject that medicine, and use it not¹? So that too is a verbal intimation which is wrong. True members of the Order will not use a thing so obtained, and he who acts thus is regarded like the last.

33. 'And what is the verbal intimation which is right? Suppose a brother, O king, when there is necessity for it, should intimate among families either related to him, or which had invited him to spend the season of Was with him², that he is in want of medicines—this is a verbal intimation which is not wrong. True members of the Order will partake of things so asked for; and the individual who acts thus is, in the religion of the Noble Ones, praised, thought highly of, esteemed, reckoned among those whose mode of livelihood is pure,

¹ This story has not yet been traced; but the Sinhalese (p. 317) gives it at great length.

² *Ñâti-pavâritesu kulesu*. Compare *Pâkittiya* 39 ('Vinaya Texts,' vol. i, p. 39).

approved of the Tathâgatas, the Arahats, the Supreme Buddhas. And the alms that the Tathâgata, O king, refused to accept of Kasî-Bhâradvâga, the Brahman¹, that was presented for the sake of testing him with an intricate puzzle which he would have to unwind², for the sake of pulling him away, of convicting him of error, of making him acknowledge himself in the wrong. Therefore was it that the Tathâgata refused that alms, and would not partake thereof.'

34. 'Nâgasena, was it always, whenever the Tathâgata was eating, that the gods infused the Sap of Life from heaven into the contents of his bowl, or was it only into those two dishes—the tender boar's flesh, and the rice porridge boiled in milk—that they infused it³ ?'

'Whenever he was eating, O king, and into each morsel of food as he picked it up—just as the royal cook takes the sauce and pours it over each morsel in the dish while the king is partaking of it⁴. [232] And so at Verañgâ, when the Tathâgata was eating the cakes⁵ made of dried barley, the gods moistened each one with the Sap of Life, as they placed it

¹ See Sutta Nipâta I, 4. The Sinhalese always has a long î in Kasî.

² Âvetthana. Compare the use of all these terms above, II, 1, 3 (vol. i, p. 46).

³ There is nothing about this infusion of the Sap of Life (*dibbam ogam*) in the published texts of the *Piṭakas*. But it is mentioned in the account in the *Gâtaka Commentary* of the second meal referred to ('Buddhist Birth Stories,' p. 92). The other is, of course, the Buddha's last meal, 'Book of the Great Decease,' IV, 14-23 (in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 71-73).

⁴ *Hīnañ-kumburē* gives here a great deal of additional matter (pp. 314-324).

⁵ *Pulake*; which the Sinhalese renders *peti*.

near him¹. And thus was the body of the Tathâgata fully refreshed.'

'Great indeed was the good fortune, Nâgasena, of those gods that they were ever and always so zealous in their care for the body of the Tathâgata! Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the problem as to the Buddha's mode of livelihood.]

[DILEMMA THE FIFTIETH.

ON THE BUDDHA'S AFTER-DOUBT².]

35. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say:

"The Tathâgata gradually, through millions of years, through æon after æon³, brought his omniscient wisdom to perfection for the sake of the salvation of the great masses of the people⁴."

'But on the other hand (they say)⁵:

"Just after he had attained to omniscience his

¹ I am not sure what meal is here referred to. The Buddha is twice said to have taken meals at *Veraṅgâ* (in the *Sutta Vibhaṅga*, pp. 6, 11; *Pârâgika* I, 2 and I, 4). In neither case is there any mention of these cakes. But the former of the two may be the one referred to, as it took place in a time of drought.

² Compare my manual 'Buddhism,' p. 41.

³ Literally 'through four Asaṅkheyyas and a lak of Kappas.'

⁴ This passage has not yet been traced in the *Piṭakas*, and the word *samuddharanâ* (rendered 'salvation') does not occur elsewhere in published texts. It means literally 'bringing safe to shore.' Compare *samuddha/a* at *Saddhammopâyaṇa* 143 in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society' for 1887, p. 44.

⁵ See 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. i, p. 85, and *Samyutta Nikâya* VI, 1. The words are very slightly different.

heart inclined, not to the proclamation of the Truth, but to rest in peace."

'So that, Nâgasena, just as if an archer, or an archer's pupil, who had practised archery for many days with the object of fighting, should, when the day of the great battle had come, draw back—just so did the Tathâgata, who through countless ages had gradually matured his omniscience for the sake of bringing safe to the shore (of salvation) the great masses of the people, turn back, on the day when that omniscience had been reached, from proclaiming the Truth. Just as if a wrestler who through many days had practised wrestling should, when the day of the wrestling match¹ had come, draw back—just so did the Tathâgata, who through countless ages had gradually matured his omniscience for the sake of bringing safe to the shore (of salvation) the great masses of the people, turn back, on the day when that omniscience had been reached, from proclaiming the Truth.

'Now was it from fear, Nâgasena, that the Tathâgata drew back, or was it from inability to preach², or was it from weakness, or was it because he had not, after all, attained to omniscience? [233] What was the reason of this? Tell me, I pray, the reason, that my doubts may be removed. For if for so long a time he had perfected his wisdom with the object of saving the people, then the statement that he hesitated to announce the Truth must be wrong. But if that be true, then the other statement must be false. This too is a double-edged problem,

¹ Compare Sumaṅgala Vilâsini, p. 85.

² Apâka/atâya, not found elsewhere. I follow the Sinhalese, which has *bœna kiyana no dœnena bæwin*.

now put to you,—a problem profound, a knot hard to unravel,—which you have to solve.’

36. ‘The statements in both the passages you quote, O king, are correct. But that his heart inclined, not to the preaching of the truth, but to inaction, was because he saw, on the one hand, how profound and abstruse was the Doctrine¹, how hard to grasp and understand, how subtle, how difficult to penetrate into; and, on the other, how devoted beings are to the satisfaction of their lusts, how firmly possessed by false notions of Individualism². And so (he wavered) at the thought: “Whom shall I teach? And how can I teach him?”—his mind being directed to the idea of the powers of penetration which beings possessed.

‘Just, O king, as an able physician, when called in to a patient suffering from a complication of diseases, might reflect: “What can be the treatment, what the drug, by which this man’s sickness can be allayed?”—just so, O king, when the Tathâgata called to mind how afflicted were the people by all the kinds of malady which arise from sin, and how profound and abstruse was the Doctrine, how subtle, and how difficult to grasp, then at the thought: “Whom can I teach? And how shall I teach him?” did his heart incline rather to inaction than to preaching—[234] his mind being directed to the powers of penetration which beings possessed.

‘And just, O king, as a king, of royal blood, an anointed monarch, when he calls to mind the many

¹ ‘Of Arahatsip’ is Hinafi-kumburê’s gloss.

² Sakkâya-di//hi. The belief in being, instead of in becoming; the belief in the permanence of individuality. See my ‘Hibbert Lectures,’ pp. 211–214.

people who gain their livelihood in dependence on the king—the sentries and the body-guard, the retinue of courtiers, the trading folk, the soldiers and the royal messengers, the ministers and the nobles¹—might be exercised at the thought: “How now, in what way, shall I be able to conciliate them all?”—just so when the Tathâgata called to mind how profound and abstruse was the Doctrine, how subtle, and how difficult to grasp, and how devoted beings were to the satisfaction of their lusts, how firmly possessed by false notions of Individualism, then at the thought: “Whom shall I teach? And how shall I teach him?” did his heart incline rather to inaction than to preaching—his mind being directed to the powers of penetration which beings possessed.

37. ‘And this, too, is an inherent necessity in all Tathâgatas that it should be on the request of Brahmâ that they should proclaim the Dhamma. And what is the reason for that? All men in those times, with the ascetics and the monks, the wandering teachers and the Brahmans, were worshippers of Brahmâ, reverers of Brahmâ, placed their reliance on Brahmâ. And therefore, at the thought: “When so powerful and glorious, so famous and renowned, so high and mighty a one has shown himself inclined (to the Dhamma), then will the whole world of gods and men become inclined to it, hold it fitting, have faith in it”—on this ground, O king, the Tathâgatas preached the Dhamma when requested to do so by Brahmâ. For just, O king, as what a sovran or a minister of state shows homage to, or offers worship to, that will the rest of mankind, on

¹ On this list see below, IV, 6, 11.

the ground of the homage of so powerful a personage, show homage to and worship—just so, O king, when Brahmâ had paid homage to the Tathâgatas, so would the whole world of gods and men. For the world, O king, is a reverer of what is revered. And that is why Brahmâ asks of all Tathâgatas that they should make known the Doctrine, and why, on so being asked, they make it known¹.

‘Very good, Nâgasena! The puzzle has been well unravelled, most able has been your exposition. That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the problem as to the Buddha's hesitation to make the Doctrine known.]

Here ends the Fifth Chapter.

¹ Hīnañ-kumburê here gives a page of description—not found in the Pâli—of the episode of Brahmâ's request to the Buddha. The oldest account of this episode has been already translated in vol. xiii of the ‘Sacred Books of the East,’ in ‘Vinaya Texts,’ part i, pp. 84–88.

BOOK IV. CHAPTER 6.

[DILEMMA THE FIFTY-FIRST.

CONTRADICTIONARY STATEMENTS AS TO THE BUDDHA'S
TEACHER.]

1. [235] 'Venerable Nāgasena, this too has been said by the Blessed One :

"I have no teacher, and the man
Equal to me does not exist.
No rival to me can be found
In the whole world of gods and men¹."

'But on the other hand he said :

"Thus then, O brethren, Âlāra Kālāma, when he was my teacher and I was his pupil, placed me on an equality with himself, and honoured me with exceeding great honour²."

¹ This verse is found three times in the Piṭakas—in the Mahāvagga I, 6, 8, in the Ariya-pariyesana Sutta (*Magghima Nikāya* I, 171), and in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta (*Magghima Nikāya*, No. 86). It occurs with other stanzas of a similar tendency, and many of the lines in those stanzas are repeated, but with variations and in a different order, by the author of the *Lalita Vistara* (pp. 526, 527 of Rāgendra Lāl Mitra's edition). One verse is found there in two detached lines which run thus in the Sanskrit :—

Âtāryyo na hi me kaṣṭhit, sadṛśo me na vidyate

and

Sadevâsuragandharvvo nâsti me pratipudgalaḥ.

Hinaṁ-kumburê renders *pratipuggalo*, not by 'rival,' but by 'superior.'

² Mr. Trenckner has pointed out that this quotation is found in two Suttas, Nos. 85 and 100 in the *Magghima Nikāya*.

‘Now if the former of these statements be right, then the second must be wrong. But if the second be right, then the first must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.’

2. ‘Both the quotations you have made, O king, are accurate. But when he spoke of Ā/āra Kālāma as his teacher, that was a statement made with reference to the fact of his having been his teacher while he (Gotama) was still a Bodisat and before he had attained to insight and to Buddhahood; and there were five such teachers, O king, under whose tuition the Bodisat spent his time in various places—his teachers when he was still a Bodisat, before he had attained to insight and to Buddhahood. And who were these five?’

3. ‘Those eight Brahmans who, just after the birth of the Bodisat, took note of the marks on his body—[236] Rāma, and Dhaga, and Lakkhana, and Manti¹, and Yañña², and Suyāma, and Subhoga³, and Sudatta⁴—they who then made known his future glory, and marked him out as one to be carefully guarded—these were first his teachers⁵.

¹ Hīnaśi-kumburê reads Gâtimantī. It may be noted that Hardy (Manual of Buddhism, p. 149), who omits Yañña, gives Gâti and Manta as two separate names, and spells the last two names Bhoga Sudanta.

² So also the Simhalese, p. 329. But the Gâtaka Commentary (verse 270 at vol. i, p. 50) has kondañña.

³ The Gâtaka Introduction (loc. cit.) has Bhoga. The Simhalese has Subhoga.

⁴ Hīnaśi-kumburê agrees here with Hardy in reading Sudanta.

⁵ This episode has not been traced in the Piṭakas. The Simhalese here gives also the detail of the one and two fingers, found in the Gâtaka, and translated in my ‘Buddhist Birth Stories,’ p. 72.

‘And again, O king, the Brahman Sabbamitta of distinguished descent, who was of high lineage in the land of Udiṅka¹, a philologist and grammarian, well read in the six Vedaṅgas², whom Suddhodana the king, the Bodisat’s father, sent for, and having poured out the water of dedication from a golden vase, handed over the boy to his charge, to be taught—this was his second teacher³.

‘And again, O king, the god who raised the agitation in the Bodisat’s heart, at the sound of whose speech the Bodisat, moved and anxious, that very moment went out from the world in his Great Renunciation—this was his third teacher⁴.

¹ In the North-West. See *Gâtaka* I, 140, &c.

² *Khaṅgavantaṃ*. These are phonetics, prosody, grammar, exegesis, astronomy, and ritual. I was wrong in taking Childers’s interpretation of this word at ‘Buddhist Birth Stories,’ p. 72.

³ This episode is also not in the *Piṭakas*. On *onogeti* see *Mahāvagga* I, 22, 18. Sabbamitra is given in the *Thera Gāthā*, I, 150, as the name of a Thera, and in the *Divyāvadana*, p. 420, as the name of Asoka’s herald or court crier.

⁴ There is nothing about any such devatā in the *Piṭakas*. *Hīnaśi-kumburē* takes it to mean the god who took the outward appearance of the four visions—an old man, a sick man, a dead man, and a recluse. But in that story—which is not related in the *Piṭakas* of the Buddha, though it is referred to in connection with him at *Buddhavaṃsa* XXVI, p. 16—the god does not speak. The only god whose words are said, in any of the later Pāli legends, to have agitated the Bodisat’s heart at that moment, was the Evil One himself; and that only in one version of the legend, the Pāli authority for which I cannot give. It is in Hardy’s ‘Manual,’ p. 157, where the speech of the Evil One, placed at *Gâtaka* I, 63 at a later time, is said to have been made at the moment of the Renunciation. Even if it be not a mere blunder of Hardy’s to put it at that time, still it cannot be the speech referred to by our author. For the startling doctrine that the Evil One himself was one of the Bodisat’s teachers would never have been smuggled in, as it were, by concealing the identity of the spirit referred to under

‘ And again, O king, Āra Kālāma—he was his fourth teacher.

‘ And again, O king, Uddaka the son of Rāma—he was his fifth teacher.

‘ These, O king, are the five who were his teachers when he was still a Bodisat, before he had attained to insight and to Buddhahood. But they were teachers in worldly wisdom. And in this Doctrine that is transcendental, in the penetrating into the wisdom of the omniscient ones—in that there is no one who is above the Tathāgata to teach him. Self-dependent for his knowledge is the Tathāgata, without a master, and that is why it was said by the Tathāgata :

“ I have no teacher, and the man
Equal to me does not exist.
No rival to me can be found
In the whole world of gods and men.”’

‘ Very good, Nāgasena ! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to the Buddha’s teachers.]

the generic term of devatā. Now in the Fo-pan-hin-tsi-kin (Nanjio, No. 680), a Chinese work of the beginning of the seventh century A. D., we find in the sixteenth kwuen or chapter (if one may trust the abstract given in Beal’s ‘ Romantic Legend,’ p. 131) that a Devaputra named Tsao-ping is said to have spoken to the Bodisat at the moment of the Renunciation. It is scarcely open to doubt that our author had in his mind an earlier form of that episode. But if so it is the only proved case of his having Sanskrit, and not Pāli works, as his authority.

[DILEMMA THE FIFTY-SECOND.]

WHY MUST THERE BE ONLY ONE BUDDHA
AT A TIME ?]

4. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this too was said by the Blessed One :

"This is an impossibility, an occurrence for which there can be no cause, that in one world two Arahats Buddhas supreme should arise at one and the same time [237]—such a thing can in no wise be¹."

'But, Nâgasena, when they are preaching, all the Tathâgatas preach (the Doctrine as to) the thirty-seven constituent elements of insight²; when they are talking, it is of the Four Noble Truths that they talk; when they are instructing, it is in the three Trainings³ that they instruct; when they are teaching, it is the practice of zeal⁴ that they teach. If, Nâgasena, the preaching of all the Tathâgatas is one, and their talk of the same thing, and their training the same, and their teaching one, why then should not two Tathâgatas arise at the same time? Already by the appearance of one Buddha has this world become flooded with light. If there should be a second Buddha the world would be still more illuminated by the glory of them both. When they were exhorting two Tathâgatas would exhort at ease; when they were instructing two Tathâgatas would instruct at ease. Tell me the reason of this, that I may put away my doubt.'

¹ *Ânguttara Nikâya* I, 15, 10.

² These divisions of the seven 'Jewels of the Law' of Arahatship are set out in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 62-63.

³ *Adhisîla*, *adhiçitta*, and *adhipaññâ*.

⁴ *Appamâda*.

5. 'This world system, O king, is a one-Buddha-supporting world; that is, it can bear the virtue of only a single Tathâgata. If a second Tathâgata were to arise the world could not bear him, it would shake and tremble, it would bend, this way and that, it would disperse, scatter into pieces, dissolve, be utterly destroyed. Just as a boat, O king, might be able to carry one passenger across. Then, when one man had got on board, it would be well trimmed and able to bear his weight¹. But if a second man were to come like to the first in age and caste and strength and size and stoutness of body and build of frame, and he too should get on board the boat—would that boat be able, O king, to carry them both?'

'Certainly not, Sir! it would shake and tremble; it would bend, this way and that; it would break into pieces, be shattered, dissolved, and utterly destroyed; it would sink into the waves.'

'Just so, O king, with this world, if a second Tathâgata were to appear. Or suppose, O king, that a man [238] had eaten as much food as he wanted, even so that he had filled himself with nourishment up to the throat, and he—thus satiated², regaled, filled with good cheer, with no room left for more, drowsy and stiff as a stick one cannot bend—were again to eat as much food as he had eaten before—would such a man, O king, then be at ease?'

'Certainly not, Sir! If he were to eat again, but once more, he would die.'

¹ Samupâdikâ, for which the Sinhalese has sama bara wanniya, usûlana sulu wanniya.

² Dhâto; not in Childers, but see Gâtaka II, 247, Mahâvagga VI, 25, 1, and below, IV, 6, 29.

‘Well, no more could this world bear a second Tathâgata, than that man could bear a second meal.’

6. ‘But how is that, Nâgasena? Would the earth tremble at a too great weight of goodness?’

‘Suppose, O king, there were two carts quite filled with precious things up to the top¹, and people were to take the things from the one cart and pile them up on the other, would that one be able to carry the weight of both?’

‘Certainly not, Sir! The nave of its wheels would split, and the spokes would break, and the circumference would fall to pieces, and the axle-tree would break in twain².’

‘But how is that, O king? Would the cart come to pieces owing to the too great weight of goods?’

‘Yes, it would.’

7. ‘Well, just so, O king, would the earth tremble owing to the too great weight of goodness. But that argument has been adduced to make the power of the Buddhas known³. Hear another fitting reason why two Buddhas could not appear at the same

¹ Literally ‘mouth.’ I presume a small uncovered bullock cart is meant, like that figured in Plate 57 in Cunningham’s ‘Bharhut Tope.’ The chariot on the other hand is of the shape given in Plates 3, 34, 35 of Fergusson’s ‘Tree and Serpent Worship.’ The usual form of the bullock cart has also a hood, or cover, as clearly shown in Fergusson’s Plate No. 65, and Cunningham’s Plate No. 34. But the one here referred to cannot have had the cover over it, for then the supposition that more goods were piled on to it, when full, would be an impossible one. I know of no other passage where the mukha, literally ‘mouth,’ of a cart is mentioned, and I may possibly be wrong in rendering it ‘top.’

² This simile has already been used in the Vessantara Dilemma above, I, 173.

³ Our author himself here confesses that his thoughts are more on edification than on logic.

time. If, O king, two Buddhas were to arise together, then would disputes arise between their followers, and at the words: "Your Buddha, our Buddha," they would divide off into two parties—just as would the followers of two rival powerful ministers of state. This is the other [239] reason, O king, why two Buddhas could not appear at the same time.

8. 'Hear a further reason, O king, why two Buddhas could not appear at the same time. If that were so, then the passage (of Scripture) that the Buddha is the chief would become false, and the passage that the Buddha takes precedence of all would become false, and the passage that the Buddha is the best of all would become false. And so all those passages where the Buddha is said to be the most excellent, the most exalted, the highest of all, the peerless one, without an equal, the matchless one, who hath neither counterpart nor rival—all would be proved false. Accept this reason too as in truth a reason why two Buddhas cannot arise at once.

9. 'But besides that, O king, this is a natural characteristic of the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, that one Buddha only should arise in the world. And why? By reason of the greatness of the virtue of the all-knowing Buddhas. Of other things also, whatever is mighty in the world is singular. The broad earth is great, O king, and it is only one. The ocean is mighty, and it is only one. Sineru, the king of the mountains, is great; and it is only one. Space is mighty, and it is only one. Sakka (the king of the gods) is great, and he is only one. Mâra (the Evil One, Death) is great, and he is only one. Mahâ-Brahmâ is mighty, and he is only one.

A Tathâgata, an Arahata Buddha supreme, is great ; and he is alone in the world. Wherever any one of these spring up, then there is no room for a second. And therefore, O king, is it that only one Tathâgata, an Arahata Buddha supreme, can appear at one time in the world.'

'Well has the puzzle, Nâgasena, been discussed by simile adduced and reason given. Even an unintelligent man on hearing this would be satisfied; how much rather one great in wisdom as myself. Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to why there should be only one Buddha at a time in the world.]

[DILEMMA THE FIFTY-THIRD.

WHY SHOULD GIFTS BE GIVEN TO THE ORDER RATHER THAN TO THE BUDDHA?]

[240] 10. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said to his mother's sister¹, Mahâ-Pagâpatî the Gotamî, when she was about to give him a cloth wrapper for use in the rainy season² :

"Give it, O Gotamâ, to the Order. If the Order is presented by you with it, then will you have paid homage thereby alike to the Order and to me³."

'But what, Nâgasena? Is not the Tathâgata of

¹ There is no general word in Pâli for aunt or uncle. There are separate expressions for each of the degrees of relationship expressed by those words in English—mother's brother, father's sister, &c.

² Vassika-sâṁikâ. See the note at 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. ii, p. 225 (Sacred Books of the East, vol. xvii).

³ From the Ganta Sutta (Magg'hima Nikâya, No. 142). See Mr. Trenckner's note.

greater weight and importance, and more worthy of gifts than even the jewel treasure of the Order, that the Tathâgata should have told his aunt, when about to present him with a wrapper for the rainy season which she herself had carded and pressed and beaten and cut and woven¹, to give it to the Order! If, Nâgasena, the Tathâgata were really higher and greater and more excellent than the Order, then he would have known that a gift given to him would be most meritorious, and therefore would not have told her to give it to the Order. But inasmuch as the Tathâgata, Nâgasena, puts himself not in the way of gifts to himself, gives no occasion for such gifts, you see that he then told his aunt to give that wrapper rather to the Order.'

11. 'The quotation you make, O king, is correct, and the Blessed One did so direct his aunt's gifts². But that was not because an act of reverence paid to himself would bear no fruit, or because he was unworthy to receive gifts, but it was out of kindness and mercy that he, thinking: "Thus will the Order in times to come, when I am gone, be highly thought of;" magnified the excellence which the Order really had, in that he said: "Give it, O Gotamî, to the Order. If you present the Order with it, thus will you have paid homage alike to the Order and to me." Just as a father, O king, while he is yet alive, exalts in the midst of the assembly of ministers, soldiers, and royal messengers, of

¹ The translation of these five technical terms of cloth-making is doubtful. The *Simhalese* (p. 335) has *piṅgana*, *sindina*, *pothita*, *kaṣīna*, *wiyana*.

² The *Simhalese* (p. 335) here gives at length the story of *Paṅgāpati's* gift, at the time when Gotama returned, as the Buddha, to *Kapilavathu*.

sentries, body guards, and courtiers¹—yea, in the presence of the king himself—the virtues which his son really possesses, thinking: “If established here he will be honoured of the people in times to come;” so was it out of mercy and kindness that the Tathâgata, thinking: “Thus will the Order, in times to come, when I am gone, be highly thought of;” magnified the excellence which the Order really had, in that he said: “Give it, O Gotamî, to the Order. If you present the Order with it, thus will you have paid homage alike to the Order and to me.”

12. [241] ‘And by the mere gift of a wrapper for the rainy season, the Order, O king, did not become greater than, or superior to, the Tathâgata. Just, O king, as when parents anoint their children with perfumes, rub them, bathe them, or shampoo them², does the son by that mere service of theirs become greater than, or superior to, his parents?’

‘Certainly not, sir! Parents deal with their children as they will, whether the children like it or not³. And therefore do they anoint them with perfumes, shampoo, or bathe them.’

‘And just so, O king, the Order did not become greater than, or superior to, the Tathâgata merely by the fact of that gift; and although the Tathâgata, whether the Order liked it or not, told his aunt to give the wrapper to the Order.

13. ‘Or suppose, O king, some man should bring a complimentary present to a king, and the king should present that gift to some one else—to a soldier or a

¹ On this list see above, p. 234 of the Pâli text (IV, 5, 36).

² On these words compare *Ânguttara Nikâya* II, 4, 2.

³ *Akâmakaranîyâ*. Compare *Vimâna Vatthu* X, 6 and *Dîgha Nikâya* II, 46.

messenger, to a general or a chaplain,—would that man become greater than, or superior to, the king, merely by the fact that it was he who got the present¹?’

‘Certainly not, Sir! That man receives his wage from the king, from the king he gains his livelihood; it was the king who, having placed him in that office, gave him the present.’

‘And just so, O king, the Order did not become greater than, or superior to, the Tathâgata merely by the fact of that gift. The Order is, as it were, the hired servant of the Tathâgata, and gains its livelihood through the Tathâgata. And it was the Tathâgata who, having placed it in that position, caused the gift to be given it.

14. ‘And further the Tathâgata, O king, thought thus: “The Order is by its very nature worthy of gifts. I will therefore have this thing, my property though it be, presented to it,” and so he had the wrapper given to the Order. For the Tathâgata, O king, magnifies not the offering of gifts to himself, but rather to whomsoever in the world is worthy of having gifts presented to him. For this was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the most excellent *Magghima Nikâya*, [242] in the religious discourse entitled *Dhamma-dâyâda*, when he was exalting the attainment of being content with little:

“He would become the first of my Bhikkhus, the most worthy of presents and of praise².”

15. ‘And there is not, O king, in the three worlds

¹ The same simile has already occurred, vol. i, p. 220 (IV, 2, 22).

² *Magghima Nikâya*, vol. i, p. 13 (in ‘Mr. Trenckner’s edition for the Pâli Text Society).

any being whatever more worthy of gifts, greater or more exalted or better, than the Tathâgata. It is the Tathâgata who was greatest and highest and best. As it was said, O king, by Mânava-gâmika the god, in the most excellent *Samyutta Nikâya*, as he stood before the Blessed One in the midst of the assembly of gods and men :

“Of all the Râgagaha hills Mount Vipula’s acknowledged chief,
Of the Himâlayas Mount White, of planetary orbs the sun,
The ocean of all waters, of constellations bright the moon ¹—
In all the world of gods and men the Buddha’s the acknowledged Lord ²!”

‘And those verses of Mânava the god, O king, were well sung, not wrongly sung, well spoken, not wrongly spoken, and approved by the Blessed One ³. And was it not said by Sâriputta, the Commander of the faith :

“There is but one Confession, one true Faith,
One Adoration of clasped hands stretched forth
—That paid to Him who routs the Evil One,
And helps us cross the ocean of our ills ⁴!”

¹ This must have been composed after the moon god had become established in belief as the husband, or lord, of the Nakshatras, or lunar mansions. For it cannot, of course, be intended that the moon is itself a constellation.

² *Samyutta Nikâya* III, 2, 10 (vol. i, p. 67 of the Pâli Text Society’s edition).

³ These phrases of approval are commonly used in the *Piṭakas* of words uttered by any one whose sayings would not, of themselves, carry weight. So in the *Dīgha* III, 1, 28 and in the *Magghima* I, 385.

⁴ This verse has not yet been traced in the *Piṭakas*. In

‘And it was said by the Blessed One himself, the god over all gods :

“There is one being, O brethren, who is born into the world for the good and for the weal of the great multitudes, out of mercy to the world, for the advantage and the good and the weal of gods and men. And what is that being? A Tathâgata, an Arahata Buddha supreme¹.”

‘Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to the precedence of the Order over the Buddha.]

[DILEMMA THE FIFTY-FOURTH.]

IS IT MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO BE A LAYMAN, OR TO ENTER THE ORDER?]

16. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One :

“I would magnify, O brethren, the Supreme Attainment² either in a layman or in a recluse. Whether he be a layman, O brethren, or a recluse, the man who has reached the Supreme Attainment

the Thera Gâthâ we have a collection of verses ascribed to Sâriputta, but this is not one of them. The literal translation is : ‘There is but one feeling of faith, but one taking of refuge, but one stretching forth of the hands (with joined palms, in adoration—that paid) to the Buddha, who puts to rout the armies of the Evil One, and is able to make (us) cross (the ocean of continual becoming).’ The taking of refuge meant is the confession, the repetition of which characterises a man as a Buddhist—‘I take my refuge in the Buddha, &c.’

¹ Ânguttara Nikâya I, 13, 1.

² That is, of insight and of the practice of right conduct.

shall overcome all the difficulties inherent therein, shall win his way even to the excellent condition of Arahatship¹." [243]

'Now, Nāgasena, if a layman, clad in white robes, enjoying the pleasures of sense, dwelling in a habitation encumbered with wife and children², making constant use of the sandal wood of Benares³, of garlands and perfumes and unguents, accepting gold and silver, wearing a turban inlaid with jewels and gold, can, having reached the Supreme Attainment, win his way to the excellent condition of Arahatship—and if a recluse, with his shaven head and yellow robes, dependent for his livelihood on the alms of other men, perfectly fulfilling the four-fold code of morality⁴, taking upon himself and carrying out the hundred and fifty precepts⁵, con-

¹ *Samyutta Nikāya* XLIV, 24, says Mr. Trenckner. The passage has not yet been reached in M. Léon Feer's edition for the Pāli Text Society. *Hīnañ-kumburē* (p. 341) renders *ñāya* by *nirwāna*.

² Literally 'a bed encumbered, &c.' See below, p. 348 of the Pāli text, where the question, as here, is whether such a layman can attain to the *Nirvāṇa* of Arahatship.

³ So the Buddha says of himself (*Āṅguttara Nikāya* III, 38), that, in the days when he was a layman, he never used any sandal wood except that from Benares.

⁴ I don't know what these four *Sīlakkhandhas* are. Morality is described in the *Piṭakas* as threefold, fivefold, or tenfold, according as the *Sīlas*, in three divisions (as translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' vol. xi of the 'Sacred Books of the East,' pp. 189–200), are referred to; or the first five, or the whole ten, of the moral precepts (the Buddhist Ten Commandments) set out in my 'Buddhism,' p. 160. This reference to four divisions of the moral code is foreign to the *Piṭakas*, at least as we yet know them.

⁵ The *Diyaḍḍhesu sikkhāpada-satesu*. It is clear from the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* III, 83 that the precepts referred to are those of the *Pātimokkha* (translated by me at the beginning of 'Vinaya

ducting himself according to the thirteen extra vows¹ without omitting any one of them, can also, having reached the Supreme Attainment, win his way to the excellent condition of Arahatsip—then, Sir, what is the distinction between the layman and the recluse? Your austerity is without effect, your renunciation is useless, your observance of the precepts is barren, your taking of the extra vows is vain. What is the good of your therein heaping up woes to yourselves, if thus in comfort the condition of bliss can be reached?’

17. ‘The words you ascribe to the Blessed One, O king, are rightly quoted. And that is even so. It is the man who has reached to the Supreme Attainment who bears the palm. If the recluse, O king, because he knows that he is a recluse, should neglect the Attainments, then is he far from the fruits of renunciation, far from Arahatsip—how much more if a layman, still wearing the habit of the world, should do so! But whether he be a layman, O king, or a recluse, he who attains to the supreme insight, to the supreme conduct of life, he too will win his way to the excellent condition of Arahatsip.

18. ‘But nevertheless, O king, it is the recluse who is the lord and master of the fruit of renunciation. And renunciation of the world, O king, is full of gain, many and immeasurable are its advantages, its profit can no man calculate. Just, O king, as no man can put a measure, in wealth, on the

Texts,’ vol. xvii of the ‘Sacred Books of the East’), notwithstanding the fact that the actual number of these rules is 227.

¹ The Dhutangas: see above, IV, 5, 10, and the enumeration below at the translation of p. 351 of the Pāli text.

value of a wish-conferring gem, [244] saying: "Such and such is the price of the gem"—just so, O king, is the renunciation of the world full of gain, many and immeasurable are its advantages, its profit can no man calculate—no more, O king, than he could count the number of the waves in the great ocean, and say: "So and so many are the waves in the sea!"

19. 'Whatsoever the recluse, O king, may have yet to do, all that doth he accomplish straightway, without delay. And why is that? The recluse, O king, is content with little, joyful in heart, detached from the world, apart from society, earnest in zeal, without a home, without a dwelling-place, righteous in conduct, in action without guile, skilled in duty and in the attainments—that is why whatsoever may lie before him yet to do, that can he accomplish straightway, without delay—just as the flight of your javelin¹, O king, is rapid because it is of pure metal, smooth, and burnished, and straight, and without a stain.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the recluse having no advantages over the layman.]

¹ Nârâṅka. As Childers expresses a doubt as to the character of this weapon, I would refer to the *Magghima* I, 429, *Gâtaka* III, 322, and *Milinda*, pp. 105, 418 (of Mr. Trenckner's text).

[DILEMMA THE FIFTY-FIFTH.

ASCETICISM.]

20. 'Venerable Nāgasena, when the Bodisat was practising austerity¹, then there was found no other exertion the like of his, no such power, no such battling against evil, no such putting to rout of the armies of the Evil One, no such abstinence in food, no such austerity of life. But finding no satisfaction in strife like that, he abandoned that idea, saying:

"Not even by this cruel asceticism am I reaching the peculiar faculty, beyond the power of man, arising from insight into the knowledge of that which is fit and noble². May there not be now some other way to wisdom³?"

'But then, when weary of that path he had by another way attained to omniscience, he, on the other hand, thus again exhorted and instructed his disciple in that path (he had left, saying):


[245] "Exert yourselves, be strong, and to the faith
The Buddhas taught devote yourselves with zeal.
As a strong elephant a house of reeds,
Shake down the armies of the Evil One⁴."

¹ See 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' pp. 90, 91; and *Magghīma Nikāya* I, 240-246.

² *Alamariya-dassana-ñāṇa-visesaṃ*. I am not sure of the exact meaning of this compound. For *alamariya* the *Siṃhalese* has here (p. 343) *sarvagñatā*, and renders the whole 'do I arrive at a superhuman condition, at the distinctive faculty which is able to see into omniscience,' and on IV, 8, 21 it gives a slightly different but practically identical rendering, 'I shall not reach that superhuman condition which can distinguish or which suffices for insight into the supreme omniscience.'

³ That is the wisdom of Buddhahood. The passage is from the *Magghīma Nikāya* I, 246 (quoted also below, IV, 8, 21).

⁴ This is a very famous stanza. It is put into the mouth of



‘Now what, Nāgasena, is the reason that the Tathāgata exhorted and led his disciples to that path which he had himself abandoned, which he loathed?’

21. ‘Both then also, O king, and now too, that is still the only path. And it is along that path that the Bodisat attained to Buddhahood. Although the Bodisat, O king, exerting himself strenuously, reduced the food he took till he had decreased it to nothing at all¹, and by that disuse of food he became weak in mind, yet when he returned little by little to the use of solid food, it was by that path that before long he attained to Buddhahood. And that only has been the path along which all the Tathāgatas reached to the attainment of the insight of omniscience. Just as food is the support of all beings, as it is in dependence on food that all beings live at ease, just so is that the path of all the Tathāgatas to the attainment of the insight of omniscience. The fault was not, O king, in the exertion, was not in the power, not in the battle waged against evil, that the Tathāgata did not then, at once, attain to Buddhahood. But the fault was in the disuse of food, and the path itself (of austerity) was always ready for use.

22. ‘Suppose, O king, that a man should follow a path in great haste, and by that haste his sides

Abhibhû at Thera Gâthâ, verse 256, and in the *Samyutta Nikâya* VI, 2, 4, §§ 18 and 23; and also, in its Sanskrit form, into the mouth of the Buddha at the *Divyâvadana*, p. 300, and into the mouth of the gods at *ibid.* p. 569. It is possibly another instance of our author having Sanskrit, and not Pâli, authorities in his mind, that he ascribes it here to the Buddha, and not to Abhibhû, the Elder.

¹ The *Simhalese* has here six pages of description of the austerities not found in the Pâli text.

should give way¹, or he should fall a cripple on the ground, unable to move, would there then be any fault, O king, in the broad earth that that man's sides had given way?'

'Certainly not, Sir! The great earth is always ready. How should it be in fault? The fault was in the man's own zeal which made him fail.'

'And just even so, O king, the fault was not in the exertion, not in the power, not in the battle waged against evil, that the Tathâgata did not then, at once, attain to Buddhahood. But the fault was in the disuse of food, and the path itself was always ready—[246] just as if a man should wear a robe, and never have it washed, the fault would not be in the water, which would always be ready for use, but in the man himself. That is why the Tathâgata exhorted and led his disciples along that very path. For that path, O king, is always ready, always right.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the path.]

¹ Pakkha-hato: 'should become like one whose two hands are ruined' says the *Simhalese* here (p. 349), but at p. 411 (on p. 276 of the *Pâli*) it translates the same term, 'whose hands and feet are broken.' It is literally 'should become side-destroyed,' and may mean paralysed.

[DILEMMA THE FIFTY-SIXTH.

THE BACKSLIDERS.]

23. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this doctrine of the Tathâgatas is mighty, essentially true, precious, excellent, noble, peerless, pure and stainless, clear and faultless. It is not right to admit a layman who is merely a disciple¹ into the Order. He should be instructed as a layman still, till he have attained to the Fruit of the First Path², and then be admitted. And why is this? When these men, still being evil, have been admitted into a religion so pure, they give it up, and return again to the lower state³, and by their backsliding the people is led to think: "Vain must be this religion of the Samana Gotama, which these men have given up." This is the reason for what I say.'

24. 'Suppose, O king, there were a bathing tank⁴, full of pure clear cold water. And some man, dirty, covered with stains and mud, should come there, and without bathing in it should turn back again, still dirty as before. Now in that matter whom would the people blame, the dirty man, or the bathing tank?'

'The dirty man, Sir, would the people blame,

¹ *Tâvatakam*. I take this word, in the sense of 'mere,' as an accusative in agreement with *gihim* (see the use of the word at pp. 107, 115, 241 of the Pâli text), and not as an accusative of motion, 'into so great a sâsanam.'

² That is till he be converted, till he has 'entered the stream.' See 'Buddhism,' p. 101.

³ That is, of a layman.

⁴ *Ta/âka*, which Childers wrongly renders 'pond, pool, lake.' It is always an artificial tank, reservoir. See *Kullavagga* X, 1, 6; *Gâtaka* I, 239; *Milinda*, pp. 66, 81, 296.

saying: "This fellow came to the bathing tank, and has gone back as dirty as before. How could the bathing tank, of itself, cleanse a man who did not care to bathe? What fault is there in the tank?"'

'Just so, O king, [247] has the Tathâgata constructed a bathing tank full of the excellent waters of emancipation¹,—the bath of the good law. Whosoever of conscious discerning beings are polluted with the stains of sin, they, bathing in it, can wash away all their sins. And if any one, having gone to that bathing tank of the good law, should not bathe in it, but turn back polluted as before, and return again to the lower state, it is him the people would blame, and say: "This man entered religion according to the doctrine of the Conquerors, and finding no resting-place within it, has returned again to the lower state. How could the religion of the Conquerors, of itself, cleanse him who would not regulate his life in accordance with it? What fault is there in the system?"'

25. 'Or suppose, O king, that a man afflicted with dire disease should visit a physician skilled in diagnosis², knowing an efficacious and lasting method of cure, and that that man should then not let himself be treated, but go back again as ill as before. Now therein whom would the people blame, the sick man or the doctor?'

'It is the sick man, Sir, they would blame, say-

¹ 'Vimutti: of the nectar of the Nirvâṇa which is the highest fruit of Arahatsip' is Hinañi-kumburê's gloss.

² Roguppatti-kusalam: 'skilled in the threefold origin of disease' says the Sinhalese (p. 351). See also pp. 248, 272 of the Pâli text.

ing : " How could the physician, of himself, cure this man, who would not let himself be treated ? What fault is there in the doctor ? "

' Just so, O king, has the Tathâgata deposited in the casket of his religion the ambrosial medicine (of Nirvâṇa) which is able to entirely suppress all the sickness of sin, thinking : " May all those of conscious sentient beings who are afflicted with the sickness of sin drink of this ambrosia, and so allay all their disease. " And if any one, without drinking the ambrosia, should turn back again with the evil still within him, and return once more to the lower state, it is he whom the people will blame, saying : " This man entered religion according to the doctrine of the Conquerors, and finding no resting-place within it, has returned again to the lower state. How could the religion of the Conquerors, of itself, cure him who would not regulate his life in accordance with it ? What fault is there in the system ? "

¹26. ' Or suppose, O king, a starving man were to attend at a place where a mighty largesse of food ² given for charity was being distributed, and then should go away again, still starving, without eating anything. Whom then would the people blame, the starving man, or the feast of piety ? '

' It is the starving man, Sir, they would blame, saying : [248] " This fellow, though tormented with hunger, still when the feast of piety was provided for him, partook of nothing, and went back as hungry as before. How could the meal, of which he

¹ The *Simhalese* (p. 352) inserts here ' Give me, Sir, I pray you, another smile, ' and then goes on ' Then suppose, O king, &c. '

² Bhatta, perhaps rice, as the food par excellence.

would not eat, enter, of itself, into his mouth? What fault is there in the food?"

'Just so, O king, has the Tathâgata placed the most excellent, good, auspicious, delicate ambrosial food, surpassing sweet, of the realisation of the impermanency of all things¹, into the casket of his religion, thinking: "May all those of conscious sentient beings who feel within them the torment of sin², whose hearts are deadened by cravings, feeding upon this food, allay every longing that they have for future life in any form, in any world." And if any one, without enjoying this food, should turn back, still dominated by his cravings, and return once more to the lower state, it is he whom the people will blame, saying: "This man entered religion according to the doctrine of the Conquerors, and finding no resting-place within it, has returned again to the lower state. How could the religion of the Conquerors, of itself, purify him who would not regulate his life in accordance with it? What fault is there in the system?"'

27. 'If the Tathâgata, O king, had let a householder be received into the Order only after he had been trained in the first stage of the Excellent Way, then would renunciation of the world no longer indeed be said to avail for the putting away of evil qualities, for purification of heart—then would there be no longer any use in renunciation. It would be as if a man were to have a bathing tank excavated

¹ Kayâgata-sati: literally 'intentness of mind on (the truth relating to) bodies.'

² Kilesa-kilant-agghattâ. Compare *khâttagghattam*, *Gâtaka* I, 345.

by the labour of hundreds (of workpeople¹), and were then to have a public announcement made: "Let no one who is dirty go down into this tank! Let only those whose dust and dirt have been washed away, who are purified and stainless, go down into this tank!" Now would that bath, O king, be of any use to those thus purified and stainless?'

'Certainly not, Sir! The advantage they would have sought in going into the bath they would have already gained elsewhere. Of what use would the bath be to them then?'

'Just so, O king, had the Tathâgata ordained that only laymen who had already entered the first stage of the Excellent Way should be received into the Order, then would the advantage they seek in it have been already gained. Of what use would the renunciation be to them then?'

28. 'Or suppose, O king, that a physician, a true follower of the sages of old², one who carries (in his memory) the ancient traditions and verses³, a practical man⁴, skilled in diagnosis, and master of an efficacious and lasting system of treatment, who had collected (from medicinal herbs) a medicine able to cure every disease, were to have it announced: [249] "Let none, Sirs, who are ill come to visit me! Let the

¹ Stonemasons and sculptors are implied as well as navvies. Compare my note at 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 262.

² Sabhâva-isi-bhattiko. Compare Siva-bhattiko (Saivite) at Mahāvamsa, chapter 93, line 17. In râga-bhattiko (above, p. 142 of the Pâli text) the connotation is different. The Sinhalese (p. 353) repeats the phrase.

³ Suta-manta-dharo, which the Sinhalese repeats.

⁴ Atakkiko: 'without the theories (vitarka) resorted to by those ignorant of the practice of medicine' says Hīnaśī-kumburê.

healthy and the strong visit me!" Now, would then, O king, those men free from illness and disease, healthy and jubilant, get what they wanted from that physician ?'

'Certainly not, Sir! What men want from a physician, that would they have already obtained otherwise. What use would the physician be to them ?'

'Just so, O king, had the Tathâgata ordained that only those laymen who had already entered the first stage of the Excellent Way should be received into the Order, then would the advantages they seek in it have been already gained elsewhere. Of what use would the renunciation be to them then ?

29. 'Or suppose, O king, that some had had many hundreds of dishes of boiled milk-rice prepared¹, and were to have it announced to those about him: 'Let not, Sirs, any hungry man approach to this feast of charity. Let those who have well fed, the satisfied, refreshed, and satiated², those who have regaled themselves, and are filled with good cheer, —let them come to the feast.' Now would any advantage, O king, be derived from the feast by those men thus well fed, satisfied, refreshed, satiated, regaled, and filled with good cheer ?'

'Certainly not, Sir! The very advantage they would seek in going to the feast, that would they have already attained elsewhere. What good would the feast be to them ?'

'Just so, O king, had the Tathâgata ordained that

¹ As Agâtasattu is said to have done for Devadatta at *Gâtaka* I, 186.

² See above, IV, 6, 5.

only those laymen who had already entered the first stage of the Excellent Way should be received into the Order, thus would the advantages they seek in it have been already gained elsewhere. Of what use would the renunciation be to them?

30. 'But notwithstanding that, O king, they who return to the lower state manifest thereby five immeasurably good qualities in the religion of the Conquerors. And what are the five? They show how glorious is the state (which those have reached who have entered the Order), how purified it is from every stain, how impossible it is for the sinful to dwell within it together (with the good), how difficult it is to realise (its glory), how many are the restraints to be observed within it.

31. 'And how do they show the mighty glory of that state? Just, O king, as if a man, poor, and of low birth, without distinction¹, deficient in wisdom, were to come into possession of a great and mighty kingdom, it would not be long before he would be overthrown, utterly destroyed², and deprived of his glory. For he would be unable to support his dignity. [250] And why so? Because of the greatness thereof. Just so is it, O king, that whosoever are without distinction, have acquired no merit, and are devoid of wisdom, when they renounce the world according to the religion of the Conquerors, then, unable to bear that most excellent renunciation, overthrown, fallen, and deprived of their glory, they return to the lower state. For they are unable to

¹ Nibbisesa, not in Childers; but see, for instance, *Gâtaka* II, 32.

² Paridhamśati. Compare below, IV, 7, 8 (p. 265 of the Pâli).

carry out the doctrine of the Conquerors. And why so? Because of the exalted nature of the condition which that doctrine brings about. Thus is it, O king, that they show forth the mighty glory of that state.

32. 'And how do they show how purified that state is from every stain? Just, O king, as water, when it has fallen upon a lotus, flows away, disperses, scatters, disappears, adheres not to it. And why so? Because of the lotus being pure from any spot. Just so, O king, when whosoever are deceitful, tricky, crafty, treacherous, holders of lawless opinions, have been admitted into the religion of the Conquerors, it is not long before they disperse, and scatter, and fall from that pure and stainless, clear and faultless¹, most high and excellent religion, and finding no standing-place in it, adhering no longer to it, they return to the lower state. And why so? Because the religion of the Conquerors has been purified from every stain. Thus is it, O king, that they show forth the purity of that state from every stain.

33. 'And how do they show how impossible it is for the sinful to dwell within it together with the good? Just, O king, as the great ocean does not tolerate the continuance in it of a dead corpse², but whatever corpse may be in the sea, that does it bring quickly to the shore, and cast it out on to the dry land. And why so? Because the ocean is

¹ *Nikkanta-pandara*: literally 'thornless and yellow-white.' The second of these epithets of the religion (*sāsana*) is applied to it above, IV, 6, 23 (p. 250 of the Pāli). The Sinhalese merely repeats them.

² On this curious belief see the note above on IV, 3, 39 (p. 187 of the Pāli).

the abode of mighty creatures. Just so, O king, when whosoever are sinful, foolish, with their zeal evaporated, distressed, impure, and bad, have been admitted into the religion of the Conquerors, it is not long before they abandon that religion, and dwelling no longer in it—the abode of the mighty, the Arahats, purified, and free from the Great Evils¹—they return to the lower state. And why so? Because it is impossible for the wicked to dwell in the religion of the Conquerors. Thus is it, O king, that they show forth the impossibility of the sinful to abide within it together with the good.

34. 'And how do they show how difficult a state it is to grasp? Just, O king, as archers who are clumsy, untrained, ignorant, and bereft of skill, are incapable of high feats of archery, such as hair-splitting², but miss the object, and shoot beyond the mark. And why so? Because of the fineness and minuteness of the horse-hair. [251] Just so, O king, when foolish, stupid, imbecile³, dull, slow-minded

¹ They are lust, dulness, delusion, and ignorance.

² *Vālaggavedham*, 'hair-splitting'; which is also used in the *Piṭakas* in the secondary sense we too have given to it.

³ *E/amûga*, supposed to mean literally 'deaf and dumb'; but often (if not always) used in this secondary sense. See *Gâtaka* I, 247, 248 (where both MSS. read *elamûga*), and *Magghima Nikâya* I, 20 (where Mr. Trenckner has an interesting note). In both places the fifth century commentators explain the word by *lâla-mukha*, 'drivelling,' supposing it to be derived from *elâ*, 'saliva,' and *mukha*, 'mouth.' This is certainly wrong, for the last part of the compound is *mûka*, 'dumb.' The fact is that the word was a puzzle, even then. The meaning assigned to it by both Pâli and Sanskrit lexicographers of 'deaf and dumb' has not yet been confirmed by a single passage either in Pâli or Sanskrit. And as *eḍa*, 'sheep,' is common in both, in its longer form of *eḍaka*, *e/aka*, the compound probably meant originally 'as dumb

fellows renounce the world according to the doctrine of the Conquerors, then they, unable to grasp the exquisitely fine and subtle distinctions of the Four Truths, missing them, going beyond them, turn back before long to the lower state. And why so? Because it is so difficult to penetrate into the finenesses and subtleties of the Truths. This is how they show forth the difficulty of its realisation.

35. 'And how do they show how many are the restraints to be observed within it? Just, O king, as a man who had gone to a place where a mighty battle was going on, when, surrounded on all sides by the forces of the enemy, he sees the armed hosts crowding in upon him, will give way, turn back, and take to flight. And why so? Out of fear lest he should not be saved in the midst of so hot a fight. Just so, O king, when whosoever are wicked¹, unrestrained, shameless, foolish, full of ill-will, fickle, unsteady, mean and stupid, renounce the world under the system of the Conquerors, then they, unable to carry out the manifold precepts, give way, turn back, and take to flight, and so before long return to the lower state. And why so? Because of the multiform nature of the restraints to be observed in the religion of the Conquerors. Thus is it, O king, that they show forth the manifoldness of the restraints to be observed.

as a sheep,' which would be a quite satisfactory basis for the secondary sense of 'imbecile,' in which alone it can be traced in Pāli. For the Sanskrit form *eḍamūka* Böhtlingk-Roth give only lexicographers as authority. So *elā*, 'saliva,' is in Pāli only a lexicographer's word, and may have been invented to explain *eḍamūga*, and *ane/agalā vākā*, as at *Sumāṅgala*, p. 282.

¹ *Pākata*. *Hīna/i-kumburē* says (p. 356) *pāpakalāwū*, which suggests a different reading.

36. 'As on that best of flowering shrubs, O king, the double jasmine¹, there may be flowers that have been pierced by insects, and their tender stalks being cut to pieces, they may occasionally fall down. But by their having fallen is not the jasmine bush disgraced. For the flowers that still remain upon it pervade every direction with their exquisite perfume. Just so, O king, whosoever having renounced the world under the system of the Conquerors, return again to the lower state, are, like jasmine flowers bitten by the insects and deprived of their colour and their smell, colourless as it were in their behaviour, and incapable of development. But by their backsliding is not the religion of the Conquerors put to shame. For the members of the Order who remain in the religion pervade the world of gods and men with the exquisite perfume of their right conduct.

37. 'Among rice plants that are healthy [252] and ruddy there may spring up a kind of rice plant called Karumbhaka², and that may occasionally fade. But by its fading are not the red rice plants disgraced. For those that remain become the food of kings. Just so, O king, whosoever having renounced the world under the system of the Conquerors return again to the lower state, they, like Karumbhaka plants among the red rice, may grow not, nor attain development, and may even occasionally relapse into the lower state. But by their backsliding is not the religion of the Conquerors put to shame,

¹ Vassikā. So also above, IV, 3, 32 (p. 183 of the Pāli).

² 'A yellowish white kâwalu sort' says Hīnaśi-kumburê, and Clough renders kâwalu by 'a species of panic grass' (*panicum glaucum*). The word has only been found in this passage.

for the brethren that remain stedfast become fitted even for Arahatship.

38. 'On one side, O king, of a wish conferring gem a roughness¹ may arise. But by the appearance of that roughness is not the gem disgraced. For the purity that remains in the gem fills the people with gladness. And just so, O king, whosoever having renounced the world under the system of the Conquerors return again to the lower state, they may be rough ones and fallen ones in the religion. But by their backsliding is not the religion of the Conquerors put to shame, for the brethren who remain stedfast are the cause of joy springing up in the hearts of gods and men.

39. 'Even red sandal wood of the purest sort, O king, may become in some portion of it rotten and scentless. But thereby is not the sandal wood disgraced. For that portion which remains wholesome and sweet scatters and diffuses its perfume all around. And just so, O king, whosoever having renounced the world under the system of the Conquerors return again to the lower state, they, like the rotten part of the sandal wood, may be as it were thrown away in the religion. But by their backsliding is not the religion of the Conquerors put to shame. For the brethren who remain stedfast pervade, with the sandal wood perfume of their right conduct, the world of gods and men.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! By one appropriate simile after another, by one correct analogy after another have you most excellently made clear the

¹ Kakkasam. The Sinhalese (p. 357) has left out this clause, evidently by mistake only.

faultlessness of the system of the Conquerors, and shown it free from blame. And even those who have lapsed make evident how excellent that system is.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to those who have lapsed.]

[DILEMMA THE FIFTY-SEVENTH.]

WHY HAVE ARAHATS NO POWER OVER THEIR BODIES?]

40. 'Venerable Nāgasena, your (members of the Order) say: [253]

"There is one kind of pain only which an Arahāt suffers, bodily pain, that is, and not mental¹."

'How is this, Nāgasena? The Arahāt keeps his mind going by means of the body. Has the Arahāt no lordship, no mastery, no power over the body?'

'No, he has not, O king.'

'That, Sir, is not right that over the body, by which he keeps his mind going, he should have neither lordship, nor mastery, nor power. Even a bird, Sir, is lord and master and ruler over the nest in which he dwells.'

41. 'There are these ten qualities, O king, inherent in the body, which run after it, as it were, and accompany it from existence to existence². And what are the ten? Cold and heat, hunger and thirst,

¹ This passage has not yet been traced in the Piṭakas. An almost identical phrase has already been quoted, as said by the Buddha himself, at II, 1, 4 (p. 44 of the Pāli).

² Bhavē bhavē anuparivattanti. See IV, 4, 41 (p. 204 of the Pāli).

the necessity of voiding excreta, fatigue and sleepiness, old age, disease, and death. And in respect thereof, the Arahāt is without lordship, without mastery, without power.'

'Venerable Nāgasena, what is the reason why the commands of the Arahāt have no power over his body, neither has he any mastery over it? Tell me that.

'Just, O king, as whatever beings are dependent on the land, they all walk, and dwell, and carry on their business in dependence upon it. But do their commands have force, does their mastery extend over it?'

'Certainly not, Sir!'

'Just so, O king, the Arahāt keeps his mind going through the body. And yet his commands have no authority over it, nor power.'

42. 'Venerable Nāgasena, why is it that the ordinary man suffers both bodily and mental pain?'

'By reason, O king, of the untrained state of his mind. Just, O king, as an ox when trembling with starvation might be tied up with a weak and fragile and tiny rope of grass or creeper. But if the ox were excited¹ then would he escape, dragging the fastening with him. Just so, O king, when pain comes upon him whose mind is untrained, then is his mind excited, and the mind so excited bends his body this way and that and makes it grovel on the ground, [254] and he, being thus untrained in mind, trembles² and cries, and gives forth terrible

¹ Parikupati, not in Childers; but see above, IV, 1, 38 (p. 118 of the Pāli).

² Tasati. Mr. Trenckner points out (p. 431) that two MSS.

groans. This is why the ordinary man, O king, suffers pain as well in body as in mind.'

43. 'Then why, Sir, does the Arahāt only suffer one kind of pain—bodily, that is, and not mental?'

'The mind of the Arahāt, O king, is trained, well practised, tamed, brought into subjection, and obedient, and it hearkens to his word. When affected with feelings of pain, he grasps firmly the idea of the impermanence of all things, so ties his mind as it were to the post of contemplation, and his mind, bound to the post of contemplation, remains unmoved, unshaken, becomes steadfast, wanders not—though his body the while may bend this way and that and roll in agony by the disturbing influence of the pain. This is why it is only one kind of pain that the Arahāt suffers—bodily pain, that is, and not mental.'

44. 'Venerable Nāgasena, that verily is a most marvellous thing that when the body is trembling the mind should not be shaken. Give me a reason for that.'

'Suppose, O king, there were a noble tree, mighty in trunk and branches and leaves. And when agitated by the force of the wind its branches should wave. Would the trunk also move?'

'Certainly not, Sir!'

'Well, O king, the mind of the Arahāt is as the trunk of that noble tree.'

'Most wonderful, Nāgasena, and most strange!'

read *rasati* and one *sarati*. The *Siṃhalese* rendering (p. 359), *bhaya wanneya*, confirms the reading he has adopted.

¹ The *Siṃhalese* (p. 360) has four lines here that are not in the *Pāli*.

Never before have I seen a lamp of the law that burned thus brightly through all time.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the Arahāt's power over his body.]

[DILEMMA THE FIFTY-EIGHTH.

THE LAYMAN'S SIN.]

45. [255] 'Venerable Nāgasena, suppose a layman had been guilty of a Pârâgika offence¹, and some time after should enter the Order. And neither he himself should be aware that when still a layman he had so been guilty, nor should any one else inform him, saying: "When a layman you were guilty of such an offence." Now if he were to devote himself to the attainment of Arahātship², would he be able so to comprehend the Truth as to succeed in entering upon the Excellent Way?'

'No, O king, he would not.'

'But why not, Sir?'

'That, in him, which might have been the cause of his grasping the Truth has been, in him, destroyed. No comprehension can therefore take place.'

46. 'Venerable Nāgasena, your people say:

"To him who is aware (of an offence) there comes

¹ This, for a member of the Order, would be either unchastity, theft, murder, or putting forward false claims to extraordinary holiness. See 'Vinaya Texts,' part i, pp. 3-5. But Hīnaśikumburê takes the word Pârâgika here in the sense of matricide, parricide, injuring a Bo Tree, murder of an Arahāt, wounding a Tathâgata, or rape of a nun.

² Tathattâya. Rāhat phala pizisa pilipadane wī nam, says the Sinhalese (p. 361).

remorse. When remorse has arisen there is an obstruction in the heart. To him whose heart is obstructed there is no comprehension of the Truth¹."

'Why should there then be no such comprehension to one not aware of his offence, feeling no remorse, remaining with a quiet heart. This dilemma touches on two irreconcilable statements. Think well before you solve it.'

47. 'Would selected seed², O king, successfully sown in a well-ploughed, well-watered, fertile soil, come to maturity?'

'Certainly, Sir!'

'But would the same seed grow on the surface of a thick slab of rock?'

'Of course not.'

'Why then should the same seed grow in the mud, and not on the rock?'

'Because on the rock the cause for its growth does not exist. Seeds cannot grow without a cause.'

'Just so, O king, the cause by reason of which his comprehension of the Truth (his conversion) might have been brought about, has been rooted out in him. Conversion cannot take place without a cause.'

48. '[Give me, Sir, another simile³.]'

'Well, O king, will sticks and clods and cudgels⁴

¹ This passage has not yet been traced in the *Piṭakas*.

² *Sâradam* bīgam. 'Seed which will give sâra.' It has nothing to do with *sâradam*, 'autumn.' See *Samyutta Nikâya* XXII, 24.

³ Added from the *Siṃhalese* (p. 362). It is not in the *Pâli*.

⁴ *Lakuṣa*, not in *Childers*. But see below (p. 301 of the *Pâli* text). It is probably the same Dravidian word as appears in the Sanskrit dictionaries as *laguḍa*.

and clubs find a resting-place in the air, in the same way as they do on the ground ?'

'No, Sir.'

'But what is the reason why they come to rest on the earth, when they will not stand in the air ?'

'There is no cause in the air for their stability, and without a cause they will [256] not stand.'

'Just so, O king, by that fault of his the cause for his conversion has been removed. And without a cause there can be no conversion. Now will fire, O king, burn in water in the same way as it will on land ?'

'No, Sir.'

'But why not ?'

'Because in water the conditions precedent for burning do not exist. And there can be no burning without them.'

'Just so, O king, are the conditions precedent to conversion destroyed in him by that offence of his. And when the conditions which would bring it about are destroyed there can be no conversion.'

49. 'Venerable Nāgasena, think over this matter once more. I am not yet convinced about it. Persuade me by some reason how such obstruction can occur in the case of one not aware of his offence, and feeling therefore no remorse.'

'Would the Halāhala¹ poison, O king, if eaten by

¹ There is a curious confusion about this word. It is found in post-Buddhistic Sanskrit in the sense of a particular sort of strong poison, and in this sense it occurs also in the *Gātaka Commentary* I, 271; III, 103; and in the *Tela-kaśāha-gāthā*, verse 82. In none of these passages is the nature of the poison at all explained; it is taken for granted as a well-known powerful poison. But above (p. 122 of the Pāli), and at *Gātaka* I, 47, 48, it is used in

a man who did not know he had eaten it, take away his life ?'

'Yes, Sir.'

'Just so, O king, is there an obstruction to his comprehension of the Truth, who, without being aware of it, has committed a sin. And would fire, O king, burn a man who walked into it unawares?'

'Yes, Sir.'

'Well, just so in the case you put. Or would a venomous snake, if it bit a man without his knowing it, kill him?'

'Yes, Sir.'

'Well, just so in the case you put. And is it not true that Samana Kolañña, the king of Kalinga,—when surrounded by the seven treasures of a sovereign overlord he went mounted on his state elephant to pay a visit to his relatives,—was not able to pass the Tree of Wisdom, though he was not aware that it was there¹? Well, of the same kind is the reason why one who has committed an offence, even though he know it not, is nevertheless incapable of rising to the knowledge of the Truth.'

'Verily, Nâgasena, this must be the word of the Conqueror. To find any fault with it were vain. And this (explanation of yours) must be the meaning of it. I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma of the layman's sin.]

the sense of kolâhala, 'noise' (compare the Sanskrit halahâlâ, used as a cry or call). In this sense it is probably a mere imitation of the supposed sound. In the sense of poison its derivation is doubtful.

¹ This must be the incident referred to at *Gâtaka* IV, 232, though the name of the king is given (on the previous page) simply as Kâliṅga and not as Samana-kolañño.

[DILEMMA THE FIFTY-NINTH.

THE GUILTY RECLUSE.]

50. [257] 'Venerable Nāgasena, what is the distinction, what the difference, between a layman who has done wrong, and a Samāna (member of the Order) who has done wrong? Will they both be reborn in like condition? Will the like retribution happen to both? Or is there any difference?'

'There are, O king, ten qualities which abound in the guilty Samāna, distinguishing him from the guilty layman. And besides that, in ten ways does the Samāna purify the gifts that may be given him.

51. 'And what are the ten qualities which abound in the guilty Samāna, distinguishing him from the guilty layman? The guilty Samāna, O king, is full of reverence for the Buddha, for the Law, for the Order, and for his fellow-disciples; he exerts himself in putting questions about, and in recitation of (the sacred texts); he is devoted to learning, though he has done wrong. Then, O king, the guilty one entering the assembly, enters it decently clad, he guards himself alike in body and mind through fear of rebuke, his mind is set upon exerting himself (towards the attainment of Arahātship), he is of the companionship of the brethren. And even, O king, if he does wrong he lives discreetly. Just, O king, as a married woman sins only in secret and in privacy, so does the guilty Samāna walk discreetly in his wrongdoing. These are the ten qualities, O king, found in the guilty Samāna, distinguishing him from the guilty layman.

52. 'And what are the ten ways in which, besides,

he purifies a gift given to him? He purifies it in that he wears an invulnerable coat of mail¹; in that he is shorn in the fashion of the characteristic mark of renunciation used by the seers of old²; in that he is one who is included in the multitude of the brethren; in that he has taken his refuge in the Buddha, the Law, and the Order; in that he dwells in a lonely spot suitable for the exertion (after Arahatsip); in that he seeks after the treasure of the teaching of the Conquerors; in that he preaches the most excellent law (Dhamma); in that his final destiny is to be reborn in the island of truth³; in that he is possessed of an honest belief that the Buddha is the chief of all beings; in that he has taken upon himself the keeping of the Uposatha day. These, O king, are the ten ways in which, besides, he purifies a gift given to him.

53. [258] 'Even, O king, when thoroughly fallen, a guilty Samāna yet sanctifies the gifts of the supporters of the faith—just as water, however thick, will wash away slush and mud and dirt and stains—just as hot, and even boiling water will put a mighty blazing fire out—just as food, however nasty, will allay the faintness of hunger. For thus, O king, hath it been said by the god over all gods in the most excellent *Magghima Nikāya* in the chapter "On gifts."⁴

¹ 'The threefold robes, the Arahad-dhaga, for the suppression of all evil, worn by all the Buddhas' adds the *Sinhalese* (p. 364). Compare above, vol. i, p. 190.

² The Rishis; 'who were gaining the Swarga-moksha' adds the *Sinhalese*. (It was before the days of Arahatsip.)

³ Dhamma-dīpa, that is to reach Arahatsip, Nirvāna. Compare the *Gātaka* stanza, IV, 121, verse 3.

⁴ The *Dakkhiṇā Vibhaṅga*, No. 12 in the *Vibhaṅga Vagga*, No. 142 in the whole *Nikāya*.

“Whene’er a good man, with believing heart,
Presents what he hath earned in righteousness
To th’ unrighteous,—in full confidence
On the great fruit to follow the good act—
Such gift is, by the giver, sanctified.”’

‘Most wonderful, Nâgasena, and most strange!
We asked you a mere ordinary question, and you,
expounding it with reasons and with similes,
have filled, as it were, the hearer with the sweet
taste of the nectar (of Nirvâna¹). Just as a cook,
or a cook’s apprentice, taking a piece of ordinary
nutmeg, will, treating it with various ingredients,
prepare a dish for a king—so, Nâgasena, when
we asked you an ordinary question, have you,
expounding it with reasons and similes, filled the
hearer with the sweet taste of the nectar of Nirvâna.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to the guilty recluse.]

¹ *Amata-madhuram savanûpagam akâsi. Hînaś-kum-burê* (p. 365) understands this differently, and has apparently read *amataṃ madhuram*. For he translates ‘filled the hearer with the taste of Nirvâna, and adorned the least of the people with the ear-ring of Arahatsip.’ It is difficult to see where he finds ‘the least of the people,’ and there is no authority for rendering *savanûpagam* by ‘ear-ring.’ *Amata* as an epithet of the state of mind called by Western writers *Nirvâna* (which is only one of many names applied in the Buddhist books themselves to Arahatsip) has nothing to do with immortality. As this wrong notion of the use of the word has led to much confusion, I have considered in an appendix all the passages in which the epithet occurs.

[DILEMMA THE SIXTIETH.

THE SOUL IN WATER.]

54. 'Venerable Nāgasena, this water when boiling over the fire gives forth many a sound, hissing and simmering¹. Is then, Nāgasena, the water alive? Is it shouting at play? [259] or is it crying out at the torment inflicted on it?'

'It is not alive, O king, there is no soul or being in water. It is by reason of the greatness of the shock of the heat of the fire that it gives forth sounds, hissing and simmering.'

'Now, venerable Nāgasena, there are false teachers who on the ground that the water is alive reject the use of cold water, and warming the water feed themselves on tepid foods of various kinds².

'These men find fault with you and revile you, saying: "The Sakyaputtiya Samanas do injury to the souls of one function³." Dispel, remove, get rid of this their censure and blame.'

55. 'The water is not alive, O king. Neither is there therein either soul or being. And it is the

¹ *Kikkī/āyati kīṭikī/āyati*. The English words entirely fail in representing the sound of these striking words (in which the *k* is pronounced as *ch*). They recur Mahāvagga VI, 26, 7 and Puggala Paññatti 3, 14.

² *Vekaṭika-vekaṭikam*. Hīnaś-kumburē renders this by *hunu-hunuyem*, and *hunu* is the Pāli *unha*. But the expression may be compared with *vikaṭa*, 'filth' (used for food), at Mahāvagga VI, 14, 6. On the belief of the Gains in the 'water-life,' see the Āyāraṅga Sutta I, 1, 3 (in vol. xxii of the S. B. E., p. 5).

³ *Ekindriyam gīvam*. The belief in such a soul is to be understood as held by the teachers referred to, not by Buddhists. Hīnaś-kumburē's translation implies that the one function meant is *prāṇa*. Compare the heretical opinions described in the Dīgha II, 20, and 26.

great shock of the heat of the fire that makes it sound, hissing and simmering. It is like the water in holes in the ground, in ponds and pools and lakes, in reservoirs, in crevices and chasms, in wells, in low-lying places, and in lotus-tanks¹, which before the mighty onset of the hot winds² is so deeply affected that it vanishes away. But does the water in that case, O king, give forth many a sound, hissing and simmering?’

‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘But, if it were alive, the water would then also make some sound. Know therefore, O king, that there is no soul, neither being, in water; and that it is the greatness of the shock of the heat of the water that makes it give forth sounds.

56. ‘And hear another reason, O king, for the same thing. If water, O king, with grains of rice in it, is put in a vessel and covered up, but not placed over the fireplace, would it then give forth sound?’

‘No, Sir. It would remain quiet and unmoved.’

‘But if you were to put the same water, just as it is in the vessel, over a fireplace³, and then light up the fire, would the water remain quiet and motionless?’

¹ This list recurs in almost identical terms below, p. 296 (of the Pāli text). See also above, II, 1, 10 (vol. 1, p. 55).

² Vātātapa, not ‘heat and wind’ as Böhtlingk-Roth understand it in their rendering of vātātapika. See ‘Vinaya Texts,’ III, 159 and *Samyutta* XXII, 12.

³ Uddhane. This word is always rendered ‘oven’ in the dictionaries. But I doubt whether there were ovens at all, in our sense, in those times, and in any case, the word certainly means a fireplace made of bits of brick between which the wood for the fire is laid. We must imagine the bricks to be laid, as a general rule, in a triangle. I have often seen both Sinhalese peasants, and Tamils from the Madras Presidency, boiling their rice in the open over such extemporised fireplaces in pots either placed on the

‘Certainly not, Sir. It would move and be agitated, become perturbed and all in commotion, waves would arise in it, it would rush up and down and in every direction [280], it would roll up and boil over¹, and a garland of foam would be formed above it.’

bricks, or more usually suspended from three sticks meeting above the centre of the space between the bricks. That this, and this only, is the sense in which the word is used in Pāli is clear from a comparison of the passages in which it is used, though of course in huts the fireplace, though of the same kind, would be a more permanent structure. I have not traced the word in the Piṭakas. In the *Gāṭaka Commentary* I, 68 we find that smoke usually rises uddhanato. This it would not do from an oven. At *Gāṭaka* I, 33 and *Dhammapada Commentary* 176 uddhane āropetvā must mean ‘lifted up on to’ not ‘put into.’ At *Gāṭaka* I, 346 the speaker says he will take the uddhana-kapallāni, and the rice with ingredients for the curry, up on to the flat roof of the house, and there cook and eat them. These are the bits of brick to make, not an oven, but a fireplace of. At *Gāṭaka* II, 133 the husband wrings the neck of the parrot (the parrot of the *Arabian Nights*, chap. 2, I may add) and throws it uddhanantaresu ‘into the space (between the bricks) of the fireplace.’ At *Gāṭaka* III, 178 and *Dhammapada Commentary* 263 we hear of meat boiled on the uddhana. In the *Rasavāhini* (quoted in the ‘*Journal of the Pāli Text Society*,’ 1884, p. 53) the context shows that a fireplace or hearth, not an oven, is meant. Finally above (p. 118 of the Pāli) we hear of a cauldron being mounted on to an uddhana, and the fire being lighted under it.

The derivation is uncertain. The Sanskrit lexicographers give various forms of the word—always with the meaning ‘oven’—uddhāna, udvāna, uddhmāna (this last probably influenced by a supposition that the word was connected with dham). The *Siṃhalese* is uduna, and though ‘fireplace’ is better than ‘oven,’ we have really no corresponding word in English. The gypsies, who are Indian in origin, should have a name for it. But I only find in their vocabularies yogongo-tan, which means simply *aggi/hāna*.

¹ Uttarati patarati. ‘Itirenneya pœtirenneya’ says the *Siṃhalese*.

‘But why so, O king, when water in its ordinary state remains quiet and motionless?’

‘It is because of the powerful impulse of the heat of the fire that the water, usually so still, gives forth many a sound, bubbling and hissing.’

‘Then thereby know, O king, that there is no soul in water, neither being; and that it is the strong heat of the fire that causes it to make sounds.

57. ‘And hear another reason, O king, for the same thing. Is there not water to be found in every house put into water-pots with their mouths closed up?’

‘Yes, Sir.’

‘Well, does that water move, is it agitated, perturbed, in commotion, does it form into waves, does it rush up and down and in every direction, does it roll up and roll over¹, is it covered with foam?’

‘No! That water is in its ordinary state. It remains still and quiet.’

‘But have you ever heard that all this is true of the water in the great ocean? and that rearing up² it breaks against the strand with a mighty roar?’

‘Yes, I have both heard of it, and have seen it myself—how the water in the great ocean lifts itself up a hundred, two hundred, cubits high, towards the sky.’

‘But why, whereas water in its ordinary state remains motionless and still, does the water in the ocean both move and roar?’

‘That is by reason of the mighty force of the

¹ Uttarati patarati, the second of which the *Siṃhalese* (p. 368) omits here. See p. 117 of the *Pāli*.

² Ussakkittvā, ‘continually pumping up,’ says the *Siṃhalese*.

onset of the wind, whereas the water in the water-jars neither moves nor makes any noise, because nothing shakes it.'

'Well, the sounds given forth by boiling water are the result, in a similar way, [261] of the great heat of the fire.'

58. 'Do not people cover over the dried-up mouth of a drum¹ with dried cow-leather?'

'Yes, they do.'

'Well, is there any soul or being, O king, in a drum?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'Then how is it that a drum makes sounds?'

'By the action or effort of a woman or a man.'

'Well, just as that is why the drum sounds, so is it by the effect of the heat of the fire that the water sounds. And for this reason also you might know, O king, that there is no soul, neither being, in water; and that it is the heat of the fire which causes it to make sounds².

59. 'And I, too, O king, have something yet further to ask of you—thus shall this puzzle be thoroughly threshed out. How is it? Is it true of every kind of vessel that water heated in it makes noises, or only of some kinds of vessels?'

'Not of all, Sir. Only of some.'

'But then you have yourself, O king, abandoned the position you took up. You have come over to my side—that there is no soul, neither being, in water. For only if it made noises in whatever

¹ Bheri-pokkharam, which the Sinhalese renders bheri-mukha. Compare Vimāna Vatthu 18, 10, where pokkhara is a sort of drum.

² A similar analogy has been used above, vol. i, p. 48.

vessel it were heated could it be right to say that it had a soul. There cannot be two kinds of water—that which speaks, as it were, which is alive, and that which does not speak, and does not live. If all water were alive, then that which the great elephants, when they are in rut, suck up in their trunks, and pour out over their towering frames, or putting into their mouths take right into their stomachs—that water, too, when crushed flat between their teeth, would make a sound. And great ships, a hundred cubits long, heavily laden, full of hundreds of packages of goods, pass over the sea—the water crushed by them, too, would make sounds. [262] And mighty fish, leviathans with bodies hundreds of leagues long¹, since they dwell in the great ocean, immersed in the depths of it, must, so living in it, be constantly taking into their mouths and spouting out the ocean—and that water, too, crushed between their gills or in their stomach, would make sounds. But as, even when tormented with the grinding and crushing of all such mighty things, the water gives no sound, therefore, O king, you may take it that there is no soul, neither being, in water.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena! With fitting discrimination has the puzzle put to you² been solved. Just, Nâgasena, as a gem of inestimable value which had come into the hands of an able master goldsmith, clever and well trained, would meet with due appreciation, estimation, and praise—just as a rare pearl

¹ Their names are given. On this belief see above, III, 7, 10 (vol. i, p. 130) and *Kullavagga* IX, 1, 3.

² *Desâgato*, ‘based on the teaching of the Omniscient One,’ says *Hînañi-kumburê*, who therefore apparently read *desanâgato*.

at the hands of a dealer in pearls, a fine piece of woven stuff at the hands of a cloth merchant¹, or red sandal wood at the hands of a perfumer—just so in that way has this puzzle put to you been solved with the discrimination it deserved.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the water-life.]

Here ends the Sixth Chapter².

¹ Dussika, a word only found, so far as I know, here and below at V, 4 (p. 331 of the Pāli), where see the note.

² Sakala-gana mano-mandanīyya-wû srī-saddharmâ-dâsayehi sha/wana vargaya nimiyeya, says the *Simhalese*.

BOOK IV. CHAPTER 7.

[DILEMMA THE SIXTY-FIRST.

THE OBSTACLES.]

1. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said :

"Live, O brethren, devoted to and taking delight in that which has no *Papañkas* (none of those states of mind which delay or obstruct a man in his spiritual growth ¹)."

'What is that which has no *Papañkas*?'

'The fruit of Conversion has no *Papañkas*, O king, the fruit of that stage of the Path in which those live who will be only once, or not all reborn, the fruit of Arahatsip has no *Papañkas*.'

'But if that be so, Nâgasena, [263] then why do the brethren concern themselves with recitation of, with asking questions about the discourses, and the pieces in mixed prose and verse, and the expositions, and the poems, and the outbursts of emotion, and the passages beginning "Thus he said," and the birth-stories, and the tales of wonder, and the extended treatises ²? Why do they trouble themselves about new buildings ³, about gifts and offerings to the Order?'

¹ This passage has not yet been traced in the *Piṭakas*.

² These are the well-known *navangāni*, the nine divisions into which the Scriptures are divided. See *Magghima Nikāya* I, 133; *Āṅguttara Nikāya* IV, 6, &c.

³ *Navakammena palibugganti*. The *Sinhalese* adds *khaṇḍa-phulla-paṭisaṃkharanāyena*, 'repairing dilapidations.'

2. 'They who do all these things, O king, are working towards attainment of freedom from the Papañkās, (that is of Arahats¹). For whereas, O king, all those of the brethren who are pure by nature, those upon whose hearts an impression has been left by good deeds done in a former birth², can (get rid of the Papañkās, can) become Arahats, in a moment—those on the other hand whose minds are much darkened by evil³ can only become Arahats by such means as these.

3. 'Just, O king, as while one man who has sown a field and got the seed to grow can, by the exertion of his own power, and without any rampart or fence, reap the crop—whereas another man when he has got the seed to grow must go into the woods, and cut down sticks and branches and make a fence of them, and thus only reap the crop—in the same way those who are pure by nature, upon whose hearts an impression has been left by good deeds done in a former birth, can, in a moment, become Arahats, like the man who gathers the crop without a fence. But those, on the other hand, whose minds are darkened by the evil they have done can only become Arahats by such means as these—like the man who can only reap his crop if he builds the fence.

4. 'Or just, O king, as there might be a bunch of fruits on the summit of a lofty mango tree. Then

¹ This is (very properly) added in the Sinhalese, for the two are practically identical. Hereafter it throughout renders nippapañko hoti by 'become an Arahats.'

² Vāsita-vāsanā. See above, vol. i, p. 18.

³ Mahârâgakkhâ, 'evil done both in this and in former births' is here to be understood.

whoever possesses the power of Iddhi could take those fruits¹, but whoever had not, he would have first to cut sticks and creepers and construct a ladder, and by its means climb up the tree and so get at the fruit. In the same way those who are by nature pure, and upon whose hearts an impression has been left by good deeds done in a former birth, may attain, in a moment, to Arahatship, like the man getting the fruit by the power of Iddhi. But those, on the other hand, whose minds are darkened by the evil they have done can only become Arahats by such means as these, like the man who only gets the fruit by means of the ladder he has made.

5. [264] 'Or just, O king, as while one man who is clever in business will go alone to his lord and conclude any business he has to do, another man, rich though he may be, must by his riches bring others to his service, and by their help get the business done—and it is for the business' sake that he has to seek after them. In the same way those who are by nature pure, upon whose hearts an impression has been left by good deeds done in a former birth, may reach, in a moment, to the attainment of the Six Transcendent Qualities², like the man who does the business alone by himself. Whereas those brethren whose minds are darkened by the evil they have done can only by such means as these realise the gains of renunciation, like the man who through others' help brings his business to the desired end.

¹ By the simple process of going through the air to the top of the tree.

² Chasu abhiññâsu vastibhâvam pâpunanti.

6. 'For recitation is of great good, O king, and asking questions, and superintending building work, and seeing to gifts and offerings is of great good—each of them to one or other of the spiritual objects which the brethren seek to obtain. Just, O king, as there might be some one of the ministers or soldiers or messengers or sentries or body-guards or attendants who was especially serviceable and useful to the king, but when he had any business given him to do they would all help him—just so are all these things of assistance when those objects have to be attained. When all men, O king, shall have become by nature pure, then will there be nothing left for a teacher¹ to accomplish. But so long as there is still need of discipleship², so long will even such a man, O king, as the Elder Sâriputta himself (though he had attained to the summit of wisdom by reason of his having been, through countless ages, deeply rooted in merit), yet find it impossible, without discipleship, to attain to Arahatsip³. Therefore is it, O king, that hearing (the Scriptures) is of use, and recitation of them, and asking questions about them. And therefore is it that those also who are addicted to

¹ 'Who is a Buddha' adds *Hīnaśi-kumburê* (p. 372).

² *Savanena*, literally 'bearing.'

³ *Āsavakkhayam*, literally 'to the destruction of the *Āsavas*;' that is, of the Great Evils, which are lust, dulness, becoming, and ignorance. Mr. Trenckner marks this passage as corrupt, but *Hīnaśi-kumburê* seems to have had the same reading before him as Mr. Trenckner has selected from his MSS., except that he has not had any mark of punctuation after the word *hoti*.

The particular occasion on which Sâriputta became finally free from the *Āsavas* is related in the *Dīgha-nakha Suttanta*, No. 74 in the *Magghima Nikāya* (vol. i, p. 50 of Mr. Trenckner's edition for the Pāli Text Society).

these things, becoming free from the obstacles thereto, attain to Arahats¹hip¹.'

'Right well have you made me understand this puzzle, Nāgasena. That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the obstacles.]

[DILEMMA THE SIXTY-SECOND.]

THE LAY ARAHAT.]

7. 'Venerable Nāgasena, your people say :

"Whosoever has attained, as a layman, to Arahats¹hip, one of two conditions are possible to him, and no other—either that very day he enters the Order, or he dies away, for beyond that day he cannot last²."

[265] 'Now if, Nāgasena, he could not, on that day, procure a teacher or preceptor, or a bowl and set of robes³, would he then, being an Arahats¹hip, admit himself, or would he live over the day, or would some other Arahats¹hip suddenly appear by the power of Iddhi and admit him, or would he die away?'

'He could not, O king, because he is an Arahats¹hip, admit himself. For any one admitting himself to

¹ Literally 'therefore is it that recitation, &c., is a condition free from the obstacles, and unmade' (the Unmade being also one of the many epithets of Arahats¹hip).

² This passage has not yet been traced in the Piṭakas.

³ All these are necessary to one who is a candidate for admission to the Order—the teacher and preceptor being, as it were, his proposer and seconder; and no one being admitted who is not already provided with a bowl and a set of robes.

the Order is guilty of theft¹. And he could not last beyond that day. Whether another Arahāt should happen, or not, to arrive, on that very day would he die away.'

'Then, Nāgasena, by whatever means attained, the holy condition of Arahātship is thereby also lost, for destruction of life is involved in it.'

8. 'It is the condition of laymanship which is at fault, O king. In that faulty condition, and by reason of the weakness of the condition itself, the layman who, as such, has attained to Arahātship must either, that very day, enter the Order or die away. That is not the fault of Arahātship, O king. It is laymanship that is at fault, through not being strong enough.

'Just, O king, as food, that guards the growth and protects the life of all beings, will, through indigestion, take away the life of one whose stomach is unequal to it, whose internal fire is low and weak—just so if a layman attains Arahātship when in that condition unequal to it, then by reason of the weakness of the condition he must, that very day, either enter the Order or die away.

'Or just, O king, as a tiny blade of grass when a heavy rock is placed upon it will, through its weakness, break off and give way—just so when a layman attains Arahātship, then, unable to support Arahātship in that condition, he must, that very day, either enter the Order or die away.

'Or just, O king, as a poor weak fellow of low birth and little ability, if he came into possession of

¹ 'Inasmuch as he would be taking a dress to which he was not entitled' is Hīnaśi-kumburē's gloss.

a great and mighty kingdom, would be unable to support the dignity of it¹—just so if a layman attains to Arahatship, then is he unable, in that condition, to support it. [266] And that is the reason why he must, on that very day, either enter the Order or die away.’

‘Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to the lay Arahats.]

[DILEMMA THE SIXTY-THIRD.]

THE FAULTS OF THE ARAHAT.]

9. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, can an Arahats be thoughtless²?’

‘The Arahats, O king, have put thoughtlessness far from them. They are never inadvertent.’

‘But can an Arahats be guilty of an offence?’

‘Yes, O king.’

‘In what respect?’

‘In the construction of his cell³, or in his intercourse (with the other sex)⁴, or in imagining the wrong time (for the midday meal) to be the right

¹ We have had the same simile above, IV, 6, 30.

² Compare the note on *Kullavagga* V, 9, 5.

³ Which must not exceed certain dimensions, &c. See the 6th *Samghādisesa* (‘*Vinaya Texts*,’ I, pp. 8, 9).

⁴ *Saṅkharitte*. Perhaps only the 5th *Samghādisesa* (loc. cit.) is here referred to, but *Hīnaśi-kumburē* (p. 375) takes it in a much more extended sense, as referring to all the restrictions, as to time and place, &c., laid down for the guidance of the brethren in their relations with women.

time¹, or when he has been invited (to a meal²) forgetting the invitation, or in taking to be "left over³" food which has not been left over.'

'But, venerable Nāgasena, your people say:

"Those who commit offences do so from one of two reasons, either out of carelessness or out of ignorance⁴."

'Now, is the Arahāt careless that he commits offences?'

'No, O king.'

'Then if the Arahāt commits offences, and yet is not careless, he must be capable of thoughtlessness.'

'He is not capable of thoughtlessness, and yet the Arahāt may be guilty of offences.'

'Convince me then by a reason. What is the reason of this?'

10. 'There are two kinds of sins, O king—those which are a breach of the ordinary moral law, and those which are a breach of the Rules (of the Order). And what is a breach of the ordinary moral law? The ten modes of evil action⁵ (killing, theft,

¹ It is curious that the well-known rule as to not eating solid food after sunturn at noon is not expressly stated in the Pātimokkha, or indeed anywhere in the Vinaya. But it is often implied. See, for instance, the 37th Pāṭittiya Rule; Mahāvagga VI, 19, 2; VI, 33, 2; VI, 40, 3; Kullavagga V, 25, &c.

² See the Pāṭittiya Rules, Nos. 32 and 46.

³ A Bhikkhu may not, except for certain special reasons, such as sickness, either keep or eat food which has been left over after the principal meal. See the 35th Pāṭittiya Rule. Hīnaśi-kumburē (pp. 374-376) goes at great length into the full meaning of these five technical terms of the Buddhist Canon Law, giving examples under each.

⁴ Not traced as yet. 'Ignorance of the Sikshāpadas' says the Simhalese (p. 376).

⁵ Dasa akusala-kamma-pathā. See Childers sub voce.

unchastity, lying, slander, harsh language, frivolous talk, covetousness, malice, and false doctrine). These things are against the moral law. And what is a breach of the Rules? Whatever is held in the world as unfitting and improper for Samanas, but is not wrong for laymen—things concerning which the Blessed One laid down rules for his disciples, not to be transgressed by them their lives long. Eating after sunturn, O king, is not wrong to those in the world, but is wrong to those in the religion (the Order) of the Conquerors. Doing injury to trees and shrubs is no offence in the eyes of the world, but it is wrong in the religion. The habit of sporting in the water is no offence to a layman, but it is wrong in the religion. And many other things of a similar kind, O king, are right in the world, but wrong in the religion of the Conquerors. This is what I mean by a breach of the Rules. Now the Arahat (he in whom the Great Evils are destroyed) is incapable of sinning against whatever is moral law, but he may unawares be guilty of an offence against the rules of the Order. [267] It is not within the province of every Arahat to know everything, nor indeed in his power. He may be ignorant of the personal or family name of some woman or some man. He may be ignorant of some road over the earth. But every Arahat would know about emancipation, and the Arahat gifted with the six modes of transcendental knowledge¹ would know what lies within their scope, and an omniscient Tathâgata, O king, would know all things.'

¹ Cha/abhiññô—which every Arahat is not.

‘Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to the faults
of the Arahats.]

[DILEMMA THE SIXTY-FOURTH.]

WHAT IS, BUT NOT IN THE WORLD.]

11. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, there are to be seen in the world Buddhas, and Paṭṭhaka-Buddhas, and disciples of the Tathâgatas, and sovran overlords, and kings over one country, and gods and men;—we find rich and poor, happy and miserable;—we find men who have become women, and women who have become men—there are good deeds and evil, and beings experiencing the result of their virtue or their vice;—we find creatures born from eggs, and in the water, and in sediment, or springing into life by the mere apparitional birth; creatures without feet, bipeds and quadrupeds, and creatures with many feet;—we find Yakkhas and Rakkhasas, and Kum-bhandas, and Asuras, and Dânavas, and Gandhabbas, and Petas and Pisâkas, and Kinnaras, and Mahoragas, and Nâgas and Supannas¹, and magicians and sorcerers;—there are elephants, and horses, and cattle, and buffaloes, and camels, and asses, and goats, and sheep, and deer, and swine, and lions, and tigers, and leopards, and bears, and wolves, and hyenas, and dogs, and jackals, and many kinds of birds;—there is gold and silver, and the pearl, and

¹ Fairies and goblins of various degrees and powers, most of them not mentioned in the Piṭakas.

the diamond, and the chauk, and rock, and coral, and the ruby, and the Masâra stone, and the cat's-eye, and crystal, and quartz, and iron ore¹, and copper, and brass², and bronze;—there is flax, and silk, and cotton, and hemp³, and wool;—there is rice, and paddy, and barley, and millet, and kudrûsa grain, and beans⁴, and wheat, and oilseed, and vetches;—there are perfumes prepared from roots, and sap, and pith, and bark, and [268] leaves, and flowers, and fruit, and of all other sorts;—we find grass, and creepers, and shrubs, and trees, and medicinal herbs, and forests, and rivers, and mountains, and seas, and fish, and tortoises,—all is in the world. Tell me, Sir, what there is, then, which is not in the world.'

12. 'There are three things, O king, which you cannot find in the world. And what are the three? That which, whether conscious or unconscious, is not subject to decay and death—that you will not find. That quality of anything, (organic or inorganic), which is not impermanent—that you will not find. And in the highest sense there is no such thing as being possessed of being⁵.'

¹ Kâ/a-loha, 'black metal' (not found in the Piṭakas).

² Va//a-loha, 'round metal.' I can only guess what this is. The Sinhalese has simply wa/aloha, which is equally unintelligible. The word occurs again below (p. 331 of the Pāli), and Hīnaśi-kumburê there renders it *toesi*, which is a particular kind of brazen vessel.

³ Two kinds are mentioned, sâṇa and bhaṅga. I don't know the difference between them. The Sinhalese has sana and baṅ-kâlpê.

⁴ Three kinds of Phaseoli are mentioned, Varaka, Mugga, and Mâsa.

⁵ Paramatthena sattûpaladdhi natthi. It is very curious

‘Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the puzzle as to what is not in the world.]

[DILEMMA THE SIXTY-FIFTH.

THINGS WITHOUT A CAUSE.]

13. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, there are found beings in the world who have come into existence through Karma, and others who are the result of a cause, and others produced by the seasons¹. Tell me—is there any thing that does not fall under any one of these three heads?’

‘There are two such things, O king. And what are the two? Space, O king, and Nirvâna.’

‘Now do not spoil the word of the Conquerors, Nâgasena, nor answer a question without knowing what you say!’

‘What, pray, is it I have said, O king, that you should address me thus?’

‘Venerable Nâgasena, that is right what you said in respect of space. But with hundreds of reasons

that both here, and in the analogous phrase at III, 5, 6 (p. 71 of the Pâli), Hînañi-kumburê should merely repeat the words in the text. Both of these curt summaries of the deepest Buddhist doctrine were probably as ambiguous to him as they are to us. The literal translation of the phrase here would be, ‘In the highest sense there is no acquisition of a being.’ As in Buddhism being cannot strictly be predicated of any thing, or of any god or animal or man,—each is really only becoming—the sense probably meant must be very nearly as I have ventured to render.

¹ Utu-nibbattâ; which the Sinhalese repeats. See the next dilemma on ‘Karma-born, cause-born, and season-born.’

did the Blessed One proclaim to his disciples the way to the realisation of *Nirvâna*. And yet you say that *Nirvâna* is not the result of any cause!’

‘No doubt, O king, the Blessed One gave hundreds of reasons for our entering on the way to the realisation of *Nirvâna*. But he never told us of a cause out of which *Nirvâna* could be said to be produced.’

14. ‘Now in this, *Nâgasena*, we have passed from darkness into greater darkness, [269] from a jungle into a denser jungle, from a thicket into a deeper thicket—inasmuch as you say there is a cause for the realisation of *Nirvâna*, but no cause from which it can arise. If, *Nâgasena*, there be a cause of the realisation of *Nirvâna*, then we must expect to find a cause of the origin of *Nirvâna*. Just, *Nâgasena*, as because the son has a father, therefore we ought to expect that that father had a father—or because the pupil has a teacher, therefore we ought to expect that the teacher had a teacher—or because the plant came from a seed, therefore we ought to expect that the seed too had come from a seed¹—so, *Nâgasena*, if there be a reason for the realisation of *Nirvâna*, we ought to expect that there is a reason too for its origin,—just as if we saw the top of a tree, or of a creeper, we should conclude that it had a middle part, and a root.’

‘*Nirvâna*, O king, is unproduceable, and no cause for its origin has been declared.’

‘Come now, *Nâgasena*, give me a reason for this. Convince me by argument, so that I may know how

¹ Compare the argument based above, II, 3, 2, on this and similar series.

it is that while there is a cause that will bring about the realisation of *Nirvâna*, there is no cause that will bring about *Nirvâna* itself.'

15. 'Then, O king, give ear attentively, and listen well, and I will tell you what the reason is. Could a man, O king, by his ordinary power, go up from hence to the *Himâlaya*, the king of mountains?'

'Yes, Sir, he could.'

'But could a man, by his ordinary power, bring the *Himâlaya* mountains here?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'Well! therefore is it that while a cause for the realisation of *Nirvâna* can be declared, the cause of its origin can not. And could a man, O king, by his ordinary power cross over the great ocean in a ship, and so go to the further shore of it?'

'Yes, Sir, he could.'

'But could a man [270] by his ordinary power bring the further shore of the ocean here?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'Well! so is it that while a cause for the realisation of *Nirvâna* can be declared, the cause of its origin can not. And why not? Because *Nirvâna* is not put together of any qualities.'

16. 'What, Sir! is it not put together?'

'No, O king. It is uncompounded, not made of anything. Of *Nirvâna*, O king, it cannot be said that it has been produced, or not been produced, or that it can be produced¹, that it is past or future or present, that it is perceptible by the eye or the ear or the nose or the tongue, or by the sense of touch.'

'But if so, *Nâgasena*, then you are only showing

¹ The *Sinhalese* is here (p. 381) expanded.

us how *Nirvâna* is a condition that does not exist ¹. There can be no such thing as *Nirvâna*.'

'*Nirvâna* exists, O king. And it is perceptible to the mind. By means of his pure heart, refined and straight, free from the obstacles ², free from low cravings, that disciple of the Noble Ones who has fully attained can see *Nirvâna*.'

17. 'Then what, Sir, is *Nirvâna*? Such a *Nirvâna* (I mean) as can be explained by similes ³. Convince me by argument how far the fact of its existence can be explained by similes.'

'Is there such a thing, O king, as wind?'

'Yes, of course.'

'Show it me then, I pray you, O king—whether by its colour, or its form, whether as thin or thick, or short or long!'

'But wind, *Nâgasena*, cannot be pointed out in that way ⁴. It is not of such a nature that it can be taken into the hand or squeezed. But it exists all the same.'

'If you can't show me the wind, then there can't be such a thing.'

'But I know there is, *Nâgasena*. That wind

¹ *Natthidhammaṃ nibbānaṃ upadisatha*. Compare the use of *atthi-dhammaṃ nibbānaṃ*, at p. 316 (of the Pāli). I take the compound to mean either 'has the quality (or condition) of not existing,' or 'is a condition that is not.' And the latter is more in harmony with the analogous phrase *atthisattā devā* (p. 317 of the Pāli) since that can only mean 'gods, which are beings that are.'

² Lust, malice, pride, sloth, and doubt.

³ *Hīnaśi-kumburē* puts the stop, not after *nibbānaṃ* as Mr. Trenckner does, but after *opammehi*.

⁴ On the connotation of *upadassayitum*, see pp. 316, 347, of the Pāli.

exists I am convinced ¹, [271] though I cannot show it you.'

'Well! just so, O king, does Nirvâna exist, though it cannot be shown to you in colour or in form ².'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to Nirvâna.]

[DILEMMA THE SIXTY-SIXTH.

MODES OF PRODUCTION.]

18. 'Venerable Nâgasena, what are they who are said, in this connection, to be "Karma-born," and "cause-born," and "season-born"? And what is it that is none of these?'

'All beings, O king, who are conscious, are Karma-born (spring into existence as the result of Karma). Fire, and all things growing out of seeds, are cause-born (the result of a pre-existing material cause). The earth, and the hills, water, and wind—all these are season-born (depend for their existence on reasons connected with weather). Space and Nirvâna exist independently alike of Karma, and cause,

¹ Me hadaye anupavi//ham, literally 'has entered into my heart.' But Hīnaś-kumburê takes vâto atthîti as dependent on gâṇâmi, and renders these three words by 'it (the wind) has entered into my heart,' and then adds, by way of gloss, 'and has struck against my body, and travels through the sky.' In another passage below, IV, 8, 65 (p. 317 of the Pâli), this same word anupavi//ham recurs in a clause the sense of which is doubtful; and there Hīnaś-kumburê explains it quite differently. It looks very much as if we had here an idiom peculiar to our author; but one cannot of course be sure on any such point till the Piṭakas are all published.

² The same simile is used below, p. 317 (of the Pâli).

and seasons. Of Nirvâṇa, O king, it cannot be said that it is Karma-born or cause-born or season-born ; that it has been, or has not been, or can be produced, that it is past or future or present, that it is perceptible by the eye or the nose or the ear or the tongue or by the sense of touch. But it is perceptible, O king, by the mind. By means of his pure heart, refined and straight, free from the obstacles, free from low cravings, that disciple of the Noble Ones who has fully attained can see Nirvâṇa.'

'Well has this delightful puzzle, venerable Nāgasena, been examined into, cleared of doubt, brought into certitude. My perplexity has been put an end to as soon as I consulted you, O best of the best of the leaders of schools !'

[Here ends the dilemma as to modes of
production.]

[DILEMMA THE SIXTY-SEVENTH.

DEAD DEMONS.]

19. 'Venerable Nāgasena, are there such things as demons (Yakkhâ) in the world ?'

'Yes, O king.'

'Do they ever leave that condition' (fall out of that phase of existence) ?

'Yes, they do.'

'But, if so, why is it that the remains of those dead Yakkhas are never found, nor any odour of their corpses smelt ?'

'[272] Their remains are found, O king, and an odour does arise from their dead bodies. The remains of bad Yakkhas can be seen in the form of

worms and beetles and ants and moths and snakes and scorpions and centipedes, and birds and wild beasts.'

'Who else, O Nāgasena, could have solved this puzzle except one as wise as you!'

[Here ends the dilemma as to dead demons.]

[DILEMMA THE SIXTY-EIGHTH.

THE METHOD OF PROMULGATING THE RULES.]

20. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those who were teachers of the doctors in times gone by—Nārada¹, and Dhammantari², and Aṅgīrasa³, and Kapila⁴, and Kandaraggisāma, and Atula, and Pubba Kaṭṭhāyana⁵—all these teachers knowing thoroughly, and of themselves, and without any omission, the rise of disease and its cause and nature and progress and cure and treatment and management⁶,—each of them composed his treatise en bloc, taking time by the forelock, and pointing out that in such and such a body such and such a disease would arise. Now no one of these

¹ No doubt the celebrated Devārshi is meant, though it is odd to find him in a list of physicians.

² In Sanskrit Dhanvantarī, the physician of the gods. He is mentioned in the *Gāṭaka* IV, 496, with Bhoga and Vetaraṇī, as a well-known physician of old famous for the cure of snake-bite.

³ The connection of Aṅgīrasa with the physicians is due to the charms against disease to be found in the *Atharva-veda*.

⁴ Kapila is known in the Brahman literature as a teacher of philosophy rather than of medicine.

⁵ Probably 'the Eastern Kaṭṭhāyana,' but nothing is known of these last three names. Hīnaśī-kumburē calls all seven 'Rishis.'

⁶ Siddhāsiddham, for which Hīnaśī-kumburē (p. 385), who merely repeats all the other terms, has sādhyāsādhyā.

was omniscient. Why then did not the Tathâgata, who was omniscient, and who knew by his insight of a Buddha what would happen in the future, determining in advance that for such and such an occasion such and such a rule would be required, lay down the whole code of rules at once ; instead of laying them down to his disciples from time to time as each occasion arose, when the disgrace (of the wrong act) had been already noised abroad, when the evil was already wide spread and grown great, when the people were already filled with indignation¹ ?

21. 'The Tathâgata, O king, knew very well that in fulness of time the whole of the hundred and fifty Rules² would have to be laid down to those men. But the Tathâgata, O king, thought thus : "If I were to lay down the whole of the hundred and fifty Rules at once the people would be filled with fear [273], those of them who were willing to enter the Order would refrain from doing so, saying, 'How much is there here to be observed ! how difficult a thing is it to enter religion according to the system of the Samana Gotama'—they would not trust my words, and through their want of faith they would be liable to rebirth in states of woe. As occasion arises therefore, illustrating it with a religious discourse, will I lay down, when the evil has become manifest, each Rule."'

'A wonderful thing is it in the Buddhas, Nâgasena, and a most marvellous that the omniscience of the Tathâgata should be so great. That is just so,

¹ This question has already been discussed above, III, 6, 2 (I, 116).

² The rules of the Pâtimokkha are 227 in number, but without the Sekhiyas they are 152.

venerable Nāgasena. This matter was well understood by the Tathāgata—how that hearing that so much was to be observed, men¹ would have been so filled with fear that not a single one would have entered religion according to the system of the Conquerors. That is so, and I accept it as you say².

[Here ends the dilemma as to the method in which the Rules were laid down.]

[DILEMMA THE SIXTY-NINTH.
THE HEAT OF THE SUN.]

22. 'Venerable Nāgasena, does this sun always burn fiercely, or are there times when it shines with diminished heat?'

'It always burns fiercely, O king, never gently.'

'But if that be so, how is it that the heat of the sun is sometimes fierce, and sometimes not³?'

23. 'There are four derangements⁴, O king, which happen to the sun, and affected by one or other of these its heat is allayed. And what are the four? The clouds, O king, and fog⁵, and

¹ Sattā, literally 'beings,' but that means human beings, men and women, as no others (gods, Nāgas, animals, &c.) were admitted to the Order. See Mahāvagga I, 63; I, 76, 1; Kullavagga X, 17, 1.

² In the Introductory Stories to the Rules it is often stated, how, when a Bhikkhu had done some act, the people were indignant, the brethren heard that and reported the matter to the Blessed One, who then, and then only, laid down the Rule prohibiting that act. But these Introductory Stories are really later than the Rules.

³ Here Hīnaṣi-kumburē (pp. 386-7) goes into great details, giving instances, and quoting verses.

⁴ Rogā, literally 'diseases.'

⁵ Mahikā. Childers gives frost as the only meaning of this word.

smoke¹, and eclipses²—these are the four derangements which happen to the sun, and it is when affected by one or other of these that its heat is allayed.’

‘Most wonderful, Nāgasena, and most strange [274] that even the sun, so transcendent in glory, should suffer from derangement—how much more than other, lesser, creatures. No one else could have made this explanation except one wise like you !’

[Here ends the dilemma as to the heat
of the sun.]

[DILEMMA THE SEVENTIETH.
THE SEASONS.]

24. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, why is it that the heat of the sun is more fierce in winter than in summer?’

‘In the hot season, O king, dust is blown up³ into clouds, and pollen⁴ agitated by the winds rises up into the sky, and clouds multiply in the heavens, and gales blow with exceeding force. All these crowded and heaped together shut off the rays of the sun, and so in the hot season the heat of the sun is diminished. But in the cold season, O king, the earth below is at rest, the rains above are

¹ Megho, literally ‘rain-cloud.’ But clouds of smoke are meant, as is clear from the parallel passage loc. cit. which has dhuma-rago, but see Kullavagga XII, 1, 3 (from which the whole section IV, 7, 23 is derived).

² Rāhu.

³ Anupahataṃ. Compare Dr. Morris’s note in the ‘Journal of the Pāli Text Society,’ 1884, p. 75, on Therā Gāthā 625.

⁴ Renū. Perhaps this should again be rendered dust. See the verse at Gāṭaka I, 117 (which is nearly the same as Divyāvadāna, p. 491).

in reserve¹, the dust is quiet, the pollen wanders gently through the air, the sky is free from clouds, and very gently do the breezes blow. Since all these have ceased to act the rays of the sun become clear, and freed from every obstruction the sun's heat glows and burns. This, O king, is the reason why the heat of the sun is more fierce in winter than in summer.

'So it is when set free from the obstacles besetting it that the sun burns fiercely, which it cannot do when the rains and so on are present with it.'

['Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say².']

[Here ends the dilemma of the seasons³.]

Here ends the Seventh Chapter⁴.

¹ Mahā-megho upa//hito hoti, which is very ambiguous. The Sinhalese (p. 389) has mahā meghaya pa/an-gannā-lada wanneya.

² Inserted from Hīnaś-kumburê.

³ There is great uncertainty at present as to the views held, first in the *Piṭakas* and later in the *Commentaries*, regarding the calculation of time and the division of years into months and seasons. Our author here seems to regard the year as divided into two seasons only, Hemanta and Gimha. But Hemanta is usually supposed to last only from the 1st November (that is the middle of Kattika) to the beginning of March (that is the middle of Phagguni), Gimhāna for the next four months (March 1st–June 30th), and Vassāna the remaining four (July–October)—the year being thus divided into three equal cold, hot, and rainy seasons. At Mahāvagga VIII, 24, 3 there is a division of the year into unequal dry and wet seasons (utu and vassāna), and at Gâtaka I, 86 it is said that vasanta-samayo begins when hemanta ends at the full moon of Phagguni. As our author places the characteristic events of the rainy season in the hot season, he cannot have had the division into three seasons in his mind.

⁴ 'Of the excellent Saddharmādāsa' says the Sinhalese.

BOOK IV. CHAPTER 8.

[DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-FIRST.

VESSANTARA'S GIVING¹.]

1. 'Venerable Nâgasena, do all the Bodisats give away their wives and children, or was it only Vessantara the king who did so?'

'All of them do so, not Vessantara only.'

[275] 'Do they then give them away with their own consent?'

'The wife, O king, was a consenting party. But the children, by reason of their tender age, lamented. Had they thoroughly understood, they too would have approved.'

'A hard thing, Nâgasena, was it that the Bodisat carried out, in that he gave away his own children, his only ones, dearly beloved, into slavery to the Brahman. And this second action was harder still, that he bound his own children, his only ones, and dearly beloved, young and tender though they were, with the jungle rope, and then, when he saw them being dragged along² by the Brahman,—their hands

¹ We have seen above, IV, 1, 41 (I, 178), how Hīnaśi-kumburē expanded the story of Vessantara, which had aroused also in our author a greater enthusiasm than any of the many other subjects that he treats. Here too the Sinhalese translator fairly runs riot over the 'mighty giving of the glorious king,' and expands the ten pages of the Pāli into thirty-three pages of his version (pp. 389-421), whereas usually one page of the Sinhalese covers very nearly a page of the Pāli.

² Anumaggiyante. See Mr. Trenckner's note. But the

bruised by the creeper,—yet could look on at the sight. And this third action was even harder still, that when his boy ran back to him, after loosing the bonds by his own exertion, then he bound him again with the jungle rope and again gave him away. And this fourth action was even harder still, that when the children, weeping, cried: “Father dear, this ogre is leading us away to eat us!” he should have appeased them by saying: “Don’t be afraid.” And this fifth action was even harder still, that when the prince, *Gāli*, fell weeping at his feet, and besought him, saying: “Be satisfied, father dear, only keep *Kaṇhâginâ* (his little sister). I will go away with the ogre. Let him eat me!”—that even then he would not yield. And this sixth action was even harder still, that when the boy *Gāli*, lamenting, exclaimed: “Have you a heart of stone then, father, that you can look upon us, miserable, being led away by the ogre into the dense and haunted jungle, and not call us back?”—that he still had no pity. And this seventh action was even harder still, that when his children were thus led away to nameless horrors until they passed gradually to their bitter fate¹, out of sight—that then his heart did not break, utterly break! What, pray, has the man who seeks to gain merit to do with bringing sorrow on others! Should he not rather give himself away?’

2. ‘It is because what he did, O king, was so

Siṃhalese (p. 390) has at mardanaya ko/a welannawun dœka.

¹ *Rû/arû/assa bhîmabbhîmassa*. The *Siṃhalese* (p. 390) omits these words, giving other details in place of them, and as they occur only here I am not sure of their meaning.

difficult, that the sound of the fame of the Bodisat was spread abroad among gods and men through the ten thousand world systems—[276] that the gods exalt him in heaven; and the Titans in the Titan-world, and the Garuḍas in their abodes, and the Nāgas in the Nāga-world, and the Yakshas where they dwell—that through the ages the reputation of this his glory has been handed down by successive tradition—till now, to-day, it has reached to this meeting of ours, at which we sitting are, forsooth, disparaging and casting a slur on that gift¹, debating whether it were well given or ill! But that high praise, O king, shows forth the ten great qualities of the intelligent, and wise, and able, and subtle-minded Bodisats. And what are the ten? Freedom from greed, the not clinging (to any worldly aim), self-sacrifice, renunciation, the never turning back again (to the lower state), the equal delicacy and greatness, the incomprehensibility, the rarity, and the peerlessness of Buddhahood. In all these respects is it that the fame of that giving shows forth the great qualities of the Bodisats.'

3. 'What, venerable Nāgasena? he who gives gifts in such a way as to bring sorrow upon others—does that giving of his bring forth fruit in happiness, does it lead to rebirth in states of bliss?'

'Yes, O king. What can be said (to the contrary)?'

'I pray you, Nāgasena, give me a reason for this.'

'Suppose, O king, there were some virtuous Samāna or Brahman, of high character, and he were

¹ Vikittentā vikopentā. Hīnaś-kumburē (p. 410) has 'angrily finding fault with.' Compare above, vikopanā, at p. 266 (of the Pāli).

paralysed, or a cripple¹, or suffering from some disease or other, and some man desirous of merit were to have him put into a carriage, and taken to the place he wished to go to. Would happiness accrue to that man by reason thereof, would that be an act leading to rebirth in states of bliss?’

‘Yes, Sir. What can be said (to the contrary)? That man would thereby acquire a trained elephant, or a riding-horse, or a bullock-carriage, on land a land-vehicle and on water a water-vehicle, in heaven a vehicle of the gods² and on earth one that men could use,—from birth to birth there would accrue to him that which in each would be appropriate and fit,—and joys appropriate would come to him, and he would pass from state to state of bliss, and by the efficacy of that act mounting on the vehicle of Iddhi he would arrive at the longed-for goal, the city of Nirvâṇa itself.’

‘But then, O king, a gift given in such a way as to bring sorrow upon others does bring forth fruit in happiness, does lead to rebirth in states of bliss [277],—inasmuch as that man by putting the cart-bullocks to pain would attain such bliss.

4. ‘And hear another reason, O king, for the same thing. Suppose some monarch were to raise from his subjects a righteous tax, and then by the issue of a command were to bestow thereout a gift, would that monarch, O king, enjoy any happiness on that account, would that be a gift leading to rebirth in states of bliss?’

¹ Pakkha-hato vâ pīḥa-sappī vâ. See the note above on IV, 6, 22.

² Devayāna, on which compare Sutta Nipāta, verse 139 (Vasala Sutta 24).

‘Certainly, Sir. What can be said against it? On that account the monarch would receive a hundred thousandfold, he might become a king of kings, a god above the gods, or Brahmâ lord of the Brahma gods, or a chief among the Samanas, or a leader of the Brahmans, or the most excellent among the Arahats.’

‘Then, O king, a gift given in such a way as to bring sorrow upon others does bring forth fruit in happiness, does lead to rebirth in states of bliss—inasmuch as that monarch by giving as a gift what was gained by harassing his people with taxation would enjoy such exceeding fame and glory.’

5. ‘But, venerable Nâgasena, what was given by Vessantara the king was an excessive gift; in that he gave his own wife as wife to another man, and his own children, his only ones, into slavery to a Brahman. And excessive giving is by the wise in the world held worthy of censure and of blame. Just, Nâgasena, as under too much weight the axle-tree of a cart would break, or a ship would sink, as his food would disagree with him who ate too much, or the crops would be ruined by too heavy rain, or bankruptcy would follow too lavish generosity, or fever would come from too much heat, or a man would go mad from excessive lust, or become guilty of an offence through excessive anger, or fall into sin through excessive stupidity, or into the power of robbers through too much avarice, or be ruined by needless fear, or as a river would overflow through excessive inflow, or a thunderbolt fall through too much wind, or porridge boil over through too hot a fire, or a man who wandered

about too much¹ would not live long—just so, Nāgasena, is excessive giving held by the wise in the world as worthy of censure and of blame. And as king Vessantara's gift was excessive [278] no good result could be expected from it.'

6. 'Giving exceedingly², O king, is praised, applauded, and approved by the wise in the world; and they who give away anything as a gift just as it may occur to them³, acquire fame in the world as very generous givers. Just, O king, as when a man has taken hold of a wild root which by its extraordinary virtues is divine, that moment he becomes invisible even to those standing within arm's length—just as a medicinal herb by the exceeding power of its nature will utterly kill pain, and put an end to disease—just as fire burns by its exceeding heat, and water puts that fire out by its exceeding cold—just as by its exceeding purity a lotus remains undefiled by water or by mud—just as a (magic) gem by the extraordinary virtue inherent in it procures the granting of every wish—just as lightning by its marvellous quick sharpness cleaves asunder even the diamonds, pearls, and crystals—just as the earth by its exceeding size can support men, and snakes, and wild beasts, and birds, and the waters,

¹ *Atisaññārena*, which the Sinhalese merely repeats. The meaning is doubtful. The use of *saññā* at *Gâtaka* II, 112 has suggested the above rendering.

² The whole of this answer turns on the ambiguity of the prefix *ati*, which may mean either 'very much' or 'too much.'

³ *Yâdisam kîdisam*. The meaning of this idiom cannot be controlled by parallel passages, as I know of none. *Hînañ-kumburê* (pp. 412-413) construes *yâdisam* as an accusative dependent on *atidânadâyî*; 'Those who give away anything as a gift, acquire fame in the world as exceeding givers of that.'

and rocks, and hills, and trees—just as the ocean by its exceeding greatness can never be quite filled—just as Sineru by its mighty weight remains immovable, and space by the greatness of its wide extent is infinite, and the sun by its mighty glory dissipates the darkness—just as the lion in the greatness of its lineage is free from fear—just as a wrestler in the greatness of his might easily lifts up his foe—just as a king by the excellence of his justice becomes overlord, and a Bhikkhu by reason of his very righteousness becomes an object of reverence to Nāgas, and Yakshas, and men, and Māras—just as a Buddha by the excellence of his supremacy is peerless—just so, O king, is exceeding generosity praised, applauded, and approved by the wise in the world; and they who give away anything as a gift, just as it may occur to them, acquire in the world the fame of being nobly generous. And by his mighty giving Vessantara the king, O king, was praised, and lauded, and exalted, and magnified, and famous throughout the ten thousand world systems, and by reason, too, of that mighty giving is it that he, the king Vessantara, has, now in our days, become the Buddha, the chief of gods and men.

7. 'And now, O king, tell me—is there anything in the world which should be withheld as a gift, and not bestowed, when one worthy of a gift, one to whom it is one's duty to give¹, is there?'

¹ *Dakkhiṇeyya*. We have no word in English to express the full meaning of this word. It was an idea that was common ground to our Buddhist apologist, and to the Brahman opponents whom he always has in view, that there were certain people to whom gifts ought to be given, and the being worthy was one of the conditions precedent to belonging to this class. Of course the

‘There are ten sorts of gifts, Nāgasena, in the world that are commonly disapproved of as gifts. And what are the ten? Strong drink, Nāgasena, and festivals in high places¹, and women, and buffaloes, and suggestive [279] paintings², and weapons, and poison, and chains, and fowls, and swine, and false weights and measures. All these, Nāgasena, are disapproved of in the world as gifts, and those who give such presents become liable to rebirth in states of woe.’

‘I did not ask you, O king, what kinds of gifts are not approved of. But this, O king, I asked: “Is there anything in the world which ought to be withheld, and not bestowed as a gift, if one worthy of a gift were present?”’

‘No, Sir. When faith arises in their hearts some give food to those worthy of gifts, and some give clothes, and some give bedding, and some give dwellings, and some give mats or robes, and some give slave girls or slaves, and some give fields or premises, and some give bipeds or quadrupeds, and

Brahmans held that to be a Brahman was another condition, but the Buddhist, who inherited the idea from them, had discarded this part of the conception. See, for the Brahman view, Eggeling’s *Satapatha-Brāhmana* II, 114, 344.

¹ *Samagga-dānam*. Childers under *samaggā* gives only the meaning ‘assembly,’ but it is clear from *Kullavagga* V, 26; VI, 2, 7; the *Sutta Vibhaṅga* II, 267, and *Sumaṅgala* I, 84, that the word, at least as a masculine (which it is here), has the technical sense of one of those orgies in high places which were common in so many parts of the world in very early times, and were due in India to Kolarian influences. The ‘giving’ (*dāna*) of such a *samagga* would doubtless mean the providing of the necessary food, seats, cushions, &c.

² *Kitta-kammam*. See my note on *Paṭibhāna-kittam* at ‘*Vinaya Texts*,’ III, 172.

some give a hundred¹ or a thousand or a hundred thousand, and some give the kingdom itself, and some give away even their own life.'

'But then, O king, if some give away even their own lives, why do you so violently attack² Vessantara, that king of givers, for the virtuous bestowal of his child and wife? Is there not a general practice in the world, an acknowledged custom, according to which it is allowable for a father who has fallen into debt, or lost his livelihood, to deposit³ his son in pledge, or sell him?'

'Yes, that is so.'

'Well, in accordance therewith was it that Vessantara, O king, in suffering and distress at not having obtained the insight of the Omniscient Ones, pledged and sold his wife and children for that spiritual treasure. So that he gave away what other people had given away, he did what other people had done. Why then do you, O king, so violently attack him, the king of givers?'

¹ I. e. pieces of money, which it would be against the rules for a member of the Buddhist Order to accept. But the donees in all these cases are not necessarily Buddhists.

² Paripâtesī, not in Childers; but see *Gâtaka* II, 208; and below, p. 367 (of the Pâli text). *Hînaśi-kumburê* has here *nindâ karanne*, and just below *apasâdanaya karanne*.

³ *Âvapitum*, not in Childers. Dr. Morris, in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society' for 1886, p. 157, compares the Sanskrit root *vyap*, but this does not help us much. *Hînaśi-kumburê* (p. 414) has 'an *toeneka œpaye hinduwanna/a*,' which means, I think, 'to deposit as a pledge in some place or other.' At all events *œpa*, the ordinary word now in use in Ceylon courts for 'bail,' may very well be actually derived from *vâpa*. And the passage at *Gâtaka* I, 321 is an exact parallel to our phrase here, for there the Bodisat, when an elephant, gives away his teeth and tusks as *vâpana* for the insight of the Omniscient Ones.

8. 'Venerable Nâgasena, I don't blame him for giving, but for not having made a barter¹ with the beggar, and given away himself rather, instead of his wife and children.'

[280] 'That, O king, would be an act of a wrong doer, to give himself when he was asked for his wife and children. For the thing asked for, whatever it is, is that which ought to be given. And such is the practice of the good. Suppose, O king, a man were to ask that water should be brought, would any one who then brought him food have done what he wanted?'

'No, Sir. The man who should have given what he first asked to be brought would have done what he wanted.'

'Just so, O king, when the Brahman asked Vessantara the king for his wife and children, it was his wife and children that he gave. If the Brahman, O king, had asked for Vessantara's body, then would Vessantara have not saved his body, he would neither have trembled nor been stained (by the love of self), but would have given away and abandoned his own body. If, O king, any one had come up to Vessantara the king, and asked of him, saying: "Become my slave," then would he have given away and abandoned his own self, and in so giving would he have felt no pain.

9. 'Now the life of king Vessantara, O king, was a good thing shared in by many—just as meats when cooked are shared in by many, or as a tree covered with fruit is shared in by many flocks of

¹ Niminitvâ, also not in Childers; but see *Gâtaka* III, 63, 221.

birds. And why so? Because he had said to himself: "Thus acting may I attain to Buddhahood." As a man in need, O king, who is wandering about in his search after wealth, will have to pass along goat-tracks, and through jungles full of stakes and sticks¹, and doing merchandise by sea and land, will devote his actions, words, and thoughts to the attainment of wealth—just so, O king, did Vessantara, the king of givers, who was longing for the treasure of Buddhahood, for the attainment of the insight of the Omniscient Ones, by offering up to any one who begged of him his property and his corn, his slave girls and his slaves, his riding animals and carriages, all that he possessed, his wife and children and himself, seek after the Supreme Enlightenment. Just, O king, as an official who is anxious for the seal², and for the office of the custody thereof [281], will exert himself to the attainment of the seal by sacrificing everything in his house—property and corn, gold and silver, everything—just so, O king, did Vessantara, the king of givers, by giving away all that he had, inside his house and out³, by giving even his life for others, seek after the Supreme Enlightenment.

10. 'And further, O king, Vessantara, the king of givers, thought thus: "It is by giving to him precisely what he asks for, that I shall be of service

¹ *Agapatham saṅkupatham vettapatham gaḁḁhati*. *Hīnaśi-kumburē*, at p. 416, repeats the words with a gloss on the two last words, which I have followed.

² *Mudda-kāmo*; *mudra-nam ganam perekkuwa*, says *Hīnaśi-kumburē*, p. 416.

³ *Bāhirabbhantaram dhanam datvā*. I am not sure that I have rightly understood this phrase, which the Sinhalese merely repeats.

to the Brahman:" and therefore did he bestow upon him his wife and children. It was not, O king, out of dislike to them that he gave them away, not because he did not care to see them more, not because he considered them an encumbrance or thought he could no longer support them, not (in annoyance) with the wish of being relieved of what was not pleasant to him—but because the jewel treasure of omniscience was dear to him, for the sake of the insight of the Omniscient Ones, did he bestow that glorious gift,—immeasurable, magnificent, unsurpassed—of what was near and dear to him, greatly beloved, cherished as his own life, his own children and his wife! For it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god of gods, in the *Kariyâ Piṭaka*¹:

"'Twas not through hatred² of my children sweet,
'Twas not through hatred of my queen, Maddt,
Thraller of hearts³—not that I loved them less—
But Buddhahood more, that I renounced them all."

¹ *Kariyâ Piṭaka* I, 9, 53.

² Dessa, that is dreshya, from dvish. Compare diso, 'an enemy.' It occurs also at *Kariyâ Piṭaka* I, 4, 7; 5, 3; 8, 16 (quoted *Gâtaka* IV, 406); II, 4, 11; III, 1, 6 (quoted *Gâtaka* I, 46); III, 2, 16; 3, 10; 6, 18. The effect of the use of this rare poetical word is lost in the English version.

³ Maddt and *Kaṇhâginâ*, the names of Vessantara's wife and daughter, mean respectively 'enthraler (of men's minds),' and 'the dark conquerors (of hearts).' As Vessantara is used in the *Magghima* (I, 386, line 5) as an adjective, not a name, and is applied to the Buddha, it too must have a special meaning. But it can scarcely be connected with *Vaisya*, while we have a very famous epithet in *vaisvânara*, so often applied to the sacred fire as 'common good to all men.' The insertion of the t would explain the shortening of the â, and though there seems to be no sufficient reason for any alteration at all of the older term, this is

11. 'Now at that time, O king, Vessantara, when he had given away his wife and children, entered the leaf hut, and sat down there. And heavy grief fell upon him distressed by his exceeding love for them, and his very heart¹ became hot, and hot breath, too much to find its way through the nose, came and went through his mouth, and tears rolled in drops of blood from his eyes. Such was the grief, O king, with which Vessantara gave to the Brahman his wife and children in the thought that his practice of giving should not be broken in upon. But there were two reasons, O king, why he thus gave them away. What are those two? That his practice of giving should not be interrupted was one; the other was that as a result of his so doing his children, distressed by living with him only on wild roots and fruits, should eventually be set free by their new master. [282] For Vessantara knew, O king: "No one is capable of keeping my children as slaves. Their grandfather will ransom the children, and so they will come back to me." These are the two reasons why he gave his children away to the Brahman.

12. 'And further, O king, Vessantara knew: "This Brahman is worn out, aged, well stricken in years, weak and broken, leaning on a stick, he has drawn near the end of his days, his merit is small, he will not be capable of keeping my children as

probably the real derivation of Vessantara. And the whole legend may well be due to previous stories of the world-wide beneficence of Agni Vairvânara, or of the sun as Vairvânara.

¹ Hadaya-vatthu, 'like a broth-pot foaming over,' is Hîṇaṣṣakumburê's explanation of this phrase (pena nœgena mas soeliyak men hrîdaya wastuwa, p. 417).

slaves." Would a man be able, O king, by his ordinary power, to seize the moon and the sun¹,

¹ *Kandima-suriye*. We should say 'the sun and the moon,' and I cannot think the difference of phraseology is entirely without significance. While the Brahmins put their own caste and order first, the Buddhist texts talk of 'Samanas and Brahmins,' 'Khattiyas and Brahmins.' This has, and no doubt rightly, been held significant of the opinion of the authors. Why should the fact of their always referring, in similar compounds, to the moon before the sun, and to women before men, be less so? Now it is almost always taken for granted that the Buddhists were reformers, as opposed to the Brahmins, who wanted to run still in the ancient grooves. But there is another side of the question that has been entirely overlooked. There is ample evidence in their literature that (at least in certain directions, more especially of religious thought) the Brahmins had been constantly progressive, and their *Brâhmanas* are really the result of reform following on reform. To use a parallel drawn from modern politics, Buddhists are to Brahmins much more like Socialists to Liberals than like Liberals to Conservatives. The Brahmins had worked out in their minds no new complete system, and when they reformed they left the roots of the old order of things in the ground. But in the momentous change from matriarchate to patriarchy they threw all their power and influence on the side of the newer conception. And when, like Kronos to Jupiter, the old gods gave place to the new, it was they who worked out the newer set of ideas—more especially heaven or sun-worship as against moon-worship and all that it involved. We must not forget that a change of dynasty, or of precedence, among the gods was of more importance to men in those times than a change of dynasty among earthly kings. And though the Buddhists it is true, as we ourselves now, cared for none of these things, and were busied with other discussions than the precedence of the sun and moon, they quite quietly and naturally, when they had to choose, adopted the form of words which did not imply an acceptance of the Brahmin position, whose system in other matters they were trying, if not to storm, at least to turn.

We are here in the midst of questions too vast to be discussed with profit in a note. But Buddhism certainly arose among those sections of the community least influenced by the reforms the Brahmins supported. And there is evidence, in the precedence the

mighty and powerful as they are, keeping them in a basket or a box, to use them, deprived of their light, as plates?’

‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘Neither, O king, could any one whatever keep in use, as his slaves, the children of Vessantara, who were to the world like the moon and the sun in glory.

13. ‘And hear another reason, O king, for the same thing¹. That wondrous gem, O king, of a sovran overlord, bright and beautiful, with its eight facets so well cut, four cubits in thickness, and in circumference² as the nave of a cart-wheel, could no man, wrapping it up in a cloth and putting it into a basket, keep and use as a hone³ to grind his scissors⁴ upon. And neither, O king, could any one soever keep in use, as his slaves, the children of Vessantara, like to the jewels of the lord of the world in glory.

14. ‘And hear, O king, another reason. Just as the elephant king Uposatha⁵, gentle and handsome, eight cubits in height and nine in girth and length, showing the signs of rut in three places on his body, all white, sevenfold firm⁶, could never by any one

Buddhists gave to women and to the moon, that the older ideas had not, even then, died out.

¹ These words are repeated before each of the following similes.

² *Parināha*, which Childers is wrong in rendering ‘breadth,’ when not qualified by *āyāma* (*wa/a cettāwū*, says the *Siṃhalese*, p. 418).

³ *Nisāna*; *karagal*, says *Hīnaśi-kumburē*.

⁴ *Satthaka*, see *Kullavagga V*, 11, 1.

⁵ The mythic fairy elephant of the *Kakkavatti* (not a snake king as Prof. E. Müller has it, ‘*Journal of the Pāli Text Society*,’ 1888, p. 16). See my note at ‘*Buddhist Suttas*,’ p. 254.

⁶ *Sattappati*//*hito*. The *Siṃhalese* merely repeats this ambiguous word (compare IV, 8, 57).

be covered up with a saucer¹ or a winnowing fan¹, could never be put into a cowpen like a calf, or made use of as one [283]; just so could no one whatever keep in use, as his slaves, the children of Vessantara, who were, in the world, like Uposatha the elephant king.

15. 'And hear, O king, another reason. Just, O king, as the mighty ocean is great in length and breadth, and deep, not to be measured, and hard to cross, impossible to fathom or to cover up, and no one could close it in and make use of it as a single ferry, just so could no one whatever keep in use, as his slaves, the children of Vessantara, as esteemed in the world as the mighty ocean.

16. 'And hear another reason, O king. Just as the Himâlaya, the king of the mountains, five leagues high, and three thousand leagues in extent at the circumference, with its ranges of eight and forty thousand peaks, the source of five hundred rivers, the dwelling-place of multitudes of mighty creatures², the producer of manifold perfumes, enriched with hundreds of magical drugs, is seen to rise aloft, like a cloud, in the centre (of the earth); like it, O king, could no one whatever keep in use, as his slaves, the children of Vessantara, as esteemed in the world as Himâlaya, the mountain king.

'And hear another reason, O king. Just as a

¹ Suppena vâ sarâvena vâ. Hînaś-kumburê renders the first of these words by kullaka, which is a winnowing-basket; and the second by malâwaka, which I do not understand. But the use of sarâva at Gâtaka I, 8, 14 and Sumaṅgala I, 298 seems to me to confirm Childers's rendering.

² Mahâbhûta: 'Yakshas' says Hînaś-kumburê, p. 419. Compare above, p. 250 (of the Pâli).

mighty bonfire burning on a mountain top would be visible afar off in the darkness and the gloom of night, so was Vessantara the king well known among men, and therefore could no one whatever keep in use, as his slaves, the children of so distinguished a man—for just as at the time of the flowering of the Nâga trees¹ in the Himâlaya mountains, when the soft winds (of spring)² are blowing, the perfume of the flowers is wafted for ten leagues, or for twelve [284], so was the sound of the fame of king Vessantara noised abroad, and the sweet perfume of his righteousness wafted along for thousands of leagues, even up to the abodes of the Akanitt^hā, (the highest of all) gods, passing on its way the dwelling places of the gods and Asuras, of the Garuḍas and Gandhabbas, of the Yakshas and Râkshasas, of the Mahoragas and Kinnaras, and of Indra the monarch of the gods³! Therefore is it that no one could keep his children as slaves.

¹ Nâga-puppha-samaye. Hînaśi-kumburê says, 'at the time when the Nâ trees bloom.' The Nâ or Nâga is the *Mesua ferea*, whose lovely flowers, like those of the Champak, are still in special request for laying before the images of the Buddha in Buddhist temples. I am told that these so-called flowers are not flowers at all, botanically speaking, but young shoots. But it is one of the most beautiful sights in a Ceylon landscape to see this splendid forest tree, lofty and wide-spreading as it is, one mass of what look like red blossoms from crown to root. For at the 'bloom time' it casts all its green leaves, and has the appearance of a scarlet bell. No wonder that this was thought supernatural, and that the tree should be called the Nâga tree. Its timber is so valuable that in Anglo-Indian the tree is called the 'Iron-wood' tree. But it may be regretted that the commercial spirit of the European has substituted this hard name for the 'Fairy tree' of the native languages.

² Ugu-vâta, which the Sinhalese repeats.

³ Compare vol. i, pp. 38, 175.

17. 'And the young prince *Gâli*, O king, was instructed by his father, *Vessantara*, in these words : " When your grandfather, my child, shall ransom you with wealth that he gives to the Brahman, let him buy you back for a thousand ounces of gold¹, and when he ransoms your sister *Kaṇhâginâ* let him buy her back for a hundred slaves and a hundred slave girls and a hundred elephants and a hundred horses and a hundred cows and a hundred buffaloes and a hundred ounces of gold. And if, my child, your grandfather should take you out of the hands of the Brahman by word of command, or by force, paying nothing, then obey not the words of your grandfather, but remain still in subjection² to the Brahman." Such was his instruction as he sent him away. And young *Gâli* went accordingly, and when asked by his grandfather, said :

" As worth a thousand ounces, Sir,
My father gave me to this man ;
As worth a hundred elephants,
He gave the girl *Kaṇhâginâ*."

' Well has this puzzle, *Nâgasena*, been unravelled, well has the net of heresy been torn to pieces, well has the argument of the adversaries been overcome and your own doctrine been made evident, well has the letter (of the Scriptures) been maintained while

¹ *Nikkha-sahassam*. See my ' Ancient Coins and Measures,' pp. 6, 14; *Samyutta Nikâya* II, 3, 9, 9 (*Gâtaka* I, 375, IV, 97; *Ânguttara* III, 73, 3).

² *Anuyâyino*. Not found elsewhere, and not in Childers. But *anuyâyati* occurs below (p. 391 of the text) and an *ânu-yâyin* at *Sutta Nipâta* V, 7, 3, 4 and *Tela-ka-âha-gâthâ* 25 (compare 41). *Hīnaṣi-kumburē* (p. 420) has *anuwa hoesirew*.

you have thus explained its spirit! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to Vessantara's gift of his wife and children.]

[DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-SECOND.
PENANCE.]

18. 'Venerable Nâgasena, did all the Bodisats go through a period of penance, or only Gotama?'

'Not all, O king, but Gotama did.'

'Venerable Nâgasena, if that be so, it is not right that there should be a difference between Bodisat and Bodisat.'

[285] 'There are four matters, O king, in which there is such difference. And what are the four? There is a difference as to the kind of family (in which they are born¹), there is a difference as to their place in the period (which has elapsed since the succession of Buddhas began²), there

¹ Kula-vemattatâ. Those Bodisats who are to become Buddhas in their then lives may be born either in a Brahman or in a Kshatriya family, but in no other.

² Addhâna-vemattatâ, which is ambiguous, as 'period-difference' may mean different things according to the interpretation given to 'period.' Now the Bodisat theory has never been thoroughly worked out in detail. It is clear from the statements given in pp. 38-58 of my 'Buddhist Birth Stories' that the Bodisat who became Gotama the Buddha was held to have been in existence throughout the whole period in which the former twenty-four Buddhas appeared, and this is probably the 'period' intended. Hînañ-kumburê's version (p. 421) is as ambiguous as the Pâli. Spence Hardy gives at p. 87 of his 'Manual of Buddhism' what purports to be a translation of our passage. But it is only a loose paraphrase, and he interprets this 'period-difference' as simply

is a difference as to the length of their individual lives¹, there is a difference as to their individual size². In these four respects, O king, there is a difference between Bodisat and Bodisat. But there is no difference between any of the Buddhas, who are alike in bodily beauty³, in goodness of character, in power of contemplation and of reasoning, in emancipation, in the insight arising from the knowledge of emancipation, in

identical with the next one in the list, the 'length-of-life-difference'—which must be wrong.

It must be remembered that the Bodisats referred to throughout this dilemma are exclusively men—not those mentioned in the *Gâtakas* (who are all Bodisats of the historical Buddha), but only those Bodisats who became Buddhas in the same life—that is, the Buddhas themselves before they reached Buddhahood.

¹ *Âyu-vemattatâ*. This may be due to either of two causes—in the first place they may be born as creatures whose allotted period of life varies. Thus the Bodisat was twenty times Sakka, the king of the gods; and his life would then have lasted hundreds of thousands of years. But he was 106 times an animal of some kind, and then his life would have been of course much shorter. Again, in his births as a man (more than 350 times, see the table in my 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' p. ci), the average duration of men's lives will have varied, according to Buddhist theory, from many centuries down to only a few years. It is in this second sense only that (with *Hīnaśi-kumburê*) we must suppose the phrase *âyu-vemattatâ* to be used—thus excluding all the Bodisats except such as were men. But in the *Gâtaka* stories the average age of man is (with one or two exceptions) normal.

² *Pamâṇa-vemattatâ*, which we must also understand to refer only to the varying average size of mankind, which, according to Buddhist theory, is very great at the commencement, and very small at the close, of a Kalpa. For it is only the men-Bodisats, and only in each series the last man-Bodisat (just before he became 'Buddha'), concerning whom this question of penance could arise.

³ *Rûpe*, which the *Siṃhalese* repeats (p. 422), and which cannot here mean bodily form only.

the four bases of confidence¹, in the ten powers of a Tathâgata², in the sixfold special know-

¹ *Katu-vesâragge*. They are the confidence that no one—Samâsa or Brahman, God or Mâra—can reprove him by saying: (1) 'The qualities which you maintain to be those of a Buddha have not been attained by you;' or (2) 'The Great Evils which you maintain to have ceased in an Arahant have not ceased in you;' or (3) 'The qualities which you say are dangerous (in the higher life) are not really dangerous to one who practises them;' or (4) 'The aim which you held before others in preaching your Dhamma will not lead him who follows it to the destruction of sorrow.' The list will be found in the *Ânguttara Nikâya* IV, 8 (where it is probably a quotation from one of the conversational Suttas). But the punctuation in Dr. Morris's edition should be corrected by putting full stops after each viharâmi. Childers gives a different explanation under *vesâragga*, but his interpretation must be altered to that here given, which is the only correct one.

² These have not been found in any *Piṭaka* text, but Burnouf gives them in a note to the 'Lotus de la Bonne Loi' (p. 781) from the *Ginâlaṅkāra*. He says the expression *dasabalo* is found as applied to the Buddha 'à chaque instant dans les textes,' but this is not the case, so far at least as the older texts are concerned. In one of the old verses preserved at the *Mahāvagga* I, 22, 13, and quoted in the *Gâtaka* (vol. i, p. 84), *dasabalo* occurs as an epithet of the Buddha, but among the numerous epithets applied in the *Buddhavaṃsa* to the various Buddhas the term does not occur, nor have I been able to find it in the published portions of any of the great *Nikâyas*. (Ten *Nâga-balas* are ascribed to the Buddha in *Buddhavaṃsa*, p. 39, but these seem to be different.) Buddha-rakkhita, the author of the *Ginâlaṅkāra*, probably lived at about the eleventh or twelfth century A.D., and Hardy's paraphrase of his interpretations (in the 'Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 380, 381) is throughout inaccurate. As therefore it is precisely the growth of ideas about the Buddha that is of prime importance in the history of Buddhism, I give here Buddha-rakkhita's explanation, adding the Sanskrit names as given in the *Mahāvvyutpatti*, § 8:—

1. *Thānâ/hana-nâna-balam* . *Sthānasthāna-gñāna-balam* . (1)
2. *Sabbatha-gâmini-patipadâ* *Karma-vipâka* (5)
3. *Aneka-dhātu-nânâ-dhātu* . *Nânâdhimukti* (4)
4. *Sattānam nânâdhimutikatâ* *Nânâdhatu* (3)

ledge¹, in the fourteenfold knowledge of Buddha², in the eighteen characteristics of a Buddha³—in a word, in all the qualities of a Buddha. For all the Buddhas are exactly alike in all the Buddha-qualities.'

'But if, Nāgasena, that be so, what is the reason that it was only the Gotama Bodisat who carried out the penance?'

'Gotama the Bodisat had gone forth from the world, O king, when his knowledge⁴ was immature, and his wisdom was immature. And it was when he was bringing that immature knowledge to maturity that he carried out the penance.'

19. 'Why then, Nāgasena, was it that he thus went forth with knowledge and with wisdom immatured? Why did he not first mature his knowledge, and then, with his knowledge matured, renounce the world?'

'When the Bodisat, O king, saw the women of his harem all in disorder⁵, then did he become dis-

5. Vipāka-*vemattatā* . . . *Indriya-parāpara* (7)

6. *Samkilesa-vodāna-vatthu* . *Sarvatra-gāminī-pratipad* . . (2)

7. *Indriya-paropariya* . . . *Samkilesa-vyavadāna-vyutthāna* (6)

8. *Pubbe-nivāsānussate* . . *Purva-nivasānusmrīti* . . . (8)

9. *Dibba-kakkhu* *Kyut-utpatti* (9)

10. *Asava-kkhaya* *Āsava-kshaya* (10)

Some of these terms are found in the *Dharma-saṅgraha*, *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, vol. i, part 5, pp. 16, 51.

¹ *Kāśa-asādhārana-ñāna*, not yet found elsewhere.

² Possibly the above ten with four others.

³ The details of these eighteen are given by Spence Hardy in the 'Manual of Buddhism,' p. 381, but he does not mention his authority. *Hīnaśi-kumburē* (p. 422) merely repeats the Pāli.

⁴ 'Of the four Truths' is *Hīnaśi-kumburē*'s gloss.

⁵ See *Gātaka* I, 61. But the whole episode is told in the *Piṭakas*, not of the Bodisat, but of Yasa (*Mahāvagga* I, 7).

gusted, and in him thus disgusted discontent sprang up. And on perceiving that his heart was filled with discontent, a certain god of those that wait on Death (Mâra) thought: "This now is the time to dispel that discontent of his heart," and standing in the air he gave utterance to these words: "O honourable one! O fortunate one! Be not thou distressed. On the seventh day from this the heavenly treasure of the Wheel shall appear to thee, with its thousand spokes, its tire, and its nave, complete and perfect; and the other treasures, those that walk on earth and those that travel through the sky, shall come to thee of their own accord; and the words of command of thy mouth shall bear sway over the four great continents and the two thousand dependent isles; and thou shalt have above a thousand sons, heroes mighty in strength to the crushing out of the armies of the foe; and with those sons surrounding thee thou, master of the Seven Treasures, shalt rule the world!" [286] But even as if a bar of iron, heated the livelong day and glowing throughout, had entered the orifice of his ear, so was it that those words, O king, entered the ear of the Bodisat. And to the natural distress he already felt there was added, by that utterance of the god, a further emotion, anxiety, and fear. Just as a mighty fiery furnace, were fresh fuel thrown on it, would the more furiously burn—just as the broad earth, by nature moist, and already swampy through the water dripping on it from the vegetation and the grass that have arisen on it, would become more muddy still when a great rain cloud had poured out rain upon it—so to the distress that he already felt there was

added, by that utterance of the god, a further emotion, anxiety, and fear.'

20. 'But tell me, Nāgasena, if the heavenly Wheel-treasure had, on the seventh day, appeared to the Bodisat, would he, the Wheel having appeared, have been turned back from his purpose?'

'No Wheel-treasure appeared, O king, on the seventh day to the Bodisat. For rather that was a lie that was told by that god with the object of tempting him. And even had it appeared, yet would not the Bodisat have turned aside. And why not? Because the Bodisat, O king, had firmly grasped (the facts of) the impermanence (of all things, of) the suffering (inherent in existence as an individual, of) the absence of a soul (in any being made up of the five Skandhas), and had thus arrived at the destruction of the attachment (to individuality which arises from lust, or from heresy, or from dependence upon outward acts, or from delusions as to the possession of a permanent soul)¹. The water, O king, which flows into the river Ganges from the Anottata lake, and from the Ganges river into the great ocean, and from the great ocean into the openings into the

¹ Upādānakkhayam patto. Childers says that the destruction of these upādānas 'constitutes Arahatsip.' I know of no authority for this, and it is incompatible with the Buddhist theory of Arahatsip that any Arahats should go through such a period of penance as our author supposes the Bodisat to have done after he had reached this 'destruction of the upādānas.' The perception of the first of the above facts, the impermanence of all things and beings (*aniccam*), constitute indeed the 'entrance upon the path' (see above, p. 25), and of course the upādānas are destroyed in every Arahats, but that is very different from Childers's conclusion, which would make the terms convertible.

regions under the earth¹—would that water, after it had once entered that opening, turn back and flow again into the great ocean, and from the great ocean into the Ganges river, and from the Ganges river into the Anottata lake?’

[287] ‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘In the same way, O king, it was for the sake of that last existence of his that the Bodisat had matured merit through the immeasurable æons of the past. He had now reached that last birth, the knowledge of the Buddhas had grown mature in him, in six years he would become a Buddha, all-knowing, the highest being in the world. Would then the Bodisat, for the sake of the Wheel-treasure, turn back?’

‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘No! Though the great earth, O king, with all its peaks and mountain ranges, should turn back, yet the Bodisat would not before he had attained to Buddhahood. Though the water of the Ganges should flow backwards up the stream, yet the Bodisat would not turn back before he had attained to Buddhahood. Though the mighty ocean with its immeasurable waters² should dry up like the water in the footprint of a cow³, yet would not the Bodisat turn back before he had attained to Buddhahood. Though Sineru, the king of the moun-

¹ Pâtāla-mukham, which the Sinhalese repeats. There is a similar sequence in the *Samyutta* I, 5, 4.

² Aparimita-gala-dharo. *Hīnaśi-kumburê*, p. 424, has dhârî, which may either be the same in meaning as dharo, or refer to the dhârâ, the streams of water.

³ Gopade; not in Childers, but compare Gopadaka, ‘puddle,’ in a similar connection at *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī* I, 147 (where one MS. reads Gopade).

tains, should split up into a hundred or a thousand fragments, yet would not the Bodisat turn back before he had attained to Buddhahood. Though the sun and moon with all the stars should fall, like a clod, upon the ground, yet would not the Bodisat turn back before he had attained to Buddhahood. Though the expanse of heaven should be rolled up like a mat, yet would not the Bodisat turn back before he had attained to Buddhahood! And why not? Because he had torn asunder every bond.'

21. 'Venerable Nâgasena, how many bonds are there in the world?'

'There are these ten bonds in the world, O king, bound by which men renounce not the world, or turn back again to it. And what are the ten? A mother, O king, is often a bond, and a father, and a wife, and children, and relations, and friends, and wealth, and easy income, [288] and sovranty, and the five pleasures of sense. These are the ten bonds common in the world, bonds bound by which men renounce not the world or turn back to it. And all these bonds had the Bodisat, O king, burst through. And therefore could he not, O king, turn back.'

22. 'Venerable Nâgasena, if the Bodisat, on discontent arising in his heart at the words of the god, though his knowledge (of the four Truths) was yet imperfect, and his insight of a Buddha not mature, did nevertheless go forth into renunciation of the world, of what advantage was penance to him then? Ought he not rather, awaiting the maturity of his knowledge, to have lived in the enjoyment of all (suitable) foods?'

'There are, O king, these ten sorts of individuals who are despised and contemned in the world,

thought shameful, looked down upon, held blameworthy, treated with contumely, not loved. And what are the ten? A woman without a husband, O king, and a weak creature, and one without friends or relatives, and a glutton, and one dwelling in a disreputable family, and the friend of sinners, and he whose wealth has been dissipated, and he who has no character, and he who has no occupation¹, and he who has no means. These are the ten despised and contemned in the world, thought shameful, looked down upon, held blameworthy, treated with contumely, not loved². It was on calling these conditions to mind, O king, that this idea occurred to the Bodisat: "Let me not incur blame among gods and men as being without occupation or without means! Let me as a master in action, held in respect by reason of action, one having the supremacy which arises from action, one whose conduct is based upon action, one who carries action (into every concern of life)³, one who has his dwelling in action, be constant in earnestness⁴." That was the spirit, O king, in which the Bodisat, when he was bringing his knowledge to maturity, undertook the practice of penance.'

23. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Bodisat, when he was undergoing penance, said thus to himself:

¹ Kamma is here explained by Hīnaśi-kumburê by karmânta ('such as husbandry or merchandise').

² On this list of epithets compare above, p. 229 (of the Pâli).

³ Kamma-dhoreyyo. The latter word is not in Childers. Hīnaśi-kumburê (p. 427) has karmayama usulannâ wû. It is the Sanskrit dhaureya, and the whole might be rendered 'like a beast of burden whose load is action.'

⁴ Appamâdo—that constant theme of praise and exhortation in the early Buddhist books.

[289] "But it is not by this penance severe that I shall reach the peculiar faculty of the insight arising from the knowledge of that which is fit and noble—that insight beyond the powers of ordinary men. May there not be now some other way to the wisdom (of Buddhahood)¹?"

'Was then the Bodisat, at that time, 'confused in his mind about the way²?'

'There are twenty-five qualities, O king, which are causes of weakness of mind, weakened by which the mind cannot successfully be devoted to the destruction of the *Âsavas* (the Great Evils—lust, becoming, delusion, and ignorance)³. And what are the twenty-five? Anger, O king, and enmity, and hypocrisy⁴, and conceit⁵, and envy, and avarice, and deceit⁶,

¹ These words, already quoted above, IV, 6, 20 (p. 244 of the Pâli), are put into the mouth of the Bodisat, after the conclusion of the 'penance,' in the *Mahâ Sakkaka Sutta* (M. I, 246), which is the chief Pîṭaka text on the penance (the *Dukkha-kârikâ*). The Sinhalese version here (p. 427) has already been given in the note on the former passage.

² The way to Buddhahood (not the way to Arahatsip). This is Hînaśi-kumburê's explanation, which agrees with the context.

³ It will be noticed that (the destruction of the *Âsavas* being Arahatsip, not Buddhahood) this is really no reply.

⁴ *Makkho*, 'depreciation of the good qualities of others,' says Hînaśi-kumburê, pp. 427, 564. But the use of the word at *Gâtaka* I, 385; *Mahāvagga* I, 15, 4; *Kullavagga* III, 34, 2; *Magghima Nikâya* I, 15, shows that concealing one's own faults is rather the meaning.

⁵ *Pâlâso*; not in Childers. But see *Ânguttara Nikâya* II, 6, 12; *Puggala Paññatti* II, 2; *Magghima Nikâya* I, 15, &c. This and the last are usually mentioned together (see for instance below, VII, 2, 18), and the contrast is 'concealing the faults one has, and laying claim to virtues one has not.'

⁶ *Mâyâ*. It is noteworthy that this famous word, which plays so great a part in the later philosophies, and which is often sup-

and treachery, and obstinacy¹, and perverseness², and pride, and vainglory, and the intoxication (of exalted ideas about birth or health or wealth), and negligence in (well-doing), and intellectual inertness or bodily sloth³, and drowsiness⁴, and idleness, and friendship with sinners, and forms, and sounds, and odours, and tastes, and sensations of touch, and hunger, and thirst⁵, and discontent⁶. These are the

posed to express a fundamental conception of the Buddhists, has not yet been traced, and will probably never be found, in the *Piṭakas*, in any other than this subordinate and purely ethical sense. So when Mr. Gough in his 'Philosophy of the Upanishads' says, p. 186, that 'pessimism, metempsychosis, and *mâyâ* (the primitive world fiction) are retained in Buddhism' he is as wrong about *mâyâ* as he is about metempsychosis. He is evidently still under the delusion that Buddhism teaches the transmigration of souls, and that it has inherited from such schoolmen as *Sāṅkarākārya* the theory of the *mâyâ*. This is as funny as the astounding blindness which makes him say (pp. 267, 268) 'there is no quest of verity, of an active law of righteousness (in Buddhism), but only a yearning after a lapse into the void' (!). The converse proposition would be nearer to the actual fact, and the Buddhist *Aviggâ* is quite different from the *Mâyâ* of the later Vedântists. How absolutely different is the world in which the thoughts of a Buddhist would move is shown by *Hīnañ-kumburê*'s gloss: 'The *mâyâ* of concealing faults one has' (*tamâge ceti aguna samgawana mâyâ*).

¹ *Thambho* (not 'stupor,' as Childers has it). 'That obstinacy of mind (*dridhawû sit ceti bawâ*) which will not bend to the exhortation of the great,' says the *Siṃhalese*.

² *Sârambho*; not merely 'clamour, angry talk,' as Childers has it. See the commentary on the word *sârambhî* at *Gâtaka* III, 259, with which *Hīnañ-kumburê* here agrees. 'Contrariness' would be perhaps a better rendering.

³ *Thīnamiddham*; so *Hīnañ-kumburê* (but he takes them as two).

⁴ *Tandî*, as *Hīnañ-kumburê* reads (for Mr. Trenckner's *nandî*).

⁵ *Khudâ pipâsâ*, which must be taken separately to make up the twenty-five. The *Siṃhalese* takes them as two.

⁶ *Aratî*, which the *Siṃhalese* (taking *thīna* and *middha* separately) omits.

twenty-five qualities, O king, which are causes of weakness of mind, weakened by which the mind cannot successfully be devoted to the destruction of the *Âsavas*. (And of these it was) hunger and thirst, O king, which had then seized hold of the body¹ of the Bodisat. And his body being thus, as it were, "possessed," his mind was not rightly devoted to the destruction of the *Âsavas*. Now the Bodisat, O king, through the immeasurable æons of the past, had followed after the perception of the Four Noble Truths through all of his successive births. Is it then possible that in his last existence, in the birth in which that perception was to arise, there should be any confusion in his mind as to the way? But nevertheless there arose, O king, in the Bodisat's mind the thought: "May there not now be some other way to the wisdom (of a Buddha)?" And already before that, O king, when he was only one month old, when his father the Sakya was at work (ploughing), the Bodisat, placed in his sacred cot for coolness under the shade of the *Gambu* tree, sat up crosslegged, and putting away passion, free from all evil conditions of heart, he entered into and remained in the first *Ghâna*—a state of joy and ease, born of seclusion, full of reflection, full of investigation, [290] and so into the second, and so into the third, and so into the fourth *Ghâna*².

¹ *Pariyâdiyimsu*; literally 'were suffused as to the body of' (*Hīnañ-kumburē* has *sarīrayehi vyāpta wū*). The passive forms of this verb are always difficult to translate. See above, p. 254, and below, pp. 296, 297 (of the Pāli), and *Kullavagga* VI, 2, 6; VII, 2, 1.

² This passage follows in the *Mahā Saṅkaka Sutta* immediately after the passage quoted above (*Magghima Nikāya* I, 246), and the

‘Very good, Nāgasena ! That is so, and I accept it as you say. It was whilst he was bringing his knowledge to maturity that the Bodisat underwent the penance.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to the penance undergone by the Bodisat.]

[DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-THIRD.

VIRTUE STRONGER THAN VICE.]

24. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, which is the more powerful, virtue or vice?’

‘Virtue, O king¹.’

‘That is a saying, Nāgasena, which I cannot believe—that virtue is more powerful than vice. For there are to be seen here (in the world) men who destroy living creatures, who take to themselves what has not been given, who walk in evil in their lusts, who speak lies, who commit gang robberies on whole villages, who are highwaymen, sharpers, and swindlers, and these all according to their crime suffer the cutting off of their hands, or their feet, or their hands and feet, or their ears, or

incident is also related at *Gâtaka* I, 57. But in both these books there is reference only to the first—not to the second, third, and fourth *Ghânas*. As this is therefore only another instance of the difference between the *Piṭakas* and the more advanced views of our author, I have not translated the remaining *Ghânas*. As will be seen from the version of them in my ‘*Buddhist Suttas from the Pāli*’ (S. B. E., vol. xi, p. 272), the idea that a mere baby could have practised these higher meditations would only become possible after the Buddha theory had been much more developed than it is in the *Piṭakas*.

¹ *Kusalam*. So it has been already laid down at III, 7, 7 (pp. 83, 84 of the *Pāli*), that merit (*puñṇam*) is more than demerit.

their nose, or their ears and nose, or the Gruel Pot, or the Chank Crown, or the Râhu's Mouth, or the Fire Garland, or the Hand Torch, or the Snake Strips, or the Bark Dress, or the Spotted Antelope, or the Flesh Hooks, or the Penny Cuts, or the Brine Slits, or the Bar Turn, or the Straw Seat, or they are anointed with boiling oil, or eaten by dogs, or are impaled alive, or are beheaded with a sword¹. Some of them sin one night and that night experience the fruit of their sin, some sinning by night experience the next day, some sinning one day experience that day, some sinning by day experience that night, some experience when two days or three have elapsed. But all experience in this present visible world the result of their iniquity. And is there any one, Nâgasena, who from having provided a meal with all its accessories² for one, or two, or three, or four, or five, or ten, or a hundred, or a thousand (members of the Order), has enjoyed in this present visible world wealth or fame or happiness—(is there any one who) from righteousness of life, or from observance of the Uposatha, (has received bliss even in this life³)?’

25. ‘There are [291], O king, four men who by giving gifts, and by the practice of uprightness, and by the keeping of Uposatha, even in their earthly bodies attained to glory in Tidasapura (the city of the gods).’

¹ This is a repetition of the list given above (I, 276–278), where the technical terms are explained. Compare Mr. William Andrews's book, ‘Punishments in the Olden Time.’

² *Saparivâram dânam*. *Pirikara-sahita-wû mahâ dan dî*, says the *Sinhalese*, p. 430.

³ The words in brackets are supplied from *Hinasi-kumburê*.

‘And who, Sir, were they¹?’

‘Mandhâtâ the king, and Nimi the king, and Sâdhna the king, and Guttîla the musician².’

‘Venerable Nâgasena, this happened thousands of births ago, and is beyond the ken of either of us two. Give me, if you can, some examples from that period (of the world) which is now elapsing in which the Blessed One has been alive.’

‘In this present period, O king, the slave *Punnaka*, on giving a meal to Sâriputta the Elder, attained that day to the dignity of a treasurer (*Setthi*), and he is now generally known as *Punnaka the Setthi*. The queen, the mother of Gopâla, who (being the daughter of poor peasant folk) sold her hair for eight pennies, and therewith gave a meal to Mahâ *Kakkâyana* the Elder and his seven companions, became that very day the chief queen of king Udena. Suppiyâ, the believing woman, cut flesh from her own thigh to provide broth³ for a sick Bhikkhu, and on the very next day the wound closed up, and the place became cured, with skin grown over it. Mallikâ, the queen who (when a poor flower girl) gave the last night’s gruel (she had reserved for her own dinner) to the Blessed One, became that very day the chief queen of the king of Kosala⁴. Sumana, the garland maker, when he had

¹ The king himself has already mentioned them, in reverse order, above, I, 172.

² The legends will be found in full in the *Gâtaka* stories numbered respectively, in Professor Fausböll’s edition, 258, 533, 494, and 243.

³ *Paṭikkhâdaniyam*. See the note on Mahâvagga VI, 23, where this curious story is given in full.

⁴ See *Gâtaka* III, 495, 496 for this story. *Âbhidosikam* is not in Childers, but see the *Sutta Vibhaṅga*, *Pârâgika* I, 5, 6.

presented to the Blessed One eight bunches of jessamine flowers, came that very day into great prosperity. Eka-sâtaka the Brahman, who gave to the Blessed One his only garment, received that very day the office of Sabbatthaka (Minister in general)¹. All these, O king, came into the enjoyment of wealth and glory in their then existing lives.'

'So then, Nâgasena, with all your searching and enquiry you have only found six cases²?'

'That is so, O king.'

26. 'Then it is vice, Nâgasena, and not virtue which is the more powerful. For on one day alone I have seen ten men expiating their crimes by being impaled alive, and thirty even, and forty, and fifty, [292], and a hundred, and a thousand. And further, there was Bhaddasâla, the soldier in the service of the royal family of Nanda³, and he waged war against king Kandagutta⁴. Now in that war, Nâgasena, there were eighty Corpse Dances. For they say that when one great Head Holocaust has taken place (by which is meant the slaughter of ten thousand elephants, and a lac of horses, and five thousand charioteers, and a hundred koṭis of soldiers on foot), then the headless corpses arise and dance in frenzy over the battle-field. And all the men

¹ 'Received from the king the great honour (sammâna) called sabbatthaka,' says Hīnaśī-kumburê, p. 431. But we find a particular office so called at Gâtaka II, 57. (It is true the reading there is sabbatthaka, but Mr. Trenckner's reading is doubtless preferable.)

² All these cases have already been referred to above, I, 172.

³ 'Nandagutta of the Brahman caste,' says the *Simhalese*, p. 431.

⁴ 'Descended from the Sākya race,' adds Hīnaśī-kumburê.

thus slain came to destruction through the fruit of the Karma of their evil deeds¹. And therefore, too, do I say, Nâgasena, that vice is more powerful than virtue. And have you heard, Nâgasena, that in all this dispensation (since the time of Gotama the Buddha) the giving by the Kosala king has been unequalled?’

‘Yes, I have heard so, O king.’

‘But did he, Nâgasena, on account of his having given gifts so unequalled, receive in this present life wealth, or glory, or happiness?’

‘No, O king, he did not.’

‘Then, in that case, surely, Nâgasena, vice is more powerful than virtue?’

27. ‘Vice, O king, by reason of its meanness, dies quickly away. But virtue, by reason of its grandeur, takes a long time to die. And this can be further examined into by a metaphor. Just, O king, as in the West Country² the kind of corn called Kumuda-bhandîkâ, ripening quickly and being garnered in a month, is called Mâsalu (got in a month)³, but the rices only come to perfection in six months or five. What then is the difference, what the distinction herein between Kumuda-bhandîkâ and rice?’

‘The one is a mean plant, O king, the other a grand one. The rices are worthy of kings, meet for

¹ The Pâli being otherwise unintelligible, the above version has been expanded in accordance with the Sinhalese interpretation. Kavandha as a living headless trunk occurs already in the Sutta Vibhaṅga, Pârâgika IV, 9, 3.

² Aparante. This may mean merely the western country (as at Gâtaka I, 98), or may be a specific place name as Aparântika is in the ‘Indian Antiquary,’ VII, 263.

³ So the Sinhalese, which seems to follow a slightly different reading.

the king's table; the other is the food of servants and of slaves.

[293] 'Just so, O king, it is by reason of its meanness that vice dies quickly away. But virtue, by its grandeur, takes a long time to die.'

28. 'But, Nāgasena, it is just those things which come most quickly to their end which are in the world considered the most powerful. And so still vice must be the more powerful, not virtue. Just, Nāgasena, as the strong man who, when he enters into a terrible battle, is able the most quickly to get hold of his enemies' heads under his armpit¹, and dragging them along to bring them prisoners to his lord, that is the champion who is regarded, in the world, as the ablest hero—just as that surgeon who is able the most quickly to extract the dart, and allay the disease, is considered the most clever—just as the accountant who is able with the greatest speed to make his calculations, and with most rapidity to show the result, is considered the cleverest counter—just as the wrestler who is able the most quickly to lift his opponent up, and make him fall flat on his back, is considered the ablest hero—just so, Nāgasena, it is that one of these two things—virtue and vice—which most quickly reaches its end that is, in the world, the more powerful of the two.'

'The Karma of both the two, O king, will be made evident in future births; but vice besides that will by reason of its guilt be made evident at once, and in this present life. The rulers (Kshatriyas)

¹ Upakaḍḍake. The word is not in the Pāli dictionaries, but I follow Hīnaś-kumburē, p. 432, who renders it Kisilla, and the context at the parallel passage, *Gātaka* I, 63 (see also *Gātaka* I, 158, and the *Sutta Vibhaṅga* II, 260).

of old, O king, established this decree : " Whosoever takes life shall be subject to a fine, and whosoever takes to himself what has not been given, and whosoever commits adultery, and whosoever speaks lies, and whosoever is a dacoit, and whosoever is a high-wayman, and whosoever cheats and swindles. Such men shall be liable to be fined or beaten or mutilated or broken¹ or executed." And in pursuance thereof they held repeated enquiry, and then adjudged one or other punishment accordingly. But, O king, has there ever been by any one a decree promulgated : " Whosoever gives gifts, or observes a virtuous life, or keeps Uposatha, to him shall wealth be given, or honours ? " And do they make continued enquiry, and bestow wealth or honours accordingly, as they do stripes or bonds upon a thief ?'

' Certainly not, Sir.'

' Well, if they did so then would virtue too be made evident even in this life. [294] But as they neither make such enquiry concerning givers, nor bestow wealth and honours upon them, therefore is virtue not manifested now. And this is the reason, O king, why vice is made known in this life, whereas he (the giver) receives the more abundantly in the lives to come. And therefore it is virtue which, through the destructions brought about by Karma, is by far the more powerful of the two².'

' Very good, Nāgasena ! Only by one wise as you could this puzzle have been so well solved.

¹ Bhettabbo, ' have their arms or legs broken.'

² In this sentence the translation follows Hīnaś-kumburê, who has apparently had a different, and fuller, reading before him.

The problem put by me in worldly sense have you in transcendental sense made clear.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to virtue and vice.]

[DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-FOURTH.

OFFERINGS TO THE DEAD.]

29. 'Venerable Nāgasena, these givers when they bestow their offerings, devote them specifically to former (relatives) now departed¹, saying: "May this gift benefit such and such." Now do they (the dead) derive any benefit therefrom?'

'Some do, O king, and some do not.'

'Which then are they that do, and which do not?'

'Those who have been reborn in purgatory, O king, do not; nor those reborn in heaven; nor those reborn as animals. And of those reborn as Pretas three kinds do not—the Vantāsikā (who feed on vomit), the Khuppipāsino (who hunger and thirst), the Nigghāma-tanhikā (who are consumed by thirst). But the Paradattūpagīvinō (who live on the gifts of others) they do derive profit, and those who bear them in remembrance do so too.'

'Then, Nāgasena, offerings given by the givers have run to waste², and are fruitless, since those

¹ Petā; which are not ghosts, disembodied 'souls,' but new beings whose link of connection with the departed is, 'not soul,' but Karma.

² Vissotam, from sru. The Sinhalese, p. 434, has āsthāna gata wanneya (for asthāna).

for whose benefit they are given derive no profit therefrom.'

'No, O king. They run not to waste, neither are fruitless. The givers themselves derive profit from them.'

'Then convince me of this by a simile.'

'Suppose, O king, people were to get ready fish and meat and strong drinks and rice and cakes, and make a visit on a family related to them. If their relatives should not accept their complimentary present, would that present be wasted or fruitless?'

'No, Sir, it would go to the owners of it.'

'Well, just so the givers themselves derive the profit. Or just, O king, [295] as if a man were to enter an inner chamber, and there were no exit in front of him, how would he get out?'

'By the way he entered.'

'Well, just so the givers themselves derive the profit.'

30. 'Let that pass, Nâgasena. That is so, and I accept it as you say. We will not dispute your argument. But, venerable Nâgasena, if the offerings made by such givers do advantage certain of the departed, and they do reap the result of the gifts, then if a man who destroys living creatures and drinks blood and is of cruel heart, were after committing murder or any other dreadful act, to dedicate it to the departed, saying: "May the result of this act of mine accrue to the departed"—would it then be transferred to them?'

'No, O king.'

'But what is the reason, what is the cause, that a good deed can accrue to them, and not an evil one?'

‘This is really not a question you should ask, O king. Ask me no foolish question, O king, in the idea that an answer will be forthcoming. You will be asking me next why space is boundless, why the Ganges does not flow up stream, why men and birds are bipeds, and the animals quadrupeds!’

‘It is not to annoy you that I ask this question, Nâgasena, but for the sake of resolving a doubt. There are many people in the world who are left-handed or squint¹. I put that question to you, thinking: “Why should not also these unlucky ones have a chance² of bettering themselves?”’

‘An evil deed, O king, cannot be shared with one who has not done it, and has not consented to it. People convey water long distances by an aqueduct. But could they in the same way remove a great mountain of solid rock?’

‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘Well, just in that way can a good deed be shared, but a bad one cannot. And one can light a lamp with oil, but could one in the same way, O king, light it with water?’

[296] ‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘Well, so is it that a good deed can be shared, but not an evil one. And husbandmen take water from a reservoir to bring their crops to maturity, but could they for the same purpose, O king, take water from the sea?’

¹ Vâmagâhino viḷakkhukâ. Neither of these words are in the dictionaries. Hīnaī-kumburê, p. 436, says, ‘who spoil what they take hold of, and whose eyes have lost their cunning.’

² Otâra, which the Sinhalese renders awakâsaya; and in that sense the word is used at Magg'hima Nikâya I, 334.

‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘So again is it that though a good deed can be shared, an evil one cannot.’

31. ‘But, venerable Nāgasena, why is that? Convince me of this by a reason. I am not blind, or unobservant. I shall understand when I have heard.’

‘Vice, O king, is a mean thing, virtue is great and grand. By its meanness vice affects¹ only the doer, but virtue by its grandeur overspreads the whole world of gods and men.’

‘Show me this by a metaphor.’

‘Were a tiny drop of water to fall on the ground, O king, would it flow on over ten leagues or twelve?’

‘Certainly not. It would only have effect² on that very spot of ground on which it fell.’

‘But why so?’

‘Because of its minuteness.’

‘Just so, O king, is vice minute. And by reason of its littleness it affects the doer only, and cannot possibly be shared. But if a mighty rain cloud were to pour out rain satisfying the surface of the earth, would that water spread round about?’

‘Certainly, Sir. That thunderstorm would fill up the depressions in the ground and the pools and ponds, and the gullies and crevices and chasms, and the lakes and reservoirs and wells and lotus-tanks, and the water would spread abroad for ten leagues or for twelve³.’

¹ Pariyâdiyati. See the note above at IV, 8, 23.

² A similar metaphor is used below, IV, 8, 55 (p. 311 of the Pāli).

³ This long list is made up of the two given above at pp. 35,

‘But why so, O king?’

‘Because of the greatness of the storm.’

‘Just so, O king, is virtue great. And by reason of its abundance it can be shared by gods and men.’

‘Venerable Nâgasena, why is it that vice is so limited, [297] and virtue so much more wide-reaching?’

‘Whosoever, O king, in this world gives gifts, and lives in righteousness, and keeps Uposatha¹, he, glad, right glad, joyful, cheerful, happy, becomes filled with a sweet sense of trust and bliss, and bliss ruling in his heart his goodness grows still more and more abundantly. Like a deep pool of clear water, O king, and into which on one side the spring pours, while on the other the water flows away; so as it flows away it comes again, and there can be no failure there—so, O king, does his goodness grow more and more abundantly. If even through a hundred years, O king, a man were to keep on transferring² to others (the merit of) any good he

259 of the Pâli (Paragraphs II, 1, 10 and IV, 6, 55 of the translation).

¹ The Buddhist Sabbath. See ‘Buddhism,’ pp. 140, 141.

² *Âvaggeya*, which the *Simhalese*, p. 437, merely repeats, is ambiguous (literally ‘cause to bend towards’). Compare *Gâtaka* I, 74, 89, 108, 171; II, 243. In most places the meaning ‘bend back or towards’ comes to have the secondary sense of ‘re-reflect.’ But throughout this discussion there is an underlying reference to a very beautiful Buddhist conception that a man can transfer to others the merit of any good deed he has done. Thus at the end of a palm-leaf manuscript the copyist often adds the pious wish: ‘May the merit of my having made this copy redound to the advantage of all men,’ or words to that effect. And the preceding metaphor would seem to show that this must be the secondary sense here attached to ‘causing to bend towards;’—the more he

had done, the more he gave it away the more would his goodness grow, and he would still be able to share it with whomsoever he would. This, O king, is the reason why virtue is so much the greater of the two.

32. 'But on doing evil, O king, a man becomes filled with remorse ¹, and the heart of him who feels remorse cannot get away (from the thought of the evil he has done), it is forcibly bent back on it, thrown back on it, obtains no peace ²; miserable, burning, abandoned of hope, he wastes away, and gaining no relief from depression ³, he is, as it were, possessed with his woe! Just, O king, as a drop of water, falling on a dry river bed with its mighty sandbanks rising and falling in undulations along its crooked and shiftty course, gains not in volume, but is swallowed up on the very spot where it fell, just so, O king, is a man, when he has done wrong, overcome with remorse, and the heart of him who feels remorse cannot get away from the thought of the evil he has done, it is forcibly bent back on it, thrown back on it, obtains no peace; miserable, burning, abandoned of hope, he wastes away, and gaining no release from his depression, he is, as it

spends (as it were) his virtue, the more remains, just as however much the water flows away from the spring, still quite as much remains, and he can still share with others that which is left. The doctrine of imputed righteousness is not confined to Buddhists, but the Buddhist theory is really quite different from the corresponding Western ideas, even from the Catholic doctrine of the transference of the righteousness of saints.

¹ So already above, III, 7, 7 (I, 128).

² *Patilīyati patiku/ati pativa//ati na sampasārīyati*. None of these words are in the dictionaries.

³ *Na parivaddhate*; literally 'is not dilated.'

were, swallowed up of his woe. This is the reason, O king, why vice is so mean.'

'Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the problem as to virtue and vice.]

[DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-FIFTH.

DREAMS.]

33. 'Venerable Nāgasena, men and women in this world see dreams pleasant and evil, things they have seen before and things they have not, things they have done before and things they have not, [298] dreams peaceful and terrible, dreams of matters near to them and distant from them, full of many shapes and innumerable colours. What is this that men call a dream, and who is it who dreams it?'

'It is a suggestion¹, O king, coming across the path of the mind which is what is called a dream. And there are six kinds of people who see dreams—the man who is of a windy humour², or of a bilious one, or of a phlegmatic one, the man who dreams dreams by the influence of a god, the man who does so by the influence of his own habits, and the man who does so in the way of prognostication³. And

¹ Nimittam, aramunuwa in the *Simhalese*, p. 438.

² Vātiko, which Childers renders wrongly rheumatic. Wāta prakṛiti wū, says the *Simhalese*, p. 438.

³ The *Simhalese* gives the different kinds of dreams seen by each of these six—the first dreams of journeys through space, the second of fire and conflagrations, the third of water, the fourth

of these, O king, only the last kind of dreams is true; all the rest are false.'

34. 'Venerable Nāgasena, when a man dreams a dream that is a prognostication, how is it? Does his own mind set out itself to seek the omen, or does the prognostication come of its own accord into the path of his mind, or does some one else come and tell him of it?'

'His own mind does not itself seek the omen, neither does any one else come and tell him of it. The prognostication comes of its own accord into his mind. It is like the case of a looking-glass, which does not go anywhere to seek for the reflection; neither does any one else come and put the reflection on to the looking-glass. But the object reflected comes from somewhere or other across the sphere over which the reflecting power of the looking-glass extends.'

35. 'Venerable Nāgasena, does the same mind which sees the dream also know: "Such and such a result, auspicious or terrible, will follow?"'

'No, that is not so, O king. After the omen has occurred he tells others, and then they explain the meaning of it.'

'Come, now, Nāgasena, give me a simile to explain this.'

'It is like the marks, O king, and pimples, and cutaneous eruptions which arise on a man's body to his profit or loss, to his fame or dishonour, to his praise or blame, to his happiness or woe. [299] Do

of good or bad things according as the god is kindly or malignant, the fifth of what he has himself seen or heard, and the last of his future gain or loss.

in that case the pimples come because they know :
 "Such and such is the event which we shall bring about?"

'Certainly not, Sir. But according to the place on which the pimples have arisen, the fortune-tellers, making their observations, give decision, saying :
 "Such and such will be the result."

'Well, in the same way, O king, it is not the same mind which dreams the dream which also knows :
 "Such and such a result, conspicuous or terrible, will follow." But after the omen has occurred he tells others, and they then explain the meaning of it.'

36. 'Venerable Nāgasena, when a man dreams a dream, is he awake or asleep?'

'Neither the one, O king, nor yet the other. But when his sleep has become light¹, and he is not yet fully conscious², in that interval it is that dreams are dreamt. When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home (has entered again into the Bhavaṅga)³, and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not⁴ has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. Just, O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will fall even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has returned into itself, and

¹ Okkante middhe; 'like a monkey's sleep,' says Hīnaśī-kumburē.

² On bhavaṅga compare Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha III, 8.

³ 'Like a bird that has re-entered its nest' is Hīnaśī-kumburē's gloss.

⁴ Appaṭivigānantassa, 'does not know the distinctions between bliss and woe (sukha dukkha vibhāga),' says the Simhalese, p. 440.

a mind shut in does not act, and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream. For it is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. As the mirror, O king, are you to regard the body, as the darkness sleep, as the light the mind. Or again, O king, just as the glory of a sun veiled in fog is imperceptible, as its rays, though they do exist, are unable to pierce through, and as when its rays act not there is no light, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream. For it is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. As the sun, O king, are you to regard the body, as the veil of fog sleep, [300] as the rays the mind.

37. 'Under two conditions, O king, is the mind inactive though the body is there—when a man being in deep sleep the mind has returned into itself, and when the man has fallen into a trance¹. The mind of a man who is awake, O king, is excited, open, clear, untrammelled, and no prognostication occurs to one whose mind is so. Just, O king, as men seeking concealment avoid the man who is open, candid, unoccupied, and unreserved,—just so is it that the divine intention is not manifested to the wakeful man, and the man who is awake therefore sees no dream. Or again, O king, just as the qualities which lead to wisdom are found not in that brother whose mode of livelihood and conduct are wrong, who is the friend of sinners, wicked, insolent, devoid

¹ Nirodha, which the *Simhalese* repeats. Probably the fourth *Ghâna* is here referred to.

of zeal,—just so is it that the divine intention is not manifested to the wakeful man, and the man who is awake, therefore, sees no dream.’

38. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, is there a beginning, a middle, and an end in sleep?’

‘Yes, O king, there is.’

‘Which then is the beginning, which the middle, and which the end?’

‘The feeling of oppression and inability¹ in the body, O king, of weakness, slackness, inertness—that is the beginning of sleep. The light “monkey’s sleep” in which a man still guards his scattered thoughts²—that is the middle of sleep. When the mind has entered into itself—that is the end of sleep. And it is in the middle stage, O king, in the “monkey’s sleep” that dreams are dreamt. Just, O king, as when a man self-restrained with collected thoughts, steadfast in the faith, unshaken in wisdom, plunges deep into the woods far from the sound of strife, and thinks over some subtle matter, he there, tranquil and at peace, will master the meaning of it—just so a man still watchful, not fallen into sleep, but dozing in a “monkey’s sleep,” will dream a dream. [301] As the sound of strife, so, O king, are you to regard wakefulness, and as the lonely wood the “monkey’s sleep.” And as that man avoiding the sound of strife, keeping out of sleep, remaining in the middle stage, will master the meaning of that subtle matter, so the still watchful man, not fallen into sleep, but dozing in a “monkey’s sleep,” will dream a dream.’

¹ Onāho pariyonāho, ‘obstruction, covering.’ See the *Tevigga Sutta*, § 58.

² *Vokinnakam saggati*. ‘Destroys sleep by scattered thoughts,’ says the *Simhalese*, p. 441.

‘Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to dreams¹.]

[DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-SIXTH.

PREMATURE DEATH.]

39. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, when beings die, do they all die in fullness of time, or do some die out of due season?’

‘There is such a thing, O king, as death at the due time, and such a thing as premature death.’

‘Then who are they whose decease is at the due time, and who are they whose decease is premature?’

‘Have you ever noticed, O king, in the case of mango trees or Gambu trees or other fruit-bearing trees, that their fruits fall both when they are ripe and when they are not ripe?’

‘Yes, I have.’

‘Well, those fallen fruits, do they all fall at the due time, or do some fall prematurely?’

‘Such of those fruits, Nāgasena, as are ripe and mature² when they fall, fall in fullness of time. But of the rest some fall because they are bored into by worms, some because they are knocked down by a

¹ It is not known whether the whole of this theory of dreams is taken from the Pi/akas, or whether it is an expansion of views there suggested. But the germs of the theory are certainly in the Pi/akas. Thus the Buddha is made at *Maggħima Nikāya* I, 249, 250 to say of himself that in his midday sleep he was neither stupefied nor the contrary (neither *sammūlho* nor *asammūlho*), which comes very near to the ‘monkey’s sleep’ referred to throughout this dilemma.

² *Vilinani, wilikun wū* says *Hīnaḥ-kumburē* (p. 442).

long stick, some because they are blown down by the wind, some because they have become rotten—and all these fall out of due season¹.

‘Just so, O king, those men who die of the effect of old age, they die in fullness of time. But of the rest some die of the dire effect of the Karma (of evil deeds), some of excessive journeying², some of excessive activity.’

40. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, those who die of Karma, or of journeying, or of activity, or of old age, they all die in fullness of time: and even he who dies in the womb, that is his appointed time, so that he too dies in fullness of time; and so of him who dies in the birth chamber [302], or when he is a month old, or at any age up to a hundred years. It is always his appointed time, and it is in the fullness of time that he dies. So, Nâgasena, there is no such thing as death out of due season. For all who die, die at the appointed time.’

‘There are seven kinds of persons, O king, who, there being still a portion of their appointed age to run, die out of time. And which are the seven? The starving man, O king, who can get no food, whose inwards are consumed³—and the thirsty man who can get no water, whose heart is dried up—and the man bitten by a snake, who, when consumed by the fierce energy of poison, can find no cure—and he who has taken poison, and when all his limbs are

¹ This simile has already been used above, IV, 3, 7 (I, 235).

² Gati-patibâ/â, gamana bâhulyatâwen says the Simhalese.

³ Upahat-abbhantaro, ‘whose interior is burnt by the fierceness of the stomach fire’ (*ga/ha-râgni-gahani*), says Hīnaśi-kumburê, p. 443.

burning, is unable to procure medicine—and one fallen into fire, who when he is aflame, can find no means of putting out the fire—and he who having fallen into water can find no firm ground to stand on—and the man wounded by a dart, who in his illness can find no surgeon—all these seven, there being still a portion of their appointed time to run, die out of due season. And herein (in all these seven cases) I declare that they are all of one nature¹. In eight ways, O king, does the death of mortals take place—through excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, through the adverse union of these three, through variations in temperature, through inequality in protection, through (medical) treatment, and through the working of Karma². And of these, O king, it is only death by the working of Karma that is death at the due season, all the rest are cases of death out of due season. For it is said :

“ By hunger, thirst, by poison, and by bites,
 Burnt, drowned, or slain, men out of time do die ;
 By the three humours, and by three combined,
 By heats, by inequalities, by aids,
 By all these seven men die out of time³.”

41. [303] ‘ But there are some men, O king, who die through the working of some evil deed or other they have committed in a former birth. And of

¹ Hīnañi-kumburê had apparently a different reading (perhaps *ekamse na vadâmi*). For he translates, p. 444, ‘ In this death I do not say that there is one cause.’

² As was noticed above on p. 112 (of the Pâli), some of these medical terms are very uncertain, and the Sinhalese gives no help.

³ Not traced in the Piṭakas.

these, O king, whosoever has starved others to death, after having been himself through many hundreds of thousands of years tormented by hunger, famished, exhausted, emaciated, and withered of heart, dried up, wasted away, heated, and all on fire within, will, either as youth or man or old man, die of hunger too. And that death will be to him a death at the appointed time¹. Whosoever has put others to death by thirst, after having through many hundreds of thousands of years become a Preta consumed by thirst, thin and miserable, will himself too, either as youth or man or old man, die of thirst. And that death will be to him a death at the appointed time. Whosoever has put others to death by having them bitten by snakes, will, after wandering through many hundreds of thousands of years from existence to existence, in which he is constantly bitten by boa constrictors and black snakes, himself too, either as youth or man or old man, die of snake bite. And that will be to him a death at the appointed time. Whosoever has put others to death by poison will, after existing for many hundreds of thousands of years with burning limbs and broken body, and exhaling the odour of a corpse, himself too, either as youth or man or old man, die of poison. And that will be to him a death at the appointed time. Whosoever has put others to death by fire, he having wandered from purgatory² to purgatory, from one mass of burning charcoal to

¹ Sâmâyiko, 'timely,' but Childers says 'temporary,' and we have had the word above (p. 22 of the Pâli) in the sense of 'religious.' The Sinhalese, p. 445, repeats the word.

² Yama-visaya, 'abode of the god of death.'

another, with burning and tortured limbs, for many hundreds of thousands of years, will himself too, either as youth or man or old man, be burnt to death. And that will be to him a death at the appointed time. Whosoever has put others to death by drowning, he having suffered many hundreds of thousands of years as a being disabled, ruined, broken, weak in limb, and anxious in heart, will himself too, either as youth or man or old man, die by drowning. And that will be to him a death at the appointed time. Whosoever has put others to death by the sword, [304] he having suffered for many hundreds of thousands of years (in repeated births as an animal) from cuts and wounds and blows and bruises, or (when born as a man) ever destroyed by weapons¹, will himself too, either as youth or man or old man, perish by the sword. And that will be to him a death at the appointed time.'

42. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the death out of due time that you also speak of—come now, tell me the reason for that.'

'As a great and mighty fire, O king, on to which dry grass and sticks and branches and leaves have been heaped, will nevertheless, when this its food has been consumed, die out by the exhaustion of the fuel. Yet such a fire is said to have gone out in fullness of time, without any calamity or accident (having happened to it). Just so, O king, the man who, when he has lived many thousands of days, when he is old and stricken in years, dies at last of

¹ Sarnâhato. Compare above, pp. 181, 254 of the Pâli, and *Magghima Nikâya* I, 337.

old age, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, is said to have reached death in the fullness of time. But if there were a great and mighty fire, O king, on to which dry grass and sticks and branches and leaves had been heaped, then if a mighty rain cloud were to pour out rain upon it, and it were thus to be put out, even before the fuel was consumed, could it be said, O king, that that great fire had gone out in fullness of time ?'

'No, Sir, it could not.'

'But wherein would the second fire differ, in its nature, from the first ?'

'The second one, Sir, which suffered from the onset of the rain—that fire would have gone out before its time.'

'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,—from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time.

43. 'Or again, O king, it is like a mighty storm cloud which, rising up into the heavens, should pour out rain, filling the valleys and the plains. That cloud would be said to have rained without calamity or accident. Just so, O king, the man who after having lived long, dies at last, when he is old and well stricken in years, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, of old age, is said to have

reached death in the fullness of time. [305] But if, O king, a mighty storm cloud were to rise up into the heavens, and as it did so were to be dissipated by a mighty wind, could it be said, O king, that that cloud had perished in due time ?'

'No, Sir, it could not.'

'But wherein would the second cloud differ, in its nature, from the first ?'

'The second one, Sir, which suffered from the onset of the whirlwind, would have been dissipated before its time.'

'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,—from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time.

44. 'Or again, O king, it is like a powerful and deadly snake, which being angered should bite a man, and to him that poison, no impediment and no accident happening to it, should bring death. That poison would be said, without impediment or accident, to have reached its aim. Just so, O king, the man who, having lived long, dies at last, when he is old and well stricken in years, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, of old age, he is said to have reached, unimpeded and uninterrupted, to the goal of his life, to have died in the fullness of time. But if a snake charmer were to give a drug to the man while he was suffering from

the bite, and thus get rid of the poison, could it be said that the poison was removed in the fullness of time?’

‘No, Sir, it could not.’

‘But wherein, O king, would the second poison differ, in its nature, from the first?’

‘The second one, Sir, which was acted upon by the introduction of the drug, would have been removed before its end was attained.’

‘Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,—from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one’s time.

45. ‘Or again, O king, it is like the arrow discharged by an archer. [306] If that arrow should go to the very end of the line of the path along which it was natural for it to go, then it would be said to have reached that aim, without let or hindrance. Just so, O king, the man who, having lived long, dies at last, when he is old and well stricken in years, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, of old age, is said to have reached death, unimpeded and uninterrupted, in the fullness of time. But if, at the moment when the archer was discharging the arrow, some one should catch hold of it, could that arrow be said to have reached the end of the line of the path along which it was shot?’

‘No, Sir, it could not.’

‘But wherein, O king, would the second arrow differ, in its nature, from the first?’

‘By the seizure which intervened, Sir, the course of the second arrow was arrested.’

‘Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,—from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one’s time.

46. ‘Or again, O king, it is like the brazen vessel which a man should strike. And by his striking thereof a note should be produced, and sound to the very end of the line of the path along which it was its nature to sound. It would then be said to have reached that aim without let or hindrance. Just so, O king, the man who, having lived long, dies at last, when he is old and well stricken in years, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, of old age, is said to have reached death, without let or hindrance, in the fullness of time. But if a man were to strike a brazen vessel, and by his striking thereof a note should be produced, but some one, before it had reached any distance, were to touch the vessel, and at his touching thereof the sound should cease, could then that sound be said to have reached the end of the line of the path along which it was its nature to sound?’

‘No, Sir, it could not.’

‘ But wherein, O king, would the second sound differ, in its nature, from the first ? ’

‘ By the touching which intervened, Sir, that sound was suppressed ¹. ’

[307] ‘ Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,—from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one’s time.

47. ‘ Or again, O king, it is like the corn seed which had sprung up well in the field, and by means of a plentiful downpour of rain had become well laden far and wide ² with many seeds, and had survived in safety to the time of standing crops, that corn would be said to have reached, without let or hindrance, to its due season. Just so, O king, the man who, having lived long, dies at last, when he is old and well stricken in years, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, of old age, is said to have reached death, without let or hindrance, in the fullness of time. But if that corn, after it had sprung up well in the field, should, deprived of water, die, could it be said to have reached its due season ? ’

¹ Uparato, for which Hīnaś-kumburē, p. 449, has upahata wīyāyē.

² Otaka-vitaka-ākīna. Ghanayawū pata/awū ākīna-wū says the Sinhalese.

‘No, Sir, it could not.’

‘But wherein, O king, would the second crop differ, in its nature, from the first?’

‘Oppressed by the heat which intervened, that crop, Sir, perished.’

‘Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,—from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one’s time.

48. ‘And have you ever heard, O king, of a young crop that, after it had come to ear, worms sprung up and destroyed down to the roots?’

‘We have both heard of such a thing, Sir, and have seen it, too.’

‘Well, O king, was that crop destroyed in season, or out of season?’

‘Out of season, Sir. For surely if worms had not destroyed the crop it would have survived to harvest time.’

‘What then, O king! on a disaster intervening the crop is lost, but if no injury is done it, it survives to the harvest?’

‘That is so, Sir.’

[308] ‘Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,—from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in

temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time.

49. 'And have you ever heard, O king, of a crop that had grown, and was bent down by the weight of the grains of corn, the ears having duly formed¹, when a so-called Karaka rain (hail-storm)² falling on it, destroyed it?'

'We have both heard of such a thing, Sir, and have seen it, too.'

'Well, O king! would you say the crop was destroyed in season or out of season?'

'Out of season, Sir. For if the hail-storm had not come the crop would have lasted to harvest time.'

'What then, O king! on a disaster intervening the crop is lost, but if no injury is done it, it survives to the harvest?'

'That is so, Sir.'

'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,—from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O

¹ *Maṅgarita-patte*, which the *Siṃhalese* renders *karal patra cettâwû*.

² *Karaka-vassam* is *pâsâna-warsha* in the *Siṃhalese*. If *karaka* originally meant 'hard shell,' it could have reached its ordinary meaning of 'water-pot,' from the fact that an empty half of a cocoa-nut shell is the most common form of cup.

king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time.'

50. 'Most wonderful, Nāgasena, most strange! Right well have you explained, by reason and by simile, how it is that people die before their time. That there is such a thing as premature death have you made clear and plain and evident¹. A thoughtless man even, Nāgasena, a puzzle-headed fellow, could by any one of your comparisons have come to the conclusion that premature deaths do occur;—[309] how much more an able man! I was convinced already, Sir, by the first of your similes, that such deaths happen, but nevertheless, out of the wish to hear still further and further solutions, I would not give in.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to premature deaths.]

[DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-SEVENTH.

WONDERS AT THE GRAVE.]

51. 'Venerable Nāgasena, are there wonders at the *Ketiyas* (the mounds raised over the ashes) of all who have passed entirely away (of all the Arahats deceased)²?'

'Of some, O king, but not of others.'

'But of which, Sir, is this the case, and of which not?'

¹ *Vibhūtam katam* is rendered *prasiddha karaṇa laddeya* in the *Simhalese*, p. 451.

² *Parinibbutānam*. The words in brackets are *Hīnaś-kumburē's* gloss. 'Of all who have been entirely set free' is an alternative, and perhaps a better, rendering.

‘It is by the stedfast resolve, O king, of three kinds of people, that wonders take place at the *Ketiya* of some person deceased who has been entirely set free. And who are the three? In the first place, O king, an Arahāt, when still alive, may, out of pity for gods and men, make the resolve: “Let there be such and such wonders at my *Ketiya*¹.” Then, by reason of his resolve, wonders happen there. Thus is it that wonders occur by the resolve of an Arahāt at the *Ketiya* of one entirely set free.

‘And again, O king, the gods, out of pity for men, show wonders at the *Ketiya* of one who has been entirely set free, thinking: “By this wonder may the true faith remain always established on the earth, and may mankind, believing, grow in grace!” Thus is it that wonders occur by the resolve of a god at the *Ketiya* of one entirely set free.

‘And again, O king, some woman or some man of believing heart, able, intelligent, wise, endowed with insight, may deliberately take perfumes, or a garland, or a cloth, and place it on the *Ketiya*, making the resolve: “May such and such a wonder take place!” Thus is it that wonders occur by the resolve of human beings at the *Ketiya* of one entirely set free.

52. ‘These, O king, are the three kinds of people by whose stedfast resolve wonders take place at the *Ketiyas* of Arahats deceased. And if there has been no such resolve, O king, by one of these, then

¹ Mr. Trenckner prints *evaṃ-nāma* as qualifying *Ketiya*. The Sinhalese, p. 451, takes it as I have rendered.

is there no wonder at the *Ketiya* even of one whose *âsavas* had been destroyed, who had attained to the sixfold insight, who was master of himself. And if there be no such wonder, then, O king, [310] one should call to mind the purity of conduct one has seen¹, and draw in trusting faith the conclusion: "Verily, this child of the Buddhas has been entirely set free!"

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to wonders
at the grave.]

[DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH.

CONVERSION AND CONDUCT.]

53. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those who regulate their lives aright—do they all attain to insight into the Truth, or are there some of them who do not?'

'Some do, O king, and some do not.'

'Then which do, Sir, and which do not?'

'He who is born as an animal, O king, even though he regulate his life aright, will not attain to insight into the Truth, nor he who is born in

¹ These words are very ambiguous, and unfortunately the *Simhalese* (p. 452), though much expanded, is equally so. The kind of wonder referred to throughout the dilemma is also doubtful. The only one of the kind mentioned, so far as I know, in the *Piṭakas* is that referred to in the 'Book of the Great Decease,' V, 26, where the placing of garlands on a *Ketiya* produces calm in the heart. But it is difficult to believe that our author had merely a spiritual experience of this kind in his thoughts. The whole discussion points rather to the late date at which he wrote.

the Preta world, nor he who holds wrong views, nor the deceitful man, nor he who has slain his mother, or his father, or an Arahāt, nor he who has raised up a schism in the Order, nor he who has shed a Buddha's blood, nor he who has furtively attached himself to the Order¹, nor he who has become a pervert², nor he who has violated a sister of the Order, nor he who, having been guilty of one or other of the thirteen grievous offences³, has not been rehabilitated, nor a eunuch, nor an hermaphrodite—and whosoever is a human child under seven years of age, even though he regulate his life aright, will not attain to insight into the Truth. To these sixteen individuals there is no attainment of insight, O king, even though they regulate their life aright.'

54. 'Venerable Nāgasena, there may or may not be a possibility of insight to the fifteen you have first singled out for opposition⁴. But what is the reason why an infant, one under seven years of age, should not, even though he regulate his life aright, attain to insight? Therein there is still a puzzle left. For is it not admitted that in a child there is not passion, neither malice, nor dullness, nor pride, nor heresy, nor discontent, nor lustful thoughts? Being undefiled by sin, that which we call an infant is fit and ready (to the attainment

¹ Theyya-samvāsaka. See Mahāvagga I, 69, 4.

² Titthiya-pakkantaka, 'gone over to the Titthiyas.'

³ Garukāpatti, which Hīnaśi-kumburê takes to be equivalent to the Samghādisesa offences. This is doubtless correct, and the use of the phrase in that sense is a sign of our author's later date.

⁴ Viruddhā, 'placed in a class' (wœdêrum wû), says the Simhalese, p. 453. It is literally 'opposed,' and the idiom is curious.

even of Arahatsip—how much more)¹ is he worthy to penetrate at a glance into the four truths!’

‘The following is the reason, O king, for my saying [311] that an infant, even though he regulate his life aright, cannot attain to insight. If, O king, one under seven years of age could feel passion about things exciting to passion, could go wrong in things leading to iniquity, could be befooled in matters that mislead, could be maddened as to things that infatuate, could understand a heresy, could distinguish between content and discontent, could think out virtue and vice, then might insight be possible to him. But the mind of one under seven years of age, O king, is powerless and weak, mean, small, slight, obscure, and dull, whereas the essential principle of Nirvâṇa is transcendental, important, weighty, wide-reaching, and extensive. Therefore is it, O king, that the infant, with so imperfect a mind, is unable to grasp an idea so great. It is like the case of Sineru, O king, the king of the mountains, heavy and ponderous, wide-reaching and mighty as it is,—could now a man, by his ordinary strength and power and energy, root that mountain up?²’

‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘But why not?’

‘Because of the weakness of the man, and because of the mightiness of Sineru, the mountain king.’

¹ The words in brackets are added from the *Sinhalese*.

² Similar metaphors have already been used in the 71st Dilemma (p. 283 of the *Pāli*) and in the 74th Dilemma (p. 295 of the *Pāli*).

'Just so, O king, is the relation of the infant's mind to Nirvāṇa¹.

55. 'And again, it is like the broad earth, O king, long and wide, great in expanse and extension, large and mighty—would now a tiny drop of water be able to wet and turn to mud that broad earth²?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'But why not, O king?'

'Because of the minuteness of the drop of water, and because of the greatness of the broad earth.'

'Just so, O king, is the relation of the infant's mind to Nirvāṇa.

[312] 56. 'Or again, O king, suppose there were weak and powerless, minute, tiny, limited, and dull fire—would it be possible, with so insignificant a fire, to overcome darkness and make light appear over the whole world of gods and men?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'But why not, O king?'

'Because of the dullness of the fire, and because of the greatness of the world.'

'Just so, O king, the mind of one under seven years of age is powerless and weak, limited, insignificant, obscure, and dull; it is veiled, moreover, with the thick darkness of ignorance. Hard would it be, therefore, for it to shine forth with the light of knowledge. And that is the reason, O king, why to an infant, to one under seven years of age, even though he order his conduct aright, there can be no attainment of insight into the Truth.

¹ In the text the whole comparison is repeated.

² For a similar metaphor see above, IV, 8, 31 (p. 296 of the Pāli).

57. 'Or again, O king, suppose there were a Sâlaka¹, minute in the measure of its body, and rendered lean by disease, and it on seeing an elephant king, which showed the signs of rut in three places, and was nine cubits in length, and three in breadth, and ten in girth, and seven in height², coming to its lair, were to begin to drag the elephant towards it with the view of swallowing it—now would the Sâlaka, O king, be able to do so³?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'But why not, O king?'

'Because of the minuteness of the Sâlaka's body, and because of the magnitude of the elephant king.'

'Just so, O king, the mind of one under seven years of age is powerless and weak, limited, insignificant, obscure, and dull. Grand and transcendental is the ambrosial essence of Nirvâna⁴. With that mind so powerless and weak, so limited, insignificant, obscure, and dull, he cannot penetrate into the grand and transcendental essence of Nir-

¹ It is unknown what this *kimi* (insect, vermin, small creature) is, and it is not mentioned elsewhere. Susruta mentions a *sârikâmukha* insect, and as in one rare word at least, which the Pâli translator did not sufficiently understand to restore to the ordinary Pâli form (*kalasi* for *karisi*, see above, I, xxiii), we find *la* stood in our author's dialect for *ri*, there may be some connection between the two. It would be particularly interesting to be able to determine the species and habitat of this creature, as it might throw some light on the district in which our author flourished.

² These measurements differ slightly from those given above, IV, 8, 14 (p. 282 of the Pâli), for a fine elephant.

³ Compare the tale of the frog who wanted to swallow the bull in Æsop's fables (not yet traced in the *Gâtakas*). Is the Sâlaka a kind of frog, much smaller than ours?

⁴ So *Hinâfi-kumburê*, p. 455.

vâna. And that is the reason, O king, why to an infant, one under seven years of age, even though he order his conduct aright, there can be no attainment to insight of the Truth.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma on conversion and conduct.]

[DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-NINTH.

THE PAIN OF NIRVÂNA¹.]

[313] 58. 'Venerable Nâgasena, how is it? Is Nirvâna all bliss, or is it partly pain²?'

¹ The following pages will seem only so much verbiage, and will convey no idea to a European reader, unless he realises that the Nirvâna discussed is of course not a salvation to be enjoyed by a 'soul' after death, and in some other world; but a state of mind to be realised and enjoyed by a man here, on this earth, in this life, and in this life only.

Though I had pointed this out already in 1876 the animistic interpretation of Nirvâna is still the prevalent one, and still continues to lead to endless confusion. Why is it then, the reader may ask, that our author does not contradict the Christian interpretation of the Buddhist summum bonum in so many words? Simply because it never occurred to him as possible. It was probably even as inconceivable to him as the Buddhist interpretation of it seems to be to most Western writers.

² This dilemma and the next have been translated into French in the 'Revue de l'histoire des Religions' for 1885 (vol. xi, pp. 336 and following). The author's name being given as Mr. Lewis da Sylva, of Colombo, the article as it stands is presumably a translation into French, made in Paris, of Mr. da Sylva's version in English from the Sinhalese, which may account for the fact that there is scarcely a sentence which is not misleading.

‘Nirvâna is all bliss, O king. There is no intermingling of pain in it.’

‘That, Sir, is a saying we cannot believe—that Nirvâna is all bliss. On this point, Nâgasena, we maintain that Nirvâna must be alloyed with pain. And there is a reason for our adopting that view. What is that reason? Those, Nâgasena, who seek after Nirvâna are seen to practise exertion and application both of body and of mind, restraint in standing, walking, sitting, lying, and eating, suppression of sleep, subjugation of the organs of sense, renunciation of wealth and corn, of dear relatives and friends. But all those who are joyful and happy in the world take delight in, are devoted to, the five pleasures of sense—they practise and delight their eyes in many kinds of pleasurable forms, such as at any time they like the best—they practise and delight their ears in many kinds of pleasurable sounds of revelry and song, such as at any time they like the best—they practise and delight their sense of smell with many kinds of perfumes of flowers, and fruits, and leaves, and bark, and roots, and sap, such as at any time they like the best—they practise and delight their tongue with many kinds of pleasurable tastes of hard foods and of soft, of syrups, drinks, and beverages, such as at any time they like the best—they practise and delight their sense of touch with many kinds of pleasurable feelings, tender and delicate, exquisite and soft, such as at any time they like the best—they practise and delight their minds with many sorts of conceptions and ideas, pure and impure, good and bad, such as at any time they like the best. You, on the other hand, put a stop to and destroy,

maim and mangle, put a drag on and restrain the development of your eye, and ear, and nose, and tongue, and body, and mind. Therefore is your body afflicted and your mind afflicted too, and your body being afflicted you feel bodily discomfort and pain, and your minds being afflicted you feel mental discomfort too and pain. Did not even Mâgandiya, the ascetic, find fault with the Blessed One, and say¹: [314] "The Samana Gotama is a destroyer of increase²?"

59. 'Nirvâna, O king, has no pain in it. It is bliss unalloyed. When you, O king, maintain that Nirvâna is painful, that which you call "painful" is not Nirvâna. It is the preliminary stage to the realisation of Nirvâna, it is the process of seeking after Nirvâna. Nirvâna itself is bliss pure and simple, there is no pain mixed with it. And I will give you an explanation of this. Is there such a thing, O king, as the bliss of sovereignty which kings enjoy?'

'Most certainly.'

'And is there no pain, O king, mingled with that bliss?'

'No, Sir.'

'But surely then, O king, why is it that when their frontier provinces have broken out in revolt, the kings, to the end that they may bring the inhabitants of those provinces into subjection again, leave their homes, attended by their ministers and chiefs, their

¹ In the Mâgandiya Sutta, No. 75 in the *Magghima Nikâya*, where the speech will be found at I, 502.

² *Bhûtahaṅke*. See Mr. Trenckner's valuable note. *Hînaṣ-kumburê*, p. 456, quotes the Pâli, reading *Bhûtahu*, and rendering it 'anabhiwṛiddhi-karāṇayek.

soldiers and their guards, and marching over ground even and uneven, tormented the while by gnats and mosquitoes and hot winds, engage in fierce fights, and suffer the presentiment of death ?’

‘That, venerable Nâgasena, is not what is called the bliss of sovranty. It is only the preliminary stage in the pursuit of that bliss. It is after they have thus, in pain, sought after sovranty, that they enjoy the bliss thereof. And thus that bliss, Nâgasena, is itself unmixed with pain, for the bliss of sovranty is one thing, and the pain another.’

‘Just so, O king, is Nirvâna all bliss, and there is no pain mingled with it. Those who are in quest of Nirvâna afflict their minds and bodies it is true, restrain themselves in standing, walking, sitting, lying, and in food, suppress their sleep, keep their senses in subjection, abandon their very body and their life. But it is after they have thus, in pain, sought after Nirvâna, that they enjoy the Nirvâna which is bliss unalloyed—as kings do the bliss of sovranty after their foes have been put down. Thus is it, O king, that Nirvâna is all bliss, and there is no pain mingled with it. For Nirvâna is one thing, and the pain another.

[315] 60. ‘And hear another explanation, O king, of the same thing. Is there such a thing, O king, as the bliss of knowledge which those teachers have who have passed through their course ?’

‘Yes, Sir, there is.’

‘Well, is that bliss of knowledge alloyed with pain ?’

‘No.’

‘What then, O king, is the good of their afflicting

themselves by bowing down before and standing up in the presence of their teachers; by drawing water, and sweeping out the cell, and placing tooth-sticks and washing-water ready; by living upon scraps left over; by doing service in shampooing, and bathing, and washing of the feet; by suppressing their own will, and acting according to the will of others; by sleeping in discomfort, and feeding on distasteful food?'

'That, Nâgasena, is not the bliss of knowledge, it is a preliminary stage in the pursuit thereof. It is after the teachers have, in pain, sought after knowledge, that they enjoy its bliss. Thus is it, Nâgasena, that the bliss of knowledge is unalloyed with pain. For that bliss of knowledge is one thing, and the pain another.'

'Just so, O king, is Nirvâṇa all bliss, and there is no pain mingled with it. Those who are in quest of Nirvâṇa afflict their minds and bodies it is true, restrain themselves in standing, walking, sitting, lying, and in food, suppress their sleep, keep their senses in subjection, abandon their very body and their life. But it is after they have thus, in pain, sought after Nirvâṇa, that they enjoy the Nirvâṇa which is bliss unalloyed—as teachers do the bliss of knowledge. Thus is it, O king, that Nirvâṇa is all bliss, and there is no pain mingled with it. For Nirvâṇa is one thing, and the pain another.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the pain of
Nirvâṇa.]

[DILEMMA THE EIGHTIETH.]

THE OUTWARD FORM OF NIRVÂNA.]

61. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this Nirvâna that you are always talking of—can you make clear by metaphor, or explanation, or reason, or argument, the form, or figure, or duration¹, or measure of it?'

[316] 'Nirvâna, O king, has nothing similar to it. By no metaphor, or explanation, or reason, or argument can its form, or figure, or duration, or measure be made clear.'

'That I cannot believe, Nâgasena,—that of Nirvâna, which really after all is a condition that exists², it should be so impossible in any way to make us understand either the form, or figure, or duration, or measure! Give me some explanation of this.'

62. 'Very well, O king, I will do so. Is there such a thing, O king, as the great ocean?'

'Yes, the ocean exists.'

'Well, suppose some one were to ask you, saying: "How much water is there, your majesty, in the sea, and how many are the creatures that dwell therein?" When that question had been put, how would you answer him?'

'I should reply thus to such a question: "My good fellow! this is an unaskable thing that you ask me. No one ought to ask such a question. It

¹ So the Pâli (*vayaṃ*). But the Sinhalese has *wâsaya*, 'dwelling-place,' throughout §§ 56 and 57.

² *Atthi-dhammassa nibbânassa*. The Sinhalese, p. 459, translates 'the form, &c., of the quality (*dharma*) of Nirvâna'—as if the Pâli were *nibbâna-dhammassa*. But see next page, note 2.

is a point that should be left alone. The physicists¹ have never examined into the ocean in that way. And no one can measure the water there, or count the creatures who dwell therein." Thus, Sir, should I make reply.'

63. 'But why, O king, would you make such a reply about the ocean which, after all, is really an existing condition of things². Ought you not rather to count and tell him, saying: "So and so much is the water in the sea, and so and so many are the creatures that dwell therein?"'

'That would be impossible, Sir. The question is beyond one's power.'

'As impossible as it is, O king, to tell the measure of the water in the sea, or the number of the creatures dwelling therein, though after all the sea exists, so impossible is it in any of the ways you suggest to tell the form, or figure, or duration, or measure of Nirvâna, though after all it is a condition that does exist. [317] And even, O king, if one of magical powers, master over mind, were to be able to count the water and the creatures in the sea, even he could not tell the form or the figure, the duration or the measure of Nirvâna.

64. 'And hear another explanation of the same thing, O king. Are there, O king, among the gods certain of them called "The Formless Ones³?"'

¹ Lokakkhâyikâ, 'those who have in former days enquired into and described the world,' says the Sinhalese.

² Atthidhammassa again, which Hînaśi-kumburê now renders cœti swabbhawawû. 'Pourquoi répons-tu ainsi au sujet de l'état naturel du grand océan,' says the French. (Compare above, p. 270 of the Pâli.)

³ Arûpakâyikâ. It is very odd that Hînaśi-kumburê takes the word here, and in the answer, as a feminine singular, and still

‘Yes, Sir. I have heard there are such.’

‘Well, O king, can you make clear by metaphor, or explanation, or reason, or argument the form, or figure, or duration¹, or size of these gods, the “Formless Ones?”’

‘No, I cannot.’

‘Then, O king, there are none.’

‘The Formless Ones, Sir, do exist; and yet it is impossible in any of the ways you suggest to explain either their form or figure, either their duration or their size.’

‘As impossible as it is, O king, to tell the form or figure, the duration or the size of the gods called “Formless Ones,” though they after all are beings that exist², so impossible is it in any of the ways you suggest to explain the form or the figure, the duration or the measure of Nirvâna, though after all it is a condition that does exist.’

65. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, I will grant you that Nirvâna is bliss unalloyed, and yet that is impossible to make clear, either by simile or explanation, by reason or by argument, either its form or its figure, either its duration or its size. But is there no quality of Nirvâna which is inherent also in other

more so that the French translation takes it throughout as a masculine singular. But the *Simhalese* throughout the sequel treats it properly as a plural nominative; and there can be little doubt that the inhabitants, or some of the inhabitants, of the ‘Formless Realm,’ the *Arûpâvaṅkara* or *Arûpa-brahma-loka*, are referred to. But this name is different from those given to any of these gods in *Childers*, and I cannot trace it in the *Piṭakas* as applied to any of them.

¹ I follow the Pâli, which still has *vayam*. The *Simhalese* has here and below *winâsaya*.

² *Atthisattanam* yeva, which the *Simhalese*, p. 460, represents merely by *cettâwû*.

things¹, and is such that it can be made evident by metaphor²?’

‘Though there is nothing as to its form which can be so explained, there is something, O king, as to its qualities which can.’

[318] ‘O happy word, Nâgasena! Speak then, quickly, that I may have an explanation of even one point in the characteristics of Nirvâna. Appease the fever of my heart. Allay it by the cool sweet breezes of your words!’

‘There is one quality of the lotus, O king, inherent in Nirvâna, and two qualities of water, and three of medicine, and four of the ocean, and five of food, and ten of space, and three of the wish-conferring gem, and three of red sandal wood, and three of the froth of ghee, and five of a mountain peak.’

66. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the lotus which you said was inherent in Nirvâna,—which is that?’

‘As the lotus, O king, is untarnished by the water³, so is Nirvâna untarnished by any evil dispositions. This is the one quality of the lotus inherent in Nirvâna.’

¹ *Aññehi anupavittam*; ‘not previously explained by others,’ says Hīnaśī-kumburē. Neither rendering is altogether satisfactory. Perhaps ‘of which you have been convinced by others,’ in agreement with the use of the word above, p. 270 of the Pāli.

² In the French of Mr. da Sylva this sentence runs (p. 342): ‘Mais vénérable, n’y a-t-il pas une vertu du Nirvâna dont on puisse percevoir quelque ressemblance.’

³ That is, no drop of water adheres to the lotus, though it is surrounded by water and water may fall on it. For instances of the frequent similes drawn from this fact see below, V, 14; and Dhammapada 401; Sutta Nipâta II, 14, 17; III, 9, 32; IV, 6, 9. The French translation is: ‘de même que le lotus élève fièrement sa tête au-dessus de l’eau’ (!).

67. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those two qualities of water which you said were inherent in Nirvāṇa,—which are they?'

'As water, O king, is cool and assuages heat, so also is Nirvāṇa cool, and assuages the fever arising from all evil dispositions. This is the first quality of water inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O king, as water allays the thirst of men and beasts when they are exhausted and anxious, craving for drink, and tormented by thirst, so does Nirvāṇa allay the thirst of the craving after lusts, the craving after future life, and the craving after worldly prosperity¹. This is the second quality of water inherent in Nirvāṇa.'

68. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those three qualities of medicine, which you said were inherent in Nirvāṇa,—which are they?'

[319] 'As medicine, O king, is the refuge of beings tormented by poison, so is Nirvāṇa the refuge of beings tormented with the poison of evil dispositions. This is the first quality of medicine inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O king, as medicine puts an end to diseases, so does Nirvāṇa put an end to griefs. This is the second quality of medicine inherent in Nirvāṇa. And again, O king, as medicine is ambrosia², so also is Nirvāṇa ambrosia. This is the third quality of medicine inherent in Nirvāṇa.'

¹ On these fundamental conceptions see my notes in 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 148, 149, where it is shown that the three 'cravings' which end in Nirvāṇa are pretty much the same as the lust of the flesh, theism, and materialism.

² Amata, the translation of which word by 'immortality' has given rise to so much confusion. So the French here says 'la médecine a le pouvoir de combattre la mort,' which is nearly as bad. See the Appendix.

69. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those four qualities of the ocean which you said were inherent in Nirvâna, —which are they?'

'As the ocean, O king, is free from (empty of) corpses¹, so also is Nirvâna free from (empty of) the dead bodies of all evil dispositions². This, O king, is the first quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the ocean is mighty and boundless, and fills not with all the rivers that flow in to it; so is Nirvâna mighty and boundless, and fills not with all beings (who enter in to it). This is the second quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the ocean is the abode of mighty creatures, so is Nirvâna the abode of great men—Arahats, in whom the Great Evils and all stains have been destroyed, endowed with power, masters of themselves. This is the third quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the ocean is all in blossom³, as it were, with the innumerable and various and fine flowers of the ripple of its waves, so is Nirvâna all in blossom, as it were, with the innumerable and

¹ See on this belief above, IV, 3, 39 (I, 259).

² The word used here for free, empty (*suñña*), has again given rise to the most odd misconceptions. As Nirvâna is hence called *Sunyatâ*, 'emptiness,' Christian writers (taking Nirvâna as a name for some kind of future life) have very naturally thought, in trying to fasten some meaning upon emptiness in a future life, that it must mean 'annihilation of a soul,' and have labelled Buddhism as Nihilism! The real meaning is really very simple, and entirely ethical (not metaphysical or animistic):

'Men may rise on stepping stones

Of their dead selves to higher things.'

See below, IV, 8, 78, for a metaphor founded on a similar idea.

³ *Samkusumito*, only found here. Compare 'garlands, *vitvam*,' I, 175, 176.

various and fine flowers of purity, of knowledge, and of emancipation. This is the fourth quality of the ocean inherent in *Nirvâna*.'

[320] 70. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those five qualities of food which you said were inherent in *Nirvâna*,—which are they?'

'As food, O king, is the support of the life of all beings, so is *Nirvâna*, when it has been realised, the support of life, for it puts an end to old age and death. This is the first quality of food inherent in *Nirvâna*. And again, O king, as food increases the strength of all beings, so does *Nirvâna*, when it has been realised, increase the power of Iddhi of all beings. This is the second quality of food inherent in *Nirvâna*. And again, O king, as food is the source of the beauty of all beings, so is *Nirvâna*, when it has been realised, the source to all beings of the beauty of holiness. This is the third quality of food inherent in *Nirvâna*. And again, O king, as food puts a stop to suffering in all beings, so does *Nirvâna*, when it has been realised, put a stop in all beings to the suffering arising from every evil disposition. This is the fourth quality of food inherent in *Nirvâna*. And again, O king, as food overcomes in all beings the weakness of hunger, so does *Nirvâna*, when it has been realised, overcome in all beings the weakness which arises from hunger and every sort of pain. This is the fifth quality of food inherent in *Nirvâna*.'

71. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those ten qualities of space which you said were inherent in *Nirvâna*,—which are they?'

'As space, O king, neither is born nor grows old, neither dies nor passes away nor is reborn (has

a future life to spring up into), as it is incompressible, cannot be carried off by thieves, rests on nothing, is the sphere in which birds fly, is unobstructed, and is infinite; [321] so, O king, Nirvâna is not born, neither does it grow old, it dies not, it passes not away, it has no rebirth (no future life to spring up into), it is unconquerable, thieves carry it not off, it is not attached to anything¹, it is the sphere in which Arahats move, nothing can obstruct it, and it is infinite. These are the ten qualities of space inherent in Nirvâna.'

72. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of the wish-conferring gem which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,—which are they?'

'As the wishing-gem, O king, satisfies every desire, so also does Nirvâna. This is the first quality of the wishing-gem inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the wishing-gem causes delight, so also does Nirvâna. This is the second quality of the wishing-gem inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the wishing-gem is full of lustre, so also is Nirvâna. This is the third quality of the wishing-gem inherent in Nirvâna.'

73. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of red sandal wood which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,—which are they?'

¹ Anissitam, so below, p. 351 of the Pâli, the dhutaṅgam is said to be anissitam. The translation is difficult. In our passage here Hīnaś-kumburê (p. 464) renders it, as applied both to space and to Nirvâna, by 'having no âsra wa.' Below, as applied to the vows (dhutaṅgas), he renders it (p. 512) by 'unconnected with craving' (*trishnânisrita*). 'Self-dependent' or 'untarnished (by reliance on external things)' would suit the context in all three passages.

‘As red sandal wood, O king, is hard to get, so is Nirvâna hard to attain to. This is the first quality of red sandal wood inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as red sandal wood is unequalled in the beauty of its perfume, so is Nirvâna. This is the second quality of red sandal wood inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as red sandal wood is praised by all the good, so is Nirvâna praised by all the Noble Ones. This is the third quality of red sandal wood inherent in Nirvâna.’

74. [322] ‘Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of the skimmings of ghee¹ which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,—which are they?’

‘As ghee is beautiful in colour, O king, so also is Nirvâna beautiful in righteousness. This is the first quality of the ghee inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as ghee has a pleasant perfume, so also has Nirvâna the pleasant perfume of righteousness. This is the second quality of ghee inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as ghee has a pleasant taste, so also has Nirvâna. This is the third quality of ghee inherent in Nirvâna.’

75. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, those five qualities of a mountain peak which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,—which are they?’

‘As a mountain peak is very lofty, so also is Nirvâna very exalted. This is the first quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as a mountain peak is immovable, so also is Nirvâna. This is the second quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king,

¹ This is butter made of buffaloes’ milk, and is highly esteemed in India.

as a mountain peak is inaccessible, so also is Nirvâna inaccessible to all evil dispositions. This is the third quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as a mountain peak is a place where no plants can grow, so also is Nirvâna a condition in which no evil dispositions can grow. This is the fourth quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as a mountain peak is free alike from desire to please and from resentment, so also is Nirvâna. This is the fifth quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna.'

[323] 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the problem as to the form of Nirvâna.]

[DILEMMA THE EIGHTY-FIRST.

THE TIME OF NIRVÂNA.]

76. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say¹:

"Nirvâna is not past, nor future, nor present, nor produced, nor not produced, nor producible²."

'In that case, Nâgasena, does the man who, having ordered his life aright, realises Nirvâna, realise something already produced, or does he himself produce it first, and then realise it?'

'Neither the one, O king, nor the other. And nevertheless, O king, that principle of Nirvâna (nibbâna-dhâtu) which he, so ordering his life aright, realises—that exists.'

¹ Not yet traced in the *Piṭakas*.

² 'By the action of Karma as a pre-existing cause' is to be understood.

‘Do not, venerable Nāgasena, clear up this puzzle by making it dark! Make it open and plain as you elucidate it. With a will, strenuous in endeavour, pour out upon it all that has been taught you. It is a point on which this people is bewildered, plunged into perplexity, lost in doubt. Dissipate this guilty uncertainty; it pierces like a dart¹!’

77. ‘That principle of Nirvāṇa, O king, so peaceful, so blissful, so delicate, exists. And it is that which he who orders his life aright, grasping the idea of all things (of the Confections, *Samkhāras*) according to the teachings of the Conquerors, realises by his wisdom—even as a pupil, by his knowledge, makes himself, according to the instruction of his teacher, master of an art.

‘And if you ask: “How is Nirvāṇa to be known?” it is by freedom from distress and danger, by confidence, by peace, by calm, by bliss, by happiness, by delicacy, by purity, by freshness².

78. ‘Just, O king, as a man being burnt in a blazing fiery furnace heaped up with many faggots of dry sticks, when he has freed himself from it by

¹ *Bhinda’ etam anto-dosa-sallam*; ‘break and take away the dart of the guilt (*dosa*) of that doubt which has arisen in my inmost being (*satana*),’ says *Hīnaśī-kumburē*. It is literally ‘break this dart of guilt within.’ The meaning is clear enough (except as to whether the guilt is the speaker’s or ‘this people’s’). To break a dart in a wound would be no kindness, and that cannot have been the author’s idea. To bring out the meaning one must amplify a little, and I should have followed the *Simhalese* had it not seemed preferable to leave the personality of the guilty one as ambiguous in the translation as in the text.

² *Hīnaśī-kumburē*, p. 467, does actually put these words into Nāgasena’s mouth.

³ *Sītalato*, literally ‘by cold.’ See the note above on III, 6, 6 (I, 119).

a violent effort, and escaped into a cool place, [324] would experience supreme bliss—just so whosoever orders his life aright, he by his careful thinking will realise the supreme bliss of Nirvâna, in which the burning heat of the threefold fire (of lust, malice, and delusion)¹ has all gone out. As the furnace, O king, so should you regard this threefold fire, as the man fallen into the fire the man who is ordering his life aright, as the cool place Nirvâna.

79. 'Or again, O king, as a man fallen into a pit full of the dead bodies of snakes and dogs and men, of ordure, and of refuse, when, finding himself in the midst of it entangled in the hair of the corpses, he had by a violent effort escaped into a place where no dead bodies were, would experience supreme bliss—just so whosoever orders his life aright, he by his careful thinking will realise the supreme bliss of Nirvâna, from which the corpses of all evil dispositions have been removed². As a corpse, O king, so should you regard the four pleasures of sense, as the man fallen among corpses the man who is ordering his life aright, as the place free from corpses Nirvâna.

80. 'Or again, O king, as a man (fallen among enemies with drawn swords in their hands)³, quaking with fear and terror, agitated and upset in mind, when with a violent effort he has freed himself from them, and escaped into a strong refuge, a firm place of security, experiences supreme bliss—just so whosoever orders his life aright, he by his careful thinking will realise the supreme bliss of Nirvâna,

¹ Râga, dosa, moha.

² Compare above, IV, 8, 69, and the note there.

³ The words in brackets are added from the *Simhalese*, p. 467.

in which fear and terror have been put away. As the terror, O king, so should you regard the anxiety which arises again and again on account of birth, old age, disease, and death, as the terrified man the man who is ordering his life aright, as the place of refuge *Nirvâna*.

81. 'Or again, O king, as a man fallen on a spot filthy with dirt, and slime, and mud, when with a violent effort he has got rid of the mud, and escaped to a clean and spotless place, would experience supreme bliss—just so whosoever orders his life aright, he by his careful thinking will realise the supreme bliss of *Nirvâna*, from which the stains and mud of evil dispositions have been removed. As the mud, O king, [325] so should you regard income, and honour, and praise¹, as the man fallen into the mud the man who is ordering his life aright, as the clean and spotless place *Nirvâna*.

82. 'And if again you should ask: "How does he who orders his life aright realise that *Nirvâna*?" (I should reply), He, O king, who orders his life aright grasps the truth as to the development of all things², and when he is doing so he perceives therein birth, he perceives old age, he perceives disease, he perceives death. But he perceives not therein either happiness or bliss, he perceives not therein, whether in the beginning, or the middle, or the end, anything worthy of being laid hold of (as lasting satisfaction)³. As a man, O king, if a mass of iron

¹ So also at *Gâtaka* IV, 222 (verse 48).

² *Samkhârânam parattam sammasati*. Compare *Dharma-pada*, verse 374.

³ *Gayhûpagam*; so the *Simhalese*.

had been heated the livelong day¹, and were all glowing, scorching, and red hot, would find no spot on it, whether at one end or in the middle or at the other end, fit to be taken hold of—just so, O king, he who orders his life aright grasps the truth of the development of things, and in doing so he perceives therein birth, he perceives old age, he perceives disease, he perceives death. But he perceives not therein either happiness or bliss, he perceives not therein, whether in the beginning, or in the middle, or in the end, anything fit to be taken hold of (as a lasting satisfaction).

83. 'And discontent arises in his mind when he thus finds nothing fit to be relied on as a lasting satisfaction, and a fever takes possession of his body², and without a refuge or protection, hopeless, he becomes weary of repeated lives³. As if a man had fallen into a burning and blazing mighty fiery furnace, and saw no refuge from it, no way of escape, he would, hopeless, be weary of the fire—just so, O king, discontent arises in his mind when he thus finds nothing fit to be relied on as a lasting satisfaction, and a fever takes possession of his body, and without a refuge or protection, hopeless, he becomes weary of repeated births.

84. 'And in the mind of him who thus perceives

¹ Divasa-santatta. So Hīnaś-kumburê, and compare *Magghima Nikāya* I, 453, and *Gātaka* IV, 118 (where the reading is *diva-santatta*). See also above, p. 46 of the Pāli.

² For *dāho okkamati*, Hīnaś-kumburê may have had a different reading. He renders *dahadiya selawenneya*, 'sweat shapes' (sic for 'forms').

³ Bhavesu; literally 'of becomings' ('in any of the three worlds,' adds the *Simhalese*).

the insecurity of transitory life, (of starting afresh in innumerable births)¹ the thought arises: "All on fire is this endless becoming, burning, and blazing! Full of pain is it, of despair! If only one could reach a state in which there were no becoming, there would there be calm, that would be sweet—the cessation of all these conditions², the getting rid of all these defects³ (of lusts, of evil, and of Karma), the end of cravings, the absence of passion, peace, Nirvâṇa!" And therewith does his mind leap forward into that state in which there is no becoming, and then has he found peace, [326] then does he exult and rejoice⁴ at the thought: "A refuge have I gained at last!" Just, O king, as a man who, venturing into a strange land, has lost his way, on becoming aware of a path, free from jungle, that will lead him home, bounds forward along it, contented in mind, exulting and rejoicing at the thought: "I have found the way at last!"—just so in him who thus perceives the insecurity of transitory births there arises the thought: "All on fire is this endless becoming, burning, and blazing! Full of pain is it, and despair! If only one could reach a state in which there were no becoming, there would there be calm, that would be sweet—the cessation of all these conditions, the getting rid of all these defects, the end of cravings, the absence of passion, peace, Nirvâṇa!" And therewith does his mind leap forward into that state in which there is no becoming,

¹ Pavatte. I have included Hīnaśī-kumburē's explanation of this word, for which there is no equivalent in English.

² Saṃkhārā, saṃkhāra-dharmayāgē says the Sinhalese.

³ Upadhi; the Sinhalese (p. 470) has simply klesayan.

⁴ Pahamsīyati kuhūyati, both words only found here.

and then has he found peace, then does he exult and rejoice at the thought : " A refuge have I found at last ! " And he strives with might and main along that path, searches it out, accustoms himself thoroughly to it, to that end does he make firm his self-possession, to that end does he hold fast in effort, to that end does he remain steadfast in love (toward all beings in all the worlds), and still to that does he direct his mind again and again, until gone far beyond the transitory, he gains the Real, the highest fruit (of Arahatsip) ¹. And when he has gained that, O king, the man who has ordered his life aright has realised, (seen face to face,) Nirvâna ² !'

'Very good, Nâgasena ! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the problem as to the time
of Nirvâna ³.]

¹ Appavattam okkamati, Apravṛttiya yayi kiyana lada Arhat-phalaya/a pœminenneya, says Hīnaś-kumburê.

² This paragraph is an excellent example of the difficulty of doing anything like justice in translations to the most instructive and valuable passages in our Buddhist texts. It is in the Pâli full of eloquence, and even in the Sinhalese, though there too much expanded, it is powerful and striking. To a Buddhist it must have been inspiring and touching to the last degree, carefully led up to, as it is, with masterly skill, by our author. But it is so full of terms untranslatable into English, and with difficulty even comprehensible to minds saturated with Western ideas, that every translation must be inadequate, and any attempt to reproduce the real beauty of its style must be a failure.

³ How almost impossible it is for a reader with pre-conceived delusions to grasp the plain sense of such passages may be seen from the strange note which the French translator has added at the end of this clear and eloquent description. He says, 'La conclusion de ce Jâtaka (sic !) paraît être que le dévot bouddhiste peut

[DILEMMA THE EIGHTY-SECOND.

THE PLACE OF NIRVÂNA.]

85. 'Venerable Nâgasena, does there exist the spot—either in the direction of the East, or of the South, or of the West, or of the North, either above, or below, or on the horizon—where Nirvâna is stored up¹ ?'

'There is no spot, O king,—either in the East, or the South, or in the West, or the North, either above, or below, or on the horizon—where Nirvâna is.'

'But if so, Nâgasena, then neither can Nirvâna exist, and those who realise it, their realisation is vain. And I will give you an explanation of this. Just, Sir, as there are on the earth fields in which crops can be grown, flowers from which perfumes come, bushes on which flowers can grow, trees on which fruits can ripen, mines from which gems can be dug, so that whosoever desires any of these things can go there and get it—just so, Nâgasena, if [327] Nirvâna exists one must expect there to be some place, where it is produced². But since there is not, therefore I declare that there can be no Nirvâna, and those who realise it, their realisation is vain.'

86. 'There is no spot, O king, where Nirvâna is

atteindre Nirvâna dans cette vie même. Il est fâcheux que l'auteur ne se soit pas expliqué plus catégoriquement sur cette question intéressante' (1).

¹ Sannihitam perhaps 'is situate.' Hīnaśi-kumburē has pihi-
siye, 'can be got.'

² Ikāhitabbo. See above, p. 269 of the Pāli.

situate, and yet Nirvâna is, and he who orders his life right will, by careful attention, realise Nirvâna. Just as fire exists, and yet there is no place where fire (by itself) is stored up. But if a man rubs two sticks together the fire comes;—just so, O king, Nirvâna exists, though there is no spot where it is stored up. And he who orders his life aright will, by careful attention, realise Nirvâna.

87. 'Or again, O king, just as there are the seven treasures of the king of kings—the treasure of the wheel, and the treasure of the elephant, and the treasure of the horse, and the treasure of the gem, and the treasure of the woman, and the treasure of the finance minister, and the treasure of the adviser. But there is no spot where these treasures are laid up. When a sovran conducts himself aright they appear to him of their own accord¹—just so, O king, Nirvâna exists, though there is no place where it is stored up. And he who orders his life aright will, by careful attention, realise Nirvâna.'

88. 'Venerable Nâgasena, let it be granted that there is no place where Nirvâna is stored up. But is there any place on which a man may stand and, ordering his life aright, realise Nirvâna?'

'Yes, O king, there is such a place.'

'Which then, Nâgasena, is that place?'

'Virtue, O king, is the place. For if grounded in virtue, and careful in attention—whether in the land of the Scythians² or the Greeks, whether in China or

¹ This is stated in regard to each of the seven in the standard passage on these seven treasures, translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 251-259.

² Sakâ. Hînaî-kumburê has sadly blundered over this, to him, strange word. He actually translates it 'one's own.'

Tartary¹, whether in Alexandria² or in Nikumba, whether in Benares or in Kosala, whether in Kashmîr or in Gandhâra³, whether on a mountain top⁴ or in the highest heavens⁵—wheresoever he may be, the man who orders his life aright will realise Nirvâna. [328] Just, O king, as the man who has eyes wherever he may be—in the land of the Scythians or the Greeks, in China or in Tartary, in Alexandria, Nikumba, Benares, or Kosala, in Kashmîr or in Gandhâra, on a mountain top or in the highest heavens—will be able to behold the expanse of heaven and to see the horizon facing him—just so, O king, will he who orders his conduct aright and is careful in attention—whether in the land of the Scythians or the Greeks, whether in China or Tartary, whether in Alexandria, or Benares, or Kosala, or Nikumba, whether in Kashmîr or in Gandhâra, whether on a mountain top or in the highest heavens—wheresoever he may be, attain to the realisation of Nirvâna.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! You have preached to me of Nirvâna, and of the realisation thereof, you have set forth the advantages of virtue, you have explained the supreme attainment, you have raised aloft the standard of the Truth, you have established the eye of Truth, you have shown how right means adopted by those of high aims will be neither

¹ Vilâta, the Simhalese has Milâta.

² That is Alexandria on the Indus. See the Introduction to the first part, p. xxiii.

³ All these names are discussed, *ibid.* pp. xliii, xlv.

⁴ Naga-muddham. Hînaśi-kumburê understands this as the top of Mount Meru, Sakka's heaven.

⁵ Brahma-loke.

barren nor unfruitful. That is so, and I accept it as you say¹.

[Here ends the problem of the place of Nirvâna.]

[Here ends the Eighth Chapter ².]

¹ In the *Simhalese*, pp. 472, 473, this last paragraph is much expanded.

² The *Simhalese* has *Sakala-gana-mano-nandanîyawû me Sñi-saddharmâdâsayehi a/aweni wargaya nimiyeya*.

BOOK V.

THE PROBLEM OF INFERENCE.

[329] 1. Now Milinda the king went up to the place where Nâgasena was, and bowed down before him, and took his seat on one side. And when so seated he, longing to know, to hear, and to remember, and longing to make the light of knowledge arise and to break in pieces his ignorance, roused up in himself courage and zeal, and, full of self-possession and thoughtfulness, spake thus to Nâgasena :

2. 'Venerable Nâgasena, tell me, have you ever seen the Buddha¹ ?'

'No, O king.'

'Then have your teachers ever seen the Buddha?'

'No, Sire.'

'So you say, venerable Nâgasena, that you have never seen the Buddha, and that your teachers have never seen the Buddha. Therefore, Nâgasena, the Buddha did not exist. There is no clear evidence, in that case, of a Buddha.'

'But did those Kshatriyas of old exist, who were the founders of the line of kings from which you come?'

'Certainly, Sir. How can there be any doubt about that?'

'Well, O king. Have you ever seen them?'

'No, Sir.'

¹ A similar question has been already asked above, III, 5, 1 (I, 109).

‘And those who instructed you—the family chaplains, and officers of the staff, and those who lay down the law, and ministers of state—have they ever seen those Kshatriyas of old?’

‘No, Sir.’

‘If then neither have you seen them, nor your teachers, where are they? There is no clear evidence, in that case, of those Kshatriyas of old!’

3. ‘But, Nāgasena, the royal insignia they used are still to be seen—[330] the white sunshade of state, and the crown, and the slippers, and the fan with the yak’s tail, and the sword of state, and the priceless throne—and by these can we know and believe that the Kshatriyas of old lived once.’

‘Just so, O king, can we know that Blessed One and believe in him. For there is a reason for our knowledge and belief that the Blessed One was. And what is that reason?—The royal insignia used by that Blessed One, by him of knowledge and insight, the Arahats, the Buddha Supreme, are still to be seen—the four Means of keeping oneself ready and mindful, and the fourfold Great Struggle, and the four steps to Iddhi, and the five Organs of the moral sense, and the five moral Powers, and the seven forms of the wisdom of the Arahats, and the Noble Eightfold Path¹—and by these can the whole

¹ These are the famous thirty-five constituent qualities that make up Arahatsip (that is, that state of mind which, from another point of view and by another of its numerous names, is also called Nirvâṇa). They formed the subject of the last discourse delivered by Gotama before his death to his disciples (‘Book of the Great Decease,’ III, 61), and on my translation of that passage (‘Buddhist Suttas,’ pp. 60–63) I have added a note giving all the details.

It is perhaps worthy of remark that both here and twice else-

world of gods and men know and believe that that Blessed One existed once. By this reason, on this ground, by this argument, through this inference, can it be known that the Blessed One lived.

“He who, himself set free in that bless'd state
In which the Upadhis have ceased to be,
—Lusts, sin, and Karma,—has brought safe ashore,
Saved from the sea of woe, great multitudes—
Only by inference can it be known
That he, the best of men, existed once¹.”

4. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, give me an illustration.’
‘Just, O king, as the architect of a city², when he wants to build one, would first search out a pleasant spot of ground, with which no fault can be found, even, with no hills or gullies in it, free from rough ground and rocks, not open to the danger of attack. And then, when he has made plain any rough places there may still be on it, he would clear it thoroughly of all stumps and stakes, and would proceed to build there a city fine and regular, measured out into suitable quarters³, with trenches and ramparts thrown up around it⁴, with strong gateways, watch-towers, and battlements, with wide squares and open places and junctions (where two roads meet) and cross-ways (where four

where, at pp. 37, 335 (of the Pâli), our author reverses the order of Nos. 4 and 5—the five moral Powers and the five Organs (of the higher sense)—which are really only the same mental qualities looked at from two different points of view.

¹ These verses have not been traced as yet in the *Piṭakas*.

² There is another parable of the architect above, p. 34 of the Pâli (I, 53 of the translation).

³ *Bhâgaso mitam*, an expression constantly recurring.

⁴ *Ukkizna*. See *Gâtaka* IV, 106.

roads meet)¹, with cleanly and even high roads², with regular lines of open shops (bazaars), well provided with parks, and gardens, and lakes, and lotus-ponds, and wells, adorned with many kinds of temples to the gods, free from every fault. And then when the city stood there in all its glory, he would go away to some other land. And in course of time that city might become mighty and prosperous, filled with stores of food, [331] peaceful, glorious, happy, free from distress and calamity, the meeting-place of all sorts and conditions of men. Then nobles and brahmans, merchants and work-people; soldiers mounted on elephants, and on horses, and on chariots; infantry, and bowmen, and swordsmen; standard-bearers, officers, and camp-followers³; high-born warriors whose delight is in war, fighting champions, men mighty as elephants, heroes, men who fight in buckskin⁴, devoted fighting-men born of slaves in great houses or of the private in the royal army⁵; troops of professional wrestlers⁶;

¹ According to the dictionaries each of those four words (*kaṭṭhara*, *katukka*, *sandhi*, and *singhātaka*) means either a square, or a place where four roads meet. The *Sinhalese* has *āpana-katushka-sandhi ceti*, omitting the last and certainly inexact in its rendering of the first word. *Sandhi* I have only met with here in this sense.

² *Rāga-maggam*; literally 'the king's highways,' which also only occurs here.

³ For *pinda-dāvikā Hīnaśi-kumburē* (who at p. 475 gives the *Pāli* of all this) reads *pinda-dayakā*.

⁴ *Vammino yodhino*. But both *Hīnaśi-kumburē* here, and the parallel passage in the *Samañña Phala Sutta* (D. II, 14), read *Kamma-yodhino*.

⁵ For *Bhaṭṭi-putta Hīnaśi-kumburē* reads *Bhaṭṭa-puttā*.

⁶ These two (*Bhaṭṭi-puttā* and *Malla-gaṇā*) are omitted in the *Dīgha*.

cooks and curry makers, barbers and bathing attendants, smiths and florists, workers in gold and silver and lead and tin and copper and brass¹ and iron, and jewellers; messengers; potters, salt gatherers², tanners, carriage builders, carvers in ivory³, rope makers, comb makers, cotton-thread spinners, basket makers, bow manufacturers, bow-string makers, arrow fletchers, painters, dye manufacturers, dyers, weavers, tailors, assayers of gold⁴, cloth merchants⁵, dealers in perfumes, grass cutters, hewers of wood, hired servants⁶, people who live by gathering flowers and fruits and roots in the woods, hawkers of boiled rice, sellers of cakes, fishmongers, butchers, dealers in strong drinks, play actors, dancers, acrobats⁷, conjurors, professional bards⁸, wrestlers

¹ *Vaṭṭakârâ*. See the note above on IV, 7, 11 (p. 267 of the Pâli).

² *Loṇakârâ*, 'salt makers.' But *Hīnaṣi-kumburê* reads *loha-kârâ* and translates *lokuruwo*, 'workers in metal'

³ *Dantakârâ*, which in the *Siṃhalese* is simply repeated. There is no such word in Clough.

⁴ *Heraṇṇikâ*. Childers says 'royal treasurer,' and *Hīnaṣi-kumburê* 'coiners of silver *māsakas*' (*raṇ masu tanannoya*), but *Subhṭi* (in his *Siṃhalese* gloss on *Abhidhāna Padīpikâ*, verse 343) renders it 'judgers of gold' (*raṇ balannâ*); and that this is right is shown by the context in the passage of the *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī* (p. 315), where the probably identical word *heraṇṇaka* is used.

⁵ *Dussika*. *Hīnaṣi-kumburê* renders this word here by *pili welendo*, 'cloth-sellers,' but above (p. 262 of the Pâli) by *sāyam kârako*, 'dice manufacturers.'

⁶ It is instructive that men working for hire are put here among the lowest sort of work-people, while the slave born in the house stands in the best company.

⁷ *Laṅghakâ*. *Pinuṃ kârāyo*, 'turners of summersets' in the *Siṃhalese*. See *Gâtaka* I, 431, and above, pp. 31, 191 of the Pâli.

⁸ *Vetâlikâ*. *Vetâliyehi maṅgalâṣṭhaka kiyannâwū* in

(boxers), corpse burners, casters out of rotten flowers¹, savages², wild men of the woods³, prostitutes, swingers and jumpers⁴, and the slave girls of bullies—people of many countries, people from Scythia, Bactria, China, and Vilâta; people of Uggēni, of Bhâruka~~kk~~ha, of Benares, of Kosala, and of the border lands; people from Magadha, and Sâketa, and Suratt~~h~~a, and the West; from Kotumbara and Madhura, from Alexandria, Kashmîr, and Gandhâra⁵,—all these coming to take up their residence there, and finding the new city to be regular, faultless, perfect, and pleasant, would know: “Able indeed must that architect have been by whom this city was built!”

5. ‘Just so, O king, that Blessed One, peerless, unequalled, unapproached, incomparable, admirable beyond all measure by weight or calculation, of infinite virtue, full of virtue and perfection, boundless in wisdom and glory and zeal and power, who, when he had attained to the summit of all the perfections

the *Simhalese* (Wandi-bha~~tt~~ayo according to Subhûti on Abhidhâna Padîpikâ 369).

¹ Pupp~~h~~akk~~h~~adakkâ. A well-known low caste whose duty it was to remove flowers offered on the shrines of the gods after they had faded. At Thera Gâthâ, verse 620, this is called one of the meanest of occupations.

² Venâ. Hîna~~si~~-kumburê has ‘lute makers,’ but this must be wrong.

³ The *Simhalese* says simply Weddahs (Wœddas), the well-known interesting wild men of Ceylon.

⁴ Lâsikâ, ‘those,’ says the *Simhalese*, ‘who as if intoxicated with joy jump about and leap and dance.’ But I think it is connected with the ancient usages to which the lascivious swinging of the Saivites and Vallabhâkâryas owes its origin.

⁵ On all these names see the Introduction to part I, pp. xliii, xlv. Aparântaka and Pâtheyyaka might there have been added, as well as puratthimo ganapado (from p. 42).

of the Buddhas, [332] overthrew Mâra and all his hosts,—he, bursting asunder the net of heresy, and casting aside ignorance, and causing wisdom to arise, and bearing aloft the torch of Truth, reached forward to Buddhahood itself, and so, unconquered and unconquerable in the fight, built this city of Righteousness. And the Blessed One's City of Righteousness, O king, has righteousness for its rampart, and fear of sin for its moat, and knowledge for the battlement over its city gate, and zeal for the watch-tower above that, and faith for the pillars at its base, and mindfulness for the watchman at the gate, and wisdom for the terrace above, and the Suttantas for its market-place, and the Abhidhamma for its cross-ways, and the Vinaya (the Canon Law) for its judgment hall, and constant self-possession for its chief street. And in that street, O king, these bazaars are open—a flower bazaar, and a fruit bazaar, and an antidote bazaar, and a medicine bazaar, and an ambrosia bazaar, and a bazaar for precious stones, and a bazaar for all manner of merchandise.'

6. 'But what, venerable Nâgasena, is the flower bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha?'

'There are certain subjects for meditation, O king, that have been made known by the Blessed One, by him of knowledge and insight, by the Arahât, the Buddha Supreme. And they are these. The idea of the impermanence (of every thing and of every being), the idea of the absence of any abiding principle (any soul in any thing or any being), the idea of the impurity and the idea of the danger connected with the body, the idea of getting rid of evil dispositions, the idea of freedom from passion, the idea of peace, the idea of dissatisfaction with the

things of the world, the idea of the transitory nature of all conditions, the idea of ecstatic trance, the ideas of a corpse in the various stages of decay, the ideas of a place of execution in all its various horrors, the idea of love to all beings, the idea of pity for all beings, the idea of sympathy with all beings, the idea of equanimity in all the changing circumstances of life, the idea of death, and the idea of the body¹. These, O king, are the subjects for meditation prescribed by the Blessed One. And of these, whoever, longing to be delivered from old age and death, takes any one as the subject of his meditation, by that meditation does he become set free from passion, set free from malice, set free from dullness, set free from pride, set free from wrong views, by that does he cross the ocean of *Samsâra*, and stem the torrent of cravings, and cleanse himself of the threefold stain², and destroy within himself all evil; and so, entering that glorious city, spotless and stainless, pure and white, [333] ageless and deathless, where all is security and calm and bliss—the city of *Nirvâṇa*—he emancipates his mind in *Arahatship*! And this, O king, is what is called “The Blessed One’s bazaar of flowers.”

“Take with you Karma as the price,
And go ye up to that bazaar,
Buy there an object for your thought,
Emancipate yourselves. Be free³!”

¹ *Hīnaśī-kumburê* devotes a paragraph to each of these subjects for meditation.

² Of *râga*, *dosa*, and *moha*.

³ This stanza has not yet been found in the *Piṭakas*. In the first line it does not seem quite clear at first sight why Karma, of all things, should be the price. That Indian word being too

7. 'And what, venerable Nāgasena, is the perfume bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha?'

'There are certain categories of virtue, O king, that have been made known by the Blessed One, and anointed by the perfume of that righteousness the children of the Blessed One fill with the fumes of the fragrant incense of the perfume of goodness the whole world of gods and men, in every direction, and to windward and to leeward, continuing to pervade it again and yet again. And which are those categories? The virtue of taking refuge¹,

full of meaning to be translateable, is necessarily retained, and hence the phrase 'taking Karma as the price' may convey no meaning at all. If so, in trying to escape Scylla the unhappy translator has fallen into Charybdis. But it must mean one of two things, either something to be abandoned, given up; or something good which the buyer possesses, and may exchange for the good he wants to buy. If our author means the first it must be Karma (as one of the Upadhis), as a basis for continued individuality, and be much the same as egoism. If he means the other, then Karma, though standing alone, must be here used in the sense of kusala-kamma, good Karma, that is, the effect of good deeds done in a former life. Now our author never elsewhere uses kamma, without any qualifying adjective, in the sense of good Karma. On pp. 7, 20, 67, 108 foll., 134, 151, 189, 302 of the Pāli the unqualified word means throughout bad Karma, the effect of bad deeds done in a former birth. In a few passages it is used of former deeds in a way that apparently includes both good and bad. See especially pp. 3, 10, 146, 268. Now a buyer, in the case put, could not give up either the bad or the good deeds he had already done in a former life—that would be beyond his power. He could only offer, in exchange for the good he wanted to buy, good Karma (that is, in the sense of good deeds) either in the present, or in the immediate future. Below, V, 21 (p. 341 of the Pāli), will be found instances given by our author himself. It is forced, no doubt, to call this 'a price,' but it is probably the sense intended, and so Hīnaś-kumburē takes it.

¹ Taking the threefold refuge in the Buddha, the Doctrine (Dharma), and the Order.

the virtue that is fivefold and eightfold and tenfold¹, and the virtue of self-restraint tabulated in the five recitations that compose the Pâtimokkha². And this, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's bazaar of perfumes." For it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods :

"No flower's scent can go against the wind,
Not sandal wood's, nor musk's, nor jasmine
flower's :

But the sweet perfume of the good doth go
Against the wind, and the good man pervades,
On every side, the sweetness of his life³."

"Red sandal wood, musk, and the lotus, and
jasmine—

The perfume of goodness surpasseth them all.
Abundant the sweet scent of musk and of sandal
wood—

Still stronger, the scent of the good mounts to
heaven⁴!"

8. 'And what, venerable Nâgasena, is the fruit bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha?'

'Certain fruits have been made known, O king, by the Blessed One. And they are these:—The fruit of the first stage of the Excellent Way (con-

¹ These are respectively the first five, the first eight, and the whole ten, of the Precepts set out in my 'Buddhism,' p. 160.

² The whole of this text is translated in vol. xiii of the 'Sacred Books of the East.' The sîlas here enumerated are only the lower morality. The higher ethics come below in § 12.

³ From Aṅguttara Nikāya III, 79. The verse is quoted in the Dhammapada, verse 54, and also in the Gâtaka Book, III, 291.

⁴ It is not known where these lines originally stood. But they are quoted in the Dhammapada, verses 55, 56, and also in the Gâtaka Book loc. cit., and in the Sumaṅgala Vilâsini, p. 56.

version), and of the second stage, and of the third stage, and of the fourth (Arahatship)¹,—the fruit of the attainment of emptiness²,—the fruit of the attainment of the absence of the three signs (of an unconverted life, lust, malice, and dullness)—and the truth of the attainment of that state in which no low aspirations survive. [334] And whosoever desires any one of these, he gives his Karma as the price, and buys the fruit he longs for—either conversion or any other.

9. 'Just, O king, as any man who has a mango-tree bearing fruit all the year round, he does not knock down the fruits until buyers come. But when a buyer has come, and the fruit-grower has taken the price, then he says: "Come, my good man, this tree is always in bearing (it has therefore fruits in all stages of growth), take from it the kind of fruit you prefer, whether unripe, or decayed³, or hairy⁴, or sour, or ripe⁵." And the buyer, for the price paid, takes the kind he likes the best—if that be unripe fruit then he takes that, if it be decayed fruit then that, if it be hairy fruit then that, if it be sour fruit then that, if it be ripe fruit then he takes a ripe one. Just so, O king, whosoever desires any one of those other fruits, he gives his Karma as the price, and buys the fruit he longs for—

¹ The details of these 'fruits' will be found in 'Buddhism,' pp. 108–110.

² As to in respect of what, see the note above on IV, 8, 69 (p. 219 of the Pāli).

³ *Dovilaṃ*, *nilāta* says the *Simhalese*, p. 484.

⁴ *Kesika*. *Hīnaśi-kumburē* merely repeats this word.

⁵ The mango is used in all stages—when ripe for eating, and for pickles, curries, &c., in other stages.

either conversion or any other. And this, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's bazaar of fruits."

"Men give their Karma as the price,
And buy the fruit ambrosia ;
And happiness is theirs, and peace,
Who've bought the fruit ambrosia ¹."

10. 'And what, venerable Nâgasena, is the antidote bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha ?'

'Certain drugs, O king, have been made known by the Blessed One ; drugs by which the Blessed One delivers the whole world of gods and men from the poison of evil dispositions. And what are these drugs ? The four Noble Truths made known by the Blessed One, that is to say, the truth as to sorrow, and the truth as to the origin of sorrow, and the truth as to the cessation of sorrow, and the truth as to that path which leads to the cessation of sorrow ². And whosoever, longing for the highest insight (the insight of Arahatsip) ³, hear this doctrine of the four truths, they are set quite free from rebirth, [335] they are set quite free from old age, they are set quite free from death, they are set quite free from grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair. And this, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's bazaar of antidotes."

¹ These lines have not been traced as yet in the *Pitakas*, and are probably not meant as a quotation. 'Ambrosia' is of course the ambrosia of Arahatsip.

² For the full text of these 'Truths' see 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 148-150.

³ *Aññâ*. The *Simhalese*, p. 486, has *awabodhaya*. The word is rare, but it occurs at *Gâtaka* I, 140; II, 333; and at *Dhammapada*, verses 57, 96, always in this sense.

“Of all the drugs, in all the world,
The antidotes of poison dire,
Not one equals that Doctrine sweet.
Drink that, O brethren. Drink and live!¹”

11. ‘And what, venerable Nâgasena, is the medicine bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha?’

‘Certain medicines, O king, have been made known by the Blessed One, medicines by which he cures the whole world of gods and men. And they are these:—“The four Means of keeping oneself ready and mindful, and the fourfold Great Struggle, and the four Steps to Iddhi, and the five Organs of the moral sense, and the five moral Powers, and the seven Forms of the Wisdom of the Arahats, and the Noble Eightfold Path².” By these medicines the Blessed One purges men of wrong views, purges them of low aspirations, purges them of evil speaking, purges them of evil deeds, purges them of evil modes of livelihood, purges them of wrong endeavours, purges them of evil thoughts, purges them of erroneous meditation; and he gives emetics to the vomiting up of lusts, and of malice, and of dullness, and of doubt, and of self-righteousness, and of sloth of body and inertness of mind, and of shamelessness and hardness of heart, and of all evil. And this, O king, is what is called “The Blessed One’s bazaar of medicine.”

“Of all the medicines found in all the world,
Many in number, various in their powers,
Not one equals this medicine of the Truth.
Drink that, O brethren. Drink, and drinking, live!

¹ Not traced as yet.

² See the note above on V, 3 (p. 330 of the Pâli).

For having drunk that medicine of the Truth,
 Ye shall have past beyond old age and death,
 And—evil, lusts, and Karma rooted out—
 Thoughtful and seeing, ye shall be at rest¹!”

12. ‘And what, venerable Nâgasena, is the ambrosia bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha?’

‘An ambrosia, O king, has been made known by the Blessed One, that ambrosia with which he besprinkles the whole world of gods and men—as men anoint a king on his coronation day—[336] and men and gods, when sprinkled with that ambrosia, are set free from rebirths, old age, disease, and death, from grief, and lamentation, and pain, and sorrow, and despair. And what is that ambrosia? That meditation which consists in active attention to, and leads to a true grasp of, the real conditions of corporeal things². For it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods:

“They, O brethren, feed on ambrosia who feed on active attention directed to corporeal things³.” This, O king, is what is called “The Blessed One’s ambrosia bazaar.”

¹ Nibbutâ, with allusion to the freedom and calm of Nirvâna. The verses have not been traced as yet in the Piṭakas.

² Kâya-gatâ-sati-bhavanâ, where each term really requires a long commentary.

³ It will be noticed that Nâgasena is here really going an inch beyond his text. In that text (which has not been traced) amata, ambrosia, means no doubt as elsewhere, the ambrosia of Nirvâna. And the text does not say that the active attention and the ambrosia are the same, but only that they who feed on the one feed also on the other. Even if we translate ‘are feeding’ instead of ‘feed’ (which is grammatically possible) a similar argument would hold good. But though it is impossible to say for certain, without knowing the context of the passage, the rendering above is more in accord with Pâli usage, and more likely therefore to be right.

“ He saw mankind afflicted with disease,
 He opened freely his ambrosia shop ;
 Go, then, O brethren, give your Karma for it,
 And buy, and feed on, that ambrosial food¹.”

13. ‘ And what, venerable Nāgasena, is the jewel bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha ? ’

‘ Certain jewels, O king, have been made known by the Blessed One, and adorned with those jewels the children of the Blessed One shine forth in splendour, illuminating the whole world of gods and men, brightening it in its heights, in its depths, from horizon to horizon, with a brilliant glory. And those jewels are these—the jewel of right conduct, and the jewel of meditation, and the jewel of knowledge, and the jewel of emancipation, and the jewel of the insight which arises from the assurance of emancipation, and the jewel of discrimination, and the jewel of the sevenfold wisdom of the Arahats².

14. ‘ And what, O king, is the Blessed One’s jewel of right conduct³? The right conduct which follows on self-restraint according to the rules of the Pātimokkha, the right conduct which follows on

¹ Not traced as yet. All these stanzas seem to belong together, and will doubtless be found in the same Sutta or poem.

² These seven jewels (or treasures, *ratanāni*) of the Buddha are intended of course to correspond to the seven treasures (also *ratanāni*) of the king of kings (the *akkavatti*). They are different from the seven ‘Treasures of the Noble Ones’ (*Ariya-dhanāni*) which are ethical qualities, whereas these jewels are means to the attainment of Arahatship.

³ *Sīla*, a most difficult word to translate, as it includes so much that in English would be expressed by the varying phrases: goodness, virtue, righteousness, uprightness, morality, &c.

restraint of the bodily organs and the mind¹, the right conduct which results from a pure means of livelihood, the right conduct in relation to the four requisites of a recluse², the right conduct presented in the Short, and Middle, and Long Summonses³, the right conduct of those who are walking in the Path, and the right conduct of those who have attained each of the various fruits thereof (beginning at conversion and ending at Arahatsip)⁴. And all the beings in the world, O king, gods⁵ and men, and the Māras too (the spirits of evil), and the Brahmas (the very highest of the gods), and Samānas and Brahmans are filled with longing and desire for a man who wears, as his ornament, this jewel of right conduct. And the Bhikkhu, O king, who puts it on shines forth in glory all around, upwards and downwards, and from side to side, surpassing in lustre all the jewels to be found from the Waveless Deep⁶ below to the highest heavens above, excelling them all, overwhelming them all. Such, O king, are the jewels of right conduct set out for sale in the Blessed One's bazaar of gems. And this is what is called "The Blessed One's jewel of righteousness."

¹ Indriya; no doubt here the six organs, that is the usual five, and bhavaṅgo or mano as the sixth.

² Clothing, food, lodging, and medicine for the sick.

³ Translated in 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 189-200.

⁴ What we have here are the two higher stages of the three into which Buddhist ethics naturally falls. The morality of laymen has been included above, V, 7, where it already passes over into that of the ordinary, unconverted member of the Order. Here we begin with that, starting with the last item of the previous list, and go on, through the sīlas, to the highest ethics of Arahatsip.

⁵ The devas, those gods dwelling in Sakka's heaven, and, I think, the devatās also (fairies, nyads, dryads, &c.).

⁶ Avīṭi, the lowest of the purgatories.

“Such are the virtues sold in that bazaar,
 The shop of the Enlightened One, the Blest;
 Pay Karma as the price, O ye ill-clad!
 Buy, and put on, these lustrous Buddha-gems!”

[337] 15. ‘And what, O king, is the Blessed One’s jewel of meditation? The meditation that consists of specific conceptions, and of investigation regarding them¹;—the meditation that consists of reflection only, specific conceptions being lost sight of²;—the meditation that continues after specific conceptions and reflection on them have both ceased³;—the meditation that is void (of lusts, evil dispositions, and Karma);—the meditation from which three signs (of an unconverted life—lust, malice, and dullness) are absent;—the meditation in which no low aspirations remain⁴. And when a Bhikkhu, O king, has put on this jewel of meditation (Samâdhi), then ideas of lust, and ideas of anger, and ideas of cruelty, and all the various bad thoughts that have their basis in the evil dispositions of pride, self-righteousness, adhesion to wrong views, and doubt—all these, since they come into contact with meditation, flow off from him, disperse, and are dispelled, they stay not with him, adhere not to him. Just, O king, as when water has fallen on a lotus leaf it flows off from it, is dispersed and scattered

¹ I think the first *Ghâna* (see ‘Buddhist Suttas,’ p. 272) is meant.

² Apparently the passage over from the first to the second *Ghâna*.

³ But insight, and the resulting bliss, remain. Compare above, II, 2, 3 (I, 67).

⁴ Compare above, V, 8, on the last three.

away, stays not on it, adheres not to it¹—so when a Bhikkhu has put on this jewel of meditation, then ideas of lust, and ideas of anger, and ideas of cruelty, and all the various bad thoughts that have their basis in the evil dispositions of pride, self-righteousness, obstinacy in wrong views, and doubt—these all, as soon as they come in contact with meditation, flow off, disperse, and are dispelled, stay not with him, adhere not to him. And why not? Because of the exceeding purity of the habit of meditation. This, O king, is what is called “The Blessed One’s jewel of meditation,” and such are the jewels of meditation set out for sale in the Blessed One’s bazaar of gems.

“Bad thoughts can ne’er arise beneath the brow
Encircled by this coronet of gems.
It charms away perplexed and wandering thought.
Make it your own, buy it, put on the crown!”

16. ‘And what, O king, is the Blessed One’s jewel of knowledge? That knowledge by which the disciple of the noble ones knows thoroughly what is virtue, and what is not; what is blameworthy, and what is not; what should be made a habit of, and what should not; what is mean, and what is exalted; [338] what is dark, and what is light, and what is both dark and light;—the knowledge by which he truly knows what sorrow is, and what the origin of sorrow is, and what the cessation of sorrow is, and what is the path that leads thereto. This, O king, is what is called “The Blessed One’s jewel of knowledge.”

¹ See the note upon IV, 8, 65.

“ He who has knowledge as his jewelled wreath,
Will not continue long in outward form ¹.
Soon will he reach Nirvâṇa, in rebirth
In any world ² no longer take delight!”

17. ‘ And what, O king, is the Blessed One’s jewel of emancipation? Arahatship is called the jewel of emancipation, and the Bhikkhu who has reached Arahatship is said to have decked himself with the jewel of emancipation. And just as a man, O king, who is decorated with ornaments made of strings of pearls, of diamonds and gold and corals; whose limbs are anointed with akalu ³, and with frankincense ⁴, and with Talis ⁵, and with red sandal wood; who is adorned with a garland of Ironwood blossoms, and Rottleria flowers, and flowers from the Sal tree, and the Sala/a ⁶, and the champak, and yellow jasmynes ⁷, and Atimuttaka flowers ⁸, and

¹ Bhavo here equal to pañka skandha, according to Hīna/i-kumburê, p. 491.

² Bhava, here tri-widha-bhawa in the Sinhalese.

³ Akalu; only found here. The Sinhalese has agaru kalu, and agaru according to Clough is Dalbergia.

⁴ Tagara. Agil tuwaralâ, ‘logwood frankincense.’

⁵ Tâlîsaka. Clough says the Talis tree is Flacourtia cataphracta.

⁶ Not in the Pâli dictionaries. But it is mentioned in Buddhavaṃsa II, 51 (there spelt sa/a/a). This verse is quoted at Gâtaka I, 13, verse 51, and the word is there spelt sala/a. The Sinhalese has salala, and the Sanskrit lexicons have sarala. Clough identifies it, no doubt wrongly, with the last, the Anglo-Indian Hal tree, which the botanists call the Shorea robusta.

⁷ Yûthikâ; sînidâ, says Hīna/i-kumburê, p. 492, and Clough thinks this is oleander. But Böhlingk-Roth say a sort of jasmine, Jasminum auriculatum.

⁸ Yohombu in the Sinhalese. Clough says this is a creeper called Borago Zeylanica. But does that grow in the North-West of India? According to Böhlingk-Roth, Atimuttaka is the

trumpet flowers, and lotuses, and white and Arabian jasmines¹—just as, with all this finery of garlands and perfumes and jewelry, he would outshine all other men, overwhelming them with brilliant glory and splendour—just so, O king, does he who has attained to Arahatsip, he in whom the Great Evils (lusts, and becoming, delusion, and ignorance) are rooted out, he who has put on the diadem of emancipation of heart, just so does he outshine all other Bhikkhus from the lowest in attainment up to those even who are themselves emancipated², overwhelming them in brilliant glory and splendour. And why is that so? Because, O king, there is one diadem that is the chief of all, and that is this diadem of emancipation of heart! And this, O king, is what is called “The Blessed One’s jewel of emancipation.”

“All the people that dwell in a house look up
To their Lord when he wears his crown of gems—
The wide world of the gods and of men looks up
To the wearer of Freedom’s diadem!”

18. ‘And what, O king, is the Blessed One’s jewel of the insight that follows on the assurance of emancipation? The knowledge arising out of looking back over the course³—that knowledge by

name of three plants, one of which is the *Gaertnera Racemosa*, much cultivated for the beauty and perfume of its flowers.

¹ The last four are the *Pâtali*, *Uppala*, *Vassika*, and *Mallikâ*, all of which are well known. Our author’s flora and fauna are so numerous that one ought, if one had the necessary knowledge, to be able to draw conclusions as to his own ‘habitat.’

² On the use of *upâdây’* *upâdâya* see above, p. 182, and below, p. 341 of the Pâli.

³ *Pakkavekkhana-ñânam*. That is, in looking back over the

which the disciple who is walking along the Excellent Way passes, from time to time, both the Way itself and the Fruits thereof up to Nirvâna in review, and is aware what evil dispositions he has got rid of, and what evil dispositions remain to be conquered—that is what [339] is called “The jewel of the assurance that follows on the knowledge of emancipation.”

“The knowledge by which the Noble Ones know
The stages they’ve passed, and the road yet
untrod;—

Strive, O ye sons of the Conqueror, strive
That jewel—‘Assurance’—yourselves to obtain!”

19. ‘And what, O king, is the Blessed One’s jewel of discrimination? The discrimination of the sense of, and the discrimination of the deeper truths underlying the sense of the sacred writ, and the discrimination of philological peculiarities, and the discrimination of correct and ready exposition¹. And the Bhikkhu, O king, who is adorned with these four jewels of discrimination, whatsoever company he enters into, whether of nobles, or brahmans, or merchants, or workpeople, enters it in confidence, neither put out nor shy; undaunted and undismayed, he enters the assembly without excitement or fear. Just, O king, as a warrior, a hero in the fight, when accoutred in all his harness

course he has followed along the Excellent Way, he becomes conscious of having got beyond each of the obstacles (the *Sam-yoganas*) that can beset him. It is the doctrine of ‘final assurance’ from the Buddhist point of view. Compare *ñânadassana* at *Digha* II, 83.

¹ *Paṭisambhidâ*. *Hīnaṣi-kumburê* merely repeats the ambiguous technical terms of the Pāli. Childers, *sub voce*, gives the various interpretations of other authorities. Compare above, I, 29, 34, 36. The third and fourth seem to me to be doubtful.

of war¹, goes down undismayed to the battle, in the confident thought: "If the enemy should remain afar off I can knock them down with my arrows, should they come thence towards me I can hit them with my javelins, should they come yet nearer I can reach them with my spear, should they come right up I can cleave them in two with my sabre², should they come to close quarters I can pierce them through and through with my dagger³"—just so, O king, does the Bhikkhu, when he wears the fourfold jewel of discernment, enter any assembly undismayed, in the confident thought: "Should any one put to me a puzzle turning on the discrimination of the sense, I shall be able to explain it, comparing sense with sense, explanation with explanation, reason with reason, argument with argument⁴,—and thus shall I resolve his doubts,

¹ *Paññāvudho*; literally 'with the five weapons on.' The expression is not infrequent; compare *paññāvudha-sannaddha*, used of a hunter, at *Gātaka* III, 467; IV, 283, 437; and *sannaddha-paññāvudhā*, used of sailors fighting, at *Gātaka* IV, 160. But it is quite possible that weapons different from those here described are there meant, as they are not suited, for instance, to the hunter.

² *Hīnañ-kumburē* translates this weapon (*maṇḍalagga*) simply by *kaḍuwa*, sword; but 'bent blade' must mean a sabre.

³ *Kṣurikā*. Childers has only 'knife.' The *Simhalese*, p. 493, has *kirisaya*, which is not in Clough, but is doubtless the Malay *kreese*. These five weapons are not mentioned elsewhere, and as three of the five words are rare, are probably those in special use in the country where our author lived. In this respect it is noteworthy that the Sanskrit *kṣurikā* is only mentioned, according to Böhtlingk-Roth, in the *Rāga Taraṅginī* of Kāśmīr, and in the title of a late Upanishad. We shall therefore scarcely go far wrong if we understand by our author's *kṣurikā* the famous Afghan knife.

⁴ *Arthayen arthaya gaḥapā*, &c., says the *Simhalese*. He

dispel his perplexity, and delight him by my exposition of the problem raised. Should any one put to me a puzzle turning on discrimination of the deeper truths, I shall be able to explain it by comparing truth with truth, and the various aspects and phases of Arahatsip each with each¹, [340]—and thus his doubts too shall I be able to resolve, and, dispelling his perplexity, to delight him with my exposition of the problem raised. Should any one put to me a puzzle turning on the discrimination of philological peculiarities, I shall be able to explain it by comparing derivation with derivation², and word with word, and particle with particle, and letter with letter, and one modification of a letter by contact (sandhi) with another, and consonant with consonant, and vowel with vowel, and accent (intonation) with accent, and quantity with quantity, and rule with rule, and idiom with idiom;—and thus his doubts too shall I be able to resolve, and, dispelling his perplexity, to delight him with my exposition of the problem raised. Should any one put to me a puzzle turning on the discrimination of expositions, I shall be able to explain it by comparing metaphor with metaphor, and characteristic with characteristic³, and sentiment with sentiment—and thus his doubts too shall I be able to resolve, and, dispelling his perplexity, to delight him with my exposition of the

will reply by adducing parallel passages, much in the style of modern scholarship.

¹ He gives the principal ones, as set out in his previous arguments.

² Nirutti. Hīnaś-kumburê unfortunately simply repeats all these technical terms.

³ Lakkhaṇa. As for instance above, I, 51-62.

problem raised. And this, O king, is what is called
 “The Blessed One’s jewel of discrimination.”

“First buy the jewel of discrimination,

Then cut¹ it with your knowledge and your
 skill;

So, free from all anxiety and fear,

Shall you illuminate both earth and heaven !”

20. ‘And what, O king, is the Blessed One’s
 jewel of the sevenfold wisdom of the Arahats? It
 is self-possession, and investigation of the system of
 doctrine, and zeal, and joy, and tranquillity, and
 contemplation, and equanimity². And the Bhikkhu,
 O king, who is adorned with this sevenfold jewel of
 the divisions of the higher wisdom³ shines forth
 over the whole world of gods and men, brightens
 it, illuminates it, and dispersing the darkness makes
 the light arise. This, O king, is what is called
 “The Blessed One’s jewel of the sevenfold wisdom.”

“The gods and men in reverence stand up

To him who wears this wisdom-diadem.

Show your good actions then,—that is the price,—

And buy, and wear, this wisdom-diadem !”’

[341] 21. ‘And what, venerable Nāgasena, is the
 bazaar for all manner of merchandise set up by the
 Blessed One, the Buddha?’

‘The Blessed One’s bazaar for all manner of

¹ Phaseyya ; literally ‘he who having bought paṭisambhidā
 shall touch it with his ñāṇa.’ The *Siṃhalese*, p. 494, has *sparsa-*
koṭa, which does not help us.

² The *Siṃhalese* again only repeats these seven technical terms,
 except the second *Dhamma-viñaya*, which it renders by *pragñā*.

³ Bodhi. Childers says, ‘the supreme knowledge of a Buddha.’
 But this is wrong, as is evident even from the context here. The
 whole exposition is of Arahatship, not Buddhahood.

merchandise, O king, is the ninefold word of the Buddha; and the relics remaining of his body, and of the things he used; and the sacred mounds (*Ketiyaṇi*, *Dāgabas*) erected over them¹; and the jewel of his Order. And in that bazaar there are set out by the Blessed One the attainment (in a future birth) of high lineage, and of wealth, and of long life, and of good health, and of beauty, and of wisdom, and of worldly glory, and of heavenly glory, and of *Nirvāṇa*. And of these all they who desire either the one or the other, give Karma as the price, and so buy whichever glory they desire. And some buy with it a vow of right conduct, and some by observance of the *Uposatha* day, and so on down to the smallest Karma-price they buy the various glories from the greatest to the least. Just, O king, as in a trader's shop, oil, seed, and peas and beans can be either taken in barter for a small quantity of rice or peas or beans, or bought for a small price decreasing in order according to requirement—just so, O king, in the Blessed One's bazaar for all manner of merchandise advantages are to be bought for Karma according to requirement. And this, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's bazaar of all manner of merchandise."

"Long life, good health, beauty, rebirth in heaven,
High birth, *Nirvāṇa*—all are found for sale—
There to be bought for Karma, great or small—
In the great Conqueror's world-famed bazaar.
Come; show your faith, O brethren, as the price,
Buy and enjoy such goods as you prefer²!"

¹ *Hīnaṇi-kumburê*, characteristically enough for a Ceylon man, adds, 'and the Footprint and the Bo-tree.'

² The first line only of these verses is in the *Samyutta* III, 2, 7.

22. 'And the inhabitants that dwell in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness, O king, are such as these: Masters in the Suttantas, and masters in the Vinaya, and masters in the Abhidhamma; preachers of the faith; repeaters of the *Gâtakas*, and repeaters of the *Dîgha*, and repeaters of the *Magghima*, [342] and repeaters of the *Samyutta*, and repeaters of the *Ânguttara*, and repeaters of the *Khuddaka Nikâya*;—men endowed with right conduct, men accomplished in meditation, men full of knowledge, men taking delight in contemplation of the sevenfold wisdom of the Arahats, men of insight¹;—men who frequent the woods for meditation, or sit at the roots of trees, or dwell in the open air, or sleep on heaps of straw, or live near cemeteries, or lie not down to sleep,—men who have entered the Excellent Way², men who have attained one or more of the four fruits thereof, men who are still learners (have not yet reached Arahatsip, but are close upon it), men enjoying the Fruits, that is, either *Sotâpannas*, or *Sakadâgâmins*, or *Anâgâmins*, or Arahats;—men of the threefold wisdom³, men of the sixfold transcendental wisdom⁴, men of the power of *Iddhi*, men who have reached perfection in knowledge, men

¹ *Vipassakâ*, not necessarily the insight of the Arahats, as Childers says. We have seen *Vipassanâ* ascribed above, p. 16 (of the *Pâli*), to a *Sotâpanno*.

² *Paṭipannakâ*; so the *Simhalese*, p. 496 (but see otherwise below, V, 21, p. 344 of the *Pâli*).

³ *Teviggâ*, having the *pubbe-nivâsânussati-ñâna*, the *ketopariya-ñâna*, and the *âsavânaṃ khaya-ñâna*. See *Dîgha Nikâya* II, 91-94 and 97.

⁴ These are the last three, and besides them the so-called Divine Eye, and Divine Ear, and also the power of *Iddhi*. See *Dîgha Nikâya* II, 87-90, 95-96.

skilled in the maintenance of constant self-possession, in the Great Struggle, in the Steps to Iddhi, in the Organs of their moral sense, in the sevenfold wisdom, in the Excellent Way, in *Ghâna*, in *Vimokkha*, and in the attainment of the exalted and tranquil bliss that is independent of form or the absence of form—yea! like a forest full of bamboos, full of reeds, that City of Righteousness has been ever crowded and frequented by such Arahats as these! For it is said¹:

(1) “Men devoid of passion, and of malice, and of dullness, men in whom the Great Evils (lust, becoming, delusion, and ignorance) are not, men who have neither craving thirst, nor grasping desires,—these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness.

(2) “Men whose home is the forest, men who have taken on themselves the extra vows, men full of joy, men who are wearing rough garments, men rejoicing in solitude, heroes—these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness.

(3) “Men who sleep sitting, or on any sleeping-place that comes, or spend their time standing or walking up and down in meditation, men who clad themselves in cast-off raiment—all these dwell in the City of Righteousness.

(4) “Men wearing the full set of three robes, tranquil, with a skin for the fourth, who rejoice in taking but one meal each day, the wise—these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness.

(5) “The earnest and prudent, heroes who feed on little and know no greed, content whether they receive an alms or receive it not—these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness.

¹ It is not known in what text.

(6) "The meditative, delighting in *Ghâna*, heroes of tranquil minds, and steadfast, looking forward to *Nirvâna*—these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness.

(7) "Men walking in the path, and standing in the fruits thereof, those who have attained some fruits thereof but are yet learners as to the last, whose hope is directed to the utmost goal—these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness.

(8) "Those who have entered the stream, and those who, free from stains, will only be reborn once more on earth, those who will never return again, and *Arahats*—these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness.

(9) "Those skilled in the means of attaining undisturbed self-possession, and rejoicing in contemplation on the sevenfold wisdom, those who are full of insight, and bear the words of the *Dharma* in their hearts—these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness.

[343] (10) "Those skilled in the Steps to *Iddhi*, and rejoicing in the meditations of *Samâdhi*, those who are devoted to the Great Struggle—these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness.

(11) "Those perfect in the sixfold wisdom of the *Abhiññâs*, delighting in the sphere that is theirs by rightful inheritance¹, those having the power of flying through the air—these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness.

(12) "Those of downcast eyes, and measured speech, the doors of whose senses are guarded, who

¹ *Pettike goḥare ratâ*. That is in the four *Sati-paṭṭhânas*. See the passage quoted below at VII, 1, 7, p. 368 of the *Pâli*.

are self-restrained, who are well trained according to the supreme Dhamma—these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness.

(13) “Those of the threefold wisdom, and of the sixfold wisdom, those who have become perfect in Iddhi and perfect in knowledge—these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness.”

23. ‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who carry in their hearts the words of the excellent knowledge that is immeasurable, who are free from bonds, whose goodness and fame and power and glory no man can weigh, who (in imitation of their Master)¹ keep the royal chariot-wheel of the kingdom of righteousness rolling on, who have reached perfection in knowledge—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “The Commanders of the Faith in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus, who have the power of Iddhi, who have learned the discriminations², who are full of confidence, who travel through the air, who are hard to oppose, hard to overcome, who can move without support, who can shake the broad earth and the waters on which it rests, who can touch the sun and the moon, who are skilful in transforming themselves and in making steadfast resolutions and high aspirations, who are perfect in Iddhi—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “The royal chaplains in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who have taken upon themselves the extra vows,

¹ Anuppavattakâ. See below, p. 363 of the Pâli.

² See above, V, 19.

who desire little and are content, who would loathe any breach of the regulations as to the manner of seeking an alms¹, and beg straight on from hut to hut, as a bee smells flower after flower², and then go away into the loneliness of the woods, those who are indifferent as to their body and as to life, those who have attained to Arahatsip, those who place the highest value on the virtues of the practice of the extra vows—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “The judges in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who are pure and stainless, in whom no evil dispositions are left, who, skilful in the knowledge of the fall and rise of beings³, have perfected themselves in the Divine Eye—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “The givers of light⁴ in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus [344] who are learned in the traditions, who hand on what has been handed down, the repeaters of the Discourses, and of the Canon Law, and of the tables of contents, those who are skilled in the exact determination of letters into surds and sonants, into

¹ Importunity, or even attracting attention in any way. See above, p. 229 of the Pāli.

² Compare Sigalovāda Sutta, p. 365, and Dhammapada, verse 49: ‘As a bee, injuring not the flower or its colour or its scent, flies away, taking the nectar, so let a sage go through the village.’

³ That is the fall of beings from one state of existence—their death in that state in other words—and their rise, their rebirth, in another.

⁴ Gotaka, as a city official, is something akin to torchbearer, lamplighter.

longs and short, as to lightness and heaviness¹, those who know by heart the ninefold word—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “The peace officers² in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who are learned in the Vinaya (Rules of the Order, Canon Law), wise in the Vinaya, skilled in detecting the source of offences³, skilled in deciding whether any act is an offence or not, whether an offence is grievous or slight, whether it can be atoned for or not, skilled in deciding questions as to the rise, the acknowledgment, the absolution, or the confession of an offence⁴; as to the suspension, or the restoration, or the defence of an offender⁵, who are perfect masters in the Vinaya—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “The Rûpa-dakshas⁶ in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who wear on their brows the lotus garland of that noble Emancipation, who have attained to that

¹ These are six out of the ten divisions of *Vyañjana-vuddhi*, mentioned in the verse at *Sumaṅgala Vilâsini* I, 177. *Hīna-kumburê*, p. 501, merely repeats the words.

² *Dhamma-rakkhâ*, ‘dharmikawû âraksha-grahanayehi niyuktawû’ in the *Simhalese*.

³ *Nidâna-paṭṭhana-kusalâ*; ‘Âpatti gena hœra dœkwî-mehi dakshawû,’ says the *Simhalese*.

⁴ One word, *vuttâna*, is here doubtful.

⁵ See *Mahāvagga* IX, 4, 9. 10, &c.

⁶ Literally ‘skilled in form, shape, beauty.’ The *Simhalese* repeats this ambiguous expression, adding the qualification *amâtyayo*, ‘ministers, officials.’ One would think that these would have been the judges, but our author has already made the *Arahats* the judges in his *Dhamma-nagara*. This only leaves him some minor official post to give away to those learned in Canon Law, and he has chosen one as unintelligible in Ceylon as it is to me.

highest and best and most exceeding excellent of all conditions, who are loved and longed for by the great multitudes—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “Flower-sellers in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who have penetrated to the comprehension of the four Truths, and have seen them with their eyes, who are wise in the teaching, who have passed beyond doubt as to the four fruits of Samanaship, who having attained to the bliss thereof, share those fruits with others who have entered the paths¹—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “Fruit-dealers in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who, being anointed with that most excellent perfume of right conduct, are gifted with many and various virtues, and are able to dispel the bad odour of sin and evil dispositions—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “Perfume dealers in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus whose delight is in the Dhamma, and whose converse is pleasant, who find exceeding joy in the higher subtleties of the Dharma and the Vinaya², who either in the forest, or at the foot of trees, or in empty

¹ *Paṣipannā*, which *Hīnaśi-kumburê* takes here to mean Arahats, but see the note above, V, 20 (p. 341 of the Pāli).

² *Abhidhamme abhivinaye*. A phrase very instructive as to the correct rendering of the much misunderstood word *abhidhamma*. As I pointed out already in the ‘Hibbert Lectures’ for 1881, it is a blunder to translate it, as is usually done, by ‘metaphysics.’ The whole context is taken from the *Saṅgīti Sutta*.

places, drink the sweet sap of the Dharma, who plunging themselves, as it were, in body, speech, and mind into the sweet juice¹ of the Dharma, excel in expounding it, in seeking and in detecting the deeper truths in the various doctrines, who—wheresoever and whensoever the discourse is of wishing for little, of contentment, of solitude, of retirement, of the exertion in zeal, of right conduct, of meditation, of knowledge, of emancipation, of the insight arising from the assurance of emancipation—[345] thither do they repair, and drink in the sweet savour of that discourse—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “Thirsty and drunkards in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who are addicted to the habit of wakefulness from the first watch of the night to the last, who spend day and night in sitting, standing, or walking up and down in meditation, who, addicted to the habit of contemplation, are devoted to their own advancement by the suppressing of evil dispositions—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “Watchmen in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who in the spirit and in the letter, in its arguments and explanations, in its reasons and examples, teach and repeat, utter forth and recapitulate the ninefold word of the Buddha—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “Lawyers (dealers in Dharma²) in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

¹ ‘The ambrosia of the Saddharma,’ says Hīnaśī-kumburē, p. 502.

² Dhammāpanikā. The Sinhalese has Dhārmikāpanikayo.

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who are wealthy and rich in the wealth of the treasures of the Doctrine, in the wealth of the traditions, and the text, and the learning thereof, who comprehend the signs, and vowels, and consonants thereof, in all their details, pervading all directions with their knowledge — such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “Bankers of the Dhamma¹ in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

‘And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who have penetrated to the sublimer teaching, who understand exposition and the divisions of objects of meditation to be practised, who are perfect in all the subtler points of training²—such Bhikkhus are called, O king, “Distinguished masters of law in the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness.”

24. ‘Thus well planned out, O king, is the Blessed One’s City of Righteousness, thus well built, thus well appointed, thus well provisioned, thus well established, thus well guarded, thus well protected, thus impregnable by enemies or foes. And by this explanation, O king, by this argument, by this reason, you may by inference know that the Blessed One did once exist.

(1) “As when they see a pleasant city, well planned out,

Men know, by inference, how great the founder was ;

So when they see our Lord’s ‘City of Righteousness’

They know, by inference, that he did once exist.

¹ Dhamma-seṭṭhino, which the Sinhalese repeats.

² Adhisīla, adhiṭṭita, and adhipaṇṇā, says Hīnaśī-kumburē.

- [346] (2) "As men, seeing its waves, can judge, by inference,
The great extent and power of the world-embracing sea ;
So may they judge the Buddha when they see the waves
That he set rolling through the world of gods and men—
He who, unconquered in the fight, allays all griefs,
Who rooted out, in his own heart, Craving's dread power,
And set his followers free from the whirlpool of rebirths—
' Far as the waves of the Good-Law extend and roll,
So great, so mighty, must our Lord, the Buddha, be.'
- (3) "As men, seeing its mighty peaks that tower aloft,
Can judge, by inference, Himālaya's wondrous height ;
So when they see the Buddha's Mount-of-Righteousness—
Stedfast, unshaken by fierce passion's stormy blasts,
Towering aloft in wondrous heights of calm and peace,
Where lusts, evil, and Karma cannot breathe or live,—
They draw the inference: 'Great as this mountain high
That mighty Hero's power upon whose word it stands.'

- (4) "As men, seeing the footprint of an elephant king,
Can judge, by inference: 'How great his size must be!'
So when they see the footprint of the elephant of men,
Buddha, the wise, upon the path that men have trod,
They know, by inference: 'How glorious Buddha was¹!'
- (5) "As when they see all living things crouching in fear,
Men know: "'Tis the roar of the king of the beasts that frightens them.'
So, seeing other teachers break and fly in fear,
They know: "'Tis a king of the truth hath uttered words sublime!'
- (6) "Seeing the earth smiling, well watered, green with grass,
Men say: 'A great and pleasant rain hath fallen fast.'
So when they see this multitude rejoicing, peaceful, blest,
Men may infer: 'How sweet the rain that stilled their hearts!'
- (7) "Seeing the wide earth soaked, boggy, a marsh of mud,
Men say: 'Mighty the mass of waters broken loose.'

¹ It is perhaps such poetical figures as this that have afforded foundation for the legend of Buddha's footprint.

So, when they see this mighty host, that once
 were dazed
 With the mud of sin, swept down in Dhamma's
 stream, and left
 In the wide sea of the Good-Law, some here,
 some there,
 All, gods and men alike, plunged in ambrosial
 waves,
 They may infer, and say: 'How great that
 Dhamma is!'

- (8) [347] "As when men, travelling, feel a glorious
 perfume sweet
 Pervading all the country side, and gladdening
 them, infer at once,
 'Surely, 'tis giant forest trees are flowering
 now!'
 So, conscious of this perfume sweet of righteous-
 ness
 That now pervades the earth and heavens,
 they may infer:
 'A Buddha, infinitely great, must once have
 lived!'"

25. 'And it would be possible, O king, to show
 forth the Buddha's greatness, by a hundred or a
 thousand such examples, such reasons, such argu-
 ments, such metaphors. Just, O king, as a clever
 garland maker will, from one heap of all kinds of
 flowers, both following the instruction of his teacher,
 and also using his own individuality as a man, make
 many variegated and beautiful bouquets,—just so,
 O king, that Blessed One is, as it were, an infinite,
 immeasurable, heap of variegated flowers of virtue.
 And I now, a garland maker, as it were in the

church of the Conqueror, stringing those flowers together,—both following the path of our teachers of old, and also using such power of wisdom as in me is,—could show forth by inference the power of the Buddha in innumerable similes. But you, on the other hand, must show a desire to hear them¹.

‘Hard would it be, Nâgasena, for any other men thus to have shown by inference, drawn from such examples, the power of the Buddha. I am filled with satisfaction, venerable Nâgasena, at your so perfectly varied exposition of this problem.’

Here ends the problem of Inference².

¹ The *Simhalese* is here much expanded.

² Mr. Trenckner reads ‘*Anumâna pañham*,’ the *Simhalese* has ‘*Mahâ Anumâna Prasnayayi*.’

BOOK VI.

THE DHUTAṄGAS.

[348] 1. The king saw Bhikkhus in the forest, lone
 And far away from men, keeping hard vows.
 And then he saw too householders, at home,
 Eating the sweet fruits of the Noble Path¹.
 Considering both of these, deep doubts he felt.
 'If laymen also realise the Truth
 Then surely vowing vows must be in vain.
 Come! let me ask that best of teachers, wise
 In the threefold basket of the Buddha's words,
 Skilled to o'erthrow the arguments of the foe.
 He will be able to resolve my doubts!'

2. Now Milinda the king went up to the place
 where Nâgasena was, and bowed down before him,
 and took his seat on one side. And when so seated,
 he said to Nâgasena: 'Venerable Nâgasena, is
 there any layman living at home, enjoying the
 pleasures of sense, occupying a dwelling encumbered
 with wife and children, enjoying the use of sandal
 wood from Benares, and of garlands, perfumes, and
 ointments, accepting gold and silver, with an em-
 broidered head-dress on, set with diamonds and
 pearls and gold—is there any such who has seen face
 to face the calm, the supreme good, Nirvâṇa?'

'Not one hundred only, O king, nor two nor

¹ 'Standing in the Fruit of the Anâgâmins.' So they had
 already reached the third stage in the Excellent Way.

three nor five nor six hundred, not a thousand only, nor a hundred thousand, nor ten millions, nor ten thousand millions, not even only a billion laymen (have seen *Nirvâṇa*)—not to speak of twenty or thirty or a hundred or a thousand who have attained to clear understanding (of the four Truths)¹. By

¹ I take this to mean, 'Not to speak of comparatively small numbers who have experienced *Abhisamaya*, an innumerable host of laymen have reached *Nirvâṇa*—that is, have reached, and during their lives remained in, the third stage of the Path, and attained *Arahatship* just before they died. *Abhisamaya* is used either absolutely or in composition. *Mânâbhisamaya* (A. IV, 38, 5=M. I, 12) certainly, and perhaps *Atthâbhisamaya*, is used of *Arahats*, but they do not occur in our author. He uses occasionally *Dhammâbhisamaya* (see pp. 255, 350, &c., of the Pâli) and *Katu-sakkâbhisamaya* (see pp. 171, 334, &c.), but more frequently *Abhisamaya* absolutely. *Dhammâbhisamaya*, 'penetration into, clear understanding of, the Dhammas or Dhamma,' may refer to the four Dhammas of *Āṅguttara* IV, 1 (= M. P. S., IV, 2, 3), or to the comprehension of the qualities (Dhammas) of things, or (what is very much the same) to the comprehension of the principal doctrine (Dhamma) of the impermanence of all things. In the last case it would be the same thing, looked at from a slightly different point of view, as the *Dhamma-kakkhu*, the Eye for the Truths (see *Sumaṅgala Vilâsini* I, 237), or as that insight (*Vipassanâ*) which is the entrance to the Path. But the four Truths (as to sorrow, &c.) are also important Dhammas, and as the expression *Katu-sakkâbhisamaya* clearly refers to them and them only, this may also be the meaning of *dhammâbhisamaya*, or at any rate of *abhisamaya* standing above. So at least I take the latter here. We know that the 'Eye for the Dhamma,' the perception of the first only of the *tīṇi lakkhaṇāni* (impermanence), implies and involves the entrance into the Path. Oddly enough there is as yet no evidence to show whether the perception of the cardinal doctrine of the four Truths necessarily does so too; or can do so alone, without the *Dhamma-kakkhu*. If the latter, then there are two gates to the Path. And this is not only quite possible, but is the inference one might fairly draw from the constant phrase 'After the exposition of the Truths had concluded so and so attained to' one or other of the *phalāni*.

what kind of exposition shall I lay before you evidence showing that I know this¹?’

‘Do you yourself tell me².’

3. ‘Then, O king, I will explain it. All those passages in the ninefold word of the Buddha that deal with holiness of life, [349] and attainment of the path, and the divisions of the excellent habit of living under vows, shall be brought to bear in this connection³. Just, O king, as water which has rained down upon a country district, with both low-lying and high places, level land and undulations, dry ground and wet, will—all of it—flow off thence and meet together in the ocean of great waters; so will all those passages meet together, and be brought into connection, here. And a manifestation of reasons out of my experience and knowledge shall be also brought to bear. Thus will this matter be thoroughly analysed, its beauty will be brought out⁴, it will be exhausted⁵, brought home

¹ Literally ‘shall I give you anuyoga,’ which the *Simhalese* renders ‘opportunity for speech’ (!). Above, at p. 10 of the *Pāli*, the rendering is quite different, ‘pāḍam dī samugena.’ The only translation that fits the context in both of these places (the only ones in which the idiom has, so far, been found) is ‘lay before you (proofs of my) mastery (over the subject),’ or something of that sort. It is a disappointing satisfaction to find that the phrase was as unintelligible in Ceylon as it is to us. In my version above I should now prefer to write instead of ‘repeated his lesson to his teacher for the last time,’ ‘gave his teacher proofs that he had understood what he had taught him.’

² *Hinañ-kumburê*, p. 508, puts these words into the mouth of *Nāgasena*.

³ Literally ‘will come into connection here.’

⁴ *Vikīṭṭo*, which the *Simhalese* only repeats.

⁵ *Paripunnō*; literally ‘filled’ (*paripūra wanneya*).

to rest¹. It will be, O king, as when an able writing-master, on exhibiting, by request, his skill in writing, will supplement the written signs by an explanation of reasons out of his experience and knowledge, and thus that writing of his becomes finished, perfect, without defect. So will I also bring to bear a manifestation of reasons out of my experience and knowledge; and thus shall this matter be thoroughly analysed, its beauty shall be brought out, it shall be exhausted, set at rest².

4. 'In the city of Sâvatthi, O king, about fifty millions of the disciples of the Blessed One, devout men and devout women, were walking in the paths, and out of those three hundred and fifty-seven thousand³ were established in the fruit of the third path. And all of them were laity, not members of the Order. And there too, at the foot of the *Gandamba* tree, when the double miracle took place⁴, two hundred millions of living beings⁵ penetrated to an understanding (of the four Truths). And again on the delivery of the *Râhulovâda*⁶ discourse, and of the *Mahâ Mangala*⁷ discourse, and of the *Samaññita*⁸ exposition, and of the

¹ *Samânîto*, 'treated with respectful affection,' says *Hīnāṅkumburē*.

² I cannot hope to have solved all the difficulties with which the last two paragraphs bristle. But I think the general sense is clear, and the way smoothed for future translators.

³ This curious number (like others below) must have a history and a meaning.

⁴ See *Sumaṅgala Vilâsini*, p. 57; *Gâtaka* I, 77, 78; IV, 263-266.

⁵ Mostly gods of one sort or another.

⁶ See the note above on I, 32 (p. 20 of the *Pâli*).

⁷ In the *Sutta Nipâta* II, 4.

⁸ See the note above, *loc. cit.*

Parâbhava¹ discourse, and of the Purâbheda² discourse, and of the Kalaha-vivâda discourse, and of the Kûla-vyûha¹ discourse, and of the Mahâ-vyûha¹ discourse, and of the Tuwaṭaka¹ discourse, and of the Sâriputta¹ discourse, an innumerable number of celestial beings penetrated to knowledge (of the four Truths). In the city of Râgagaha three hundred and fifty thousand devout laymen and devout laywomen, disciples of the Blessed One, were walking in the Paths. And there again at the taming of Dhana-pâla the great elephant³ nine hundred million living beings, and again at the meeting at the Pâsânika Ketiya on the occasion of the Pârâyana discourse⁴ one hundred and forty million living beings, and again at the Indasâla cave eight hundred millions of gods, and again at Benares [350] in the deer park Isipatana at the first preaching of the Dhamma⁵ one hundred and eighty million Brahma gods and innumerable others, and again in the heaven of the Thirty-Three at the preaching of the Abhi-dhamma on the *Pandû Kambala Rock*⁶ eight hundred millions of the gods, and on the descent from the world of the gods at the gate of the city of Saṅkassa⁶, at the miracle of the manifestation to the world⁷,

¹ In the *Aṅguttara* of the Sutta Nipâta.

² Sutta Nipâta I, 6.

³ See the note above on IV, 4, 44 (p. 207 of the Pâli), also below, p. 410 of the Pâli.

⁴ Sutta Nipâta, pp. 185, 205 (of Professor Fausbøll's edition for the Pâli Text Society).

⁵ See 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 154, and the note above on I, 38.

⁶ Gâtaka IV, 265.

⁷ Loka-vivarana-pâṭihâriye, referred to at Dâḥavamsa II, 120. The exact meaning of the second word, literally 'uncovering,'

three hundred millions of believing men and deities penetrated to a knowledge (of the four Truths). And again at Kapila-vatthu among the Sakyas, at the preaching of the Buddhavaṃsa¹ in the Nigrodha Arāma, and again at the preaching of the Mahā Samaya Suttanta², gods in numbers that cannot be counted penetrated to a knowledge of the Dhamma. And again at the assemblies on the occasions of Sumana the garland maker³, and of Garahadinna, and of Ānanda the rich man, and of Gambuka the naked ascetic⁴, and of Mandûka the god, and of Matta-kundali the god, and of Sulasā the courtesan⁵, and of Sirimā the courtesan, and of the weaver's daughter, and of Subhaddā, and of the spectacle of the cremation of the Brahman of Sāketa, and of the Sûnāparantas, and of the problem put by Sakka⁶, and of the Tirokudda Sutta⁷, and of the Ratana Sutta⁸—at each of these eighty-four thousand penetrated to a knowledge of the Dhamma. So long, O king, as the Blessed One remained in the world, so long wheresoever in the three great divisions

is doubtful. Alwis, in another connection, renders it 'prosperity.' See his quotation from Buddhaghosa's *Papañka Sûdanī* quoted by Childers sub voce. The Sinhalese has rūpa-kāya-sampat dakwā dakwā, 'continually manifesting (to all the world) the glory of his outward form.'

¹ See the commentary on that work quoted by Dr. Morris in his edition for the Pāli Text Society, pp. viii-x.

² See the opening words of that discourse, No. 20 in the Dīgha, in Grimblot.

³ See above, pp. 115, 291 of the Pāli.

⁴ Compare Thera Gāthā 283-286.

⁵ Her whole story is given, *Gātaka* III, 435 foll.

⁶ The account of which is in the Dīgha, No. 21.

⁷ In the Khuddaka Pāṭha.

⁸ In the Sutta Nipāta and Khuddaka Pāṭha.

(of India)¹ or in the sixteen principal countries (in them)² he stayed, there, as a usual thing, two, three, four, or five hundred, or a thousand, or a hundred thousand, both gods and men, saw face to face the calm, the supreme good, Nirvâna. And all of those who were gods, O king, were laymen. They had not entered the Order. So these and many other billions of gods, O king,—even while they were yet laymen, living at home, enjoying the pleasures of sense,—saw face to face (realised in themselves) the condition of Peace, the Supreme Good, Nirvâna³.

5. 'If so, venerable Nâgasena,—if laymen, living at home and enjoying the pleasures of sense, can see Nirvâna,—what purpose then do these extra vows serve? That being so, rather must [351] the vows be workers of mischief. For, Nâgasena, if diseases would abate without medicine, what would be the advantage of weakening the body by emetics, by purges, and other like remedies?—if one's enemies could be subdued with one's fists only, where would be the need of swords and spears, of javelins and bows and cross-bows, of maces and of clubs?—if trees could be climbed by clambering up them with the aid of the knots and of the crooked and hollow places in them, of the thorny excrescences and creepers and branches growing on them, what would be the need of going in quest of ladders long and strong?—if sleeping on the bare ground gave

¹ That is, Pâṭṇa, Avanti, and Dakkhināpatha (say the East, the Upper Ganges Valley, and the Dekkan).

² The full list is given in the note at 'Vināya Texts,' II, 146.

³ This Buddhist way of looking on the gods as laymen has been already referred to above in the note on p. 20 of the Pāli, I, 32 of the translation.

ease to the limbs¹, why should one seek after fine large beds, soft to the touch?—if one could cross the desert alone, inaccessible though it be, and full of danger and fear, why need one wait for a grand caravan, well armed and well equipped?—if a man were able by his own arms to cross a flowing river, what need he care for firm dykes or boats?—if he could provide board and lodging for himself out of his own property, why should he trouble to do service to others, to flatter with sweet words, to run to and fro?—when he can get water from a natural pool, why should he dig wells and tanks and artificial ponds? And just so, venerable Nâgasena, if laymen, living at home and enjoying the pleasures of sense, can realise in themselves the condition of Peace, the Supreme Good, Nirvâna, what is the need of taking upon oneself these vows?’

6. ‘There are, O king, these twenty-eight good qualities in the vows, virtues really inherent in them; and on account of these all the Buddhas alike have longed for them and held them dear. And what are the twenty-eight? The keeping of the vows, O king, implies a mode of livelihood without evil, it has a blissful calm as its fruit, it avoids blame, it works no harm to others, it is free from danger, it brings no trouble on others, it is certain to bring with it growth in goodness, it wastes not away, it deludes not, it is in itself a protection², it works the satisfaction of desires and the taming of all beings, it is good for self-

¹ Dhâtu-samatâ, for which Hīnaśī-kumburê (p. 511) has Dhâtu-samanaya.

² Hīnaśī-kumburê, p. 512, takes ārakkhā-patthitadadam as one compound.

control, it is appropriate¹, (he who keeps the vows) is self-dependent², is emancipated³, the keeping of them is the destruction of lust, and of malice, and of dullness; it is the pulling away of pride, the cutting off of evil thoughts, the removal of doubts, the suppression of sloth, the putting away of discontent; it is long-suffering, its merit is beyond weight, and its virtue beyond measure, and it is the path that leads to the end of every grief. These, O king, are the twenty-eight good qualities in the vows; [352] and it is on account of these that all the Buddhas alike have longed for them and held them dear.

7. 'And whosoever, O king, thoroughly carry out the vows, they become completely endowed with eighteen good qualities. What are these eighteen? Their walk is pure, their path is accomplished, well guarded are they in deed and word, altogether pure are they in manners and in mind, their zeal flags not, all their fears are allayed, all delusions (as to the permanence and as to the degree) of their individuality have been put away, anger has died away while love (to all beings)⁴ has arisen in their hearts, in taking nourishment they eat it with the three right views regarding food⁵, they are honoured of

¹ *Paśirûpam*, probably 'to the life of a recluse,' but the *Simhalese* takes it to mean 'to the doctrine' (*sâsana*).

² *Anissitam*. See the note above on the translation of p. 321 of the Pâli. 'Independent of craving' (*trishnâ*), says the *Simhalese*.

³ *Vippamuttam*. Of *trishnâ*, says the *Simhalese* again.

⁴ *Mettâ*, which always has the connotation. *Hînañ-kumburê* accordingly renders it *sakala-satwayan kerehi maitreya*.

⁵ *Âhâro pariññâto*. The three right views are, 1 as to its nature, 2 as to its impurity, 3 as to the lust of taste.

all men, they are temperate in eating, they are full of watchfulness, they need no home, wheresoever is a pleasant spot there do they dwell, they loathe to do ill, they take delight in solitude, they are in earnest always. These, O king, are the good qualities with which they who carry out the vows are completely endowed.

8. 'And these ten, O king, are the individuals worthy of those advantages inherent in the vows—the man full of faith, ashamed to do wrong, full of courage, void of hypocrisy, master of himself, not unstable¹, desirous to learn, glad to undertake the task that is hard, not easy to take offence, of a loving heart. These, O king, are the ten individuals worthy of those advantages inherent in the vows.

9. 'And all they, O king, who as laymen, living at home and in the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense, realise in themselves the condition of Peace, the Supreme Good, Nirvāṇa,—all they had in former births accomplished their training, laid the foundation, in the practice of the thirteen vows, had purified their walk and conduct by means of them; and so now, even as laymen, living at home and in the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense, do they realise in themselves the condition of Peace, the Supreme Good, Nirvāṇa. Just, O king, as a clever archer first in regular succession teaches his pupils at the training ground the different kinds of bows, the manner of holding the bow up, and of keeping it in a firm grasp, and of bending the fingers, and of planting the feet, and of taking up the arrow, and of placing it on

¹ Alolo, 'not greedy after the four requisites of a recluse,' says the *Siṃhalese*, p. 514.

the string, and of drawing it back, and of restraining it, and of aiming at the mark, and thus of hitting¹ a man of straw, or targets made of the *Khanaka* plant², or of grass, or of straw, or of masses of clay, or of shields³—and after that, introducing them to the service of the king, he gains the reward of high-bred chargers and chariots and elephants and horses and money and corn and red gold and slave girls and slaves and wives and lands. [353] Just so, O king, all they who as laymen, living at home in the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense, realise in themselves the condition of Peace, the Supreme Good, *Nirvāṇa*,—all they had in former births accomplished their training, laid the foundation, in the practice of the thirteen vows, had purified their walk and conduct by means of them; and so now, even as laymen, and living at home in the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense, do they realise in themselves the condition of Peace, the Supreme Good, *Nirvāṇa*.

10. 'And there is no realisation of Arahatsip, O king, in one single life, without a previous keeping of the vows. Only on the utmost zeal and the most devoted practice of righteousness, and with the aid of a suitable teacher, is the realisation of Arahatsip attained. Just, O king, as a doctor or surgeon first procures for himself a teacher, either by the payment of a fee or by the performance of service, and then

¹ Vedhe. I follow Mr. Trenckner, but the *Sinhalese* translation is based on the reading *Vede*.

² The *Sinhalese* takes this word in composition with the following *tina* and spells it *Ganakaya*. Compare *Kanaka*, 'a chick pea.'

³ *Phalaka*. But *Hīnaś-kumburê*, p. 514, takes it in the technical sense of a kind of rough roller, made of the wood apple tree (*dimbul porô*), and used for levelling rice-fields.

thoroughly trains himself in holding the lancet, in cutting, marking, or piercing with it, in extracting darts, in cleansing wounds, in causing them to dry up, in the application of ointments, in the administration of emetics and purges and oily enemias, and only when he has thus gone through training, served his apprenticeship, made himself skilful, does he visit the sick to heal them. Just so, O king, all they who as laymen, living at home in the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense, realise in themselves the condition of Peace, the Supreme Good, Nirvâna,—all they had in former births accomplished their training, laid the foundation, in the practice of the thirteen vows, had purified their walk and conduct by means of them; and so now, even as laymen, and living at home in the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense, do they realise in themselves the condition of Peace, the Supreme Good, Nirvâna.

11. 'And there is no perception of the truth to those who are not purified by the virtues that depend on the keeping of the vows. Just as without water no seed will grow, so can there be no perception of the truth to those not purified by the practice of the vows. Just as there is no rebirth in bliss to those who have done no meritorious actions, no beautiful deeds, so is there no perception of the truth for those not purified by the practice of the vows.

12. 'Like the broad earth, O king, is the character resulting from the keeping of the vows, to serve as a basis to those who desire to be pure¹. Like water is it, O king, to wash away the stain of all things

¹ Visuddhi-kâmaṇaṃ, which Hīnaś-kumburê characteristically renders, 'who desire to attain to Nirvâna' (p. 516).

evil in those who desire to be pure. Like the fire is it, O king, to burn out the lust of all evil in those who desire to be pure [354]. Like the wind is it, O king, to carry away the dust of all evil in those desiring to be pure. Like medicine is it, O king, to allay the disease of evil in those desiring to be pure. Like ambrosia is it, O king, to act as an antidote to the poison of evil in those desiring to be pure. Like arable land is it, O king, on which to grow the crop of all the virtues of renunciation to those desiring to be pure. Like a wishing-gem¹ is it, O king, for conferring all the high attainments they long and crave for upon those who desire to be pure. Like a boat is it, O king, for carrying to the further shore of the mighty ocean of transmigration all those who desire to be pure. Like a place of refuge is it, O king, where those who desire to be pure can be safe from the fear of old age and death. Like a mother is it, O king, to comfort those who desire to be pure when afflicted with the sorrows of sin. Like a father is it, O king, to raise up in those who desire to be pure and to increase in goodness all the good qualities of those who have renounced the world. Like a friend is it, O king, in not disappointing those who desire to be pure in their search after the good qualities of those who have renounced the world. Like a lotus flower, O king, is it, in not being tarnished by the stain of evil. Like costly perfume (of saffron and of jasmine and the Turkish incense and the Greek)²

¹ Manoharo. Childers does not give this meaning to the word, but it is confirmed by the passages above and below, pp. 118, 358 of the Pāli, and by the Sinhalese.

² *Katu-gātiya-gandho*. The two last are Yavana and Tarukkha. Böhtlingk-Roth explain both as *Olibanum*. Our

is it, O king, for counteracting the bad odour of evil for those who desire to be pure. Like a lofty mountain range is it, O king, for protecting those who desire to be pure from the onslaught of the winds of the eight conditions to which men are subject in this world (gain and loss, and fame and dishonour, and praise and blame, and happiness and woe)¹. Like the space of heaven is it, O king, in the freedom from all obstruction, in the magnitude, in the great expanse and breadth it gives to those who desire to be pure. Like a stream is it, O king, in washing away for those who desire to be pure the stain of all evil. Like a guide is it, O king, in bringing safe out of the desert of rebirths, out of the jungle of lusts and sins, those who desire to be pure. Like a mighty caravan is it, O king, for bringing those who desire to be pure safe into that most blessed city of Nirvāṇa, peaceful and calm, where no fear dwells. [355] Like a well-polished spotless mirror is it, O king, for showing to those who desire to be pure the true nature of the constituent elements of all beings. Like a shield is it, O king, for warding off from those who desire to be pure the clubs and the arrows and the swords of evil dispositions. Like a sunshade is it, O king, for warding off from those who desire to be pure the scorching heat of the threefold fire². Like

author does not give the details, but it is unlikely that he meant other perfumes than those usually comprised in the term 'perfume of four kinds.' The expression is not found in the Piṭakas, though it occurs in Buddhaghosa; and its use by our author may help to settle his date when we know its history, and the exact composition of the two foreign perfumes it includes.

¹ The eight Loka-dhammas.

² That is, of lust, malice, and dullness—that fire the 'going out' of which (in one's heart) is Nirvāṇa.

the moon is it, O king, as being longed and hoped for by those who desire to be pure. Like the sun is it, O king, as dispelling the blackness of the darkness of ignorance for those who desire to be pure. Like the ocean is it, O king, as causing to arise in those desiring to be pure the costly treasures of the virtues of those who have renounced the world, and by reason too of its immensity, of its being beyond measure and beyond count.

13. 'Thus is it, O king, of great service to those desiring to be pure, a remover of all sorrow and lamentation, an antidote to discontent; it puts an end to fear, and individuality, and imperviousness of mind; to evil, and to grief, and to pain, and to lust, and to malice, and to dullness, and to pride, and to heresy, and to all wrong dispositions; it brings with it honour and advantage and bliss; it fills them with ease and with love and with peace of mind; it is free from blame; it has happiness here as its fruit; it is a mine and treasure of goodness that is beyond measure and beyond count, costly above all things, and precious.

14. 'Just, O king, as men for nourishment seek after food, for health medicine, for assistance a friend, for crossing water a boat, for pleasant odours a perfume, for security a place of refuge, for support the earth, for instruction a teacher, for honours a king, and for whatever they desire a wishing-gem—just so, O king, do the Arahats seek after the virtues of the keeping of the vows for the attainment of all the advantages of renunciation of the world.

15. 'And what water is for the growth of seeds, [356] what fire is for burning, what food is for giving strength, what a creeper is for tying things up, what

a sword is for cutting, what water is for allaying thirst, what a treasure is for giving confidence, what a boat is for crossing to the further shore, what medicine is for allaying disease, what a carriage is for journeying at ease, what a place of refuge is for appeasing fear, what a king is for protection, what a shield is for warding off the blows of sticks and stakes, of clubs, of arrows, and of darts, what a teacher is for instruction, what a mother is for nourishing, what a mirror is for seeing, what a jewel is for ornament, what a dress is for clothing, what a ladder is for mounting up, what a pair of scales is for comparison¹, what a charm is for repetition, what a weapon is for warding off scorn, what a lamp is for dissipating darkness, what a breeze is for allaying fever, what knowledge of an art is for the accomplishment of business, what medicinal drugs are for the preservation of life, what a mine is for the production of jewels, what a gem is for ornament, what a command is for preventing transgression, what sovereignty is for dominion—all that, O king, is the character-that-comes-of-keeping-the-vows for the good growth of the seed of renunciation, for the burning out of the stains of evil, for giving the strength of Iddhi, for tying up one's self in self-control and presence of mind, for the complete cutting off of doubt and mistrust, for allaying the thirst of craving, for giving confidence as to perception of the truth, for crossing to the further shore of the fourfold stream (of sensuality, individuality, delusion, and ignorance), for allaying the disease of evil dis-

¹ Nikkhepana; not in Childers, but compare *Samyutta Nikāya* XX, 22, 6,

positions, for attaining to the bliss of Nirvāṇa, for appeasing the fears that arise from birth, old age, decay and death, grief, pain, lamentation, woe, and despair, for being protected in the possession of the advantages of renunciation, for warding off discontent and evil thoughts, for instruction in all the good involved in the life of those who have renounced the world, for nourishment therein, for explaining to men quietude and insight, and the path and the fruits thereof and Nirvāṇa, for bestowing upon men a costly ornament high in the praise and admiration of the world, for closing the doors of all evil states, for mounting up to the peaks of the mountain heights of renunciation, for distinguishing crooked and cunning and evil intentions in others, for the proper recitation of those qualities which ought to be practised and those which ought not, for warding off as one's enemies all evil dispositions, for dissipating the darkness of ignorance, for allaying the fever arising from the scorching of the threefold fire, for the accomplishment of the attainment of the Condition of Peace—so gentle and so subtle,—for the protection of the virtues of the life of a recluse, for the production of the precious jewels of the sevenfold wisdom—self-possession, investigation of the truth, energy, joy, calm contemplation, and serenity,—for the adornment of the recluses, for the prevention of any transgression against that blameless, abstruse, delicate bliss [357] that comes of peace, for dominion over all the qualities that recluses and Arahats affect. Thus, O king, is it that keeping the vows is one and the same thing as attaining to all these qualities. And the advantage thereof, O king, cannot be weighed, neither measured; it has no equal, no rival, no

superior, great is it and glorious, extensive and abundant, deep and broad, and large and wide, full of weight and worth and might.

16. 'And whosoever, O king, having evil cravings in his heart, being hypocritical, greedy, a slave to his stomach¹, seeking after material gain or worldly fame and glory, unfit (for the outward signs of Arahatsip), not having reached the attainments, whose conduct is inconsistent (with membership in the Order), unworthy of it, inappropriate to it—who-soever being such shall take upon himself the vows, he shall incur a twofold punishment, suffering the loss of the good that may be in him. For in this world he shall receive disgrace, and scorn², and blame, and ridicule, and suspension, and excommunication³, and expulsion, and he shall be outcast, rejected, dismissed; and in his next life he shall suffer torment in the great *Avīḷi* purgatory that is a hundred leagues in depth, and covered, as with a garland, with hot and scorching, fierce and fiery blazing flames; therein shall he rise and fall for myriads of years, upwards and downwards and across,—a foam-bubble, as it were, cast up and thrown from side to side in a boiling sea⁴. And, when released from thence, then as a mighty Preta (ghost), in the outward form of a monk, but with

¹ Odarika; not in Childers, and only found as yet at this passage and at the Thera Gāthā, verse 101. It is the Sanskrit audarika. 'Who enters the Order for the sake of his stomach' says the *Simhalese*, p. 521.

² *Khī/anam*. Compare *khī/ito* above, pp. 229, 288 of the Pāli.

³ Compare the rules at *Kullavagga* I, 25, 1, &c.

⁴ On *Phen-uddehakam* compare *Gātaka* III, 46; on *sam-parivattakam* above, p. 253 of the Pāli.

body and limbs lean and rugged and dark, with head swollen¹, bloated, and full of holes, hungry and thirsty, odd and dreadful in colour and form, his ears all torn, and his eyes ever winking, his limbs a mass of mortifying sores², his whole body the prey of maggots, his stomach all scorching and hot like a fiery furnace blazing in the breeze, yet with a mouth no larger than a needle so that his thirst can never cease, with no place of refuge to fly to, no protector to help him, groaning and weeping and crying out for mercy, shall he wander wailing o'er the earth!

17. 'Just, O king, as whosoever, being unfit for royalty, without having properly attained to it, being inappropriate to it, unworthy of it, unsuitable for it, a low-born man and base in lineage, should receive the consecration of a king, he would suffer mutilation, having his hands or his feet, or his hands and feet cut off, or his ears or his nose, or his ears and nose cut off, [358] or he would be tortured, being subjected to the Gruel Pot, or to the Chank Crown, or to the Râhu's Mouth, or to the Fire Garland, or to the Hand Torch, or to the Snake Strips, or to the Bark Dress, or to the Spotted Antelope, or to the Flesh Hooks, or to the Pennies, or to the Brine Slits, or to the Bar Turn, or to the Straw Seat³, or he would be anointed with boiling oil, or be eaten by dogs, or be impaled alive, or be beheaded, or be subjected to punishments of various kinds. And why? Because he being unfit for it, without having properly attained to it, being inappropriate to it, unworthy of it, unsuitable for it, a low-born man

¹ Sûna (for sûna). See *Kullavagga* X, 1, 2, 3.

² Aru-gatto pakka-gatto. See *Magghima Nikâya* I, 506.

³ On all these see the notes above, I, 276, 277.

and base in lineage, he had placed himself in the seat of sovereignty, and thus transgressed beyond his right limits. Just so, O king, whosoever having evil cravings in his heart, being hypocritical, greedy, a slave to his stomach, seeking after material gain or worldly fame and glory, unfit (for the outward signs of Arahatsip), not having reached the attainments, whose conduct is inconsistent (with membership in the Order), unworthy of it, inappropriate to it—whosoever being such shall take upon himself the vows, he shall incur a twofold punishment, suffering the loss of the good that may be in him. For in this world he shall receive disgrace, and scorn, and blame, and ridicule, and suspension, and excommunication, and expulsion, and he shall be outcast, rejected, dismissed; and in his next life he shall suffer torment in the great *Avīṭī* purgatory that is a hundred leagues in depth, and covered, as with a garland, with hot and scorching, fierce and fiery blazing flames; therein shall he rise and fall for myriads of years, upwards and downwards and across,—a foam-bubble, as it were, cast up and thrown from side to side in a boiling sea. And, when released from thence, then as a mighty Preta (ghost), in the outward form of a monk, but with body and limbs lean and rugged and dark, with head swollen, bloated, and full of holes, hungry and thirsty, odd and dreadful in colour and form, his ears all torn, and his eyes ever winking, his limbs a mass of mortifying sores, his whole body the prey of maggots, his stomach all scorching and hot like a fiery furnace blazing in the breeze, yet with a mouth no larger than a needle so that his thirst can never cease, with no place of refuge to fly

to, no protector to help him, groaning and weeping and crying out for mercy, shall he wander wailing o'er the earth !

18. ' But whosoever, O king, is fit, who has reached the attainments, whose conduct is consistent with membership in the Order, who is worthy of it, appropriate to it, who desires little and is content, given to seclusion, not fond of society, alert in zeal, resolute of heart, without guile, without deceit, not a slave to his stomach, seeking neither material gain nor worldly fame or glory, full of faith, who has entered the Order from belief (in the doctrine, and not from worldly motives), and is full of desire for release from old age and death—whosoever being such shall take upon himself the vows with the idea of upholding the faith, he is deserving of twofold honour. For he is near and dear to, loved and longed for by both gods and men, dear as rare jasmine flowers to the man bathed and anointed, as sweet food to the hungry, as cool, clear, fragrant water to the thirsty, as a healing drug to a poisoned man, as a costly chariot drawn by high-bred steeds to the hurrying traveller, as a wishing-gem to the greedy for gain, as the pure white sunshade of sovranty to one ambitious for a throne, as the blessed attainment of the fruits of Arahatship to the seeker after holiness. It is he who attains to the fullest mastery over the four Earnest Meditations, the fourfold Great Struggle, the four Roads to Saintship, the five Organs of the moral sense, the five moral Powers, the seven forms of Wisdom, and the Noble Eightfold Path¹, quietude and insight reign in his heart, attainment

¹ For the details of these constituent elements of Arahatship, see my note in 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 60-63.

through study becomes easy to him, and the four fruits of the life of a recluse¹, [359] the four kinds of Discrimination², the threefold Knowledge³, the six-fold higher Wisdom⁴, in a word, the whole religion of the recluses becomes his very own, an anointed king is he, and over him is borne the pure white sunshade of emancipation!

19. 'Just, O king, as all the citizens and country folk in the land, the soldiers and the peons (royal messengers), wait in service upon a Kshatriya king, born to the purple, and on both sides of lineage high, when he has been consecrated with the inauguration ceremonies of the Kshatriyas⁵; the thirty-eight divisions of the royal retinue, and the dancing men, and acrobats, and the soothsayers⁶,

¹ These are the four stages of the path to Arahatsip.

² *Paṭisambhidā*—in worldly things, and in religion, in intuitive knowledge, and in exposition.

³ *Tisso Viggā*. One explanation of this term is the knowledge of the three limitations of individuality,—its impermanence, the pain involved in the struggle to maintain it, and the absence of any permanent principle (any soul) in any individual. But it is also explained in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* III, 58, as meaning the knowledge firstly of one's own former births, secondly of other people's former births, and thirdly of the nature, the origin, and the right method of subduing sorrow and the *āsavas* (that is, lust, individuality, delusion, and ignorance). The first triplet is identical with the three *lakkhaṇas*, the second with the last three of the *Dasabalas*, the ten powers of a Buddha. So in the *Sutta Vibhaṅga* (*Pārāgika* I, 1–8) the last of these three is called *tatīyā viggā*. Compare also 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 162.

⁴ The *Abhiññās*.

⁵ Some details of this are given in the *Siṃhalese*, p. 524.

⁶ *Mukha-maṅgalikā*, which the *Siṃhalese* repeats, and which apparently means 'panegyrists.' The exact connotation of both these terms has yet to be settled. *Soḷḷhi vāḷakā* may correspond with the people who throw rice after a departing wedding pair;

and the heralds¹, and Samanas and Brahmans, and the followers of every sect, frequent his court, and he becomes the lord of every seaport, and treasure-mine, and town, and custom-house²—giving instructions as to the fate of every foreigner and criminal³—just so, O king, whoever is fit, who has reached the attainments, whose conduct is consistent with membership in the Order, who is worthy of it, appropriate to it, who desires little and is content, given to seclusion, not fond of society, alert in zeal, resolute of heart, without guile, without deceit, not a slave to his stomach, seeking neither material gain nor worldly fame or glory, full of faith, who has entered the Order from belief (in the doctrine, and not from worldly motives), and is full of desire for release from old age and

and Mukha-maṅgalikâ may be those who prophesy the lucky days on which a thing is to be commenced. But this is the only passage in which the phrases occur in Pāli, and in Sanskrit we have only much later authorities. See the Commentary on Sakuntalâ, quoted in the note on p. 152 of Sir M. Monier-Williams's edition, and Wilson's explanation in his Sanskrit Dictionary of swasti-vakânâ.

¹ Soṭṭhi-vâṭakâ, 'utterers of blessing.' The Sinhalese has sôbhana-vâṭanikayo (perhaps 'augurs').

² Suṅkaṭṭhâna, 'taxing-place.' But the Sinhalese, p. 524, has only samasthâna.

³ I can only guess at the meaning of this enigmatical phrase, which the Sinhalese again merely repeats, but a precisely similar passage occurs in the Sumaṅgala Vilâsini, p. 246; and though the exact course of proceedings in the ancient law courts of India is still, in many details, uncertain, it is yet clear that the actual apportionment of punishment (as well as the execution of it) was always held to be the sole prerogative of the king. This was more especially the case where mutilation or a death sentence was concerned. Minor punishments the judges could, no doubt, order without reference to the king. See Jolly, 'Beiträge zur indischen Rechts-geschichte,' in the 'Zeitschrift der deutschen morg. Gesellschaft,' 1890, pp. 344 foll.

death—whosoever being such shall take upon himself the vows with the idea of upholding the faith, he is deserving of twofold honour. For he is near and dear to, loved and longed for by both gods and men, dear as rare jasmine flowers to the man bathed and anointed, as sweet food to the hungry, as cool, clear, fragrant water to the thirsty, as a healing drug to a poisoned man, as a costly chariot drawn by high-bred steeds to the hurrying traveller, as a wishing-gem to the greedy for gain, as the pure white sunshade of sovereignty to one ambitious for a throne, as the blessed attainment of the fruits of Arahatsip to the seeker after holiness. It is he who attains to the fullest mastery over the four Earnest Meditations, the fourfold Great Struggle, the four Roads to Saintship, the five Organs of the moral sense, the five moral Powers, the seven forms of Wisdom, and the Noble Eightfold Path, quietude and insight reign in his heart, attainment through study becomes easy to him, and the four fruits of the life of a recluse, the four kinds of Discrimination, the threefold Knowledge, the sixfold higher Wisdom, in a word, the whole religion of the recluses becomes his very own, an anointed king is he, and over him is borne the pure white sunshade of emancipation!

20. 'Such, O king, are the thirteen vows purified by which a man shall bathe in the mighty waters of Nirvâna, and there indulge himself, as one sporting in the waves, with the manifold delights of religion, he shall addict himself to the eight modes of transcendental ecstasy, he shall acquire the powers of Iddhi, distant sounds, human and divine, shall greet his ear, he shall divine the thoughts of others, he

shall be able to call to mind his own previous births, and to watch the rise and fall from birth to birth of others, and he shall perceive the real nature and the origin of, he shall perceive the means of escape from sorrow, and from lust, individuality, delusion, and ignorance, the stains of life !

‘ And what are these thirteen ? Wearing raiment made up of pieces taken from a dust-heap—Wearing three robes, and three robes only—Living on food received by begging—Begging straight on from house to house—Eating only once a day, at one sitting—Eating from one vessel only—Refusing food in excess of the regulations—Dwelling in the woods—Dwelling at the root of a tree—Dwelling in the open air—Dwelling in or near a cemetery—Not altering the mat or bed when it has once been spread out to sleep on—and sleeping in a sitting posture. It is he, O king, who, in former births, has undertaken and practised, followed and carried out, observed, framed his conduct according to, and fulfilled these thirteen vows, who acquires all the results of the life of a recluse, and all its ecstasy of peace and bliss becomes his very own ¹.

¹ The *Simhalese*, pp. 525–531, goes at great length into the details of all these vows, each of which it divides into stages of greater or less severity, specifying the practice to be followed in each stage. As a matter of fact the members of the Buddhist Order have not observed them in any completeness. Like the Buddha himself, the majority have undertaken only the second of the thirteen—the wearing of three robes ; and the others have only been occasionally practised, and then usually only one or more at a time, by isolated members. It is true that the *Gâtaka Commentary* (Fausböll, vol. ii, p. 449) says that Upasena Vanganta-putta kept the whole thirteen of the Dhutaṅgas. But this is at variance with the older text (in the *Vinaya*, Nissaggiya, No. XV) giving that account of the same episode on which the story in the

21. 'Just, O king, as a shipowner who has become wealthy by constantly levying freight in some seaport town, will be able to traverse the high seas, and go to Vanga, or Takkola, or China, or Sovira, or Surat, or Alexandria, or the Koromandel coast, or Further India, or any other place where ships do congregate—just so, O king, [360] it is he who in former births has undertaken and practised, followed and carried out, observed, framed his conduct according to, and fulfilled these thirteen vows, who acquires all the results of the life of a recluse, and all its ecstasy of peace and bliss becomes his very own.

22. 'And just, O king, as a husbandman will first remove the defects in the soil—weeds, and thorns, and stones—and then by ploughing, and sowing,

Gâtaka Commentary is based. The thirteen vows are not referred to at all in the rules of the Order, as translated in the three volumes of the Vinaya Texts, nor are they mentioned as a whole in any Piṭaka text yet published. But the thirteen names are given together in a different order in a passage twice repeated in the Parivâra, a late book, probably written in Ceylon (pp. 131, 193). It is there declared of each of the thirteen vows that five sorts of people undertake them—those who do so from stupidity, those who do so from vain desire, those who are mad, those who do so because the vows have been exalted by the Buddhas and their followers, those who do so from high motives. It is clear therefore that our author's doctrine of the thirteen Dhutaṅgas is at variance with primitive Buddhism. It would require, however, a separate note on each of the thirteen to show the exact degree of this variance. The basis on which each of these observances rests can be found in the older teaching, and nearly all of them have been praised or followed, in a greater or less degree, from very early times,—not indeed as general rules binding on all members of the Order, but as supplementary or extra vows, conducive, but subsidiary to the ethical self-culture of the Arahat.

and irrigating, and fencing, and watching, and reaping, and grinding, will become the owner of much flour, and so the lord of whosoever are poor and needy, reduced to beggary and misery—just so, O king, it is he who in former births has undertaken and practised, followed and carried out, observed, framed his conduct according to, and fulfilled these thirteen vows, who acquires all the results of the life of a recluse, and all its ecstasy of peace and bliss becomes his very own.

23. 'And again, O king, just as an anointed monarch is master over the treatment of outlaws, is an independent ruler and lord, and does whatsoever he desires, and all the broad earth is subject to him—just so, O king, is he who has undertaken, practised, and fulfilled in former births these vows, master, ruler, and lord in the religion of the Conquerors, and all the virtues of the Samanas are his.

24. 'And was not Upasena, the Elder, he of the sons of the Vangantas¹, from his having thoroughly practised all the purifying merits of the vows, able to neglect the agreement arrived at by the members of the Order resident at Sāvatti, and to visit with his attendant brethren the Subduer of men, then retired into solitude, and when he had bowed down before him, to take his seat respectfully aside? And when the Blessed One saw how well trained his retinue was, then, delighted and glad and exalted in heart, he greeted them with courteous words, and said in his unbroken beautiful voice:

"Most pleasant, Upasena, is the deportment of

¹ According to the Sinhalese this was a Brahman clan. But the derivation suggests the borders of Bengal, where it is somewhat strange to find Brahmans so early.

these brethren waiting upon you. How have you managed thus to train your followers?"

'And he, when so questioned by the omniscient Buddha, the god over all gods, spake thus to the Blessed One as to the real reason for the goodness of their nature: "Whosoever, Lord, may come to me to ask for admission to the Order or to become my disciple, to him do I say [361]: 'I, Sir, am a frequenter of the woods, who gain my food by begging, and wear but this robe pieced together from cast-off rags. If you will be the same, I can admit you to the Order and make you my disciple.' Then, if he agree thereto with joy, and abase himself¹, I thereupon admit him to the Order and to the company of my pupils. But if not, then neither do I admit him to the one nor to the other. Thus is it, Lord, that I train them²." And thus is it, O king, that he who has taken upon himself the vows becomes master, ruler, and lord in the religion of the Conquerors; and all its ecstasy of peace and bliss becomes his very own.

25. 'Just, O king, as a lotus flower of glorious, pure, and high descent and origin is glossy, soft, desirable, sweet-smelling, longed for, loved, and praised, untarnished by the water or the mud, graced with tiny petals and filaments and pericarps, the resort of many bees, a child of the clear cold

¹ Oramati. See *Gâtaka* I, 492, where it is also used intransitively in the sense of 'abase oneself'; and *Gâtaka* I, 498, where it is transitive, 'to lower' (the water in the ocean). But *Hinañ-kumburê*, p. 533, has simply *celêda*, 'and adheres thereto.'

² As remarked in the note, p. 268, this episode is taken from the introduction to the 15th *Nissaggiya*.

stream—just so is that disciple of the Noble Ones who in former births has undertaken and practised, followed and carried out, observed and framed his conduct according to, and fulfilled these thirteen vows, endowed with the thirty graces. And what are the thirty? His heart is full of affectionate, soft, and tender love, evil is killed, destroyed, cast out from within him, pride and self-righteousness are put an end to and cast down, stable and strong and established and undeviating is his faith, he enters into the enjoyment of the heart's refreshment, the highly praised and desirable peace and bliss of the ecstasies of contemplation fully felt, he exhales the most excellent and unequalled sweet savour of righteousness of life, near is he and dear to gods and men alike, exalted by the best of beings the Arahāt Noble Ones themselves, gods and men delight to honour him, the enlightened, wise, and learned approve, esteem, appreciate, and praise him, untarnished is he by the love either of this world or the next¹, he sees the danger in the smallest tiniest offence, rich is he in the best of wealth—the wealth that is the fruit of the Path, the wealth of those who are seeking the highest of the attainments,—he is partaker of the best of the four requisites of a recluse that may be obtained by asking, he lives without a home addicted to that best austerity that is dependent on the meditation of the *Ghānas*, [362] he has unravelled the whole net of evil, he has broken and burst through, doubled up and utterly destroyed both the possibility of rebirth in any of the five future states, and the five obstacles to the

¹ Compare 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 10, and the note there.

higher life in this one (lust, malice, sloth, pride, and doubt), unalterable in character, excellent in conduct¹, transgressing none of the rules as to the four requisites of a recluse, he is set free from rebirths, he has passed beyond all perplexity, his mind is set upon complete emancipation, he has seen the truth², the sure and steadfast place of refuge from all fear has he gained, the seven evil inclinations (to lust, and malice, and heresy, and doubt, and pride, and desire for future life, and ignorance) are rooted out in him, he has reached the end of the Great Evils (lust, individuality, delusion, and ignorance), he abounds in the peace and the bliss of the ecstasies of contemplation, he is endowed with all the virtues a recluse should have. These, O king, are the thirty graces he is adorned withal.

26. 'And was not Sâriputta, the Elder, O king, the best man in the whole ten thousand world systems, the Teacher of the world himself alone excepted? And he who through endless ages had heaped up merit, and had been reborn in a Brahman family, relinquished all the delights of the pleasures of sense, and gave up boundless wealth³, to enter the Order according to the teaching of the Conqueror, and having restrained his actions, words, and thoughts by these thirteen vows, became in this life of such exalted virtue that he was the one who, after the Master, set rolling on the royal chariot-

¹ Abhinîta-vâso, 'having the ten ariya-vâsas,' says the *Simhalese*.

² *Diṭṭha-dhammo*, 'seen the Four Truths,' says the *Simhalese*, p. 535.

³ For *saṅkha Hinaṅ-kumburê has saḥassa*.

wheel of the kingdom of righteousness in the religion of Gotama, the Blessed One. So that this was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in that most excellent collection, the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*¹:

“I know, O brethren, of no other man who in succession to me sets rolling on the glorious chariot-wheel of the kingdom of righteousness so well as Sâriputta. Sâriputta, O brethren, sets rolling that wheel the best of all.”

‘Most excellent, Nâgasena! The whole ninefold word of the Buddha, the most exalted conduct, the highest and best of the attainments to be gained in the world,—all these are wrapped up together in the virtues that result from the keeping of the vows.’

Here ends the Ninth Chapter².

Here ends the Solving of Puzzles.

¹ *Aṅguttara* I, 13, 7.

² The ninth, because the numbering of the *Vaggas* is carried on from the last book. But according to the divisions enumerated at the beginning of the work (translated at p. 4 of the previous volume) it is one of the principal divisions of the book that is here closed, and the chapters ought not to run on.

BOOK VII.

OPAMMA-KATHÂ-PAÑHO.

THE SIMILES.

CHAPTER 1.

1. [363] 'Venerable Nāgasena, with how many qualities must a member of the Order (a Bhikshu) be endowed to realise Arahatsip ?'

'The brother, O king, who wishes to attain Arahatsip must take :—

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| 1. One quality of the ass . . . | VII, 1, 2 |
| 2. And five of the cock . . . | 3 |
| 3. And one of the squirrel . . . | 8 |
| 4. And one of the female panther . . . | 9 |
| 5. And two of the male panther . . . | 10 |
| 6. And five of the tortoise . . . | 12 |
| 7. And one of the bamboo . . . | 17 |
| 8. And one of the bow . . . | 18 |
| 9. And two of the crow . . . | 19 |
| 10. And two of the monkey . . . | 21 |
| 11. And one of the gourd . . . | VII, 2, 1 |
| 12. And three of the lotus . . . | 2 |
| 13. And two of seed . . . | 5 |
| 14. And one of the Sal-tree . . . | 7 |
| 15. And three of a ship . . . | 8 |
| 16. And two of the anchor . . . | 11 |
| 17. And one of the mast . . . | 13 |
| 18. And three of the pilot . . . | 14 |
| 19. And one of the sailor . . . | 17 |
| 20. And five of the ocean . . . | 18 |
| 21. And five of the earth . . . | VII, 3, 1 |

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| 22. And five of water | VII, 3, 6 |
| 23. And five of fire | 11 |
| 24. And five of wind | 16 |
| 25. And five of rock | 21 |
| 26. And five of space | 26 |
| 27. And five of the moon | 31 |
| 28. And seven of the sun | 36 |
| 29. And three of Sakka | 43 |
| 30. And four of a sovran overlord | 46 |
| 31. And one of the white ant | VII, 4, 1 |
| 32. And two of the cat | 2 |
| 33. And one of the rat | 4 |
| 34. And one of the scorpion | 5 |
| 35. And one of the mungoose | 6 |
| 36. [364] And two of the old jackal | 7 |
| 37. And three of the deer | 9 |
| 38. And four of the bull | 12 |
| 39. And two of the boar | 16 |
| 40. And five of the elephant | 18 |
| 41. And seven of the lion | VII, 5, 1 |
| 42. And three of the <i>Kakravâka</i> bird | 8 |
| 43. And two of the <i>Penâhikâ</i> bird | 11 |
| 44. And one of the house-pigeon | 13 |
| 45. And two of the owl | 14 |
| 46. And one of the crane | 16 |
| 47. And two of the bat | 17 |
| 48. And one of the leech | 19 |
| 49. And three of the serpent | 20 |
| 50. And one of the rock-snake | 23 |
| 51. And one of the road spider | VII, 6, 1 |
| 52. And one of the child at the breast | 2 |
| 53. And one of the land tortoise | 3 |
| 54. And five of the mountain height | 4 |
| 55. And three of the tree | 9 |

56. And five of the rain-cloud	.	VII, 6, 12
57. And three of the jewel	. . .	17
58. And four of the hunter	. . .	20
59. And two of the fisherman	. . .	24
60. And two of the carpenter	. . .	26
61. And one of the waterpot	. . VII, 7, 1	
62. And two of iron	. . .	2
63. And three of a sunshade	. . .	4
64. And three of a rice field	. . .	7
65. And two of medicine	. . .	10
66. And three of food	. . .	12
67. And four of the archer ¹	. . .	15
And four of the king.		
And two of the doorkeeper.		
And one of a grindstone.		
And two of a lamp.		
And two of the peacock.		
And two of the steed.		
And two of the publican.		
And two of a threshold.		
And one of a balance.		
And two of a sword.		
And two of a fish.		
[365] And one of a borrower.		
And two of a sick man.		
And two of a corpse.		
And two of a river.		
And one of a buffalo.		
And two of a road.		
And one of a tax-gatherer.		
And three of a thief.		

¹ The published text carries the details of these similes no further than this. See the remarks in the Introduction, pp. xxiv, xxv.

And one of the hawk.
 And one of the dog.
 And three of the physician.
 And two of a woman with child.
 And one of the yak cow.
 And two of the hen.
 And three of the dove.
 And two of the one-eyed man.
 And three of the husbandman.
 And one of the female jackal ¹.
 And two of the dyers' straining-cloth ².
 And one of a spoon.
 And one of the negotiator of a loan.
 And one of a collector.
 And two of a charioteer.
 And two of a village headman.
 And one of a tailor.
 And one of a helmsman.
 And two of a bee.'

Here ends the Table of Contents.

¹ *Gambuka-sigâliyâ*. In *Gâtaka*, No. 294, of Fausböll, the jackal is male. The reference therefore here is to a kind of jackal named after the *Gambu* fruit.

² *Kaṅgavâarakassa*. See *Magghima Nikâya* I, 142-4, and *Gâtaka* V, 186, in both of which passages the Burmese MSS. read *kaṅka-*. The *Sinhalese*, p. 540, has *perahan kaḍḍe*.

I. THE ASS.

2. 'Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the harsh-voiced ass which you say he ought to take, which is that?'

'Just, O king, as the ass, wheresoever he may lie down—whether on a dust heap, or in the open space where four roads meet, or three ¹, or at the entrance to a village, or on a heap of straw—[366]—nowhere is he given to resting long; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort ², wheresoever he may spread out his mat for repose—whether on strewed grass, or leaves, or on a bed of thorns, or on the bare earth—nowhere should he be given to sloth. This is the one quality of the ass he ought to have. For this has been said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods:

“Sleeping on pillows of chaff, my disciples, O brethren,

Keep themselves earnest and ardent in strenuous fight ³.”

¹ *Katukke* and *siṅghâṭake*. I follow Hinaśi-kumburê in the distinction he makes between the meaning of these terms—*satara* and *tun maṃ sandhiyehi* (p. 540).

² *Yogî yogavaḥaro*. The rendering of these words is quite inadequate, and has given me much trouble. Neither 'yogee' nor 'devotee' can be used, for they both have acquired connotations contradictory to what was in our author's mind. He means the Buddhist Bhikshu belonging to that class among the Bhikshus (by no means the majority) who had devoted themselves to a life of systematic effort according to the Buddhist scheme of self-training. But I have found it impossible to put into any English phrase sufficiently short for the constant repetition of the two Pâli words any full and accurate representation of all that they imply. See the note above on p. 43 of the Pâli, and *Gâtaka*, vol. i, p. 303.

³ Not traced as yet. Mr. Trenckner prints the passage as

‘And this too, O king, was said by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith :

“If it but raineth not knee-deep on him
When sitting in high meditations plunged—
What cares the man on Arahatsip intent for
ease¹!”

2. THE COCK.

3. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, those five qualities of the cock which you say he ought to take, what are they?’

‘Just, O king, as a cock goes early and betimes to roost ; so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, early and betimes sweep out the open space around the Dâgaba, and having got ready² the drinking-water for the day’s use, and dressed himself³, and taken his bath, he should bow

prose, but it is clearly two verses with a slight corruption in the first line. The point of the verses lies in the untranslatable pun of the words upadhâna, ‘pillow,’ and padhâna, ‘strenuous fight.’ The word etarahi seems to me suspect, and some such reading as kaṇḍīgaropadhânâ va would restore the metre, and at the same time bring the play on the words more into prominence.

¹ This verse is found in the Thera Gâthâ, No. 985. Hīnaṣ-kumburê takes the na in the first line as a negative to abhivassati, and translates, ‘So long as it does not rain knee-deep on him, when sitting in meditation, what cares the Bhikshu, who is bent on attaining Nirvâṇa, for ease!’—and this is, I think, preferable to Mr. Trenckner’s division of the words.

² That is, ‘filtered;’ perahâ nagâ tabâ, says the Sinhalese, p. 541.

³ Sarfram paṣigaggitvâ, ‘rested a little to remove the weariness of his body,’ says the Sinhalese here, but adds below, § 4, siwuru hœnda.

down in reverence before the Dâgaba, and then pay visits to the senior Bhikshus, and, on his return, enter in due time into the chamber of solitude. This, O king, is the first of the qualities of the cock he ought to have.

4. 'And again, O king, as a cock rises early and betimes ; so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, rise early and betimes to sweep out the open space around the Dâgaba, and get ready the drinking-water for the day's use, and dress himself, and pay his daily reverence to the Dâgaba, and enter into the chamber of solitude. This, O king, is the second of the qualities of the cock he ought to have.

5. 'And again, O king, as the cock is unremitting in scratching the earth to pick up what he can find to eat ; so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, practise continual self-examination and circumspection in taking any nourishment he may find to eat, reminding himself : [367] " I eat this, seeking not after pleasure, nor after excitement, nor after beauty of body, nor after elegance of form, but merely for the preservation of my body, to keep myself alive, as a means of appeasing the pain of hunger, and of assisting me in the practice of the higher life. Thus shall I put an end to all former sorrow, and give no cause for future sorrow to arise ; therein shall I be free from blame, and dwell at ease." This, O king, is the third of the qualities of the cock he ought to have. For it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods :

" Like child's flesh in the desert wild,
Or smearing grease upon the wheel,

Solely to keep himself alive,
Does he, when feeling faint, take food ¹."

6. ' And again, O king, as the cock, though it has eyes, is blind by night; so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, though he is not blind, be as one blind. Whether in the woods, or on his daily walk for alms in search of food, blind should he be and deaf and dumb to all delights of form, or sound, or taste, or smell, or touch, should not make them the objects of his thought, should pay no special, detailed, attention to them ². This, O king, is the fourth of the qualities of the cock he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Mahā Kakkāyana, the Elder :

" Let him with eyes be as one blind,
And he who hears be as the deaf,

¹ Not traced as yet. The verse is a riddle based on two parables. Of these the first is already published in the *Samyutta Nikāya* XII, 63, 5-8. It tells of a father and mother who in the desert (and of course only with the object of keeping themselves alive) ate their only child. The other is not yet published; but Mr. Trenckner points out that it occurs in the 34th *Samyutta*. Oiling wheels is done solely to keep the cart going. Compare the dying Buddha's comparison of himself to a worn-out cart, which can only with difficulty be made to move along. Like that, the body of the Tathāgata can only with difficulty be kept a little longer going ('Buddhist Suttas,' p. 37).

As to the last word, I take it, with *Hīnaśi-kumburê*, p. 542, to be *muḥḥito*, and not *amuḥḥito* as is printed in the text. That is also the reading adopted by Fausbøll at *Gāṭaka* II, 294, where the verses are quoted.

² *Na nimittam gahetabbam nānubyañganam gahetabbam*. On these common expressions compare *Āṅguttara* I, 2, 6, &c.; *Puggala Paññatti* II, 17, IV, 24, &c.; *Dīgha* II, 64, &c.; and Buddhaghosa as quoted in 'Vinaya Texts,' II, 9. *Hīnaśi-kumburê* only repeats the first, but explains the second by *nœwata nœwata wimasīmem*.

He who can speak be as the dumb,
 The man of strength as were he weak.
 As each new object rises to his ken,
 On the sweet couch of blest Nirvâna's peace
 Let him lie down and rest¹."

7. ' And again, O king, as the cock, even though persecuted² with clods and sticks and clubs³ and cudgels, will not desert his home ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort,—whether he be engaged in robemaking or in building-work, or in any of his daily duties, or in teaching, or in receiving instruction⁴—never give up his presence of mind. For that, O king—his presence of mind—is the home in which he dwells. This, O king, is the fifth of the qualities of the cock he ought to have. [368] And this, O king, has been said by the Blessed One, the god over all gods⁵ :

" And which, O Bhikshu, is the Bhikshu's resort, the realm which is his own by right?—it is this, the four modes of being mindful and thoughtful⁶."

¹ From Thera Gâthâ 501. The *Simhalese* supports Mr. Trenckner in reading *givhâv* in line three, but on the other hand has (twice) *mana-sâyikam* for *mata-sâyikam*. For the last line, of which a literal translation is impossible, it says, 'Let him make his couch on, fix his attention on, that Nirvâna which is *mana-sâyika-kitta*.' I think *mata* is the right reading, and that very possibly a riddle or pun is intended on the two meanings of that word.

² *Paripâtīyanto*. See above, p. 279 of the *Pāli*, and *Gâtaka* II, 208. The *Simhalese*, p. 543, has *he/anu labanneya*.

³ *Laku/a*. See above, pp. 255, 301 of the *Pāli*, and compare the *Hindī*.

⁴ *Hīnaśi-kumburē* expands all these details.

⁵ In the *Samyutta Nikāya* XLVI, 7. See Mr. Trenckner's note.

⁶ The four *Satipaṭṭhānas*. Compare above, p. 343 of the *Pāli*.

‘ And this too, O king, has been said by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith :

“ The elephant distinguishes good food
From bad, he knows what gives him sustenance,
And even when asleep he guards his trunk ¹—
So let each Buddha’s son, earnest in zeal,
Never do violence to the Conqueror’s word,
Nor injury to his self-possession, best of gifts². ”

3. THE SQUIRREL.

8. ‘ Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the squirrel which you say he ought to take, which is that ? ’

‘ Just as the squirrel, O king, when an enemy falls upon him, beats his tail on the ground till it swells, and then with his own tail as a cudgel drives off the foe ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, when his enemy, sin, falls upon him, beat the cudgel of his self-possession till it swells, and then by the cudgel of self-possession drive all evil inclinations off. This, O king, is the one quality of the squirrel which he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by *Kulla Panthaka*, the Elder :

“ When sins, those fell destroyers of the gains
Gained by the life of recluse, fall on us,
They should be slain, again and yet again,
By resolute self-possession as a club ³. ”

¹ As he does in war, according to *Magg'hima I*, 415.

² Not traced as yet. It is not included in the collection of Sâriputta’s verses preserved in the *Thera Gâthâ*.

³ Not in the published texts.

4. THE PANTHER (FEMALE)¹.

9. 'Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the female of the panther which you say he ought to take, which is that?'

'Just, O king, as the female of the panther conceives only once, and does not resort again and again to the male²; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort,—seeing how future conceptions and births involve a period of gestation and a fall from each state as it is reached, and dissolution and death and destruction, seeing the horrors of transmigration and of rebirths in evil states, the annoyance of them, the torment of them,—he should stedfastly resolve never to enter upon any future life. [369] This, O king, is the one quality of the female panther which he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the Sutta Nipâta, in the Sutta of Dhaniya the cowherd :

"Like a strong bull who's burst the bonds that bound him,
Or elephant who's forced his way through jungle,
Thus shall I never more enter the womb—
And now, if it so please you, god, rain on³!"

5. THE PANTHER (MALE).

10. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those two qualities of the panther which you say he ought to take, which are they?'

¹ Dîpinî, perhaps 'leopardess.' The *Simhalese* has 'tigress,' which is certainly wrong.

² Because it realises the pains and sorrows of cub-bearing, says the *Simhalese*.

³ Sutta Nipâta I, 2, 12.

‘Just, O king, as the panther, lying in ambush in wild places, behind a thicket of long grass or brush-wood, or among the rocks, catches the deer; so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, resort to solitary places in the woods, at the foot of a tree, on mountain heights, in caves and grottoes, in cemeteries, in forests, under the open sky, on beds of straw, in quiet, noiseless spots, free from strong winds, and hid from the haunts of men. For the strenuous Bhikshu, O king, earnest in effort, who frequents such solitudes, will soon become master of the six forms of transcendent insight. This, O king, is the first of the qualities of the panther he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Elders who collected the scriptures :

“As the panther by lying in ambush catches the deer,

So the sons of the Buddha, with insight and earnestness armed,

By resorting to solitudes gain that Fruit which is best¹.”

II. ‘And again, O king, as the panther, whatever may be the beast he has killed, will never eat it if it has fallen on the left side; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, not partake of any food that has been procured by gifts of bamboos, or palms’ leaves, or flowers, or fruits, or baths², or chunam, or tooth-sticks, [370] or water for washing; or by flattery, or by gaining the laity over by sugared

¹ That is, of course, Arahatsip. The lines are not to be found in the published texts.

² Sinâna-dânenâ; omitted by the Sutta Vibhaṅga and by Hīnaśī-kumburê (who quotes the Pāli of this passage).

words (literally by pea-soup-talk), suppressing the truth and suggesting the false¹, or by petting their children², or by taking messages as he walks from house to house³, or by doctoring them, or by acting as a go-between, or as a messenger on matters of business or ceremony⁴, or by exchanging with them things he has received as alms, or by giving back again to them as bribes robes or food once given to him⁵, or by giving them hints as to lucky sites, or lucky days, or lucky signs (on their children's bodies at birth), or by any other of those wrong modes of obtaining a livelihood that have been condemned by the Buddha⁶—no food so procured should he eat, as the panther will not eat any prey that has fallen on its left side. This is the second of the qualities of the panther he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith :

“ This food, so sweet, has been procured
Through intimation given by speech.
Were I, then, to partake thereof,
My mode of livelihood would be blamed.

¹ *Muggasuppatâ*. So *Hīnañ-kumburê*, p. 546. The *Sutta Vibhaṅga* omits both this word and the next.

² *Pāribhaṭṭakā*.

³ *Gaṅgha-pesaniyena*. The *Sutta Vibhaṅga* I, 185, on which our whole paragraph here is based, reads *-pesanikena*. I have differentiated the three sorts of messages according to the *Simhalese*.

⁴ *Hīnañ-kumburê*, both in his transcription of the Pāli (p. 546) and in his translation (p. 547), reads *pahīna-gamana*.

⁵ *Anuppadāna*. Compare *Gāṭaka* III, 205. At *Sigālovāda Sutta*, p. 307, and *Milinda*, p. 315, it means simply providing a person with things he wants. Childers's rendering, 'giving,' is inadequate in all the passages.

⁶ Referring to the *Sīlas*.

Now though by hunger dire oppressed
 My stomach seem to rise, to go,
 Ne'er will I break my rule of life,
 Not though my life I sacrifice¹."

6. THE TORTOISE.

12. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those five qualities of the tortoise which you say he ought to take, what are they?'

'Just, O king, as the tortoise, which is a water animal, keeps to the water; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, let his heart go out over the whole wide world with pity and with love—mighty, abounding, beyond measure, free from every feeling of hatred or of malice—towards all creatures that have life². This, O king, is the first of the qualities of the tortoise he ought to have.

13. 'And again, O king, just as the tortoise, when, as he swims on the water and raises his head, he catches sight of any one, that moment sinks, and dives into the depths, lest they should see him again; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, when evil inclinations fall upon him, sink into the waters of meditation, dive down into the deeps thereof, lest those evil inclinations should catch sight of him again. This, O king, is the

¹ Not traced as yet. Hīnaśī-kumburê gives a long account of the circumstances under which these verses were spoken. Sâriputta was ill. Moggallâna asked him what would be good for him to take. Sâriputta told him. His friend then, by intervention of the king of the gods, procured it. But Sâriputta refused to make use of it.

² The Brahma-vihâras (Nos. 1 and 2). See 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 201.

second of the qualities of the tortoise he ought to have.

14. [371] 'And again, O king, just as the tortoise gets up out of the water, and suns himself; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, when he rouses himself (withdraws his mind) out of meditation,—whether taken sitting, or lying down, or standing, or walking up and down,—sun his mind in the Great Struggle against evil dispositions. This, O king, is the third of the qualities of the tortoise he ought to have.

15. 'And again, O king, just as the tortoise, digging a hole in the ground, dwells alone; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, giving up worldly gain and honour and praise, take up his abode alone, plunging into the solitudes of empty lonely places in the groves and woods and hills, in caves and grottoes, noiseless and quiet. This, O king, is the fourth of the qualities of the tortoise he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Upasena, the Elder, of the sons of the Vaṅgantas:

"Lonely and quiet places, haunts
Of the deer, and of wild beasts,
Should the Bhikshu seek as his abode,
For solitude's sweet sake¹."

16. 'And again, O king, as the tortoise, when on his rounds he sees any one, draws in at once all his head and limbs into his shell, and hiding them there, keeps still in silence to save himself; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, wheresoever forms, or sounds, or odours, or tastes,

¹ Thera Gāthā 577.

or feelings strike upon him, shut to the gate of self-restraint at the six doors of his senses, cover up his mind in self-control, and continue constant in mindfulness and thoughtfulness to save his Samāṇa-ship. This, O king, is the fifth of the qualities of the tortoise he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the most excellent *Samyutta Nikāya*, in the Sutta of the parable of the tortoise :

“As the tortoise withdraws his limbs in his shell,
Let the Bhikshu bury the thoughts of his mind,
Himself Independent, injuring none,
Set free himself, speaking evil of none ¹.”

7. THE BAMBOO.

17. [372] ‘Venerable Nāgasena, that one quality of the bamboo which you say he ought to take, which is it?’

‘Just, O king, as the bamboo, whithersoever the gale blows, to that quarter does it bend accordingly, pursuing no other way of its own ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, conduct himself in accordance with the ninefold teaching of the Master, the word of the Buddha, the Blessed One, and steadfastly keeping to all things lawful and blameless, he should seek after the qualities of the Samāṇa-ship itself. This, O king, is the one quality of the bamboo he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Rāhula, the Elder :

¹ The parable is in the 46th *Samyutta*. The verses are already published at vol. i, p. 7 of M. Feer’s edition for the Pāli Text Society.

“In accord alway with Buddha’s ninefold word
And steadfast in all lawful, blameless acts,
I have passed beyond rebirth in evil states ¹.”

8. THE BOW.

18. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the bow which you say he ought to have, which is it?’

‘Just, O king, as a well-made and balanced bow bends equally from end to end, and does not resist stiffly, like a post; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, bend easily in accord with all his brethren—whether elders, juniors, of medium seniority, or of like standing with himself—and not repel them. This, O king, is the one quality of the bow he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the Vidhura *Punnaka Gâtaka* :

“Let the wise bend as the bow, yield as the reed,
Not be contrary. He shall dwell in the home of
kings ².”

9. THE CROW.

19. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, those two qualities of the crow that you say he ought to take, which are they?’

‘Just, O king, as the crow goes about full of apprehension and suspicion, [373] always on watch and guard; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, go about full of apprehension and suspicion, always on watch and guard,

¹ Not traced as yet. *Hīnaśi-kumburê* reads *samuttarim*.

² *Gâtaka*, No. 545, verse 159.

in full self-possession, with his senses under control. This, O king, is the first of the qualities of the crow he ought to have.

20. 'And again, O king, as the crow, whatever food he catches sight of, eats it, sharing with his kind; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never omit to share with virtuous co-religionists, and that without distinction of person or deliberation as to quantity¹, whatever lawful gifts he may have lawfully received, down even to the contents of his begging-bowl. This, O king, is the second of the qualities of the crow he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith:

"Whate'er they may present to me, austere in life,
All that, just as it comes, do I divide
With all, and I myself then take my food²."

10. THE MONKEY.

21. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those two qualities of the monkey which you say he ought to have, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the monkey, when about to take up his abode does so in some such place as a mighty tree, in a lonely place covered all over with branches, a sure place of refuge; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, choose as the teacher under whom to live a man modest, amiable, righteous, of beauty of character, learned in tradition and in the scriptures, lovable, venerable, worthy of

¹ So Hīnaśī-kumburē understands this, his version agreeing with the quotation given by Mr. Trenckner from Buddhaghosa.

² Not traced as yet.

reverence, a speaker of profitable things, meek, clever in admonition, in instruction, and in education, able to arouse, to incite, to gladden¹—such a friend should he choose as teacher. This, O king, is the first of the qualities of the monkey he ought to have.

22. 'And again, O king, as the monkey wanders about, and stands and sits, always on trees, and, if he goes to sleep, spends the night on them; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, stand and walk up and down thinking, [374] and lie down, and sleep, in the forest, and there enjoy the sense of self-possession. This, O king, is the second of the qualities of the monkey he ought to have. For it has been said, O king, by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith:

“Walking, or standing, sitting, lying down,
'Tis in the forest that the Bhikshu shines.
To dwell in wildernesses far remote
Has been exalted by the Buddhas all².”’

Here ends the First Chapter³.

¹ For the last six words, none of which are in Childers, see *Magghima Nikâya* I, 145, 6, and below, VII, 2, 20.

² Not traced as yet.

³ The Kambojan MS., in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge, ends here.

BOOK VII. CHAPTER 2.

THE SIMILES (continued).

II. THE GOURD.

1. 'Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the gourd which you say he ought to take, which is it?'

'Just, O king, as the gourd, climbing up with its tendrils¹ on to some other plant—whether a grass, or a thorn, or a creeper—grows all over it; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, who desires to grow up into Arahatsip, do so by climbing up with his mind over the ideas that present themselves (as subjects for the *Kammatahâna* meditations). This, O king, is the one quality of the gourd which he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith:

"As the gourd, clambering up with its tendrils,
grows
O'er the grass, or the thorn-bush, or creeper wide-spread,
So the son of the Buddha on Ar'hatship bent,
Climbs up o'er ideas, to perfection and peace²."

¹ *Sondikâhi*, which must mean here the tentacles or feelers of the gourd-creeper. The *Simhalese* has simply *Sondim*. I have only found the word elsewhere in the connection *Sondikâ kilaṅgâ* at *Magghima* I, 228 and *Samyutta* IV, 1, 6, 4.

² Not traced as yet. The last line is literally, 'By climbing up on the *ârammanas* should grow in the Fruit of those who have nothing left to learn' (that is, in Arahatsip).

12. THE LOTUS.

2. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those three qualities of the lotus which you say he ought to take, which are they?'

[375] 'Just, O king, as the lotus, though it is born in the water, and grows up in the water, yet remains undefiled by the water (for no water adheres to it); just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, remain undefiled by the support that he receives, or by the following of disciples that he obtains, or by fame, or by honour, or by veneration, or by the abundance of the requisites that he enjoys. This, O king, is the first of the qualities of the lotus that he ought to have.

3. 'And again, O king, as the lotus remains lifted up far above the water; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, remain far above all worldly things. This, O king, is the second of the qualities of the lotus that he ought to have.

4. 'And again, O king, as the lotus trembles when blown upon by the slightest breeze; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, exercise self-control in respect of the least of the evil dispositions, perceiving the danger (in the least offence). This, O king, is the third of the qualities of the lotus he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods:

"Seeing danger in the least offence, he takes upon himself, trains himself in, the precepts¹."

¹ See *Magghima Nikāya* I, 33; *Digha* II, 42, &c.

13. THE SEED.

5. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those two qualities of seed which you say he ought to have, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as seed, tiny though it be, yet if sown in good soil, and if the god rains aright, will give abundant fruit; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, so conduct himself aright that the righteousness of his life may give abundantly of the fruits of Samanaship. This, O king, is the first quality of seed which he ought to have.

6. 'And again, O king, as seed planted in well-weeded soil comes quickly to maturity; just so, O king, will his mind, when well-mastered¹, and well-purified in solitude, if it be cast by the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, into the excellent field of self-possession, come quickly to maturity. This, O king, is the second quality of seed which he ought to have. [376] For it was said, O king, by Anuruddha, the Elder :


" If seed be sown on a well-weeded field,
Its fruit, abounding, will rejoice the sower.
So the recluse's heart, in solitude made pure,
Matures full fast in self-possession's field². "

14. THE SAL-TREE.

7. 'Venerable Nāgasena, that one quality of the Sal-tree which you say he ought to take, which is it?'

¹ Supariggahītam, which the Sinhalese, p. 553, omits.

² Not in the published texts.



‘Just, O king, as the Sal-tree grows within the ground to the depth of a hundred cubits or more ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, perfect in solitude the four Fruits of Samanaship, the four Discriminations, the six forms of transcendental Insight, and all the qualities befitting a recluse. This, O king, is the one quality of the Sal-tree he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Râhula, the Elder :

“ The tree that’s called the Sal-tree grows above the earth,
And shoots beneath, a hundred cubits deep.
As in the fullness of time, and at its highest growth
That tree shoots in one day¹ a hundred cubits high,
Just so do I, O Buddha, like the Sal,
Increase, in solitude, in inward good.”

15. THE SHIP.

8. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of the ship that you say he ought to take, which are they ?’

‘Just, O king, as a ship, by the combination of the quantity of the different kinds of timber of which it is composed, conveys many folk across ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, cross the whole world of existence, whether in heaven, or on earth, by the combination of a number of qualities arising out of good conduct, righteousness, virtue, and the performance of duty.

¹ Ekâham. I follow the Sinhalese (*eka divasim*), but confess myself very doubtful as to this being the meaning intended by the author.

This, O king, is the first of the qualities of a ship he ought to have.

9. 'And again, O king, just as a ship [377] can bear the onslaught of various thundering waves and of far-reaching whirlpools; so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be able to bear the onslaught of the waves of various evil inclinations, and the onslaught of the waves of varied evils—veneration and contempt, support and honour, praise and exaltation, offerings and homage, blame and commendation in families not his own. This, O king, is the second of the qualities of the ship he ought to have.

10. 'And again, O king, as the ship journeys over the great ocean, immeasurable and infinite though it be, without a further shore, unshaken in its depths, roaring with a mighty noise, and filled with crowds of fish and monsters and dragons of all sorts; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, make his mind journey through to penetration into the four Truths in their triple order, in their twelvefold form¹. This, O king, is the third of the qualities of the ship he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the most excellent *Samyutta* Nikâya, in the *Samyutta* on the Truths²:

"Whenever you are thinking, O Bhikkhus, you should think: 'Such is sorrow,'—you should think: 'Such is the origin of sorrow,'—you should think: 'Such is the end of sorrow,'—you should think: 'Such is the path that leads to the end of sorrow.'"

¹ See 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 150-152, and especially § 21, from which the expressions here used are taken.

² This is the 55th *Samyutta*.

16. THE ANCHOR.

11. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those two qualities of the anchor which you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the anchor, even in the mighty sea, in the expanse of waters agitated by the crowding of ever-varying waves, will fasten the ship, and keep it still, not letting the sea take it in one direction or another; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, keep his mind steadfast in the mighty struggle of thoughts, in the waters of the waves of lust and malice and dullness, not letting them divert it in one direction or another. This, O king, is the first quality of the anchor he ought to have.

12. 'And again, O king, as the anchor floats not, but sinks down, and even in water a hundred cubits deep holds the ship fast, brings it to rest; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, when he receives support, and fame, and honour, and veneration, and reverence, and offerings, and praise, [378] be not lifted up on the summit of the support or the fame, but keep his mind fixed on the idea of merely keeping his body alive. This, O king, is the second quality of the anchor he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Sāriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith:

"As the anchor floats not, but sinks down beneath the waves,
So be abased, not lifted up, by praise or gifts¹."

¹ Not traced as yet.

17. THE MAST.

13. 'Venerable Nāgasena, that one quality of the mast which you say he ought to take, which is it?'

'Just, O king, as the mast carries ropes and braces and sails¹; just so should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, always have mindfulness and self-possession—when going out or coming back, when looking ahead or looking round, when stretching forth his arm or bending it back, when wearing clothes or carrying his bowl, when eating or drinking or swallowing or tasting, when easing himself or walking or standing or sitting, when asleep or awake, when talking and when silent, never should he lose his mindfulness and self-possession. This, O king, is the one quality of the mast he ought to have². For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods :

"Mindful, my brethren, should the Bhikshu remain, and self-possessed. This is my instruction to you³."

18. THE PILOT.

14. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those three qualities of the pilot which you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the pilot, day and night, with

¹ Lakāra. Childers says 'a part of a ship,' Dr. Morris ('Journal of the Pāli Text Society,' 1884, p. 101, note) says 'a chain attached to a well.' I follow the *Siṃhalese*, p. 556, which has *ruwala*. See *Gāṭaka* II, 112, and compare IV, 21.

² The *Siṃhalese* has here a page of matter not found in the Pāli.

³ *Dīgha Nikāya* XVI, 2, 12.

continuous and unceasing zeal and effort, navigates¹ his ship; just so, O king, does the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, when regulating his mind, continue night and day unceasingly zealous and earnest in regulating his mind by careful thought. This, O king, is the one quality of the pilot he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the Dhammapada (the Collection of scripture verses):

“Be full of zeal, watch over your own thoughts;
 Raise yourselves up out of the slough of endless
 births,
 As the strong elephant engulfed in depths of
 mud².”

[379] 15. ‘And again, O king, as the pilot knows all that is in the sea, whether good or bad; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, know good from evil, and what is an offence from what is not, and what is mean from what is exalted, and what is dark from what is light. This, O king, is the second quality of the pilot he ought to have.

16. ‘And again, O king, as the pilot puts a seal on the steering apparatus³ lest any one should touch it; so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, put the seal of self-control on his heart, lest any evil or wrong thoughts should arise within it. This is the third quality of the pilot he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the

¹ Sâreti, ‘makes go.’ Not in Childers, but see *Anguttara Nikâya* III, 35, 4, and compare *Kullavagga* V, 11, 2.

² Dhammapada, verse 327.

³ Yanta, which the *Simhalese* renders *yantra* (p. 559).

Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the most excellent *Samyutta Nikāya* :

“Think, O Bhikshus, no evil or wrong thoughts, such as thoughts of lust, or of malice, or of delusion¹.”

19. THE SAILOR².

17. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, that one quality of the sailor which you say he ought to take, which is it?’

‘Just as the sailor on board ship, O king, thinks thus: “I am a hireling, and am working for my wage on board this ship. By means of this ship is it that I get food and clothing. I must not be lazy, but zealously navigate the ship;” just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, think thus: “Gaining a thorough knowledge of this body of mine, put together of the four elements, continuously and unceasingly will I be self-possessed in mindfulness and thoughtfulness, and tranquil and peaceful will exert myself to be set free from births, old age, disease, and death, grief, lamentation, sorrow, suffering, and despair.” This, O king, is the one quality of the sailor he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Sāriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith :

“Understand what the body is, realise that again
and again,

Seeing the nature of the body, put an end to
grief³.”

¹ *Samyutta* LV, 7.

² *Kammakaro*. *Hīnañ-kumburē* translates this ‘handyman, artisan, ship’s carpenter.’

³ Not traced as yet.

20. THE SEA.

18. [380] 'Venerable Nāgasena, those five qualities of the sea you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the sea brooks no contact with a corpse¹; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, brook no association with the stains of evil—lust and malice and dullness and pride and delusion, concealing the faults one has and claiming virtues one has not², envy and avarice, deceit and treachery and trickiness, wickedness and sinfulness of life. This, O king, is the first quality of the sea he ought to have.

19. 'And again, O king, just as the sea carries within it stores of all kinds of gems—pearls and diamonds and cat's-eyes, and chank shells, and quartz³, and coral, and crystal, but conceals them all; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, though he have attained to the various gems of character—the Path, and the Fruits

¹ This curious belief has been made use of above, I, 259 of the translation. See also *Divyāvadāna*, p. 234.

² *Makkho* and *pālāso*, 'hypocrisy and conceit.' See the notes above on IV, 8, 23.

³ *Silā*. Mr. Trenckner prints the passage as if *saṅkhasilā* were to be taken together. But the use of the nominatives *saṅkho silā* in the corresponding list at *Kullavagga IX, 1, 3, 4* shows that by *silā*, 'rock,' some kind of gem is meant. And that our author does not intend to deviate from the earlier authority is clear from his own work (above, p. 267 of the *Pāli*), where he also gives the two nominatives in a similar, though longer, list of gems. What may be the particular gem referred to under the name 'rock' is doubtful. *Hīnaśi-kumburê*, p. 561, merely repeats the word *silā*; and Clough, besides 'rock,' gives as special meaning only 'arsenic.' At *Kullavagga* ('*Vinaya Texts*, III, 304) I have rendered it 'rock,' but 'quartz' now seems to me preferable.

thereof, and the four *Ghānas*, and the eight *Vimokkhas*, and *Samādhi*, and the five Attainments (forms of ecstatic contemplation and Insight), and the six forms of Transcendental Knowledge¹—conceal them and not bring them to the light. This, O king, is the second quality of the sea he ought to have.

20. 'And again, O king, just as the sea associates with mighty creatures; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, associate himself with a fellow-disciple who desires little and is contented, who is pure in speech², whose conduct is directed to the eradication of evil, who is given to righteousness, modest, amiable, dignified, venerable, a speaker of profitable words, meek, one who will point out his associate's faults, and blame him when he does wrong, clever in admonition, in instruction, and in education, able to arouse, to incite, and to gladden—with such a man as a friend, in righteousness should he dwell. This, O king, is the third quality of the sea he ought to have.

21. 'And again, O king, as the sea, though filled with the fresh water brought down by the Ganges, and the Jumna, and the *Akīravatī*, and the *Sarabhū*, and the *Mahī*, and by other rivers a hundred thousand in number, and by the rains of heaven, yet

¹ It is very characteristic of our author that his interpretation of the gems into ethical conceptions is quite different from that of the *Kullavagga*, and much more mystic. In the older passage they are translated into the seven constituent characteristics of *Arahatsip*. (See 'Vinaya Texts,' loc. cit., p. 305.) Compare also *Divyāvadāna*, pp. 115, 229.

² *Dhuta-vādo*, not in Childers, and only found here. Perhaps 'who inculcates the keeping of the extra vows.' *Dhutaṅga-wādiwū*, says *Hīnaśī-kumburē*, p. 561.

never overflows its shore ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never consciously transgress the precepts for the sake of support, or fame, or praise, or salutations, or reverence, or honour—no ! not even for his life. This, O king, is the fourth of the qualities of the sea he ought to have. [381] For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods¹ :

“Just, O king, as the great ocean has fixity as its characteristic, and never overflows its shores ; just so, O king, should my disciples never overstep the regulations I have laid down for them—no ! not even to save themselves alive².”

22. ‘And again, O king, as the sea is not filled even by all the rivers—the Ganges, and the Jumna, and the Aśiravattī, and the Sarabhū, and the Maht—nor by the rains from heaven ; just so, O king, should

¹ Devāṭidevena. It is not known when this epithet, which our author so constantly applies to the Buddha, first came into use. It is not found in the *Piṭakas*, and the *Milinda* is the oldest book in which it has been traced. It is given in the *Mahāvvyutpatti*, page 1, as a recognised epithet, but not in the corresponding Pāli list of epithets in the *Abhidhāna Padīpikā* (though *deva-deva* occurs there). The origin of the appellation is solemnly explained in the *Divyāvadāna*, p. 391. It is there said to have been first bestowed on the Buddha (when, as a child, he was presented in the temple), because all the gods bowed down before him. There is nothing about this in the corresponding passage of the *Lalitā Vistara*, pp. 136–138. The epithet is used of the Buddha in an inscription of Toramāna Shāhi (‘*Epigraphia Indica*’ for October, 1889). It occurs also in a verse preserved in the commentaries on the *Dhammapada* and the *Gāthaka* (*Gāthaka* IV, 158 = *Dhammapada* 148)—a verse not found in the *Piṭaka* versions of the same episode—and is used in a kind of pun in the *Mahāvamsa*, chap. i, verse 56. But these three passages are all of the fifth century A.D.

² Not traced as yet. A similar parable is used at the passage already quoted from the *Kullavagga* IX, 1, 3, 4.

the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never be satisfied with receiving instruction, with asking and answering questions, with listening to the word, and learning it by heart, and examining into it, with hearing the Abhidhamma and the Vinaya, and the deep sayings of the Suttas, with analysis of forms, with learning the rules of right composition, conjunction, and grammatical construction¹, with listening to the ninefold teaching of the Conqueror. This, O king, is the fifth quality of the sea he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the Sutasoma Gâtaka²:

“Just as the fire, in burning grass and sticks,
Is never satisfied, nor the great sea
Filled with the waters of all streams that flow—
So are these students wise, O king of kings,
Listening, ne’er sated with the words of truth³.”

Here ends the Second Chapter.

¹ The translation is here doubtful. The *Simhalese* apparently takes *viggaha* as qualifying *pada*, though it renders the whole by ‘learning the rules of resolving words into their elements, and of building them up into compounds, and of Sandhi, and of conjugation, and of declension.’

² Not reached as yet in Professor Fausböll’s edition. Mr. Trenckner says the verse quoted is No. 47 in the 537th Gâtaka.

³ The *Simhalese* reads *Evam hi me* for *Evam h’ ime*, and renders ‘listening to me.’ Mr. Trenckner points out that the Gâtaka MSS. read *Evam pi te*.

BOOK VII. CHAPTER 3.

THE SIMILES (continued).

21. THE EARTH.

1. [382] 'Venerable Nāgasena, those five qualities of the earth which you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the earth remains just the same whether one scatter upon it desirable things or the reverse—whether camphor and aloes and jasmine and sandal-wood and saffron, or whether bile and phlegm and pus and blood and sweat and fat and saliva and mucus and the fluid which lubricates the joints and urine and faeces—still it is the same; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, remain the same, unmoved at support or neglect, at fame or dishonour, at blame or praise, in happiness or in woe. This, O king, is the first of the qualities of the earth he ought to have.

2. 'And again, O king, as the earth has no adornment, no garlands, but is suffused with the odour of itself; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, wear no finery, but rather be set round with the sweet savour of his own righteousness of life. This, O king, is the second quality of the earth he ought to have.

3. 'And again, O king, as the earth is solid, without holes or interstices, thick, dense, and spreads itself out on every side; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be endowed with an unbroken righteousness of life with no gaps

or cracks in it, thick, dense, and spreading itself out on every side. This, O king, is the third quality of the earth he ought to have.

4. 'And again, O king, as the earth is never weary, though it bears up the villages and towns and cities and countries, the trees and hills and rivers and ponds and lakes, the wild creatures and birds and men, multitudes of men and women; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be never weary in giving exhortation and admonition and instruction and education, in rousing and inciting and gladdening, and at the expositions of the faith. This, O king, is the fourth quality of the earth he ought to have.

5. 'And again, O king, as the earth is free alike from fawning and from ill-will¹; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, continue in spirit, like the earth, free alike from fawning upon any man, from ill-will to any man. This is the fifth quality of the earth he ought to have. [383] For it was said, O king, by the devoted woman, Kulla Subhaddâ, when she was exalting the recluses of her own sect²:

¹ This simile has already occurred above, I, 258, 259 (of the translation).

² The *Simhalese* (pp. 563, 564) gives the whole story. She was the daughter of Anâthapindîka (Sudatta), the famous supporter of the Buddha, and builder of the Getavana at Sâvatthi. On her marriage to a rich merchant at Sâketa (Audh) named Kâlaka, he invited the Brahman naked ascetics of his sect, the Âgîvakas, and asked her to go and entertain 'the Arahats.' Hearing the word Arahats she went quickly and full of delight to do so; and was shocked beyond measure to find a number of disorderly fakîrs, with neither modesty in their hearts, nor decency in their outward behaviour. So she fled from the hall, and on her husband remonstrating, was indignant. He then asked her what the recluses

“ Were one, enraged, to cut their one arm with an
axe,
Another, pleased, to anoint the other with sweet
scent,
No ill-will would they bear the one, nor love the
other.
Their hearts are like the earth, unmoved are my
recluses¹. ”

22. WATER.

6. ‘ Venerable Nâgasena, the five qualities of water which you say he ought to take, which are they ? ’

‘ Just, O king, as water is firmly fixed (in pools, wells, &c.), shakes not, and (in its ordinary state) is not disturbed, and is pure by nature ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, putting away hypocrisy, and whining, and intimating their wants, and improper influences of all sorts, be fixed, unshaken, undisturbed, and pure in nature. This, O king, is the first quality of water he ought to have.

7. ‘ And again, O king, as water is always of a refreshing nature ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be full of pity, and love, and kindness to all beings, seeking the good of all, in mercy to all. This, O king, is the second quality of water he ought to have.

8. ‘ And again, O king, as water makes the dirty clean ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu,

of her sect were like, and she told him. Another verse from her description is quoted below, p. 387 of the Pâli. The above story has been often repeated.

¹ Not traced. Hînañ-kumburê reads *ekañ ke bâham* (twice) and *mânaso, pamodito*; and he is no doubt right,

earnest in effort, be in all places, whether in the village or in the forest, free from disputes with, free from offence against his teachers, his masters, or those standing towards him like a teacher. This, O king, is the third quality of water he ought to have.

9. 'And again, O king, as water is desired of all men; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, wishing for little, content, given to solitude and retirement, be always an object of desire to all the world. This, O king, is the fourth quality of water he ought to have.

10. 'And again, O king, as water works no harm to any man; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never do any wrong, whether in deed or word or thought, which would produce in others either strife, or quarrel, or contention, or dispute, or a feeling of emptiness, or anger¹, or discontent. [384] This, O king, is the fifth quality of water he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the *Kaṇha Gâtaka*²:

"If you would grant a boon to me,
O Sakka, lord of every creature,—
Let none, Sakka, on my account,
Be harmed, whether in mind or body,
At any time or place. This, Sakka,
This would I choose as boon of boons³."

¹ *Rittagghâna*, which *Hinasi-kumburê* renders *siswa kipîma*.

² These words are in the original ascribed, not to the Buddha himself, but to *Kaṇha-kumâro*, the then Bodisat.

³ *Gâtaka* IV, 14. Professor Fausbøll reads *mam kate*, but the Sinhalese (pp. 566, 567) confirms Mr. Trenckner's reading, *mam kâna, mam nissâya, mam anatta-kâmatâya*.

23. FIRE.

11. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those five qualities of fire which you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as fire burns grass, and sticks, and branches, and leaves; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, burn out in the fire of wisdom all evil dispositions which feed on objects of thought, whether subjective or objective, whether desirable or the reverse. This, O king, is the first quality of fire he ought to have.

12. 'And again, O king, as fire has no pity, neither mercy; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, show no pity, neither mercy, to any evil dispositions. This, O king, is the second quality of fire he ought to have.

13. 'And again, O king, as fire destroys cold; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, lighting up in his heart the burning fire of zeal, destroy all evil dispositions therein. This, O king, is the third quality of fire he ought to have.

14. 'And again, O king, as fire, seeking no favour of any man, bearing no ill-will to any man, makes heat for all; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, dwell in spirit like the fire, fawning on none, bearing ill-will to none. This, O king, is the fourth quality of fire he ought to have.

15. 'And again, O king, as fire dispels darkness, and makes the light appear; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, dispel the

darkness of ignorance, and make the light of knowledge to appear. This is the fifth quality of fire he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in his exhortation to Râhula, his son :

[385] " Practise thyself, Râhula, in that meditation which acts like fire. Thereby shall no wrong dispositions, which have not yet arisen, arise within thee, nor shall they that have arisen bear sway over thy heart¹."

24. WIND.

16. ' Venerable Nâgasena, those five qualities of wind which you say he ought to take, which are they ? '

' Just, O king, as wind pervades the spaces in the woods and groves in flowering time ; so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, rejoice in the groves of meditation that are all in blossom with the sweet flowers of emancipation. This, O king, is the first quality of wind he ought to have.

17. ' And again, O king, as wind sets all the trees that grow upon the earth in agitation, bends them

¹ Not traced as yet exactly in these words. But the passage at *Magghima Nikâya* I, 424, lines 3-6, agrees with it throughout, except that for *akusalâ dhammâ* here we have there *manâpâ-manâpâ phassâ*, which comes to much the same thing. As the words are there addressed to Râhula, and as our passage here is introduced with the same formula as the quotation below (p. 388 of the Pâli) which is certainly taken from the same page of the *Magghima*, I think the above (M. I, 424, lines 3-6) is most probably the passage our author now intended to quote. If so, we have here a real case of difference in reading.

down; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, retiring into the midst of the woods, there examining into the true nature of all existing things (all phenomena, *Samkhâras*), beat down all evil dispositions. This, O king, is the second quality of wind he ought to have.

18. 'And again, O king, as the wind wanders through the sky; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, accustom his mind to wander among transcendental things. This is the third quality of wind he ought to have.

19. 'And again, O king, as wind carries perfume along; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, carry along with him alway the fragrant perfume of his own righteousness of life. This, O king, is the fourth quality of wind he ought to have.

20. 'And again, O king, as wind has no house, no home to dwell in; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, remain alway without a house, without a home to dwell in, not addicted to society, set free in mind. This, O king, is the fifth quality of wind he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the Sutta Nipâta :

"In friendship of the world anxiety is born,
In household life distraction's dust lies thick;
The state set free from home and friendship's
ties—

That, and that only, is the recluse's aim¹."

¹ Sutta Nipâta I, 12, 1. It has been already quoted above, IV, 5, 1 (p. 211 of the Pâli), where see the note.

25. THE ROCK.

21. 'Venerable Nāgasena, the five qualities of the rock that you say he ought to have, which are they?'

[386] 'Just, O king, as rock is firm, unshaken, immoveable; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never be excited by alluring things—forms, or sounds, or scents, or tastes, or touch—by veneration or contempt, by support or by neglect, by reverence or its absence, by honour or dishonour, by praise or blame, nor should he be offended by things that give offence, nor bewildered on occasions of bewilderment, neither should he quake nor tremble, but like a rock should he be firm. This, O king, is the first quality of the rock he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods :

"The solid rock's not shaken by the wind,
Just so the wise man falters not, nor shakes,
At praise or blame¹."

22. 'And again, O king, as a rock is firm, unmixed with extraneous things; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be firm and independent, given to association with none. This, O king, is the second quality of the rock he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods :

"The man who mixes not with householders,
Nor with the homeless, but who wanders lone,
Without a home, and touched by few desires,—
That is the man I call a Brāhmaṇa²."

¹ Dhammapada 81. The first line recurs at Mahāvagga V, 1, 27.

² From the Sutta Nipāta III, 9, 35. It is also included in the Dhammapada collection of Scripture verses (No. 404).

23. 'And again, O king, as on the rock no seed will take root ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never permit evil dispositions to take root in his mind. This, O king, is the third quality of rock that he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Subhûti, the Elder :

"When lustful thoughts arise within my heart,
Examining myself, alone I beat them down.
Thou who'rt by lust excited, who by things
That give offence, allowest of offence,
Feeling bewildered when strange things occur,
Thou shouldst retire far from the lonely woods.
For they're the dwelling-place of men made pure,
Austere in life, free from the stains of sin.
Defile not that pure place. Leave thou the
woods¹."

24. [387] 'And again, just as the rock rises aloft, just so should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, rise aloft through knowledge. This is the fourth quality of the rock he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods :

"When the wise man by earnestness has driven
Vanity far away, the terraced heights
Of wisdom doth he climb, and, free from care,
Looks over the vain world, the careworn crowd—
As he who standing on the mountain top
Can watch his fellow-men still toiling on the
plain²."

25. 'And again, O king, just as the rock cannot

¹ Not traced as yet.

² This verse, not traced elsewhere as yet, is included in the Dhammapada collection as verse 28.

be lifted up nor bent down ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be neither lifted up nor depressed. This, O king, is the fifth quality of the rock he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the devout woman, *Kulla Subhaddâ*, when she was exalting the recluses of her own sect :

“The world is lifted up by gain, depressed by loss.
My Samanas remain alike in gain or loss.”

26. SPACE.

26. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, those five qualities of space which you say he ought to have, which are they?’

‘Just, O king, as space is everywhere impossible to grasp ; just so, O king, should it be impossible for the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, to be anywhere taken hold of by evil dispositions. This, O king, is the first quality of space he ought to have.

27. ‘And again, O king, as space is the familiar resort of *Rishis*, and ascetics, and gods¹, and flocks of birds ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, make his mind wander easily over all things with the knowledge that each individual (*Samkhâra*) is impermanent, born to sorrow, and without any abiding principle (any soul). This, O king, is the second quality of space he ought to have.

¹ *Bhûta*, which the *Simhalese*, p. 572, renders *yaksha*. I think it means all kinds of gods (except the highest), demigods, fairies, superhuman beings, &c.

28. 'And again, O king, as space inspires terror ; just so, O king [388], should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, train his mind to be in terror of rebirths in any kind of existence. To seek no happiness therein. This, O king, is the third quality of space he ought to have.

29. 'And again, O king, as space is infinite, boundless, immeasurable ; just so, O king, should the righteousness of the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, know no limit, and his knowledge be beyond measure. This, O king, is the fourth quality of space he ought to have.

30. 'And again, O king, as space does not hang on to anything, does not cling to anything, does not rest on anything, is not stopped by anything ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, neither in any way depend on, nor cling to, nor rest on, nor be hindered by either the families that minister to him, or the pupils who resort to him, or the support he receives, or the dwelling he occupies, or any obstacles to the religious life, or any requisites that he may want, or any kind of evil inclination. This, O king, is the fifth quality of space he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in his exhortation to Râhula, his son :

"Just, Râhula, as space rests nowhere on anything, so shouldst thou practise thyself in that meditation which is like space. Thereby shall neither pleasant nor unpleasant sensations, as they severally arise, bear sway over thy heart¹."

¹ *Magghima Nikâya* I, 424. See the note above on VII, 3, 15.

27. THE MOON.

31. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those five qualities of the moon which you say he ought to have, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the moon, rising in the bright fortnight, waxes more and more; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, grow more and more in good conduct and righteousness and virtue and the constant performance of duty, and in knowledge of the scriptures and study¹, and in the habit of retirement, and in self-possession, and in keeping the doors of his senses guarded, and in moderation in food, and in the practice of vigils. This, O king, is the first quality of the moon he ought to have.

32. 'And again, O king, as the moon is a mighty lord²; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be a mighty lord over his own will.

¹ Âgamâdhigame. These are two, not one. Âgama adhi-gama dekhi da says the Simhalese, p. 573.

² U/ârâdhipati. Dr. Morris in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society' (1880, p. 107) ingeniously proposes to read u/urâgâdhipati, 'king and lord over the u/u's, the lunar mansions.' In that case the u/âra in the latter clause of the sentence would be a play upon words. But Mr. Trenckner's reading is confirmed by the Simhalese, which has *lândra diwya-râga tema mahatwû sisiragunayem adhipati wûyeya*, 'the moon, that heavenly king, is a lord by reason of his great coldness.' And the reading may well stand, for the mention, in the latter part of the clause, of the thing over which the Bhikshu is to be lord does not necessarily require a corresponding word in the first part. We have numerous instances in these similes of the ethical interpretation of the physical simile being an addition, with nothing corresponding to it in the type discussed. The moon was a god, lord over other things besides the lunar mansions.

This, O king, is the second quality of the moon he ought to have.

33. 'And again, O king, as the moon wanders at night ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be given to solitude. [389] This, O king, is the third quality of the moon he ought to have.

34. 'And again, O king, as the moon hoists a standard over his mansion¹ ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, hoist the standard of righteousness. This, O king, is the fourth quality of the moon he ought to have.

35. 'And again, O king, as the moon rises when begged and prayed to do so ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, frequent for alms those families who have asked and invited him to do so². This, O king, is the fifth quality of the moon he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the most excellent *Samyutta Nikâya* :

"Like the moon, O brethren, let your visits be paid to the laity. Drawing back alike in outward demeanour and in inward spirit, be ye always, as strangers on their first visit, retiring in the presence of the laity. [As the man who looks down a deep

¹ *Kando vimâna-ketu*. 'Has his mansion, forty-nine *yoganas* in extent, as his banner,' says *Hīnañ-kumburê*. (A *yogana* is, seven miles.) *Vimâna* does not mean lunar mansion, but the palace which every deity, and therefore also the moon, is supposed to inhabit.

² The *Sinhalese*, p. 573, has the exact opposite. 'As the moon rises whether begged to do so or not, so should the Bhikshu visit the laity whether invited to do so or not.' But the Pâli must be right, as the subsequent quotation shows.

well, or a mountain precipice, or a river in flood, would be abashed alike in body and in mind; so be ye, O brethren, as the moon in your visits to the laity. Holding alike in your outward demeanour and your inward spirit, be ye alway, as strangers on their first visit, retiring in the presence of the laity]¹.”

28. THE SUN.

36. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, the seven qualities of the sun you say he ought to have, which are they?’

‘Just, O king, as the sun evaporates all water; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, cause all evil inclinations, without any exception, to dry up within him. This, O king, is the first quality of the sun he ought to have.

37. ‘And again, O king, as the sun dispels the darkness; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, dispel all the darkness of lust, and of anger, and of dullness, and of pride, and of heresy, and of evil, and of all unrighteousness. This, O king, is the second quality of the sun he ought to have.

38. ‘And again, O king, as the sun is always in motion; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be ever thoughtful. This,

¹ *Samyutta* XVI, 3, 2, 3. The sentence in brackets is added from *Hīnaśi-kumburē*, who gives here, p. 274, the Pāli text. *Apakassa*, the gerund of *ava-karsh*, and *naviyā*, ‘new-comers,’ are only found in this passage. In three cases M. Léon Feer has here gone wrong, as he has so often elsewhere done, by putting the readings of the *Simhalese MSS.* only in the notes, and adopting the *Burmese readings* in the text. He should have read, as *Hīnaśi-kumburē* does, *nikkham naviyā gambhīrūdapānam, nadī-duggam.*

O king, is the third quality of the sun he ought to have.

39. 'And again, O king, as the sun has a halo of rays ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, have a halo of meditation. This, O king, is the fourth quality of the sun he ought to have.

40. 'And again, O king, as the sun continually warms multitudes of people ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, rejoice the whole world of gods and men with good conduct, and righteousness, and virtue [390], and the performance of duty, and with the *Ghânas*, and the *Vimokkhas*, and *Samâdhi*, and the *Samâpattis* (various modes of transcendental meditation or ecstasy), and with the five moral powers, and the seven kinds of wisdom, and the four modes of being mindful and self-possessed, and the fourfold great struggle against evil, and the pursuit of the four roads to saintship. This, O king, is the fifth quality of the sun he ought to have.

41. 'And again, O king, as the sun is terrified with the fear of *Râhu* (the demon of eclipses) ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, seeing how beings are entangled in the waste wildernesses of evil life and rebirth in states of woe, caught in the net of the mournful results here of evil done in former births, or of punishment in purgatory, or of evil inclinations, terrify his mind with a great anxiety and fear. This, O king, is the sixth quality of the sun he ought to have.

42. 'And again, O king, as the sun makes manifest the evil and the good ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, make mani-

fest the moral powers, and the kinds of wisdom, and the modes of being mindful and self-possessed, and the struggle against evil, and the paths to saintship, and all qualities temporal and spiritual. This, O king, is the seventh quality of the sun he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Vangtsa, the Elder :

“As the rising sun makes plain to all that live
Forms pure and impure, forms both good and bad,
So should the Bhikshu, like the rising orb,
Bearing the scriptures ever in his mind,
Make manifest to men, in ignorance blind,
The many-sided Noble Path of bliss¹.”

29. SAKKA.

43. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, the three qualities of Sakka (the king of the gods) which you say he ought to take, which are they?’

‘Just, O king, as Sakka enjoys perfect bliss ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, rejoice in the perfect bliss of retirement. This, O king, is the first quality of Sakka he ought to have.

44. ‘And again, O king, as when Sakka when he sees his gods around him keeps them in his favour, fills them with joy ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, keep his mind detached, alert, and tranquil, should make joy spring up within him, should rouse himself, exert himself, be full of zeal. [391] This, O king, is the second quality of Sakka he ought to have.

¹ Not traced as yet.

45. 'And again, O king; as Sakka feels no discontent; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never allow himself to become discontented with solitude. This, O king, is the third quality of Sakka he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Subhûti, the Elder :

"Since I, great hero, have renounced the world,
According to the doctrine that you teach,
I will not grant that any thought of lust
Or craving care has risen in my breast ¹,"'

30. THE SOVRAN OVERLORD.

46. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the four qualities of the sovran overlord which you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the sovran overlord gains the favour of the people by the four elements of popularity (liberality, affability, justice, and impartiality); just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, find favour with, please, and gladden the hearts of the brethren and rulers of the Order and the laity of either sex. This, O king, is the quality of the sovran overlord he ought to have.

47. 'And again, O king, as the sovran overlord allows no robber bands to form in his realm; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never allow lustful or angry or cruel ideas to arise within him. This, O king, is the second quality of the sovran overlord he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods :

¹ Not traced as yet.

“The man who takes delight in the suppression
Of evil thoughts, and alway self-possessed,
Reflects on the impurity of things
The world thinks beautiful, he will remove—
Nay, cleave in twain, the bonds of the Evil One¹.”

48. ‘And again, O king, as the sovran overlord travels through² the whole world even to its ocean boundary, examining into the evil and the good; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, examine himself day by day as to his acts and words and thoughts, saying to himself: “How may I pass the day blameless in these three directions?” This, O king, [392] is the third quality of the sovran overlord he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the most excellent Ekuttara Nikāya :

“With constant care should the recluse
Himself examine day by day—
‘As days and nights pass quickly by
How have they found me? and how left³?’”

¹ This verse has not been elsewhere traced as yet, but is included in the Dhammapada collection, verse 350. Vitakka, which, in accord with the context and with Hīnaśī-kumburê, is rendered above ‘evil thoughts,’ and by Professor Max Müller ‘doubts,’ really means simply ‘thoughts,’ and is sometimes used without any bad connotation. In the Pāli the word Māru, which spoils the metre, may possibly be an ancient gloss introduced by mistake into the text.

² Anuyāyati, which is only found here, and which the Sinhalese, p. 577, renders anusāsanā karanneya. But compare ānuyāyin at Sutta Nipāta V, 7, 3-5, and Tela Kaṭṭha Gāthā 25, anuyāyin above, p. 284 of the Pāli, and ānuyāto at Tela Kaṭṭha Gāthā 41.

³ Mr. Trenckner points out that this passage is taken from the Aṅguttara X, 5, 8. Hīnaśī-kumburê, who gives the Pāli, prints it as verse, and translates the context at some length.

49. 'And again, O king, as the sovran overlord is completely provided with protection, both within and without ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, keep self-possession as his door-keeper for a protection against all evil, subjective and objective. This, O king, is the fourth quality of the sovran overlord he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods :

"With self-possession as his door-keeper, O brethren, the disciple of the noble ones puts away evil and devotes himself to goodness, puts away what is matter of offence and devotes himself to blamelessness, preserves himself in purity of life¹."

Here ends the Third Chapter.

¹ Not traced as yet, but the same phrase from 'puts away evil' to the end occurs at *Gâtaka* I, 130, 131.

BOOK VII. CHAPTER 4.

THE SIMILES (continued).

31. THE WHITE ANT.

1. 'Venerable Nāgasena, that quality of the white ant which you say he ought to have, which is it?'

'Just, O king, as the white ant goes on with his work only when he has made a roof over himself, and covered himself up; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, on his round for alms, cover up his mind with righteousness and self-restraint as a roof. For in so doing, O king, will he have passed beyond all fear. This, O king, is the one quality of the white ant he ought to have. [393] For it was said, O king, by Upasena Vaṅganta-putta, the Elder:

"The devotee who covers up his mind,
Under the sheltering roof of righteousness
And self-control, untarnished by the world
Remains, and is set free from every fear¹."

32. THE CAT.

2. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those two qualities of the cat you say he ought to have, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the cat, in frequenting caves and holes and the interiors of storied dwellings, does so only in the search after rats; just so, O king, should

¹ Not traced as yet. But as it is doubtless an old verse it is interesting that it contains the word yogī.

the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, whether he have gone to the village or to the woods or to the foot of trees or into an empty house¹, be continually and always zealous in the search after that which is his food, namely self-possession. This is the first quality of the cat he ought to have.

3. 'And again, O king, as the cat in pursuing its prey always crouches down²; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, continue conscious of the origin and end³ of those five groups of the characteristic marks of individuality which arise out of clinging to existence, thinking to himself: "Such is form, such is its origin, such its end. Such is sensation, such is its origin, such its end. Such are ideas, such is their origin, such their end. Such are the mental potentialities (the Confections, *Sam-khârâ*), such is their origin, such their end. Such is self-consciousness, such is its origin, such its end⁴." This, O king, is the second quality of the cat he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods :

¹ Hammiyantara. The Sinhalese has *Piṭṭa barânda æti uḍu mahal prâsâda ætulaṭa giye da*. 'Barânda,' which is not in Clough, I take to be simply 'verandah,' and the whole to mean: 'or goes into the interior of a mansion with an upper story to it on which is a verandah.' Buddhaghosa on *Kullavagga* VI, 1, 2, (putting only *kûṭṭagâra*, 'peaked chamber,' for *barânda*), has the same explanation. Ten or twelve years is allowed in *Kullavagga* VI, 17, 1, for the building of such a *prâsâda*. See also *Mahāvagga* I, 30, 4, and VI, 33, 2.

² *Âsanne* is Mr. Trenckner's reading. But *Hīnaṭ-kumburē*, who translates *deyat tabā hindīmem ma*, 'sitting with its forepaws stretched out,' evidently read *âsanena*.

³ *Abbaya*, not in Childers, is of course *avyaya*.

⁴ The Sinhalese expands this speech over ten pages, 580-589, and then omits the verse at the end.

“ Seek not rebirths afar in future states.
 Pray, what could heaven itself advantage you !
 Now, in this present world, and in the state
 In which you find yourselves, be conquerors ! ”¹

33. THE RAT.

4. ‘ Venerable Nāgasena, that one quality of the rat you say he ought to take, which is it ? ’

‘ Just, O king, as the rat, wandering about backwards and forwards, is always smelling after food¹ ; just so, O king, [394] should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be ever in his wanderings to and fro, bent upon thought. This is the quality of the rat he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Upasena Vaṅganta-putta, the Elder :

“ Ever alert and calm, the man of insight,
 Esteeming wisdom as the best of all things,
 Keeps himself independent of all wants and cares². ”

34. THE SCORPION.

5. ‘ Venerable Nāgasena, that one quality of the scorpion you say he ought to take, which is it ? ’

‘ Just, O king, as the scorpion, whose tail is its weapon, keeps its tail erect as it wanders about ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, have knowledge as his weapon,

¹ Upasimsako. Dr. Morris, in the ‘ Journal of the Pāli Text Society ’ (1884, p. 75), suggests upasiṅghako. But the Sinhalese in the first clause (p. 589, last line) has patamim ma, ‘ hoping for, seeking for,’ and in the second (p. 590, line 2) pœtīmema ma, which is the same thing (from prārthanā, which confirms Mr. Trenckner’s reading).

² Not traced as yet.

and dwell with his weapon, knowledge, always drawn. This, O king, is the quality of the scorpion he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Upasena Vaṅganta-putta, the Elder :

“With his sword of knowledge drawn, the man of insight
Should ever be unconquerable in the fight,
Set free from every fear¹.”

35. THE MUNGOOSE.

6. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, that one quality of the mongoose you say he ought to take, which is it?’

‘Just, O king, as the mongoose, when attacking a snake, only does so when he has covered his body with an antidote; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, when going into the world where anger and hatred are rife, which is under the sway of quarrels, strife, disputes, and enmities, ever keep his mind anointed with the antidote of love. This, O king, is the quality of the mongoose he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith :

“Therefore should love be felt for one’s own kin,
And so for strangers too, and the whole wide world
Should be pervaded with a heart of love—
This is the doctrine of the Buddhas all.”’

36. THE OLD MALE JACKAL.

7. [395] ‘Venerable Nāgasena, the two qualities of the old male jackal you say he ought to take, which are they?’

¹ Not traced as yet.

‘Just, O king, as the old male jackal, whatever kind of food he finds, feels no disgust, but eats of it as much as he requires ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, eat without disgust such food as he receives with the sole object of keeping himself alive. This, O king, is the first quality of the old male jackal he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Mahâ Kassapa, the Elder :

“Leaving my dwelling-place, I entered once
 Upon my round for alms, the village street.
 A leper there I saw eating his meal,
 And, as was meet, deliberately, in turn,
 I stood beside him too that he might give a gift.
 He, with his hand all leprous and diseased,
 Put in my bowl—’twas all he had to give—
 A ball of rice ; and as he placed it there
 A finger, mortifying, broke and fell.
 Seated behind a wall, that ball of food
 I ate, and neither when I ate it, nay,
 Nor afterwards, did any loathing thought
 Arise within my breast¹.”

8. ‘And again, O king, as the old male jackal, when he gets any food, does not stop to examine it ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never stop to find out whether food given to him is bitter or sweet, well-flavoured or ill—just as it is should he be satisfied with it. This, O king, is the second quality of the old male jackal

¹ Thera Gâthâ 1054-1056. The reading *pakkena hatthena* seems to me to be quite correct. Compare *pakka-gatto*, also of a leper, at M. I, 506 ; and above, p. 357 of the Pâli.

he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Upasena Vaṅganta-putta, the Elder :

“ Bitter food too should he enjoy,
Nor long for what is sweet to taste.
The mind disturbed by lust of taste
Can ne’er enjoy the ecstasies
Of meditations high. The man content
With anything that’s given—in him alone
Is Samānaship made perfect¹. ”

37. THE DEER.

9. ‘ Venerable Nāgasena, those three qualities of the deer you say he ought to take, which are they ? ’

‘ Just, O king, as the deer frequents the forest by day, and spends the night in the open air ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, pass the day in the forest, and the night under the open sky. This, O king, is the first quality of the deer he ought to have. [396] For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the exposition called the Lomahamsana Pariyāya :

“ And I, Sāriputta, when the nights are cold and wintry, at the time of the eights (the Ashṭakā festivals²), when the snow is falling, at such times did I pass the night under the open sky, and the day in the woods. And in the last month of the hot season I spent the day under the open sky, and the night in the woods³. ”

¹ Thera Gāthā 580.

² So called because they were held on the 8th day after the full moon in the two winter months. See the notes in ‘ Vinaya Texts,’ I, p. 130, and in the *Magghima*, p. 536.

³ *Magghima Nikāya* I, p. 79. To quote this passage here as an authority the Bhikshu ought still to follow, is a striking instance of

10. 'And again, O king, as the deer, when a javelin or an arrow is falling upon him, dodges it and escapes, not allowing his body to remain in its way; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, when evil inclinations fall upon him, dodge them, and escape, placing not his mind in their way. This, O king, is the second quality of the deer he ought to have.

11. 'And again, O king, as the deer on catching sight of men escapes this way or that, that they may not see him; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, when he sees men of quarrelsome habits, given to contentions and strife and disputes, wicked men and inert, fond of society—then should he escape hither or thither that neither should they see him, nor he them¹. This, O king, is the third quality of the deer he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith :

“ Let not the man with evil in his heart,
Inert, bereft of zeal, of wicked life,
Knowing but little of the sacred words—
Let not that man, at any time or place,
Be my companion, or associate with me². ”

the fatal habit of quoting texts of Scripture apart from their context. As it stands, it seems as if it supported the proposition of our author. But it is really just the contrary. For it occurs in the description given by Gotama of what he had done before he arrived at insight, when he was carrying out that system of penance which he afterwards abandoned as useless, and indeed worse than useless.

¹ See *Magghima Nikâya* I, 79, where the closing words are the same.

² *Thera Gâthâ* 987 (but the last words differ).

38. THE BULL.

12. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those four qualities of the bull you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the bull never forsakes its own stall; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never abandon his own body on the ground that its nature is only the decomposition, the wearing away, the dissolution, the destruction of that which is impermanent¹. This, O king, is the first quality of the bull he ought to have.

13. 'And again, O king, as the bull, when he has once taken the yoke upon him, bears that yoke through all conditions of ease or of pain; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, [397] when he has once taken upon himself the life of a recluse, keep to it, in happiness or in woe, to the end of his life, to his latest breath. This, O king, is the second quality of the bull he ought to have.

14. 'And again, O king, as the bull drinks water with never satiated desire; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, receive the instruction of his teachers and masters with a desire, love, and pleasure that is never satiated². This, O king, is the third quality of the bull he ought to have.

15. 'And again, O king, as the bull equally bears the yoke whoever puts it on him; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, accept with bowed head the admonitions and ex-

¹ See *Dîgha Nikâya* II, 83; *Gâtaka* I, 146.

² *Ghâyamânenâ, atrîptikawa âghrânayem* in the *Simhalese*.

hortations of the elders, of the brethren of junior or of middle standing, and of the believing laity alike. This, O king, is the fourth quality of the bull he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith :

“ A novice, seven years of age, a boy
 Only to-day received into our ranks,
 He too may teach me, and with bended head,
 His admonitions will I gladly bear.
 Time after time, where'er I meet him, still
 My strong approval, and my love, will I
 Lavish upon him—if he be but good,—
 And yield the honoured place of teacher to him¹.”

39. THE BOAR.

16. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, those two qualities of the boar you say he ought to take, which are they?’

‘Just, O king, as the boar, in the sultry and scorching weather of the hot season, resorts to the water; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, when his heart is distracted and ready to fall, all in a whirl, inflamed by anger, resort to the cool, ambrosial, sweet water of the meditation on love. This, O king, is the first quality of the boar he ought to have.

17. ‘And again, O king, as the boar, resorting to muddy water, digs into the swamp with his snout, and making a trough for himself, lies down therein; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, put his body away in his mind, and

¹ Not traced as yet. *Hīnaśi-kumburê*, p. 594, takes *santo* in the sense of *sat puruṣa guṇayem yukta wū*.

lie down in the midst of contemplation. [398] This, O king, is the second quality of the boar he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Pindola Bhâradvaga, the Elder:

“ Alone, with no one near, the man of insight,
Searching into and finding out the nature
Of this body, can lay him down to rest
On the sweet bed of contemplations deep¹. ”

40. THE ELEPHANT.

18. ‘ Venerable Nâgasena, the five qualities of the elephant he ought to take, which are they ? ’

‘ Just, O king, as the elephant, as he walks about, crushes the earth ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, mastering the nature of the body, crush out all evil. This, O king, is the first quality of the elephant he ought to have.

19. ‘ And again, O king, as the elephant turns his whole body when he looks, always looking straight before him, not glancing round this way and that² ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, turn his whole body when he looks, always looking straight before, not glancing round this way and that, not looking aloft, not looking at his feet, but keeping his eyes fixed about a yoke’s length in front of him. This, O king, is the second quality of the elephant he ought to have.

20. ‘ And again, O king, as the elephant has no permanent lair, even in seeking his food does not always frequent the same spot, has no fixed place of

¹ Not traced as yet.

² On this curious belief, see ‘ Buddhist Suttas,’ p. 64.

abode; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, have no permanent resting-place, but without a home should go his rounds for alms. Full of insight, wherever he sees a pleasant suitable agreeable place¹, whether in a hut or at the foot of a tree, or in a cave, or on a mountain side, there should he dwell, not taking up a fixed abode. This, O king, is the third quality of the elephant he ought to have.

21. 'And again, O king, as the elephant revels in the water, plunging into glorious lotus ponds full of clear pure cool water, and covered over with lotuses yellow, and blue, and red, and white, sporting there in the games in which the mighty beast delights; [399] just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, plunge into the glorious pond of self-possession, covered with the flowers of emancipation, filled with the delicious waters of the pure and stainless clear and limpid Truth; there should he by knowledge shake off and drive away the *Samkhâras*², there should he revel in the sport that is the delight of the recluse. This, O king, is the fourth quality of the elephant he ought to have.

22. 'And again, O king, as the elephant lifts up his foot with care, and puts it down with care; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be mindful and self-possessed in lifting

¹ For *dese bhavam* the Sinhalese reads *desa-bhâga*.

² *Samkhâra* is here used in the sense in which they are said at *Dhammapada*, verse 203, to be *paramâ dukkhâ*. The word is there explained by the commentator (wrongly, I think) as the five *Skandhas*. The Sinhalese, p. 596, simply has *sarva samskâra dharmayam*.

up his feet and in putting them down, in going or returning, in stretching his arm or drawing it back,—wherever he is he should be mindful and self-possessed. This, O king, is the fifth quality of the elephant he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the most excellent *Samyutta Nikâya* :

“ Good is restraint in action,
And good restraint in speech,
Good is restraint in mind,
Restraint throughout is good.
Well guarded is he said to be
Who is ashamed of sin, in all things self-controlled ¹. ”

Here ends the Fourth Chapter.

¹ From the *Samyutta* III, 1, 5, 6. The first four lines are also included in the *Dhammapada* collection, verse 361.

BOOK VII. CHAPTER 5.

THE SIMILES (continued).

[400] 41. THE LION.

1. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those seven qualities of the lion you say he ought to have, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the lion is of a clear, stainless, and pure light yellow colour; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be clear, stainless, and pure light in mind, free from anger and moroseness. This, O king, is the first quality of the lion he ought to have.

2. 'And again, O king, as the lion has four paws as his means of travelling, and is rapid in his gait; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, move along the four paths of saintship. This, O king, is the second quality of the lion he ought to have.

3. 'And again, O king, as the lion has a beautiful coat of hair, pleasant to behold; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, have a beautiful coat of righteousness, pleasant to behold. This, O king, is the third quality of the lion he ought to have.

4. 'And again, O king, as the lion, even were his life to cease, bows down before no man; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, even though he should cease to obtain all the requisites of a recluse—food and clothing and lodging and medicine for the sick—never bow down

to any man¹. This is the fourth quality of the lion he ought to have.

5. 'And again, O king, as the lion eats regularly on, wheresoever his prey falls there does he eat whatever he requires, and seeks not out the best morsels of flesh; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, stand for alms at each hut in regular order, not seeking out the families where he would be given better food, not missing out any house upon his rounds², he should not pick and choose in eating, wheresoever he may have received a mouthful of rice there should he eat it, seeking not for the best morsels. This, O king, is the fifth quality of the lion he ought to have.

6. 'And again, O king, as the lion is not a storer up of what he eats, and when he has once eaten of his prey returns not again to it; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never be a storer up of food. This is the sixth quality of the lion he ought to have.

7. [401] 'And again, O king, as the lion, even if he gets no food, is not alarmed, and if he does³, then he eats it without craving, without faintness, without sinking⁴; just so, O king, should the

¹ This is an injunction the Bhikshus still observe. Some of them have been known to attend a levée in Ceylon (improperly, as I venture to think). But as they would bow to no one, not to governor or prince, the levée became, so far as they were concerned, a mere march-past.

² This is one of the Dhutaṅgas, and is in the Sekhiyas (No. 33). Most Bhikshus never 'stand for alms' at all. But if they do, they observe this rule.

³ 'If he does not,' says the *Siṃhalese*.

⁴ *Anagghâpanno*. The MSS. in parallel passages (*Tevigga* I, 27; *Āṅguttara* II, 5, 7; III, 131; *Udāna* VII, 3, 10; *Magghima* I,

strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be not alarmed even if he gets no food, and if he does then should he eat it without craving, without faintness, without sinking, conscious of the danger in the lust of taste, in full knowledge of the right outcome of eating (the maintenance of life for the pursuit of holiness)¹. This, O king, is the seventh quality of the lion he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the most excellent *Samyutta Nikâya*, when he was exalting Mahâ Kassapa, the Elder :

“ This Kassapa, O Bhikshus, is content with such food as he receives, he magnifies the being content with whatever food one gets, he is not guilty of anything improper or unbecoming for the sake of an alms, if he receive none, yet is he not alarmed, and if he does then does he eat it without craving, without faintness, without sinking, conscious of danger, with full knowledge of the right object in taking food². ”

42. THE *KAKRAVÂKA* BIRD.

8. ‘ Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of the *Kakravâka* bird you say he ought to take, which are they ? ’

‘ Just, O king, as the *Kakravâka* bird never forsakes his mate even to the close of his life ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, never, even

173; Sumaṅgala I, 59) have usually *agg'hopanno*. The Sinhalese has *âhâra trishnâwehi no gœli*.

¹ *Nissarana-paññena*. This *Hinañ-kumburê* renders *nissaraṇâkhyâtawû brahmaṇariyânugraha pinisa yanâdiwû pratyawekshâ ñânayem yuktawû*.

² *Samyutta XVI, 1, 3* (vol. ii, p. 194 of M. Léon Feer's edition for the Pâli Text Society).

to the close of his life, give up the habit of thought. This, O king, is the first quality of the *Kakravâka* bird he ought to have.

9. 'And again, O king, as the *Kakravâka* bird feeds on the *Sevâla* and *Pavaka* (water-plants so called), and derives satisfaction therefrom, and being so satisfied, neither his strength nor his beauty grows less; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, find satisfaction in whatever he receives. And if he does so find satisfaction, O king, then does he decrease neither in power of meditation, nor in wisdom, nor in emancipation, nor in the insight that arises from the consciousness of emancipation, nor in any kind of goodness. [402] This, O king, is the second quality of the *Kakravâka* bird he ought to have.

10. 'And again, O king, as the *Kakravâka* bird does no harm to living things; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, laying aside the cudgel, laying aside the sword, be full of modesty and pity, compassionate and kind to all creatures that have life¹. This, O king, is the third quality of the *Kakravâka* bird he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the *Kakravâka Gâtaka* :

"The man who kills not, nor destroys,
Oppresses not, nor causes other men
To take from men that which is rightly theirs²—

¹ This is from the first clause in the *Kûla Sîla* (translated in 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 189).

² *Na ginâti na gâpaye*. Both these forms are to be derived, I venture to think, from *GYÂ* (or its more primitive form *GÎ*), and not from *GI*. It is true that Childers gives *ginâti* as third person singular of *GI*, and that (through the influence of the

And this from kindness to all things that live—
No wrath with any man disturbs his peace¹.”

43. THE PENÂHIKÂ² BIRD.

11. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, those two qualities of the Penâhikâ bird you say he ought to take, which are they?’

‘Just, O king, as the Penâhikâ bird, through jealousy of her mate, refuses to nourish her young³; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be jealous of any evil dispositions

common word *Gina*) there has really, perhaps, been some confusion in Pāli writers between the two roots, closely allied as they are both in form and meaning. But whether or not that be so elsewhere, we have here at least another instance of the frequent association of a simple verb with its own causal. *Gâpeti*, which occurs three times in the *Milinda*, and is always explained by *Hīnañi-kumburê* in the same way (see my notes above on pp. 171, 227 of the Pāli; here he has *artha-hāni no karawā da*), i neither for *ghâpeti* (as Dr. Edward Müller suggests in his grammar, p. 37) nor for *gâpayati*, but for *gyâpayati*. For the apparent confusion between *GI*, *gayati*, ‘conquer,’ and *GYÂ*, *ginâti*, (1) ‘overcome, bring into subjection,’ (2) ‘oppress, extort,’ see the commentary on *gine* at *Dhammapada*, verse 103 (quoted also at *Gâtaka* I, 314), which runs *ginitvâna gayam âhareyya*; and on *gayam* at verse 201 (taken from *Samyutta* III, 2, 4, 7), which is explained by *ginanto*, and at verse 104 where *gitam* is explained by *ginâti*. But in Pīṭaka texts I know of no instance where the two roots cannot be kept quite distinct; and it is quite possible that the *Dhammapada* commentator, while interpreting the one root by the other, is still conscious of the difference between them. *Gīna* (the p. p. p. of *ginâti*) is not given at all by Childers, but occurs *Gâtaka* III, 153, 223, 335; V, 99.

¹ *Gâtaka* IV, 71. One word differs, and the lines are not spoken by the Buddha, but by the bird.

² The *Simhalese* (p. 600) has *kœndœttiya*, a word not in Clough.

³ *Hīnañi-kumburê*’s translation of this clause shows that he had a different reading in his Pāli text.

which arise within him, and putting them by his mindfulness into the excellent crevice of self-control, should dwell at the door of his mind in the constant practice of self-possession in all things relating to his body¹. This, O king, is the first quality of the *Penâhikâ* bird he ought to have.

12. 'And again, O king, as the *Penâhikâ* bird spends the day in the forest in search of food, but at night time resorts for protection to the flock of birds to which she belongs; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, who has for a time resorted to solitary places for the purpose of emancipation from the ten Fetters, and found no satisfaction therein, repair back to the Order for protection against the danger of blame, and dwell under the shelter of the Order². This, O king, is the second quality of the *Penâhikâ* bird he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Brahmâ Sahampati in the presence of the Blessed One :

"Seek lodgings distant from the haunts of men,
Live there in freedom from the bonds of sin;
But he who finds no peace in solitude
May with the Order dwell, guarded in heart,
Mindful and self-possessed³."

¹ 'As the *Penâhikâ*, refusing to nourish her young in the nest, puts them into a crevice of a tree, and watches them there,' is the Sinhalese interpretation. And the word *susira* would not have been used in the second clause unless something corresponding to it had originally stood also in the first.

² Here again it is probable from the Sinhalese version that *Hînañ-kumburê* reads *rattim* for *ratim*.

³ The verse occurs in the Thera Gâthâ 142, but is here quoted from the *Samyutta Nikâya* VI, 2, 3, 4, where the readings *sañe ka nâdhigaññhaye satimâ* must be corrected according to the readings here.

44. THE HOUSE-PIGEON.

13. [403] 'Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the house-pigeon you say he ought to take, which is it?'

'Just, O king, as the house-pigeon, while dwelling in the abode of others, of men, does not become enamoured of anything that belongs to them, but remains neutral, taking notice only of things pertaining to birds; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, while resorting to other people's houses, never become enamoured of women or of men, of beds, or chairs, or garments, or jewelry, or things for use or enjoyment, or various forms of food that are there, but remain neutral always, addicted only to such ideas as become a recluse. This, O king, is the quality of the house-pigeon he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the *Kulla Nânada Gâtaka* :

"Frequenting people's homes for food or drink,
In food and drink alike be temperate,
And let not beauty's form attract thy thoughts¹."

45. THE OWL.

14. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those two qualities of the owl you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the owl, being at enmity with the crows, goes at night where the flocks of crows are, and kills numbers of them; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be

¹ *Gâtaka* IV, 223. There is a difference of reading, making no difference to the sense; and the words are put into the mouth, not of the Buddha, but of the old ascetic, the Bodisat of the story.

at enmity with ignorance ; seated alone and in secret, he should crush it out of existence, cut it off at the root. This, O king, is the first quality of the owl he ought to have.

15. 'And again, O king, as the owl is a solitary bird ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be devoted to solitude, take delight in solitude. This, O king, is the second quality of the owl he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the most excellent *Samyutta Nikāya* :

"Let the Bhikshu, my brethren, be devoted to solitude, take delight in solitude, to the end that he may realise what sorrow really is, and what the origin of sorrow really is, [404] and what the cessation of sorrow really is, and what the path that leads to the cessation of sorrow really is¹."

46. THE INDIAN CRANE².

16. 'Venerable Nāgasena, that one quality of the Indian crane you say he ought to take, which is it ?'

'Just, O king, as the Indian crane by its cry makes known to other folk the good fortune or disaster that is about to happen to them ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, make known to others by his preaching of the Dhamma how dreadful a state is purgatory, and how blissful is Nirvāṇa. This, O king, is the quality of the Indian crane he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Pindola Bhāra-dvāga, the elder :

¹ Not traced as yet.

² *Satapatto*, literally 'the hundred-feathered one,' *Simhalese* *kœrœl*, quite different from the ordinary crane (*bako*). This one was a bird of ill omen. See *Gâtaka* II, 153 foll.

“Two matters there are that the earnest recluse
Should ever to others be making clear—
How fearful, how terrible, purgatory is;
How great and how deep is Nirvâna's bliss¹.”

47. THE BAT.

17. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, those two qualities of the bat you say he ought to take, which are they?’

‘Just, O king, as the bat, though it enters into men's dwelling-places, and flies about in them, soon goes out from them, delays not therein; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, when he has entered the village for alms, and gone on his rounds in regular order, depart quickly with the alms he has received, and delay not therein. This, O king, is the first quality of the bat he ought to have.

18. ‘And again, O king, as the bat, while frequenting other folk's houses, does them no harm; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, when visiting the houses of the laity, never give them cause for vexation by persistent requests, or by pointing out what he wants, or by wrong demeanour, or by chattering, or by being indifferent to their prosperity or adversity; he should never take them away from their chief business occupations, but desire their success in all things. This, O king, is the second quality of the bat he ought to have. For it was said, O king, [405] by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the Lakkhana Suttanta:

“‘Oh! How may others never suffer loss
Or diminution, whether in their faith,

¹ Not traced as yet.

Or righteousness, or knowledge of the word,
 Or understanding, or self-sacrifice,
 Or in religion, or in all good things,
 Or in their stores of wealth, or corn, or lands,
 Or tenements, or in their sons, or wives,
 Or in their flocks and herds, or in their friends,
 And relatives, and kinsmen, or in strength,
 In beauty, and in joy '—'tis thus he thinks—
 Longing for other men's advantage and success¹!"

48. THE LEECH.

19. 'Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the leech which you say he ought to take, which is it?'

'Just, O king, as the leech, wheresoever it is put on, there does it adhere firmly, drinking the blood; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, on whatsoever subject for meditation he may fix his mind, call that subject firmly up before him in respect of its colour, and shape, and position, and extension, and boundaries, and nature, and characteristic marks, drinking the delicious draught of the ambrosia of emancipation. This, O king, is the quality of the leech he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Anuruddha, the Elder:

"With heart made pure, in meditation firm,
 Drink deep of freedom's never-failing draught²."

¹ This is from the 30th Sutta in the Dîgha Nikâya, where it occurs in the description of the Bodisat.

² Not traced as yet. Childers translates *aseḷana* by 'charming,' &c., apparently on the authority of Subhūti's English gloss on *Abhidhâna Padîpikâ* 597. But that meaning is rather the point of union between all the synonyms given in the verse, and not the exact meaning of each of them. The word, either in its simple form, or with an added -ka, occurs in *Therî Gâthâ* 55; *Magghima Nikâya* I, 114.

49. THE SERPENT.

20. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of the serpent you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the serpent progresses by means of its belly; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, progress by means of his knowledge. For the heart of the recluse, O king, who progresses by knowledge, continues in perception (of the four Truths), that which is inconsistent with the characteristics of a recluse¹ does he put away, that which is consistent with them does he develop in himself. This, [406] O king, is the first quality of the serpent he ought to have.

21. 'And again, O king, just as the serpent as it moves avoids drugs²; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, go on his way avoiding unrighteousness. This, O king, is the second quality of the serpent he ought to have.

22. 'And again, O king, as the serpent on catching sight of men is anxious, and pained, and seeks a way of escape³; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, when he finds himself thinking wrong thoughts, or discontent arising within him, be anxious and pained, and seek a way of escape, saying to himself: "This day must I have spent in carelessness, and never shall I be able to recover it." This, O king, is the third quality of the

¹ *Vilakkhanam*, not found elsewhere. *Hināṇi-kumburê*, p. 604, renders it simply 'dullness' (*moha*).

² 'Goes slanting, avoiding medicinal plants, trees, &c.,' says the *Simhalese*.

³ *Kintayati*, perhaps 'put out.' *Gœlawî yanta sitanneya*, says the *Simhalese*, p. 605.

serpent he ought to have. For it is a saying, O king, of the two fairy birds in the *Bhallātiya Gāṭaka* :

“’Tis one night only, hunter, that we’ve spent
Away from home, and that against our will,
And thinking all night through of one another,
Yet that one night is it that we bemoan,
And grieve ; for nevermore can it return¹ !”

50. THE ROCK-SNAKE².

23. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, that one quality of the rock-snake that you say he ought to take, which is it?’

‘Just, O king, as the rock-snake, immense as is its length of body, will go many days with empty belly, and, wretched, get no food to fill its stomach, yet in spite of that it will just manage to keep itself alive ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, though he be addicted to obtaining his food by alms, dependent on the gifts that others may give, awaiting offers, abstaining from taking anything himself, and find it difficult to get his belly’s-full, yet should he, if he seek after the highest good³, even though he receive not so much as four or five mouthfuls to eat, fill up the void by water. This, O king, is the quality of the rock-snake he ought to have. For it was said, O king, [407] by Sāriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith :

¹ *Gāṭaka* IV, 439.

² *Agagara*. Childers renders this ‘boa-constrictor.’ But *Hīnaś-kumburê* has *pimburâ*, which is a rock-snake, often confounded with the boa-constrictor on account of the size to which it grows.

³ *Atthavasikena*, *attha* being rendered *Nirvāṇa* by the *Sinhalese*.

“Whether it be dry food or wet he eats,
Let him to full repletion never eat.
The good recluse goes forth in emptiness,
And keeps to moderation in his food.
If but four mouthfuls or but five he get,
Let him drink water. For what cares the man
With mind on Arahatsip fixed for ease¹!”

Here ends the Fifth Chapter.

¹ Thera Gāthā 982, 983. The next verse but one has been already quoted above; p. 366 of the Pāli; and these recur at *Gātaka* II, 293, 294.

BOOK VII. CHAPTER 6.

THE SIMILES (continued).

51. THE ROAD SPIDER.

1. 'Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the road spider you say he ought to have, which is it?'

'Just, O king, as the road spider weaves the curtain of its net on the road, and whatsoever is caught therein, whether worm, or fly, or beetle, that does he catch and eat; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, spread the curtain of the net of self-possession over the six doors (of his six senses), and if any of the flies of evil are caught therein, there should he seize them. This, O king, is the quality of the road spider he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Anuruddha, the Elder:

"His heart should he shut in, at its six doors,
By self-possession, best and chief of gifts,
Should any evil thoughts be caught within,
Them by the sword of insight should he slay¹."

52. THE CHILD AT THE BREAST.

2. 'Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the child at the breast you say he ought to take, [408] which is it?'

'Just, O king, as the child at the breast sticks to its own advantage, and if it wants milk, cries for it;

¹ Not traced as yet.

just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, adhere to his own good, and in everything—in teaching, in asking and answering questions, in the conduct of life, in the habit of solitude, in association with his teachers, in the cultivation of the friendship of the good—should he act with knowledge of the Truth. This, O king, is the quality of the child at the breast he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, in the *Suttanta* of the Great Decease:

“Be zealous, rather, I beseech you, Ānanda, in your own behalf. Devote yourselves to your own good. Be earnest, all aglow, intent on your own good¹!”

53. THE LAND TORTOISE².

3. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, that one quality of the land tortoise which you say he ought to take, which is it?’

‘Just, O king, as the land tortoise, being afraid of the water, frequents places far from it, and by that habit of avoiding water its length of life is kept undiminished; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, seeing the danger in the want of earnestness, be mindful of the advantages that distinguish earnestness. For by that perception of

¹ *Mahā-parinibbāna Suttanta* V, 24, translated in ‘*Buddhist Suttas*,’ p. 91. The beginning of the exhortation has been already quoted above, p. 177 (of the Pāli).

² *Kittaka-dhara-kummassa*, literally ‘of the tortoise who wears the sectarian mark (on his forehead).’ The *Simhalese* repeats this phrase, which clearly distinguishes this tortoise from the other, the water tortoise, of VII, 1, 12.

danger in carelessness, his Samanaship fades not away, but rather does he go forward to Nirvâna itself. This, O king, is the quality of the land toroise he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the Dhammapada :

“ The Bhikshu who in earnestness delights,
Who sees the danger of indifference,
Shall fall not from his high estate away,
But in the presence of Nirvâna dwell¹. ”

54. THE MOUNTAIN HEIGHT.

4. ‘ Venerable Nâgasena, those five qualities of the mountain height you say he ought to have, which are they ? ’

‘ Just, O king, as the mountain height is a hiding-place for the wicked ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, keep secret the offences and failings of others, revealing them not. This, O king, is the first of the qualities of the mountain height he ought to have.

5. ‘ And again, O king, just as the mountain height is void of many people ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, [409] earnest in effort, be void of lust, angers, follies, and pride, of the net of (wrong) views², and of all evil dispositions. This, O king,

¹ Dhammapada, verse 32. The source from which the verse is taken is unknown now, and was also evidently unknown to our author. With the closing words *nibbânass eva santike*, compare verse 372, *sa ve nibbâna-santike*. *Santike*, ‘ immediate, close,’ is always used with the connotation of being in the very presence of. The local qualification, ‘ near,’ is *upanissaya*, *avidûre*.

² *Diṭṭhi-gâla*, the net of delusions, those relating to the per-

is the second quality of the mountain height he ought to have.

6. 'And again, O king, just as the mountain height is a lonely spot, free from crowding of men; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be given to solitude, and free from evil, unworthy qualities, from those that are not noble. This, O king, is the third quality of the mountain height he ought to have.

7. 'And again, O king, just as the mountain height is clean and pure; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be good and pure, happy, and without self-righteousness. This, O king, is the fourth quality of the mountain height he ought to have.

8. 'And again, O king, just as the mountain height is the resort of the noble ones; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be sought after by the noble ones. This, O king, is the fifth quality of the mountain height he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the most excellent *Samyutta Nikāya* :

"With solitary men, those noble ones,
Whose minds, on Arahatship strictly bent,
Rise easily to contemplation's heights,
Stedfast in zeal and wise in holy writ—
With such should he resort, with such commune¹."

manence of any individuality, and the separateness of oneself from others, as well those now living as those in the future and the past.

¹ This is a favourite stanza. It occurs in the *Samyutta* XIV, 16-18, and is included in the verses ascribed, in the *Thera Gāthā*, to the Arahats Somamitta and Vimāla (verses 148, 266).

55. THE TREE.

9. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of the tree you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the tree bears fruits and flowers; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, bear the flowers of emancipation and the fruits of Samanaship¹. This, O king, is the first quality of the tree he ought to have.

10. 'And again, O king, as the tree casts its shadow over the men who come to it, and stay beneath it; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, receive with kindness, both as regards their bodily wants and their religious necessities, those that wait upon him, and remain near by him. This, O king, is the second quality of the tree he ought to have.

11. 'And again, O king, just as the tree makes no kind of distinction in the shadow it affords; [410] just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, make no distinctions between all men, but nourish an equal love to those who rob, or hurt, or bear enmity to him, and to those who are like unto himself. This, O king, is the third quality of the tree he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith:

"Devadatta, who tried to murder him;
 Âṅgulimâla, highway robber chief;
 The elephant set loose to take his life;
 And Râhula, the good, his only son—
 The sage is equal-minded to them all²."

¹ The Sinhalese, p. 610, is here greatly expanded.

² This stanza has only been traced at present in commentaries,

56. THE RAIN.

12. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those five qualities of the rain you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the rain lays any dust that arises; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, lay the dust and dirt of any evil dispositions that may arise within him. This, O king, is the first quality of the rain he ought to have.

13. 'And again, O king, just as the rain allays the heat of the ground; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, soothe the whole world of gods and men, with the feeling of his love. This, O king, is the second quality of the rain he ought to have.

14. 'And again, O king, as the rain makes all kinds of vegetation to grow; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, cause faith to spring up in all beings, and make that seed of faith grow up into the three Attainments, not only the lesser attainments of glorious rebirths in heaven or on earth, but also the attainment of the highest good, the bliss of Arahats¹. This, O king, is the third quality of the rain he ought to have.

15. 'And again, O king, just as the rain-cloud, rising up in the hot season, affords protection to the grass, and trees, and creepers, and shrubs, and medicinal herbs, and to the monarchs of the woods that grow on the surface of the earth; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort,

where it is quoted with some variation. See the Commentary on the Dhammapada, p. 147.

¹ In my note above, I, 146, I might have referred to this passage.

cultivating the habit of thoughtfulness, afford protection by his thoughtfulness to his condition of Samanaship, for in thoughtfulness is it that all good qualities have their root. This, O king, is the fourth quality of the rain he ought to have.

16. [411] 'And again, O king, as the rain when it pours down fills the rivers, and reservoirs, and artificial lakes, the caves, and chasms, and ponds, and holes, and wells, with water; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, pour down the rain of the Dhamma according to the texts handed down by tradition, and so fill to satisfaction the mind of those who are longing for instruction. This, O king, is the fifth quality of the rain he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith:

"When the Great Sage perceives a man afar,
Were it a hundred or a thousand leagues,
Ripe for enlightenment, straightway he goes
And guides him gently to the path of Truth¹."

57. THE DIAMOND.

17. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of the diamond you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the diamond is pure throughout; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be perfectly pure in his means of livelihood. This, O king, is the first quality of the diamond he ought to have.

18. 'And again, O king, as the diamond cannot

¹ Not traced as yet.

be alloyed with any other substance ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never mix with wicked men as friends. This, O king, is the second quality of the diamond he ought to have.

19. 'And again, O king, just as the diamond is set together with the most costly gems ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, associate with those of the higher excellence, with men who have entered the first or the second or the third stage of the Noble Path, with the jewel treasures of the Arahats, of the recluses, of the threefold Wisdom, or of the sixfold Insight. This, O king, is the third quality of the diamond he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the Sutta Nipâta :

"Let the pure associate with the pure,
Ever in recollection firm ;
Dwelling harmoniously wise
Thus shall ye put an end to griefs¹."

58. THE HUNTER.

20. [412] 'Venerable Nâgasena, those four qualities of the hunter you say he ought to have, which are they ?'

'Just, O king, as the hunter is indefatigable, so also, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be indefatigable. This, O king, is the first quality of the hunter he ought to have.

21. 'And again, O king, just as the hunter keeps his attention fixed on the deer ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, keep his

¹ Sutta Nipâta II, 6, 10 (verse 282).

attention fixed on the particular object which is the subject of his thought. This, O king, is the second quality of the hunter he ought to have.

22. 'And again, O king, just as the hunter knows the right time for his work ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, know the right time for retirement, saying to himself: " Now is the right time to retire. Now is the right time to come out of retirement." This, O king, is the third quality of the hunter he ought to have.

23. 'And again, O king, just as the hunter on catching sight of a deer experiences joy at the thought: "Him shall I get!" just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, rejoice at the sight of an object for contemplation, and experience joy at the thought: "Thereby shall I grasp the specific idea of which I am in search¹." This, O king, is the fourth quality of the hunter he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Mogharâga, the Elder:

¹ *Uttarim visesam udhigakkhissâmi.* Hînañi-kumburê, p. 614, renders this, 'shall I arrive at the advantage of the attainment of the fruits of the path.' And he may be right, as the word *uttarim* is used. But the context seems to imply the rendering I have ventured to give, which preserves the usual connotation in this connection of the other two words of the phrase. A Bhikshu, for instance, on seeing a faded flower, will try to realise, to conjure up before his mind, the real fact of the transitoriness of all earthly (and of all heavenly) things. That is the specific idea of which he is in search, the deer he has to catch. No doubt it is only an intermediate step to the realisation of the fruits of the path. But as *visesam adhigakkhati* is the technical term for success in such meditation, I cannot but think that the mind of our author was directed to the intermediate, rather than to the later stage of the Bhikshu's endeavour. The Sinhalese has, perhaps, been guided by the verse, but there the word *visesam* is omitted.

“ The recluse who, with mind on Nirvâṇa bent,
Has acquired an object his thoughts to guide,
Should be filled with exceeding joy at the hope :
‘ By this my uttermost aim shall I gain ¹.’ ”

59. THE FISHERMAN.

24. ‘ Venerable Nâgasena, those two qualities of the fisherman you say he ought to take, which are they ? ’

‘ Just, O king, as the fisherman draws up the fish on his hook ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, draw up by his knowledge, and that to the uttermost, the fruits of Samanaship. This, O king, is the first quality of the fisherman he ought to have.

25. ‘ And again, O king, just as the fisherman by the sacrifice of a very little comes to great gain ² ; just so, O king, [413] should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, renounce the mean baits of worldly things ; then by that renunciation will he gain the mighty fruits of Samanaship. This, O king, is the second quality of the fisherman he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Râhula, the Elder :

“ Renouncing the baits of the world he shall gain
The state that is void of lust, anger, and sin,—
Those conditions of sentient life—and be free,
Free from the cravings that mortals feel,
And the fruits of the stages of th’ Excellent Way
And the six modes of Insight shall all be his ³. ”

¹ Not traced as yet. There are stanzas of Mogha-râga’s both in the Sutta Nipâta and the Thera Gâthâ, but this is not one of them.

² By putting a small fish on his hook catches a big one.

³ Not traced as yet.

60. THE CARPENTER.

26. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those two qualities of the carpenter he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the carpenter saws off the wood along the line of the blackened string (he has put round it to guide him)¹; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, standing on righteousness as a basis, and holding in the hand of faith the saw of knowledge, cut off his evil dispositions according to the doctrine laid down by the Conquerors. This, O king, is the first quality of the carpenter he ought to have.

27. 'And again, O king, just as the carpenter, discarding the soft parts of the wood², takes the hard parts; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, forsaking the path of the discussion of useless theses, to wit :—the everlasting life theory—the let-us-eat-and-drink-for-tomorrow-we-die theory³—the theory that the soul and the body are one and the same—that the soul is one thing, the body another—that all teachings are alike

¹ *Kâḷa-suttam*. See Dr. Morris's note in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1884, pp. 76–78, where he compares Mahâ Vastu, p. 17, and other passages.

² *Pheggum*. See above, p. 267 (of the Pâli), and *Magghima Nikâya* I, 198, 434, 488, from which it is clear that pheggu is a technical term applied to the softer portions of every tree, no doubt the outside portions. Sâra, on the other hand, means not pith, but heart of a tree. The Sinhalese words are sambulu and araḥuwa. Compare the ebony tree, the outside of which is as soft and white as deal, whereas the inside is black and hard.

³ *Sassatam* and *Ukkhedam*. See 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 149. Hīnaśi-kumburê, p. 615, omits these two, and is very confused in his version of the others.

excellent¹—that what is not done is of no avail—that men's actions are of no importance—that holiness of life does not matter—that on the destruction of beings nine new sorts of beings appear—that the constituent elements of being are eternal²—that he who commits an act experiences the result thereof—that one acts and another experiences the result of this action—and other such theories of Karma or wrong views on the result of actions—forsaking, I say, all such theses, paths which lead to heresy, he should learn what is the real nature of those constituent elements of which each individuality is, for the short term of its individuality, put together, and so reach forward to that state which is void of lusts, of malice, and of dullness, in which the excitements of individuality are known no more, and which is therefore designated the Void Supreme³.

¹ Tad uttamam aññad uttamam. The Sinhalese omits the second uttamam.

² The Sinhalese takes all the four previous phrases as qualifying this last one.

³ This passage will be found of the greatest importance for the history of the development of early Buddhist belief. In the present state of our knowledge—or rather of our ignorance—of that subject, its obscure allusions are no doubt unintelligible. But they will not always remain so. And, when rightly understood, they will be expressly valuable inasmuch as they refer to that department of Buddhist belief of which we know, from other sources, the least. The development—or degeneration, if the expression be preferred—of Buddhist doctrine took place along three principal lines. Firstly, in the doctrine as to the person of the Buddha; secondly, in the pushing of Arahatsip into the background and the elevation, in its place, of Bodisatsip into the ideal; and thirdly, in the doctrine of the relation of man to the universe. We know a good deal of the growth of the legend of the Buddha, and of the change in the ethical standpoint. Of the evolution of the philosophic conceptions we know at present but little. It is on this last point that our author here lets us somewhat behind the scenes. The theses he

This, O king, is the second quality of the carpenter he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the Sutta Nipāta :

“ Get rid of filth ¹ ! Put aside rubbish from you !
 Winnow away the chaff ², the men who hold
 Those who are not so, as true Samānas !
 Get rid of those who harbour evil thoughts,
 Who follow after evil modes of life !
 Thoughtful yourselves, and pure, with those resort,
 With those associate, who are pure themselves ³ ! ”

Here ends the Sixth Chapter.

condemns are to some extent the same as those the discussion of which is condemned in the well-known passages in the Piṭakas, where similar lists occur. In other respects they are evidence of a different and later stage of thought than appears in those parts of the Piṭakas at present accessible. And on the positive side, in the closing words, though the author has evidently enough the old Arahātship in view, yet he chooses expressions which became the germ of the much later nihilism of the Mādhyamika school, which has had so much influence in the more corrupt Buddhisms, more especially in China. As these later views never penetrated into Ceylon (or at least never had any vogue there, and were forgotten when Hīnañ-kumburē wrote), it is not surprising that the Sinhalese scholar should be at fault in his interpretation of this difficult passage. Sanskrit Buddhist texts will be here the best commentary.

¹ *Kārandavam*. In Childers, ‘a sort of duck,’ in the Sinhalese, ‘excrement.’

² *Palāpe vāhetha*. Chaff is so often used in Pāli of frivolous talk that it is given in the dictionaries as having that meaning. Hīnañ-kumburē takes it here in the sense of men of low caste, leprous *Kandālas*.

³ Not traced as yet. It is not in the Sutta Nipāta. This is the only passage in which our author gives the name of a book as the source from which he takes a passage, when the passage cannot be found in it. See Introduction, I, xliii.

BOOK VII. CHAPTER 7.

THE SIMILES (continued).

61. THE WATERPOT.

1. [414] 'Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the waterpot you say he ought to take, which is it?'

'Just, O king, as the waterpot when it is full gives forth no sound; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, even when he has reached the summit of Samāñaship, and knows all tradition and learning and interpretation, yet should give forth no sound, not pride himself thereon, not show himself puffed up, but putting away pride and self-righteousness, should be straightforward, not garrulous of himself, neither deprecating others. This, O king, is the quality of the waterpot he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the Sutta Nipāta :

"What is not full, that is the thing that sounds,
That which is full is noiseless and at rest;
The fool is like an empty waterpot,
The wise man like a deep pool, clear and full ¹."

62. BLACK IRON ².

2. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those two qualities of black iron you say he ought to take, which are they?'

[415] 'Just, O king, as black iron even when

¹ Sutta Nipāta III, 11, 43 (verse 721).

² Kañyasa. I suppose to distinguish it from bronze.

beaten out¹ carries weight; just so, O king, should the mind of the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be able, by his habit of thoughtfulness, to carry heavy burdens. This, O king, is the first quality of black iron he ought to have.

3. 'And again, O king, as black iron does not vomit up the water it has once soaked in²; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, never give up the faith he has once felt in the greatness of the Blessed One, the Supreme Buddha, in the perfection of his Doctrine, in the excellence of the Order—never give up the knowledge he has once acquired of the impermanence of forms, or of sensations, or of ideas, or of qualities, or of modes of consciousness. This, O king, is the second quality of black iron he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods :

"That man who is in insight purified,
Trained in the doctrine of the Noble Ones,
Grasping distinctions as they really are,
What need hath he to tremble? Not in part
Only, but in its full extent, shall he
To the clear heights of Arahatsip attain³."

63. THE SUNSHADE.

4. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of the sunshade⁴ you say he ought to take, which are they?'

¹ Suthito. 'Like a thin, strong creeper,' says the *Simhalese*.

² There is no explanation in the *Simhalese* of this curious phrase.

³ Not traced as yet. *Hīnañ-kumburê* (p. 618) reads *visesa-guṇā pavedhati*, and *mukhabhāvam eva so*.

⁴ *Khatta*. As used by high officials, a circular sunshade sup-

‘Just, O king, as the sunshade goes along over one’s head; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be of a character above all evil dispositions. This, O king, is the first quality of the sunshade he ought to have.

5. ‘And again, O king, just as the sunshade is held over the head by a handle; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, have thoughtfulness as his handle. This, O king, is the second quality of the sunshade he ought to have.

6. ‘And again, O king, as the sunshade wards off winds and heat and storms of rain; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, ward off the empty winds of the opinions of the numerous Samāṇas and Brahmans who hold forth their various and divergent nostrums, ward off the heat of the threefold fire (of lust, malice, and dullness), and ward off the rains of evil dispositions. [416] This, O king, is the third quality of the sunshade he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith:

“As a broad sunshade spreading far and firm,
Without a hole from rim to rim, wards off
The burning heat, and the god’s mighty rain;
So doth the Buddha’s son, all pure within,
Bearing the sunshade brave of righteousness,
Ward off the rain of evil tendencies,
And the dread heat of all the threefold fire¹.”

ported, not by a short stick fixed underneath its centre, but by a long stick fastened to a point on its circumference; and carried, not by the person it shades, but by an attendant behind him.

¹ Not traced as yet.

64. THE RICE FIELD.

7. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those three qualities of the rice field you say he ought to have, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the rice field is provided with canals for irrigation; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be provided with the lists of the various duties incumbent on the righteous man—the canals that bring the water to the rice fields of the Buddha's doctrine¹. This, O king, is the first of the qualities of the rice field he ought to have.

8. 'And again, O king, just as the rice field is provided with embankments whereby men keep the water in, and so bring the crop to maturity; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be provided with the embankments of righteousness of life, and shame at sin, and thereby keep his Samāñaship intact, and gain the fruits thereof. This, O king, is the second quality of the rice field he ought to have.

9. 'And again, O king, just as the rice field is fruitful, filling the heart of the farmer with joy, so that if the seed be little the crop is great, and if the seed be much the crop is greater still; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be fruitful to the bearing of much good fruit, making the hearts of those who support him to rejoice, so that where little is given the result is great, and where much is given the result is greater still.

¹ As the pun on the two secondary meanings of *mâtikâ*, 'rule, line,' is untranslatableable, I add here Hīnañ-kumburê's gloss on the simile.

This, O king, is the third quality of the rice field he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Upâli, the Elder, he who carried the rules of the Order in his head :

“ Be fruitful as a rice field, yea, be rich
In all good works ! For that is the best field
Which yieldeth to the sower the goodliest crop¹. ”

65. MEDICINE.

10. [417] ‘Venerable Nâgasena, those two qualities of medicine you say he ought to take, which are they ?’

‘Just, O king, as vermin are not produced in medicine; just so, O king, should no evil dispositions be allowed to arise in the mind of the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort. This, O king, is the first of the qualities of medicine he ought to have.

11. ‘And again, O king, just as medicine is an antidote to whatever poison may have been imparted by bites or contact, by eating or by drinking in any way; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, counteract in himself the poison of lusts, and malice, and dullness, and pride, and wrong belief. This, O king, is the second of the qualities of medicine he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all the gods :

“ The strenuous recluse who longs to see
Into the nature, and the meaning true,
Of the constituent elements of things,
Must as it were an antidote become,
To the destruction of all evil thoughts¹. ”

¹ Not traced as yet.

66. FOOD.

12. 'Venerable Nāgasena, those three qualities of food you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as food is the support of all beings, just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be a handle, as it were, by which all beings may open the door of the noble eightfold path. This, O king, is the first of the qualities of food he ought to have.

13. 'And again, O king, just as food increases people's strength; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, grow in increase of virtue. This, O king, is the second of the qualities of food he ought to have.

14. 'And again, O king, just as food is a thing desired of all beings; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, be desired of all the world. This, O king, is the third of the qualities of food he ought to have. For it was said, O king, by Mahā Moggallāna, the Elder :

"By self-restraint, training, and righteousness,
By duty done, and by attainments reached,
The strenuous recluse should make himself
To all men in the world a thing desired¹."

67. THE ARCHER.

15. [418] 'Venerable Nāgasena, those four qualities of the archer you say he ought to take, which are they?'

'Just, O king, as the archer, when discharging

¹ Not traced as yet.

his arrows, plants both his feet firmly on the ground, keeps his knees straight, hangs his quiver against the narrow part of his waist, keeps his whole body steady, places both his hands firmly on the point of junction (of the arrow on the bow), closes his fists, leaves no openings between his fingers, stretches out his neck, shuts his mouth and one eye¹, and takes aim² in joy at the thought: "I shall hit it³;" just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, plant firmly the feet of his zeal on the basis of righteousness, keep intact his kindness and tenderness of heart, fix his mind on subjugation of the senses, keep himself steady by self-restraint and performance of duty, suppress excitement and sense of faintness, by continual thoughtfulness let no openings remain in his mind, reach forward in zeal, shut the six doors (of the five senses and the mind), and continue mindful and thoughtful in joy at the thought: "By the javelin of my knowledge will I slay all my evil dispositions." This, O king, is the first of the qualities of the archer he ought to have.

16. 4' And again, O king, as the archer carries a vice⁵ for straightening out bent and crooked and

¹ Literally 'and his eyes.'

² *Nimittam ugum karoti*. 'Keeps his mind directed,' says *Hīnaśi-kumburē*, p. 621.

³ On other technical terms of archery, compare above, p. 352 (of the *Pāli*).

⁴ From this point to the end, Mr. Trenckner's text is taken from a MS. brought from Siam, as explained in his Introduction, pp. v, vi, and in my Introduction, I, xxiv. *Hīnaśi-kumburē* gives no indication of any change here in the MSS. he used.

⁵ *Āḷaka*, which *Hīnaśi-kumburē*, p. 622, merely repeats. But see Dr. Morris, in the 'Journal of the Pāli Text Society,' 1886, p. 158.

uneven arrows ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, carry about with him, so long as he is in the body, the vice of mindfulness and thoughtfulness, wherewith he may straighten out any crooked and bent and shifty ideas. This, O king, is the second of the qualities of the archer he ought to have.

17. ' And again, O king, as the archer practises ¹ at a target ; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, practise, so long as he is in the body. And how, O king, should he practise ? He should practise himself in the idea of the impermanence of all things, of the sorrow inherent in individuality, in the absence in any thing or creature of any abiding principle (any soul) ; in the ideas of the diseases, sores, pains, aches, and ailments of the body that follow in the train of the necessary conditions of individuality ; in the ideas of its dependence on others ², and of its certain disintegration ³ ; in the ideas of the calamities, dangers, fears, and misfortunes to which it is subject ; of its instability under the changing conditions of life ; of its liability to dissolution, its want of firmness, its being no true place of refuge, no cave of security, no home of protection, no right object of trust ; of its vanity, emptiness, danger, and insubstantiality [419] ; of its being the source of pains and subject to punish-

¹ Upâseti (only found here). Hīnaś-kumburê, p. 622, has *abhyâsa karanneya*. He gives the whole passage from *katham maharâga yoginâ tatiyam angam gahetabbam* in Pâli, and reads throughout *upâsitabbam*, without the omissions.

² Parato, not in Childers, but see *Magghima Nikâya* I, 435, 500, where all these expressions occur together.

³ Palokato, from rug.

ments¹ and full of impurity, a mongrel compound of conditions and qualities that have no coherence; of its being the food alike of evil and of the Evil One²; of its inherent liability to rebirths, old age, disease, and death, to griefs, lamentations, despair; and of the corruption of the cravings and delusions that are never absent from it. This, O king, is the third of the qualities of the archer he ought to have.

18. 'And again, O king, just as the archer practises early and late; just so, O king, should the strenuous Bhikshu, earnest in effort, practise meditation early and late. For it was said, O king, by Sâriputta, the Elder, the Commander of the Faith:

"Early and late the true archer will practise,
'Tis only by never neglecting his art,
That he earns the reward and the wage of his skill.
So the sons of the Buddha, too, practise their art.
It is just by never neglecting in thought
The conditions of life in this bodily frame
That they gain the rich fruits which the Arahats
love³."

Here ends the fifth riddle, the riddle of
the archer.

Here end the two hundred and sixty-two questions of Milinda, as handed down in the book in its six parts, adorned with twenty-two chapters. Now those which have not been handed down are forty-

¹ Vadhakato, 'untrustworthy as the man who assassinates his friend,' says Hīnaś-kumburê, p. 623.

² Marāmisato, given by Hīnaś-kumburê both in the Pāli and Sinhalese, but omitted by Mr. Trenckner. (*Mrityu-māra-klesa mārayan/a āhāraya-wu-bœwim*.)

³ Not traced as yet.

two¹. Taking together all those that have been, and those that have not been, handed down, there are three hundred plus four, all of which are reckoned as 'Questions of Milinda ².'

19. On the conclusion of this putting of puzzles and giving of solutions between the king and the Elder, this great earth, eighty-four thousand leagues in extent, shook six times even to its ocean boundary, the lightnings flashed, the gods poured down a rain-fall of flowers from heaven, Mahâ Brahmâ himself signified his applause, and there was a mighty roar like the crashing and thundering of a storm in the mighty deep. And on beholding that wonder, the five hundred high ministers of the king, and all the inhabitants of the city of Sâgala who were there, and the women of the king's palace, bowed down before Nâgasena, the great teacher, raising their clasped hands to their foreheads, and departed thence ³.

20. [420] But Milinda the king was filled with joy of heart, and all pride was suppressed within him. And he became aware of the virtue that lay in the religion of the Buddhas, he ceased to have any doubt at all in the Three Gems⁴, he tarried no longer in the jungle of heresy, he renounced all obstinacy; and pleased beyond measure at the high

¹ There are only thirty-eight in the list at VII, 1, 1.

² Before these last sentences (Now those Milinda), Hīnaśi-kumburê has: 'Here ends that mirror of the good law called, "The Questions of Milinda."' Then he goes on as above.

³ I here follow Hīnaśi-kumburê, who has apparently had a fuller text before him.

⁴ The Buddha, his religion, and his order.

qualities of the Elder, at the excellence of his manners befitting a recluse, he become filled with confidence, and free from cravings, and all his pride and self-righteousness left his heart ; and like a cobra deprived of its fangs he said : ‘ Most excellent, most excellent, venerable Nâgasena ! The puzzles, worthy of a Buddha to solve, have you made clear. There is none like you, amongst all the followers of the Buddha, in the solution of problems, save only Sâriputta, the Elder, himself, the Commander of the Faith. Pardon me, venerable Nâgasena, my faults. May the venerable Nâgasena accept me as a supporter of the faith, as a true convert from to-day onwards as long as life shall last ! ’

21. Thenceforward the king and his mighty men continued in paying honour to Nâgasena. And the king had a Wihâra built called ‘The Milinda Wihâra,’ and handed it over to Nâgasena, the Elder, and waited upon him and all the multitude of the Arahats Bhikshus of whom he was the chief with the four requisites of the Bhikshu’s life. And afterwards, taking delight in the wisdom of the Elder, he handed over his kingdom to his son, and abandoning the household life for the houseless state, grew great in insight, and himself attained to Arahatship ! Therefore is it said :

‘ Wisdom is magnified o’er all the world,
And preaching for the endurance of the Faith.
When they, by wisdom, have put doubt aside
The wise reach upward to that Tranquil State.
That man in whom wisdom is firmly set,
And mindful self-possession never fails,
He is the best of those who gifts receive,
The chief of men to whom distinction’s given.

Let therefore able men, in due regard
 To their own welfare ¹, honour those who're wise,—
 Worthy of honour like the sacred pile
 Beneath whose solid dome the bones of the great
 dead lie ².

Here ends the book of the puzzles and the
 solutions of Milinda and Nāgasena ³.

¹ This line is identical with the sixth line of the little poem on the gift of Wihāras preserved in the *Kullavagga* VI, 1, 5, and VI, 9, 2, and quoted as a whole in the *Gāṭaka*, book I, 93, and in part above IV, 5, 1. This line also occurs, in a third connection, at *Gāṭaka* IV, 354.

² These verses differ from those here given by Hīnaśi-kumburê, which I have quoted in the Introduction to this volume.

³ This closing title is omitted by Hīnaśi-kumburê, who gives instead of it a second account of how he came to write his translation, and then adds as the closing title to his own book: 'Here ends the *Srī Saddharmādāsaya* (the Mirror of the Good Law) made by Sīnaśi-kumburê Sumaṅgala, the Elder.' [Sīnaśi is merely the Elu form of the Sinhalese word Hīnaśi, which is the name of a plant, *coryza sativa*; and Hīnaśi-kumburê is the locative of the name of the place, Hīnaśi-field, where he was born. Every unnānsê in Ceylon has such a local name in addition to his religious name. And the religious names being often identical (there are, for instance, many Sumaṅgalas), the Bhikkhus are usually spoken of by the former, and not by the latter.]

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

PART I.

- P. xxv. For 'Mahâyâna' read 'Madhyamika.' There is a Nâgasena mentioned in the Bharhut Tope.
- „ 6, l. 1. Read 'to Tissa the Elder, the son of the Moggallî.' The whole sentence had better perhaps have been rendered: 'And these two also were foreseen by our Buddha (just as he foresaw Tissa the Elder, the son of the Moggallî), in that he foretold, saying, &c.'
- „ 30, n. 1. The phrase *isi-vâtam parivâtam nagaram akamsu* recurs at *Gâtaka* III, 142; *Samanta Pâsadikâ* 316; *Saddhamma Samgaha* 41.
- „ 32, n. 1. Compare *Saddhamma Samgaha*, p. 42.
- „ 60, § 13. On the first simile, compare the *Samyutta Nikâya* XXII, 102, 7.
- „ 76, last line. For 'yoke' read 'yolk.'
- „ 78. It would have been better perhaps to have avoided the use of the words 'where' and 'there,' and to have rendered: 'In the case of beings who, having died, have been reborn elsewhere, time is. In the case of beings who, having died, have not been reborn elsewhere, time is not. And in the case of beings, &c.' The three cases are those of the *Puthuggana*, the *Arahat* when dead, and the *Arahat* alive. My note refers to the third case, not to the second; and should, I think, be modified accordingly. See *Samyutta Nikâya* III, 12, 35; *Mahâ Parinibbâna Sutta* IV, 3; *Dhammapada*, verse 89; *Sutta Nipâta* II, 13, 1, 12; *Maggâima Nikâya* I, 235; *Gâtaka* IV, 453; and compare *Udâna*, p. 80.
- Hinari-kumburê* gives only a literal translation. A similar question is discussed in the *Kathâ Vatthu* XV, 3.
- „ 99, n. 1. For 'chapter' read 'book, p. 39.'
- „ 107, l. 16. After 'brought about' insert a comma.
- „ 118, § 5. I now prefer 'initiation' instead of 'ordination' as the translation of *Upasampadâ*.
- „ 119, n. 1. This interpretation is confirmed by part ii, p. 197.
- „ 129, l. 7. The phrase, 'though his hands and feet were cut off,' seems, at first sight, out of place. But compare part ii, p. 147.
- „ 150, l. 2. Read 'and not accepting them.'

- P. 153, § 18. Read 'Kīṇā:' and compare Gâtaka IV, 189.
 „ 164 (six lines from the bottom of the page). Read 'and then a subsequent ease to the pain he has given.'
 „ 176, § 39. In accordance with the note at part ii, pp. 86, 87, we must read 'a huge and mighty cauldron, full of water and crowded with grains of rice, is placed over a fireplace.'
 „ 179. On the problem of king Sivi and his new eyes, compare the question discussed in Kathā Vatthu III, 7.
 „ 229, n. 1, l. 6. For 'these' read 'those.'
 „ 239, n. 2. For 'But I never think' read 'But I now think.'
 „ 241, § 20. For 'The Master said, Nāgasena,' read 'The Master said, O king.'
 „ 244, n. 2. For 'Gatharaggi' read 'Gaḥaraggi.'
 „ 278, n. 1. For 'adika' read 'ādika.'
 „ 288, n. 3. For 'purdhita' read 'purohita.'
 „ 290, n. 2. This story, which I could not trace, is no doubt the one referred to in Kariyā Pitaka I, 7.
 „ 291, l. 22. Read 'Uposatha.'

PART II.

- P. 27, last line but two. Read 'kāma-loka.'
 „ 29, n. 2, l. 7. Read 'saṃsāra.'
 „ 139, l. 4. For 'sun and moon' read 'moon and sun.'
 „ 148, two lines from the bottom. For 'O king' read 'Sir.'
 „ 150, four lines from the bottom. For 'destructions' read 'distinctions.'
 „ 166, n. 1. Read 'samāhato.'
 „ 219, n. 2. Read 'bhāvanā.'
 „ 252, l. 4. For 'pulling' read 'putting.'
 „ 271, n. 1. Compare the 'Journal of the Pāli Text Society,' 1887, p. 155.

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- 'Æsop's' fables, page 180.
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
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TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.				Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.			III Class.							
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.								
Gutturales.											
1 Tenuis	k	.	.	.	क	𐬕	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	k
2 " aspirata	kh	.	.	.	ख	𐬖	𐬒	𐬒	𐬒	𐬒	kh
3 Media	g	.	.	.	ग	𐬔	𐬓	𐬓	𐬓	𐬓	.
4 " aspirata	gh	.	.	.	घ	𐬕	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	.
5 Gutturo-labialis	q	.	.	.	𐬐	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	.
6 Nasalis	h (ng)	.	.	.	𐬠	{ 𐬠 (ng) 𐬠 (n) 𐬠 (hv) }	.	.	.	.	.
7 Spiritus asper	h	.	.	.	ह	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	h, hs
8 " lenis	,	.	.	.	𐬡	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	.
9 " asper faucalis	'h	.	.	.	𐬢	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	.
10 " lenis faucalis	'h	.	.	.	𐬣	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	.
11 " asper fricatus	.	'h	.	.	𐬤	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	.
12 " lenis fricatus	.	'h	.	.	𐬥	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	.
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)											
13 Tenuis	.	k	.	.	𐬦	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	k
14 " aspirata	.	kh	.	.	𐬧	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	kh
15 Media	.	g	.	.	𐬨	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	.
16 " aspirata	.	gh	.	.	𐬩	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	.
17 " Nasalis	.	𐬪	.	.	𐬪	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	.

CONSONANTS (considered).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlevi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y	. . .		य	𐬨 𐬨𐬀 𐬨𐬀	𐬨	ي	ي	י	γ
19 Spiritus asper	. . .	(y)		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
20 " lenis	. . .	(y)		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
21 " asper assibilatus	. . .	s		स	𐬰	𐬰	س	س	ס	s
22 " lenis assibilatus	. . .	s		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t	. . .		त	𐬔	𐬔	ت	ت	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th	. . .		थ	𐬕	𐬕	تھ	تھ	ת	th
25 " assibilata	. . .	. . .	TH	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
26 Media	d	. . .		द	𐬆	𐬆	د	د	ד	. . .
27 " aspirata	dh	. . .		ध	𐬇	𐬇	دھ	دھ	ד	. . .
28 " assibilata	. . .	. . .	DH	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
29 Nasalis	n	. . .		न	𐬨	𐬨	ن	ن	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l	. . .		ल	𐬌	𐬌	ل	ل	ל	l
31 " mollis 1	. . .	l		ळ	𐬭	𐬭	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
32 " mollis 2	. . .	. . .	L	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
33 Spiritus asper 1	s	. . .		स	𐬰	𐬰	س	س	ס	s
34 " asper 2	. . .	. . .	s (ʃ)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
35 " lenis	z	. . .		. . .	. . .	. . .	ز	ز	ז	z
36 " asperimus 1	. . .	. . .	z (ʃ)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
37 " asperimus 2	. . .	. . .	z (ʒ)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	0			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ē			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
3 " labialis	ō			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
5 " longa	ā	(a)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
6 Palatalis brevis	i			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
7 " longa	ī	(i)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
8 Dentalis brevis	ē			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
9 " longa	ā			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
10 Lingualis brevis	ri			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
11 " longa	ri			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
12 Labialis brevis	u			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
13 " longa	ū	(u)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 " longa	ē (ai)	(e)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi	(ai)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
17 " "	ei (ēi)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
18 " "	oi (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20 " longa	ō (au)	(o)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu (au)	(au)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
22 " "	eu (ēu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
23 " "	ou (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
24 Gutturalis fracta	ä			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Labialis fracta	ū			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ö			...	...	...	...	...	...	...



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AND EDITED BY

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
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
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PART IV

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INTRODUCTION.

ATTENTIVE readers of the Sacred Books of the East have had ample opportunities of becoming acquainted with the Zoroastrian scriptures, so far as these have been preserved by the Parsis. In vols. iv, xxiii, and xxxi they have translations of all the texts extant in the original language of the Avesta, excepting a few fragments which are not yet collected. And in vols. v, xviii, and xxiv they have translations of later Pahlavi texts, showing how faithfully the old doctrines and legends were handed down by the priests of Sasanian times to their immediate successors. But they will also have noticed that the translators of these texts are well aware of the fact that the texts themselves are mere fragments of the religious writings of the Zoroastrians, which owe their preservation to the circumstance that they were those portions most usually committed to memory by the priesthood, such as the liturgy, sacred myths, and ceremonial laws. The object of the present volume is to add to those fragments all the accessible information, that can be collected from Irânian sources, regarding the contents of the whole Zoroastrian literature in Sasanian times.

It has been long known that this literature was contained in twenty-one Nasks, or treatises, named either from the nature of their contents, or from their initial words, and each having one of the twenty-one words of the Ahunavair attached to it as a kind of artificial reminder of their proper order and number while enumerating them. Very brief statements of the contents of each Nask have also been accessible in manuscripts of the Persian Rivâyats, such as those translated in pp. 419-438 of this volume. And the existence of a much longer account of the Nasks in the *Dinkard* was ascertained by Haug, who published

some extracts from it in 1870, when describing several of the Nasks in the Index to the Pahlavi-Pāzand Glossary. He was unable to do more, on account of the defective state of all modern manuscripts of the *Dīnkard*, in which a large portion of the text of the description of the Nasks, in the eighth and ninth books, is missing in various places without any hint of the omissions. These defects were owing to the abstraction of 52 folios of this part of the Irānian manuscript of the *Dīnkard*, after it was brought to India and before any copy of it had been written; and, even now, two of these folios are still missing, as stated in pp. 262, 270. The importance of recovering these 52 missing folios was due to the fact that they contain the text of Dk. VIII, Chaps. VII, 5–XIX, 36, XXXI, 31–XXXVIII, 19, XLIV, 34–XLVI, 5, and Dk. IX, Chaps. I, 1–XI, 11, XII, 15–XLVII, 17, or nearly half the text of the two books.

Regarding the early history of the *Dīnkard* there exists a detailed statement in the last chapter of its third book, which can now be translated with greater precision than was possible in 1867, when Haug published its Pahlavi text, with an English translation, in his introduction to the *Farhang-i Oīm-aēvak*, or *Zand-Pahlavi Glossary*. In this historical statement it is evident that §§ 1–8 refer to the traditional history of the Zoroastrian scriptures generally, considered as the original source of the information contained in the *Dīnkard*; but §§ 9–13 may be accepted as the actual history of the compilation of the work itself, the facts of which may, very possibly, have all been within the personal knowledge of the writer of the statement. The Pahlavi text of this statement, as preserved in the manuscripts B and K (see pp. xxxv–xxxviii and 2), may be translated as follows:—

‘1. About the *Dīnkard* scripture (nīpīk), from the Exposition of the Good Religion, there is *this*:—The *Dīnkard* scripture is a work which is adorned with all wisdom, and a publication of the Mazda-worshipping religion. 2. And, first, the work—which *was derived* from the good religion of those of the primitive faith, and which *was* the knowledge revealing the good religion of the

prophet (vakhshvar) Spítāmân Zaratûst, *whose* guardian spirit is revered, and *his* first disciple through asking and hearing the same revered guardian spirit—is information which is a similitude of enlightenment on every subject from the original light. 3. And those original questions and the decision of the exalted ruler Kai-Vistâsp to have *them* written *were its* origin, and he ordered *them* to deliver the original to the treasury of Shapîgân¹, *and* to distribute copies provided. 4. And, after that, he sends a copy to the fortress of documents, to keep the information also there.

'5. And during the ruin that happened to the country of Irân, and in the monarchy, owing to the evil-destined villain Alexander, that which *was* in the fortress of documents came to be burnt, and that in the treasury of Shapîgân² into the hands of the Arûmans, and *was* translated by him even into the Greek language, as information which *was* connected with the ancients (min pêsîngân padvastakô).

'6. And that Artakhshatar, king of kings, who *was* son of Pâpak, came for the restoration of the monarchy of Irân, *and* the same scripture *was* brought from a scattered state to one place. 7. The righteous Tôsar of the primitive faith, who was the priest of priests³, appeared with an exposition recovered from the Avesta, and *was* ordered to complete *the scripture* from that exposition. 8. He did so accordingly (ham-gûnakô), to preserve a similitude of the splendour of the original enlightenment in the treasury of Shapîgân⁴, and *was* ordered to distribute copies *of* the information provided.

'9. And after the ruin and devastation that came from the Arabs, even to the archives (dîvân) and treasures of the realm, the saintly⁵ Âtûr-farnbag, son of Farukhō-zâd, who became the leader of the orthodox, brought those copies, which were scattered on *all* sides, *and* new resources, back from dispersion into union *with* the archives of his residence; *and*, through observance and consideration for the Avesta and Zand of the good religion, he made the sayings of those of the primitive faith again a similitude of the illumination (fîrôkô) from that splendour.

¹ Both MSS. have Shasîgân here, but see p. 413, n. 4.

² So in K, or perhaps Shîzîgân; B has Shasîgân.

³ So in K.

⁴ So in K; B has Shapân.

⁵ B has Âtûrpâd inserted here by mistake.

'10. Through the awful displeasure (*or defect*) and ruin (*or injury*) that happened to Zaratûst, son of Âtûr-farnbag, who became the leader of the orthodox, even those archives came to devastation, that scripture to dilapidation and dispersion, *and* the statements (*vâkîh*) also to obsolescence, perversion, and corruption.

'11. And, after that, I, Âtûrpâd, son of Hêmêd *and* leader of the orthodox, *have* likewise written, from their fragments (*sûbâra-gânô*), a new means of giving assistance *to* the Mazda-worshipping religion, with much prayer, investigation, and trouble. 12. From whatever *was* recovered from those dilapidated (*visândakô*), decayed, worn out, and dust-mingled (*khâk-âmêg*) archives—and these, too, brought back by taking away, carrying *off*, and seizing—*it* is selected, owing to ¹ the assistance of the counselling wisdom of the mighty spirit, for the rediffusion of the words and deeds of the ancients, and *of* the evidence of the Avesta, for those of the primitive faith. 13. And the increase of knowledge from the good religion, arranged and prescribed in its chapters, is a lustre from encountering that splendour from the enlightenment of the original light primarily composed for the exposition of the good religion, *and* this which is named is a resemblance by adoption *of* the thousand chapters of that great original Dînkard². 14. It is perfected by the sacred beings, *and* transmits the powerful effect which *has* come upon even that which is the perfect religion of the sufferers³ in *this* age, and also the coming of the assistance of the soul to the knowledge⁴ of the orthodox; and even reunion with⁵ the rest of Irân is acquaintance *with* the exposition of the Mazda-worshipping religion, and the reproviding of more resources of a like origin, which *will be* also due to those whom the Supreme *has* provided, the disciples of Aûshêdar⁶, son of Zaratûst, for asking again a declaration of⁷ the good religion from Aûshêdar.'

From this statement it appears that the compilation of the Dînkard was commenced by Âtûr-farnbag, son of Farukhō-zâd, one of the leaders or supreme high-priests of the Mazda-worshippers, and was revised and completed

¹ Assuming that m stands for min.

² Both MSS. have zak rabâ bûn Dênô-kardô.

³ K has dênô-î būrdârân.

⁴ B has 'arising.'

⁵ B has 'and the reunited selection for.'

⁶ See Dk. VIII, Chap. XIV, 12.

⁷ B omits 'a declaration of.'

by Âtûrpâd, son of Hêmêd, one of his successors. From the Mâdîgân-î gugastak Abâlis we learn that Âtûr-farnbag had a religious disputation with Abâlis in the presence of the Khalîfah Al-Mâmûn, who reigned A.D. 813-833; he must therefore have been compiling the *Dînkard* during the first half of the ninth century. In the *Sikand-gûm-ânîk Vigâr*, IV, 107, IX, 3, X, 55, he is also mentioned as a compiler of the *Dînkard*, but the details there quoted must have been taken from its first two books which are still missing. It is likewise stated at the beginning of both its fourth and fifth books that their contents are derived from his statements, and a similar acknowledgement is made with regard to some of the contents of Chap. CXLII of the third book; so that the evidence of his authorship is very complete. With regard to Âtûrpâd, the completer of the *Dînkard*, we may safely identify him with the Âtûrpâd, son of Hâmêd, mentioned in Bd. XXXIII, 11 as a contemporary of Zâd-spâram, who flourished at the latter end of the ninth century (see S. B. E., vol. xviii, p. xiv). We have, therefore, every reason to be satisfied that the whole of the *Dînkard* was compiled during the ninth century.

The history of the transmission of the text of its last seven books, through the last thousand years, down to the present manuscripts, is equally satisfactory, owing to the preservation of a series of colophons appended to the text, of which the first and most important may be translated as follows:—

‘Completed in great joy and full of gratification this last portion of the manuscript of the incomparable, priceless, and unequalled *Dînkard*, at the place where *it was found and* happily disinterred¹ by us in Asûristân, within the happily prosperous, odoriferous, precious, well-thriving, *and* glorious Bakdâd of Good Rectitude²; from a copy which, as regards the religion, is *just* as the leaders of the saintly *and* orthodox, who *were* of the family of the saintly Âtûrpâd, son of Mâraspend, (who re-explained knowledge, by five *or* six well-destined ones, from the pure revelation

¹ Khûs-kand might be the name of a place here, but cannot be so in the next paragraph.

² The angel Aharîsvang (Av. ashiš vanguhî).

which is the all-embellished learning of learnings) *and* the successive leaders of the orthodox (*who* again provided at different times [ahamvâr] for its restoration, through manuscripts *at* various places, to maintain reading *and* investigation *therein*) had written.

‘I, Mâh-vindâd, *son* of Naremâhân, *son* of Vâhrâm, *son* of Mitrô-âpân, like an adopted son for his own possession, who wrote *it*, *am* letting *it* forth *on* the day Dên of the month Tîr, the victor, of the year 369 after the year 20 of that Yazdakard, king of kings, who *was* son of Shatrô-ayâr [2nd July, 1020]¹; in reliance on the pure good religion of the Mazdâ-worshippers, as regards remembrance of Zaratûst, the Spîtâmân with the righteous guardian spirit, *and* of the genuine achievement of Âtûrpâd, son of Mâraspend; and as regards remembrance of the righteous utterance of blessings for the whole embodied existence *by* the desirers of righteousness, who are thinkers of good thoughts, speakers of good words, and doers of good deeds; in the worldly *existence*, through completely-wishful kind regard of the practices of righteousness, they shall unite with the union of the renovation of the universe, and spiritually *their* pure souls *and* guardian spirits *attain* to the supremely great position and eminence, and complete acquirement of recompense, which are in the light that is endless, constantly beneficial, *and* full of glory, which they shall obtain. *This* is especially for those saintly *and* supremely learned men, Âtûrfarnbag, son of Farukhō-zâd, *and* Âtûrpâd, son of Hêmêd, by whom this priceless² Dînkard scripture *was* selected so learnedly and (with a pure perception of the spiritual lord, in seizing the cream of the fortunate commentary of³ the good religion) so truly amicably, and fully affectionately *for* the good creatures and religion, with great advantage for us moderns, *and* concealed for me who, through eagerness *for* righteousness, like an adopted son, *have* happily disinterred this scripture; and even he who reads, and shall make use of it, is reliant and free from doubt about it; and him who shall take a copy from it, and preserves *it* with propriety, they shall appropriately connect with it.’

¹ The remainder of this colophon, so far as it is here translated, is also quoted in the second colophon.

² Here written ar’gō, but it is an-ar’gō in the second colophon.

³ Reading dên farukhō zand shîr-hâkō-î, but this is doubtful. From this point the whole of the rest of this colophon, including the aphorisms, is also found in K.

(This is followed by a long succession of aphorisms, and the colophon winds up with some threats against those who shall misuse the manuscript.)

As this colophon mentions only the 'last portion' of the *Dīnkard*, and is appended to the text of Dk. III-IX, it is probable that the first portion of the work, Dk. I, II, had already become separated from the rest within 150 years of its revision and completion. And if Māh-vindād did not copy from the original manuscript of Âtûrpâd, he must certainly have done so from a very early transcript.

The second colophon was written by Shatrô-ayâr, *son of Êrdîshir, son of Airîk, son of Rûstâm, son of Airîk, son of Kubâd, son of Airân-shah*, who completed his copy on the day *Aûharmazd* of the month *Spendarmad* in the year 865 after the 20th year of *Yazdakard* [3rd October, 1516], having transcribed it from a copy written by Mar'zapân, *son of Spend-dâd, son of Mar'zapân, son of 'Mitrô-âpân, son of Spend-dâd, son of Mitrô-âpân, son of Mar'zapân, son of Dahisn-aiyyâr, son of Rôg-vêh, son of Shâh-mard*. The date of Mar'zapân's copy may be approximately fixed by observing that his father's first cousin wrote a copy of AV. and Gf., mentioned in K20, in the year 690 of *Yazdakard*, while his great great granduncle wrote a similar copy, mentioned in MH6, in the Pârsî year 618. If this Pârsî year be reckoned from the era of the 20th year of *Yazdakard*, as seems probable¹, these dates give 52 years for three generations; and Mar'zapân, living one generation later than the writer of A.Y. 690, may perhaps have written his copy of the *Dīnkard* about A.Y. 707 [A.D. 1338]; so that there was probably another copyist, intermediate between him and Māh-vindād-i Naremâhân, of whom no record has been preserved. Shatrô-ayâr concludes his colophon by quoting a long passage from the first colophon, as already stated in p. xxxiv, n. 1, and by acknowledging his obligations to three other persons whom he names. This colophon is the last that now remains attached to the manuscript B, but it was formerly followed

¹ Observe the use of the phrase 'Pârsî year' in the third colophon and in the manuscript K (see p. xxxviii).

by a third colophon, written by the actual writer of B, and preserved in copies transcribed from B since its arrival in India.

This third colophon was written by Mâh-vindâd, *son of Vâhrâm, son of Êrdîshîr of Tûrkâbâd*, who completed his copy, from that of Shatrô-ayâr, on the day *Âvân* of the month Khûrdâd in the Pârsî year 1009 after the 20th year of *Yazdakard* [21st December, 1659, N. S.]. This copy, which constitutes the manuscript B, was afterwards approved by Vâhrâm, *son of Mâh-vindâd, son of Rûstâm, son of Anôshak-rûbân, son of Rûstâm of Tûrkâbâd*, who blesses the writer of the second colophon, on the day Tîstar of the month Vohûman in the year 1038 of *Yazdakard* [18th August, 1669, N. S.]. It was also finally seen and approved by Rûstâm, *son of Gûstâsp, son of Êrdîshîr*, who likewise blesses the writer of the second colophon; and the approximate date of this approval may be guessed from the fact that Rûstâm Gûstâsp is known to have copied one manuscript in A.D. 1706, and another in 1741.

Regarding this manuscript B, written in 1659, it appears from Mullâ Fîrûz's *Avtâgh Dîn* (Bombay, 1830) that Mullâ Bahman, son of Mullâ Behrâm, a Parsi priest of Yazd, brought this manuscript of the *Dînkard* from Irân to Surat in 1783, and, having shown it to Aspandîârji Ratanji-shâh, he lent it to Kâusji Rustamji, then Dastûr of Surat, and allowed him to have it copied. Mullâ Bahman had great difficulty in obtaining the return of his manuscript, and when it was returned many folios were missing. It was after this loss of folios that Aspandîârji had several other copies transcribed from the defective manuscript, to be sent to various persons, and all these copies were therefore equally defective.

This manuscript B, thus defective, afterwards came into the possession of Mullâ Fîrûz, who was high-priest of the Kadmi Parsis in Bombay; and, after his death in 1830, it descended to his successor. In 1875 it belonged to Dastûr Sohrâbji Rustamji, high-priest of the Kadmis, through whose courtesy, and that of Dastûr Dr. Jâmâspji Minochiharji, it was then lent to me long enough to

enable me to copy and collate two-thirds of Dk. III and to collate Dk. IV-IX; and Dastûr Jâmâspji, afterwards, kindly supplied me with a copy of the remainder of Dk. III.

The manuscript has been bound in its defective state, and contains 322 folios, originally fourteen inches high and ten inches wide, written 20 to 22 lines to the page. When complete it appears to have consisted of 392 folios, all numbered in Persian words, but with several blunders, including one of fifty folios, so that the last folio was really numbered 442. Of the 70 folios not bound with the rest of the manuscript, fourteen were lying loose in the volume; forty-three belonged to Dastûr Rustamji Kaikobâdji of Nausâri, with a copy of which I was kindly supplied by Dastûr Dr. Peshotani Behramji of Bombay, who also enabled me to collate it with the original folios; and seven folios were lent to me by Dastûr Dr. Hoshangji Jâmâspji of Poona, for the purpose of copying. The remaining six folios have not been discovered; they comprise the first folio of the manuscript, containing the commencement of Dk. III, which was probably lost before the manuscript arrived in India; also one folio in Dk. VII, two in Dk. IX (see pp. 262, 270 of this volume), and the last two folios of the manuscript, containing the third colophon and final approvals (see p. xxxvi).

I am likewise much indebted to the kindness of Professor Kielhorn, who gave me a modern copy of Dk. IV-IX (with the text in its defective state) which had been prepared at Poona, so that it was only necessary to collate this copy with the original text of the manuscript B. With the aid of all this liberal assistance I was enabled to obtain the whole text of the *Dinkard*, known to exist, in the course of a few months; that it has since taken as much as sixteen years to find opportunities for translating and publishing rather more than one-fourth of its contents, will not surprise any one who is acquainted with the nature of the work that had to be done.

The only known manuscript, independent of B, that contains any portion of the *Dinkard*, is the old codex K

brought from Persia by the late Professor Westergaard in 1843, and now No. 43 of the Irânian manuscripts in the University Library at Kopenhagen. This codex contains about one-fifth of the text of the *Dînkard* in two detached portions, together with other Pahlavi texts. The first portion occupies fols. 177-261, and comprises Dk. VI, of which one-eighth is missing, with Dk. III, Chaps. CLX and CCLXXXIII, and a colophon, all written in the district of *Tûrkâbâd* by *Mitrô-âpân*, son of *Anôshak-rûbân*, son of *Rûstâm*, son of *Shatrô-ayâr*, son of *Mâh-vindâd*, son of *Vâhrâm*, son of *Gûshisn-ayâr*, son of *Mitrô-âpân*, and completed on the day *Gôs* of the month *Mitrô* in the *Pârsî* year 943 after the 20th year of *Yazdakard* [10th May, 1594, N. S.]. This copyist appears to have been a great-uncle of the writer who approved the manuscript B in 1669, ten years after it was written; and the original from which he copied was, no doubt, descended from *Mâh-vindâd-î Naremâhân's* manuscript of 1020, as he appends to his colophon all the latter part of *Mâh-vindâd's* colophon (see p. xxxiv, n. 3). The second portion of the text of the *Dînkard*, contained in the manuscript K, is written by another hand on 42 additional folios, and comprises the last two chapters of Dk. III, the whole of Dk. V, and the first three-tenths of Dk. IX (as mentioned in p. 172, n. 1, of this volume). This manuscript supplies several short passages in the *Dînkard*, which are omitted by B, especially in the first portion of the text described above. It has also afforded much assistance in the translation of Dk. IX, Chaps. I, 1-XXXI, 17.

Regarding the authorship of the summary account of the Nasks, contained in Dk. VIII, IX, it may be reasonably assumed, in default of any positive information, that the compiler was *Âtûrpâd*, son of *Hêmêd*, the last editor of the *Dînkard*. And, as nothing is said about any previous treatise being consulted, it may be safely supposed that he had access to the Avesta texts and Pahlavi versions of all the Nasks he describes, fully three centuries after the Muhammadan conquest of Persia. The only Nask he could not obtain was the *Vastag*, and the Pahlavi version

of the *Nâdar* was also missing ; under which circumstances, the fully detailed accounts of these two Nasks, given in the Persian *Rivâyats*, must be viewed with suspicion, until better evidence of their authenticity has been discovered than is at present available.

The survival of so much of the sacred Zoroastrian literature, during three centuries of Muhammadan rule, indicates that the final loss of nearly all this literature was not so directly attributable to the Arabs as the Parsis suppose. So long as a considerable number of the Persians adhered to their ancient religion, they were able to preserve its literature almost intact, even for centuries ; but when, through conversion and extermination, the *Mazda*-worshippers had become a mere remnant, and then fell under the more barbarous rule of the Tartars, they rapidly lost all their old literature that was not in daily religious use. And the loss may have been as much due to their neglecting the necessary copying of manuscripts, as to any destructiveness on the part of their conquerors ; because the durability of a manuscript written on paper seldom exceeds five or six centuries.

The statements of the *Dînkard*, about the classification and subdivisions of the Nasks, are corroborated and supplemented by those of *Zâd-sparam* (see pp. 401-405). The division of all literature into three classes of knowledge, religious, worldly, and intermediate, is one that would naturally suggest itself to any classifier¹, but the names employed (which are transcribed from the Avesta, and do not exactly correspond with these three meanings) must have originated at a period when the Avesta language was still spoken. That such a classification cannot be very strictly carried out in practice is already admitted in *Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 13.*

¹ Professor Darmesteter has suggested to me the very similar apportionment of the old Hebrew literature, mentioned in Jeremiah xviii. 18, thus :—‘ For the law shall not perish from the priest, nor counsel from the wise, nor the word from the prophet.’ And in Ezekiel vii. 26, thus :—‘ Then shall they seek a vision of the prophet : but the law shall perish from the priest, and counsel from the ancients.’

The further division of the literature into twenty-one books, seven in each of the three classes, is a much more artificial arrangement, and can, perhaps, be best explained as an attempt to make the twenty-one words of the Ahunavair serve the purpose of a reminder for enumerating the Nasks in their proper order. This arrangement was probably made at some period when the scattered Avesta literature was being collected and re-arranged, the Pahlavi versions being then supplied, and the present Pahlavi names of the Nasks appointed. This may possibly have been the work of 'composition and preservation' attributed to Âtûr-pâd, son of Mâraspend, in Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 22, when 'the Nasks were enumerated' (see Dk. IV, 27, in p. 415), which occurred in the fourth century.

Why the established sequence of the Nasks, detailed in Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 12, should differ from the successive sequences of their three classes, given in §§ 9-11, is very imperfectly explained; but some of the reasons for the difference may perhaps be guessed. If the notation proposed in p. 7, n. 3, be adopted, the established sequence is G2-4; H1-7; G5; L6; G7; L7, 1-5; G6, 1; in which the only Nasks that are out of their order in the classes are G1, 5-7 and L6, 7. The placing of G6, 1 next after L5 (that is, the Hâdôkht and Stôd-yast next after the Vendîdâd) may perhaps have been owing to the constant use of these three Nasks in the liturgy, in which either the Vendîdâd, or the Hâdôkht¹, was frequently interpolated in the recitation of the Stôd-yast which comprised by far the larger portion of the present Yasna and Vispêrad. But this position of the Stôd-yast, at the end of the list of Nasks, was probably considered derogatory to its sacred character by most of the writers of the Persian Rivâyats, who have, therefore, restored it to its original place at the head of the Gâthic Nasks. Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 15, states that G5 was placed after H7 because the Vastag was connected with the Vistâsp-sâstô, probably by the nature of its contents. And, possibly, the sequence L6, G7, L7 of the Kitradâd, Spend, and Bakân-yast, between the Vastag

¹ So long as it was preserved.

and *Nîkâdûm*, may indicate some similar resemblance of contents; especially as the contents of the *Kîtradâd* and *Bakân-yast* were so far from being strictly legal that these Nasks were placed in a sub-class by themselves, and the connection of the *Spend* with the *Gâthas* appears to have been merely historical. The Persian *Rivâyats* place the *Spend* next after the *Vastag*, thereby bringing the two imperfectly *Gâthic* Nasks together, as well as the two imperfectly legal ones; but then they also transpose the *Ganabâ-sar-nigad* and the *Hûspâram*, for which there seems to be no justification.

With regard to the names of the Nasks, it is evident that several of the Persian names, used in the *Rivâyats*, are more or less irreconcilable with the Pahlavi names in the *Dinkard*, and some others are improbable readings of the Pahlavi forms. In this translation the Pahlavi forms have been followed, as clearly more authentic than the Persian corruptions, and some few of the names have been read differently; while in other cases the most probable readings have been merely suggested in foot-notes, not on account of the Persian reading being justifiable, but because the evidence for the suggested reading is less complete than would be desirable.

In dealing with this account of the Nasks it is always necessary to remember that the compiler of the *Dinkard* relies entirely upon their Pahlavi versions, as he states distinctly in *Dk. VIII*, Chap. I, 3; he occasionally mentions the Avesta texts, as in Chaps. VI, 1, XII, 1, and it is abundantly evident, to the practised translator, that Avesta phrases often underlie the Pahlavi passages which seem to be quoted at length from the original Nasks, especially in *Dk. IX*; but, for some of the details mentioned, there may be no older authority than a Pahlavi commentary, and this should ever be borne in mind by the sceptical critic in search of anachronisms.

Owing to his complete reliance upon the Pahlavi versions, it is impossible to ascertain with certainty whether any particular statement, made by the compiler of the *Dinkard*, was contained in the Avesta text; his summary, there-

fore, throws little or no satisfactory light upon the origin of that text. A few of the details he mentions (such as those contained in Dk. VIII, Chaps. XIII, 17-20, XLIII, 24 and Dk. IX, Chaps. XXXII, 17, XXXIX, 13-16, LIII, 3) evidently refer to Sasanian times, and may be reasonably supposed to have originated in the Pahlavi versions of those times. But vaguer prophecies of good or evil, such as are common in all religions at all times, may have often occurred in the Avesta texts themselves.

It is evident, however, that all the Nasks have accumulated around the Gâtha centre of the *Stôd-yast*, and that this Gâtha centre in the earliest Sasanian times was neither more nor less extensive than it is at present. The age of Gâthic composition had so long passed away in the time of the earliest Sasanian monarchs, that the sages whom they appointed to collect and re-arrange the sacred literature, were unable to fully understand many of the stanzas they had to translate into Pahlavi, much less could they have added to their number. How far they may have been able to write ordinary Avesta text is more uncertain, but any such writing was probably confined to a few phrases for uniting the fragments of old Avesta which they discovered, or for interpolating opinions of their own. All such compositions, however, would have been hazardous, as forming no part of their duties, which seem to have been confined to the arrangement of the fragmentary Avesta texts, and their translation into Pahlavi with explanatory comments in that language. It appears from the traditional statements, mentioned in p. 415, that this work was completed, and the Nasks were fully arranged, by *Âtûrpâd*, son of *Mâraspend*, in the reign of *Shahpûhar II* (A. D. 309-379); but the Pahlavi versions were certainly revised, and some further commentaries added, after the suppression of the heresy of *Mazdak*, as late as the reign of *Khûsrô I* (A. D. 531-579).

That the Avesta texts themselves were not written, to any great extent, in Sasanian times, is shown by the quantity of Pahlavi commentary necessary to adapt them to the altered circumstances of those times. The Gâthic

Nasks, being strictly religious, required only some explanations, with little extended commentary ; because the religion had to be maintained without sensible modification. Of the Hadha-māthric Nasks we know but little. But the strictly Legal Nasks consisted chiefly of the commentary which is always necessary to adapt ancient laws to modern ideas.

With regard to the mode of describing the Nasks, adopted in the *Dinkard*, it is evident that the compiler intended, in the first place, to give merely a very short account of the general contents of each Nask, to be followed by a detailed statement of the particular contents of each chapter (see Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 23, 24). But, when he had fully carried out this intention with respect to the first three Nasks, his work came to a premature conclusion, which has deprived us of much valuable information regarding the rest of the Nasks. The descriptions of these other Nasks vary in extent, but may be roughly classified as follows:—Of the *Nādar* and *Vastag* there is no description whatever. Of the *Dāmdād*, *Radō-dād-aitag*, *Kaskîrôbô*, *Vistâsp-sâstô*, *Bakân-yast*, and *Stôd-yast* the description is very short, averaging 80 Pahlavi words for each. Of the *Pâgag*, *Baris*, *Kitrādād*, *Spend*, and *Hādôkht* the description is rather longer, averaging 358 Pahlavi words for each ; but, as such a description is still far too brief to be satisfactory, the compiler must have intended to add a detailed account of each chapter of all these Nasks. On coming to the strictly Legal Nasks, however, he adopted a different plan, by giving a much more voluminous statement of the contents of certain selected chapters ; thus the very long description of the *Nikâdûm*, *Ganabâ-sar-nigad*, *Hûspâram*, and *Sakâdûm* averages 3670 Pahlavi words for each. This change of plan is somewhat modified in the case of the *Vendîdād*, where the description of 1272 Pahlavi words is only moderately long. While the first three Nasks, the *Sûdkar*, *Varstmânsar*, and *Bakô*, after a very short description averaging 65 Pahlavi words for each, are again described in detail, as already mentioned, to the average extent of 8647 Pahlavi words for each.

From these descriptions, and their connection with certain Avesta texts and Pahlavi writings, it is now possible to form a more or less adequate conception of the contents of Nasks I-IV, X, XIII-XIX, XXI, and also some idea of those of Nasks VI, XII; but the accounts of the remaining six Nasks, most of which belonged to the Hadha-māthric or scientific class, are very unsatisfactory.

With reference to the total extent of the Nasks, when they were all extant, it is obvious that the length of descriptions, drawn up on the same plan, ought to bear approximately some definite proportion to the lengths of text described; so that, if the extent of the text of one Nask be known, and the proportion it bears to the length of its description be ascertained, this proportion becomes a rough means of estimating the probable extent of other Nasks, from the length of their descriptions drawn up on the same plan. Three years ago an attempt was made¹ to estimate the total extent of the Nasks in this way, based upon the assumptions that the Nasks still extant were three in number, that the length of the description of the Vendîdād was a fair average one for estimating the extent of Pahlavi version in all the lost Nasks, and that the proportion of Avesta text to Pahlavi version in the Nirangistān was also a fair average for estimating the extent of their Avesta texts. These assumptions were carefully made, as the least liable to objection, and the total extent of the Nasks in Sasanian times, thus estimated, amounted to 133,000 words of Avesta text and 844,000 of Pahlavi version.

Since the completion of the translation of Dk. IX it has, however, become possible to estimate the probable extent of the first three Nasks from the proportion between the actual extent of the first three fargard's of the Bakō (Yas. XIX-XXI) and the length of their description. It has also been thought no longer reasonable to neglect the actual length of the Nirangistān as a basis for estimating the extent of the Pahlavi versions of the strictly Legal Nasks XV-

¹ In the *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen und historischen Classe der k. b. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu München*, 1888, pp. 441, 442.

XVIII; and the Bakân-yast has been identified with the Yasts still extant¹. These additional considerations have led to a new estimate of the probable extent of each Nask separately, based upon the best data available in each case, as stated in detail in the foot-notes to the names of the Nasks in the Extant Fragments (pp. 451-488 of this volume). These estimates are here collected, for the sake of convenient reference, as follows:—

			Avesta.	Pahlavi.
G2 :	Nask	1. Sûdkar . . .	4,700 words	10,500
" 3	"	2. Varstmânsar . . .	8,300 "	18,500
" 4	"	3. Bakô . . .	9,500 "	21,200
H1	"	4. Dâmdâd' . . .	8,900 "	29,300
" 2	"	5. Nâdar . . .	6,800 "	22,200
" 3	"	6. Pâgag . . .	9,100 "	29,800
" 4	"	7. Radô-dâd-aîtag . . .	10,500 "	34,300
" 5	"	8. Baris . . .	4,400 "	14,600
" 6	"	9. Kaskîsrôbbô . . .	5,500 "	17,900
" 7	"	10. Vistâsp-sâstô . . .	2,200 "	7,200
G5	"	11. Vastag . . .	8,900 "	18,400
L6	"	12. Kitradâd' . . .	2,600 "	23,400
G7	"	13. Spend . . .	9,900 "	20,500
L7	"	14. Bakân-yast . . .	22,000 "	44,000
" 1	"	15. Nikâdûm . . .	62,600 "	562,900
" 2	"	16. Ganabâ-sar-nigad' . . .	28,000 "	251,500
" 3	"	17. Hûspâram . . .	44,900 "	403,600
" 4	"	18. Sakâdûm . . .	53,000 "	476,600
" 5	"	19. Vendîdâd' . . .	23,000 "	48,000
G6	"	20. Hâdôkht . . .	8,400 "	17,400
" 1	"	21. Stôd-yast . . .	12,500 "	22,400
Total extent of 21 Nasks .			345,700	2,094,200

This total is about $2\frac{1}{2}$ times as great as that of the former estimate, but, as nearly the whole of this increase is in the four strictly Legal Nasks, whose length is well attested by that of the extant Nîrangistân, there is little probability that further investigation will lead to any re-

¹ This had been done, long ago, in a Persian Rivâyat, quoted in B29, fol. 164, which states that the following sixteen Yasts were in the Bayân-yast Nask, namely, the Hôrmezd, Âbân, Mâh, Tîr, Gôr, Mihir, Srôsh, Rashn, Fravardîn, Bahîrâm, Râm, Dîn, Âshasang, Âstâd, Zamyâd, and Khursheh Yasts.

duction of this estimate. No probable alteration of the estimate of the extent of the Hadha-māthric Nasks, which is the most uncertain, would materially affect the total.

Another matter of interest to the readers of translations from the Pahlavi, especially to those who are aware of the ambiguities of the original text, is the degree of confidence they can place in the correctness of the translation. In the case of the *Dīnkar* it is fortunately possible to consult manuscripts written in Persia, and descended through only four or five intermediate copies from the work of the original writer, so that the text is remarkably free from copyists' errors. The eighth and ninth books also contain very few of those involved sentences, with long parenthetical clauses, which, owing to the habitual absence or misplacement of stops, are very perplexing to a translator. The chief difficulties of the text arise from its synoptical character, and the consequent want of connection between its sentences; there being often too little context to define the meaning of a doubtful word. The number of words of doubtful meaning in Pahlavi is, however, fast diminishing, in proportion to the advancing study of the texts; and the certainty of a translator, as to the correctness of his work, is increasing in a like proportion. At any rate, the reader may safely rely upon the general accuracy of these translations, even if a few errors should hereafter be discovered.

As an instance of such possible errors I will here correct one that exists in my translation of the Epistles of Mānū-*skīhar*, which was pointed out to me by Mōbad Tehmuras Dinshawji Ankalesaria, in a letter dated 28th October, 1887. In Ep. II, ii, 9-11, there occurs an illustration of what should be done when commentators differ, derived from the use that can be made of different observations of the stars, and containing three names that were difficult to identify. These names were doubtfully read as corruptions of the names of three of the lunar mansions, but it now appears that they were the names of three sets of astronomical tables (*zīk*); so that *Shatro-ayārān*, *Hindūk*, and *Ptolemēōs* should be read, instead of *Satvāharān*, *Avēnak*, and *Paḍramgōs*; both sets of readings expressing the same

Pahlavi letters. With these alterations the passage may be translated as follows :—

Ep. II, ii, 9. 'And there may be a position of the stars, *settled* even by computers of the stars, when they would take that of the sun and moon from the tables of Shatro-ayâr, that of Saturn from the Hindû tables, and that of Mars from the tables of Ptolemy, *and* the position comes *out* very good, *and they* are able to speak *of* the maturity of strength undoubtedly brought on. 10. That this is to be seen as an occurrence is a conjunction which is not possible; because, if the tables of Shatro-ayâr *be* exact, yet, since its Saturn *and* Mars are not from the tables, the effect is not a good configuration; if the Hindû tables *be* correct, yet, since its sun, moon, *and* Mars are not from those tables, the effect is not good; *and* if the tables of Ptolemy *be* correct, yet, since its sun, moon, and Saturn are not from those tables, the effect is not good; on account of which the conjunction is not correct in any way; they believe *it* possible, however, for a firm mind to accomplish this auspicious labour. 11. But they say the just and wise *are* making the decision that this would be a very good position, because that which is in the tables of Shatro-ayâr is truly issuing from him, the great Shatro-ayâr; *and* that of Shatro-ayâr, *being* better through the tables of Ptolemy, remains that employed.'

In conclusion, it is desirable to make some remarks upon the transliteration of Pahlavi, because it is necessary to express not only the various sounds of the letters of a very deficient alphabet, but also the mode of writing several abbreviated compounds which are quite as essential to the correct orthography of Pahlavi as the forms of the separate letters themselves. For this purpose italics are used to indicate not only a few differences of sound from the usual English pronunciation of consonants, but also different letters having the same sound, and letters abbreviated in the writing of compounds. When the abbreviated letter is already italicised, the preceding short vowel (which is not expressed in Pahlavi writing) is also italicised to indicate the abbreviation, or an apostrophe is introduced between the two consonants when no short vowel sound intervenes. Hyphens are used both to connect the components of compound words, which are often written

separately, and also to separate words that are written together in Pahlavi. The application of these rules will be best understood by reference to the following list of transliterations which have been found necessary:—

ALPHABET.

𐭠 a (<i>initial</i>), â, h, kh, zd.	𐭠 or 𐭡 s, 𐭠 + 𐭠.
𐭡 z, a (<i>privative</i>), aê, dē (<i>final</i>), h (<i>final</i>).	𐭡 s, sh, 𐭠 + 𐭠, g-a.
𐭢 b.	𐭣 gh.
𐭣 f, p, v.	𐭤 k.
𐭥 d, t.	𐭥 m.
𐭦 g, k, z.	𐭦 l, n, ô, ô, r, û, v.
𐭧 l, r.	𐭧 l, r.
𐭨 z.	𐭨 d, ê, g, g, ga, î, y.

IRREGULAR COMPOUNDS.

𐭠𐭡 ayâ.	
𐭠 (𐭠 + 𐭣, or 𐭠 + 𐭦) aêk, af, ag, ap, av, az, âf, âg, âk, âp, âv, âz, haf, hak, hap, haz, khef, khck, khz.	
𐭠 âñ.	
𐭡 z, aê, âê (<i>final</i>), êh (<i>final</i>).	
𐭡 adîn, didû (<i>better bidû</i>).	
𐭡 lþ, rag, raz, r'g, rþ, r'z.	
𐭡 dif, diþ, gîf, sag, sak, sap, sig, siþ, sp.	
𐭡 s'k, yâf, yâv.	
𐭡 m-ê.	
𐭡 dag, d-k, êg, êk, gag, gak, gug, îk, îv, îz, yaz, yes.	
𐭡 dên (<i>better bèn</i>), yên.	

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS VOLUME.

A.D. for Anno Domini; Âf. for Âfrîngân; Ar. for Arabic; AV. for *Arđâ-Vîrâf nâmak*, ed. Hoshangji and Haug, 1872; Av. for Avesta; A.Y. for Anno *Yazdakarđi*; B for Bombay MS. of *Dînkard*, written in Irân, A.D. 1659, see pp. xxxv-xxxvii; B29 for MS. No. 29 in the University Library at Bombay; Bd. for Bundahis, as translated in vol. v of this series; Bk. for Book; B.P. for Bahman Pûngyah, see p. 418, n. 3; Byt. for Bahman Yast, as translated in vol. v of this series; Ch. or Chald. for Chaldee; Chap. for chapter; Dd. for *Dâdistân-î Dînîk*, as translated in vol. xviii of this series; Dk. for *Dînkard*; Dv. for *Dîn-vîgîrgard*; ed. for edited by or edition; Ep. for Epistles of *Mânûskîhar*, as translated in vol. xviii of this series; Farh. Oîm. for *Farhang-i Oîm-aêvak*, or *Zand-Pahlavi Glossary*, ed. Hoshangji and Haug, 1867; fol. for folio; G for gâthic; Gah. for *Gahanbâr* or *Gâhanbâr*; Gen. for Genesis; gen. for genitive; Gesch. der Sas. for *Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden*, 1879; Gf. for tale of *Gôst-î Fryânô*, ed. West and Haug, 1872; Gld. for Geldner; H for *hadha-mâthric*; Haug's Essays for Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsis, by M. Haug, 2nd ed.; Hn. for *Hâdôkht Nask*, ed. Haug, 1872; Ibid. for ibidem; J2 for *Jâmâspji's Yasna* MS. with Pahlavi, now in the Bodleian Library, by the same copyist as K5; K for Copenhagen MS. No. 43, written A.D. 1594, see pp. xxxvii-viii; K1, K5, K20, K35 for Iranian MSS. Nos. 1, 5, 20, 35 in the University Library at Copenhagen; L for legal; l. for line; ll. for lines; Mf4 for the Mullâ Fîrûz Library's *Yasna* MS. with Pahlavi, descended from an ancestor of K5; MH6, MH10 for MSS. Nos. 6, 10 of Haug's Collection in the State Library at Munich; Mkh. for *Dînâ-î Maînôg-î Khirad*, as translated in vol. xxiv of this series; MS. for manuscript; n. for foot-note; N.S. for new style; Ny. for *Nyâyis*; O225 for MS. No. 225 of Ouseley's Collection in the Bodleian Library at Oxford; OM for Olshausen and Mohl's *Fragmens relatifs à la religion de Zoroastre*; p. for page; Pahl.

for Pahlavi; Pâz. for Pâzand; Pers. for Persian; pp. for pages; Pt₄ for Peshotanji's Yasna MS. with Pahlavi, similar to Mf₄; Riv. for Rivâyat; S.B.E. for Sacred Books of the East; Sd. and Sg. for Sad-dar and Sikand-gûmânîk Vigâr, as translated in vol. xxiv of this series; Sîr. for Sîrôzah; Sls. for Shâyast-lâ-shâyast, as translated in vol. v of this series; Sp. for Spiegel; Vend. for Vendîdâd; Vig. for Vigirkard-i Dînk, ed. Peshotan, Bombay, 1848; Vîsp. for Vîspêrad; vol. for volume; W. or Westerg. for Westergaard; Yas. for Yasna; Yt. for Yast; ZA. for Zend Avesta; Zs. for Selections of Zâd-spam, as translated in vol. v of this series.

CONTENTS OF THE NASKS

AS STATED IN

THE EIGHTH AND NINTH BOOKS

OF THE

DĪNKARD.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. For all divisions into chapters and sections the translator is chiefly responsible, as the stops found in the manuscripts are not used systematically.

2. Italics are used for any English words which are not expressed, or fully understood, in the original text, but are added to complete the sense of the translation.

3. Italics occurring in Oriental words, or names, represent certain peculiar Oriental letters (see the 'Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets' at the end of this volume), or certain abbreviated modes of writing Pahlavi letters, for which see the remarks on Pahlavi transliteration near the end of the Introduction. Italic *a, ð, d, e, é, h, i, î, kh, l, p, r, sh, u, v, zd* indicate no change of pronunciation; but *g* should be sounded like *j*, *hv* like *wh*, *k* like *ch* in 'church,' *s* like *sh*, and Avesta *z* like French *j*.

4. In the translation words in parentheses are merely explanatory of those that precede them.

5. For the meaning of the abbreviations, used in the notes, see the explanatory list after the Introduction.


6. The manuscripts used, being the only two independent authorities for the text of the *Dīnkar* known to exist, are:—

B (written A.D. 1659), a nearly-complete MS. of Books III–IX, brought from Irān to Surat in 1783, and now divided between three, or more, owners in Bombay, Nawsârî, and Poona. Of the Books here translated two folios are missing, which contained portions of Bk. IX, Chaps. XXXIII, XXXIV, XXXVI, XXXVII.

K (written A.D. 1594 and later), No. 43 in the University Library at Copenhagen, a miscellaneous MS. containing several fragments of Books III, V, VI, IX. Of the Books here translated it contains the text of Bk. IX, Chaps. I, 1–XXXI, 17.

CONTENTS OF THE NASKS.

DĪNKARD.—BOOK VIII.



CHAPTER I.

1. Praise *for* Aûharmazd, and obeisance *to* the Mazda-worshipping religion which is the ordinance of Aûharmazd opposed to the demons.

2. The eighth *book* is the present (latamman) memorandum about a summary of what is in the Nasks of the Mazda-worshipping religion, each separately. 3. That which is within the compass (shâd-aûrvân) of this book, about the account of the good religion, is a writing for the information of the many, *and* an announcement from the commentary (zand)—that which is in explanation of revelation (dênô)—which, for this simple (pâdram) high-priest, is in itself the writing of the voice of revelation¹.

4. But, before that, is a writing² of the usage about the divisions (bangisnô) of the reckoning of the Mazda-worshipping revelation, also the parts (bâhar) of its divisions, and the sections (burînakô) of the parts; *and* the exposition of the account—

¹ The author means that he derives his information about the contents of the Nasks entirely from their Pahlavi versions which, so far as he is concerned, are of equal authority with the Avesta text.

² This introductory chapter.

which, though very condensed, is in its division— is *also* condensed in the parts of its division, and more diffuse in the sections of the parts. 5. The divisions of the reckoning of the Mazda-worshipping revelation are three :—Gâthas which are the higher spiritual knowledge *and* spiritual duty; Law which is lower¹ worldly knowledge and worldly duty; and the Hadha-māthric which are mostly information and matters about what is between these two ².

¹ Or 'mostly,' if we read *avīrtar*, instead of *azīrtar*, as is done in the next clause of this sentence.

² The three Pahlavi terms are *gāsânō*, *dād*, and *hâḍak-mānsarik*. Of these *dād* evidently means 'law,' because the Dāḍik Nasks are chiefly devoted to legal matters (see Chaps. XVI–XLIV); and *gāsânō* appears to mean 'gâthas' rather than 'verses,' because the first Gāsānik Nask contained the Gâtha texts (see Chap. XLVI), the next three were commentaries upon the Gâthas (see Chaps. II–IV and Bk. IX, Chaps. II–LXVIII), and the remaining three, so far as we are informed, were devoted to religious matters, but we have no reason to suppose that any of them were metrical, except the Gâthas themselves. The exact meaning of *hâḍak-mānsarik* is less clear; it is derived from Av. *hadha-māthra*, 'provided with spells, or inspired words,' a term applied to Zaratūst in Vīsp. XIII, 1 and also to the Māthra-spenta, or liturgy, in a phrase (see Westerg. Z. A., p. 485) which is appointed to be used in certain parts of the liturgy whenever the Vistāsp Yast (a remnant of the last Hadha-māthric Nask) is recited; just as another phrase, referring to the Law, is appointed to be used in the same places whenever the Vendīdād (one of the Dāḍik Nasks) is recited. In what sense the Hadha-māthric Nasks can be said to be 'provided with spells' is not clear from the details given in Chaps. V–XI, but, practically, the meaning of the term must be something like 'semi-religious,' being applied to philosophy and science which are neither strictly religious nor strictly secular.

The same three terms were applied to the three classes of mankind, probably the priests, philosophers, and laity; a classification analogous to that of the three professions, the priests, warriors, and husbandmen, but not quite identical with it, as may be gathered from a passage in the sixth book of the Dīnkard. This book is

6. And the reason of the triple division of the reckoning of revelation is the exposition of all knowledge *and* duty, and the kinds of knowledge and action *in* the same revelation are these three that *have been* written. 7. Also in the Ahunavair¹, which

'about an epitome, composed *and* preserved by those of the primitive faith, concerning the statements of the religion of Mazda-worship;' and its statements are introduced by the following words:—'Those of the primitive faith, who *were* the sages of the ancients, considered thus, &c.' Near the middle of the book the following passage occurs:—'And this, too, *was* considered by them thus, that these are the three species of mankind:—One is the Gâthic, one the Hadha-mâthric, *and* one the Dâđk. The association (hamîh) of him who is Gâthic is with the sacred beings, *and* his severance (vîgî-aîtagîh) from the demons *and* fiends; the extent of *his* wealth is due to members of the community *and* religious feasts (dâhm va-sûr), and the punishment for the sin which he may commit is shame and is invisible. The association of him who is Hadha-mâthric is with the righteous, and his severance from the wicked; also the extent of his wealth is that which may be produced virtuously, and the punishment for the sin he shall commit is the goad, or scourge (see Chap. XLIV, 65 n); also noxious creatures *for* the body, and compensating the destitute. And the association of him who is Dâđk is with Irânians, and his severance from foreigners; also the extent of his wealth is due to affairs that it is possible to accomplish lawfully, *and* the punishment for the sin which he shall commit is *for* the lifetime of a fowl (kûk), the day of a demon.'

¹ This information seems to be taken from the first fargard of the Sûđkar Nask (see Bk. IX, Chap. II, 19). The Ahunavair (Av. ahuna vairya) is the name of the most sacred formula of the Parsis, derived from its second and third words; it is also called the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô, from its first phrase, and is a declaratory statement in metre, consisting of one stanza of three lines, containing twenty-one Avesta words, as follows:—

Yathâ ahû vairyô, athâ ratus ashâd-kîd hatâ,
Vangheus dazdâ mananghō shyaothananām anghēus mazdâi,
Khshathremtâ ahurâi â, yim drigubyô dadad vâstârem.

The usual Pahlavi version of this formula explains it as follows:—

is the basis of the reckoning of revelation, are three metrical lines (gâs); the first chiefly indicates the Gâthic lore, the second the Hadha-mâthric lore, *and* the third the Law.

8. And there have been twenty-one parts¹ of its divisions, which are called Nasks :—(9) Seven are Gâthic, because they are composed for the Gâthas,

‘As is the will of the spiritual lord (as is the will of Aûharmazd) so should be the priestly master (so virtuous should he be) owing to whatsoever are the duties and good works of righteousness (the duties and good works should be as virtuous as the will of Aûharmazd). Whose is the gift of good thought (that is, the reward and recompense that good thought gives, it gives also *unto* him) which, among spiritual lords, is the work of Aûharmazd (that is, he would do that which Aûharmazd requires): [there are *some* who would say thus: Whose gift is for good thought (that is, the reward and recompense which they give for good thought, they give also unto him); *and* there are *some* who would say thus: Whose gift is through good thought (that is, the reward and recompense which they give up through good thought, they would also give even him); Âtûrpâd, son of Zaratûst, said thus: Owing to the gift of good thought, among spiritual lords, they recognise a doer of deeds]. The dominion for Aûharmazd is his (that is, his dominion exists through the advantage that Aûharmazd has maintained) who gives allotments (vâyagânō) to the poor (that is, he would make intercession for them).’

The Avesta text may be translated, according to Haug, as follows:—‘As a spiritual lord is desirable, so is a priestly master, for the sake of every righteousness, *to be* a giver of good thoughts as to the actions of life towards Mazda; and the dominion is for the lord whom he (*Mazda*) has given as a protector for the poor.’

According to Geldner the first two lines refer to Zaratûst, and, if we assume that yim is a contraction of yô im, the Avesta text may be translated somewhat as follows:—‘As *he is* the desirable spiritual lord, so *is he* the priestly master with every right, the producer of the actions of the good thoughts of life towards Mazda. The dominion, however, is for Ahura who has given him as a protector for the poor.’

¹ See §§ 18, 19.

and their names¹ are that of the ritual of the Gâthic worship, which is the *Stôd-yast*, *with* the *Sûdkar*, *Varstmânsar*, *Bakö*, *Vastag*, *Hâdökht*, and that which has made them Gâthic², the *Spend*. 10. And the names of the seven *Hadha-māthric* are *Dâm-dâd*, *Nâdar*, *Pâgag*, *Radö-dâd-altag*, *Baris*, *Kasktsrôbô*, *and* *Vistâsp-sâstô*. 11. *And* seven are *Legal*, because they are composed for the lawyer (*dâdîk*), and their names are those of the legal, and those are the *Nîkâdûm*, *Ganabâ-sar-nîgad*, *Hûspâram*, *Sakâdûm*, *and* *Vendîdâd*, and those which are composed for the law with separate dedications, the *Kitradâd* and *Bakân-yast*. 12. And the sequence is *Sûdkar*, *Varst-mânsar*, *Bakö*, *Dâmdâd*, *Nâdar*, *Pâgag*, *Radö-dâd-altag*, *Baris*, *Kasktsrôbô*, *Vistâsp-sâstô*, *Vastag*, *Kitradâd*, *Spend*, *Bakân-yast*, *Nîkâdûm*, *Ganabâ-sar-nîgad*, *Hûspâram*, *Sakâdûm*, *Vendîdâd*, *Hâdökht*, and *Stôd-yast*³.

13. In all three *divisions* all three are *found*; in the Gâthic are the *Hadha-māthric* and *Legal*, in the *Hadha-māthric* are the Gâthic and *Legal*, and in the *Legal* are the Gâthic and *Hadha-māthric*.

¹ For variants of these names, in the order stated in § 12, see the notes to the first sections of Chaps. II-XVI, XXI, XXVIII, XXXVIII, XLIV-XLVI, which begin the summary description of each of the twenty-one Nasks.

² Referring probably to 'the bestowal of the other Nasks' mentioned in Chap. XIV, 5.

³ This is the order in which the twenty-one words of the *Ahuna-vair* are applied to the twenty-one Nasks, as hinted in § 19; and, therefore, the order in which they ought to be enumerated. Representing the three divisions of the Nasks by G, H, L, respectively, and the seven Nasks in each division by the ciphers 1-7, the order of enumeration is as follows:—G 2-4; H 1-7; G 5; L 6; G 7; L 7, 1-5; G 6, 1. More or less fanciful reasons for this dislocation of the divisions are given in §§ 15-17.

14. *In* each separately that which is essentially and specially itself is included, and that which is partly another and introduced is included; and the reason of it is *that* in spiritual and worldly *existences*, and in worldly and spiritual *existences*, and in that which is between the two, *there* are both *existences*.

15. The occurrence *of* the joining of the Vastag part of the Gâthas on to the last of the Hadha-mâthric¹ is because *it* is written in connection with the Vistâsp-sâstô, the last *of* the Hadha-mâthric.

16. The reason of the Hâdôkht and Yast *being* in succession to the Vendîdâd, the last of the Law², and 'the production of the worldly creation'³ *being* between the Hadha-mâthric *and* those spiritual Gâthas, is because the spiritual *existence* likewise, which is spiritual life (ah v ô), is the beginning; and the worldly *existence* is purposed and caused, and a part is preserved (nôst-aitô), important for the purpose and intended for the spiritual life, the part at the beginning. 17. And the rejoining of the end of the Law, which is *about* the Hô⁴, to the Gâthas, which are the beginning,

¹ That is, the placing of G 5 after H 7.

² That is, the placing of G 6, 1 after L 5. The Vendîdâd appears to be the last of the truly legal Nasks, as the contents of the Kîtradâd (see Chap. XIII) appear to have been chiefly historical, and those of the Bakân-yast (see Chap. XV) chiefly religious. These two Nasks are also placed in a sub-class in § 11.

³ This Dahisnô-î-sti^h-dâdô is evidently another name for the Dâmdâd, or 'the creatures produced,' which is placed between G 2-4 and H 2-7.

⁴ Written Hîm in Pâzand, for Hûm; and referring to the white Hô^m, mentioned in Pahl. Vend. XX, 17, 21, and its healing properties. It is not absolutely necessary to understand from the text that the twentieth fargard was literally the end of the Vendîdâd in Sasanian times, because Chap. XLIV, 81 is quite as descriptive of the twenty-second as of the twentieth fargard.

is a symbol of the existence of the pure influence of the Gâthic lore upon the first spiritual state—that *which* exists likewise at last—and of the rejunction of the worldly existence to the spiritual, because it came down from the spiritual to exist at present.

18. And the reason of the twenty-one-fold partition of the three divisions of the reckoning of revelation is in the distinction which is evident from *their* composition; also in the three metrical lines of the Ahunavair, which is the basis of the reckoning of revelation, there are twenty-one words (*mârtk*). 19. As the three metrical lines of the Ahunavair, which is the basis of the reckoning of revelation, are an emblem of the triple division of the reckoning of revelation; so the twenty-one words of the three *lines* indicate the twenty-one-fold partition of these three divisions; as *it* is declared that 'He who is the omniscient creator produced a discourse from every single word.'

20. *As to* the sections of the parts, such as the Hâs and Fargards¹ in the Nasks, *it* is known *there* were one thousand², from the testimony *and* knowledge of the religion owing to the teaching of Zaratûst—*whose* guardian spirit is revered—in the country of Irân. 21. And after the devastation occurred, owing to the evil-destined *and* raging villain Alexander, *there* was not so much of them

¹ The term Hâ (*hâd*, Av. *hâiti*) is applied to the chapters of the Yasna, and the term Fargard (Av. *fra+kereta*) to the chapters of the Vendîdâd and most of the other Nasks.

² Combining the information given in the Persian Rivâyats with that in the Dînkard we find only 905 chapters enumerated, of which 180 are said to have been lost, from the philosophical Nasks, during the Greek rule.

recovered as would be possible for a high-priest to preserve¹. 22. And that which the saintly (hû-fravardō) Âtûr-pâd², son of Mâraspend, achieved through their composition and preservation, is known so far as the decrees (kakō) in the treatises (mâdî-gân) of the country of Irân are preserved as teaching and admonition (pandânō).

23. After writing of each separate Nask, that is, as to what it speaks about more particularly³, each Nask is accounted for separately, and what is in its various Hâs and Fargards comes to be realized⁴; for in these particulars (mâdîgân) any ruggedness of the auspicious⁵ and desirable collection is explained. 24. But, first, the class of writing of the various Nasks—that is, about what they speak—is here written; the extent of attainment not *being* adapted to *their* peculiarity of wonderfulness.

CHAPTER II.

1. Homage *to* the glory *of* the good religion *of* Mazda-worship!

2. The Sûdkar⁶ contains particulars about the

¹ Probably meaning not more than a high-priest could retain in his memory.

² A supreme high-priest who was prime minister of king Shah-pûhar II (A.D. 309–379).

³ In this eighth book of the Dînkard.

⁴ In the more detailed statements in the ninth book.

⁵ Reading hûsukûngûn, but it may be khûskûnîñō, 'beneficent,' or anasikôn-gûn, 'unconfusing.'

⁶ Corresponding to the first word, yathâ, in the Ahunavair, according to the Persian Rivâyat of Bahman Pûngyah, which adopts the sequence detailed in Chap. I, 12. All other Persian Rivâyats and also the Dînî-vîgîrkard adopt the sequence G 1-4; H 1-7;

power of the pure glorifying of the first utterance of *Aûharmazd*¹, through thinking, speaking, and acting; and *about* abstaining from the law of very evil *and* very disturbing people². 3. Glorifying the observances (*hûnarânö*) *and* good works of the good religion *and* of a like nature, as well as their effectualness; and condemning the faults and sin of him of very evil religion, when all kinds of neglect of the spiritual ceremony and of care for the archangel of the worldly existence are owing to him³; *also* much information about spiritual matters. 4. It *has* become old (*kahûni*⁴), and is a witness whose statement *extends* even unto the renovation of the *universe*⁵.

5. Righteousness is perfect excellence⁵.

G 5, 7; L 6, 7, 1, 3, 2, 4, 5; G 6. Like most of the names of the Nasks, *Sûdkar* is an adjective, meaning 'causing benefit, or acting beneficially'; it is corrupted into *Sûdgar*, or *Istûdgar*, in the *Rivâyats* and *Dv*. For a detailed account of the contents of each of its twenty-two *fargard*s see Bk. IX, Chaps. II-XXIII.

¹ The *Abunavair*, or *Yathâ ahû vairyô*, which *Aûharmazd* recited before the creation in order to confound *Aharman* (see Bd. I, 21, 22). This clause refers chiefly to the first *fargard* of the *Sûdkar* (see Bk. IX, Chap. II).

² Referring to Bk. IX, Chaps. V, IX, X, &c.

³ See Bk. IX, Chap. IX. ⁴ See Bk. IX, Chap. XXIII, 7.

⁵ The text is *aharâyih dšâdih pâhlûm aîtö*, the Pahl. equivalent of the Av. *ashem vohû vahistem asti*, 'righteousness is the best good,' the first metrical line of the *Ashem-vohû* formula, with which it is usual to conclude forms of prayer and religious writings. It is here used to conclude the account of each of the twenty-one Nasks, and twice over at the end of the last one, so that it occurs twenty-two times in this eighth Book. In the ninth Book it concludes the account of each *fargard* of the three Nasks detailed, and is written twice at the end of the second Nask, and twice at the end of the Book; so that it occurs in three series of 22, 24, and 24 repetitions, respectively, in the ninth Book. As the formula,

CHAPTER III.

1. The Varstmânsar¹ *contains* particulars about the birth of Zaratûst, his attaining the religion², and whatever is on the same subject³. 2. A notice (numâd) of the priestliness, discipleship, spiritual lordship, priestly authority, and steadfastness which are in his original more concise words of the Gâthas⁴. 3. The explanation (zand) of the statements about everything and also the good arrangement (khus-radakö) are such as that which *one* speaks of thus : — ‘*It is the Varstmânsar which has given forth an exposition upon everything.*’ 4. So that, in the Varstmânsar, something is said about *everything* that is mentioned in the Gâthas.

5. Of righteousness the excellence is perfect.

which is thus repeated, consists of four words, it is capable of $1 \times 2 \times 3 \times 4 = 24$ permutations in the order of its words; and it appears as if the author intended that each of the four series of repetitions of the formula, contained in the two Books, should give all these permutations successively; and, with the exception of a few deviations (chiefly in the first two series, and probably due to the errors of copyists), he has maintained this fanciful peculiarity throughout. The English translations of the formula have been varied, so as to preserve this peculiarity to some extent, but it has not been found possible to differentiate the whole of the twenty-four permutations.

¹ Corresponding to the second word, ahû, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the third Nask in other Rivâyats. Varstmânsar means ‘used as spells, or employed as liturgy,’ and is often corrupted into Vahist-mânthrah in the Rivâyats. For a detailed account of the contents of each of its twenty-three fargard’s see Bk. IX, Chaps. XXIV–XLVI.

² See Bk. IX, Chap. XXIV.

³ This final phrase is often used for unspecified details, and may be considered as equivalent to *et cætera*.

⁴ See Bk. IX, Chap. XXV.

CHAPTER IV.

1. The Bakō¹ *contains* particulars about the division of the recital of the first saying of revelation², the first creature³ *in* that saying, the first occurrence of it, the adaptation of the creature, and the greatness of that saying which is incorporating the creature, owing thereto; also, especially, the intermingling of thought (mêd)⁴ with it. 2. Very comprehensive knowledge about everything, each separately its own offspring, and many an appendage as much connected with it as that which is said concerning the Bakō⁵, that 'the Bakō of the community (dâh-mân) is heard where it is spoken for the community,' that is, whoever shall do this good work, for him this good work *will* be done.

3. Righteousness is perfect excellence.

CHAPTER V.

1. Amid the Dâmdâd'⁶ are particulars about the maintenance of action and the production of the

¹ Corresponding to the third word, vairyô, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the fourth Nask in other Rivâyats. Bakō means 'subdivision, or apportionment,' and is written Bagh, or Bagh-ast, in the Rivâyats. For a detailed account of the contents of each of its twenty-two fargard's see Bk. IX, Chaps. XLVII-LXVIII.

² The Ahunavair (see Chap. II, 2 and Bk. IX, Chap. XLVII, 3).

³ The Ahû, or 'spiritual lord,' who is the first creature mentioned in the Ahunavair (see Bk. IX, Chap. XLVII, 4).

⁴ Av. maiti, Pâz. mit in Bk. IX, Chap. XLVII, 5; the Av. manas of Yas. XIX, 29 (Sp.).

⁵ This section is an extreme condensation of the contents of Bk. IX, Chaps. XLVIII-LXVIII.

⁶ Corresponding to the fourth word, athâ, in the Ahunavair,

beneficial creatures. 2. First, as to the spiritual existence, and how much *and* how is the maintenance in the spiritual *existence*; and the production of the worldly *existence* therefrom, qualified *and* constructed for descending (*fitôdanô*) into the combat with the destroyer, and accomplishing the associated necessity for the end and circumvention (*garang*) of destructiveness.

3. The manner *and* species *of* the creation of the creatures; also their material *existence*, and the character and use of the races and species; and whatever is on the same subject. 4. The reason for *their* creation, and for *their* perfection at last. 5. About the adversity, injury, and misery of those creatures, and their secret (*nîhônô*) resources *and* means of attacking *and* annihilating *them*; *with* the preservation *or* disablement (*apîkârtntdanô*) of the creatures thereby¹.

6. Of righteousness the excellence is perfect excellence.

according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the fifth Nask in other Rivâyats. *Dâmdâd* means 'the creatures produced,' and it is called *Dvâzdah-hâmâst* (or *humâst*) in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contained thirty-two *kardah*, or subdivisions. No further particulars of this and the subsequent Nasks are given by the *Dīnkard*, beyond the contents of this eighth Book.

¹ So far as this brief account of the *Dâmdâd* goes, it corresponds very well with much of the contents of the *Bundahis*. *Zâd-spāram*, in his *Selections*, IX, 1, 16, also quotes the *Dâmdâd* as the authority for certain details contained in the *Bundahish*, which work must therefore be considered as derived from this Nask. It is very probable, however, that the Nask contained much more information than is here hinted, because the author's usual plan, in these brief summaries, is evidently to confine his remarks to a few of the details near the beginning of each Nask.

CHAPTER VI.

1. On account of the Zand of the Nâdar¹ not reaching us, the Avesta is retained, for teaching, recital, *and* ceremony, because *it has* come unto *us* with authority.

2. Of righteousness the excellence is perfect excellence.

CHAPTER VII.

1. The Pâgag² *contains* particulars about lawfully slaughtering a sheep, for the ceremonial of fires, waters, *and* holy-water, in aid of a season-festival³ of the Mazda-worshippers; besides this, namely, in what are the skill, and the means for selection, of a man for such work, and the formula (nîrang) of the ceremony. 2. And this, namely, from which limb of the sheep species is the

¹ Corresponding to the fifth word, ratus, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the sixth Nask in other Rivâyats. Owing to its Zand, or Pahlavi version, having been lost, the author does not undertake to describe its contents; but the Rivâyats state that it consisted of thirty-five jûrat, or compilations, about astronomy and astrology. The traditional name Nâdar, or Nâdûr, is probably a misreading; as Vakhtar (for Vakhttar), 'more destined,' and Vakhtar, 'fate-bringing,' would be more intelligible readings of the same letters.

² Corresponding to the sixth word, ashâd, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the seventh Nask in other Rivâyats. Pâgag probably means 'cooking,' with reference to the preparations for the sacred feasts; it is called Pâgam, Pâtam, or Pâzûn in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contained twenty-two kardah, or subdivisions.

³ The six Gâhanbârs or season-festivals are held on the five days ending, respectively, with the 45th, 105th, 180th, 210th, 290th, and 365th days of the Parsi year (see Sls. XVIII, 3 n).

share *of* the fires and waters to be taken¹, *and* how is the preparation which is to be carried on, *and* with what Avesta. 3. And whatever is about a season-festival; where the appointed place is, when *one* celebrates *it*, *and* when it has fully elapsed; the assembly of the season-festival, and the donation for the feast; where and when the celebration is possible, in what proportion the provisions are to be given out, *and* when to be prepared *and* divided; where its advantage is, *and* what benefit *there* is from it to the good creations both spiritually and materially.

4. And this, namely, what skill is more suitable for the sacerdotal (*rad-pīśag*) leadership *and* other priestly authority (*radīh*) each separately. 5. About the business *of* the sacerdotal leadership, where *it is* owing to *having* appointed the place and *having* gone forth to the assembly of the Mazda-worshippers, *and* when *they are* to be made aware that that assembly is more particularly for the arrangement of renunciation of vice and retribution for sin; the needful supply of things for the feast; the selection of the men for the Zōti duty *and* Rāspī duty before the day²; the Zōtis, Rāspīs, and others who put in action the work for the preparation *and* giving of the portions; *and* the cleansing of the body-clothing. 6. *As to* the selection *of* the president (*pēs-gās*) *of* the feast *there* is this, namely, what ability is requisite for that presidentship. 7. The allotment of the portions, and giving *them* sooner to *those* who are sooner in need *of them*. 8. Scoffing before

¹ The heart for the fires, and the fore-legs for the waters, according to Sls. XI, 4.

² The Zōti is the chief officiating priest in the ceremonial, and the Rāspī is the assistant priest.

priestly authorities, *who are great and good, and* when they do not give a portion to the authorities are *cases when* the season-festivals are not to be considered as celebrated. 9. This, too, that the Zôti and Râspîs are for the Zôti duty *and* Râspî duty, *and* the other priestly authorities for the control of sin and computation (*âvâr*) of the portions; and more on the same subject.

10. About the rotation of the day-watches (*gâs*), days, months, and seasons of the year—which are when *it* is summer *and* winter—and the appearances (*sahtsnö*) therein which are owing to the motion of the constellations¹. 11. Where the coming of the righteous guardian spirits (*fravâhar*) into the worldly *existence occurs*, in those ten days which are the end of the winter *and* termination of the year, because the five Gâthic days², among them, are for that *purpose*; the cessation of that same, as well as *its* continuance. 12. The great needfulness *of* the guardian spirits of the righteous in the ceremonial *and* obeisance of those ten days, *and* their abundant gratification therefrom; their vexation from

¹ That is, the *apparent* motions of the akhtarân, or signs of the zodiac.

² The five supplementary days, named after the five Gâthas, which are added to the twelfth month of thirty days to complete the 365 days of the year. They are also called *fravardîkân*, or 'those devoted to the Fravards,' or Fravashis, the guardian spirits, or prototypes, of created beings, who are supposed to revisit their old haunts on earth during those days. The last five days of the twelfth month are also considered a part of the same festival of ten days, which would have terminated at the vernal equinox, as indicated in the text, about A.D. 1000 if the ordinary receding calendar of the Irânian Parsis were used; but it seems probable, from Bd. XXV, that the calendar in those times was fixed for the new year to begin at the vernal equinox.

want of welcome and want of obeisance; and *their* ascent from the worldly existences. 13. The extreme importance (*frêvôḍānikh*) of liberality and bounty at that season; and the proper duty of the priestly authority of a district (*shatrô*) in assisting and interceding for the poor, for the sake of teaching, from the days devoted to the guardian spirits, *proper* actions among those having guardian spirits.

14. About the period for taking medicinal plants, and whatever is on the same subject. 15. About where *there* is a household, village, communal, or provincial petitioning *for* the royal chastisement of sins affecting the soul, each separately; *and* for whom is the atonement. 16. About the advantage owing to disposal of sin and infliction of chastisement, and the harm owing to not disposing of sin *and* neglecting the chastisement inflicted.

17. About the first thirty-three chieftainships (*radh*), around *and* concealed; that is, which *and* how many are spiritual, *and* how many worldly; and which is the second, and which the third, of the spiritual *and* worldly *existences*. 18. About the admirableness and great meritoriousness of public observances, and the awfulness and grievous sinfulness of apostasy. 19. And also this, that is, when any one is doubtful, through apostasy, which is the law from the sacred beings in elucidation, and which of the sacred beings is to be entreated for assistance. 20. About this, namely, *for* which of the women the bringing of a handful of anything, from the property of *her* husband, *to be* given away is allowable, in what proportion, and how, *and* for whom; and for whom, when she gives *it* away, *it* is allowable *for* the husband to bring *it* back.

21. About this, namely, when summer comes on, where does winter run to; and when winter comes on, where does summer go to? 22. About the amount of disaster¹ *that* has passed by in one century, and the duration of *its* passing; everything which is connected with the disaster, and whatever is on the same subject. 23. Where *and* how many months are of such a kind², *and* how many of such a kind²; as well as the religious names of the twelve months, and the reason of the name of each one of them, that is, to which of the sacred beings, in the ceremonial, each one of these twelve months is predominantly appertaining; so also of the thirty days which are in every month, and so also of the five Gâthas in every *year*—that is, the five Gâthic days at the end of the year³—all the sacred beings *to whom they are* appertaining, and when the righteous guardian spirits (*ardâš fravardō*) are revered.

24. Righteousness is perfect excellence.

CHAPTER VIII.

1. The *Radō-dâd-aŋtag*⁴ *contains* particulars *about* the religious and important customs *and* laws to be

¹ Pâz. vôiğhn.

² Reading hamgûn in both places; but the two words may be hamînô, 'summer,' and khamînô, 'wet weather.'

³ The five supplementary days mentioned in § 11.

⁴ Corresponding to the seventh word, *kîd*, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the eighth Nask in other Rivâyats. *Radō-dâd-aŋtag* means 'concerning the habits of a priestly master,' which is a fair description of the contents of this Nask, but it is misread *Ratustâš*, or *Ratustâšd*, in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contained originally fifty kardah, or subdivisions, of which only thirteen were recovered after the time of Alexander.

enforced. 2. The reason of the worthiness and superexcellence in a sacerdotal leader, *and his* possession of a portion of the other authority (*pat̄h*) of a ruler also; that is, how worthiness is to be distinguished from unworthiness, and superexcellence from unworthiness, in him, namely, in the priestly chieftainship (*rad̄h*) of Khvanīras¹ *and* the other regions, each separately, the first which stood aloof from the Mazda-worshippers.

3. About the demonstration *and* notification of the sitting together of the archangels, the ritual and appliances in the ceremonial of the sacred beings, the position and business of the Zōtis *and* Rāsp̄s² in a ceremonial, and also all the business of the leaders in their duty, each separately *and* originally³.

4. The greatness of the helpfulness (*viḡt̄dār-dahisn̄h*) in good works, the kinds of helpfulness, and the proximity of Aūharmazd to the thoughts, words, *and* deeds of the embodied existence.

5. The excellence of righteousness is perfect.

CHAPTER IX.

1. The Baris⁴ *contains* particulars about the invigorating power, truth, *and* generosity of the many

¹ Av. *Hvaniratha*, the central region of the earth, containing the countries best known to the Irānians, around which the other six smaller regions were supposed to be arranged.

² See Chap. VII, 5.

³ Or 'fundamentally' (*va/ b̄n*).

⁴ Corresponding to the eighth word, *haḥā*, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the ninth Nask in other Rivâyats. Baris, or Barīs, means 'splendid, sublime;' and the Rivâyats state that it contained originally sixty kardah, or subdivisions, of which only twelve were recovered after the time of Alexander.

capabilities of instinctive *and* acquired wisdom. 2. And also the ill-advisedness of falsity, stinginess¹, and ignorance; and the many defects which are fraternizing *with* the opponent of capabilities. 3. The blessing and cursing, the good will and ill-will of the good ritual and evil ritual, the good statements and evil statements of Vohûman, Spendarmad, Srôsh, Aharîsvang², *and* many *other* sacred beings, and of evil thought, lust, wrath, unrighteousness³, and many *other* demons; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

4. The destiny, nature, desire, religion, habit, learning, business, and diligence of the period, *and* whatever is on the same subject, as regards sovereignty, government, priestly authority, justice, and mediation. 5. The union, peace, and promise-keeping, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 6. The law and custom, good works and sin, good repute and evil repute, righteousness and wickedness, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 7. The modesty and pomp, glory and penance (srôshîkîh)⁴, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 8. The connec-

¹ Pûs, the demon of misers in Bd. XXVIII, 28.

² These four angels are personifications of Av. vohû manô, 'good thought,' spenta ârmaitis, 'bountiful devotion,' sraoshô, 'the obedient one,' and ashîs vanguih, 'good rectitude.'

³ These four demoniacal propensities are here mentioned as the opponents of the foregoing four angels. Akômanô and Aeshm, the first and third, are the recognised opponents of Vohûman and Srôsh, respectively (see Bd. XXX, 29). Varenô, the second, is considered a demon (see Bd. XXVIII, 25), and is mentioned in the Dinkard, book VI, as opposing the angel Ard or Aharîsvang (see Dd. XCIV, 2); here he evidently opposes another female angel, Spendarmad, while Aharîsvang or Ashi is opposed by her simple negation, Anâhar.

⁴ Av. sraoshya, see Pahl. Vend. XIII, 9.

tion through ownership, subordination, service, and religion, and whatever is on the same subject. 9. The suitability and unsuitability, friendship and enmity, and whatever is on the same subject. 10. The handsomeness and ugliness, youth and decrepitude, opulence and destitution, happiness and misery, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 11. The strength in races *and* species of things, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 12. The learning, solving of questions, complete virtue, and whatever is on the same subject. 13. The hunger¹ and thirst, and their remedy, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 14. The delirium and death, and *their* expediency, and whatever is on the same subject. 15. The primitive state *and* tendency of things, precedence and sequence, and whatever is on the same subject. 16. The acceptableness *and* unacceptableness, gratification and afflictiveness², and whatever is on the same subject. 17. The mightiness (takīkīh), loquacity, sociality, and whatever is on the same subject. 18. The understanding *and* mind; the body *and* soul; the heaven, hell, *and* future existence; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 19. The omniscience of the creator Aûharmazd, *and* all goodness of like motive, the life *and* glory of a righteous man, *and* whatever is on the same subject³.

20. And many other arrangements of the creator, through propagation of statements, preparation of sovereignty, maintenance of the body, and preserva-

¹ Supposing that sūkō stands for sūd.

² Reading bēshīnīdārīh which is more probable than the bēshāzīnīdārīh, 'curativeness,' of the MS.

³ All the details in §§ 5-19 are to be read in connection with 'the period' mentioned in § 4.

tion of the soul; a statement adapted to that which one mentions thus: 'Truly-spoken statements are the Baris, Kaskîsrôbbô, *and* Vistâsp-sâstô.'

21. The excellence *of* righteousness is perfect.

CHAPTER X.

1. The Kaskîsrôbbô¹ *contains* particulars about the explanation of the ceremonial *and* ritual of the sacred beings, through what *arises its* conversion *into* demon-worship, *and* information *as to* cleanness and uncleanness. 2. The preparations and precautions for the Yasts²; the tokens and signs of the overflowing and evil owing to the demons at various times, and the cause of their exhaustion *and* the final victory of the sacred beings. 3. Then the exalting chants *of* every kind, which Aûharmazd *taught* to Zaratûst, are called the teaching (sâstô) of the spirits.

4. Excellence *that is* perfect is righteousness.

CHAPTER XI.

1. The Vistâsp-sâstô³ is about particulars of

¹ Corresponding to the ninth word, vangheus, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the tenth Nask in other Rivâyats. Kaskîsrôbbô may perhaps mean 'with happy, or comfortable, statements,' and is corrupted into Kasrôbb, Kaskasîrah, or Kas-kanz, in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contained originally sixty kardah, or subdivisions, of which only fifteen were recovered after the time of Alexander.

² The minor ceremonies.

³ Corresponding to the tenth word, dazdâ, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the eleventh Nask in other Rivâ-

every kind *relating* to Kai-Vistâsp¹; the temper, character, demeanour, knowledge, learning, and law for sovereignty; the government of the creatures, *and* the advancement of the will of the sacred beings requisite for it.

2. The creator Aûharmazd sends the archangels² on to Kai-Vistâsp as evidence about Aûharmazd, *and* a reminder of Sptâmân Zaratûst, *of* the pure goodness of the Mazda-worshipping religion, *and of* the command for the ruler Vistâsp, as to *its* triumph, on accepting the religion from Zaratûst. 3. The visible coming of the archangels to the metropolis, *and*, secondly, *their* domestication (handêmânth) at the residence *of* Vistâsp and his companions; the envoys' explanation of Aûharmazd's message to Vistâsp, *and* the accepting of the Mazda-worshipping religion *by* the obedient king Vistâsp.

4. The outpouring (sârînlđanō) of Argâsp the Khyôn³, by the demon of wrath, for war with Vistâsp

yats. Vistâsp-sâstō means 'the instruction of Vistâsp,' and is corrupted into Vistâsp-shâh, Vistâspād, or Vistâsp, in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contained originally sixty kardah, or jûrat, of which only ten, or eight, were recovered after the time of Alexander. The last number refers, no doubt, to the eight fargards still extant under the corrupt name Vistâsp Yast, which probably consist of fragments of the Avesta text of this Nask; but in comparing that text with this description it must be remembered that the author is describing the contents of the Pahlavi version which would contain much commentary.

¹ The king of Irân in the time of Zaratûst, who accepted the Mazda-worshipping religion; the last king of the old history derived from the Avesta (see Chap. XIII, 15, 16).

² Compare Vistâsp Yt. 40.

³ The 'deadly Hvyona Aregad-aspa' of Yt. IX, 30, XVII, 50, whom Kavi Vistâspa prayed to be delivered from. According to the Yâdkâr-i Zarîrân, Argâsp, king of the Khyôns, made war upon

and disturbance of Zaratûst; the arrangements *and* movements of king Vistâsp for that war, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

5. Excellence *that is* perfect is righteousness.

CHAPTER XII.

1. The Avesta *and* commentary of the Vastag¹ *have* not reached us through *any* high-priest.
2. Excellence *that is* perfect *is* righteousness.

CHAPTER XIII.

1. The *Kitradâd*² *contains* particulars about the race of mankind; how the formation of the first

Vistâsp on account of the latter's conversion to Mazda-worship, and was defeated with great difficulty in a most desperate battle which is also described in the Shâhnâmah. Whether the Khyôns were the Chionitae of later times is uncertain.

¹ Corresponding to the eleventh word, *mananghô*, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the twelfth Nask in other Rivâyats. The name of this Nask is very uncertain; in five occurrences of the word the first letter is omitted once and may once be the conjunction 'and,' and the last syllable is also omitted once; the B. P. Riv. calls it *Dâd*, by omitting the first and last letters and varying the reading of the rest, and the other Rivâyats call it '*Hast* or '*Hart*. They also state that it contained twenty-two *kardahs*, or *fargard*s, in six divisions treating of various religious and worldly duties, as detailed in the translations in the latter part of this volume.

² Corresponding to the twelfth word, *shyaothananâm*, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the fourteenth Nask in other Rivâyats. *Kitradâd* means 'the races produced,' a name of the same form as *Dâmdâd*, but it is read *Kîdrast*, *Kîrast*, or *Girast* in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contained twenty-two *kardah*, or subdivisions.

man, Gâyômarđ¹, by Aûharmazd *was* for the manifestation of the bodily form (kerpîh); and *in* what manner the first couple, Mashya and Mashyô², arose. 2. About their progeny *and* lineage during the entire progress *of* mankind in the central region of Khvanîras³, and the distribution from them into the six⁴ regions which are around Khvanîras. 3. The various races, which are specially enumerated, *were* ordered to disperse by the attracting *or* banishing command of the creator, to each separate race, as to the place where it went to; *and whose* life *and* soul (nisman) are appointed from yonder *world*. 4. Also the original description of their descent into the various regions, of those, too, who are on the frontiers of Khvanîras, and those who also made their habitation in the intermediate places; *and* the customs of each one *of* the species of mankind which was produced among the original races.

5. The original establishment of law *and* custom; that of village superintendence (dihânkânîh)⁵, for the cultivation *and* nourishment *of* the world, *based* upon the traditional early law (vâsarîd pêsâdâdô); *and* that of monarchy, for the protection and govern-

¹ The original human being who was created as the source whence mankind were to spring, in the same way as 'the sole-created ox' was to be the origin of all other animals (see Bd. III, 14, 17, 19-23, IV, 1, XV, 1, 31).

² Literally 'man and woman,' here written masyê va-masyâôî. The mode of their origin from Gâyômarđ and the development of man upon the earth are detailed in Bd. XV.

³ See Chap. VIII, 2.

⁴ The MS. has 'seven' by mistake.

⁵ A more probable reading than gehânakânîh in the sense of 'colonization.'

ment of the creatures, upon Hôshâng the Pêsdâdian¹.

6. A report of the lineage of Hôshâng, who *was* the first, and Tâkhamô-rupô² who *was* the second ruler of the seven regions; and an enumeration of reports of lineage from the original creation even unto Yim³.

7. A report of the lineage of Yim, the third ruler of the seven regions; information as to his period, *and* the progress (sa^hisnô) of time from the original creation till the end of the reign of Yim.

8. A report of the ill-informed evil ruler of the seven regions, Dahâk⁴; his lineage back to Tâz⁵, the brother of Hôshâng and father of the Tâzîks (*Arabs*); information *as to* him and his period, the progress of time from the end of the good reign of Yim till the end of the evil reign of Dahâk, and the lineage from Yim as far as Frêdûn⁶.

¹ This 'Hôshâng of the early law,' Av. Haoshyanghō paradhâtō, is considered to have been the great-grandson of Mashya and first monarch of the world, being the founder of the Pêsdâdian dynasty (see Bd. XV, 28, XXXI, 1, XXXIV, 3, 4).

² Here written Tâkhamô-rupô, Av. Takhmô-urupa; the great-grandson and successor of Hôshâng (see Bd. XXXI, 2, 3, XXXIV, 4).

³ Av. Yimō khshaêtō, the Gamshêd of the Shâhnâmah; the brother and successor of Tâkhamô-rupô (see Bd. XXXI, 3-5, XXXIV, 4).

⁴ Also called Az-î Dahâk, Av. azis dahâkō, 'destructive serpent,' a name applied to a foreign dynasty, considered as a single king who conquered Yim and succeeded him, being traditionally his third cousin once removed (see Bd. XXXI, 5, 6, XXXIV, 5). Further details are given in Bk. IX, Chap. XXI, 1-13. Dahâk was the last ruler of all the seven regions, excepting Kât-Ûs.

⁵ See Bd. XV, 26-28.

⁶ Av. Thraêtaonō, son of Âthwyō, and, traditionally, the ninth in descent from Yim (see Bd. XXXI, 7, 8); nine generations being assumed necessary to allow for the thousand years' reign of the Dahâk dynasty which he put an end to. His rule was confined to the central region of Khvanîras.

9. A report of Frêdûn, the ruler of Khvantras ; as to the smiting of Dahâk, the conquering of the country of Mâzendarân¹, and the allotment of Khvantras among his three sons, Salm, Tûg, and Aitrê² ; their union with the daughters of Pât-srôbô³, king of the Arabs and descendant of Tâz, and the lineage and report of them, each separately. 10. The reign of Mânûskîhar of Irân, descendant (nâpô) of Aitrê. 11. The expiating⁴ monarch Frâsîyâv of Tûrân, and Aûzôbô⁵ the Tûmâspian, monarch of Irân.

12. The descendant of Mânûskîhar, Kavî-Kavâd, who *was* progenitor of the Kayâns and ruler of Irân ; and the expiating ruler Keresâsp⁶. 13. Kât-Ûs, *grandson*⁷ of Kavâd, ruler and maintainer of royalty (kat-dânô) in the seven regions. 14. Kât-Khûsrôî who *was* son of Sîyâvakhsh⁸ *and* ruler of

¹ The land on the southern coast of the Caspian belonging to the Mâzainya daêva (demons, or idolators) of the Avesta.

² The last of whom was slain by his brothers, and was avenged by his descendant Mânûskîhar (see Bd. XXXI, 9-12).

³ Possibly the celebrated individual of that name who is mentioned, in Pahl. Vend. XX, 4, as an instance of opulence. The Shâhnâmah speaks only of the three daughters of the king of Yaman.

⁴ Or 'plundering ;' but Tûg-hômônd here, and Tûgâvand in § 12, may perhaps mean 'descended from Tûg,' as Frâsîyâv was the sixth in descent from Tûg (see Bd. XXXI, 14).

⁵ Said to have been a great-grandson of Mânûskîhar (see Bd. XXXI, 23).

⁶ Probably the hero who was sixth in descent from Tûg, and third cousin of Frâsîyâv (see Bk. IX, Chap. XV ; Bd. XXXI, 14, 26, 27) ; though placed by Firdausî as a king Garshâsp preceding Kât-Qubâd.

⁷ As appears from Bd. XXXI, 25.

⁸ The son of Kât-Ûs, who did not become king.

Khvanîras. 15. And a special report of many particulars of the races of Irân, Tûrân, and Salmân¹, even unto the ruler Kai-Lôharâsp² and the monarch Kai-Vistâsp³. 16. The prophet (vakhshvar) of the Mazdâ-worshipping religion, Zaratûst the Spîtâmân, and the progress of time from the beginning of the reign of Frêdûn till the coming of Zaratûst to conference *with Aûharmazd*⁴.

17. And many races and statements, onwards from that *time*, are enumerated in the same Nask as *having* existed, and are characterized by it for existence, such as the Sasanians—whom it reckons as the well-created—and their sovereignty. 18. In the race of Mânûskîhar, Nôdar⁵, Yôskö Fryânö⁶, and

¹ The people of the Airya, Tûirya, and Sairima provinces, mentioned in Yt. XIII, 143.

² Fifth in descent from Kavî-Kavâd, and third cousin once removed of his predecessor Kai-Khûsrôî (see Bd. XXXI, 25, 28).

³ Son of Kai-Lôharâsp (see Bd. XXXI, 29).

⁴ The historical legends contained in the Avesta end with the sons of king Vistâsp, and other contemporaries of Zaratûst; not a word being said of any succeeding monarch. Similarly, Bd. XXXI and this historical Nask fail to carry on the details of the royal line beyond Vistâsp; ignoring the Achæmenians, Alexander, and the Askânians, they leap over an evident gap in history (very insufficiently bridged in the more modern chapter, Bd. XXXIV) to the Sasanians. This gap, between Avesta legends and the later undoubted Persian history, is a very weak point in the continuity of the two periods. And as the mode of bridging over this gap in Bd. XXXIV occurs in a chapter 'on the computation of years of the Arabs' (see S. B. E. vol. v, p. xxxvii) it must be considered as more of an Arab than a Persian contribution to history.

⁵ Av. Naotara; a son of Mânûskîhar (see Bd. XXXI, 13, 23, XXXIII, 5).

⁶ Doubtful; if the second name be a patronymic, the combination suggests the Yôistô yô Fryânânâm of Yt. V, 81, XIII, 120, regarding whom the tale of Yôst-î Fryânö is told. No son of

Namûn, son of Spend-shêd¹, is *included* the father of Avarethrabzu², Âtûr-pâd son of Mâraspend; and *its* existence, even then, remains for the future. 19. Also about the many qualities of capability and glory *of* the selfsame sovereignty, which are promoting the renovation *of the universe* destined for the races; and *its* fortune *and* splendour which are shed upon the race, and are not severed from it till the renovation³.

20. About the original knowledge of the professions, care, and industry of the period; the great acquaintance *of* mankind with the putting aside of injury from the adversary, the preservation of the body, *and* the deliverance of the soul; the govern-

Nôdar with a corresponding name is known, so that we are not dealing with a complete pedigree.

¹ Probably intended for Spend-dâd, and we should perhaps read 'Vohûmanô, son of Spend-dâd,' whose reign is celebrated as the silver age in Byt. II, 17 (see also Bd. XXXI, 29, XXXIV, 8).

² This name, or surname, is given in Pâzand, and is also to be found in Yt. XIII, 106, as follows: 'we reverence the guardian spirit of the righteous Avarethrabzu, son of Râstare-vagham.' If the latter epithet were a surname of Âtûr-pâd, the famous prime minister of Shahpûhar II, as the text intimates, we must conclude that the former epithet was a surname of his only son, Zaratûst, mentioned in his Pandnâmak. These surnames, and others of their time, might have been easily interpolated in the long list of uncouth names included in the Fravarân Yast, when the Avesta books were revised during the reign of Shahpûhar II, and the Nasks were 'reckoned,' as stated in the fourth book of the Dînkard (see Haug's Essay on Pahlavi, pp. 146, 152).

³ §§ 17-19 refer to text which must have been written either in the time of Shahpûhar II, or at some later period during Sasanian rule. Whereas §§ 1-16 are descriptive of an older record which, though consistent with the extant Avesta texts, could not have been compiled from them alone. And § 20 describes text that might have been written at any time.

ment necessary for the world, even before the coming of Zaratûst by order of the creator; the bringing of the word¹ from the sacred beings, and all occurrences to the leaders *of religion* at various times; *and* whatever is on the same subjects.

21. Perfect righteousness is excellence.

CHAPTER XIV,

1. The Spend² *contains* particulars about the origin *and* combination *of* the material *existence*, guardian spirit, *and* soul (nisman) of Zaratûst; how the creation of each one *occurred* in the spiritual *existence*, and *in* what mode *it was* produced for the worldly *existence*; how *their* connection with the parents *arose*, the coming of the parents together, the combination in the mother, and the birth from the mother; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

2. Also about the arrival of both spirits, the good *one* for developing, and the evil *one* for destroying; the victory *of* the good spirit, and the rearing of Zaratûst.

3. His attainment on maturity, at thirty years *of age*, to a conference *with* Aûharmazd; and the

¹ Reading vakhsh in the same Avesta sense as in vakhshvar, 'a prophet;' it may, however, mean 'gain, fortune, gifts.' A similarly-written word, vâyâ, 'air, breath,' is used in Sg. XIII, 7 to translate the 'Spirit' of God in Gen. i. 2.

² Corresponding to the thirteenth word, anghêus, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; and it is the thirteenth Nask in all Rivâyats. Spend means 'beneficent, or bounteous,' and is written Sfind, or Spentah, in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contained sixty kardah, or subdivisions.

occurrence of seven conferences in ten years. 4. Many marvels, owing to him, are published therein, just as there are *some* which, collected *and* selected, are noticed by the *Dinkard* manuscript¹.

5. *In* seven sections (*burīnō*), such as are called *Spend*, are the seven enquiries, *in* each instance a single enquiry; *and* the bestowal of the other Nasks, in these seven enquiries, *was* through speaking out in each one *of* the places of conference. 6. About the various enquiries, the period of the sitting *and* rising *on* each occasion, the nature of the sitting of the archangels, the coming forward of Zaratūst to that domestic conclave (*handēmānth*), his position *in* that place, what *there was* to say to him, *and* what *there was* to exhibit to him.

7. The conferring of the wisdom of omniscience upon Zaratūst, and *what was* seen *by* Zaratūst *of* the past *and* future, *and* the perpetual amount of duration therein, through that wisdom². 8. The existence of that wisdom, *and* what that is which, after *having* subsisted in it, is again well recognised; such as, owing to it, are the highest *and* best of places, heaven and the various grades of position *and* reward *of* the righteous, according to their worthiness through the practice of good works; the most downward and worst of places, hell and the place *of* punishment *of* the wicked, according to their sin; and, between the two, the place of the ever-stationary, those having equal good works *and*

¹ In its seventh book which contains a full account of the birth and much of the life of Zaratūst, with a narrative of future events, all derived, no doubt, from the *Spend Nask*. Particulars connected with his birth will also be found in Bk. IX, Chap. XXIV.

² See Byt. II, 5-9.

sin; the *Kīnvad* bridge¹, at which is the account as to good works *and* sin; and the future existence, in which is the consummation of every one, righteous and wicked, and the preservation of all good creations from every evil occurs.

9. Information also *as to* many other things which are marvellous, and *as to* a summary of the statements of these seven enquiries, which is *derived* from knowledge of every kind. 10. Likewise, about the communication of Zaratûst's knowledge of the Mazda-worshipping religion to the world, his attracting mankind to the religion, *and* the ages, after Zaratûst, until the renovation *of the universe*. 11. *And* about the nature of the advancement of the people of the period, the separation *of* centuries and millenniums, *and* the signs, wonders, and perplexity which are manifested in the world at the end of each millennium in the world.

12. Also as to the birth *and* arrival of Aûshêdar², son of Zaratûst, at the end of the first millennium³, and a report of him and his time, *and of* the many destroyers of the organizers of the period between Zaratûst's millennium and the coming of Aûshêdar⁴.

¹ Av. *kīnvatô peretus*, the route to the other world (see Bk. IX, Chap. XX, 3).

² Commonly written Hûshêdar, but it is a corruption of Av. *Ukhshyad-ereta*. He is the first of the three posthumous sons of Zaratûst, who were expected to restore his religion and make it triumphant by three successive efforts, each preceded by a period of anarchy (see Bd. XXXII, 8, 9, Byt. III, 13, 43-50).

³ The millennium of Zaratûst, which, according to the chronology of the Bundahis, must have ended during the period A.D. 593-635 (see Byt. III, 11 n).

⁴ The occurrence of such an interval between the first millennium and the coming of Aûshêdar seems inconsistent with the previous

13. The arrival of Aûshêdar-mâh¹, son of Zaratûst, at the end of the second millennium; information *about* him and his time, *and* the destroyers *of* the organizers who *were* within the millennium *of* Aûshêdar. 14. The coming and arrival of Sôshâns², son of Zaratûst, at the end of the third millennium, the destroyers *of* the organizers who *were* within the millennium *of* Aûshêdar-mâh, the arrival of Sôshâns, *and* information *about* Sôshâns and his time. 15. Also, as to the renovation *of the universe and* the future existence, *it* is declared *that* they arise in his time.

16. Perfect *is* the excellence *of* righteousness.

CHAPTER XV.

1. The Bakân-yast³ *contains* particulars, first, about the worship of Aûharmazd, the highest of divinities (bakân), and, secondly, *of* the worship of the angels of other invisible and visible worldly existences, out of whom are likewise the names of

statement as to his arrival at the end of that millennium, but, from Byt. III, 44, it appears probable that he was expected to come in the 600th year of the next millennium (A.D. 1193-1235).

¹ Commonly written Hûshêdar-mâh, but it is a corruption of Av. Ukhshyad-nēmangh. He is the second of the expected posthumous sons (see Byt. III, 52, 53).

² Av. Saoshyāns; the last of the posthumous sons, who is expected to complete the triumph of the religion, and prepare for the renovation of the universe (see Bd. XXX, 4, 7, 25, 27, Byt. III, 62).

³ Corresponding to the fourteenth word, mazdâi, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the fifteenth Nask in other Rivâyats. Bakân-yast means 'worship of the divinities,' and is written Baghân-yast, or Bayân-yast, in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contained seventeen kardah, or subdivisions.

the days¹; *also* their glory, power, triumph, *and* marvellousness. 2. Besides, *also*, many angels who are invoked by name in their worship, and the attention *and* obeisance *due* to them.

3. The worthiness *and* dispensation of favour for worshippers, *and* the duty of their many separate recitations unto the angels. 4. The duty of unlimited acquaintance *with* knowledge about the possessions *and* arrangements of the period, over which the creator Aûharmazd *has* appointed them, and they remain to cause industry.

5. Perfect is the excellence *of* righteousness.

CHAPTER XVI.

1. The beginning of the law is the Nîkâdûm² of thirty fargards³. 2. The section Patkâr-radîstân ('*magistrate code*')⁴ is about this, that the ruin *and* misery (ayôyakîh) from the destroyer, for mankind and animals, occurring really apart from the spiritual *existence*, have arisen through the sinfulness even of

¹ Each of the days of the Parsi month being named after some particular angel, or spirit. From this description it appears probable that the Yasts formed a part of this Nask; but, if so, it ought to have contained at least thirty chapters.

² Corresponding to the fifteenth word, khshathremkâ, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the sixteenth Nask in other Rivâyats. This name should probably be Vîk-ast-tûm, meaning 'the most separate concerns,' as the Nask refers chiefly to public law; but it is called Niyâram, or Niyâdâm, in the Rivâyats.

³ The Rivâyats say fifty-four kardah, which number may have been obtained by adding the 'twenty-four particulars,' mentioned in Chap. XX, 1, to the thirty fargards stated here.

⁴ The patkâr-rad, or settler of disputes, appears to have held a position somewhere between an arbitrator and a judge, and which may be approximately defined as that of a magistrate.

mankind; *and* the progress of ruin and misery in the world is owing to unauthorisedly assaulting one another. 3. Advice to mankind about abstaining therefrom, *with* an estimate of an authorised assault, *and*, again, for a slight assault and no assault. 4. To stand magisterially, even opposed to the unmagisterial, with freedom from hurt and loss to oneself; *and* to abstain altogether, likewise, from the most innocuous (anakhrûgûnôôtûm) assault even upon an unmagisterial *person*.

5. *In* all magisterial investigation (patkâr-radîh) —of which, when the custom that exists is established judicially, the substance is two statements, which are verbal and demonstrable, that subsist in different combinations—*there* are four species: the verbal and demonstrable, the verbal which is not demonstrable, the demonstrable *which* is not verbal, *and that which* is neither verbal nor yet demonstrable. 6. In the arguments (sâmân) which are allotted *as* verbal are four species, the dispute *having* different arguments *and* different assertions which are for unmagisterial investigation, for one's own priestly authority (radô), for another good man —three of such being requisite¹—and also for other evidence². 7. And in those which are allotted *as* demonstrable are six species, and for an unmagisterial *person* the assertions, like the previous species which are on the same subject, are twelve³. 8. Of

¹ Evidently referring to arbitrators with an umpire.

² Reading hanô gôkâyîh, but hanô is an unusual form. Perhaps agôkâyîh, 'want of evidence,' would be more suitable to the context.

³ So the MS., but 'four' would suit the context better, and the two Pahlavi ciphers do not differ much in shape.

all unmagisterial proceedings—which, though it be a custom, is to proceed unauthorisedly—the species are five¹, which consist in *having* demonstrated, getting upon, striking², *having* caused a wound, and *having* slain.

9. Of *those* subject to the magistrate (patkâr-radō-hômônd) the twelve species are divided into four sections of three each. 10. One section are the hearing who are seeing, they to whom a dispute which is verbal [is demonstrable; the hearing who are not seeing, they to whom a dispute which is verbal³] is not demonstrable; and the seeing who are not hearing, they to whom even a dispute which is demonstrable is not verbal. 11. And with these three, who are in one section, there is magisterial investigation; and the magistrate, unless (ba^oâ hat)⁴ risk for the body *be* certain, is then irresistible; which is as though it be said *that* to restrain by

¹ These five grades of unauthorised retribution are analogous to the five grades of personal outrage mentioned in Vend. IV, 17.

² Pahl. *zatham*, 'a blow, assault, striking,' is used throughout, instead of *zâkham* (Pers. *za'h*m), which latter word does not occur in these two books of the *Dînkard*, except in the form *zakhamî-hastanō* in Bk. IX, Chap. VIII, 6. The *Farhang-i Oîm-aêvak* also uses *zatôm* in the same sense, in its oldest MSS.; and Dd. V, 1 has *zatham*. Darmesteter suggests that *zatham* and *zâkham* are both traceable to an original *zathma*, or *zathema*.

³ The words in brackets are omitted by mistake in the MS.

⁴ The ambiguity, mentioned in the latter clause of this section, appears to lie in these words, which mean either 'but if' or 'only if.' Such ambiguity must have existed in the original Pahlavi text of the Nask, and probably indicates that the earlier part of this section is a summary of the Pahlavi version of the original Avesta text, while the latter part is a summary of the Pahlavi commentary upon that version. As the same ambiguity occurs, without comment, in § 12, where the meaning seems tolerably certain, it is doubtful if the commentator's opinion can be adopted.

wounding (*rêsh*) is not justifiable, *but* the decision therein is this, that, when they do not change through lawful litigation, and they cannot hold back without wounding, *it* is justifiable to keep *them* back even by wounding. 12. One section are the not hearing who are also not seeing, the women, and the children; and with these three, who are in one section, there is no magisterial investigation; and the decision *as to* the bodies thereof is this, that, unless risk for the body *be* certain from their complete change, they are then to be completely changed (*barâ vardisnô*). 13. One section are the foreigner and *him* worthy of death, certain of thereby producing a sentence for *being* executed from the judges; *also* the highwayman, when he stays on the highway and his destruction is proclaimed, *but* it is not possible to effect *it*. 14. With these three, likewise, who are in one section, there is no magisterial investigation, but the decision about them is even this, that when *one* is utterly destroying their life, *one* is thereby possessing merit. 15. One section are they who are walking, *or* coming upon *one*, unseasonably, *or* retreating confused into a rugged place, *and*, when *people* ask them to speak, *they* are giving no answer, *and* they are not suspicious as foreigners. 16. With these three, likewise, who are in one section, there is no magisterial investigation, and the decision about them is this, that when *one* kills them outright, *one* does not become sinful thereby.

17. *As to* whatever is on the same subject it introduces many opinions, and also this, that a counter-assault (*avâz-zatam*) is that which becomes a blow and wound, *and* is to be so committed when it

is possible to produce *them* again exactly in every single particular.

CHAPTER XVII.

Nîkâdûm Nask.

1. The second section is the Zatamistân ('*assault code*'), particulars about assault (zatam) and the annoyances (vêshîgânö) from assault, such as pain, blood, and unconsciousness; *also* the sin¹ that a man may commit in a state of unconsciousness.

2. About the seven kinds of symptoms of unconsciousness, and separate decisions about assaults that adults may commit among those who are children; also as regards an assault which proceeds to pain *and* blood, and as regards that *in* which the duration of the disposition of wrath abates the pain *and* blood.

3. About begging (khvahlîsnö) *and* beneficence (hû-dahlîsnö)², such as those of which *one* says in particular *there* are four species: when stinginess (pûsth) benefits pride (pîkô), when pride benefits stinginess, when stinginess benefits stinginess, and when pride benefits pride; and *there* are three other species that originate from these *last* two, in consultation together, when stinginess and pride benefit stinginess and pride, when stinginess and pride benefit stinginess, and when stinginess and pride benefit pride, *all* which, *together*, constitute the seven primary species; many others, too, are traced back to these. 4. Also about seeing the depravity (khang

¹ Involuntary violations of the ceremonial law.

² The terms used in this section are not quite certain.

dīdanō) of a perverting member of the community (kastâr dâhm) and of the perverter of a member of the community, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

5. About a weapon seizable, and a weapon *one* brings, *there* is this, namely, what is the thing which is imperfect (anaspôrik) as a weapon, what is that which is not, and what is that which is welcome as a weapon; what is that which, when any one forces *it* back at any one as a weapon, is itself something annoying to him; what is his natural annoyance and what his imparted; *and* the penalty *in* property and difference of sentence on a man who is carrying a weapon, due to any weapon *he* has to carry away.

6. About the six modes of engaging in conflict: through assault, tumult (khvasisnō)¹, false teaching (mītôk-sâstô)², giving no food (atapdâdō)³, speaking with wizard's spells⁴, and speaking with threats of danger⁵; and, where *there is* an engaging

¹ Pers. 'hasîs. Farh. Oîm, p. 34, ll. 6-8, has 'Av. vâiti=*Pahl.* khvasisnō is that when *one* runs behind any one for offensiveness.'

² Farh. Oîm, p. 35, ll. 1-4, has 'Av. mithôsâst and its explanation "false teaching" are that when *one* teaches a false way to any one; even when he unaccustomedly shows *it* rightly to any one, *it* is a committal of Mithôsâst by him.'

³ Compare Pers. tabah, tō, tōî. Farh. Oîm, p. 38, ll. 2-4, has 'Ataftdâd is that when *one* keeps back food and drink, whereby *there* is hunger and thirst.' It is worthy of death (see Chap. XX, 97).

⁴ Farh. Oîm, p. 34, ll. 3-5, has 'Av. yâtukhta, through wizard's spells (yâtûk-gôbisnîhâ), is that when *one* shall speak thus: "I will destroy thee through witchcraft;" when *one* says "through the spirits' lack of good religion" *it* is of the same kind.'

⁵ Farh. Oîm, p. 34, ll. 5, 6, has 'Av. dudhuwi buzda, threats of danger (saham-numâyisnîh), is that when *one* speaks thus: "I will strike with worldly weapons."

in conflict, it then occurs when *one has* stood up for beginning *it* and the assault is committed, *on* one by the other, *and* not before. 7. And this, too, that engaging in conflict occurs *as regards* adult with adult, childless women with childless women, pregnant women with pregnant women, and children of seven years with children of seven years—but, as regards children of seven years in sight of *their* fathers, it becomes an engaging in conflict of the fathers—and the decision about it is this, that the atonement for every sin which may be committed through engaging in conflict goes to the priestly authorities.

8. About the affliction *of* a pure lord who sees any one *who* has been useless (abûn) unto *his* slave, though the slave is beseeching, and does not contend for *his* ownership. 9. About sin *affecting* accusers¹ not being atoned for by any other good work, except unto the accuser himself; *also* about the slaying of a servant together with *his* lord, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

10. About slaying *by* untaught children of seven years, *or* even of eight years in sight of *their* fathers; *and* the criminality of the fathers therein, when *it* is possible for them to hinder *it* *and* they do not hinder *it*, and when *it* is not possible for them to hinder *it*.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Nikâdûm Nask.

1. The third section is the Rêshistân ('wound code'), particulars about cutting, tearing, cleaving,

¹ A sin which injures another person, or any good creation, who must be satisfied by compensation before the sin can be remitted.

disembowelling, stabbing, gnawing¹, rupturing, hacking, mutilating, and withering²; such as are all called wounds. 2. The upheaving circular movement of a certain serpent-scourge³, the throwing down of the person, and the flow of blood from the bodies of the people.

3. How the various members are divided into seventy-six that are more particularly called principal, which are comprised in two classes; two of these, which are clothed *and* different, one from the other, are female, and *some* out of the surrounding parts (gīrvôgânth), which are *apart* from eight of the principal, that are comprised in the members of the two classes *and* among those seventy-six—*and* which, in like manner, are different one from the other—are female, and are *of* different purpose and different design, one from the other.

4. These, too, namely, when any one, through an assault, produces, for any other, stupefaction, swelling, or leanness, blackness⁴, or paleness, shortness, or tallness, want of intelligence, much eating, little eating, or moderate eating, indolence, or diligence, or dulness of hearing; or he wishes to speak *some* words, and they strike him in return; or *one* altogether diminishes *any* one's speech, sight, *or* hearing,

¹ Or, perhaps, khvâyisnō (compare Pers. 'hâyîdan) may mean 'biting.'

² The last four terms are, in Pahlavi: skōnisnō, khûrdō kardānō, tâshîdanō, and khûsfîdanō.

³ The mâr-ganō (Av. khrafstraghna), we are told in Pahl. Vend. XVIII, 6, 'may be *made* of anything, *but* a leathern *one* is good' (see also Bd. XXVIII, 22). Intended as a snake-killer, it was misused as a scourge for human beings.

⁴ Assuming that vêsîh, 'excess,' is a miswriting of siyahîh.

wisdom, strength, *or* semen, milk, *or* pregnancy; *or* when *one* destroys the spleen (*sp̥ur*) or milk of females, or, in revenge (*gt̥far*), kills *his* son outright; *or* when they would inflict a wound upon a wound, and one's blood goes streaming forth.

5. Also about an assault with one, two, or three weapons, or more, in conjunction; or they may commit *it* on the spot, or in confederacy, or as a first offence¹. 6. About the measure of a wound when a two-edged sword (*dôbarakō*) plunges down, the area (*sarât*), walls, and surroundings, and the shape which is plunged; that *which* is hacked, or cleft, or mutilated, or a torrent *of* blood streaming; the affliction (*vamang*) of the furious serpent-scurge (*mâr-vanô*)², and the length, glitter, and weight of the weapon.

7. The ritual for the departure of a wound and the departure of pain, watching over *it* for the duration of three nights *or* a year, *its* greater wretchedness *or* less wretchedness, *its* cure (*sp̥ôrikîh*) *or* incurableness, and whatever is on the same subject. 8. Trivial enumerations, and decisions upon each separately.

CHAPTER XIX.

Nîkâdûm Nask.

1. The fourth section, which is also called the law of the Hamêmalistân ('*accuser's code*'), contains particulars about accusation, and about the false

¹ These three modes are expressed by Pâz. *ithrih*, *hidhih*, and *apavarâvarstih*, which stand evidently for the original Avesta words *ithra*, *hadha*, and *apaurvavarsta* (see Chap. XXI, 6).

² See § 2.

accusation *by* any one, regarding any other, as to witchcraft, destroying a righteous *man*¹, theft, plunder, injuring the existence, minor injury² as regards several particular things, taking up *a weapon*, threatening with it³, assault, tumult⁴, incarcerating⁵, false teaching, fettering, making dejected (*nigûnô*), giving no food, falsehood, speaking with wizard's spells, or with threats of danger, abstracting

¹ Pahl. *aharûbôkîh* (=Av. *ashavagha*) must not be confounded with *aharûbôîh*, 'righteousness,' for which *aharâyîh* is more commonly used.

² These two kinds of injury, usually written *bâîôdôk-zêdô* and *kâityôk-gađô* in the *Dīnkard*, are mentioned in Farh. Oīm, pp. 32, l. 8-34, l. 2, as follows:—'*Av. baodhagađ=Pahl. bôdôb-zêd and Av. baodhô-varstahê=Pahl. bôdôk-varst* are as *it were* "observantly assaulted," and *one* mentions *them* most about the assault and injury of anything which is noticeable. Through falsehood other noticeable sin is small, *and* is subdued through *being* devoid of an injurer, as the assault *and* injury of anything through wear is a small sin. *Kâityô-ged* is a sin for mankind, which is a degree of *Bôdôk-zêd*, *but* less; so also the decree (*das-tīnak*) is different from *Bôdôk-varst*. The principal *Bôdôk-zêd*, that of animals with observance, the *Bôdôk-zêd* through wear, *and* the *Kâityôk-zêd* sin towards people are sins which are *hamê-mâlân* ("affecting accusers"). The dissipating weapon for sin dissipates the sinfulness of the other sin, which is called *rûbânîk* ("affecting the soul").'

³ These two terms are *âgêreptô* and *avoîristô* (Av. *âgerep-tem* and *avaoiristem*) which are thus described in Farh. Oīm, p. 36, ll. 4-6: '*âgerept*, "seized," is that when they shall take up a weapon for smiting an innocent *person*; *avoîrist*, "turning," is that when *one* turns the weapon upon an innocent *person*.'

⁴ See Chap. XVII, 6, for some of these terms.

⁵ Pahl. *handerêtô* which is thus described in Farh. Oīm, pp. 34, l. 8-35, l. 1: '*Av. handereiti, Pahl. handeretô*, is that when, owing to negligence, *one* keeps any one exhausted; when *one* would make him fallen who is of the ruined, or him who is a master of arms, and *has* imprisoned him, the causing of much anguish thereby is the committal of incarceration.' See also § 44.

the increase of labourers' wages, wishing to cut (*vurīdanō*) and squeeze (*pashkhâdanō*) anything *from any* one, and seizing (*magīdanō*) *it* for fire *and* water, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 2. Also about the limitation of the accusation of sin therein, the retribution for *it*, and the dust, or ashes, or flour, for the eyes and the rest of the bodies of human beings, it now¹ speaks henceforth for thirty successive heads².

3. About the sin of making people eat bodily refuse³, *and* bringing *it* unlawfully to *their* persons *or* clothes; *and of* going to a menstruous woman, or a wizard. 4. About a juvenile and well-behaved woman who comes out from a house of those of the good religion, *and* is considered as well taught. 5. About falsehood *and* slander, small *and* great, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 6. About the care of a pregnant woman in lawful reclining (*khapâk*), feasting (*gashnō*), and work.

7. About a householder who does not teach his own household, *in order* to teach the household of another; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 8. About a quiet *and* an unquiet *person* with equal opinionativeness, and the opinion which *they have* to form before beginning. 9. About the expediency *or* in expediency of the opinion which is announced, and the reason of both. 10. About the man who, for fear of a counter-assault, runs away.

11. Also about not renouncing *sin*, neglecting complaints, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

¹ Pâz. *knîn* (= *knûn*).

² Of which the details are not mentioned.

³ Pahl. *hīkhar* (Av. *hikhra*) is any refuse or dirt from the living body, or any liquid exudation from a corpse.

12. The difference *of* sin in priests from that in any one else, as regards *its* renunciation. 13. About the expediency of retribution, and the measure of the expediency. 14. About *and* to what extent is the authority of one's own priestly master, *for* allowing the sin which any other person may commit as regards a disciple of that same, and that, too, of his disciple affecting the soul.

15. About the chastisement of a judge who is releasing sinners, and whatever is on the same subject. 16. About the justifiableness *of* a plaintiff in committing illegality. 17. About seizing the purity produced for foreigners, and whatever is on the same subject. 18. About *one* worthy of death making supplication (lâvakö), co-operation with *one* worthy of death, and whatever is on the same subject. 19. About confession as regards anything, the object of confession, and whatever is on the same subject. 20. About exhibiting a liking for sin worthy of death.

21. About a blow with a weapon, which is incomplete *or* not incomplete, when adults *or* children shall inflict *it*, *or* when children with mutual assistance. 22. About a wounded *person* whose anguish *was* allayed by medicine, the arising of the anguish again from disease, *when* he died, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

23. About taking security (garôbö) from the defendant after the decree of the judges. 24. About the legal proceedings as to an offence when, owing to the incapability *of* the plaintiff, adjournment *has* always occurred, *and* a man would occasion an acceleration of the statement of law (dâdö vâk) *and of* the procedure of the plaintiff. 25. About appointing

a mediator (dâḍak-gôbô), *and* the object of mediation.

26. About an assault (zatam) which is altogether of furious (pûr-tâk) origin. 27. And about a harmless (âzaḍ) assault and striking back fairly to test a weapon, *and*, when it is not possible fairly, turning *it* into execution of duty, or giving of scars (pisang-das), or punishment; a statement of the change, and whatever is on the same subject. 28. About the limit of the punishment of a child for the sin it may commit. 29. About seeking an interpretation (pâḍô-khân), the limit of interpreting, and whatever is on the same subject. 30. As regards a signal of approving the words *of* any one, on passing away, are these:—About giving up anything, making a will about it, *and* renunciation of sin.

31. About committing an assault *upon* an unknown person at an indefinite time, and whatever is on the same subject. 32. About giving a weapon *and* telling *some one* to kill a foreigner who is taken for judicial investigation, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 33. About the great hinderers¹ who are slain by a righteous man, who the great hinderers are, *and* unto whom it occurs; when *one has* to command *it* as assistance for one or many, or they shall commit the assault in advance *or* afterwards, and whatever is on the same subject. 34. About the weapon they shall seize *it is* stated thus: 'I see a man and a sheep, I strike upon this *and* upon that, and *it is* gone:' *and* whatever is upon the same subject.

¹ Doubtful: the word can be read freh-gasîgân on its first occurrence, and freh-gasîgânô on its last; but both reading and meaning are very uncertain.

35. About petitioning, *and* the going of a frontier governor (mar'z-pân) to the feet of tyrants (sâstârânö) to speak of regulations, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 36. Where *and* when *one* strikes a living *person* he vexes *him*, and the living *person* he strikes vexes *him when* dead; *but* he who strikes a dead *person* is vexed alive, and the dead *person* he strikes vexes *him when* dead; and whatever is on the same subject.

37. As to wood and useless pith (dīl), that which is for keeping is as far as a dimension that is mentioned, *and one*, therefore, passes *it* by not to burn; concerning also that wood which is only for the blast of a furnace (gûrīh zīgâ) as firewood, the burning *and* dimensions and blast of the furnace *are stated*, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 38. About the sin through which a man attains from atonement to the sacred-twigg ordeal (baresmôk-varīh), *and* from the sacred-twigg ordeal to the heat ordeal (garemôk-varīh) which *has* maintained the worthiness of an assault that is an actual inexcusability (akârīh)¹ to reasoning thought; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

39. About the excellence of physicians, *their* merit from doing good, *and* sin from not doing good; the quality that exists as regards medicines, seeking a physician for animals also, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 40. About a horse, which is new to the saddle (kôfak), *being* made tailless (kapê) and not feeding (akhavânö), how *it* is done, the sin owing to doing *it* unlawfully and heedlessly, the

¹ It might be 'inevitability,' but this would render the ordeal unnecessary.

wound *and* damage *that* arise from it, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

41. About several persons, when anything that is imperfect, *or* even not imperfect, as a weapon is convenient to them, and a wound occurs, and *it* is not evident which, *or* who, threw the weapon, it is not necessary to know *its* imperfection *or* lack of imperfection¹; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 42.

About the three modes for thrusting a weapon are these *details*, that is, so much of it when *one* thrusts it on ground that is hard, or soft, or full of ruggednesses (*ākhārigānakō*); when *one* shall bear it up aloft, and the amount of the height; *and* when *one* impels it again with a sweep, or *has* to draw up its centre at the time of a sweep; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 43. About an assault and the most hurtful occasion when, *for* the same reason, they would celebrate a religious rite; the retribution on the spot, *and* the sentence upon the fourth occasion².

44. About incarcerating (*handerêto*) in a frightful and inaccessible (*avidarg*) place, and among noxious creatures; the quantity of noxious creatures, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 45. About grasping the tail of an ox, or a horse, on which *another* sits, to hold *it* back, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 46. About threatening danger,

¹ The fact of the wound being sufficient to prove the unlawfulness of using the weapon.

² According to Vend. IV, 35, if a man wounds another so that the blood comes, and does this for the *fourth* time, he becomes an outcast and receives the maximum punishment. Also, when a person walks without the sacred girdle or shirt (Vend. XVIII, 59), it is at the *fourth* step that the demons possess him.

wizard's spells¹, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

47. About complaints as to the value of a lamb², or a sheep³, or a beast *of burden* (stôr), or a human being (vîrôk)⁴; either *when* the plaintiffs are one, or two, or three, or four, or many; how *one has* to summon the defendant, and how much time *there* is.

48. About when the controversy (han-bêshinîh) is as to theft (dûgô), and the confession as to plunder (*avor*); or the controversy is as to plunder, *and* the confession as to theft; and when the controversy is as to injuring the existence⁵, *and* the confession as to minor injury; or the controversy is as to minor injury, and the confession as to injuring the existence; *and* when the controversy is as to theft *and* plunder, *and* the confession as to injuring the existence *and* minor injury; or the controversy is as to injuring the existence *and* minor injury, *and* the confession as to theft *and* plunder. 49. And when the controversy is about so much, *and* the confession about so much *of* a different kind; when the controversy is about so much, and the confession about more of a different kind; when the controversy is about so much, *and* the confession about less *of* a different kind; when the controversy is about so much, *and* the confession as to more of the same kind; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

¹ See Chap. XVII, 6.

² Pahl. Av. *asperenô* (=Pahl. *anaspôrfk*) 'imperfect, immature;' an epithet for a lamb or kid.

³ Pahl. *anûmôyê* (Av. *anumaya*), probably 'bleater,' an epithet for a sheep or goat.

⁴ These four grades of value are mentioned in Vend. IV, 48.

⁵ See § 1.

50. About the sin of unfriendliness *of* a master towards a disciple, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 51. About taking a thief of any one's goods (a1s1gânð), conducting *him* to the judges, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 52. This, too, that when affliction has come upon a good *man*, the effort of every one, for removing that affliction, should continue just as though it happened to himself. 53. And when a good *man* is beaten through malice, the effort of every one, in demanding compensation for him from the smiter, should continue just as though it happened to himself. 54. And this, too, that, when there is no danger for one, the power of affording assistance is thus assistance *of* the innocent; *and*, as to the property which may be carried *away* from him, *and of which* they shall make no restitution, after as much as a Hâsar¹ the carrier *off* becomes guilty *and* liable to penalty.

55. About the distinction of indigenous and foreign (a1r va-an-a1r) thieves as to cold and the clothing given, *and* as to sickness *and* undergoing remedies. 56. About the hands of a foreigner *being* unfettered for no other reason but care of water and fire, to

¹ A Hâsar (Av. hâthra) is a measure of distance, as well as of time. This is stated in Farh. Oim, pp. 41, l. 11-42, l. 3, thus:— 'Of the Hâsar there are also several kinds that express measurement. A medium Hâsar on the ground, which they call also a Parasang, is a thousand steps of two feet which have to walk. With the lapse of time of a medium Hâsar the day and night are computed.' Again, p. 43, ll. 1-3 state that 'of twelve Hâsars is the longest day; that day and night in which is the longest day are twelve of the longest Hâsars, eighteen of the medium, and twenty-four of the least.' From this it appears that an average Hâsar of distance is a thousand paces, or Roman mile; and an average Hâsar of time is one hour and twenty minutes.

preserve *them* from blood, filth, and injury (âsipð). 57. About the sin of not restraining him who is the first assailant of two combatants, as soon as his attack is seen. 58. About teaching the peace of renunciation *of sin*, the bond of worthiness of him *of* great power even when proffering union in renunciation *with* him of little power, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

59. On the nature of responding about the keeping *away* from *one* worthy of death which arises through great judiciousness, the reason of keeping, how to keep, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 60. And on the nature of responding when they ask in malice about a righteous man, when *one* knows *his* whereabouts, and when *one* does not know. 61. About how *one* is to give a weapon to generals (hên-gô-padânð) *and* august frontier governors.

62. About authorisedly shooting an arrow at *one* worthy of death, which is given again for killing *him* to any one unto whom the *person* worthy of death is consigned *and* becomes supplicating (lânakð) *and* goes to the middle of the distance, and they shall afford him assistance *and* enervate *him* for *it*, when, through the three words¹ which he utters, they do not deliver *him* up again. 63. About *one* worthy of death who is preserved with great judiciousness when the evidence, which they give before that about him, is through another *one* worthy of death, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 64. About evidence as to witchcraft and destroying a righteous *man*, that is, in what propor-

¹ Possibly hûmat, hûkht, hûvarst, 'good thoughts, good words, and good deeds,' which would be accepted as a sign of repentance.

tion it is certain or doubtful. 65. About causing the execution of *one* worthy of death *for* entertaining fondness for witchcraft and laughing at witchcraft, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

CHAPTER XX.

Nikkādam Nask.

1. *In* the fifth section are twenty-four particulars¹ about the standing up and going forth of a man with a weapon and angry thoughts towards *another* man; and also when he takes a beast *of* burden, saddles *it*, and sits upon *it*, takes the rein² (ayôkham) in hand and walks *away*; this, too, that, when he arrives there, he smites that *man*, or some one else; and whatever is on the same subject. 2. About what *one* *has* to do when the conversation of two men is *of* the destruction of a righteous man, *of* highway robbery, and *of* the cursing owing thereto; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 3. About what *one* *has* to do when, of two men who are *on* the same road, one slays a righteous man; *and* *about* the other when *he* *is* fearless, *and* when *he* *is* fearful. 4. About preserving *one* worthy of death when it is requisite for medical purposes (bezashkîh), though the plaintiff is *of* a different opinion; and whatever is on the same subject.

5. About the needlessness of plaintiffs *and* defendants speaking as to the substance (min tanû) of

¹ It is not clear whether these twenty-four particulars are to be sought in the details of § 1, or in the whole chapter, or some portion of it.

² Merely a guess.

the law, when the witness and judge is the supreme priest; the confidence which they may place *in* the decision of the supreme priest, due to his own knowledge *and* evidence, when, moreover, *they have* not to atone in the body; *and* the want of confidence *in* another judge when, moreover, *they have* to atone in the body, *and* the needfulness of plaintiffs *and* defendants speaking on the substance (*vaḷ tanû*) of the law, even when the judge is aware of the law. 6. About unauthorised combatants, become mutually sinful, when, to dissipate (*sīkh tanō*) a wound of the one, *he* would make the *other* one worthy of death. 7. About supplies (*pishôn*)¹ in travelling together, and their renewal; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

8. About inflicting penalties *by* magistrates, the assistance *of* the unmagisterial *given* to magistrates, the assistance of the magistrates, *and* the exemption of these *latter* from atonement to those *former*; likewise about conversation as to an assault, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 9. About the evasion of penalty *by* men at the *time* when a sin may be committed, and the arrest *of their* nearest relations *being* important, in whatever measure implicated therein *and* impossible to consider innocent; how to confine and make them really coerced to seek a remedy, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 10. About the powerfulness which comforts in sin where *there* is any special worthiness, and the reason

¹ Compare Pers. *bising*, Av. *fshaoni*. In some cases it might perhaps be read *pīkhvô*, and be traced to Av. *pithwa*. The word often occurs, as in § 11, Chaps. XXIII, 3, 15, XXVI, 10, XXVII, 4, 6, XXXI, 25, 36, XXXVII, 5, 7, 22, XLI, 19, 23, XLIII, 19, and its meaning, 'provision, or nourishment,' is well ascertained.

of any worthiness ; the want of power where *there* is special unworthiness, and the reason of any unworthiness ; the production of the good works of one towards another of the powerful, *and* of the sin of one of those lacking power ; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

11. About the plaint which *one* *has* to argue, and for the defendant to dispute ; the time for making the statement (gôbô) when the defendant does not come, or comes not to conduct the business ; the several peculiarities of plaintiff and defendant, the time for conducting *being* on the day before yesterday, the firm *one* and the powerless, the incrimination therein, the death-blow on the exhaustion of the possessions of the plaintiff, and provisions for conducting the legal proceedings ; a privileged wife¹ shall be capable of making a plaint *for her* husband, and *of* informing the husband of the plaint ; when her property is anything whatever, and nothing is manifest as to that wealth, *she* is to be admitted for evidence ; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

12. About the ordeal of those *who have* atoned, *of* those *undergoing* the sacred-twigs ordeal, *and of* those *undergoing* the heat ordeal, *who are* pure ; the freedom from falsehood of which, each separately, which they, every one of them, request when the ordeal is not that for their own station, but that for the station of others ; and whatever is on the same subject. 13. About the object of any evidence, and, on account of the reason of *its* propriety, the impropriety of any one *being* without evidence ; *and* what-

¹ One married to her husband with the parents' consent, and never betrothed to another, so that she and her children belong to him in both worlds (see Bd. XXXII, 6 n).

ever is on the same subject. 14. About the reality *of* a statement due to an ordeal, and so many *having* gone to the ordeal place for the sake of watching the first-comer *and* after-comer; the time *of* performance, the statement, the ceremonial and the invulnerableness due to it; the kinds *of* incrimination, how to protect the limbs by which the ordeal is accomplished, *and* each one *of* the formulas (nīrang) of protection; the superintendence for observing the ceremonial, *and* the decision about the acquitted *or* convicted *one*. 15. This, too, that is, whose going to the ordeal place is first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth; *and by* whom is the command to be given. 16. About the business of the ordeal attendants (var aûstīgânō). 17. About incrimination through confession, or *some* other reason, the reliance restored thereby, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 18. About a thief destroying life *and* escaping, the suspicion owing thereto, about any one, as to assisting the thief, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 19. About *there* being no ordeal for those confessing, *and* so also as regards those of good repute; accusation as to the existence of a limit *to* the good repute, even that which is for the extent of a Yûgyâst, a Dashmest, an Agoyôst, a Takar, and a Hâsar¹ *at* the least.

¹ The relative lengths of these five measures of distance are stated in Farh. Ōīm, p. 41, ll. 9-11, as follows:—‘So much as two Dashmêst (Av. dakhshmaiti) is as much as a Yûgyast (Av. yugyasti); so much as two Agoyôhast is as much as a Dashmêst; so much as two Takar is as much as an Agoyôhast; *and* so much as two Hâsar (Av. hâthra) is as much as a Takar (Av. takara).’ As the average Hâsar is a Roman mile (see Chap. XIX, 54 n), the Takar (‘run?’) is two, the Agoyôst or Agoyôhast (‘cattle-run?’)

20. About litigation as to a costly article, when a witness of *its* possession by the one *party* is *combined* with non-possession by the *other* one with no witness, or *with its* possession by the *other* one with a single witness; or the witness of one is with the sacred beings, *and its* possession by the *other* one is likewise not manifest; when both *parties* are related (khidyahîk), or both are unrelated (anazdîhîk); and what kind of possession they say is most real.

21. About annulling the decision of a judge, and the time *it* is done at *the court of* a chief judge, and also owing to an ordeal for certainty; and whatever is on the same subject. 22. About the litigation of three persons as to property *it* is declared, so much is given to one *on* the day Aûharmazd to the day Vohûman¹, to *another* one *on* the day Ardavahist, *and* possession is not made *over to the third* one at all.

23. About selling property which is not one's own, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 24. About controversy as to anything which ought not to occur. 25. About any essential dispute *that* any one has, *when* agreeing thus: 'I do not have it *as* my own, but owing to the other person;' and whatever is on the same subject. 26. About the litigation of an Irânian with a foreigner, *or* with foreigners, *of* a

Av. gaoyaoiti?) is four, the Dashmêst ('distance-mark?') is eight, and the Yûgyâst ('stage?') is sixteen miles. This series of distances is analogous to the Sanskrit series, but more elaborate; the Hâsar is best compared with the Krosa as the commonest unit of moderate distance, though less than half its usual length; the Agoyôst is nearly the same as the Gavyûta; and the Yûgyâst is analogous to the Yogana, though nearly double its length.

¹ That is, on the first or second day of the Parsi month; and to the other on the third day.

foreigner with an Irānian, *or* a slave with a man of the country, as to a costly article; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 27. About a much-clamouring plaintiff *having* summoned defendants to the judges regarding a decision, and about the perverted wordiness *and* mixed verbiage in the legal proceedings; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

28. About the time for a high-priest of property and possessions, what is the specific necessity for a high-priest, and whatever is on the same subject.

29. About the fitness of a woman for evidence and judgeship when guardian over herself, *and* the unfitness of a privileged *wife*¹ who is a foreigner and worthy of death for only a single *offence*, even with the authority of *her* husband; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

30. About the owner of a pledge not depositing the pledge beforehand, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

31. About giving up the property of partners, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

32. About the property that any one possesses, and is without any witness as to his ownership and possession *of it*.

33. About the ordeal of excessive eating (pâûrû-khûrânö) for escaping distress (mûst-kar zîh) *by* plaintiffs *and* defendants before driving each other into legal proceedings, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

34. About the legal proceedings as to a female² they steal from some one, and she becomes a suppliant of a thief; some one takes *her* by sequestration (*hakîdakîh*)³, and they steal *her* also from him;

¹ See § 11 n.

² A slave no doubt.

³ This is the technical term for legal seizure, or sequestration (see Chap. XXXIX).

the original *possessor* (bûn) sees his own, not knowing *she is* back alive, when they become disputing about her; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

35. About property which is in the possession of any one, when some one gives *it* up to some one else in his sight, *and* he does not dispute *it*. 36. About a master teaching a disciple not to go back to legal proceedings, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 37. About controversy, with any one, as to special property in righteous gifts, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

38. About legal proceedings in which *one* accomplishes an ordeal three times, and it comes *off* in one way; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 39. About the existence of the many kinds of speaking with wizard's spells¹, *and* those with threats of danger; and about the usage in witchcraft as to the moderate *and* justifiable production of mutual afflictiveness thereby. 40. About which is the ordeal for *one* worthy of death, the greatness and littleness of an ordeal, and also this, that is, which are the blessed among twenty of those undergoing ordeals. 41. About the proportion of firewood, and from which tree it ought *to be* good; and again, too, the several appliances and formulas that are necessary in accomplishing the ordeal. 42. And this, too, that when the man is aware of his own truth, even though *he be aware of it*, the fire speaks in the words of men thus: 'Walk not on to me! for I chastise during one's progress.' 43. About *one* still mediating in legal proceedings as to a thief who *has* acted faithfully about quitting confinement and fetters to

¹ See Chap. XVII, 6.

cause a ceremonial¹, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

44. About the wealth of a priest who is not keeping his property in edifices (aûzdestikh) or domains (matâ), *but* goes on with *his* occupation ; *and* when he passes away, to whom *and* how *it has* to come.

45. About litigation as to property from the residuary *wealth* of fathers, about keeping *it* together (vâham-dâr), and whatever is on the same subject.

46. About the amount *of* retribution, *in* confinement, fettering, and punishment, for a lamb², a sheep, *or* a beast *of burden*, which is stolen ; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 47. About a defendant regarding whom three plaintiffs complain, all three as comrades, one as to a lamb, one *as to* a sheep, and one as to a beast *of burden* ; *and* whose answer is first given. 48. About the litigation of three persons as to a costly article which remains apart *from them*, he who deposited it *being* a strong person, *and* the ownership of not even one of them *being* certain. 49. About the coming of retribution to three persons who, all three as comrades, have stolen a lamb from one, a sheep from *another* one, and a beast *of burden* from *a third one*.

50. About the reason of the justifiableness, *and* that also *of* the unjustifiableness, *of* confining a fellow-countryman for his own theft, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 51. About the extent of continuance in hearing a defendant, *and* this, *too*, *as to* a plaintiff ; *also* about the time appointed for speaking, and its extent. 52. And about this,

¹ Or it may be 'to provide supplies.'

² See Chap. XIX, 47.

namely, when any one has made an accusation about any other, *and* goes back at the time appointed, *and*, before a reply is given, he shall make out another accusation about the same man, to which *of the two accusations* a reply is to be first given. 53. About the reason of the hardship of legal proceedings; about what man *it is* whose statement is second, third, fourth, *and* last in conducting legal proceedings; and about the twenty-two stratagems in conducting legal proceedings.

54. About the cancelling (pâdyârânth) of an ordeal, even that which is accomplished with three selected witnesses. 55. About the season of the hot ordeal, and also that of the cold; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 56. About one, in a procedure, demanding an ordeal, *the other one having* appointed the time for the supreme priest, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 57. About the benediction of the supreme priest on making, *or* changing, a decision; also this, namely, which are the blessings for changing, through *their* nature, a decision which is made.

58. About evidence of walking upon a water-skin (khîk) *and* putting *something* inside *it*, *of* assault and wounds, *of* wealth which they squander (nikizend) and a righteous gift, *of* a damaged and sequestered *thing*; and *of* rubbing up (pâdô-mâlisnô) and buying *it* strengthened¹, and *at* a price. 59. On litigation about the ownership of a wife, cattle, trees, *and* land; and whatever is on the same subject. 60. About the certainty *of* the statement of several leaders of an affair, as to that on which their affair

¹ Pâz. aôganghen for Av. aoganghem=aoganghem (see also Chap. XLI, 17, 18).

depends, and of the supreme priest, or three witnesses, in every legal proceeding. 61. About in-crimination (aṭrikhtakīh) of several kinds as to statements in legal proceedings, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 62. About the modes of action for eradicating the deceptions (frēvōānō-fitâr) of apostates, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

63. About *cases* where the virtuousness of the thoughts, words, *and* deeds of mankind is all *derived* from the virtuousness of the beneficent spirit, and mankind themselves shall render *it* their own, and, in that way, *its* reward reaches them; and *their* viciousness is all *derived* from the viciousness of the evil spirit, *and* mankind themselves shall render *it* their own, and, in that way, *its* bridge *penalty*¹ reaches them.

64. About the injuriousness due to unrenounced sinfulness, that is, what is injured by the first, second, third, fourth, *or* fifth unrenounced Aredûs *sin*². 65. About where *and* which is the speaking with threats of danger³, *and* which is the taking up of a *weapon* (âgêreptō), not the turning *it* down, that becomes a Tanâpûhar *sin*⁴; *also* the sin which is owing to such sin.

¹ The decision announced at the K'invad bridge (see Chap. XIV, 8), as to the fate of the soul until the renovation of the universe, after the account of its good works and sins has been accurately balanced.

² Farh. Oīm, p. 36, ll. 6, 7, has 'when through sinfulness one lays a weapon upon a sinner, the name is Aredûs.'

³ See Chaps. XVII, 6, XIX, 1.

⁴ Whereby a person becomes an outcast and worthy of death. According to Vend. IV, 67-72, 75-78, 81-84, this occurs on the eighth committal of an Âgêreptō, on the seventh of an Avôristō, and on the sixth of an Aredûs; or on the first committal of any of the three, if the criminal refuses to atone for it.

66. About *the case* where *one has* to atone, *and* who *does it*; *he* who undergoes the sacred-twig ordeal *has* atoned best; and which is the least heat ordeal. 67. About two men *having* seized property together, and *having* together, at the time, demanded a judge and ordeal about it; and when one seizes the property some time earlier, and the *other* one demands the judge and ordeal earlier; and whatever is on the same subject. 68. About some one carrying *off* the property *of* a person from the custody of *another* person in sight of the same, and he who kept it before is, within a Hâsar¹, a witness before the judge as to *its* custody or possession; and also when the witness of it has not come within the Hâsar; and whatever is on the same subject.

69. About *cases* where the decision of the judge is to be made from the Avesta and Zand², or from the common consent of the good³, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 70. About the justifiable selling of a man, a sheep, *or* a beast *of burden*, as free from defect when its defect is not obvious; also about the symptoms of their defects. 71. About *the case* where *and* how far a decision, about which *one* is in dispute, is a solitary statement, *or* more.

72. About the object of the appointment of a judge, the eminence of an appointed judge, and whatever is on the same subject. 73. About the reasonableness of the severity and want of severity

¹ Eighty minutes on the average (see Chap. XIX, 54 n), but varying from one hour to two, according to the duration of daylight.

² That is, from the scriptural law and its commentary.

³ That is, according to precedents recorded by the priesthood.

of judges. 74. And this, too, that the judgeship is to be given to him *who* is acquainted with the law (âkâs-dâd)¹; and the object of acquaintance with the law. 75. About *the case* where *there* are a supreme judge of the law, a plaint, a defence, an arrangement of legal proceedings, *and* an award; *and* through what sin it becomes injustice. 76. And this, too, that the justice of him who may therein commit falsehood, as regards so many essential decisions, is injustice.

77. About the many who may seize wealth, which is the property of some one, with their own hands; *and*, when they litigate about it, he says *it is* his own property, whereby *they* are convicted. 78. About incrimination of five kinds as to whatever property is on the spot, *or* at a distance (pavan hâsar); *and* whatever is on the same subject. 79. About putting apart, keeping apart², and two apart before *being* put away; *also* about litigation as to keeping apart, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 80. And when some one *has* to deliver property *which* is a person's own to some one else, in the

¹ This term is explained in an extract from some Nask (compare Chap. XLIII, 9) quoted in Farh. Oîm, pp. 17, l. 9-18, l. 5, as follows:—'*Av. kô asti dkaêshô vivisdâtô*, which is the judge who is acquainted with the law? *Av. yô aêta pairi arethra frazânaiti*, *he* who thoroughly understands the adjudication from the statements [even though he does not easily understand many of the statements, and though *it be* not easy as regards the statements which are not numerous, is an official who is acquainted with the law (*kardâr-i âkâs-dâd*); *and he* who does not thoroughly understand the adjudication from the statements, even though the statements are not numerous, and *it be* not easy *for him* as regards *them*, is to be still considered as unacquainted with the law (*anâkâs-dâd*)].'

² Compare § 115.

sight of him whose own *it is*, and he who is seizing upon *it* disputes about *it* as his own property; and whatever is on the same subject.

81. About disputing the debts of fathers when one of *their* associates is confessing *them*, and the rest have come, and it is possible for them to dispute *them*, *but* they do not dispute. 82. *And* about the progress of a dispute of one of the associates as to the whole debt of *one's* fathers. 83. About the possibility of children *being* worthy of death, for wizard's spells, when with their guardian; and *of* a woman *being so* when guardian of herself. 84. About *a case* where the amount of a lamb (mîdat-î asperenô) is the lowest, and the amount of a human being (vîrôk mozd) is the highest¹. 85. About theft and plunder as regards one's own property, when *one* brings *it* away from the possession of some one without dispute. 86. About the triumph *of* him who, falsely investigating, may act judicially by illegally-issued incentives, when he institutes legal proceedings for the sake of appearances²; *as distinguished* from him who is truly seeking and truly investigating.

87. About the statements of a litigation of man *and* wife, which is justifiably brought *on*³. 88. And also this, namely, when she sees *herself* injured, or defence is possible by means of that which

¹ The minimum and maximum grades of value mentioned in Chap. XIX, 47. Here it is evident that mîdat and mozd are synonyms, the former being, no doubt, the Zvâris, or Semitic, equivalent of the latter, compare Chald. מִדָּה.

² Pahl. khâkûnfâ, literally 'through making a dust.'

³ Or it may be 'of a man *and* a woman who is domineeringly plundered.'

is discharged by two fingers ¹, *it* is justifiable when they shall institute no litigation but seizing. 89. About *the person* who *has* become privileged to give away a daughter to a husband, *her* father *having* passed *away*. 90. About the sin of making a damsel (kanġk) weary of *her* husband. 91. About the sin as regards property in this action, either produced where the action for this purpose is really devoid of illiberality (adahisnġh), or to commit in order that they shall give me a wife even when they do not give her on that account. 92. About the sin of *giving* a girl (kanġk) for a girl, or other living thing, or of speaking thus: 'Do thou go in unto my sister, *or* daughter, while I, too, *will* go in unto thine.' 93. And the sin as regards the person of my wife, too, which is owing to that sin. 94. About *one* obtaining back the value which he gives away for a girl, when the girl is not that value in wedlock. 95. About a girl who, after fifteen years *of age*, is not given to a husband; and her father, to satisfy *her* menstrual excitement (dashtân-mêyah vigârdanö), and to sustain it, becomes sinful *and* harbours a paramour; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

96. About *having* given food, *and* anything except a wife, to any one who praises the Mazda-worshippers' religion of another, even though *it be* through fear; also this, that *it is* only *he*, when *he has* thereby become quite of the same tenets with the religion of the Mazda-worshippers, to whom the gift of a wife worthy of a man (vîr masâġ) is then to be pre-

¹ That is, in some very easy way. The intention was probably to discourage petty disputes between man and wife, by not interfering with the stronger party when aggrieved.

sented. 97. About committing the sin of giving no food¹, which is *one* of those worthy of death. 98. About the duty imposed of chastising a wizard for the Tanâpûhar *sin*² of assisting a demon³, so that one's duty is manifold, and to be accomplished during several years.

99. About the day and night which are longest, medium, and shortest; that is, how many Hâsars⁴ *they are*, each separately; and, *as to* their occurrence, in what control is the appointed *time* which is really theirs, each one, *as to* period. 100. About the Parasang⁵ which is the longest, medium, and shortest; and whatever is owing to *their* subdivision.

101. About the work *and* fodder (vâsân)⁶ of an injured beast *of burden*, by day and night. 102. About a sheep which kills a person, and *whether* its owner *be* innocent, or sinful, through not putting a tether (band) upon *it*; and the reason of the sinfulness and innocence therein. 103. About the period that *extends* from certainty to dubiousness, even though *it be* for the supreme priest, or *one* provides three witnesses; and how long it is. 104. About the multitude of witnesses who give no evidence, *together* with the judge *who is* unjustly deciding.

105. About the injuriousness (âzârîkîh), for the

¹ See Chap. XVII, 6.

² See § 65.

³ Reading dêv-vigîr which is miswritten *by* *the* *man*.

⁴ See Chap. XIX, 54 n.

⁵ A distance of four Hâsars (Bd. XVI, 7), or as far as a far-seeing man can distinguish a black ox from a white one (Bd. XXVI, 2). It is usually from 3½ to 4 English miles, but in Pahlavi texts it often stands for a Hâsar, or Roman mile, both being measures for long distances.

⁶ Or 'rations' (vâyagân).

priestly authorities, *of* anything *that* is given to the unworthy. 106. About what kind of gift, that is given, was accepted; that is, how, when given by one when *another* claims *it*, it returns to him; how, *and* in what proportion, when *the other* does not claim *it*, its expediency does not arise; and whatever is on the same subject. 107. About *a case* where there is property of several kinds which a man *has* given away as a righteous gift, *and it* is allowable. 108. About *the case* where whatever is given *and* reaches *some one*, when he gives it and does not say how *it was* given, it becomes a righteous gift. 109. And about *its* not *having* become a gift, through fear of whatever is its danger.

110. About the theft and extortion *of* him who does not maintain the wives and children of persons in *his* control, to preserve and nourish *them*, through fear. 111. About the allotment of punishment for the limbs of sinners, *and* upon which limbs is the allotment. 112. About the atonement for sin where *it is* most irksome. 113. About the amount of retribution for an assault (*zatam*) which may be committed upon *one* worthy of death who is preserved through great judiciousness.

114. About Aûharmazd *having* given all prosperity to Zaratûst and the disciples of Zaratûst; the theft and extortion which have arisen *in* a man when *he has* not given to a worthy *person any* of the prosperity that has befallen him; and whatever is on the same subject. 115. About how an animate *being* is situated who is in *a place* apart (*aham*), and when he dies in innocence and keeping apart¹, his

¹ Compare § 79.

wound *being* also through duty; and whatever is on the same subject. 116. About the advantage and pleasure of keeping a promise (*mitro-dârih*), and the gravity, harm, and vexation owing to various degrees of promise-breaking (*mitrôk-drûgth*); *also* how a promise is kept. 117. About the grievous sinfulness of strife, insincerity (*avâkhîh*), and slander, and the harm that proceeds therefrom; *also* the frost (*pazd*) and punishment provided for them¹, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

118. About *having* given frontier people² *as* hostages (*garôbô*) to foreigners *who have* demanded a ransom (*navisnô*). 119. About taking up (*lâlâ gêrefstanô*) anything whatever that is precious to a foreigner, and *has* become of exceeding value, when they give *it* up as a ransom³ to Irân; the extreme value of a youth (*tigil*) when they shall carry *him* off as a hostage from the foreigners, in place of ransom; *and* how *they* are to keep both. 120. About the grievous sinfulness of a man stealing back *his* ransom from foreigners, though *it be* his own son. 121. About the sinfulness of the governor (*sardâr*) of a province through *any* harm that occurs in the province owing to his elevation and evil commands.

122. About the existence of so many thieves assisting a thief with special ransom, *and* what kind of reward (*navisnô*) *one* is to use with thieves, to

¹ In hell (compare AV. XL, 7).

² Pahl. *mar'sânân*, which might be supposed to be a defective writing of *margar'gânân*, 'those worthy of death' (the two letters equivalent to *rga* being omitted), but see Chap. XXI, 13.

³ The MS. *pâk* is evidently a defective writing for *navâk* which is written correctly in the next clause of this section.

deceive with great judiciousness. 123. About attaching to the neck of a thief the *thing* which *was* stolen by him, for his personal identification, *and* conducting *him* to the judges. 124. About the non-atonement of thieves, by any amount of anything whatever, without confession as regards their own sin. 125. About the assistance *to* possession which is claimed by any one from the authorities (*padân*), when his property is stolen or extorted.

126. About the grievous sinfulness *and* deceitfulness of many kinds which *occur* when a woman who is given away with *her* concurrence, *and her* acceptance is announced, is given to another man; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 127. About the unjustifiableness of the wisdom of a man, through which he took away property in dispute, from him who *was* ignorant, before *there was* certainty *about it*. 128. About making intercession in a dispute, for him who is ignorant, *with* the judge *and* other authorities *and* chiefs, even including the king of kings¹, when there is no intercessor for him. 129. About the reason of the fitness *of* a man for sovereignty, and the lodgment *of* Aôharmazd upon the limited (*tang*) person of him who is a good ruler.

130. About the five special ordinances (*dâdîstân*) that are certain; these are without ordeal, because *they* are to be considered as certain, *and* the penalties thereof are to be fully inflicted. 131. About investigation after confession. 132. About squandering (*nikizand*) wealth of which the custom (*dastôbar*) of maintaining is begging for *it*. 133. About the progress (*sakîsnö*) of legal proceedings not *having*

¹ The Persian monarch.

occurred, *which* is not demanded on account of the existence of want of power, *and* the number of kinds *of* that want of power. 134. About a woman without a guardian, when she takes a paramour, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

135. About bringing a written statement into judicial proceedings, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 136. About the sin of frightening any one from his place, when he shall move on account of that fright, and the amount of movement and harm which will come upon him therefrom. 137. The delivery back of that which is extorted from *one's* hands or keeping; that is, how *it* is to be considered as delivered.

138. About the obviousness of a minor adjudication from that which is greater. 139. About the extreme benefit *and* peace, even in *this* world, through a wife and children *and* grandchildren, and also the prosperity, as regards produce and even wealth thereby, taking away the disputes that arise. 140. About the grievous sinfulness of wealth *acquired* through unnatural intercourse¹, the annihilation of the spiritual faculties (ma'nôgânö). 141. About a decree in which the decision is of three descriptions, about three persons. 142. About a tree which, when stolen away, is the death-blow (mât) of a hundred pure birds (vâê), *and* a thousand birds arise.

143. About a sin which, owing to deceiving previously, *has* to increase (frâz mastanö) *its* extent, and to fully taste the extremest crime of a dagger

¹ Vâm-kûnîh, compare Pers. bâmûn. It cannot be 'making loans, or money-lending,' because that would be spelt dvâm-kûnîh.

(dahrakō) of several *of* the smallest finger-*'readths*.
 144. About the sin of defiling four-footed females.
 145. About keeping back one of the combatants from fighting, *and* whatever is on the same subject.
 146. About counter-assaults of eight kinds, assault when an infidel shall commit *it* upon *one* of the good religion, and whatever is on the same subject. 147. About a counter-assault of a heretic (dûs-dênô) when an arch-heretic (sarîtar-dênô) is slain.

148. About not leaving any property in the keeping of *one* worthy of death. 149. About such numbers of abettors of sin *being* with the sinner, and whatever is on the same subjects. 150. About the injury of a plaint and defence, and the dwelling, property, and feast *of* the good, *by* that person who extols the presidentship which is given him, *but* who is not fit for the presidentship. 151. About the sinfulness of a judge when he shall make a decision for any one according to his origin. 152. About the grievous sinfulness of delivering the person of an Irânian to a foreigner, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

153. About the greatness of the gift of a righteous man, as compared with (min) the gift of another, for Rashnû¹, the just, to proclaim among the creatures *and* to accept. 154. This, too, that, when they encounter an apostate *and* it is necessary to hold a controversy, though *there be* danger for the hands or feet, *or* though even for the head, *there is to be* no refraining from asserting that which is true.

¹ The angel of justice who weighs the good works of the departed soul against its sins, in order to decide its fate till the end of time.

155. This, too, that he who does not assert, on account of fondness for wealth, or dislike for his own *people*, vexes water and fire and the righteous man, and disturbs even the reposing archangels from *their* thrones.

156. About the grievous sinfulness of making the righteous dissevered (aûskâftakö). 157. About the bad properties produced by the evil spirit, adjudication attentive to lying evidence and false, in opposition *to* Rashnû, the just, *and* through discontent *at* the advantage due to Rashnû, owing to the impossibility of the occurrence of those mischiefs *being* produced at Rashnû's *judgment* seat, there where they do not give decisions for the wretched for the sake of the aristocratic multitude (âzâd hâvandîh râî). 158. And about the aristocratic multitude which comes *to* Rashnû owing to taking bribes, and went with a complaint to Aûhar mazd, and whatever is on the same subject. 159. About a just judge who is appointed *one* of an assembly for the opposition of thieves, oppressors, *and* destroyers of the righteous.

160. About the possibility of the coming of every one, through diligence, to the best existence. 161. About the superiority (masîh) of true justice over (min) other good works, *and* the grievous sinfulness owing to false justice, and when they shall not deliver a sentence *with* a full understanding of the true from the false.

162. About solemnizing *and* learning by heart (narm kardano) the Gâthas, the Hâdokht¹, and

¹ Here written Hâdôitô; the name of the twentieth Nask (see Chap. XLV).

the Vastag¹, through knowing the foundations (pâyakân) thereof; the sin owing to not knowing *them*, and whatever proceeds therefrom. 163. About the greatness of the law through decrees and judgments from other discourses (srôbân).

164. About property of seven kinds, of which *one* says that *it* is not allowable to take *it* as security for other property. 165. About ten friends with different assertions on the same subject.

166. And about the apportionment of this discourse *there are* complete decisions of several other kinds, and into those, too, it advances *and* thereby introduces much adjudication which takes heed, in every one, of words and deeds of many kinds, *and* is specifically *and* also intelligibly apportioned.

167. Perfect excellence is righteousness.

CHAPTER XXI.

1. The first of eighteen sections of the Ganabâ-sar-nigad² contains particulars about the thief, with his arrest as the special thief of that which is seized (tereftö) by him; the premeditated sin, the imprisonment and fettering, the punishment appointed for atonement of the sin, the execution of the duty,

¹ The name of the eleventh Nask (see Chap. XII).

² Corresponding to the sixteenth word, ahurâi, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the eighteenth Nask in other Rivâyats. Ganabâ-sar-nigad means 'the thief's head downstricken;' but it is misread Dvâsrûgad, Dvâsrûngad, Dvâsrûgîd, or Dvâsrôb, in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contained sixty-five kardah, or subdivisions, which agree with the numbers of sections mentioned in Chaps. XXI, XXIII, XXIV. This Nask is evidently named from the contents of its first section, and possibly from its initial words.

and the amount of the reward (*navisn*); the amount of speciality in the ransom (*navâk*) of every one, each separately; the act *and* place of punishment, what is the person who is strangling and the mode, how those who are therein strangling are drawn forth (*nazî-âltô*) successively, *and* which is set to work first.

2. About a person whose offending limbs *are* bound, the degree of tightness of the binding and fettering, and the formula (*nîrang*) of *being* bound for the sin of theft. 3. About imprisonment, and the imprisonment which accusers *have* to provide, *at* their own expense, *if* they are those who are privileged; and whatever is on the same subject. 4. The number of places for fetters, and those which the thief, whoever *he is*, possesses, each separately. 5. How far, how, *and* for what putting on of fetters (*garov-dahisnîh*) those accusers *have* to provide a thief's fetters, too, *at* their own expense, *if* they are those who are privileged; the place for the requisite privileged putting on of fetters, the sin owing to putting on more fetters of a different kind, and that which is owing to neglecting the putting on of the fetters which *they have* to provide; the limit as regards the deserving of more fettering, the number of grades of theft beyond the limit of deserving fettering, and those which are below the limit of deserving fettering.

6. About the kinds of theft, and the excessive sinfulness of a thief through cutting¹ and wounding the body; the undiscoverableness which is specially as regards a thief at a distance (*pavan hâsar*), he

¹ Assuming that *gûdanô* stands for *khûdanô*.

who is on the spot *being* he who is within one step ; theft, with plunder, injuring the existence¹, minor injury, and other sins, *may be* in confederacy² beforehand *or* afterwards. 7. About the thievish design of a theft which is not abetted (lâ ham), a theft with equal shares, and a theft with different shares.

8. About the sin of assisting a thief (dûg alyyâ-rak), *of* making investigation and releasing, *of* a sentence of acquittal, and *of* a listener to a thief ; he who is a giver of assistance to a thief is carried off for theft ; also decisions about theft by a child, *by* a childless woman, *and by* her who is pregnant ; likewise their maintenance *and* earnings (vindisnō) in retributive work, and the work of a pregnant thief.

9. About the accumulated property *of* the innumerable which they would keep away from thieves, *both* the thief by means of *his* hands, and him who is a thief not by means of *his* hands. 10. About the testimony *of* a thief, that is, for what *it* is admissible when³ he advances as a thief ; how at the *time* when *it is necessary* to seize *and* bind *him*, and how at the *time* when it is necessary to flatter (nivâkhtanō) and deceive *him* until *one* attains to absolute power (kâm-kârth) thereby. 11. About rewards (navisnō) with thieves. 12. About the difference of theft from plunder.

13. About property which *any one*, carrying *it* off,

¹ See Chap. XIX, 1.

² Pâz. hidhih, probably for a Pahl. adjective haḍak from Av. hadha, and referring to accomplices before and after the fact (see Chap. XVIII, 5).

³ Assuming that mûn stands for amat, their Irânian equivalents being nearly alike, and the latter word being used in the succeeding clauses.

has to bring back to *its* owners ; such as that which the frontier people *may take away* from foreigners, that which the judge *may take away* from thieves, and the share which he may take away from *any one* not interfering¹ with thieves. 14. And about protectors *and* defenders of a thief, and also many other legal decisions as regards theft.

CHAPTER XXII.

Ganabâ-sar-nigad Nask.

1. The second section is miscellaneous (ham-dâdākō): about the authority for the enquiry (khvâst-radākîh) of a father into the sin of a grown-up son, when unaware of the sin of his son at the time it is committed ; that *of* a son into that of a father, *and of* others grown-up, as to one another, when they are not abettors of the sin ; and that of a husband into the sin of a wife, when not *and* when² co-operating and unrestraining. 2. About arrival *at* the period for the teaching of children by a guardian *or* father, and the mode of his teaching ; the period at which the sin of a child *has* reached a beginning, the extent of the sin of childhood, the retribution in childhood, and that also at maturity ; the sin due to not teaching a child who is to be taught, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

3. About the freedom from slaughter which is to

¹ Av. asterethwân. The share being a bribe for purchasing non-interference. In each case the property is to be restored to its original owner who had been robbed by the foreigners or thieves.

² Perhaps the repetition of the word amat, '*and when*' is a blunder of the copyist.

keep away the destruction *of* the world; and what is the mode of distributing the property of a man of the valiant after *his* slaughter. 4. About the sin of *having* given implements of slaughter to a woman, a child, *or* a foreigner. 5. About a woman who, as regards two men worthy of death, demands the head of the one, *and* is seeking a son in the *other* one.

6. About a warrior, without provisions (atûsakô), who, on the march, *has* come upon pasture, corn, and sheep whose shepherd¹ is a stranger to him, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 7. About considering property inexpedient, and the decision thereon.

8. About the amount of delay of a judge on *becoming* aware that the plaintiff is falsely petitioning *and* the defendant is falsely confessing. 9. About the amount of delay of the judge, and in the court of justice (dâd gâs); and whatever is on the same

¹ The Pahlavi word is written 𐭥𐭥 twenty-four times, and 𐭥𐭥 once, in this Book, but its reading is not quite certain. It means 'shepherd' throughout Chaps. XXIII, XXXIX, and in XXXI, 17, 31, XL, 3; but is used for 'herdsman' in XXXIX, 3, and for 'follower' in XXXI, 2. This last meaning is strongly in favour of the reading pasîg, for pasîk, 'following,' an adjectival form derived from pas, 'after,' which, when used as a noun, would imply 'one who follows,' as drovers and shepherds are accustomed to do, with a few local exceptions. The Pahlavi spelling of the word is uniformly inconsistent with the reading pâs, 'guard, protector;' and it seems hazardous to trace it to a possible Avesta adjective pasvya, from pasu, 'a sheep,' because the latter word becomes pâh in Pahlavi. The word also occurs in Pahl. Vend. XV, 116; it is a transcript of Av. fshenghî and fshenghyô in Yas. XXXI, 10 b, XLIX, 9 a, and of fshê in Vend. XIII, 10, 11; so that it may perhaps be read fsheg, or fshê, as a mere transcript from the Avesta.

subject. 10. About a decision regarding a judge who explained a doubtful opinion as a certainty, *and* that *which* is certain as a doubtful decision, *and* would make an undecided *matter* decided. 11. About the opinion as to certainty *and* that as to doubtfulness, making a decision, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

12. About the business *of* commissioned judges, from him who is lowest *to* him who is highest, one above the *other* one. 13. Decisions about adjudication; that which is legal *when* two *judges* are together, that which is legal with *either one* judge *or* two judges together, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 14. About the statements of a decision regarding interpretations (pâdō-khânânō)¹, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 15. About the proportion of the time of judges for decision, that for summoning witnesses to the judges, *and* that for the proceedings (sakisnō). 16. About the judge who is doubly satisfied², *and* him who is not doubly satisfied; *also* the time from a judge's not *being* doubly satisfied till his *being* doubly satisfied. 17. About a judge of four customs, and *his* decision thereon; one who knows the decree *and* would act to effect *it*, and one who knows *it* and would not act. 18. About the supremacy of a judge as to adjudication so far as *there* is a false decision therein; how it is when *he is* at a distance (pavan hâsar), and how it is when he is on the spot; he who is at a

¹ Pahl. pâdō-khân = Pers. pâf'khân.

² Pâz. vayôzust, Av. vayôzustô=dvayôzustô. Farh. Ôim, p. 43, ll. 10-12, has 'the Vayôzustô, who is a judge, explains this, so that the petitioner who is doubtful is a hearer of certainty; it is, as *one* says, deliberately weighed.'

distance becomes a superior therein, when he comes back to the *place of justice* before the end of a Hâsar¹. 19. About other false teaching of a judge which is manifest therefrom, *and* the retribution for the false teaching; the false summoning, false investigation, and false evidence *of* the complainant (mûst-hômônd) *having* been his own, and a separate atonement unto the afflicted *one has* to atone for the affair; *it having* been mitigated by no good work. 20. About the trouble of adjudication to the priestly authorities (radân). 21. About the proficiency *of* a woman *or* child who is acquainted with the law², for a judgeship, *being* above *that of* a full-grown man unacquainted with the law.

22. About assisting the want of one's own disciple for a master for the recited law, *and* the sin due to not assisting, such as that when, wanting assistance, *it* is allowable *for* the afflicted *one* to beg an assistant from foreigners, and according to his petition is the bringing *of* a foreigner for assistance; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 23. About the supremacy of Rashnû³ the righteous.

24. About several persons who are *engaged* in legal proceedings about the keeping *and* non-division of property not their own, and the decision as regards for whom *one* has in keeping that property which is not his own. 25. About actions which are not inconsistent and those which are inconsistent. 26. About the decision *of* a judge of congregational actions.

27. About the offence which accusers would commit, as regards the law, by means of the law, *it being*

¹ See Chap. XX, 68.

² See Chap. XX, 74.

³ See Chap. XX, 153.

not allowable to commit *it* with their own hands; also *as regards* any one's property, about which *there* is a dispute, even though with a certainty as to its ownership.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Ganabâ-sar-nigad Nask.

1. One section of *the next* twelve is the Pasûs-haûrvastân ('*shepherd's-dog code*'), about the shepherd who is selecting a shepherd's dog for the sheep, and the shepherd with various shepherd's dogs; about the shepherd's comprehension of their serviceableness, one with the other, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 2. The extent of authorised efficiency (salit-gârîkîh) accomplished by the shepherd's-dog nature of a shepherd's dog, after his *being* appointed by the shepherd.

3. About the shepherd's preparing the means of bedding¹ for the shepherd's dog, giving the amount of the price of the daily *food* of a shepherd's dog, provisions for the dog in the winter, and the preparation of a fire beforehand which it is necessary to make in the sheepfold (pâh-hastö). 4. About the mode of preparing the appointed *fireplace* of the sheepfold, the position of the shepherd's dog and the dog's fire, the means of lodging *and* provisioning the shepherd's dog in the sheepfold, the sin owing to *the occasions* when *one* proceeds to provide *another* mode, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

5. About the diligence of the shepherd's dog, and about *his* being guardian *of* the sheep asleep at night

¹ Or 'covering,' gâmakö.

in flocks¹ dreading distress; the dog, *their* protection, is not provided with bedding, *nor* with pillow, and they are happy; every night *he has* to come out, through the whole flock, three times, besides when one of the guards (paḍānō), who is apprehensive, counts *them, who*, every day *at* dawn, *has* to walk out among the sheep, with good words, to inspect *them*, to apply remedies properly *to* the sheep that are sick, wounded, bruised, *or* defective, *and* to be *their* guardian; *also* the sin owing to worrying *them*, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 6. About that which is to be done by him as regards the breeding of the sheep, *and* likewise for the sake of the young ones; *and* the sin when *he does not do it*, or shall act otherwise. 7. About his fully understanding where *and* which is the sheep for *each* young one. 8. About his habit and means of keeping away the thief *and* the wolf from the sheep, *and* the preservation of the sheep thereby when an awful cloud and wind and rain arise, *or* when the position of those distressed ones, at the fords of rivers, comes opposite a locality (nisisno) of bad footing; when *it* is not possible for him *to save* all, *he has* to save the greater in value, or the more in number.

9. About his *having* guarded a sheep from the pasture *of* others *and* the retribution for the sin of not *having* guarded as to the eating *and* damaging of the corn and pasture of others by the sheep. 10. About the extent of preservation by the shepherd's dog's driving the sheep from the corn *and* pasture of others *of* various species, such as that which *one* calls the very stupid (gōltar) pig; there is, more-

¹ Pâz. paṣṭvān for paṣṭvān (pl. of pasu).

over, the specified pasture as regards those sheep, *but* the pig, which feeds upon its own predecessors, is also that *which* may commit another sin, for it feeds upon even *its* progeny at birth.

11. About the indication of an assembly place (garang) for the sheep, in a warm *or* cool locality, by the shepherd's dog. 12. About the characteristics of sheep from one to four years *of age*. 13. About the village (vîs) of the shepherd, where the shepherd's dog is known when he arrives; how it is when a sheep *has* to be kept out of the sheepfold *by* the shepherd's dog, *and* how it is when *it has* to be driven by him to the village of the heedful shepherd. 14. About the coming of the shepherd unto a sheep, *and* the path from the village which the shepherd *has* provided for ¹ the flock.

15. About a shepherd when he withholds the daily *food* of a shepherd's dog, and the exhaustion of life thereby; after the fourth deprivation of food (atapak-dâdö) ² *it* is allowable for the shepherd's dog to kill a sheep for nourishment. 16. About a sheep, *which* comes astray into the flock to be slaughtered, *being* the perquisite of the butcher (bâhar-i kûstâr), and that of the shepherd's dog *being* its dog ³ and the appointed number of one sheep. 17. About *their* extent of movement, and their pregnancy and growing old (bâr va-khasân). 18. About the sin of the shepherd, as regards the shepherd's dog, through injustice as to work,

¹ Assuming that *val* *man* stands for *va* *l*.

² See Chap. XVII, 6.

³ The dog who allowed the sheep to stray being thus punished, by becoming the prey of the dog into whose flock the sheep strayed, who also receives a sheep as his share of the butchering.

reward, *and* chastisement; *and* of the shepherd's dog, as regards the shepherd, through improperly tending a sheep, *or* worrying *it* by exertion; also his chastisement, and the payment that occurs for the incompetence *and* unworthiness therein; *besides* adjudications between the shepherd *and* shepherd's dog.

19. About the instruction which the shepherd *gives* to the shepherd's dog, through reminders (pavan ayâdihâ), to control a sheep, when, the shepherd's dog *having* heard *some musical* notes (srûdô gâsânô), the instruction took place in the form of words; and, when the notes *were* not heard, even by a blow (zata m), the means of that instructor *being* a blow. 20. About the peculiarity of the shepherd's dog as regards *its* employment (rôgkâr) at the periods of satisfying menstrual excitement, solemnizing the season-festivals, *and* other important good works.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Ganabâ-sar-nigad Nask.

1. The first section of the *last* thirty-five is the Stôristân ('*beast-of-burden code*'), particulars about the sin, affecting the soul, due to unlawfully striking and wounding as regards beasts *of burden and* cattle; *and* the retribution and compensation for it to one's own cattle, that in case of a *beast of burden and* that in case of a sheep (anûmâê), during life.
2. That which *arises* when *one smites* them with a brand (dakhshak); that when *one* smites them on the flank, *and* that when *it is* in front of them; that

when their flanks are so smitten is complete smiting. 3. Of the smiting, too, *of* other members, the smiting in front, though the smiting *be* such as when *one* so smites for smiting on the flank, is not complete smiting. 4. And that which amounts to as much as a complete smiting, when *one* so smites as for smiting on the flank, is such as that when *one* casts *off* the skin, and that when *one* casts off the flesh, thereby, that when *one* is cutting it, *or* that when wounds (khîmân) or serpent-scourging (mârvanô)¹ are *upon* it.

5. It is also about making the dog which drives the sheep (pasûs-haûrvô) dumb. 6. About bruising the limbs and plucking the feathers of birds, such as the *case* when *it is* complete smiting, and such as that when *it is* not complete smiting. 7. And unlawfully destroying as regards fish, such as when it would make their flesh uneatable. 8. An account as to noticeably and worryingly beating cattle, about decrees of whatever kinds as to each separate beating worryingly that is to be considered as noticeable beating, *and* many decrees as to whatever is on the same subject. 9. About the retribution for making clothing of skins and woven *wool* (taḍakô), *and* the sin of any one owing to kindling a fire therewith, *or* roasting flesh which is stolen *or* plundered.

10. About the good work *of* all that is wise activity, and the reward of the happy place²; the sin of *everything* that is ignorant activity, and the

¹ See Chap. XVIII, 2, 6; or it may be muharvanô, 'cauterizing.'

² Heaven.

bridge *penalty* of the evil place¹; connected therewith, to make him who is righteous develope in wisdom, and to make him who is wicked diminish in ignorance, is the world.

CHAPTER XXV.

Ganabâ-sar-nigad Nask.

1. The second section is the Ar'gistân ('*value code*'), particulars about the value of small consumption of animate, and also that of inanimate, property; *with* the desirableness of information thereon, each separately. 2. The value of not destroying a righteous man even for a decree and justice, *and* of atonement for injuring the existence² of the fire of Varahrân³.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Ganabâ-sar-nigad Nask.

1. The third section is the Aratêstâristân ('*warrior code*'), particulars about the worthiness of destroying a wolf; *and*, among wolves, the greater need of destroying (zanisntarîh) those with two legs than those with four legs.

2. About selecting the daily *supplies* of warriors, the beasts *of burden*, clothing, and equipment of warriors, and other appurtenances (*avârtgânakîh*) which are to be given to them; *also* selecting a horse *and* accoutrements (*zênö-afzâr*) *for* each one.

¹ Falling into hell owing to the narrowness of the *Kînvad* bridge to the other world, occasioned by an excess of sin over good works (see Dd. XXI, 5-7).

² See Chap. XIX, 1.

³ The sacred Bahirâm fire.

3. About having a man's horse trained before *one* sends *him* to smite enemies. 4. About the efficacy of the resources *and* care of a warrior in the destruction which enemies occasion ; *also* the army and the slaughter of war. 5. About the sin of the village and abode of the warriors on the occurrence of a battle, and what is the retribution for wounds and damage ; what is that which is disfiguring (*apîrâyak*) therein, and what is that which is worthy of death therein.

6. About the characteristics of the wearing of armour (*zênâvandîh*) and not wearing of armour *by* warriors. 7. About the rank of the general (*sipâh-padô*), *and* other officers (*padân*) over the troops, as to daily *supplies*, pay, and dignity ; also their subordinates (*azîrag*), and the number of troopers (*gûrd*) to each one of the officers. 8. About the anxieties of a trooper for the protection of person and family. 9. About the number of troopers when the king of kings goes to battle. 10. About the proportion of daily provision for two warriors, the meat and milk and bread thereof, which are for the sake of providing guidance *and* causing contests of the warriors in that good eating ; also the reason *of* certifying (*gôvâik*) its distribution and weighing, the beast *of burden* of the original village (*bûn kôkîh*)¹, and *its* means of *being* sent unto the troops. 11. About cutting the herbs for the veterinary surgeon (*stôr bezashkô*), the store of accoutrements, *and* other things which are necessary with an army. 12. About the feeding of warriors *on* the day of battle, the meat and whatsoever are their eatables ; even so the food of the horses.

¹ Whence the supplies come.

13. About the wealth which foreigners bring away, and this which is declared thereof, that is, 'I, too, *am* assisting even the wolf.' 14. About the display of esteem by warriors together, the union of friendship one with the other, obedient unto their commander of the troops, and mindfully resigning *themselves* to death, *there* being seen a spiritual reward, without doubt, in the future existence.

15. About the choice of a commander over the troops; also as to *his* coming *and* understanding the habits of his troops, each separately, through the capability of skill which is theirs. 16. About estimating the strength *and* resources of the troops, with those of *their* enemies; that is, how the battle is to be engaged in, *or* how the *case* is when it is to be avoided. 17. About the provision of anything requisite¹ which warriors shall leave for safety when *there is* danger in the neighbourhood from a distant stronghold, or danger *to* a neighbouring stronghold from afar. 18. About *the case* where, when it is necessary to engage in battle, the horse of a warrior has not arrived, *and it* is allowable to seize upon several horses from a herd of horses. 19. About the watchful sentinel (nigâhakö pâspânö), *and* of what kind is the information from which this is manifest, to the army and commander of the troops, that the enemy is well dead, or fled.

20. About a demonstration whereby they produce terror *and* apprehension in the enemy. 21. About an altercation of the commander of the troops with foreigners before a battle; altercation also through an envoy, and calling them into subjection to the

¹ Or 'of value;' khvâstakö having both meanings.

king of kings and the religion of the sacred beings. 22. About admonition to the troops, and declaring the share and arrangement of special duty of each one in the fight; announcing to the troops the recompense of the active, telling *and* informing the troops *of* the reason of being worthy of death, *of* the worthiness of destroying foreigners, *of* the command of the sacred beings as to their destruction when they shall not accept the Irânian nationality (Aîrîh), and the equally great reward *and* recompense for their destruction announced by revelation, the legal code (dâdîstânîkîh) *of* Irân.

23. About not uttering words of irritation on the day of battle, *and* not mentioning, among the troops, any intelligence which gives the troops apprehension, but *only* that which is agreeable and pleasing, through giving heartiness and increasing the strength. 24. About the *sacred* ceremonial on the day of battle *and* evil deeds of war;—a twig of the sacred twigs of that ceremonial, and the Avesta as regards fighting, *being* the first arrow well delivered into the mark shot *at*;—the consecration of the water which is nearest to the place of battle, even by bringing holy-water; and the sequence of the fight, that is, with which arms *and* appliances *it* is first to be fought, *and* successively unto those which *are* the last.

25. About the proportion of those who keep the arms (zâê) for the combatants, and, after a victory over foreigners, are taking away the hostages and captives, out of the foreigners, from the combatants; *also their* return from them. 26. At what degree of distance from them *they have* to carry the arms *and* appliances and the restoratives for the unfatigued

and the fatigued; and, the accoutrements *being* deposited, a warm bath prepared, and relaxation of the body effected, the reward of merit is given. 27. *One has* to search offenders, to bring restoratives for the unfatigued and the fatigued, to deliver the accoutrements back to the arsenal (*gangō*), to allot the share of the hostage brought back to his own *people*, and also much else on the same subject.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Ganabā-sar-nigad Nask.

1. The fourth section is miscellaneous: about a warm bath *being* in a house of what kind, the position of security of the fireplace, the watchfulness to be upheld there, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 2. About the strength that a horse *has* to exert for the sake of the earth, and that which is to be exerted in that mode for the sake of fire. 3. About food *and* other matters which may be prepared with fire, *and* the security of the fire in like manner. 4. About fire which, even on the road, is *free* from throwing away, bodily refuse¹, and dead matter², and *from* the injury and harm owing thereto; the various safeguards of fire from *being* given to an infidel (*ag-dênô*) *or* a child; the distance of the fire from a rivulet³; the penalty for throwing *it* away, *or* other sin as regards it; *and* the

¹ See Chap. XIX, 3.

² Any solid portion of a corpse, or carcase, of a human being, dog, or other animal.

³ Which might extinguish it and, thereby, render the person who had charge of the fire grievously sinful.

proportion of nourishment and preparation for the fire in summer, *and* also in winter.

5. About picketing (*barâ nisâstanô*) a horse, that is, how *it is* justifiable when *it is* in water and dust, how it is *so* when really in very distressing bodily refuse, and how it is *so* when even in bodily refuse *that is* tolerable. 6. About the proportion of nourishment for mankind, fire, and cattle. 7. About receiving a guest, the praise of liberality, and the grandeur of the liberal, the contempt for stinginess, and the want of the wanderer.

8. About the mode of wearing garments in a dwelling of Mazda-worshippers, even so far as a bandage of four rags for protection¹; the care of them each separately, the wages of the makers *and* ornamenters of each one, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 9. About *having* procured a street-keeper (*kûgpânô*) for the Mazda-worshippers, the business of the street-keeper thereof, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

10. About preparing in the summer a store for the winter. 11. About reaping a field of corn, the Avesta² for the first reaping, and *having* consecrated the first sheaf with the dedication (*shnûman*) to Aûharmazd the lord. 12. About the union of those of the good religion together, both in removing want and *in* union even with infidels in that which

¹ Reading *vad-iê vand-î-î 4 lôtô-î pânakîh*, and taking *lôtô* as equivalent to Pers. *latah*. We might suppose that the phrase meant 'a belt of the four strings (*rûdô*) of protection,' but the number would not correspond to the three times the sacred thread-girdle passes round the waist, nor would the material of *rûdô*, 'catgut,' be appropriate for the girdle.

² The scriptural formula to be recited in its original language.

is not detrimental to the religion, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 13. About duty as regards the produce of plants *and* animals; first, suitable eating; *and* secondly, moderate eating and avoidance of profusion.

14. About possessions which belong to the nobles, *and* those which belong to the multitude; *in* what manner that which belongs to the multitude *has* to come into the possession of the nobles; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 15. About the enviousness (zigûrih) of the beast *of burden*, ox, and sheep, and also *of* people; that is, in how many of the multitudes, each separately, it is produced; and whatever is on the same subject. 16. And also much other adjudication and information on similar intelligence.

17. Perfect is the excellence of righteousness.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

I. One section of the *first* thirty of the Hûspâram¹ is the Âêrpatistân² ('*priest code*'), particulars about *a case* where *one has* to provide for a priestly assembly (aêrpatistân), which is a birth; how the *case* is when *it* is important to go, how it is when *one*

¹ Corresponding to the seventeenth word, â, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; and it is the seventeenth Nask in all Rivâyats. This name should probably be Avisp-kharam, meaning 'free from all defect;' but it is called Hûspârâm, Aspâram, or Aspârûm in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contained sixty-four, or sixty, kardah or subdivisions. The former number agrees with the total of the sections mentioned in Chaps. XXVIII, XXXII, XXXVI.

² A considerable portion of this section is still extant, combined with a larger portion of the next section, the Nîrangistân, whose name is applied to the whole text.

stays at his own *house*, and how it is when *it* is not allowable to go ; also deciding about the *chief* priest (aêrpatō), and the proportion of priests (âsrûkō) who are superior, *of* those who are intermediate, and *of* those who are inferior in the estimation of the wisdom of the righteous. 2. About the priest whom *one* is sending, and the wayfaring garments *and* appliances which are to be given to him.

3. About the disciple, as reverent towards the *chief* priest ; the labour in receiving the *sacred* words *and* teaching *them* to the disciple ; the advice of the *chief* priest to the priests ; *and* the muttered phrases at the time of contamination *by dead matter*. 4. About what priest—on the arrival of a priest back at the district from which *one* sends *him*—is to be appointed, as priest for the district from which *he came*, *by* the district governor and those of the district, for teaching *and* instruction in the district.

5. About which are *those* reckoned as the five dispositions¹ of a priest that are the glorification of the priest's statements of the law, *from* the first of *his* statements in succession unto the last, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

6. About the subjects regarding which a priest of concealed parentage is to be asked, *with* the prelude and sequel of the same subject. 7. About the bridge *penalty*² of a priest through sinfulness, *in* a separate fargard³. 8. About a priest they may carry away from a district, owing to anxiety for forming a priestly assembly, *who* becomes worried in forming *it*.

¹ See Bd. XIX, 36 n.

² See Chap. XX, 63.

³ See Chap. I, 20.

9. About the superiority of priests in means of knowledge, one as regards another; the extent of superiority through which the greater suitability for authority, of one as regards another¹, arises; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Hûspâram Nask.

1. One section is the Ntrangistân ('*ritual code*'), particulars about the ritual of the ceremonial of the sacred beings, that which is important *and* goes to the bridge of judgment²; the exceeding meritoriousness owing to an ample number of Râspîs³ in the ceremonial; and, as to the Avesta, the Zôti and Râspî are both for various phrases, those which are for the speaking of the one are for the hearing of the other. 2. About the sacred cake⁴, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 3. About abstaining from the drinking of wines at the same time as the ceremonial. 4. About the quality (sâmân) of the voice in reciting the Avesta in a ceremonial, and the

¹ Reading *sagâktarîh-î aêvakö min tanê pavan patîh*, but there are only faint traces of the third, fourth, and fifth words, as the decayed folio of the manuscript has been patched, and the repairer forgot to record the missing words at the time he did his work. His marginal note refers to a defect in the next line of the manuscript.

² The *Kînvad* bridge, at which the departed soul is believed to give a full account of its actions during life (see Chap. XIV, 8).

³ See Chap. VII, 5.

⁴ The *drôn*, or sacred cake, is a small pancake which is consecrated in the ceremonies, and dedicated to some particular spirit by means of a *shnûman*, or propitiatory dedication (see Sls. III, 32). It is tasted by the priests and by the participators in certain ceremonies (see Haug's Essays, pp. 396, 404, 408).

Avesta which is twice recited and thrice *or* four times recited. 5. About the ceremonial, and the conducting of that ceremonial whose Zôti, or Râspt, is a Tanâpûhar *sinner*¹. 6. About the Zôti duty of a woman² *or* child. 7. About a decision as regards him who is cursed by the Mazda-worshipping religion.

8. About the sin of him who does not solemnize a season-festival³, and how the *case* is when it is solemnized by him. 9. About the limits of the five periods⁴ of the day and night, and the ceremonies of the same periods. 10. About the kinds of peculiarity of the things for the season-festivals *and* other good works produced authorisedly.

11. About the quantity of holy-water which is due to one sheep⁵, the inspection *and* consideration in providing the sheep, the freedom from sickness due to contamination and other defects even in a lawful place, and the exemption from the appliances and attacks of noxious creatures; the ritual for making *it*⁶, and deciding about the maker, producer, and carrier, the taster *and* the giver to him. 12. The reason of the slaughter, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

13. About the position and duty of the Zôti *and* Râspts in the ceremonial. 14. About the perfect ceremonial, the gift to a righteous man who *has*

¹ See Chap. XX, 65.

² See Sls. X, 35.

³ See Chap. VII, 1.

⁴ These periods, or watches, are from dawn till noon, noon till 3 P.M., 3 P.M. till dusk, dusk till midnight, and midnight till dawn.

⁵ When slaughtered to provide the necessary meat-offerings (see Sls. XI, 4-6).

⁶ The holy-water apparently.

become a teacher *and* examiner *of* the wisdom of the righteous, *and* whatever is on the same subjects.

15. About the *sacred* shirt and *thread-girdle*, that is, from what it is proper *to make them*, *and* whatever is on the same subjects. 16. About gathering *and* tying the sacred twigs, *and* on the same subject. 17. About the proportion of firewood in various parts of the ceremonial, *and* the mode of bringing it forward ; that for the household fire, *and* the priestly fire of Bahirâm (Varahrân).

18. About a ceremonial amid great *opulence*, that which is amid medium *opulence*, that which is amid little opulence, and a decision as regards want of opulence. 19. About always celebrating the ceremonies of the sacred beings for that which has occurred, and not neglecting *them* in any way. 20. About *the cases* where mankind observantly, and also unobservantly, celebrate the ceremonies of the sacred beings ; that is, which is he who observantly and he who unobservantly *does so* ; *with* advice about observantly celebrating the ceremonies of the sacred beings.

21. About the cleanliness of the body *and* clothing of the celebrator of the ceremony, the assurance of his mind from sin, the ablution of the apparatus of the place of the exalted (vulandânih), the cleanliness of the place of the ceremonial, the distance therefrom for *any* degree of manifest pollution and stench, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

22. About the ceremonial of the waters and their creatures, the vigour¹ of healthfulness, the possession of the brilliancy *of* heaven, the bountifulness of

¹ Or it may be 'holy-water.'

the spirit of the waters, and whatever is on the same subject. 23. About the celebration of a ceremonial, which is an ordinance of duties for the sake of a happy state of gladness (*kḥûp parkânîh*) and happy consequences; and also many other statements on the same subject. 24. *About* the ceremonial as proper *and* improper, beneficial *and* not beneficial.

25. About the families of Zaratûst, Hvôv¹, and Vistâsp, as regards the account (*aûshmûrisnô*) *and* ceremonial of the religion and their nature.

CHAPTER XXX.

Hûspâram Nask.

1. One section is the Gôharîkistân ('*quality code*'), particulars about natural superiority; not the modified (*gastakô*), but the lawful, approved², and specific *state* of superiority; not acquired by the slender power³ of the world, but *by* seeking virtuous living through causing the prosperity *of* every person; *also* the authorisation of superiority, *and* the proportion of advantage therein. 2. About a superiority unimpoverished (*anyûrûzd*), with *one* unimpoverished with a nature unspent (*an-aûrûzd*), with *one* unspent with an impoverished (*nyûrûzd*), and *one* impoverished with an impoverished; also the extent of impoverishment and non-impoverishment, that is, with whom *it is* not customarily of much

¹ An ancestor of several persons mentioned in the Avesta, including the two brothers, Gâmâsp the prime minister of king Vistâsp, and Frashôstar the father-in-law of Zaratûst.

² Assuming that *pasandak* stands for *pasandak*; otherwise, we may read *pishonîk*, 'provided.'

³ Reading *tang-karîh*, but it may be *tund-karîh*, 'the severe labour.'

consequence (pavan freh-ar'gō), with whom *it is so* customarily, *and* with whom, owing to an exception, *it is not* customarily of much consequence on account of *its* much consequence for an uninformed *person*, that is, with whom *it is* as *it were* proper with a servant of sin. 3. And superiority is a furtherance of living beings, and pervades the natural extent thereof.

4. About him who would sell property not his own, *and* him who would buy *it*. 5. About selling a sheep frequenting the house, *and one* not frequenting the house. 6. About various precautions *as to* samples of various things. 7. About selling beasts *of burden*, cattle, slaves, servants, *and* other property, of the nature of whose species *one is* aware through speaking about the nature of different species; *and* the retribution for the sin of whatever is on the same subject. 8. That which is an obvious agreement for selling with defects¹, when it is declared of beasts *of burden*; and that which is ever defective on selling.

9. About a house in which a person, *or* dog, *has* passed away through contagious sickness, *and* the clothing which the man wore owing to that sickness; that is, how it is when spoiled for selling *for* three years, how it is when *it is so for* two years, *and* how it is *when it is so for* one year. 10. About a house in which a person, *or* dog, *has* reposed in a contagious sickness, *and* not passed *away* after *his* descent therefrom; *and* the clothing which the man wore in that sickness; that is, how it is when spoiled for selling *for* two years, how it is when *it is so for* one year, *and* how it is when *it is so for* thirty nights; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

¹ That is, without a warranty.

11. About forming a family (*gôharîk kardânō*) with foreigners, that is, how it is when allowable.
 12. About a sheep of *good* breed for the three nights¹, *and its* slaughter after the three nights; likewise many other decisions as regards superiority and sheep of a *good* breed.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Hûspâram Nask.

1. A miscellaneous section is about taking anything which is not one's own at the *time* when he does not think that they see him and they do see him, at the *time* when he thinks that they see him and they do not see him, *and* at the *time* when he thinks that they see him and they do see him. 2. About giving righteous instruction, that is, what happens, *and* how, at the *time* when the follower² asks again. 3. About the sin of imprisoning the needy, exalting falsehood, and approving deceit.

4. About the action and command which diminish, *or* alter, a liberal gift to any one. 5. About the limit of the open-handedness *of* a wife who should be privileged, *and* who is reverent towards *her* husband, out of anything *that* has not reached the husband; how it is when the husband is foolish, how it is when *it is* legally, how *when* derived from *what is* legally property, *and* how *about* that which is unspent savings (*anyûrûzd kabun*); *also* the limit of the reverence of a wife for a husband, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

¹ The three nights after a death; the sheep is to be slaughtered on the fourth day, including the day of death (see Sls. XVII, 2-5).

² See Chap. XXII, 6 n.

6. About causing the conveyance of a maiden from the house of *her* fathers, *or* guardians, to the village of *her* husband, to hold the position of house-mistress of the husband; *of* the wife when she becomes reverent and propitiatory towards him, *and* admonishing *her* when she speaks thus: 'I am thy wife, *but* I *will* not perform a wife's duties *for* thee;' *also* the quarrelling of a husband with *his* wife, and carrying *it* on *to* the bridge *of judgment*.

7. About the blood on a woman who wants washing, and the bridge *penalty* upon him who has sexual intercourse with a woman who wants washing, *with* her who is a foreigner, *or any* other of *those* not authorisedly *for* intercourse; the confusion of germs by the woman who grants intercourse to foreigners, *and* other sin which they may commit about like matters. 8. About a wife claimed from foreigners; that is, how it is when allowable.

9. About the preparation of a wife for the control of a son, the period *for it* and *for* suckling, and the wish for a son which is *present* with a husband. 10. About the sin of a man owing to rejecting the controlling of *his* son by a sister *or* grown-up daughter. 11. About three things through which mankind become sinful and injuring their own property, and the possession of them is not to be taken away. 12. About *those* who may not inflict lawful chastisement with oppressive demeanour.

13. About that which a man is to be made to provide in feasting and gifts, for *his* store of good works, on his wife bringing forth. 14. How it is when he is a man *of* wisdom, *and* how it is when *he* is a disciple; how it is *when it is* a male birth, and how it is when *it is* a female. 15. The advantage

and benefit therefrom; the religious announcement of a name for the *new*-born, should it be a male, *or* should it be a female; the good work owing to the decision of a religious appointment of a name for the progeny, [and the sin]¹ owing to giving again to it a name of the idolators (*dêvtyastân*).

16. About the ritual and usage in admitting the male to a sheep, owing to which the male is a gratifier *of* the impregnated female nature, and a protection *of* the female nature; and the want of training *and* freedom from defect of the progeny; a proper condition of the flock, too, arises likewise through worshipping the sacred beings *and* providing the sacred feast; also *about* the shepherd's dog and the blessing for him. 17. About the regard of the shepherd for the breeding *of* the sheep. 18. About the work of the ceremonial *and* of providing the sacred feast, and the advantage for the sheep from the same cause. 19. About the Mazda-worshipping district-breeding *of* the dogs in a district, through providing careful nurture *for* the dogs, which is a good work owing to the same cause.

20. About the object of payment *for* teaching the Zôti duty, *for* the guardianship of the fire, *for* the publication and watching of worship, *and for* other labour, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

21. About the lawful guardianship of a child, the child who is lamp-light and the father who is the fire, and whatever is on the same subject. 22. About sickness owing to the look of an evil eye, *or* the vicinity of a menstruous woman, because those

¹ Here, again, the repairer of the manuscript has forgotten to note the words in brackets which he had cut out of the folio before patching it.

with an evil eye, *or* menstuous, are thereby harmful. 23. About what is the kind of watching for the admitters of fear; the fearful and whatever is on the same subject. 24. And that in case of descending from a house on the outside.

25. About lawful arrangements for supplies, in union and assistance one towards the other; about payment for the labour in the lawful arrangement; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 26. About the produce of property for the multitude, *and* that also for one's own association; that is, how it is when taking *it* authorisedly, and how it is when not *doing so*; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

27. The special generosity of judges in conveying property back to *its* owners; the advantage from just judges, *and* the harm from unjust sentencing *and* false decisions. 28. So, also, the advantage from truly demanding, truly answering, *and* assisting the just; the enmity and harm from falsely demanding, falsely investigating, and assisting a false demander and false investigation; *but* not the enmity and secret harm of a complaint of the wretched. 29. Advice to judges about just decision and abstinence from false decision; and, secondly, the reward of their just decision, *and* the awful bridge *judgment* of false decision; the accountability in the spiritual *existence* in the case of judges, the praise of truth and contempt of falsity, the gratification of the sacred beings *and* vexation of the demons from just judgment and turning away from false decision, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

30. About what place the appointment by Aûhar-mazd in the original creation brought the corn *to* ¹,

¹ According to Bd. X, I, XIV, I, XXVII, 2, fifty-five species of

which arrived for use in the nourishment *and* assistance of mankind and animals ; the sowing of corn from the bodies of Mashya *and* Mashyôl¹ ; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 31. About the labour in sowing *and* cultivating corn, *and* whatever is in the business *of* agriculturists ; perseverance in agriculture, and the limit of its allotment, owing to suitable participation and inevitable participation *in* agriculture ; whatever is about the shepherd *and* whatever is about the agriculturist, and the adjudication between them. 32. About the corn which is sown, that which is reaped, that which is for an increase (pavan nad-aê), and that which is *for* other things.

33. About the excitement of any one, owing to his blood. 34. About those kinds of ownership of land *and* other things that are best. 35. About him who sees *some one* conducting water for cultivation, when *the person* unauthorisedly sows the land of the *observer who* does not dispute about it with fearlessness and effectual resistance. 36. About the selling of supplies granted, which may be done in hunger, nakedness, and fear ; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

37. About the supremacy *of* sin, both that which arises on the spot, and that at a distance (pavan hâsar) ; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 38. About the atonableness of every sin, and the bridge *judgment* for destroying a righteous *man*, *for* witchcraft, and *for* carrying evil (agîh) to fire and water. 39. About atonement for the sin of Yât, Bâzât,

grain sprang up originally where the primeval ox passed away ; a statement which does not agree with that hinted at in this section.

¹ See Chap. XIII, 1.

Khôr, Aredûs, Avôtrist, Âgêrept¹, and giving no food, through giving of scars (*pisang-das*)², labour, and punishment; the kinds of horse-whip and scourge, and how the penitential effect of both *arises*.
 40. When a sinner dies outright on account of the penalty of giving of scars, or the performance of the labour, or the exertion *of* effecting the penance of punishment, *and* when a man has died penitent, *but* incapable of a desire³ for the retribution of sin, *and* has not atoned in the worldly *existence*, what the nature *of* his soul's helplessness is, owing to sin.
 41. About those for whom there is no retribution for sin.

¹ These six names are applied to the various grades of assault and wounding, for which a special scale of punishment is appointed (see Sls. I, 1, 2, XI, 1, 2, XVI, 1, 5). Here the list begins at the most heinous end of the scale, and the last three names, which refer to the lightest offences, have been already explained in Chaps. XIX, 1 n, XX, 64 n. The first three names are explained in Farh. Oîm, pp. 36, l. 7-37, l. 2, as follows:—'For whatever reaches the source of life the name is Khôr; *one* explains Bâzâf as "smiting," and Yât as "going to," *though* it be possible *for* the soul of man to be withstanding; *and* a counterstroke is the penalty for a Yât when it *has* been so much *away* from the abode of life.' These six gradations of crime, therefore, range from the infliction of the nearest possible approximation to a fatal wound, down to the merely constructive assault of seizing a weapon. All authorities agree in estimating the relative heinousness of the first four crimes by the following numbers: 180, 90, 60, and 30; but regarding the amounts for the two lighter offences there is much difference of statement. In the old law of the Vendîdâd there are seven gradations of such crime, the lowest four corresponding in name with the lowest four here, and all punishable by lashes, with a horse-whip, or scourge, varying from five to two hundred in number, according to the heinousness of the offence and the number of times it has been committed.

² By scourging, as prescribed in the Vendîdâd.

³ Owing to sickness, or any other disabling cause.

42. About what is the kind *of* contest of a poor *man*, plundered of his property; first, as regards the oppressor who *was* the plunderer, and, afterwards, *having* petitioned for criminal proceedings, through the judges, as regards his oppressor, until their repayment of the property. 43. About *being* delivered into distress *and* disaster¹, and the decision thereon. 44. About the oppressiveness *of* the much pollution of greediness (*âzö*) which is owing to all its fiendishness, *and* the arrangement of the creator about it for restraining the same fiend² from destroying the whole worldly creation. 45. About the great judiciousness of a man in want of power *being* good, for preserving his own life and making *it* nurturable.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Hûspâram Nask.

1. One section of the *next* twenty *contains* particulars about the rite of an ordeal accomplished, also the modes of one's preservation *or* incrimination therein, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Hûspâram Nask.

1. One section is about the mode and object *of* confinement as regards a beast *of burden*, sheep, and dog that are mad (*dêvânakö*), and the operation of the affliction (*vakhsisnö*); also to what extent is their restoration; *and* when not restored, *but* come for slaughter, the care of them even in confinement,

¹ Pâz. vôighn.

² The fiend of greediness, *Âzö*.

and whatever is on the same subject. 2. About the harm (vinâs) which the beast *of burden*, sheep, *and* dog shall commit. 3. About the sin which killed *one who is* no offender¹. 4. About the care *and* remedy *for* a sick dog, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

Hûspâram Nask.

1. One section is miscellaneous : about the object of amassing property lawfully produced, *or* derived from (frôdô min) *what is* legally property; the production authorisedly of *what is* derived from *that which is* legally property, *and* the production unauthorisedly of that which is legally property thereby become one, at first, as regards the very virtuous *or* vicious legal proceedings therein.

2. About the lawful time for giving up a maiden to *her* husband, the completion of *her* possessions, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 3. About the impoverishment owing to the completion of the possessions given, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 4. About a father who *has* sons, and *for* which of *them* a wife is to be earlier sought. 5. *Also* about which of *his* daughters is to be given away to a husband, and whatever is on the same subject.

6. About the progressive meritoriousness of a righteous gift for a woman, *and* the grievous sinfulness owing to *its being* dissipated. 7. About wealth through a righteous gift, the announcement of *its* manifest acceptance, *and* the acknowledgment of *its* acceptance in words, as a completed act that is so far exhausted.

¹ Whether the sick animal, or a man attacked by it, is uncertain.

8. About a foreigner when an Irânian asks *him* for a reward for assistance in battle with his fellow-tribesmen, *and* the foreigner does not become generous, though the recompense is for the generosity of the Irânians.

9. About the offering up (madam dahisnô) of water; that which is an appointed indicator (numû-dâr), and that which is no indicator; that which is an indicator of complete presentation, *and* that of partial presentation; that water which is continually producing the offering up (ûzdahînak), in like manner, of something of the things of a righteous gift, through the moistened peculiarity and distinction¹ of an offering-producing gift of a male from *that* of a female; and that which is an indicator both male and female, and a voice producing offerings, is animate, *or* inanimate, *or derived* from the inanimate; that which is an indicator is a germ (tôkhmakô-1), that which is in a germ is of one species, that which is in a species is of one form, *and* the proportion that is appointed is completed, *though* the purpose for which *it* is appointed *has* not arisen; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

10. About the five best and five worst actions, the seven² heinous sins, *and* the three sins that are very ill-atoned for. 11. About the sin of staining with bodily refuse, injuring the existence³, *and* of a

¹ The Pahl. text is pavan mamanîh va-kadâmîh-i namîdô. Possibly namîdô, 'moistened,' may stand for numûdô, 'indicated;' but the whole sentence is more or less obscure.

² Written 4 + 2 (= six) in the MS., but this is a most unusual way of writing 'six;' it is more probable that we ought to read 4 + 3, the usual mode of writing 'seven.' 'Seven evil-doers of sin of a heinous kind' are detailed in Dd. LXXII, 2-9.

³ Pahl. bâfôdôk-zêdô, see Chap. XIX, 1 n.

death-producing formation *as to* clothing. 12. About the sin owing to idleness when, moreover, that which they might do is good. 13. About a decision as to the justifiableness *of* clothing, arms, equipments, and *other* things *being* given to foreigners, besides promoting their service and business, and *giving them* any assistance whatever, *or* listening to that which relates to assistance; likewise listening to drunkards. 14. About unlawfully destroying *and* cutting plants, *with* a decision about it.

15. About the sin of digging a grave¹ for burying a corpse, *whether* of the idolators (dēvtyastān) *or* non-idolators, and *of supplying* clothing for the corpse of a dead *one* of the idolators. 16. About him who threw bodily refuse² *on* to fire *or* water, *or any place or garment on which it* is not authorisedly *cast*, to make Mazda-worshippers polluted; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

17. An account of water as regards the description *and* extent of moisture of the land. 18. About the sin owing to rendering anything useless through water *or* fire. 19. About carrying off two-thirds *of* the misery from the world, by eradicating *it* from the creatures through all the illumination of fires; *and* carrying off all adversity from the period of the creatures, through the freedom from malice of mankind, one as regards the other, *and* through *their* perfect sympathy together.

¹ Assuming that gôbar khekîrûntanô stands for gôbar (Pers. gôr) khefrûntanô.

² See Chap. XIX, 3.

CHAPTER XXXV.

Hûspâram Nask.

1. One section *contains* particulars about the science (dânisnô) of seeking a son, advice about it from revelation (dênô), the advantage of offspring for the admonitory explanation of revelation within *one's* self, *and* the harm owing to neglecting the advice of the same.

2. About what *happens* in the begetting of a son ; the first sexual excitement it should produce for the female, the second, third, fourth, *and* fifth ; the arising of a son in the world, *and* also the milk, owing to *her* impregnation. 3. And, when *it is* so that it amounts to a son, which of the *two*, male *or* female, is sooner emitting the germs at the time *of* occurrence ; *and* how *and* how long both *have* remained, at the time, in semination, how long in connection, and how long in bleeding. 4. When *and* wherefrom various expectations are produced to contend *about*, and when and by what signs the male sex, or female sex, of the offspring *has* become manifest.

5. When the localization¹ regarding *it* is arranged, and, *as to* the members, which is the first member therein, and *their* being produced, each consecutively, till the bodily form is complete ; which, *and* in what position, is the localization of the members after the complete production of the form of the body, *and* the purpose as regards the position *and* localization of the members after the complete production *of* the

¹ Assuming that gêsî-hastanô stands for gâsî-hastanô in all three occurrences of the word. This is rather doubtful, because the noun gâs, 'position,' occurs twice in close connection with the uncertain word, and is correctly spelt.

form of the body. 6. The effect upon the offspring which is *furnished* with subjection to the male, so far as the complete effecting of it is within the limit for its authorisation¹; the time (*vidanâânag*²) of the offspring with the female, the period of its turning downwards for birth, *and* the occurrence of birth *at* the same time.

7. About the growth of life, too, with the bodily organs (*tanûgân*); *and* which is the first bone become possessed of marrow, *apart* from the other bones, as it is reported. 8. About the admissibility of the elaboration *of* the male sex, *or* female sex, within it, *by* the guardian spirit of the righteous, at the fifth month; and the ceremony for the guardian spirit of the righteous for the sake of the arrival of a male child.

9. About the act of childbirth by a pregnant woman before *recourse to* midwifery (*dâigânih*), except that relating to the navel string of the child; also its first and second food, and when the midwifery is *that* of her mother; what is the kind of milk, *and* the care of the child at the time, *its* bandaging, sleeping, nourishment, and protection; *and* the sin owing to acting unlawfully in such matters. 10. About how many months is the bearing of the offspring in the womb *of* the camel, horse, ass,

¹ The Pahl. text is as follows:—‘Kâr-î madam zâkô-î levatman dên kurn spar, vad spôr kârîh zyas dên sâman padas radâkîh.’

² This unusual hybrid word is evidently intended as a Zvâris equivalent of the Irânian zamânah, and is composed of vidanâ (= Ch. 𐭮𐭥𐭥𐭥, which is the usual Zvâris for zamân) + ânag (= ânah, the final syllables of zamânah). The central syllable of zamânah is, therefore, twice represented in the Zvâris vidanâânag. The hybrid occurs again, in Bk. IX, Chap. XVII, 3, in a phrase where it can only mean ‘time, period.’ If it were not for this after-occurrence, the word here might be read va-dô-ahûg, ‘and the dual existence,’ with some degree of probability.

cow, and woman ; and whatever is on the same subject. 11. About the spiritual perception *of* a newborn child, *and its* coming into the boundaries of worldly comprehension on the same subjects.

12. About the habits through which multitudes *of* mankind *attain* to the acme of beautiful form : that of desire for women, that of swiftness which is owing to the strength of the leg, and that of powerfulness which is owing to the vigour of the body, that of desire for wealth, that of speaking in an assembly, and that of speaking at a distance, that through which *any one* uncontrolled comes to a downfall, that through which *there is* more knowledge of obedience, *and* that through which a counteraction of the affliction of the race arises.

13. About the vicious desire of the performer *and* permitter of unnatural intercourse ; also their violent lustfulness, heinous practice, and corrupt, polluted bodies, blighted in destiny ; great through their destruction of life in the things which they see, and every greatness inevitably provides *them* a merited death ; *as* great in sinfulness as *Az-i Dahâk*¹ in oppression, *as* the serpent *Srôbar*² in witchcraft, *as* *Tûr-i Brâdrô-rêsh*³, the *Karap*⁴, in destroying the

¹ See Chap. XIII, 8 n, and compare the account of the seven special evil-doers in Dd. LXXII, 3-9.

² The Av. *azi srvara* of Yas. IX, 11 (W.), Yt. XIX, 40 ; a terrible serpent slain by Keresâspa the Sâman, as mentioned again in Bk. IX, Chap. XV, 2.

³ Also written *Brâdrôk-rêsh* ; he was one of the Tûrânian priesthood who persecuted Zaratûst in his youth, and probably the same as Pers. *Bartarûsh* (the *Brâdar-vakhsh* of Sd. IX, 5) who is said to have killed Zaratûst in the end. But, as he was one of five brothers, three of whose names were much alike (see Byt. II, 3 n), his identification is rather uncertain.

⁴ Av. *karapan*. In Dk. Bk. VII the *Karaps* are often men-

righteous, *and as* a deceiving apostate in falsehood.
 14. About the grievous sinfulness of a woman, just delivered and giving milk, whose progeny is the offspring from intercourse with divers males, and whatever is on the same subject.

15. About the increasing vigour *of* the female from the mounting of the male, and the diminished vigour of the male from mounting *on* to the female.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Hūspāram Nask.

1. Six ¹ Fargards of one section of the *last* fourteen contain particulars about the enumeration of species of ownership, their precedence one over the other, *and* their good report in conducting legal proceedings. 2. About property that is brought up to the judges, which, owing to an accuser, becomes *a source of* litigation for a judge. 3. About a decree as to restoring possession, *or* as to keeping possession, of whatever is among such matters. 4. About property

tioned as enemies of Zarātūst, both before and after his birth. Some are named, such as Dūrāsrōb, Brādrōk-rēsh, Vaēdvōist, and Gēshmak. The Karap of the district where the mother of Zarātūst was born banishes her for witchcraft, and must, therefore, have been the official head of the district. Dūrāsrōb, the Karap, travels sometimes with a disciple (hāvist), so his title was probably a priestly one. The Karap is also often mentioned with the Kaī, or Kik (Av. kavan or kavi), the title of an equally obnoxious class; both Kīks and Karaps being termed 'demon-worshippers,' or idolators; and the Pahlavi translators of the Avesta speak of them, metaphorically, as 'blind and deaf' to the sacred beings.

¹ These are called 'five Fargards' in Dd. LXI, 3 which appears to refer to §§ 7, 13. Or it may be 'seven,' if we consider the 'seven' of the next chapter as completing the last fourteen sections of this Nask.

which is, *or* is brought, out of the possession of a defendant, *and* property which is extorted from a man by worrying, or by a noticeable crime upon him ; *with* a statement about it.

5. About the earnings (*vindisnō*) of fellow-combatants *and* fellow-subordinates, *with* a statement about them. 6. About the coming of land, property, *or* anything, held by foreigners, into the princely possession of one from Irān.

7. About the guardianship of a family (*dāḍakō*) ; likewise the varieties of it, *and* the fitness of a man for it. 8. About one's own family, and whatever is on the same subject. 9. About the income (*vindisnō*) of wife *and* child.

10. About the trouble *of* the business *of* obtaining (*vindisnō*) a wife, and also her marriage, owing to the urgency of the husband, after the trouble. 11. About *her* guardian and paramour, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 12. About the proportion who *have* to keep a wife to seek *for* offspring, *and* the proportion who *have* to satisfy menstrual excitement.

13. About adoption ; likewise the varieties of it, *and* fitness for it ; the violation of adoption, the sin of the son who is accepted, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 14. About the partnership of brothers *that has* existed, is formed, *or* is designed ; *its* abandonment (*a-bûkhtīkīh*), the surplus property, the wealth that becomes quite sacrificed (*zadākō*), *and* whatever is on the same subject. 15. About property that comes to next of kin through relationship, and that through adoption. 16. About the residue that lapses into ways of righteousness.

17. About where *and* in whom, after the father, is

the prerogative as to a daughter *being* given away to a husband.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Hûspâram Nask.

1. One section *of* the seven¹ at the end *contains* particulars about the daily *food* of a grown-up man, a pregnant woman, her who is childless, *and* a child, as provided by law ; *also* that of a shepherd's dog, a village dog, and a blood-hound ; and the characteristics of these three kinds of dog.

2. About the sign of a person's conversion to the religion. 3. About association of several kinds, and one of them is that of the keepers (*padân*) with the flocks (*ramân*), and the flocks in connection with the keepers ; and of what kind is the meritoriousness of the keepers *of* those flocks, as to guardianship of every description ; the happy effects of the flock, *and* those of the keeper, of every description ; the advantage from this association, and whatever is on the same subject. 4. One is the association of priestly instructor (*radô*) and pupil², *and their* meritoriousness together ; the fame of the priestly instructor for priestly instruction, *and* that of the disciple (*hâvistô*) for every kind of *learning derived* from the priestly instructor, and every kind that the priestly instructor *imparts* to the pupil ; *and* the happy effects of the priestly instructor, of every kind, in similar matters. 5. One is the association

¹ It is doubtful whether seven sections are meant, or whether we should read 'the seven *Fargards* at the end of one section.' See, however, Chap. XXXVI, 1 n.

² Pahl. *radûnê* (Av. *ratunaya*).

of ceremonial priests (*rad-pīsa kânō*), the worthiness of a man for the sacerdotal leadership, supplies for the whole of the ceremonial priests, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 6. About the highest of all associations¹, and about the lawful and virtuous existence of this same association, when *there are* two men in *a case* where he who is opulent is always necessary for him who is in innocence, and *has* given *him* the wealth that he asks for ; or where, when the one shall commit sin, wealth is an affliction to the other ; or the ownership, as to that which the one obtains, is as much even that of the other ; or, on the passing away *of the one*, it is mingled with the wealth of the other ; and whatever is on the same subject.

7. About the punishment of the sin of him for whom *one* lies² to him by whom provision is made, by thought or by word, *and* given to him who is worthy. 8. About a father's making a child aware of the sin at the time of the sin. 9. About the sin of taking the course of a false guide and exalting falsehood, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 10. The sin of extorting supplies for a beast *of burden* from a lonely labouring person.

11. About important gifts to the worthy, atonement for deprival of food (*atapdâdō-vigârisnīh*)³, and disbursements (*aûrûzdân*) *of* that which is legally, and also *of* that which is derived from *what* is legally, property among impoverished (*nyûrûzd*) supplicants. 12. The depriver of food is he who is *for* early atonement, and *they* who severally *exist*,

¹ That of disinterested and devoted friendship, as appears from the examples given.

² By falsely recommending him as a worthy object of charity.

³ See Chap. XVII, 6 n.

through grazing¹ *and* bringing forth, are *they* who severally are also in loss of vitality, through deprival of the food of strength *and* intellect; *even* a powerful man is prostrated thereby; the food which is suitable as atonement for deprival of food, *and* that which is not suitable.

13. About that through which the indispensable creation *of* a debt arises, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 14. Where *it is* the healing *of* the sick, the spiritual *debt* is unto the archangel Ashavahist², *and* that which is worldly unto the physician's anteroom (dâlanakō).

15. About the worthiness *of* a good physician for every benefit, *and* the unworthiness *of* a bad physician for any benefit. 16. About each one of the plants *being* produced by Aûharmazd for the subjugation of one disease at least. 17. About the protectiveness *and* preciousness of the profession of medicine; the advantage and reasoning thought of a physician due to the carrying on of *his* medical practice; the pleasant food, the handsome clothing, and the swift steed for a physician; and *his* wealth *being* as much as that of an average man in a house, village, community, *or* province. 18. About the diligently

¹ Reading *karisnō*, but part of the first letter has been cut off by the repairer of the MS. The semi-starvation of cattle is being referred to.

² The personification of 'perfect righteousness' (Av. *ashavahista*) whose special duty is stated to be the care of fire (see Sls. XV, 5, 12, 13), and whose name, often written *Ardavahist* or *Ardavahist* in Pahlavi, is applied to the second month and third day of the month in the Parsi year (see Chap. XX, 22). He is here connected with the healing of the sick, because of his association with Airyaman, the smiter of diseases (see Vend. XXII, Yt. III, Sîr. I, II, 3).

remedial hand *of* the physician for the sick, opportunely mindful, yet without chastisement.

19. About the sin of a physician through handling (sûdakîh) and *having* spread a disease by walking up to the sick, because that is when *he would have been* innocent through not *having* gone. 20. About a great pestilence (sêgô), and that which is trivial.

21. About the fee¹ of a physician for curing a sick *person* of disease of the whole body, and of each one of the members; even of him who *has* cured chieftains, both those of the lower grades and him who is the supreme king of kings, and so also various destitute people. 22. About the mode and extent of delivering up fees to a physician, after the declaration of the sick *person being* well; that is, from whom *comes* the physician's fee which is announced for the cure, and also that which is not announced; from whom that only which is announced for it, from whom a meal (pishôn-1), and from whom nothing whatever *of* worldly reward comes.

23. About the physician whom *one* hears² and asks for medical treatment. 24. About a test as to the competency of a physician; that is, how *it is* to be made, how it is when it is possible to test *it*, and how it is when it is not possible to test *it*. 25.

¹ In Vend. VII, 36-44 (W.) we have some of the old Avesta laws regarding medical men and their fees. How far the Avesta text of this section of the Hûspâram Nask corresponded with that of the Vendîdâd on the same subject it is impossible to determine, because we have always to recollect that this summary of the contents of the Nasks was compiled from their Pahlavi versions (see Chap. I, 3) which included extensive commentaries, adapting the original Avesta statements to the altered circumstances of Sasanian times.

² Or 'satisfies' (shnâyêdô).

About the sin of a physician who is not tested, *and* also *of* him whom it is not possible to test, when he shall undertake the medical treatment of others, *and*, as regards a limb of any one, there is not anything which is another's test of him, *nor* even that which is not another's test of him, *nor* that which is a trial of him.

26. About how long is the duration of *having* sought a physician in Irân whereafter *it* is allowable, through not obtaining *one*, to seek *him* even from foreigners. 27. The sin of *having* sought *one* from foreigners, when *one can* obtain a physician in Irân. 28. About the fee for a foreign physician, and much else on the same subject. 29. The medical treatment of mankind, and also about the medical treatment of beasts *of burden and* cattle.

30. About the sin owing to intrusting him who is unfit for a duty. 31. About the greater suitability of a priest than *of* a disciple for duty and position; a trusty *person* is also obtaining the important *rather* than obtaining a desire for the important, and even so far as *being* a potter *rather* than an astrologer, and being careful *rather* than a potter; and the reason of it.

32. About preparing an unauthorised (*a-dastôbar*) dwelling in the locality of other persons, *and* whatever is on the same subject. 33. About boundaries where *there* is a place of residence for people, and whatever is on the same subject. 34. About what description of testimony of *one of* the good religion is *received* as evidence regarding an infidel, *and* of an infidel as regards *one of* the good religion.

35. About the greatness of eminence *of* the abode of priestly authorities (*radânö*), *both* for procedure

and for petitions¹; the openness of the doors of a priestly authority; the want of eminence of any one through every kind of offence to others, which is owing to his closed doors and evil eminence in every mode; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 36. About the extent of splendour (lîyânö) and pomp-diffusing (vafsh-afgânö) tokens from the abode of fires, *and* the arrangement as regards him who casts the allotted twigs *and* charcoal (khâr akhgar) into *them*. 37. About conveying prosperity (padîkhûth)² to the abode of fires appropriately *to* the capability of every one.

38. About the quality (sâmân) of water oozing out (atrîdö) and that which is flowing in a channel (nâêv-tâk). 39. About the characteristics of specified works which are contiguous in a place between two frontiers (mar'zö).

40. About a decision as to a sheep *free* from unlawful influence—and so also *as to one under* unlawful influence—which goes to the pasture of others with thievish intention, neglecting its own; and *as to* that which *does so* not with thievish intention. 41. About the quantity which *one has* to provide, in the duration of a day and night, on admitting to pasture *and* corn, in the case of an ox without defect (anâ-gânö), or *of* another kind, or a horse, or a sheep, or a goat, or a pig, or an animal of any other kind.

42. About the distance of a residence of mankind from a river flowing in a channel. 43. About the period for letting a sheep graze at pleasure in a pasture, *and* that for restraining *it*; the time for not

¹ These six words should, perhaps, be appended to the next clause of the sentence.

² By providing fuel and other necessities.

cutting trees, *and* that for little slaughter of sheep.
 44. About an article of clothing which is associated with defence, for fear of enemies, *and* becomes quite a good omen (sukûn) *among* mankind, *being* imperceptible *and* appropriate. 45. About a tree with stem uprooted, where *and* how *it is* allowable.

46. About a leader's causing a march of whatever kind, the people *being* in motion through fear, and they drive the sheep which are with the army on account of molestation; *also* making the sheep decide as to the pasture near to the road within reach, the pasturing *of* the first of the species of sheep, *and* letting *them* forth to pasture in succession unto the last, and the reason of it.

47. About a person who is of note¹ on account of wealth, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

48. About this intermixture *of* with-the-stream *and* against-the-stream, with banks and without banks, and waters running *and* down-pouring (nfyâpân), on the road; that is, which of the waters, running *or* down-pouring, is to be earlier revered *by him* who is returning from the road, and the reason of it.

49. About the subordination of the disciple unto the priest, as to eating, drinking, and plenty, goodness and preciousness; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

50. About that which *occurs* when foreigners come to the frontier of Irân, *and* shall do damage to Irân; *and* the frontier governors *and* fellow-champions *have* to repel the foreigners by fighting, to save the Irânian people and property which *were*

¹ Reading mûn sakhûnag. Another guess would be min nîsôn-î (for nîsân-î), in which case the translation would be 'a person *free* from indications relating to wealth.'

to be made foreign ; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

51. About the advantage of punishing a violent thief by the members of the assembly, that owing to reliance upon the actions *and* convictions of the ancients, that owing to forming many priestly assemblies, that owing to providing a disciple for a priest, that through passing away after *being* high-priest, that through *doing so* without *being* high-priest, *and* that of much information on similar statements prior to any other resources.

52. Perfect is the excellence *of* righteousness.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

1. One section of the *first* thirty of the Sakâdûm¹ contains particulars about reward *by* command of the religion, the bridge *judgment* of the destroyers of the well-commanding, *and* the provision for their destruction. 2. About the importance of a man, after fifteen years of age *and* when he has heard that there is a law² which is good, *having* sought that law² by *having* enquired *about it*. 3. About a man's scrutinizing an action before *doing it*, when he does not know whether *it be* a sin or a good work,

¹ Corresponding to the eighteenth word, yim, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the nineteenth Nask in other Rivâyats. This name, which is here written like Zaki-hat-min, should probably be Zik-ast-tûm, meaning 'the most intimate concerns,' as the Nask refers chiefly to personal and family law; but it is called Askâram, or Sakadâm, in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contained fifty-two kardah, fargards, or vêcast; thus agreeing with the total of the sections mentioned in Chaps. XXXVIII, XLI.

² It is possible to read yêdatô, 'sacred being,' instead of dâdô, 'law.'

and when *it* is possible for him to set *it* aside *and* not to do *it*.

4. About advice as to *having* entered into a house in the night by the light *of* a fire, or when *one* has noticed it in this place, though he goes elsewhere; *also* the watchful destruction of an injured person, or animal, or garment, *and* the retribution for the injury. 5. About the extent of any glitter of the sparks (*zakhsh-1-1 parkân*), *and* the width *and* height of the doors of the constructed work of that appointed place *of the fire*.

6. About a new-born child, as to how *one* has to provide its place, connected lawfully *with* illumination¹, more particularly *for* the first three nights.

7. About bringing a fire to *drive* away the overpowering fiend, and making the child taste first the Hô-m-juice, so far as collected within its precincts (*varân*), and, secondly, the butter of *Maldôk-zarem*² which is to be brought forward for it; *also* the watchfulness of the father and mother over the child, and the extent of their retiring (*navistanô*) from the two sides of the *new-born*. 8. About lawfully-made places of several kinds for the child, the limits *and* manner of the mother's giving milk to the child, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

9. About carrying forth holy-water, *or* even a cooking-pot, to a fire, where the hands are purified *and* thoroughly washed; *and* the sin owing to an un-

¹ To protect it from the demons who are supposed to be specially dangerous during the first three nights.

² Equivalent to 'mid-spring butter,' the *Av. maidhyô-zare-maya*, 'mid-verdure,' being the season corresponding to the middle of the second Parsi month, which was early in May when the year commenced at the vernal equinox (see *Bd. XXV*, 6, 21).

purified hand, not thoroughly washed, carrying *them* forth. 10. About the preservation of the cooking-pot, and the rest of one's operations with the fire, from defilement; *but* when, through want of care, defilement occurs, *by* the inexperience of any one bringing *it* to the fire, he who is careless is thereby contaminated, *and* the cooking-pot is properly placed in its position.

11. Arranging about properly-made bed-places (gâsvâarakô) in a house, those for children and those for adults; also a decision about *a case* when a carpenter (dûrgar) shall make a bed-place properly which one's own judgment considers improperly *made*, and when both *consider it* improperly, *or* when both *consider it* properly *made*; *and* more of whatever is on the same subject.

12. About what is the mode *of* producing seeing properly; *and*, when not seeing properly, the oculist (dîdpân) to intrust with it is *he* who informs people, who wish for it, *how* to extract the defect of sight; if not, the people go on and hurt; *also* the penalty for hurting, and whatever is on the same subject.

13. About the insubordination of those accustomed to work (kâr-khûgarân) to women and children; also that of a grown-up man who *has* been giving no food¹ three *times* in succession; he, too, it is who advanced the fourth *time*², because, owing to giving no food a fourth *time*, the man is he who *has* to accomplish work unrestrictedly; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

¹ See Chap. XVII, 6.

² This passage appears to refer to that quoted in Farh. Ôim, p. 38, ll. 8, 9; though the latter part of Chap. XLI, 19 is more applicable to ll. 4-8 of the same page.

14. About the care of a pointed thing, that is, how *it* is to be carried to a dwelling in the world, how *it* is to be deposited, *and* the sin owing to keeping and depositing *it* otherwise. 15. And about every garment¹ and utensil, even including such as a scum-pot, an hour-glass, and a dining-tray; that is, how *they are* to be deposited in the dwelling, *and* the sin owing to variously² placing *and* taking care of *them*. 16. About a door which is properly made; how it is when it falls down, and a wound arises from it, the carpenter *being* innocent regarding it; *and* how it is when *he is* guilty.

17. About washing the head, the care of the water and the religious ritual therein, and whatever is on the same subject. 18. About the period *for* arranging the hair, in which they shave the hair. 19. About the shaving of a child the first time, and the ritual which is taught for it; the performance of shaving *by* an instructed barber and with a sharp razor, which is the appointed practice as regards the razor of adults, *and* that also for children *with* the children's razor, because *it is* settled healthfulness; his whetstone (*sôn*), and also the care of the razor. 20. About the number of the positions of a man, in which a barber can perform shaving, and that of the positions of the barber; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

21. About each one of those who are custodians (*kîrûk-kârânö*), and the rules of the market; also their abstaining from wounding each other with a pike (*têkh*), *or* other implement, with which they

¹ Or *gâmak* may mean 'a cup.'

² Reading *min gûnagîhâ*.

shall perform *their* duty; *likewise* the sin owing to heedlessness. 22. About giving forth a pointed thing lawfully, and a wound owing to not giving *it* forth lawfully; lawfully taking *and* giving away a plate of broken victuals (*paḍ'khûr*), and a wound owing to *doing it* unlawfully; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 23. About the appointed place (*dâd-gâh*) of a horse-course *and its* distance from the middle of a town, the nature of the horse-course, the training (*farhâng*) *and* masters of manœuvres (*paḍân-t farhângânö*) when in *it*, the shooting of arrows on the horse-course, *and* the wound which occurs to man *or* animal, how it is when culpable, and how it is when not culpable. 24. About admitting a listener; where, why, *and* how *he is* to be admitted; *and* the guilt *or* innocence as regards a wound owing to him.

25. About the mode of making a *sacred thread-girdle*¹, *and* the harm from an unusual formation of it. 26. About lawfully tying *it*, without the culpability (*vazagth*) of unauthorised action; *also* when they do not tie *it* lawfully, *but* the girdling is knotted (*viragt-altö*) *and* twisted owing to culpability (*vazagânth*); and whatever is on the same subject.

27. About lawfully scratching *with* the nails, and the harm from unlawfully scratching. 28. About lawfully attending to a fire on the road; and, when *one* arrives at a ford *through* water, the sin which arises, as to fire, from not lawfully caring about the fire.

29. About warriors who mingle together in panic (*mazangth*) and darkness; injury happens *to* one

¹ See Dd. XXXIX, 1 n.

from the other, and the statement of the account published is *that there was* a state of terror; also whatever is on the same subject. 30. About the march of an army which is in fear, *and* that which is in *a state of* fearlessness which is the distinction of the army of Irân from those of foreigners. 31. About lawfully and habitually requiring a share, and the harm from unlawfully and unhabitually requiring *it*.

32. About carrying firewood, brought away from the hills, into the house; depositing *it* at first by the tongs (dast-pânakö); watching, turning, and inspecting *it*, *and* carrying *it* away to the fire; that is, how *to do it* lawfully, the sin owing to unlawfully performing *it*, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

33. About lawfully warming bull's urine¹ by the fire, *and* the sin when *it is* not lawfully *done*.

34. About selecting a pasture, one ranked above the others; that is, how *to do it* lawfully, the sin when *one* shall do *it* otherwise, *and*, owing to that, he is really injured, *or* occasions injury. 35. About what is the mode *of* construction of a lawfully-formed farm-house (dast-kadakö), the dwelling of the people, *and* the place of the beasts *of burden and* cattle; *also* the sin when *one* shall construct *it* otherwise, *and*, owing to that, he is really injured, *or* occasions injury.

36. A decision about *a case* when one *person has* lawfully to force *away* a beast *of burden* from a control unlawfully *exercised*, *and* another person intrudes unauthorisedly, *and* vexes the district authorities (pad-dihânân). 37. Also when *being* done un-

¹ Intended for ceremonial purification.

lawfully, and the beast *being away* from its control unlawfully *exercised*, the *other* person intrudes lawfully; and when both *persons act* unlawfully, or when both *act* lawfully. 38. About lawfully tying, whereby things are hung up; *and* the sin when, *through* an unlawfully-tied fastening, anything is injured, *or* occasions injury. 39. About unlawfully keeping horses in a stable (âkhûr), *and* the sin owing to the unlawfulness. 40. And, as regards the cutting of trees and shrubs, where *and* how *it is* lawfully *done*, and the harm *and* sin owing to not lawfully cutting. 41. About the mode of washing clothing, *and* the sin owing to different modes. 42. About the mode of walking in, *and* the sin owing to unusual walking in. 43. About the custom of a man of the sagacious (dânâkvarân) on passing through water, and the harm *and* sin owing to acting otherwise.

44. About the kinds of canals (nâî)¹ and fords, from those for two men passing, up to those for many; the dimensions of those *which are* large, and how much *they are* each separately *sunk* into the ground, without collecting water, when the ground is hard, and how much when *it is* soft. 45. The extent of their outer² banks, *and* the inspection as to the banks when the water is brackish, warm, *and* flowing; how far when outside of the water, and how far when in the water. 46. When *it is* brackish, cold, *and* flowing; or brackish, warm, *and* stagnant; or sweet, warm, *and* flowing; how far when in the water, and how far when outside. 47. And, when

¹ For irrigation.

² Reading vîrûnag, but the word is miswritten nîrang-î.

brackish, cold, *and* stagnant; or sweet, cold, *and* flowing; or sweet, warm, and stagnant; how far when in the water, and how far when outside of the water. 48. What is the customary operation as regards the inspection of the banks; how is the stagnation (*astîntădanǎ*) within a pool dammed up (*zarêh-stânǎ-aê*), and the stone-work inside, from the canal which is for ten men passing, up to that for many; *and* how is the damming up inside of the canal, the stagnation within the pool dammed up, or the reedy jungle (*vêsakǎ*) when distributed and it becomes tall.

49. What are the mode *and* means of maintaining the supervision of a canal; which is that *which one* should maintain over the water of the canal when half is distributed, *or*, when not, one-third; and which is that when one-third is distributed, *or*, when not, one-fourth; *a supervision* which is animate *or* inanimate, *and* after those which are inanimate *means are provided*¹, the former animate *ones* are then at rest; *and* the harm *and* sin when they shall act otherwise. 50. And, as regards the same, what is the mode *of* passage of animals of various species, by swimming across the water; *and* the sin, owing to acting otherwise, when harm occurs. 51. About the trampling down at a ford *through* water, when *one* is newly completing *it*, and when *the water is* brackish *and* flowing, when *it is* brackish *and* stagnant, when *it is* sweet *and* flowing, and when *it is* sweet *and* stagnant; the reason of passing through on it, *and* such *and* such ways for proceeding at

¹ In the shape of sluices for regulating the supply of water for irrigation.

will thereon; so, also, observation as to the water which *has* remained behind for flowing, and the harm *and* sin when *one* does not properly observe *it*, *but* walks on.

52. About two of the warriors who meet together on the road, which *of them* was *busy* about the protection *of his* horse, *and* which about the preparation of food; *also* the usage *and* other *things* in similar matters. 53. The sin of *having* eaten food for refreshment on the road, that is, how the custom is a sin when they can act otherwise.

54. About the remedies for sheep and beasts *of burden* which reinfuse fresh life; and the extent of keeping the sheep, goat, cow, mare, ass, pig¹, and woman with the male. 55. About beasts *of burden*, sheep (anûmâânö), and women, for whom, on account of contraction of orifice, *there is* a use of means for making *it* not painful (atûtakö). 56. About the extent of the distance of a male beast from the female when it is necessary to be watchful. 57. About the distance that a man *has* to remove an ox that *has* destroyed *some* concealed hay (barkasag giyah) which is the hay of others, when they quarrel with him; how it is when *it is* allowable to bring *the ox* back to *his* home; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

58. About the security of a man from the death (aôsh) of *his* fathers, and danger *having* arisen for him from a mouth *of* bad omen. 59. About the sin of a father owing to a child, when, *being* given by him to an ill-behaved *person*², he calls *it and*, when

¹ Instead of khar va-khazûrâ, the MS. has khôr va-zak-î ras.

² Assuming that minênamakö-1 stands for apênamakö-1;

it comes, *there* may occur the sin of unlawfully terrifying sheep, and the beast *of burden* is beaten; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 60. About bringing¹ a plant which is a medicinal herb, *and* whatever is on the same subject.

61. About a sociable feast (*ham-myâzdîh*) with idolators, that is, how it is *when held* authorisedly, and how it is when *it is* not; *and*, when *one* gives the sociable feast, how it is *when they are to be considered* unhonoured, and how it is when they are to be considered more honoured even than the Irânians. 62. And about the broken victuals which the idolators *have eaten and* drunk therein.

63. About the proportion of meat with the bread in atonement for deprival of food². 64. About an ordeal which is severe, and *one which is* not severe; *and* the evidence of acquittal from the achievement thereof. 65. About the secrets of the religion, *and* the sin owing to *their being* disclosed (*gushûftô*). 66. About the sin of speaking evil words to the wives of others. 67. About the extent of the most inferior house, village, community, *and* province; *and* that of the most superior. 68. And about what *was* the mode *of* residence of Frashôstar and Gâmâsp³ in a plundering (*lâtskar*) army, and their habits.

the copyist having mistaken *ap* for *az*, and substituted the *Zvâris* equivalent *min* for the latter which he supposed was a separate word.

¹ Or 'abstracting.'

² See Chaps. XVII, 6, XXXVII, 11.

³ Two brothers who were contemporaries of Zaratûst. Frashôstar was his father-in-law, and Gâmâsp was prime minister of king Vîrtâsp.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Sakâdûm Nask.

1. One section is the *Hakîdakânistân* ('code of sequestrations'), particulars about a statement of seized property, the retention thereof, *and* how was the confinement of that *which was* animate; how it is when *one* keeps *it* in a shepherd's-dog's care, and how it is when in the sequestrator's care (*hakîdaködârth*). 2. And when *it is* a seized horse of the warriors, how to keep *it* when it is not possible to retain *it* in confinement of any kind, and the damage which *has* arisen therefrom; what is the danger to occasion by it, how it is when the shelter (*srâyisnö*)¹ is on all sides, *and* how it is when on one side; while the trust, when *there is* shelter, is in the extent of the shelter, how much *and of* what kind is the shelter. 3. When *it is* a seized beast of burden, after *its* coming into the possession of the sequestrator (*hakîdak-dâr*), for how long *he has* to order work for the reasoning thought of the herdsman, *and* how is that of the sequestrator, *in* like manner, before he quite attains to his share; even through his own reasoning thought the work is authorisedly ordered, *and* how *and in* what manner is the ordering of his work. 4. And when the seized *animal* has offspring, *in* what mode *he has* to milk *it*, as well as the nourishment of the young, and whatever is on the same subject; *also* the sin owing to doing *it* unlawfully. 5. About the sequestrator when the beast of burden seized comes into his possession, how it is

¹ Av. thrâ.

when its special reputation is altered, *and* how it is when it comes with utility and advantage for him. 6. About the seizer's keeping a sheep, which is seized, in *his* flock; that is, how the custom is produced, owing to its milk *being* for the *sacred* feast, and the notification of the feasts is owing to the seized¹ sheep; when, too, it is not possible to keep *it* in the flock, what is the mode of confining *it*; and when it is not possible to keep *it* in confinement, what *he has* to do with it. 7. About the wool of a sheep which is seized; that is, how it is when the shearing is even before the various times specified, *and* the sin of shearing when *it is* before the time specified, *or one* shears when there is no reason for shearing. 8. About the lambing (gurûstāḍō) of the sheep seized, and the sin owing to *its* not lambing.

9. About sheltering (srudanō)² the seized *animal* in the most public place in a house, village, community, *or* province. 10. About the sin of the shepherd when, without saving *it* for the sequestrator, *and* through the guilelessness of the sequestrator, he shall carry away a female; *and* the sin which is owing to the offence as regards unlawfully beating *and* wounding *it*, before *it is* seized for the buyers of meat (khûr-kharânō), *and* other offences regarding it. 11. About the time appointed, between the shepherd and the sequestrator, for leading *and* bringing the female, *belonging to* the sequestrator, to the place for which the time is appointed; *in the case* when the shepherd arrives *and* the sequestrator *does*

¹ Instead of *hakīdakō*, 'seized,' the MS. has the very similarly written word *avēzakō*, 'pure.'

² Compare *srāyisnō* in § 2, and *srūdan* in § 11.

not, how that which *belongs to* the sequestrator is to come into the possession of the sequestrator, and when; when *it is* the sheep *or* beast *of burden* of a sequestrator¹, how *it is* to come into the possession of that sequestrator; when the sheep *or* beast *of burden* which is seized dies in the possession of the sequestrator, how *and* how long *he has* to shelter (srûdan) the young ones (gurûs) and wool of the same several sheep; *and* the sin when he does not shelter *them*, or *does it* otherwise.

12. About a sheep² which is mingled among the flock of any one that is in sequestration, how it is when the shepherd, *and* how it is when the shepherd's dog, is its own; and when it is mingled among any flock owing to sequestration, how it is when the shepherd, *and* how it is when the shepherd's dog, [who is its own]³ goes to another flock; how it is when the first flock-owner, *and* how it is when the second, is its own. 13. About the killing of a seized sheep *by* a shepherd's dog for necessary provisions; that is, how *it is* allowable, and *in* what mode *it is* to be done.

14. About him unto whom the sheep *or* beast *of burden* which is seized *is delivered* when it comes into a district; *and* the sequestrator's informing the governor of the district, in whose herd the sheep *or* beast *of burden* which is seized *remains*, as to the species, colour, and form of it⁴. 15. Watching over

¹ Perhaps another sequestrator is meant.

² The first case seems to be that of an unseized sheep in a seized flock, and the second that of a seized sheep in an unseized flock.

³ The words in brackets are supplied by guess, to fill up a blank space left by the repairer of the MS. on one of his patches.

⁴ Reading va-darand-î denman.

a man with sheep, who is in a disabled state of illness owing to a wound *received* in his duty as regards slaughtering; the case when *he is* concealed from a passer-by (amat nīhān min vidār) and there is protection, when *he is* an eater *and* there is no protection, when *he is* not eating and there is protection, and when *he is* not eating *and* there is no protection.

16. About the distraction¹ of a sequestrator as regards a sheep *or* beast of burden which is seized, when *it is* one *out* of four varieties², and when one *out* of three; when he nourishes *it for* half a year, *and* when *for* the duration of a year; when that which he obtains is a young *one*, and when that which he obtains is large, where *and* what is a shelter for it, and, *as to* the care of it, how it is when *in* a grain vault (kīgārakō-1), *and* when it is *under* a tree; how it is when *in* a damaged cellar (varkhō-1-1 kûstakō), and how it is when *in* a cage (pangar-1) which is not incomplete, *but is* broken, or *is* not incomplete and *is* sound, or *is* complete and sound.

17. About treasure which *they find* in the surroundings of a dwelling, *and* that which they find within the limits of the dwelling of any one. 18. About buried treasure when it is found by the side of a

¹ Reading hāzakō, but it is possibly a contracted form of ayāvakō, 'gain.'

² If it were allowable to omit this word, âyûînakō, 'variety,' and to substitute 'gain' for 'distraction,' the sentence would stand as follows:—'About the gain of a sequestrator as regards a sheep *or* beast of burden which is seized, when he nourishes *it for* one-fourth, when *for* one-third, when *for* half a year, *and* when *for* the duration of a *whole* year.' This seems more intelligible than the text as it stands in the MS.

road, *and* the ground is hard, how it is when it is one finger-breadth below, *and* how it is when *it is* two finger-breadths; as well as (ham-gûn) when the ground is soft, how it is when it is two finger-breadths below, *and* how it is when *it is* three finger-breadths. 19. When it is found within the road, and the ground is hard, how it is when it is two finger-breadths below, and how it is when *it is* three finger-breadths; *and* when the ground is soft, how it is when it is three finger-breadths below, and how it is when *it is* four finger-breadths. 20. When *it is* in an ascent *or* descent, there where *one* turns out from the road, and the ground is hard, how it is when it is below *up* to the instep¹, and how it is when *it is* up to the middle of the leg (patistân)²; *and if* soft, how it is when it is below up to the middle of the leg, and how it is when *it is* up to the knee. 21. When *it is* in a stream of water, *and* the ground is hard, how it is when it is below up to the knee, and how it is when *it is* up to mid-thigh; and when the ground is soft, how it is when it is below up to mid-thigh, *and* how it is when *it is* up to the testicles. 22. When *it is* in a ford *through* the water, and the ground is hard, how it is when it is below up to the testicles, *and* how it is when *it is* up to the navel; and when the ground is soft, how it is when it is below *up* to the navel, and how it is when *it is* up to the mouth. 23. And when *it is* in a kitchen (âs-khânö), the middle of a garden (van), *or* a sheep-fold (pâh-hastö); that is, how it is when *it is* not a permanent residence (afraz-mânisö) of *any*-

¹ Supposing that Pâz. âavad is intended for âfrapad.

² That is, up to the shin.

body, *and* how it is when *it is* a permanent residence¹.

24. About *him* who nourishes a sheep which is seized; that is, how it is when *it is* out of his store, *and* how it is when he nourishes it *as* it arrives.

25. About a dispute as regards a sheep that is seized, when one *person* says *it was* born of the colour of the mother, *and another* one says *it was* of her form², both *being* true; or one *person* mentions a single characteristic truly, *and another* one mentions many characteristics of it untruly; the *cases* when they mention *its* peculiarities otherwise, *and* in what manner; and whatever is on the same subject.

26. About a sheep³ seized, which *has* to pass on through the loftiest places in which *there* is lawfully shelter; *and* how *there* are three years, three existences (ah vôn), three places, nine occasions, and also many other regulations on the same subject.

CHAPTER XL.

Sakâdûm Nask.

1. One section is the Zîyânakistân ('*code of the injured*'), about *anything* which is animate—and that *which is* inanimate—injured through lawfully living, giving, receiving, *or* delivering back; the duty of protection and care for both kinds; the nourish-

¹ The utility of these minute details was probably to determine how long the treasure had been buried, and for what purpose, and whether there was any possibility of the rightful owner being still alive.

² Reading darand-î denman.

³ Supposing that pês stands for pâh.

ment, extension, sustentation, stimulation, establishment, consolation, and also gratification of an animate *being*; and the retribution for sin due to unlawfulness as regards the same matters.

2. About an example of a damaged gift, *in the case* when *one* gives the thing *to* a poor (*gadâk*) person at an appointed time, *and* when at *one* unappointed; *and in the case* when *one* gives him an increase, where *and* what is the increase. 3. A decision about a shepherd when they shall bring *him* back *an animal*¹, when damaged, before *its* subdivision; what he obtains for the damaged *animal* when not delivered back at the time of subdivision; when the duty about it is dictated by a religious *man*, and when he keeps *it* in *his own* possession.

4. About property which is inanimate, whose subdivisions, each separately, when *one* keeps *them* in use², and when in reserve (*armêstô*), are greater and less in value; that is, through so much effecting of penance (*avâkangisnô*) worthily, *or* through so much bringing of interest; and the capital is the same *in* value, the increase *being* the growth of dividends.

5. About the reason why the sin of an injured *person* becomes innocent through not delivering back a damaged *article*³; *and* many opinions, on the same subject, are provided for *our* benefit.

¹ Probably one sold by him to a butcher.

² For trading, or pious purposes.

³ Suffering wrongs without complaint being meritorious.

CHAPTER XLI.

Sakâdûm Nask.

1. One section of the *last* twenty-two is the Vakhshistân ('*increase code*'), particulars about the progress of increase. 2. About atonement, surrender, and compensation *for* anything, through dispelling *it* by compensating, atoning, *and* surrendering to *him* whose own *it is*; the period thereof not *being* appointed. 3. When he, whose origination of compensation, atonement, *and* surrender is his own, has appointed the period thereof, the growing of the sin actively, after the appointed time, is increase.

4. About increase¹ which is active (*kardakö*), and that which is existent (*zlstakö*); how it is when the existent becomes quite active, and how it is when both are suppressed (*armêstl-aît*). 5. About the extraction of increase upon increases which they may occasion *up* to an equality; where *and* which *it is*. 6. About a righteous gift; that is, how it is when overwhelmed by impoverishment, *and* how it is when its increase still proceeds.

7. About the progress of interest (*vakhsh*) upon effective wealth, when there is interest for it, and the interest thereon accumulates; also that which does not progress; how it is when the debtor (*âvâm-hômônd*), even on bringing back the wealth, is opulent, *and* the lender (*âvâm nafsman*) is opulent on asking for *it*; how it is when each is not opulent, *and* the debtor *was* not opulent on asking for *it*; *and* how it is when the lender (*âvâm khvêš*)

¹ As this word is written *vakhs* (= *nâs*) it is doubtful whether *vakhsh*, 'increase,' or *vinâs*, 'sin,' is intended; and the context is insufficient to solve the doubt.

is opulent on asking for *it*, *and* the debtor is not opulent through the wealth.

8. About where *and* when the life (*zīstanō*) of the lender has once passed *away*, how *it is* when *the loan* is to be issued anew at the end of the issue (*zihīsnō*), and how it is when *it has* existed in force, through the one issue *by* the deceased, *and* the interest accrues. 9. When the debtor passes away, how it is when he puts the interest into the property of any one through adoption, *and* how it is when *it is* the interest of the possessor of the wealth in both worlds.

10. About the peculiarity *of* retribution, the self-retribution of *one* liable to retribution for others, *and* the limit of one's own retribution. 11. About the penalty (*tāvān*) of him who, purchasing *animals* for impregnation, gives each a bad male; when *they are* not pregnant, *and* when they may produce; and whatever is on the same subject. 12. About the time of allowing the admission of the male *to* the beast *of* burden, sheep, and camel, and the time of consignment *to* each separate male for whom reception remains; the *case* when *it is* the time for admission of the male (*gūs-n-hilīh*), *and* the *case* when *it is* such a consignment as when the period, which is really originating with the admission of the male, has continued. 13. When, on account of no consignment *to* the male at the *proper* time, the female goes on unimpregnated, *and there* is no pregnancy of the cow, mare, camel, sheep, goat, *or* pig, each separately, how much the penalty is; *also* the sin they commit.

14. About the camel, mare, cow, *or* sheep, unto whom *there* is damaged milk, void of butter (*akaraḡ*), owing to the appointed time *one* postpones; *also* the

average *and* least milk of the mare, cow, goat, and sheep, that is, the measure of their one milking, each separately. 15. About the camel, that is, how much is its production of hair in a year, *and* the extent that the camel is surpassing therein among cattle; of them is also the ass that they allow to be seized upon for as much value as that *of* the oxen, and the mode of beating them up. 16. Where *and* how it is when the females of the camel and horse are a multiplying (*afzûnō*) *tending* to dissatisfaction; the increase even of increases of the ox, sheep, and goat progresses, *and* of them how much less is the multiplying of the female—which is an increase of increases *tending* to dissatisfaction, where *it is* extending over them—to be produced than that of the male.

17. The camel which is injured *on* the road, beyond the end of the appointed time, when they keep it *at* work unlawfully and the road is bad, when *at* work unlawfully *and* the road is good, *and* when comfortable at pasture, where seizing upon it becomes *tending* to dissatisfaction in several *ways*, and they are severally buying *it* when really invigorated¹, or *at* a price.

18. For how much increase of increases he stands up who is buying also an invigorated dog, *or* pig, at a price; and when *it is that* the increase and increase of increases remain undeveloped in them, as it *does* whenever property, *on* which the interest of the residue and income accumulates, is still for the children *of* the well-destined.

¹ Pâz. aôsanghen, both here and in § 18, no doubt for Av. aoganghem, as in Chap. XX, 58, the Av. *u* g and *u* s being much alike.

19. About *him* whose supplies some one is silently (agôpö) buying up, and the seller and important holder is quite bereaved, so that the bereaver *has* plenty for *one* deprived of food *on* a summer's day, and plenty for him who is *so* also *on* a winter's *day* (dim-ikik); *also* the supplying of mankind and fire lawfully, in the beginning, for a summer's day and night, *and* that for a winter's one¹. 20. About clothing when *it* is *that* which *one* strips off for donation. 21. About the penalty for a first deprivation of food, *and* the sin of it; *also* the penalty of the second and third, up to the tenth.

22. About a plaint and defence as regards a debt and its interest, and the decision thereon; also how *it is* when, for keeping up the repayment, debts upon debts are cancelled so far as the continuance of interest; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 23. About the uselessness of supplies which are not authorised *by* the religion. 24. About buying a slaughtered² sheep when the seller is bereaved by the delivery; *also* to how many sheep, in the two previous years, the increase and increase of increases thereof *had* specially to attain. 25. About where *and* what is that which would not conduce to increase, *and* what is that which *would*. 26. About the special sin and offence, the use of the milk, heart³, and wool, the spreading about *which tends* to dissatisfaction, the increase of increases, and the good

¹ See Farh. Oim, p. 38, ll. 4-8, and compare Chap. XXXVIII, 13.

² Reading *barâ-zegtalûntakö*, which word has been corrupted by the repairer of the MS.

³ Reading *dîl*, but the word can also be read *sar*, 'head.'

figure of any one sheep, and the regulation of every one.

27. About how the debtor *has* to announce the nature of the loan, *which* the lender, through irritation, does not approve; and, when the debtor has provided for a triple issue, when for a double issue, *and* even when he has for a single issue, the first year is *free* from begging his own time. 28. About the debtor *and* what ¹ he repays, when each year is announced *and* he does not assent; *and* how it happens, as regards the debtor, through many repayments, and all the postponements of the lender ².

29. About causing the confiscation (pâdîrângarh) of a human being (gerpîh)³, and *its* cessation ⁴ owing to worldly work, where *it is* for one month, *or*, thence onwards, for a second, a third, a sixth, a ninth, *or* a year at worldly work, *and* where *it is* regarding several human beings; the production of gain which accrues upon that single human being; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 30. About the confiscation of a cloak (gudâd) in the winter, *and* of a skin-bag for holding water (maskö-î âvdânö) in the summer; about whom *they are* appertaining to, on the passing by of the first ten nights, where *it is* after the bringing out of the cloak at the beginning of winter, *and* of the water-skin at the beginning of summer; *or* prior to the length of a month previous,

¹ Supposing that madam stands for maman; the two words being sometimes confounded.

² Who allows the debtor a longer time for repayment.

³ Literally 'bodily form.' The seizure of a slave of the debtor to work off the amount of the debt is evidently meant.

⁴ Reading va-sakisnö instead of the very similarly-written nikézsirnö, 'explanation,' of the MS.

severally, *to* the end of the winter *as regards* the cloak, *and to* the end of the summer *as regards* the water-skin; that is, *for* how much gain upon that one cloak, *or* water-skin, is the retribution of the confiscator to whom *it is* appertaining¹; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

31. About the increase of grains, *and* that of sheep *with* the progeny, milk, and wool that they may severally produce. 32. About the confiscation of clothes and implements by delivering *them* back to *him* who specially reckons many *as* his own²; that is, how the produce (vakhsh) increases when he orders *their* use imperfectly, how it *does* when *he does so* not imperfectly, *and* how it *does* when he keeps *them* in inactivity. 33. About the produce of land on which grain is cast, and *of* that on which *it is* not cast (va-zak-t an-madam ramituntô)³, when by delivery thereof *it is* self-exhausted. 34. And so also the produce *of* ornaments of gold and silver, and of red-coloured things, with many regulations on the same subject *and* what is connected therewith.

¹ This seems the more probable meaning if we are to understand that the confiscation has been actually carried out at an improper season; but, if we suppose that it is avoided on account of the season, it would be better to translate as follows:—'*For* how much gain upon that one cloak, *or* water-skin, is the confiscator, to whom *it is* appertaining, to be compensated.'

² Possibly referring to the seizure of articles sold by a dealer, but not paid for.

³ The form an of the negative prefix is here used because the Zvâris an-madam is replaced by the Pâz. an-avar in pronunciation.

CHAPTER XLII.

Sakâdām Nask.

1. One section, the Varistân ('*ordeal code*'), contains particulars of that *which*, when it becomes manifest in any one, is indicative as to witchcraft; the bringing of remedies *for* the person who is rendered sickly by a wizard; the execution of the wizard, what the religious rite is in the legal proceedings, *and* the *case* when *there is* a religious rite in the legal proceedings. 2. About the *case* when, for want of legal proceedings, he is executed without the religious rite; and what it is when¹ he dies through his own destruction of some one.

3. About the accomplishment of an ordeal by which, through the power of the spirit, *there* arises a manifestation of acquittal *or* incrimination of those maintaining inconsistencies as to witchcraft, destroying a righteous *man*, *or* other concealed instigations of sin²; the time of its performance, and the place of hurtfulness of its continuance. 4. About the place of accomplishment; *in* what manner is the selection (fragârdanō), limitation, *and* preparation, of the abode *in* which the ordeal is performed; that which is to be carried forth to that abode, *and* that of which the carrying thereto is to be avoided; who is to be admitted to that abode, *and* who is not to be admitted; *and* that which, when it occurs there,

¹ We should probably read 'and about the *case* when,' supposing that maman stands for madam, the reverse of what occurs in Chap. XLI, 28.

² That is, when there is no evidence of the crime beyond the suspicions, real or assumed, of the accusers.

is a disturbance of the work, they separate (*vangend*) therefrom.

5. About those belonging to the place of ordeal (*varistânîkân*) and other officials there, the rites and customs therein, the ceremonial to be celebrated in the abode, *and* the invocation of the sacred beings for assistance. 6. What is the mode *of* performing the hot and cold ordeal; how is the leading forth *of* the accomplishers thereto, and of what Avesta is their uplifted recitation; how is the accomplishment of the hot and cold ordeal, *and* the manifestation *of* the acquitted and incriminated thereby; *and* many statements (*gôkân*) on the same subject.

CHAPTER XLIII.

Sakâdâm Nask.

1. One section is miscellaneous: about *having* sought an assistant who is brought, that is, in what mode *it* is proper; *and* the payment of an assistant who is a member of the community (*dâhm*)¹, and also that of a foreigner (*an-Aîr*), in the same affair. 2. About how the coming of a man to confinement and fettering is through his own wealth, and whatever is on the same subject. 3. About confession through one, two, and three statements; *and* whatever is about it. 4. About the contempt *of* a disciple for a *priestly* master, which is an annoyance to him; the property *belonging* to the master, and the squandering that occurs in *it*.

¹ The contradistinction here indicated between *dâhm* and *an-Aîr* is an important confirmation of Geldner's definition of *Av. dahma* as 'Vollbürger oder Mitglieder' (see *Studien zum Avesta*, 1882, p. 14).

5. The sin that is its own penalty through *being* liable to penalty, *and* the transgressor whose penalty is owing thereto; when they would unlawfully bring a penalty upon *one* liable to penalty, or *one* thereby inflicts a penalty *upon* him, of which *one* is aware that *he* is not capable (patûkō); and the time which *one* liable to penalty *has* for the payment of that penalty of his is until *his* attaining to opulence, when, after the appointment about the penalty, he becomes capable of an atonement. 6. About the accumulation (gangīh) of sin through the expedients of the wrathful (garmakân), which are connected with much destruction of the righteous. 7. About the sin owing to which, among those that are wrathful, *he* who *has* drunk from a well on a road, *or* path, conceals the water for the sake of concealment.

8. About the sin of a judge who pronounces the sinner *to be* in innocence, and the innocent *to be* in some sinfulness. 9. About a judge acquainted with the law¹ *for* ten years, him who is *for* eleven, him who is *for* twelve, him who is *for* thirteen, him who is *for* fourteen, *and* him who is *for* fifteen; that is, their decisions, each separately, on several specially prominent objects of acquaintance with the law, as regards decision and judgment.

10. About a daughter whose religious control, during the life of her father, *resides* in *her* mother for the joint life of the mother, but for ² the authorised giving *her away there* is the father. 11. About a daughter who is unprovided with a husband, *and*

¹ See Chaps. XX, 74, XXII, 21.

² Reading râf instead of lâ, 'not.'

who *has* no father and no mother, nor yet any of the brothers of the departed parents, *and it* is not even allowable to give herself away into guardianship by a husband.

12. About property which is *bequeathed* by will *on* passing away; that is, how it is when given, *and* how it is when it does not exist. 13. About the privilege of a father in giving property to *his* children according to his wish, and a son who is irreverent towards *his* father, so that¹ *some* of the property of the father *goes* to the worthy mother; also when they would make irreverence towards the father the imputed characteristic (bākht nīśānō), where a decree about the property of the father is decided upon; *and* whatever is on the same subject, as regards the extent of irreverence *of* the son towards the father, and the sin of it.

14. About the sin of a son² who is accepted, when he recoils from that acceptance; the acceptor of a living, *or* even a departed, father is *so* because *it is* the will *of* the people, and also *for* the worldly fame of a soul of the departed; and the ceremonial *and* obeisance are, moreover, for those of them within their own dwelling, owing to letting forth their generosity, and they shall provide *them*.

15. About the production *and* arising of even that property which a liberal person *has* not seen, *if* there be any one who³ *has* not lived liberally.

¹ As aêgh also means 'where,' it is rather uncertain whether the irreverence is supposed to be the cause, or the effect, of the special provision for the mother which afterwards becomes a source of litigation.

² An adopted son must be meant.

³ Supposing that mīn stands for mūn.

16. About the production *and* arising of something of the property of a damsel, even when she gives *it* by design only to him *who is* worthy.

17. About a damsel whom an idolator (dēvtyast) carries off from her own master, *and* would give to a Mazda-worshipper; that is, how *it is* justifiable for the Mazda-worshipper, *having* had that damsel in *his* possession, to seek a son by *her*, so long as the guardianship *of* the woman is with that man. 18. About a mother *being* guardian over a living father, owing to *their having* a son. 19. About the proper completion of a provision—that was for the decision *of* the supreme judge, *on* various statements, and was never otherwise—which is the provision *of him* who is a high-priest of the religion.

20. About the sin of a father through not satisfying the menstrual excitement of a daughter who *has* attained the capability of *having* a son (berman radīh); what it is when, through not satisfying the menstrual excitement of the daughter, *he is* sinful; and how it is when the daughter herself is sinful; also the symptoms of attaining the capability of *having* a son.

21. About where *and* which is that sin on the committal of which inadvertently *one* attains to deliverance thus, when it comes to his knowledge *it is* through a determined renunciation it goes away from *its* source; *also* which is that committal inadvertently which does not occur through him who is intelligent. 22. About the four more heinous *forms* of demon-service (sêdâ-yazakīh), and the three worst sins wherein they shall perform *them*; the ten *existences* that are furtherances, and the nine that are destroyers, *of* the world.

23. About a true *statement* through which, when *one utters it, he is wicked and worthy of death.* 24. About driving the bestowable benefit of the spiritual *existence* away from the world, when he who is destroying a righteous *man* walks openly in the world; how one section *of* the spirit's earth is that of a people¹ destroying the righteous *man*, and the complaint of the spirits of fire, water, and plants, owing thereto; *also* how the bestowal of the allotment of a leading man is upon *his* inferiors. 25. About the three kinds *of* righteous men; one that is greater than water *and* earth, animals *and* plants, one that is equal *to them*, and one that is less; and what is the arrangement of—as *it were*—the conjoined formation of those who are somewhat outside of the three kinds.

26. About the grievous bridge-judgment for carrying forth dead matter to water, or to fire, with which *there* is evidence; and the heaviness of the spirit due to dead matter in the water. 27. The good work of him who brings the dead matter² *of man or dog*,

¹ Some neighbouring nation of unbelievers is probably meant, such as the Byzantines; as we must always recollect that the compiler is summarizing the contents of the Pahlavi commentary written in Sasanian times (see Chap. I, 3).

² See Chap. XXVII, 4. It appears from this section that the dead matter of an evil creature, such as a snake or frog, was considered to pollute the water as much as that of a good creature. § 28, however, admits the expediency of killing noxious creatures in the water when it is impossible to take them out beforehand; and this is in accordance with Vend. V, 35-38 (W.) which teaches that an apostate defiles no one when dead (any more than a dried-up frog that has been dead a year), because he defiles while living. This rule was evidently intended to remove all scruples as to killing such creatures, but it applies to them only when recently killed; hence the necessity of removing them, from any place liable to

or that of the serpent *or* frog, out of the water. 28. About the destruction of the serpent and frog, and other aquatic noxious creatures, in the water when it is *only* thus possible, *and* carrying *them* out from it when it is possible. 29. About the gratification of the spirit of the world, *and* the vexation of the demons, owing to the destruction of them.

30. Where *and* what are the tokens of the good¹ management and well-operating drinking-party (tôstih) of a neighbour not of the same district (ahamshatrô nazd). 31. About the sin of him who, after joining a drinking-party from sunset (hû-frâshmôkdâdö), pulverizes the road (râh tekhnunêdö), keeps the door opened, *and* would unlawfully make an uproar.

32. About Aûharmazd *having* produced the bodies *and* members of animals—through *having* created the body of the sole-created ox with satisfaction, as assistance for mankind—because *they* are repeated for protection, and also *for* the ceremonial for sacred beings specially declared. 33. About the reason of making offerings (aûstôfrîdö) to the sacred beings, for the increase of power of the allotters of destiny in the allotment of destiny; the connection of that acknowledgement (padîrisnö) and *of* the benefit *and* advantage of the recompense thereof; the proper maintenance *of* that acknowledgement, through the means *and* efficacy *of* the spiritual bridge-judgment of sin, and the fear of worldly disaster and harm from not properly maintaining the perpetual acknowledgement in force

pollution, as soon as possible after death, common sense being preferable to logical consistency.

¹ Supposing that vûp stands for khûp.

(dên patûkîh), *and from* the setting up even of ruin thereby; the reasonable control of the offering to each one of the sacred beings therein is for the skilful member of the community (hûnarîk dâhm) of whatever kind, *and* is not produced by intrusting the consecration to the violent, more particularly to those whom *one* specially enumerates; the sin and retribution owing to *having* given *it* to those who are of that class; *and* more upon the same subject.

34. About the damage and injury of the world owing to greed (âzð) and its fellow-miscreations, *and* him who is their supporter and abettor, the idolator (dêvtyastô), also the wolf of many kinds and noxious creatures of various species; because the occurrence of their fiendishness is due to the original fiend, *and* the means for strengthening their fiendishness are *derived* from the destruction of all mankind *and* the other primary worldly creations which are aiding mankind. 35. Advice to mankind about smiting and destroying the evil domination (dûs-khshasarîndanô) of the world *by* those *injurers*, and the merit manifest for *themselves* therein; the object *and* spiritual reward for smiting *and* killing each one of the wolves *and* noxious creatures, *and*, as regards the same reward, the perfection of that for destroying a two-legged wolf¹; *and* whatever is on the same subject.

36. About advice as to not reverencing the evil spirit and demons, whereby the observing (var'zô) of the several ceremonies and gratifications of the sacred beings *would be* more particularly irregular in *any* manner whatever, and the damage and

¹ A term applied to an idolator.

harm owing to those *who are* irregular *and* ill-observant, through being inclined for that irregularity *and* ill-observance, *would* become an oppressive presidency (padgah¹) of the demons over the creatures; also the vice of clamorous talking (drâyân gôg¹)¹ and the damage owing thereto, *and* the pleasure of the demons due to the same *and* other *things* which are irregular. 37. Advice about the reason, habit, *and* primitive practice of not chattering, and other good customs, during eating *and* drinking; the gratification of the sacred beings owing to that primitive practice of good customs *by* mankind, and the unself-devoting (a-khvêš-dâk) is he who is not maintaining *it*.

38. Through the ceremonial of which sacred being is the greater welcome (mâhmânötar¹) of a high-priest *and of* any good work *of* each one of the five periods of the day and night; the reward and advantage owing to celebrating the ceremony of each of them separately in its own period, and also other means *and* regulations in the same statement.

39. It is righteousness *that is* perfect excellence.

CHAPTER XLIV.

I. The Vendîdâd² *contains* particulars of Aôhar-mazd *having* produced the pleasure of mankind by

¹ Whereby the devotions are disturbed, or rendered ineffectual.

² Corresponding to the nineteenth word, drigubyô, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the twentieth Nask in other Rivâyats. In the Dînkard its name is semi-Zvâris, either Gvîd-shêdâ-dâd or Vîk-shêdâ-dâd, the Av. dâta vîdâêva, 'law opposed to the demons.' In the Rivâyats it is called Gud-dêv-dâd, Vendîdâd, or Vîndâd, and is stated to consist of twenty-two kardah, or fargard, the number it still contains. It is generally considered that the Vendîdâd now extant is a collection of frag-

that place where they specially make a residence, and the advantage from the same production¹. 2. About the formation of sixteen perfect places specially enumerated, *and* also the adversity which has happened to each separately².

3. About Aûharmazd's disclosing the religion first *among* mankind to Yim³; *its* non-acceptance by Yim owing to attachment (asrûnôih) *to* the religion of the ancients; *and* the acceptance *of* other *things* to develope, extend, and improve the world thereby⁴. 4. About the reason of the needfulness *of* making the enclosure that Yim made (var-t Yim kard), the command *and* instruction by Aûharmazd to Yim, the making by Yim just as Aûharmazd commanded *and* instructed, *and* whatever is on the same subject⁵.

5. About what the comfort of the spirit of the earth is most owing to, what *its* discomfort is more particularly owing to, and from what *its* greatest gratification *has* arisen⁶.

6. About the sin of pollution owing to carrying a corpse by a single person, *relating*, however, to that which a dog *has* not seen⁷. 7. About the food,

ments, but it is evident, from the close correspondence between the author's description and the present contents, that this fragmentary state of the text existed in his time; and there is every probability that any mutilation that exists in the text occurred before Sasanian times. The author, however, sometimes omits to mention subjects that are repeated, so it is just possible that some of these repetitions are of later date. He also makes no allusion to the twelfth fargard (see § 51 n).

¹ Vend. I, 1, 2 (W.).

² Vend. I, 3-20.

³ See Chap. XIII, 6-8.

⁴ Vend. II, 1-19.

⁵ Vend. II, 22-43.

⁶ Vend. III, 1-13, 22, 23, 34.

⁷ Vend. III, 14; the latter clause referring to the commentary on Pahl. Vend. III, 48 (Sp.).

clothing, and place of *him* who becomes polluted and worthy of death through a corpse, on account of carrying *it* alone (aêvakö-barîh râi)¹. 8. About how the several precautions of mankind *and* other pure creatures are *taken*, as regards a corpse² which has become polluted by another corpse³.

9. About the pleasure of the spirit of the earth owing to sowing *and* tilling, *and its* vexation owing to not sowing *and* not tilling; the blessing upon the sowers, *and* the advantage *and* merit owing to sowing, on account of particulars about the nourishment and protection *of* the religion thereby⁴. 10. About the destruction of the demons *which* arises from the sprouting, growing, *and* ripening of corn; *and* the good success of mankind from the eating *of it*⁵.

11. About the sin of burying a corpse through sinfulness, *and for* how much time is the uselessness *of* the ground in which the burial may be performed⁶.

12. About the power of the good religion for wiping away sin from human beings⁷.

13. About the sin of deceiving *by* an avaricious *person* (pastö) as regards *what he has* consumed and given, and the grievousness of other breaches of promise; the danger, even in the worldly *existence*, from maintaining him, *and* the retribution *it is* important for him to make⁸.

¹ Vend. III, 15-19.

² The person polluted in this manner being considered as unclean as the corpse itself.

³ Vend. III, 20, 21 and perhaps some commentary on Pahl. Vend. III, 71 (Sp.) now lost.

⁴ Vend. III, 23-31.

⁵ Vend. III, 32, 33.

⁶ Vend. III, 36-40.

⁷ Vend. III, 41, 42.

⁸ Vend. IV, 1-16.

14. About where *there is* steadfastness in the religion *there is* also a manifestation of this: when *one* becomes liberal—as to every benefit that exists for him—towards those of the same religion who come forward with a request¹. 15. About the extent of sleeping in the day and night, *and* other *matters* as to occupation *which* occurs daily².

16. About the grievous sinfulness of *having* taken a false oath, so that, apart even from the testifying retribution of the property, the oath taken thereon *has* also an efficacy very much for the accusers, which, on account of Mitrô³, Srôsh, and Rashnû, is an awful destroyer *and* adversary for one's own person, wife, child, and property; *also* the grievous bridge-judgment which is an appendage to one's own soul⁴.

17. About the sin of bringing firewood, with *which* dead matter⁵ is mingled, to a fire; *and* this too, that is, how *and* when one is innocent therein⁶.

18. About a ditch (*gôî*), which is not always a stream (*nâvô*), when the water *has* to pass through it, and also that which is always a stream, when *one* wants to increase the water therein, how often *and* how *one*

¹ Vend. IV, 44.

² Vend. IV, 45.

³ Av. Mithrô, the angel of the sun's light, friendly to man, and, hence, insisting upon the fulfilment of every promise (mithrô). He is supposed to keep an account of all breaches of promise (see Dd. XIV, 3), and to mediate between the departed soul and its accusers (see Mkh. II, 118), in doing which he co-operates with the angels of obedience (Srôsh, see Chap. IX, 3 n) and justice (Rashnû, see Chap. XX, 153 n) who estimate and weigh its good works and sins, and decide upon its fate at the bridge of judgment.

⁴ Vend. IV, 46, 50-55.

⁵ See Chap. XXVII, 4 n.

⁶ Vend. V, 1-4.

*has to inspect them for fear of dead matter having been there*¹.

19. About death which is by reason of water *or* fire, *and* does not occur through the supremacy of water *or* fire, but is owing to the demons². 20. About the great advantage owing to rain, *and connected* with raining on dead matter and the bodily refuse³ of depositories *for the dead*⁴. 21. About the greatness and goodness of 'the law opposed to the demons'⁵ for cleansing, as compared with other utterances⁶.

22. About pollution owing to bodily contact (*ham-kerpakth*) with a corpse, and *to* bodily contact with him who is in bodily contact with a corpse⁷. 23. About the wicked villain *who is* an unrighteous apostate alive, and abstaining from association (*avâkth*) *with him*⁸. 24. About how long is the time *of* pollution *of* a house in which a dog or human being passes away, the carrying away theretofore of anything going thereto, *and* the avoidance of *it*; the place into which any one goes out, the feeding, *and* other things in that house within three steps, *and* whatever is on the same subject⁹. 25. About a woman *whose* child dies in the womb, *and* which becomes dead matter; *and* whatever is on the same subject¹⁰.

¹ Vend. V, 5-7; but the last clause refers to a Pahlavi commentary found only in the manuscripts.

² Vend. V, 8, 9.

³ See Chap. XIX, 3.

⁴ Vend. V, 15-20.

⁵ The Vendidad itself, see § 1 n.

⁶ Vend. V, 22-25.

⁷ Vend. V, 27-34.

⁸ Vend. V, 35-38.

⁹ Vend. V, 39-44 (W.), and commentary on Pahl. Vend. V, 134 (Sp.).

¹⁰ Vend. V, 45-56.

26. About useless and polluted clothing, that which is cleansed for six months¹. 27. About the grievous sinfulness of irregularly letting forth clothing, as much as a single double hem², upon a corpse³.

28. About how long is the time *of* the uncultivated state of the land—*free* from admitting water and *being* sown—on which a human being or a dog passes away; the inspection of the whole land on account of the risk of dead matter *having* been there, *and* afterwards admitting water upon *it*; the sin when, *through* not exploring, dead matter is *in* that place, and the water comes on to it; *and* whatever is on the same subject⁴.

29. About how to bring a corpse out of the water, the extent of the pollution of the water around the corpse, the purity after bringing away the corpse from it, *and* whatever is on the same subject⁵. 30. About where the bodies and bones of the departed are deposited, *and* whatever is on the same subject⁶.

31. About how soon is the rushing of the fiend of corruption (nasûs drûgô) upon a human being *or* dog that has passed away at the appointed *time*, and *upon* one who *has done so* before the appointed *time* through the defectiveness (âhûgagîh) of the worldly *existence*; where the clothing of this one is which is useless, *and* which *and* how is the washing

¹ Av. khshvas maunghô; Vend. V, 57-59 (W.), and commentary on Pahl. Vend. V, 167 (Sp.).

² Pâz. dhôvana which is here assumed to be equivalent to Pers. dô bun. It is probably a reading of the Pahlavi word 𐭥𐭥 or 𐭥𐭥 in Pahl. Vend. V, 169, 172, which has been variously read as gûgan, 'a dirham,' dûkô, 'a spindle,' or yûkô, 'a rag;' the last of which would best suit the context here.

³ Vend. V, 60-62.

⁴ Vend. VI, 1-9.

⁵ Vend. VI, 26-41.

⁶ Vend. VI, 44-51.

of that which is for washing¹. 32. About the heinous pollution and grievous sinfulness *of* devouring dead matter, *or of* bringing it to fire *or* water through sinfulness². 33. About the winter, the demon-produced terror, the spider and locust³, sickness of many kinds, *and* much other evil, *which* become threatening in the world owing to the formation of dead matter⁴. 34. About how to cleanse wood, corn, *and* fodder from the dead matter *which* comes upon it⁵.

35. About medical treatment with spells, the knife, and herbs; how to test a medical man, the fee *for* curing, *and* whatever is on the same sub-

¹ Vend. VII, 1-5, 10-16. Nothing is said about VII, 6-9, 17-22 (which passages are merely a repetition of V, 27-30, 57-62), but this omission may be owing to the fact that these passages are so abbreviated in the MSS. as to be easily overlooked, especially by a reader of the Pahlavi version only.

² Vend. VII, 23-26.

³ Pahl. tanand va-mâk (=mêg), evidently equivalent to the Av. sînô madhakhayauska of Vend. VII, 26, which are rendered by tûn mêgō-k in the Pahlavi version. The identity of Av. madhakha with Pahl. madag, or mêg, Pers. maîg, mala'k 'a locust,' has long been recognised (see Darmesteter's Études Iranniennes, II, p. 199). But the meaning of Av. sîn = Pâz. tûn has been merely guessed to be 'a mosquito;' the Avesta word having been transcribed as sîn, or sin, in the prose Sad-dar, LXXII, 2, and explained by the Persian gloss pasah, 'a gnat or fly,' by some copyists, while others have read san (for sin) and have substituted its synonym sâl, 'a year,' or have read bîs, 'a poisonous herb,' instead of pasah. With regard to the word 𐭠𐭥𐭩 tanand, 'spider,' in our text, it may be observed that it has descended from a much older copy of the Pahlavi Vendîdâd than any that could have been consulted by the author of the Sad-dar, and it is easy to see how an original Pahl. 𐭠𐭥𐭩 could have been read 𐭠𐭥𐭩 in Pâzand by later copyists of the Vendîdâd.

⁴ Vend. VII, 26, 27.

⁵ Vend. VII, 28-35.

ject¹. 36. About the place on which a corpse is fettered (*garovī-aitō*), *and* also that in which it is buried through sinfulness; *and* in how much time it becomes pure, *in each case separately*². 37. About the much lodgment *of* the demons there where a corpse is buried (*nikân*), *and* the merit of laying open (*âskârinīdanō*) the *place of burial* (*nikânth*) of a corpse³.

38. About the duration of not drinking *by* a woman who *has* miscarried (*visistakō*); also *her* not feeding on the liquid of that which is watery food⁴. 39. About the washing of a metallic, stony, *or* any other cup-like article, upon which dead matter *has* come, *and which* is not pronounced useless⁵. 40. About the animal (*gôspend*) that *has* eaten dead matter, *and* the plant with which dead matter is mingled⁶. 41. About the sin of holy water *being* brought to water *which is tainted* with dead matter⁷.

42. About the house (*khânō*) in which a dog or a human being passes away⁸. 43. About how large *and* how *one has* to make the vault (*kaḍakō*) for the sake of a corpse in a dwelling (*mân*), carrying the corpse to it, when the time comes to expose *and* avoid it, *and* whatever is on the same subject⁹.

¹ Vend. VII, 36-44.

² Vend. VII, 45-50.

³ Vend. VII, 51, 52, 55-59, which refers to tombs and mausoleums (*uzdaêza uzdistā*) and not to the legal dakhmas, or depositories for the dead. §§ 51, 52 are described after the others.

⁴ Vend. VII, 60, 67-71. The contents of VII, 61-66 are not mentioned, being abbreviated in the MSS. as a repetition of V, 46-51.

⁵ Vend. VII, 73-75.

⁶ Vend. VII, 76, 77, where, however, plants are not mentioned.

⁷ Vend. VII, 78, 79.

⁸ Vend. VIII, 1-3.

⁹ Vend. VIII, 4-25.

44. About the baseness (*garas*)¹ and grievous sinfulness of the decree (*vigtrih*)¹ of death, unnatural intercourse². 45. About a dry corpse which *has been* dead throughout a year³. 46. About the merit of *having* brought unto purity a corpse-burning fire, a fire burning bodily refuse, *or* of an encampment (*sarây-îkô*)⁴; also those *which* artificers, each separately, keep in use *one has* to secure, *when* the work is done, for the appointed fireplace (*dâd-gâs*)⁵.

47. About washing the polluted who *have been* in bodily contact with a corpse, *or* moving *it*; divers preferences *as to* the purifier, the rite of washing, *and* the reward of purifiers, worldly and also spiritual⁶. 48. About the shining of the sun, moon, and stars alike discontentedly upon the polluted⁷. 49. About the gratification of all the creatures of Aûharmazd *by* the purifier, when he produces purification for the polluted *and* suchlike beings (*ângunî-attôân*); also his reward⁸. 50. About the strength *and* aid which are given to the fiend of corruption (*nasûs drûgô*) *by* him who does not understand purifying, *and yet* would accomplish *it*; *also* the sin thereof *at* the bridge *of judgment*⁹. 51. About the triumph of the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô¹⁰ in smiting the fiend and *in* healing¹¹.

¹ Both these words are blotted and doubtful in the original MS.

² Vend. VIII, 31, 32.

³ Vend. VIII, 33, 34.

⁴ Or it may be *sar aspô*, 'a troop of horse.'

⁵ Vend. VIII, 73-96.

⁶ Vend. VIII, 35-72, 97-107, IX, 1-39.

⁷ Vend. IX, 41.

⁸ Vend. IX, 42-44.

⁹ Vend. IX, 47-57.

¹⁰ The Ahunavair formula is so called from its first three words (see Chap. I, 7 n).

¹¹ Vend. IX, 45, 46, X, 1-20, XI, 1-20 may probably be all alluded to in these few words; but nothing is said about the twelfth fargard. This omission is singularly in accordance with the fact

52. About the species of dogs; the worthiness of the shepherd's dog, the village dog, and others also; how to maintain *and* nourish (srâyīnidanō) *them with* nourishment, *and* the sin owing to killing *or* even improperly maintaining them, each separately; *and* whatever is on the same subject¹. 53. And this, too, when a dog becomes useless (abōn) *or* hurtful, what is to be done with *it*, *and* how *it is* to be kept². 54. About authorisedly killing the dog-wolf³. 55. About the thirty-one dispositions among dogs, which are just as among the three special professions *and* divers others *of* five descriptions⁴. 56. About the grievous sinfulness of killing a water beaver, and statements (gōkân) of the penalty⁵.

57. About the sin which gave an Irānian to foreigners (an-Aīrānō)⁶. 58. About the sin for those three⁷ males *who have* debauched a woman

that the same fargard is omitted in all very old copies of the Vendīdād with Pahlavi version, in which, although the fargards are numbered, the thirteenth immediately follows the eleventh. The Copenhagen MS. No. 2, in which the twelfth fargard occurs with a Pahlavi version, is said to be a revision of the Vendīdād text compiled in the last century, and other copies of the Pahlavi twelfth fargard have been derived from this revised text. The omission of this fargard in all the old MSS. cannot be satisfactorily attributed to the loss of some folios in an older copy, because no fargard is likely to fill exactly a certain number of folios; the loss must also have occurred very shortly after the last revision of the Pahlavi text, to account for the author of the Dinkard not finding the Pahlavi of this fargard in the ninth century.

¹ Vend. XIII, 1-28.

² Vend. XIII, 29-38.

³ Vend. XIII, 41-43.

⁴ Vend. XIII, 44-48 which detail the thirty-one particulars in which dogs resemble people of eight avocations, three of which are the professions of priests, warriors, and husbandmen.

⁵ Vend. XIII, 50-56, XIV, 1-18.

⁶ Vend. XV, 2.

⁷ Reading *va/ zak* 3, but it may be *va/ zak-aê*, 'for the other.'

who is pregnant, *or* the wife *with* a child at the breast, *or* a daughter *of* others; *and* the sin owing to similar sin¹. 59. About the guardianship and nourishment which *it* is important to provide *for* a child that is seen *to be* improperly protected, *or for* a dog when it is born without a guardian; *and* whatever is on the same subject².

60. About menstruation, the heinousness of its pollution, and how much *one has* to abstain from it³.

61. The cleansing from the menses, the time *of* the cleansing, *and* the nature of the cleansing of any person *or* thing polluted by the menses, *or* that which becomes inefficient *thereby*; *and* whatever is on the same subject⁴. 62. And about the grievous sinfulness of having sexual intercourse with a menstruous woman⁵.

63. About the deadly bridge *penalty* of those *who have* not sustained the judges⁶. 64. About the care of the hair and nails, *and* the sin owing to want of care⁷.

65. About the apostasy of *him* who is bringing a mouth-veil⁸, a vermin-killer⁹, various sacred twigs¹⁰,

¹ Vend. XV, 8-16.

² Vend. XV, 17-45, though the last clause may include the remainder of this fargard.

³ Vend. XVI, 1-7, 13-16, also XV, 7. ⁴ Vend. XVI, 7-12.

⁵ Vend. XVI, 17. ⁶ Vend. XVI, 18 = XVII, 11.

⁷ Vend. XVII, 1-10.

⁸ Pahl. padâm (Av. paitidâna, Pâz. penôm). It 'consists of two pieces of white cotton cloth, hanging loosely from the bridge of the nose to at least two inches below the mouth, and tied with two strings at the back of the head. It must be worn by a priest whenever he approaches the sacred fire, so as to prevent his breath from contaminating the fire.' (Haug's Essays, p. 243, note 1.)

⁹ Av. khrafstraghna, an implement for killing snakes and other noxious creatures; it may be made of any material, but a leathern whip is recommended.

¹⁰ Av. baresman, a bundle of slender rods, formerly twigs of

or a goad or scourge¹ *which is* exceptional, and maintains that *it* is that which is necessary². 66. About the disapproved *one*, and the bridge-judgment upon him, who sleeps on *through* the whole night, *so as* not to accomplish *his* proper duty³. 67. And the approval *and* reward of him who does not sleep over religious *observances*, *so as* to accomplish *his* proper duty⁴. 68. About the progress of secretly-advancing ruin (sêgö) through that exhibitor of evil religion who wears no *sacred thread-girdle*, and his not wearing *it* as *it were* by law⁵.

69. About the proper duty and great value of the Parôdarsh⁶ bird, and the great good work *that* gives *it* a morsel of meat which is the size of its body, the liberalization of the primitive temperament⁷ through righteousness for the righteous man⁸. 70. About the hurry of the fire for kindling for the untroubled watching of the night, and the merit owing to law-

particular trees, but now thin metal wires, usually from five to thirty-three in number according to the nature of the ceremony. These rods are tied together by a central girdle, passing three times round them and knotted just like the sacred thread-girdle round the waist of a Parsi; but this girdle is formed of six thread-like ribbons split out of a leaflet of the date-palm and twisted together. The bundle, when properly purified, is laid upon the crescent-shaped tops of two adjacent metal stands, whence it is taken up by the officiating priest, to hold in his left hand during certain recitations.

¹ Av. astra and sraosha-karana, implements for scourging and punishing sinners and criminals.

² Vend. XVIII, 1-4.

³ Vend. XVIII, 5.

⁴ Vend. XVIII, 6.

⁵ Vend. XVIII, 8-10.

⁶ 'The foreseer' of the dawn, an epithet of the domestic cock.

⁷ Pahl. rādînfānō-î mûnak-î kâdmon.

⁸ Vend. XVIII, 13-17, 23-26, 28, 29.

fully kindling *it*; *also* the blessing of the fire on mankind, when pleased *and* untroubled¹.

71. About the four special sins by which the fiend² receives vigorous pregnancy, *and* the atonement for each separately³. 72. About the grievous sinfulness, trouble, lamentation (*navīkīh*), and harm *that* proceed from a courtesan; *also* the advantageousness of *her* destruction⁴. 73. About the retribution for the sin of having sexual intercourse with a menstruous woman⁵.

74. About the combat (*kūshisnō*) of the evil spirit with Zaratūst, the victory of Zaratūst therein, *and* whatever is on the same subject⁶. 75. About Zaratūst *having* enquired of Aūharmazd how, *and* by what means, *one has* to confound the evil spirit *and* other demons, and his reply⁷. 76. About the gratification of Vohūman, the archangel, owing to the washing *and* bringing back to use of polluted clothing; *also* praise unto Aūharmazd for his narrating the care of the clothing⁸.

77. About the reward which they give up *to* a human soul for the sake of kindness, *and* whereto *and* how is the attainment to exaltation of him who is given *it*⁹. 78. About the going of Vohūman to meet the souls of the righteous, the notification of their position, *their* announcement for reward, and the contented progress of the souls of the righteous to their [home]¹⁰, to the throne of Aūharmazd *and*

¹ Vend. XVIII, 18-22, 26, 27.

² The Av. drug is feminine.

⁴ Vend. XVIII, 60-65.

⁶ Vend. XIX, 1-10.

⁸ Vend. XIX, 20-25.

³ Vend. XVIII, 30-59.

⁵ Vend. XVIII, 66-76.

⁷ Vend. XIX, 11-14.

⁹ Vend. XIX, 27-30.

¹⁰ This word, *mêhan* (Av. *maêthana*), has been omitted by the

the archangels, which is made of gold¹. 79. About the terror of the demons owing to the scent of the righteous, and the fear that arose *among* them owing to the birth of Zarātūst².

80. About the great powerfulness of plants of a poisonous character³ for the forcible⁴ keeping away of much adversity; the production of entire species (pûr sarâdakö) of plants by Aûharmazd for the curing of the creatures from disease (ayôyakîh); the success of the Gôkerenô⁵ plant—which is the white Hôm—in curing, as compared with other plants; and the diligence of Aîrmân⁶ in the medical treatment of the world⁷.

81. Information about the ritual (nîrang) through which the violence of the fiend *was* minimized at the original creation; and the great powerfulness of the Aîrmân supplication⁸, the Ahunavair⁹, and other

repairer of the manuscript, when noting, on his patch, the words he had cut out.

¹ Vend. XIX, 31, 32.

² Vend. XIX, 33, 43-47; no notice being taken of the invocatory passage 34-42.

³ Pahl. bîs'êîhar, Av. viskithra.

⁴ Reading nîrûgîk which suits the context better than nîrangîk, 'ritualistic.'

⁵ Av. gaokerena, a mythical tree, or plant, supposed to grow in the ocean, where it is guarded by ten enormous fish, and, at the time of the renovation of the universe, the elixir of immortality is expected to be prepared from its twigs mingled with the fat of a mythical ox (see Bd. IX, 6, XVII, 1-6, XXVII, 4, XXX, 25).

⁶ Av. Airyaman, a spirit whose powers of healing, chiefly by spells, are celebrated in Vend. XXII; and who is invoked in Yas. LIV, a spell that concludes the recitation of the Gâthas.

⁷ Vend. XX, 1-12.

⁸ The Airyama-isîyô (Yas. LIV), or invocation of Airyaman, quoted in Vend. XX, 11, XXI, 20, XXII, 23.

⁹ See Chap. I, 7 n.

Gāthic Avesta¹, for restraining the demons from destroying the world of righteousness².

82. It is righteousness *that* is perfect excellence. It is the excellence *of* righteousness *that* is perfect.

CHAPTER XLV.

1. Of the three divisions of the Hādōkht³, as it exists in its 133 sections, the first is *of* thirteen⁴ sections, *and contains* particulars about the nature of the recital of the Ahunavair⁵, which is the spiritual benefit from chanting it aloud, and whatever is on the same subject⁶. 2. Advice about selecting *and*

¹ Yas. XLVI, 7 and XLIV, 16 b-e which are quoted after the other spells in each of the last three fargard's of the Vendîdād.

² Vend. XXII, 1-25, XX, 13-15, XXI, 18-23, and probably the rest of XXI.

³ Corresponding to the twentieth word, *dadaḍ*, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the twenty-first, and last, Nask in other Rivâyats. Its name occurs in the Avesta, in the form *hadhaokhta*, and it is called *Hādukht* in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contained thirty *kardah*, or *fargard's*, which differs considerably from the number stated in this chapter. Yts. XXI, XXII are traditionally supposed to belong to the Hādōkht, but there is hardly a trace of either of them in this chapter. Yt. XI is also distinguished by the same title.

⁴ As the total of the 13 + 102 + 19 sections (mentioned in §§ 1, 11, 13) is 134, instead of 133, there must be an error in one of the four numbers given in the MS. This clerical error can hardly have been made in writing 19, and is unlikely in 102; but 133 may possibly stand for an original 134, though the writing of 13 instead of 12 is more probable. The Rivâyats give no assistance in settling this question, as they all divide this Nask into 30 *kardah*. On the whole, it will be safest to read 'twelve,' instead of 'thirteen,' until some better authority becomes available.

⁵ Compare Yt. XI, 3.

⁶ It is just possible that this may refer to Yt. XXI which, though specially alluding to the recitation of the *Ashem-vohû*, or praise of

keeping a spiritual and worldly high-priest, performing every duty as to the high-priest, *and* maintaining even those of various high-priests.

3. About the twenty-one chieftainships, spiritually through Aûharmazd and materially through Zarâtûst, through which the ceremonial of the sacred beings *and* the government of the members of the community (dâhmânö râynîdârîh) exist. 4. About the duties in the five periods¹ of the day and night, each separately, and the bridge-judgment of him who shouts out² in the ceremony of a season-festival³; *likewise* of him who does not provide the preparations for the feast of a season-festival, and who also becomes worried (sûdakö) in other ceremonials of the sacred beings.

5. About how to consider *and* what to do with a sacerdotal leader *and* a man of the superior classes (pîsakîkânö), him who atones for unimportant sin, and him who does not atone even for *that which* is important; *and* whatever is on the same subject. 6. About the means through which membership of the community (dâhmîh) is prepared. 7. About the manifestation of virtuous manhood, and the merit and advantage from well uttering the words of blessing at eating *and* drinking food *and* drink, and *from* despising the inward talk of the demons.

righteousness, also mentions that of the Ahunavair in its § 4. With regard, however, to Yt. XXII, there seems no possibility of identifying its text with any portion of the Hâdökht Nask as described in this chapter.

¹ See Chap. XXIX, 9.

² Reading barâ drâyêdö, but it may be barâ girâyêdö, 'is zealous.'

³ See Chap. VII, 1.

8. About the recitations at the five periods *of the day*, the ceremonial invocation by name of many angels in each separately, *and* great information on the same subject.

9. The worthiness *of* a man restrained (vandak) by authority, the devotion of life and body to the sacred beings, the good rulers, and their examination and satisfaction; *also* the blessing and winning words which are most successful in carrying off the affliction that is owing to the fiend. 10. About all-pleasing creativeness and omniscience, every precedence¹, leadership, foresight², worthy liberality, perspicacity (vênâkîh), and all proper cause *and* effect of righteousness; the individuality (khûdîh) of righteousness, the opposition to the demons of Aûharmazd's law, and also much other information in the same section.

11. The middle *division* is *of* 102 sections *containing* particulars about spiritual and worldly diligence, the leadership *of* the diligent and their mighty means, all the former deeds of righteousness. 12. Righteousness kindling the resolution is the reward of merit, each for each, and is provided by it for that which *one* mentions thus:—'*It is* the Hâdôkht which is the maintenance of righteousness, so that it may make righteousness more abiding in the body of a man.'

13. The last *division* is *of* nineteen sections *containing* a trusty remedy, that is, a remedy whose utterance aloud by the faithful is a chief resource (afzârtûm) for the creatures of the sacred beings.

¹ Assuming that pesâgîh stands for pêsagîh.

² Assuming that pes vônâkîh stands for pês vênâkîh.

14. Also the nature of sayings full of humility (pûr-pâsth), well-favoured, most select, *and* adapted *for* that which *one* mentions thus :—‘I reverence that chief, the beneficent *and* eminent Hâdôkht, out of which is the sustainment of the strength of every word of Zaratûst they trust in.’

15. It is perfect excellence *that* is righteousness.

CHAPTER XLVI.

1. The Gâthas of the Yast¹, as the first offspring of the Ahunavair, are a recitation of the source of sources of the religion, and in the compass (parvastârîh)² of the Gâthas, every word (mârik)

¹ Corresponding to the twenty-first word, vâstârem, in the Ahunavair, according to B. P. Riv.; but it is the first Nask in other Rivâyats. In Chap. I, 9, 12 it is called Stôd-yast, ‘praise-ritual,’ (Av. staota yêsnya); and Stûd-yast, or Yast, in the Rivâyats, which also state that it contains thirty-three kardah, or jûrat. In Sls. XIII, 1 we are told that Visâi-ve-ameshâ-spentâ (Yas. XIV, 1) is the beginning of the Stôtân-yasnô; and, if we look for its end, we find Yas. LVIII, LIX both ending with special reverence of ‘the whole collection of the Stôtân-yasnân.’ We may therefore conclude that Yas. XIV–LIX, with its supplementary passages in Vîsp. V–XXIV, contains the whole of the Stôd-yast. But from this we must deduct Yas. XIX–XXI which are the first three fargards of the Bakô Nask, Yas. LII which is an interpolation, and Yas. LVI, LVII which are the Srôsh Yasts, lesser and greater; we must also consider the Yasna Haptanghâiti as a single section, in accordance with its treatment in Bk. IX, Chaps. XII, XXXV, LVII; and much of the Vîspêrad may not belong to the primitive text mentioned in § 3. Making these necessary deductions we have exactly thirty-three hâs of the Yasna left for the Stôd-yast, as stated in the Rivâyats.

² This word can also be read fravistârîh (Av. fra+vid), ‘interpretation,’ or frôstârîh, ‘handing down.’

in it is the origin of a word. 2. The word ahû¹ of the beginning² is *of* a like kind with ahyâ³, the beginning of the Gâthas; the end word, which is vâstârem⁴, is *of a like kind* with vahyô⁵, the end of the Gâthas; and the whole—which, though *its* nature is *of* one kind, is distributed (vakhtô) in *what* is selected therefrom—is stored up (avar-gûdô) in *this* compendium⁶ of all parts of the Mazda-worshipping religion.

3. Likewise the purport (avorî-hastân)⁷ of its verse (gâh), and the particulars of the primitive Vispêrad⁸ are to procure homage and praise, oblation *and* invocation; *and* the blessing⁹, which is regulated by the sagacity of the creator, is adapted for the spiritual illustration of the lodgment of the ceremonial of the sacred beings therein. 4. All

¹ The Ahunavair begins with the words yathâ ahû vairyô. The word ahû, in the MS., is written ahî as usual in Irân.

² Assuming that barâ stands for bûn.

³ The first Gâtha, or sacred hymn, begins with the words ahyâ yâsâ nemanghâ (Yas. XXVIII, 1 a). There is, of course, no connection but that of sound between ahû, 'a spiritual lord,' and ahyâ, 'of this;' nor is there any other between the concluding words vâstârem, 'a protector,' and vahyô, 'better,' though the phrases in which these latter occur are of a very similar character, which fully justifies the comparison made in the text.

⁴ The Ahunavair ends with the words yim drigubyô dadad vâstârem.

⁵ The last Gâtha ends with the words yâ erezhegyôî dâhî drigaovê vahyô (Yas. LIII, 9 d).

⁶ The Gâthas apparently.

⁷ Or *avar-gâstân*, 'disseminations.'

⁸ The Vispêrad service consists of the Yasna ritual with certain additional passages intermixed, which passages are called the Vispêrad because the earlier ones invoke 'all the chiefs' (vispê ratavô, Visp. II, 3) of creation.

⁹ Possibly Yas. LV.

three are provisions for the first *and* last presentations¹ which *one* utters by means of the Stôd Yast.

5. It is perfect *is* the excellence of righteousness ; it is perfect excellence *that is* righteousness ; with the copy revised (râyīnīdō).

¹ Probably referring to Yas. XIV and LVIII.

DĪNKARD.—BOOK IX.

CHAPTER I¹.

1. Satisfaction (*shnôkhar*) to the creator *Aûhar-mazd*, and obeisance to the *Mazda*-worshipping religion.

2. The ninth book (*babâ*) is about the *Hâs* and *Fargards*² of the various *Nasks*; the object of procuring the division of those portions which exist *being* owing to the quantity of what is in each one of the *Nasks*; *also* an explanation of a suitable selection³ therefrom, such as is an epitome (*nisangag*-1) of the abundant detail therein.

CHAPTER II.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. Glorification for the *Mazda*-worshipping religion *which* is the ordinance of *Aûharmazd* opposed to the demons.

2. Of the *Sûdkar*⁴ there are twenty-two *fargards*,

¹ From this point to Chap. XXXI, 17 the text is also found in a second MS. (K) which is independent of the MS. B brought to Surat in A.D. 1783, the original of all the Bombay copies.

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 20, 23. The contents of these are detailed below, in Chaps. II–LXVIII, so far as the first three *Nasks* are concerned.

³ Referring to Chap. LXIX.

⁴ The first of the *Nasks* and second of the *Gâthic* division (see Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 9, 12). As the *Stôd*-yart (the first of the *Gâthic*

and the first fargard is the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô¹, just as the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô *formula* is as *it were* the beginning (bûnîh) of the religion, and from it is the formation of the Nasks which, though about the first six sciences (dânîsnö), *have* also demonstrated the existence of the highest of other sciences in its own place.

3. And here it speaks about the power and success owing to uttering the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô *formula*² at the beginning of actions. 4. One *utterance* when *one* wishes to say anything to *any* one; one when he wishes to beg of *any* one; and one when he goes to work. 5. Two when he wishes to confer his blessing. 6. Four when *it is* for the homage of the chiefs of *creation* (radö-franâmisnîh), or the ceremony of a season-festival. 7. Five when *it is* for carrying off the fiend. 8. Six when *it is* for power; and six when *it is* for the success of a battle. 9. Seven when *it is* for the ceremonial of

division, but the last of the general list of Nasks) contained the text of the Gâthas, so the next three of the Gâthic division contained commentaries, or homilies, upon that text, written with different objects in view. The purpose of the Sûdkar was apparently (as its name imports) to extract useful instruction from the text, and to illustrate it with legends and remarks. A separate fargard is devoted to each hâ of the Gâthas, beginning with the three sacred formulas, and including the united Yasna Haptang-hâiti and the Afryaman. The connection between the commentary and text, though usually traceable, is not always very clear; but that is a common characteristic of homilies in general.

¹ The Ahunavair (see Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 7). This fargard explains the use made of this formula, and the benefits derived from it.

² As a spell, or appeal for success. The text of §§ 4-15 has been independently handed down by tradition, with a few variations, in Sls. XIX and the Persian Rivâyat of Bahman Pûngyah.

the archangels, *or* when *one* wishes to perform the ceremonial of the archangels. 10. Eight when *it is* for the ceremonial of a guardian spirit of the righteous. 11. Nine when *one* wishes to cast seed into his land. 12. Ten when *one* wishes to allow procreation. 13. Eleven when *one* goes to ask for a wife. 14. Twelve when *one* expects to go up on a mountain. 15. Thirteen when *one* wishes to go to an inhabited district (rûdastâk-1); twelve¹ when he goes out pathless; *and* one² when he wishes to proceed by a ford *through* the water.

16. About *the place* where *one has* to utter the first Yathâ-ahû-vairyô for smiting the demons. 17. About the good results (dahisnân) *of* a suitable recital *of* the words *of* the Ahunavair, the summary *of* everything for Zaratûst to utter. 18. And about *the fact that*, through chanting forth every single word of the Ahunavair with a virtuous intention, a demon is disabled, and *there is* protection of person *and* property from the adversary.

19. About the division of the twenty-one Nasks, likewise, according to the first, second, and third lines (gâs) of the Ahunavair³. 20. About the increase of the creatures owing to the liberal thought, word, and deed of a righteous *person*; *owing to* the priests *having* become numerous, and the reverence *of* him who is making them numerous; and *owing to* the perpetual meditation of righteousness and the existence of its recompense.

21. Righteousness is perfect excellence.

¹ Sls. XIX, 14 has 'thirteen.'

² So in both MSS., but ~~one~~ ayôv, 'or,' is more probable than 19v aêvakô, 'and one.'

³ See Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 7.

CHAPTER III¹.*Sûdkar Nask.*

1. The second fargard, Ashem-vohû ², is about the praise of righteousness which is the reward of the religion, and the want of praise at the bridge of *judgment* owing to enmity (patyânîh) to righteousness.

2. Of righteousness perfect is the excellence.

CHAPTER IV.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The third fargard, Yênhê-hâtâm ³, is about

¹ This chapter is omitted in K by mistake.

² This second sacred formula is recited by the Parsis even oftener than the Ahunavair, and consists of twelve Avesta words, as follows :—

Ashem vohû vahistem astî,
ustâ astî; ustâ ahmâi
hyad ashâi vahistâi ashem.

This may be translated as follows :—‘Righteousness is the best good, a blessing it is; a blessing *be* to that which *is* righteousness to perfect rectitude.’

But the Pahlavi version explains it as follows :—‘Righteousness is perfect excellence [righteousness of any excellence *is* good]. Happy is that righteousness and happy also that virtuous man who *is* a causer of righteousness, the righteousness that is perfect [that is, he shall accomplish duty and good works].’

³ This third formula is chiefly recited at the end of most of the hâs in the Yasna, and consists of fifteen Avesta words, as follows :—

Yênhê hâtâm âad, yêsnê paitî, vanghō
mazdau ahurō vaêthâ, ashâd haêâ,
yaunghâmêâ, tâskâ tausêâ yazamaidê.

This may be translated as follows :—‘Of whatever male of the

the formation of mankind by slow increase, and, when they live on *for* fifty¹ years, *their* slowly becoming dust; the coming of death even *to* him who is very pleasantly living, as regards mankind, at the climax (barīnō) of his life; and the happiness of the worldly *existence* is given only to the worthy, on account of *their* love of righteousness; the rest are passed by². 2. And also this, that he who is produced by the demons, *or* is proceeding to the

existences, therefore, Ahuramazda was better cognizant, through righteousness in worship, and of whatever females, both those males and those females we reverence.'

The Pahlavi version explains it as follows:—'Whoever of those existing is thus in worship as regards a good *being* [that is, shall celebrate a ceremonial for that good *being* who is Aûharmazd the lord], Aûharmazd is aware of *it*, owing to the accompaniment of righteousness [*and being* acquainted with the reward and recompense of whatever are, severally, the duty and good works that any one has performed, he grants *them*]. I reverence those of the assembly, males and females [the archangels; because the male *of* them are good, and the female *of* them].'

The Pahlavi translator evidently read vanghō in the first line of the text, as printed above, and not in the second, as in the present MSS.

¹ So in K, but B has 'seventy.' The text seems to allude to the beginning of old age, of which three grades are mentioned in the Avesta (Vend. III, 19, 20): the hanō, zaururō, and pairistâ-khshudrō. The Pahlavi version defines the age of each grade, but the ciphers given are corrupted in the MSS. extant. The Far. Oīm, p. 5, ll. 9, 10, gives fifty years as the age of the zarmân (Av. zaururō), seventy years as that of the hân (Av. hanō), and ninety years as that of the pâdîrânō-shûsar (Av. pairistâ-khshudrō); but whether this arrangement of the ages is compatible with the different order of these epithets in the Avesta is doubtful, though it shows that old age was considered to begin at the age of fifty years.

² Reading sakî-aîtō according to K, though the word can also be read segî-aîtō, 'are ruined;' in B it can be read gadâîgi-aîtō, 'are impoverished.'

demons, *or* has committed falsehood, is the opulent person who gives nothing to a worthy supplicant.

3. Righteousness is perfect excellence.

CHAPTER V.

Sūdkar Nask.

1. The fourth fargard, Yānīm-manô¹, is about where a gradual development (dêr-zahîsnîh) of that which is for the future existence is best; and, secondly, that which *occurs* now when the wisdom, instructed eloquence, diligence, and energetic effort, which are the utilizers of life, are with one, and these five misusers *of it*—greediness, want of energy, indolence, defilement, and illicit intercourse—are not with one. 2. This, too, that these five defects existed *in* Dahâk², and owing to that, moreover, Frêdûn² is irritated with *him*, and smites him in revenge for Yim³.

3. About the heinousness of these four vices, which are drunkenness, knavish companionship, apostasy, and selfishness, and the grievous results therefrom. 4. And this, too, that Yim drove away these four vices from the world, and then was able to prepare immortality. 5. About avoidance of him who, through any statement, is producing a thief as an orator (âkhûn), and *of* acquiescence with a hasty unoratorical statement of a companion. 6. And this, too, that *he* who propagates very evil commands in the world gives stout-heartedness to the fiend.

¹ The first two words of the introduction to the first Gâtha (Yas. XXVIII, o), here written yānîmanôkô in Pahlavi.

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 8.

³ Ibid. § 6.

7. About the clamour of a poor distressed *one* for a perfect remedy, and the repelling derangement (lakhvâr-pafshîrisnîh), unacceptableness, unbles-sedness, and want of Gâtha lore of the distresser arisen from the clamour of the distressed *one*. 8. About the connection of satisfying distress on true *and* reasonable complaint, and the reasonable complaining of true complainers, by him who *has* been an inferior judge, *and* gradually up to the highest adjudicator who is Aûharmazd.

9. The excellence *of* righteousness is perfect.

CHAPTER VI.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The fifth fargard, Khshmaibyâ ¹, is about the forgetfulness of a father for a son, a son for a father, a brother for a brother, a friend for a friend, a husband (mânpatô) for a wife (nârik), and a wife for a husband in a measurable time, through excess and festivity (khang); and the unforgetfulness of the spirit of the Gâthas for so many reciters and chanters of the Gâthas. 2. About the complaint of the spirit of the Gâthas when a high-priest, although priest of the country-folk (dehîgânô), passes away in an out-district ², and the body of that man does not come back to his own land; whatever is relating to that, *and*, besides that, what is to be born in that

¹ The first word of the second hâ of the first Gâtha (Yas. XXIX, 1), here written khshmôâîbê (B) and khshmâîbê (K) in Pahlavi.

² Reading aûzdêhîkîh (from Av. uzda^hvyu); in Sls. IX, 2, 3, where this passage is evidently referred to, this word has been erroneously read aûzdâyakîh and translated 'idolatry.'

land, and the oppressiveness of apostates *which* arises. 3. About the superior power of the spirit of the Gâthas, *and* also that of liberality, in preserving the soul from hell.

4. Excellence *that is* perfect is righteousness.

CHAPTER VII.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The sixth fargard, *Ad-tâ-vakhshyâ*¹, is about the perfection of the five excellences: the first through righteousness, the second through virtuous offspring, the third through land producing vegetation, the fourth through flocks of sheep, and the fifth through training in industry. 2. About the distribution of fortune to the diligent; and *of* destitution to the indolent. 3. About the acquirement of fortune singly sitting, two-fold even walking, three-fold hastening, four-fold even running, five-fold even carrying on a horse, six-fold even driving on a road, seven-fold by understanding legal proceedings, eight-fold by good protection even of wealth, nine-fold by intelligence *and* diligence in the cultivation of land, and ten-fold by providing the teaching of the bounteous texts².

4. About the grievous sorrow *of* an aged man, owing to the indolence of any one in youth. 5. About the four things through which, when a man has

¹ The first three words of the third *hâ* of the first Gâtha (Yas. XXX, 1), here written *atô-tâ-vakhshîyâ* (B) and *atâ-vakhshâ* (K) in Pahlavi.

² The liturgy (*mânsar-spend*).

amassed *them* in his youth, he becomes very pleased in old age : first, virtuous learning ; second, productive wealth ; third, a good wife ; *and* fourth, a prosperous dwelling. 6. About the five store-holders¹ of perfect excellence : industry, diligence, contentment, guileless understanding (nīrikht-hūshih), and provision of means.

7. About abstaining from sitting with drunkards.

8. And this, too, that he does not drink varieties of wine (mâê-gunagânô) with the approval of the sacred beings, who becomes a viciously-disposed assailant and annoyer of others, and a disturber kēpīntāâr) of duties, through drinking varieties of wine. 9. And this, too, that thou shouldst eat that which is your food where *there is* a suitable place. 10. And where *it is* eaten by thee it should be lightly, it should not be heavily, so that, when *it is* eaten by thee, a good work is performed, and *there is* abstinence from sin. 11. And, so that what thou eatest shall be immortally joyful to thee, where *there are* poor, provide *them* a share, and the poor *will* bless thee ; and, *as to* a poor *man* who is righteous, the opinion is *that* his blessing is best.

12. Excellence *that is* perfect *is* righteousness.

CHAPTER VIII.

Sūdkar Nask.

I. The seventh fargard, Tâ-ve-urvâtâ², is about

¹ Reading gang-dânô ; or it may be dûzagânô, 'seals,' though this is less likely, as a plural form is rarely used with a numeral.

² The first three words of the fourth hâ of the first Gâtha (Yas. XXXI, 1), here written tâ-va-ratô in Pahlavi in both MSS.

the exhibition to Zaratûst of the nature of the four periods in the millennium of Zaratûst¹. 2. First, the golden, that in which Aûharmazd displayed the religion to Zaratûst. 3. Second, the silver, that in which Vistâsp² received the religion from Zaratûst. 4. Third, the steel, the period within which the organizer of righteousness, Âtûrpâd³ son of Mâraspend, was born. 5. Fourth, the period mingled with iron is this, in which is much propagation of the authority of the apostate and other villains, as regards the destruction of the reign of religion, the weakening of every kind of goodness and virtue, and the disappearance of honour and wisdom from the countries of Irân. 6. In the same period is an account of the many perplexities and torments (zakhamî-hastanö) of the period for that desire of the life of the good which subsists in seemliness.

7. Perfect righteousness is excellence.

CHAPTER IX.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The eighth fargard, *Hvaêtumaiti*⁴, is about the abstinence of mankind, for special propitiation, from *being* unreliant *upon* religion, on account of reverence for the evil spirit⁵; that from the habit of

¹ Compare Yas. XXXI, 14; Byt. I, 1-5.

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. XI, 1-3.

³ See Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 22.

⁴ The appellation of the fifth hæ of the first Gâtha (Yas. XXXII) which begins with the words *aḥvyâkâ hvaêtus*; it is here written *khvatamaîtö* in Pahlavi in both MSS.

⁵ Compare Yas. XXXII, 3.

being ungirdled, on account of reverence for Andar¹ and that for Sôvar²; that from walking with one boot³, on account of reverence for Tâûrvö and Zârtkô⁴; that from being harmfully inquisitorial, on account of reverence for Akatâsh⁵; and that from the habit of *being* without a serpent-scurge, on account of reverence for all the demons⁶.

2. About the hungry intention (*gusnakö-minisnîh*) of him who eats⁷ and drinks chattering; the delight of the demons on that account; and advice as regards not speaking a word during eating and drinking. 3. As to the praise and gratification of the sacred beings before eating and drinking,

¹ Av. Andra, or *Indra*; one of the arch-demons produced by the evil spirit, and the special opponent of the archangel Ashavahist; he seduces from virtue and opposes the use of the sacred shirt and girdle (see Bd. I, 27, XXVIII, 8, 10, XXX, 29; Ep. I, x, 9; Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 1).

² Av. Sauru; another of the arch-demons and the special opponent of the archangel Shatvairô; he encourages anarchy and drunkenness, and opposes the use of the sacred shirt and girdle (see Bd. I, 27, XXVIII, 9, 10, XXX, 29; Ep. I, x, 9).

³ Probably equivalent to 'walking in stockings,' though some think it means 'walking barefoot.' It is sinful on account of the risk of pollution from stepping on impurities.

⁴ Av. Tauru and Zairika; two more of the arch-demons and the special opponents of the archangels Khûrdađ and Amûrdađ; they produce and diffuse poison, and are propitiated by walking with one boot (see Bd. I, 27, XXVIII, 11, 13, XXX, 29; Ep. I, x, 9).

⁵ Av. Akatasha; 'the fiend of inquisitiveness, who makes the creatures look *away* from proper things' (Bd. XXVIII, 20), and appears to be closely connected with the demon Aeshm, 'wrath.'

⁶ See Bd. XXVIII, 21, 22, and Bk. VIII, Chap. XVIII, 2.

⁷ B omits 'eats.' Talking during eating is sinful because the eater has muttered an inward prayer, as a protective spell, the good effect of which would be destroyed by speaking aloud (compare Bk. VIII, Chap. XLIII, 37).

and also on finishing; and the purity¹ of the mouth owing to its praise of righteousness². 4. About him whose ownership of any good work, that they³ may perform, does not attain to the best existence, on account of not possessing a high-priest by habit.

5. About the period of the ceremonial of Srôsh⁴, the righteous, *being* mostly on the passing away of the first half of the night, and the announcement⁵ of him who is the celebrator (*yastâr*) is for his protection from the fiend spirit. 6. The period of the ceremonial of Rashnû⁶ and Âstâd⁷ is mostly after that, in the jurisdiction (*radîh*) of the Aûshahîn⁸, and the announcement of him who is the celebrator is abundance of grain. 7. The period of the ceremonial of Mitrô⁹ of the wide cattle-pastures, and of the spirit of the pleasure of eating¹⁰, is mostly in the

¹ K has 'protection.'

² That is, its muttering the Ashem-vohû formula which is recited thrice, as a conclusion of the inward prayer (see Dd. LXXIX, 1 n).

³ Or it may be 'he,' as the optative 3rd plural is often used for the singular; but it is a doctrine of the religion that a person who causes good works to be done by others, as he does when he employs a priest to perform ceremonies, is as much the owner of the good works as the actual performer is (see Sls. X, 22, 23 for cases of less direct agency).

⁴ See Bk. VIII, Chaps. IX, 3, XLIV, 16, and Pahl. Yas. I, 22.

⁵ As an offering, referring to the verb *nivaêdhayêmi*, 'I announce or invite,' with which most of the clauses of Yas. I. commence.

⁶ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XX, 153, and Pahl. Yas. I, 23.

⁷ Av. *Arstâd*, 'rectitude,' a female angel who assists the soul on its way to the other world (see AV. V, 3).

⁸ The period from midnight till dawn (see Bk. VIII, Chap. XXIX, 9).

⁹ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XLIV, 16.

¹⁰ Av. *râma hvâstrem*, Pahl. *râmisrô khvârôm*, who co-operates with Mitrô (see Pahl. Yas. I, 9).

jurisdiction of the Hâvan¹, and the announcement of him who is the celebrator is a flock of sheep. 8. The period of the ceremonial of Ashavahist², and also *of* the fire of Aûharmazd, is mostly in the jurisdiction of the Rapithwin³, and the announcement of him who is the celebrator is an assemblage of righteousness. 9. The period of the ceremonial of the lofty lord *of* females, the descendant of waters⁴, and also *of* the water created by Aûharmazd, is mostly in the jurisdiction of the Aûzâêrin⁵, and the announcement of him who is the celebrator is a troop of heroes (vîrân ramakö). 10. And the period of the ceremonial of the guardian spirits of the righteous, *of* the females with troops of heroes and years *of* pleasant dwelling, *of* the might which is well-formed and handsome, as well as victorious and created by Aûharmazd, and *of* the fighting which is in the ascendant⁶, is mostly in the jurisdiction of the Aiwisrûthrim⁷, and the announcement of him who is the celebrator is the origin of all excel-

¹ The period from dawn till noon, and in winter it extends into the afternoon (see Bd. XXV, 9-14).

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVII, 14, and Pahl. Yas. I, 12.

³ The afternoon till 3 p.m. during summer (see Bd. XXV, 9-14). Here written Rapisvag.

⁴ Av. berezatô ahurahê nafedhrô apām, Pahl. bûr'sand khûdâî nekedân-î đvânö nâpô (see Pahl. Yas. I, 15).

⁵ The evening from the middle of the afternoon till dusk (see Bd. XXV, 9; Sls. XXI, 4-7).

⁶ See Pahl. Yas. I, 18, 19.

⁷ The period from dusk till midnight; here written ayšvîk-srûksrîm. It will be noticed that the periods for the ceremonials of the beings here detailed correspond with those with which their names are connected in Yas. I, 3-7, II, 3-7, III, 5-9, IV, 8-12, VI, 2-6, VII, 5-9 (W.).

lence, and the produce of all manifestation of righteousness.

11. Righteousness is perfect excellence.

CHAPTER X.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The ninth fargard, Yathâis¹, is about the devilry, the blighted destiny, the complete pollution, the grievous stench, the heinous sinfulness, and the annoyance to all spiritual and worldly virtue of the sodomite. 2. The atonement for grievous sinfulness and the appropriation of great good works by him who is a molester, and the awful sinfulness of him who is a propitiator, of that sinner. 3. Of the seven *one* mentions as evil, who are accounted equal to the evil spirit in vileness—*such* as Az-î Dahâk² in witchcraft, the serpent Srôbar in violence, Vadâk³ in producing evil progeny⁴, Tûr-î Brâdar-vakhsh in destroying a righteous *man*, and an apostate⁵ in grievous sinfulness—the permitter and performer of

¹ The first word of the sixth hâ of the first Gâtha (Yas. XXXIII, 1), here written yâsâis in Pahlavi in both MSS.

² See Bk. VIII, Chaps. XIII, 8, XXXV, 13, and Dd. LXXII, 2-9, which last chapter contains further details regarding these seven heinous sinners, probably derived from the actual text of this ninth fargard of the Sûdkar Nask.

³ The mother of Dahâk (Dd. LXXII, 5), the same as Udaî in Bd. XXXI, 6; for her viciousness see Dd. LXXVIII, 2.

⁴ Pahl. saryâ hûnô-dahakîh, which last word indicates an original Av. hunusta (see Pahl. Yas. L, 10 b).

⁵ Both MSS. have Aharmanô, but this differs only in its last letter from aharmôk, 'an apostate,' which is the reading of Dd. LXXII, 9 and more suitable to the context.

unnatural intercourse are unique in heinous sinfulness.

4. Perfect is the excellence of righteousness.

CHAPTER XI.

Sūdkar Nask.

1. The tenth fargard, *Yâ-shyaothanâ*¹, is about the complaint of the spirit of fires to *Aûharmazd* owing to seven descriptions of people. 2. First, owing to domestics considering *it* as contemptible and *in* an unresisting state (*agangîh*), molesting *it* immoderately, and making use of it with unwashed hands; also the damsel who *has* introduced fire into the sole of *her* foot, and the bursting of the blister (*âvilag*); and a weapon brought out into *its* splendour. 3. Second, the complaint owing to the carriers of fire from that abode [where the provision of care for fire is as a law to them, to that abode]² where the provision of care for fire is not as a law to them. 4. And there, owing to the arrival and preparation of the demons, it lay stupefied, like a powerful youth *who is* feverish and in a languid state; and its cure from that sickness (*ayôyakîh*) was by bringing forward to it their pure sandal-wood, or benzoin, or aloë-wood, or pomegranate³, or

¹ The first two words of the seventh, and last, *hâ* of the first *Gâtha* (Yas. XXXIV, 1), here written *yâ-shyâðsnô* in Pahlavi in both MSS. This fargard may perhaps be considered as a homily upon Yas. XXXIV, 4.

² The words in brackets are omitted in B by mistake.

³ The traditional equivalents of the four sweet-scented vegetable substances, Av. *urvâsna*, *vohû-gaona*, *vohû-kereti*, and *hadhâ-naêpata*, which are mentioned in Vend. VIII, 2, 79, IX, 32, XIV, 3,

whatever *there* was of the most odoriferous of plants.

5. Third, the complaint owing to the hussy¹ unto whom it happens, through menstruation, *that* the stench and filth owing to the menstruation is brought to it (*the fire*); and *its* sickness and stupefaction owing thereto are as written above. 6. Fourth, the complaint owing to the hussy who, dropping *her* knee on to the fire-stand, arranged *her* curls; the falling of damp and moisture from *her* head, with the hair and filth therefrom, into the fire; the consumption *of it* discontentedly, *and* the sickness and stupefaction owing thereto. 7. Fifth, the complaint owing to the father, *or* guardian, of a child for not keeping the child away from the fire; and the bodily refuse and other unlawfulness that come upon it from such children. 8. Sixth, the complaint owing to the adversity which the unpurified infidel (agdênô) may bring upon it, by blowing the breath of *his* mouth upon it in directing *its* use, *and* it becomes incalculable. 9. Seventh, the complaint—which, *one* says, is more awful and more grievous—owing to those who use it as an ordeal for a falsehood, and, when it is made evident thereby as to the acquitted and convicted, they become of a different opinion about it.

10. At the place of complaint that which is polluted is put forward together with that which is pure, and the increase of it (*the fire*) is through lawful and unlawful operation; *its* burning alone

XVIII, 71 as acceptable fuel for the sacred fire, or scent for fumigation; their Pahlavi names are merely corruptions of these Avesta words.

¹ The word *gêh*, 'courtezan,' is used here and in § 6 merely as a general opprobrious term for a woman.

and increasing are such as when both would be as a necessity for it, and undesired and rapid burning and increasing¹ are those which are polluted by burning *and* insatiably consuming; and in that which is an operation unlawfully—the burning alone *and* increasing *being* [such as when]² both would be as a necessity [for it]—the increase is troubled.

11. This, too, he³ says: 'I am not *of the world* here, and from here I *will* extricate *myself*, from the earth up to the sky; I am also thy son⁴, more to thee⁵ than any of the other creatures.' 12. And Aôharmazd spoke to him thus: 'So thou shouldst stand over the fire, in thy proper duty as [a spirit⁶], carrying that club; [it is a substantial means, because I produce it, through which] thou turnest off [the whole bodily existence], some to the endless light, and some to the endless darkness.'

13. This, too, that *he* who shall provide care for fire has paid the greatest reverence unto Aôharmazd.

14. The propitiation of the righteous is the best *thing*, and their vexation is the worst; when pleased they favour one, *and it is* the law of the sacred beings that they promote; [when vexed they wound, *and it is* the demon that they restrict.

15. It is righteousness *that is* perfect excellence.]⁶

¹ As in the case of a destructive conflagration.

² The words in brackets are supplied by guess, to fill up a blank space left by the repairer of B on one of his patches. In K the passage is shorter, and stands as follows:—'and in that which is unlawful operation *it is* troubled by the increase.'

³ The spirit of fires mentioned in § 1. This dialogue seems to be a quotation from the original Pahlavi version of the Nask.

⁴ Fire being called 'the son of Aôharmazd.'

⁵ Both MSS. have 'me' by mistake.

⁶ The passages in brackets are omitted in B, evidently by mistake.

CHAPTER XII.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The eleventh fargard, the Yasna¹, is about the assembly of the angels of the spiritual *existences* on account of the complaint of fire; and the complaint of fire in the assembly, with *its* statement of this, too²: 'I am not *of the world* here, and from here I *will* extricate *myself*, from the earth up to the sky, and there I *will* shine on to the earth of seven regions, like the moon and sun and even the divinely-produced stars when they shine with their own light.' 2. The words of Aûharmazd about the just complaining of fire as regards the contamination³ of the creatures, the impossibility of keeping the fire undisturbed, and satisfying the fire concerning the creation of the creatures for the worldly *existence*, *along* with the disturbed condition of fire, too, owing to the impossibility of maintaining⁴ the uncreated state which, with the freedom from disturbance of fire also, was better; *likewise* proclaiming the care of *it*. 3. And the speech of the fire *was* thus: 'If *there be* not that one mode whereby I *may* thus shine, owing to those that *have* acted according to my request⁵, thou art aware, O Aûharmazd! *there*

¹ The Yasna of seven chapters, Av. yasna haptanghâiti (Yas. XXXV, 3-XLI, 6), here written asndô (for yêsnô) in both MSS.

² The spirit of fires, after repeating to the heavenly council the complaint he had already made to Aûharmazd alone, concludes with the same threat as in Chap. XI, 11.

³ B gûmêkhtakîh (K gûmêzakîh) implies deterioration by an 'intermingling' of evil.

⁴ K omits these last four words by mistake.

⁵ That is, if he cannot desert the world, owing to the necessity of stopping with those who act properly.

are some among the creatures that I cannot grant so much *to*; therefore carry me away, O Aûharmazd! then give me away there! and be thou carrying *me* away into the midst of Airân-vêg¹!

4. The propitious² fire is from the creator Aûharmazd, and it is produced by him in a dwelling, without *being* handled (barâ sûdakö)³, by aid of bringing together⁴. 5. And so he spoke in words thus: 'Such is thine own growth, thou who art my fire! in every dwelling where thou comest, and *in* every village, every community, and every province; and as exalted as thou are the water and plants, and *he*, too, who is a guardian spirit of the righteous, when they shall bring forward holy-water for delivering up *to* thee⁵; *and*, when they shall bring forward to thee firewood which is dry, a person—through the light which he observes—*has* spoken of it thus: "This is the Gûsn-asþ⁶ fire."'

6. About so much reward of the hewer and inspector and kindler of the firewood—when all three shall do *it* for the sake of affection—as *they*

¹ The primeval home of Mazda-worship, the abode of Yim, and the scene of Zaratûst's first promulgation of the religion, the Airyanem vaêgô of the Avesta (see Vend. I, 1, 3, II, 21; Bd. XX, 32, XXXII, 3).

² Pahl. afzûnîk; the spenista ('most bounteous') fire of Yas. XVII, 11, XXXVI, 3. According to Pahl. Yas. XVII, 67 it 'stands in heaven before Aûharmazd in a spiritual state.'

³ Or it may mean '*being* rubbed out,' that is, 'by friction;' but compare the use of the word sûdakîh in Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVII, 19.

⁴ Referring probably to the establishment of a sacred fire by bringing together every possible variety of fire that can be obtained.

⁵ Merely as a formal offering, or for purifying the fire-stand, not for mingling with the fire itself.

⁶ One of the three original sacred fires, which is said to have

are possessing righteousness. 7. About the character *and* reward of the washer (âsnôtâr) and the producer of the purity and cleansing of that which the fire *has* dropped¹, *of* the introducer of the firewood and the washer upwards², *of* the stirrer of the fire and the carrier-away of the firewood, who are strictly directed; the lawful work done with a *cooking-pot and* such-like, and the sin of him who is a disturber of it. 8. About the destroyer of that which the fire *has* dropped, and the introducer of damp firewood into it. 9. About the blessing of fire for people by whom *it is* satisfied.

10. About advice as regards not bringing to the fire that which is due to theft, *or* the power of extortion, and the grievous bridge-judgment³ of him who is bringing *it*; *also* the defilement (âlûdan) and hurting of the fire from that which *occurs* when he likewise consecrates his hoard (hanbarisnô), owing to the corruption by the demons⁴ thus arisen. 11. This, too, that *it is* owing to want of attention to fire when *it is* not at every menstrual excitement they produce, *in* a woman assisted by a propensity

been established, in the time of king Kaî-Khûsrô, upon the Asnavand mountain in Âtûr-pâtakân, not far from Lake Kêkast (see Bd. XVII, 7; Zs. XI, 8-10).

¹ B srâkhtô, K srakhtô, both here and in § 8; compare Av. srask.

² Pahl. frâz âsnôtâr must mean one who washes in the mode defined by the Av. frasnâiti, as distinguished from upasnâiti, in Vend. VIII, 98, 99, Ep. II, iii, 2; this mode is explained as lâlâîk, 'upwards,' and distinguished from the frôdgûnô, 'downward mode,' in Ep. II, iv, 2.

³ B inserts 'thus arisen *through* the demons,' the same phrase as concludes the section.

⁴ K has 'owing to a single word of the demons,' by substituting aêvak gôbisnô for âhûkînisnô.

for a son (pûs radîh), *that* the progeny is a son.
 12. And about the penalty for¹ the progress of other impropriety which occurs to fire; also *about* the person who has attained to the guardianship of fire and does not lawfully control *it*.

13. About an admonition to Zaratûst as to consecrating *to* the sacred beings anything whatever which *one* eats, and not eating *what is* unconsecrated. 14. About the wish of the evil spirit that no one shall be performing (vadîdûnâñ-âdö) worship and obeisance to the sacred beings, and *that the people* shall possess no ruler and high-priest, so that no desire of theirs shall arise for any virtuousness. 15. About an admonition as to indispensably worshipping the sacred beings with the best ceremonial, that of a priest (âsrûkö) without sin; *or with* an average *one*, that of a priest whose sin is not more than one Aredûs² without a basis (a-bûn); *or with* the lowest *one*, that of a priest whose *sin* is not more than one Khôr³ on a basis (pavan bûn). 16. Whoever, in a village of Mazda-worshippers, *has* not chanted the *sacred* hymns after fifteen years *of age*, through sinfulness, is as a dog they *have* thrown provisions *to*, and it *has* occurred for a basis of the sin of unseasonable chattering⁴; also the inadmissibility of his soul by Mânsarspend⁵.

¹ Assuming that p a stands for pavan.

² See Bk. VIII, Chaps. XX, 64, XXXI, 39.

³ A sin twice as great as an Aredûs (see Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXI, 39).

⁴ The sin of talking while eating, praying, or any other occasion when a prayer (vâg) has been taken inwardly, as a spell, and is not yet spoken out.

⁵ A personification of the liturgy, Av. mǎthra spenta, 'the bounteous text.'

17. About the coming of Ast-vidâd¹, at all times, to mortals whom death has reached², and also whom *it has* not. 18. About the ideas of the wicked, that the best existence does not exist, *that* the production of the renovation of *the universe* does not occur, *that there are* no dead whom they raise up thereby, and *it is* not that change *one* attains. 19. This, too, that is false, for the same *reason* they observe, *being* wicked; because the best existence exists, *there* occurs a production of the renovation which is good, they raise up the dead thereby, and thus *one* attains that change.

20. About an admonition as to not making lamentation and weeping over those passed away; and, after the passing away of every righteous *one* of the religion to the spirits, *one* is not to augment the distress of the very spirit of life by making lamentation and weeping over the departed. 21. And this, too, that the guardian spirits of the righteous claim no lamentation and weeping after their own ceremonial and the blessing of righteous men. 22. This, too, that the body of every one is not of like will with the soul; food is the desire of the body, and also a store of wealth; righteous action is the desire of the soul, and also the gifts which they give away.

23. About an enquiry of the righteous Zarâtûst as to who it is who has banished (*âpârîntâdô*) all goodness and perfection from his own *self*, *but* thinks *them* not banished, and does not complain of

¹ Av. Astô-vîdhôtu, one of the demons of death (see Bd. XXVIII, 35; Dd. XXXVII, 44).

² Those who have attained old age, the natural time of death.

that loss¹. 24. And the reply of Aûhar²mazd, that it is he *who* is deceived³ by his own tongue through the utterance of words, so that, through speaking falsely, he has become worthy of death. 25. This, too, that for him it is the weapon of the evil spirit; *even* so complete mindfulness is the reign of Spendarmad³, and thus a liar is more a power for the religion when a man, on account of dulness of thought, *gives* no reply, so that he *may* not speak falsely through dulness of thought.

26. This, too, that he worships the demons with thousand-fold holy-water, who establishes him who is not a member of the community⁴ in the Zôti duty⁵, sooner than him who is a wise Zôti. 27. And this, too, that thou shouldst fetch him who is a member of the community for the Zôti duty, not him who is not a member of the community, for thus thy advance is to the supreme heaven (garôdmânö). 28. Also this, that a bad Zôti is worse from the Zôti duty.

29. This, too, that that which is the earliest controller (ayûkhtâr) of sin is thought *which* is subdued⁶, then forgiveness, then shame, and then listening; and, afterwards, through the sinfulness of the fiend⁷.

¹ B has 'and *there* is no complaint of the loss.'

² K zîvînîdö.

³ The female archangel who has special charge of the earth and virtuous women (see Sls. XV, 20-24); she is a personification of Av. spenta ârmaiti, 'bountiful devotion,' of which phrase the latter word is translated by Pahl. būndak-mīnisnīh, 'complete mindfulness.' See also Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3, and S. B. E., vol. xviii, pp. 393, 396.

⁴ K adâhm; B has khêshm, 'wrath,' here, but not so in § 27.

⁵ See Bk. VIII, Chap. VII, 5, 9.

⁶ B has 'he who is a controller of sin is Vohûman, owing to thinking of the spirits, which is subdued.'

⁷ K has only 'through sinfulness.'

one becomes a promise-breaker. 30. This, too, that they shall bring every man who is a wounder before the convocation *composed of* any priest who is a controller of recitation (srâyisnō ayûkhtâr), any priest who is of the district (âdehîk), any priest who is of an out-district (aûzdehîk), and any priest who is *the man's* own kinsman.

31. 'Thus say I unto thee, O Spîtâmân ! let *there be* no breach of promise ; neither when the conversation, that they would make a support, *was* with the wicked, and there is no great judiciousness in it ; nor when *it was* with those of thine own religion, the righteous, as to anything *of* great judiciousness ; because both of them are promises, both *with* the wicked and the righteous¹.'

32. It is the excellence *of* righteousness *that is* perfect.

CHAPTER XIII.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The twelfth fargard, Ustavaiti², is about the exaltation of Zaratûst through the satisfaction of water, and the hope of all creatures for him. 2. And about the impure recitation of a text, when³ the text is not uttered by a high-priest. 3. This, too, that the text which a man who is corrupted may

¹ This admonition occurs repeatedly (see Chap. XX, 5 ; Yt. X, 2 ; AV. LII, 7).

² The appellation of the first hâ of the second Gâtha (Yas. XLIII) which begins with the words ustâ ahmâi yahmâi ustâ ; it is here written aûstavâitō in Pahlavi.

³ Assuming that mûn, 'which,' stands for amat ; the Pâzand of both words being practically the same. Or, it may be, 'also him who does not utter the text through a high-priest.'

offer is an impropriety (adtnâth) for that which is an uncorrupted place. 4. This, too, is declared, that a greedy man whose belly is filled by accumulation—and the end of every sin is, to him, only for the gratification of the body—one considers just like a gallows to which *there* is a foundation (słpǝ) of every impurity. 5. This, too, that a bird (vâê) practises that habit (sân) even that it kills those outright which have become large in *our* midst, which are the serpents produced by the demons. 6. This, too, that *for* invocation (azbâyisnǝ) of the sacred beings thinking with speaking, speaking with acting, and acting without deceitfulness are effectual.

7. About the pure goodness of the archangels, and the union of their thoughts, words, *and* deeds together; their bountifulness, nurturing, and protection are the cause¹ of the prosperity of the world. 8. About the production of Zaratûst *by* Aûharmazd with a goodness like his own. 9. This, too, that whoever gives anything to the disciples of Zaratûst, his reward and recompense are just as though the thing had been given by him to Zaratûst².

10. It is perfect excellence *that is* righteousness.

CHAPTER XIV.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The thirteenth fargard, Tad-thwâ-peresâ³,

¹ B omits sân, 'the cause of.'

² Compare :—'Inasmuch as ye have done *it* unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done *it* unto me.' (Matthew xxv. 40.)

³ The first three words of the second hâ of the second Gâtha (Yas. XLIV, 1), here written tad-spâ-pêres in Pahlavi.

is about the strength *and* mightiness of the spirit of the sacred cake¹. 2. This, too, that every night the demons rush from hell² into the world, to injure *and* cause the death of the creatures; and, when *people* consecrate a sacred cake, that spirit descends to attack and keep back the demons, and to engage in combat with the demons ninety-nine times during every night; he also smites and stupefies them, and keeps *them* back from destroying the world.

3. This, too, that any one whatever of those men who utter these words³ in prayer becomes righteous, except those men who shall contentedly, *or* wishfully, carry out a command for evil deeds, and they deceive (*suftênd*), or make *others* deceive, by statements proposed to them; *and* whose evil thoughts are thus more than *their* good thoughts, their evil words more than *their* good words, and their evil deeds more than *their* good deeds. 4. About carrying off the reliance produceable that *a sin* worthy of death is the obliteration (*frâz mûshtanô*) of other sin, like an awful *and* mighty wind when it sweeps swiftly over the plain⁴.

5. Of righteousness the excellence is perfect.

CHAPTER XV.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The fourteenth fargard, *Ad-fravakhshyâ*⁵, is

¹ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XXIX, 2.

² K omits 'from hell,' and B omits 'night.'

³ Meaning probably Yas. XLIV.

⁴ A favorite metaphor derived from the Avesta text (see Pahl. Vend. III, 149; Mkh. LII, 19).

⁵ The first two words of the third hâ of the second Gâtha (Yas. XLV, 1), here written *ad-fravakhshê* (B) and *ad-fravakhshâ*

about Aûharmazd's showing to Zaratûst the terrible condition of the soul of Keresâsp¹; the dismay of Zaratûst owing to that terrible condition; the sorrowful speaking of Keresâsp as regards the slaying of multitudes, for which mankind extol him, whereby abstentions from sin *occurred*; and the recognition of him by the creator, Aûharmazd, as smiting his fire. 2. The supplication of Keresâsp *for* the best existence from Aûharmazd for those exploits when the serpent Srôbar² *was* slain by him, and the violence of that adversary; when Gandarep³ with the golden heels *was* smitten by him, *and* the marvellousness of that fiend; when the Veskô progeny⁴ *who were descendants* of Nivîk *and* Dâstânk *were* slain by him, and the grievous harm and disaster owing to them; and when the mighty wind⁵ *was* appeased by him, *and* brought back from damaging the world to benefiting the creatures; *and* for that which *happens* when owing to confinement⁶, Dahâk becomes eager, rushes on for the

(K) in Pahlavi. This chapter has been already translated in S. B. E., vol. xviii, pp. 370-372.

¹ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 12; S. B. E., vol. xviii, pp. 369-382.

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXV, 13.

³ Av. Gandarewa of Yt. V, 38, XV, 28, XIX, 41; the 'watery demon' of Mkh. XXVII, 50.

⁴ Reading hûn Veskô, the Av. hunavô Vaêskaya of Yt. V, 54, 57, who were enemies of the warrior Tusa; but the hunavô of Nivika and of the Dâstayâni were slain by Keresâspa (see Yt. XIX, 41). It is also possible to read khûnô-dâkô, 'blood-producing.'

⁵ When it becomes a storm-demon, the vâtô-daêva of Vend. X, 14, instead of being the angel of useful wind.

⁶ In the volcano, Mount Dimâvand, where he was confined by Frêdûn in olden times, and whence he is expected to break loose hereafter (see Bd. XII, 31, XXIX, 9; Byt. III, 55-61).

destruction of the world, and attempts (*girâyêdô*) the annihilation of the creatures; *when* he (*Keresâsp*) is roused to smite him, and to tame that powerful fiend for the world and creatures.

3. The enmity of fire to Keresâsp, through the distress which he occasioned to it, and the keeping of him away¹ [from heaven; also the friendship of Gôs-aûrvan² for him, through the prosperity which he occasioned to it, and the protection of him] from hell. 4. The petition of Zaratûst to the fire to have compassion upon what *was* owing to *Keresâsp's* sin; the compliance (*hangâftanô*) of the fire *with* that petition, and the departure of the soul of Keresâsp to the ever-stationary existence³.

5. Of righteousness perfect is the excellence.

CHAPTER XVI.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The fifteenth fargard, Kamnamaêza⁴, is

¹ The words in brackets occur only in K; their meaning is, however, given in the Pahlavi Rivâyat accompanying Dd. and quoted in S.B.E., vol. xviii, pp. 379, 380. The enmity of the fire to Keresâsp was owing to its having been extinguished (when kindled upon the serpent Srôbar) by the upsetting of Keresâsp's caldron, as described in Yas. IX, 11, and Yt. XIX, 40.

² Av. *geus urva*, 'the soul of the ox,' the spirit which departed from the primeval ox when the evil spirit attacked it; she is supposed to be the heavenly protector of all animals, and is also called Drvâspa (see Yt. IX, 1; Bd. III, 14, 18, IV, 2-5; Sls. XXII, 14).

³ A locality intermediate between heaven and hell, where the souls of those whose sins and good works exactly balance remain in a passive and immovable state till the resurrection (see Sls. VI, 2; Mkh. VII, 18, XII, 14; Dd. XX, 3).

⁴ The appellation of the fourth, and last, *hâ* of the second

about the arrival of Ast-vidâd¹ upon the spot, and the insecurity of any one from him; also the non-continuance of the mortal body and decaying (farsâvand) wealth of any one of the mortals summoned is death². 2. And this, too, that Ast-vidâd shall carry off all mortals by that awful and proclaimed marvel, and they are not saved from him³; each one, indeed, saves only *that* which is the soul. 3. This, too, that the soul alone sees the reward and bridge⁴ of the spiritual *existence*, and embodied it does not see such *things*; if, *when* embodied, it could have seen like that, then it would not have committed the sin really originating with it, even for anything whatever *of* the ease and comfort of the worldly existence, nor shrunk (mansîdô) from the first good work.

4. About the hideousness and frightfulness of the body of man after death, and only that which is considered by every one the most precious of desirable things is undecaying (*afarsâk*). 5. As regards the casting away of the dust, and also living people, that which is more nearly connected therewith is

Gâtha (Yas. XLVI), which begins with the words kâam nemôî zãm; it is here written kamnamēzō in Pahlavi.

¹ See Chap. XII, 17. The connection of the demon of death with Yas. XLVI is that the first few words of that hâ are supposed to be repeated by the wicked soul in despair after death (see Yt. XXII, 20, W.; Mkh. II, 159; AV. XVII, 7).

² K has marđûm, 'human (?)'.

³ B has the whole of this first clause thus:—'And the unconsumed (*apakhshînô*) property of him who is surprised by the invisible marvel *that* he shall endure, they have not saved from him.' This marvel is probably the supposed casting of a noose by Ast-vidâd, around the neck of the dead to drag him to hell, which only the righteous are able to cast off.

⁴ See Bk. VIII, Chaps. XIV, 8, XXIV, 10.

uninhabitableness¹ and its duration. 6. And when, too, this way, the consciousness is in the vicinity of the body², and the dog and bird go forth for the dismemberment of the body, the frightening of the consciousness by them is like *that of* a sheep by a wolf; also *its* disputing with the dog and bird about the dismemberment of the body, the reciting (mârḍanō) of words spiritually *at* first repelling them, thinking the body is alive. 7. And, afterwards, when the body is dismembered by them, the hastening of the consciousness to the vicinity of the dismembered body, just like a female (dênûḍakō) sheep when it hastens on to *its* young ones; *and its* noticing—with grievous unhappiness³ for the body—and recounting where the features (dêmagânō) of that body were in happiness, and to what misery it has now come. 8. And, when that body became sinful in *its* lifetime, about its not accepting, during that lifetime, that which the consciousness repeatedly well-endeavoured to promote for that body, as regards abstaining from sin and practising good works.

9. This, too, that thy time of worldly happiness *has* occurred, and that of misery is long. 10. This, too, that the people who live on, in the worldly *existence*, a hundred years are less than those who do not live a hundred years; the progress of a lifetime, little *by* little, and the rushing on *of* a lifetime; wife and property and the rest *of* worldly *things* all

¹ Corpses are to be deposited in an uninhabited place (see Vend. VI, 44-51, VII, 45-50; Dd. XVIII).

² Compare Dd. XVI, 7.

³ Pahl. ashâdîh in K, but B has ayâḍakîh, 'remembrance.'

leaving you at once, and coming to another person. 11. And this, too, that—when mankind mostly keep up any statement (*nisang-iĕ*) *or* register (*aêvar'gô*) which they have drawn out (*nazî-hênd*)¹ about ordainable supplies in a friendly *or* inimical (*patyân-mônd*) way, which is more particularly expedient for them—a supply, suitable for the discreet, of the rest of that which is constantly desirable, is to be extracted therefrom, and *one* is to keep up *its* preparation with his own.

12. About the seven immortal rulers who are produced in the region of Khvanîras², and also about the ordaining of their glory and the goodness, too, of *their* assistants living *and* privileged in both existences. 13. The tree opposed to harm³ is on Aîrân-vêg⁴, in the place of most excavations (*frêh-nigânân gâs*). 14. Gôk-patô⁵ is in foreign⁶ coun-

¹ Or 'they offer up (*ûzdahênd*).'

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. VIII, 2. And, regarding these seven rulers, compare Bd. XXIX, 5, 6; Dd. XC.

³ The many-seeded tree in the wide-formed ocean, whence the seeds of all wild plants are brought by the rain (see Yt. XII, 17; Bd. XXVII, 2, 3; Mkh. LXII, 37-42).

⁴ See Chap. XII, 3.

⁵ Gôpatshah in Bd. XXIX, 5, XXXI, 20, 22; Byt. II, 1; Dd. XC, 3, 4; Gôpaitôshah in Mkh. LXII, 8, 31; and Gôpaitô in Mkh. XLIV, 35. All these forms of the name imply that he was a king, or master, of oxen; and Mkh. describes him as a Mazda-worshipping minotaur on the sea-shore, probably the Caspian, or the river Oxus, as Bd. makes him a brother, or nephew, of Frâsîyâv the Turânian. His country is called Saukavastân in Bd., and Gôpatô in Dd.

⁶ Pahl. an-Aîrân which corresponds with the position of Saukavastân being between Tûrkistân and Kînistân, as stated in Bd. XXIX, 13, and that of Gôpatô being coterminous with Aîrân-vêg, as in Dd. XC, 4. But K, by omitting the negative prefix, places it

tries. 15. Pêhshôtanû¹, son of Vistâsp, is in Kangdez² the hundred-moated (*sad-gandak*), wherein *there are* a myriad spears (*drafsh*), those of the exalted who wear black marten *fur*, who are righteous listeners of the religion³, out of the retinue (*akharth*) of Pêhshôtanû, son of Vistâsp. 16. Frâdakhshô, son of the mortal Khûmbîks⁴, who is predominant on the waters flowing in channels. 17. Ashavâzd, son of Pôrûdakhshô⁵, who is predominant over the most manifest among uplands, the plain of Pêsinâs⁶. 18. Barâzak⁷ the causer of strife. 19. 'And the eighth Kayân⁸ who *was* renowned, O Vistâsp! it is

'within the countries of Irân;' and Mkh. makes Gôpâtô a chief of Airân-*vég*.

¹ Av. Peshôtanu, commonly written Pêshyôtanû in Pahlavi.

² A fortified settlement, to the east of Irân (see Bd. XXIX, 10), formed by Siyâvakhsh (see Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 14) who was first cousin of Vistâsp's great-grandfather (see Bd. XXXI, 25, 28, 29).

³ Who are expected to be led into Irân by Pêhshôtanû in future times, when he is summoned by the angels to restore religion to the world after the conflict of the nations (see Byt. III, 25-42).

⁴ K has 'Frâdakhshô, son of Khûmbîk the son of Hôshâng.' He was evidently the Fradhâkhsti Khuñbya of Yt. XIII, 138, who might have been considered as a descendant of the Haoshyangha mentioned before him in Yt. XIII.

⁵ Av. Ashavazdangh Pourudhâkhstayana of Yt. V, 72, XIII, 112.

⁶ Said to be in Kâvulistân where Sâma Keresâspa lies asleep till summoned to kill Dahâk in the latter times (see Bd. XXIX, 7, 11; Byt. III, 59-61). It may be connected with the vairi Pisanangh of Yt. V, 37, where Keresâspa offered sacrifice, and with the Pisn valley south-east of Qandahâr; but Chap. XXI, 20 seems to place it between Mâzendarân and Irân, and Mkh. LXII, 20 also describes it as near Mount Dimâvand. Its name is variously written Pêsinâs, Pesânsih, Pêsyânsaî, Pêsandâs, Pêrânîgas, &c.

⁷ Possibly Av. Varâza of Yt. XIII, 101.

⁸ Kavi Haosravangh (Kaî-Khûsrôî) is the eighth and last in the list of Kavis, or Kayâns, in Yt. XIII, 132; and was celebrated for

he whom one calls Kat-Khûsrôî, who produces even an advance of thy religion of the Mazda-worshippers, and also understands about it; who gives my good practices further blessings, so that the world¹ maintains my doings with benedictions.'

20. Righteousness is perfect excellence.

CHAPTER XVII.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The sixteenth fargard, Spentâ-mainyû², is about effecting the bridge-judgment of sinners, as declared by revelation. 2. About performing the ceremony (yastô) for a man and a woman, and it is ordered *for* the woman before the man; the fitness for the supreme heaven (garôdmânîkîh) arisen through the liturgy (yastô) to be recited itself, or *through purchasing heaven in the worldly existence*³.

3. About the immunity of the soul from hell through the righteousness *of having* respectfully given a horse of a *good* race, the land of a cultivated field, *or* a virtuous woman, to a righteous man; and also the woman who gives herself in marriage to

his opposition to idolatry (see Yt. V, 49, 50; Bd. XVII, 7). This section appears to be an actual quotation from the Pahlavi version of the Nask, professing to give the words of Zarâtûst.

¹ K has dêhîk, 'a provincial.'

² The first two words of the first hâ of the third Gâtha (Yas. XLVII, 1), which are converted into the Pahlavi appellation Spēndmaîtō.

³ By providing for the performance of the proper ceremonies for the benefit of one's own soul.

the righteous man; and that liberal good work increases *from time to time*¹, and *from day to day*.

4. About the bridge *penalty* of him who is a mourner (navinîdâr) and *self-wounder* in the three nights *after a death*, and how it is as though *they* who are living *should* again pour melted ore on a human being. 5. About the punishment for a woman who gives herself in marriage to a righteous man, *and* comes away² from him; such as when a hedgehog³ should be constantly going in and coming out by her sexual organ; and the cutting off of her way from the best existence. 6. About the non-deliverance of a soul of the wicked from hell till the future existence. 7. About the punishment of the wicked *there is* this, too, *it is* as though a sheep which is alive should be remaining tied by the legs, head downwards, and *there* should be a specific exudation of its toes through running at the nose⁴.

8. About the Gâthas for an ordeal⁵ of the spiritual *existence*, which is concealed in every mode, *being* without a footing (*apâ-pâstakö*), as it were, for him who is a righteous chanter of the Gâthas.

9. The excellence *of* righteousness is perfect.

¹ Pahl. vidanâânag vidanâânag, a hybrid equivalent of zamânak zamânak (see Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXV, 6 n).

² B has 'relapses.'

³ Compare AV. LXX.

⁴ Pahl. afas angûstô zahîh-1-i mâyagânîk pavan vînîk-tag aē. For mâyagânîk, 'specific' (which occurs, however, in Bk. VIII, Chap. XX, 166), we can read mâsânîk, 'tumorous or coagulating,' or we may consider it equivalent to mûyisnîk, 'lamentable.'

⁵ Compare the reference to the ordeal by fire in Pahl. Yas. XLVI, 6; the earlier part of the chapter is also somewhat of a homily upon the references to the wicked and righteous in the same hâ.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Sūdkar Nask.

1. The seventeenth fargard, Yêzt¹, is about where *he* is who shall commit *any* of these five sins ², *and*, thereby perverted from the religion, has diminished his own life and destiny ³:—A human being when he contentedly reverences a demon in spiritual lordship (ahûth) and priestly authority (radîh), *one* steadfast in religion when *he so reverences one* unsteadfast in religion, a teacher when *he so reverences one who is* no teacher *and* ignorant, *one* acquainted with the Gâthas when *he so reverences one* unacquainted with the Gâthas *and* unintelligent (anashnâs) ⁴, *and* a helpful *one* when *he so reverences* an unhelpful *and* unwise *one*.

2. This, too, where also they are who unlawfully slaughter a sheep, *or* beast of *burden*, which diminishes their life and destiny. 3. And so, too, those also who think scornfully of Aûharmazd, *O* pure *and* righteous Spîtâmân! and their own religion, the strength of the righteous *and* thy disciples.

4. Excellence *that is* perfect is righteousness.

CHAPTER XIX.

Sūdkar Nask.

1. The eighteenth fargard, Ad-mâ-yavâ ⁵, is

¹ The first word of the second hâ of the third Gâtha (Yas. XLVIII, 1), here written yezîk in Pahlavi.

² B omits 'sins.'

³ Or 'glory.'

⁴ So in K, but both MSS. give this clause imperfectly.

⁵ The first three words of the third hâ of the third Gâtha (Yas. XLIX, 1), here written ad-mâ-îyûbô in Pahlavi.

about the pregnancy of the demon from him who *has* eaten *and* chattered in sinfulness *towards* Khûr-dad and Amûrdad¹, or who makes water *when* standing², *or* who heedlessly sees *his* semen. 2. And the hussy³ who spills (*gûyêdô*) anything after sunset (*hûk-frâshmôk-dâd*), *or* who scatters a morsel (*dânar*) of food to the north, *at* night, without a recitation of the Ahunavair⁴.

3. This, too, that only the soul is constantly desirable for the body, even through this alone, that this perishable body⁵ [is a worldly state of righteousness, and, by rousing up (*lâlâ-payamîsnîh*)⁶ when thou wouldst sleep on, the righteousness] is on the advance when thou wouldst have retreated; and

¹ Av. *haurvatât*, 'completeness, or health,' and *amaretât*, 'immortality,' the archangels who have special charge of water and plants, respectively (see Sls. XV, 25-29), and are said to be injured by the sin of talking while eating and drinking those things (see Chap. IX, 2).

² Thereby polluting more ground than is necessary (see Sls. X, 5).

³ See Chap. XI, 5 n.

⁴ K does not mention the latter sinful action. The reason of the sin of such actions is that they may be considered as offerings to the demons (who are supposed to come from the north and to be powerful at night) unless protected by the Ahunavair (see Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 7) used as an exorcism (see Sd. XXX, 1, 2; Sls. X, 7, XII, 18).

⁵ B has 'even through the assertion that this is corporeal *and* perishable.' The passage in brackets occurs only in K.

⁶ This appears to be the most probable reading of the word which occurs again in § 5, where it is written *lâlâ-ûpayamîsnîh* in K, which form is also found in Hn. I, 23, where it translates Av. *ustryamnô*. For the latter member of this compound see also Chap. XX, 6, 7. For the syllable *yam* we might substitute *gam* or *gam* without much alteration of meaning, or even *dam* if we translate by 'fanning up, exciting.'

the righteousness, in arising, is like thee in every coming *and* departure; through fetching *and* delivering the breath it shall become good reward, abundant reward, and the reward of righteousness.

4. When the body shall act so, the soul is rejoiced *and* shall utter a blessing for the body thus: 'Happy may it be *for* thee, *O* perishable body! whom I have made tall, *and* whom I have brought near to the best existence.' 5. And when the body shall not accept the progress (*afrâs*) of the soul, and says *it is* evil progress on rousing up, evil progress on advancing, [and evil progress upwards, the soul is a demon]¹ and shall offer [lamentable]¹ words thus: 'Evil *art* thou, *O* perishable body! whom I made dwarfish (*gasûk*), *and* whom I have brought near to the worst existence.'

6. About where *there are* unaccustomed (*avêsakô*), imperfect, and secret signs of short life, and the healthfulness *of* uttering the Ahunavair² *and* Ashem³ for it. 7. This, too, that, when thou wouldst squat for making water, thou recitest the Ahunavair, and the Ashem, afterwards, when thou wouldst stand up; so that *any* demon, *or* fiend, shall least injure thee. 8. And when thou wouldst go in unto *thy* wife (*nârîk*), thou recitest first the Ahunavair, and the Ashem, afterwards, when thou wouldst be coming together⁴; for so thou wouldst be making that, too, *which* arises—which is thy son—more righteous and

¹ The words in brackets are omitted in K.

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 7.

³ See Chap. III, 1; here, and in §§ 7, 8, it is expressed by Pahl. *aharâyîh*, 'righteousness,' being an abbreviation of its usual appellation, 'praise of righteousness,' in Pahlavi.

⁴ Pahl. 'amat andarg hakhtô vadîdûnâñ *ae*.'

more successful through the Ashem. 9. This, too, that, when thou wouldst go into a house, thou shouldst be offering homage, and do thou utter the Ahuna-vair, *for* the spirit of the house and *for everything* of the material *existence* of the righteous which is and was and *will* be in that dwelling.

10. Also about the corruption (ta vastanō) of the wicked, and the calamity (sûr) which is unjustly distributed by them in the realm¹.

11. Excellence *that is* perfect is righteousness.

CHAPTER XX.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The nineteenth fargard, Kad-môi-urvâ², is about where the souls, when they come together, extol the soul of him who *was* a virtuous high-priest, a friend of the soul, because he did not injure it, *and* guarded *it* from hell.

2. About the darkness, the intensity (bûr'z vö-hômandîh) and far-reaching bottomlessness of the blackness, and the absence of goodness *in* hell; and the proximity to stench, close concealment³, sleet-pelted clambering (pîsnakö-bâlnîh), frozen ad-

¹ Like Yas. XLIX this fargard begins with special references to the wicked, and returns to them towards the end.

² The first three words of the fourth, and last, hâ of the third Gâtha (Yas. L, 1), here written kad-môk-ravakö in Pahlavi.

³ Compare AV. LIV, 5-8:—'As close as (tang-i k) from the ear to the eye, and as many as the hairs a horse has in *his* mane, so many in number the souls of the wicked stand, but they do not see, nor do they hear a sound, one from the other, *and* every one, therefore, thinks that he is alone.' For a description of hell see also Dd. XXVII.

vancing, painful condition, distressed state, and awful fear of those in hell. 3. This, too, that is thrown open (*lakhvâr ramîtund*) over it, from the Dâitî peak¹, which is in Atrân-vêg, to Albûr'z², and below the middle of which is the gate of hell, is the *K'invad* bridge³ which is the route (*vidâr*) of every one, righteous *or* wicked; the width across the route of the righteous is a breadth of nine spears, each one the length of three reeds, *but* the route for the wicked becomes like the edge of a razor.

4. 'Thus say I⁴ unto thee, O Spîtâmân! that the man of truth steps forward over the *K'invad* pass, even the far-famed happy bridge; for Âstâd⁵, the good promoter of the world, and Mitrô⁶ of the vast cattle-pastures save only the man possessing truth from that distress, as though they *were* a regiment (*sipâh*) a thousand strong. 5. So I say unto thee, O Spîtâmân! that thou shouldst not become a liar unto Mitrô, neither when thou wouldst converse with the wicked, nor when *thou wouldst* with those of thine own religion who are righteous; for both *of* those are promises, both *with* the wicked and the righteous; there is a promise, O Zaratûst! even *of* a wolf with young animals, *but* that which is a

¹ Or *Kakâd-î Dâitî* (see Pahl. Vend. XIX, 101; Bd. XII, 7).

² Av. *hara berezaiti*, the range of lofty mountains supposed to surround the world (see Bd. V, 3-5).

³ Here called *K'inakō-pūhal*, and *K'is-vidarg* in § 4; for a fuller description of it see Dd. XXI, 2-7. Allusion is made to it in Yas. L, 7.

⁴ *Atharmazd*, speaking to Zaratûst. The whole of this paragraph appears to be quoted verbatim from the original Pahlavi text of the Nask.

⁵ See Chap. IX, 6.

⁶ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XLIV, 16.

lascivious (*gêhîk*) promise is more awful, *O Spîtâmân!* 6. So I say unto thee, *O Spîtâmân!* that thou shouldst not seize a wanton (*gêhîk*) for use—that is, do not make her *thy* wife—and with compulsion (*ûpayamîsnîh*) of her¹—that is, do not let *thymself* lie with her. 7. And if thou shouldst seize a courtesan for use, and with compulsion of her, thou mayst not dismiss *her* afterwards, neither in adversity, nor in prosperity, neither on account of fondness for self, nor *for* life; because *he* who seizes a courtesan for use, and with compulsion, and shall dismiss her on account of fondness for self, or *for* life, becomes thereby a breaker of promises *to* the house, village, community, *or* province, *that* gives her life (*valman zîvînêdô*), *and to* the soul *that* animates her².

8. So breaking the promise comes upon the children that are theirs, through evil teaching; *and* he who is wicked is lying down without children at the bottom of hell. 9. *That* is, there is nothing whatever of³ happiness *for* the wicked, that happiness which is produced abundantly by him *who* is *Aû-harmazd*.

10. Perfect righteousness is excellence.

¹ Or, perhaps, 'with approach to her' (see Chap. XIX, 3 n). If *ûpadamîsnîh* were read, it might mean 'aspiration, or attachment' for her.

² This implies that the woman, being a notorious sinner, cannot reasonably complain of bodily injury on being dismissed; but her soul and the community are grievously injured by her being thus driven into further sin, and for this injury the man's soul will be made responsible.

³ K has 'none even of this.'

CHAPTER XXI.

Sūdkar Nask.

1. The twentieth fargard, Vohû-khshathrem¹, is about the oppressive actions of the sovereignty which Dahâk² exercised over the earth of seven *regions*, and the forward progress of his commands owing to a surrounding of terrors.

2. About Dahâk's enquiry of the members of the assembly, regarding the reason of the affliction of the collected people, after the cutting *up* of Yim³ and the accession (khûdâyth) of Dahâk; and the people's saying, *in* reply to Dahâk, that Yim had kept away want and destitution, hunger and thirst, decay and death, lamentation and weeping from the world, *besides* the cold and heat of the immoderate mingling of the demon with mankind. 3. And this, too, that⁴ 'a giver of comfort was Yim—that is, those things *were* produced by him which are the comfort of mankind—and he was a giver of desire for them, so that his happiness *was* through the gratification produced—that is, mankind gratified him through virtue. 4. And Aûdak⁵, who made

¹ The first two words of the fourth Gâtha (Yas. LI, 1), here written vohûk-khshatar (B) and vohûk-khshatar (K) in Pahlavi.

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 8.

³ As mentioned in Yt. XIX, 46; Bd. XVII, 5 ('when Yim was cut up by them the fire Frôbak saves the glory of Yim from the hand of Dahâk') and XXXI, 5. Regarding Yim see Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 6-8.

⁴ What follows, as far as the end of § 7, appears to be quoted verbatim from the original Pahlavi text of the Nask.

⁵ The demon Uda who tries to make people talk when they ought to be silent (Bd. XXVIII, 19), and who seems to be identified

Yim the splendid *and* rich in flocks—who *was* struck down by you through violent assault—unauthorisedly desirous (varak¹) and eager for the world, produced want and destitution, distress and greed, hunger and thirst, and the sanctifier² of Wrath the wounding assailant, Want without pastures, Terror, Destruction the secret-moving, Decay the decrepit³, and the seven *arch*-demons⁴.’ 5. And this, too, that ‘those who look *for* a son *are* made devoid of pregnancy by thee; evil-destined is the monster (*stipist*) self-made, the uncompleted demon that it is impossible to seek a remedy for, who does not extend (*lâ vâlêd*) from *himself*, that is, no lineage proceeds from him. 6. And thou *art* a sheep that is a wide-traveller, *and* keeps the dog *away* from mankind; thou *hast* snatched away from us the bright radiance of Yim the splendid *and* rich in flocks, who came out on every evil contingency, at the approach of

(in Pahl. Vend. XVIII, 70) with the fiend who confesses her amours to Srôsh, and is said (in Bd. XXXI, 6) to have been the mother of Dahâk, there named Udaî or Aûd, but more commonly called Vadaîk (see Chap. X, 3; Dd. LXXII, 5, LXXVIII, 2), whence possibly the matronymic Vadaîkân (Mkh. LVII, 25, the Av. vadhaghana of Vend. XIX, 6) of that monarch. The text here appears to allude to an amour with Yim.

¹ Av. vara; or it may be a miswriting of vardak, ‘astray’ (Av. vareta).

² Pahl. *afzîsîn-hômônd*, ‘one holding ceremonies,’ alluding to Dahâk himself as the progeny of Aûdâk.

³ These five demons are Aeshm, Niyâz, Saham, Ség, and Zarmân in Pahlavi, who, with the exception of Saham, ‘terror,’ are described in Bd. XXVIII, 15-17, 23, 26.

⁴ The seven *arch*-demons are the six mentioned in Bd. I, 27, XXVIII, 7-13, XXX, 29, whose Avesta names are Akem-manô, Indra, Sauru, Naunghaithya, Tauru, and Zairîka (see Vend. X, 9, 10, XIX, 43), together with either Mithaokhta or Angramainyu himself (see Bd. I, 24).

every winter, *or* scorched by extreme heat, so as to act for the benefit of his place¹. 7. Thou art intelligent, *O* Bêvarâsp²! do thou even tell how this opinion is so, that a bad ruler is a thing which is so bad; he who is a good ruler is our desire, we *will* give the revenue *of* taxation (bâhar-i madam-dedrûnisnîh) to him, *and* anything which is necessary *for* good government when he shall achieve *it*.'

8. About the smiting *by* Frêdûn³, for the sake of killing Dahâk; the striking of *his* club upon the nape of the neck⁴ (pilîk), the heart, and even the skull; and Dahâk's not dying from that beating. 9. Then smiting *him* with a sword, and the formation (vastanö) of noxious creatures of many kinds, from the body of Dahâk, at the first, second, and third blow. 10. The exclamation of the creator Aûharmazd to Frêdûn thus: 'Thou shouldst not cut him who is Dahâk, because, if thou shouldst cut him, Dahâk would be making this earth full of serpents, toads (khan-galâk), scorpions, lizards, tortoises, and frogs;' with the mode *of* binding *him* with awful fetters, in the most grievous punishment of confinement⁵.

11. This, too, *that* when Az-î Dahâk was bound, the report of the same proceeded thus through all the regions, which are seven, that down-stricken is Az-î Dahâk, but he *who* smote *him* is Frêdûn the Âspikân⁶, the exalted *and* mighty. 12. And *in* the

¹ K has only 'who came out at every place to act for *its* benefit.'

² 'With a myriad of horses,' a title of Dahâk.

³ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 8, 9.

⁴ Or, perhaps, 'the reins.'

⁵ In Mount Dimâvand (see Chap. XV, 2 n).

⁶ Av. Âthwyaâna, a patronymic derived from Âthwya who,

tenth winter those particulars *were* believed, and thus they spoke, that *it was* owing to¹ Yim that *Az-î* Dahâk is now smitten by them, because the tidings which are good are not yet gathered unto all the regions, which are seven, and those which are evil do not mention *Az*, nor demand the virtuous maiden (*karâtîk*) with importunity, nor even coveted wealth². 13. This, too, that, when information came to him of women, *or* property, that seemed to him desirable to possess, *they were* then admitted by him into a golden cage³, and that, which was completely impregnable (*airîstö*), came on through immaterial space (*maînôg-divâkîh*) to the den (*grêstakö*) of *Az-î* Dahâk.

14. This, too, that, though⁴ he who smote him *were* his brother, or descendant, or kinsman, or any one whatever *of his* nearest relations, it did not seem to them as that which is grievous, and *it was* not thought *of* in their minds, so that it did not occasion them even a reminiscence again; and thus they talked, that *if* a householder *be* he *that* smote, *he is one* for whom all the fires of the religion are suitable, *but* that householder *being* a monarch, he *that* smote is *one* who is every way their ruler. 15. This,

according to Yas. IX, 7, was the father of Thraêtaona (*Frêdûn*); but Bd. XXXI, 4, 7, 8, XXXII, 1 n, make it a family name for many preceding generations.

¹ Or *min* may mean '*apart from*.'

² Demands often made by Dahâk, as stated in § 13.

³ Pahl. *sûlak-hômand*, '*something* having apertures; 'compare the *sûlak-hômand* which translates Av. *sufrâm* and *suwraya* in Vend. II, 7, 18, 30, and has sometimes been understood as a 'signet-ring.' Also compare § 19 below.

⁴ Assuming that *mûn*, 'who,' stands for *amat*, as in Chap. XIII, 2.

too, that *at* every place where he came on, *and* upon which *his* horse's hoofs (safô) fell, the dense fire from them *was* for the protection of the horse's body. 16. This, too, that through his confused (gûmêzakô) practising of good deeds *arose* even the evil deeds of *Az-i Dahâk*.

17. About those of the Mâzendarân¹ country *having* consulted, after the smiting of Dahâk, as to turning (gâstanô) to Khvanîras², and driving out Frêdûn therefrom, *and* as to the residence offered *by* the same place through the great number fallen; also, on account of their tallness, there are *parts* of the wide-formed ocean³ that come up to *their* mid-thigh, there are *others* that *are* up to the navel, and the deeper places *are* up to the mouth. 18. And, when they have come to this region, *their* producing grievous harm and destruction *to* the poor⁴, and the coming of the people with complaints to Frêdûn, and *their* speaking thus: 'Why didst thou smite *Az-i Dahâk*, who was a good ruler as to prerogative, so that danger *was* kept away by him, and an inquisitor (vigôyîdâr) from him protected this region from those of the Mâzendarân country?' 19. And they also said this, about the vileness of the Mâzendarâns, and the wretched state of the people of this region as regards them, that is, they then speak thus: 'Since their habits are thus, since they

¹ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 9.

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. VIII, 2. Mâzendarân was considered to be outside of Khvanîras because it is separated from Irân by lofty mountains.

³ The Caspian is probably meant here, being considered a portion of the circumambient ocean.

⁴ K omits '*to* the poor.'

are filthy (dôš-hômônd)—that is, dirt (karak) is theirs—possessing holes¹ (sûlak-hômônd)—that is, holes are theirs—and having appellations (karîtu-nisnô-hômônd)—that is, they call to one another—we men (vîr) think, *and* consider upon this, that they also are human beings.’

20. About the encountering of Frêdûn with those of the Mâzendarân country on the plain of Pêšânîgas², and disputing with them thus: ‘You are of the Mâzendar country, *and* I (anmanô) *have* destroyed *Az-î* Dahâk by the swiftest ruin, *him* who was a grievous sovereign of every one, demons *and* men; for that smiting of him I am produced *by* Aûharmazd more overpowering than his limbs made paralyzed by his own enmity, and then you destroy this country of mine, you who are of the Mâzendar country.’

21. And the Mâzendarâns thought slightly (sapûkô) of Frêdûn, *and* spoke in a tone of derision thus: ‘Should it be so, that thou destroyedst *Az-î* Dahâk by the swiftest ruin, *him* who was a good sovereign of both demons and men, and thou art produced *by* Aûharmazd, for that smiting of him, more overpowering than his limbs, even then we *will* settle in this *place* and *will* stay in this *place*; and *it is* not thou that *art* exalted, who *art* an overgrown (kabad-ârôyisnô) huge sheep with the speech of a hero among other people, *and* we would not admit thee here.’

22. This, too, that ‘nevertheless *they* afterwards fled, and the victorious Frêdûn pursued *them* to the

¹ Burrows, caves, and similar underground habitations are probably meant.

² See Chap. XVI, 17.

foremost upland, and his nostrils flamed *upon* it so that *they* split it through; from his right nostril is the cutting *and* sharp scorching of the ice *that* has fallen *and* of all the cold of winter; and from his left nostril is the cutting *and* sharp scorching of the rock *that* has fallen, which is similarly burning to a fire the size of a house, carrying the dust from the feet of the male ox, Barmâyûn¹, of the obstructed victor, the mighty Frêdûn. 23. And he made it rush up on the ascent, whereby they are made figures of stone, and they who *are* of the Mâzendar country are destroyed by him through the smiting of fifties, the smiting of hundreds, the smiting of thousands², the smiting of myriads, and the smiting of *multitudes* innumerable³.

24. 'Thus *there* are destroyed by him, the victorious *and* mighty Frêdûn, two-thirds *of* those of the Mâzendar country, and one-third came out beaten and sick; and never afterwards, O Spîtâmân Zarâtûst! have they who *are* of the Mâzendar country marched upon this region of Khvanîras, and *it has* not *been* imagined by them, even in thinking about *it*, that they⁴ should go *there*, except those⁵ whose names were thus, Spîtiyôs, son of Spânsnâyôs⁶, and Arezrâspâh, son of Spânsnâyôs⁷, who have wan-

¹ This appears to have also been the name of a brother of Frêdûn (see Bd. XXXI, 8).

² B omits 'the smiting of thousands.'

³ Compare Yt. V, 54, 58, 117; Pahl. Vend. VII, 137, 139.

⁴ Literally 'we.'

⁵ K has 'the two.'

⁶ These first two names are only in K, because B repeats here a previous phrase by mistake. The second name is written Sânsnâyôs here, but is spelt correctly on its next occurrence.

⁷ These two sons of Spânsnâyôs were the *spiritual* chiefs, or

dered (*tagīdō*) in search of wisdom and have proceeded unto Frashôstar¹ of the Hvôbas².'

25. Perfect excellence is righteousness.

CHAPTER XXII.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The twenty-first fargard, Vahistôisti³, is about where the best prayers⁴ of the good religion are: unto Mitrô⁵ once every night for dismissing and lessening Wrath in the whole world, and a second time for doing so with Lethargy; a third unto Srôsh⁶ the righteous, and the fourth is the Dâhmân Âfrîn⁷ for further gifts and increasing gifts; and the most

supreme high-priests, of the two northern regions, Fradaðafsh and Vîdaðafsh. They are named Spîtôid-î Aûspôsînân and Âêrêrâsp-î Aûspôsînân in Bd. XXIX, 1; and the statement that they came from Mâzendarân, made in the text here, identifies that country with the two northern regions. The names of these two high-priests are evidently derived from the Avesta genitives Spîtôis Uspâsnaos and Êrezrâspahê Uspâsnaos in Yt. XIII, 121, persons concerning whom it is only stated that their fravashis, or guardian spirits, are to be revered.

¹ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 68.

² Av. Hvôva, the family name of Frashôstar, Gâmâsp, and several other ancient personages (see Bk. VIII, Chap. XXIX, 25).

³ The appellation of the fifth Gâtha (Yas. LIII) which begins with the words vahistâ îstis; it is here written vahistôk-îstô in Pahlavi.

⁴ The Pahlavi explanation of Av. vahistâ îstis.

⁵ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XLIV, 16.

⁶ See Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3.

⁷ 'The blessing of members of the community.' The Dâhmân Âfrînagân consists of Yas. LX, 2-7 with Âf. I, 14-18; but the Âfrîn is another formula, otherwise called 'the Âfrîn of the seven Ameshâspends,' and it is uncertain which of the two is meant here.

preservative of them was the Dāhmân *Āfrīn*. 2. And this, too, that the most admirable of shapes of women *was* Hûmâi¹ of the noble family of Vistâsp, of horses the splendid horse of Vistâsp, of oxen the male ox Barmâyûn², of sheep the very much celebrated³ sheep that is fat, white-jawed, *and* star-spotted, *with its* upper half in a manufacture (pa-sakhtakō) embroidered with gold and the topmost part yellow; and yet not one of them attains an equality to even a single thousandth *part* of the glory of a righteous man, a member of the community, by whom the Dāhmân *Āfrīn* of the good *is uttered*. 3. And this, too, as much as *its* goodness for the man and *his* wife is *its* evil *for* a villain and *his* paramour⁴.

4. About the exercise of sovereignty *by* Kât-Ûs⁵, with triumph, over the earth of seven *regions*; the advancement of his commands, by the people of the creation⁶, more swiftly than a wave of the hands; the construction of his seven dwellings (mân)⁷ in the midst of Albûr'z⁸, one of gold, two of silver, two

¹ Av. (gen.) Humayau of Yt. XIII, 139.

² See Chap. XXI, 22.

³ Reading frêh-ôkhtar (for frêh-ôkhttar), as Bd. XXIV, 3 states that 'the black sheep which is fat and white-jawed is the chief of sheep.' It might be 'the sheep of Frashôkhtar,' and this name might be a miswriting of Frashôstar, but we have no record of any such sheep of his.

⁴ It is easy to trace a connection between §§ 1, 2 and Yas. LIII, 1, and between § 3 and the Pahl. version of Yas. LIII, 6 a.

⁵ Av. Kava Usa (see Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 13).

⁶ K has 'by demons and men.'

⁷ Probably the origin of the legends of the seven halting-places of Rustam and Isfendiyâr in the Shâhnâmah.

⁸ Here meaning the mountain-range south of the Caspian (see Chap. XX, 3).

of steel, and two of crystal (*âvgtinakîñ*); the restraining of the many Mâzônîk demons¹ who are the ruin of the world, and confining *them* to their own duty; the arrival at those dwellings of his, and the swift winding (*vâftîñdân*) around those dwellings, of a person whose strength is overpowered by decrepitude, and the approach of *whose* life to departure from the body *has* taken place; the reduction (*khû-sânî-hastân*) of the decrepitude thereby, and the return of his strength and manhood, that is, a command is given by him thus: 'Keep no people away at the door!' and he might make a domestic of fifteen years *of age*.

5. Afterwards, the consultation of the demons about the death of Kât-Ûs, and the coming of Aeshm² to Kât-Ûs, approving his death, and, therefore, making *him* wretched in his mind *about* the great sovereignty which *was* possessed by him over the seven lands, and causing him to long for the sovereignty *of* the heavenly region (*âsâmân* ñ *gâs*) of the archangels³. 6. And, owing to the seductiveness of Aeshm, and the other demons who remained his co-operators for that undoing, Kât-Ûs *was* even *engaged* in opposing and molesting the sacred beings. 7. Also his not returning across Albûr'z, *but* rushing upwards, with many demons and wicked people, unto the *outer* edge of darkness⁴;

¹ Av. Mâzainya daêva, the idolators of Mâzendarân.

² The demon of wrath (see Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3 n).

³ §§ 5-9 are evidently a summary of the original form of the legend of Kâvûs's attempt to reach the sky, otherwise described in the Shâhnâmâh.

⁴ Where the endless light commences. Reading par-i tom; or it might be 'to the utmost,' if we read frêtm as equivalent to frêhtûm.

and the reason *of* the glory of the Kayâns¹ becoming a figure of clay on that border. 8. The previous separation (madam rêgî-hastanô) of Kât-Ûs from the troops, and *his* not turning from that ill-advisedness even on renewed strife aloft² *with* the supreme sacred beings. 9. Afterwards, the creator's calling back the glory of the Kayâns to himself, the falling of the troops of Kât-Ûs to the earth from that height, and the flying of Kât-Ûs to the wide-formed ocean³.

10. This, too, it says, that, besides him, some one⁴ flew behind him, thus associated with him; *and* after him flew Nêryôsang⁵, the promoter (frêh-dâdâr) *of* the world, for diverting that person *from* him. 11. And the cry of him, the unborn Khûsrôî, who *was* thus associated with him, like that of a regiment (sipâh) a thousand *strong*, *was* thus: 'Thou shouldst not smite him, O Nêryôsang, promoter *of* the world! for if thou shouldst smite this man, O Nêryôsang, promoter *of* the world! *there will* not be afterwards obtained, for acquirement, a

¹ K omits 'of the Kayâns.' It is the royal glory of Yt. XIX, which descended from heaven and accompanies the faithful rulers and champions of the religion, successively (see Chap. XXIV, 3).

² B has 'pitying strife;' khvâparîk being written instead of avarîk.

³ Meaning the Caspian, as in Chap. XXI, 17.

⁴ It will be seen, from what follows, that this was the fravashi, or guardian spirit, of his future grandson, Kaî-Khûsrôî. Every being and object belonging to Aûharmazd's creation is supposed to have its spiritual representative, created before the universe and perpetually existing (see Bd. I, 8; Mkh. XLIX, 23).

⁵ Av. Nairyôsangha, an angel who is supposed to be the usual messenger of Aûharmazd to mankind (see Byt. III, 25, 26, 59, 60). K has only 'besides him *and* behind him flew Nêryôsang.'

thorough destroyer *of* the high-priest of Tûrân¹; because owing to this man *will* be born *him whose* name is Stiyâvakhsh², *and* owing to Stiyâvakhsh I *shall* be born, who am the Khûsrôî who *will* entice the most heroic³ *one* of Tûrân—who is mostly the destruction of champions and troops—to the numerous heroes of the religion, so that I *may* accomplish the destruction of his champions and troops, when⁴ I would occasion a distant flight of the sovereign of Tûrân.’ 12. Through these words the guardian spirit of Khûsrôî delighted Nêryôsang, the promoter *of* the world; and, on these words, *the latter was* releasing him and that Kât-Ûs who thereby became discreet.

13. Perfect is the excellence *of* righteousness.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Sûdkar Nask.

1. The twenty-second fargard, Airyaman⁵, is about the meeting of Kât-Khûsrôî⁶ and Vâê, the long-continuing lord⁷ next to the renovation *of the*

¹ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 15.

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 14.

³ A single particular hero appears to be meant, although this is not quite certain.

⁴ Assuming that mûn, ‘who,’ stands for amat, as in Chap. XIII, 2.

⁵ The appellation of Yas. LIV which begins with the words â airyemâ ishyô; it is here written aîrêmanô (B) and aîremanô (K) in Pahlavi.

⁶ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 14.

⁷ Pahl. vâê-î dêrang-khûdâî=Av. vâya dareghôhvadhâta who is mentioned as a good spirit in Ny. I, 1. There are, how-

universe; and Kai-Khûsrôî's asking Vâê, the long-continuing lord, about his smiting so many of the ancients who have been the highest of mankind in splendour and glory. 2. The reply of Vâê, the long-continuing lord, about his smiting them; and, upon that answer, Kai-Khûsrôî's taking Vâê, the long-continuing lord, and transforming *him* into the shape of a camel, mounting *him*, and going, with the Irânian levies (*hangamanôîkân*), to the place where the immortal Haoist, *son* of Geurva¹, lies in strength², and his letting him lie; also *his* going beyond (*kâdmon*) him to the place where Tûs³, the banisher of strife, lay in strength, and his letting him also lie; and his going beyond him to the place where Kai-*Apīvēh*⁴ lies, and his letting him also lie.

ever, two Vâês (see Dd. XXX, 4; Mkh. II, 115), the good Vâê who assists the departed soul, and the bad Vâê who opposes it; the former is closely connected with the angel Râm in Yt. XV, 9, 58, and the latter with Astô-vîdhôtu, the demon of death, in Vend. V, 8, 9; Bd. XXVIII, 35. They appear to be personifications of the upper and lower air, respectively; the former being considered pure through its connection with the sacred beings, and the latter impure through contamination by the demons. Possibly the legend about Vâê in our text may have been suggested by the words *vayû-beredubyô* and *vayôî* in Yas. LIII, 6, 7; in which case, this *fargard* must be considered, to some extent, as a continuation of the preceding one. According to Dd. XXXVI, 3 Kai-Khûsrôî was made to pass away by Vâê.

¹ Compare Av. Yûsta Gâurvayana of Yt. XIII, 118. But Yôista Fryâna, of Yt. XIII, 120, is one of the immortals mentioned in Byt. II, 1; Dd. XC, 3.

² Reading *hang*, which can also mean 'a cave;' but we can likewise read *hûg*, 'spiritual life.'

³ Av. Tusa of Yt. V, 53, 58; he is one of the immortals mentioned in Bd. XXIX, 6; Dd. XXXVI, 3.

⁴ Av. Kavi Aipivanghu of Yt. XIII, 132, XIX, 71. He was son of Kai-Kavâd, brother of Kâi-Ûs, and great-grandfather of Vistâsp's grandfather (see Bd. XXXI, 25, 28, 31, 34).

3. His proceeding beyond them, and meeting on the road with that beneficial victor Sôshâns¹, and *being* asked by that beneficial victor thus: 'What man art thou who sittest aloft on Vâê, the long-continuing lord, so that thou makest Vâê fly, the long-continuing lord transformed into the shape of a camel?' 4. The speaking of Kai-Khûsrôî, in reply to Sôshâns, thus; 'I am Kai-Khûsrôî.' 5. The extolling of Kai-Khûsrôî, *by* Sôshâns, as regards his *having* extirpated the idol-temples on the shore of Lake Kêkast², and his smiting the wizard Frâstyâv³.

6. The glorifying of the Mazda-worshipping religion *by* Kai-Khûsrôî; the coming of the powerful being Keresâsp⁴, club in hand, advancing towards them at the dwelling of that wizard Ges⁵; the standing up of Tûs, the banisher of strife, and his calling to Keresâsp for reliance upon the Gâtha lore and *for* union with them; and the praising of righteousness⁶ *by* Keresâsp, and his throwing *away* the arm-breaker.

7. As to these, too, it says that so those men come together *for* producing the renovation *of the universe who* are mentioned in this fargard, and also in other places, *and* are all experienced *and* eminent

¹ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIV, 14.

² Apparently the present Lake Urumiyah (see Bd. XVII, 7, XXII, 2; Mkh. II, 95).

³ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 11.

⁴ See Chap. XV.

⁵ Written *Ū*, but the reading is uncertain; possibly the name may be connected with 'the Veskô progeny' in Chap. XV, 2.

⁶ Reciting the Ashem-vohû formula, as a token of adhesion to the religion.

doers, and all powerful *and* brave; and they shall produce the renovation through a desire for an existence undecaying, immortal, hungerless, and thirstless for ever *and* everlasting.

8. It is perfect excellence *that is* righteousness.

CHAPTER XXIV.

1. Of the Varstmânsar¹ there are twenty-three fargards, *and* the first is the Aêthrapaitis², on the asking of Zaratûst, by Mađôk-mâh³, about the nature of the birth of Zaratûst, and his coming to the religion. 2. And the reply of Zaratûst about the combative coming together of the life-causing and death-causing spirits at his birth⁴. 3. This, too, that when the fellow-villagers⁵ of her who bore *him* saw his head⁶

¹ The second of the Nasks and third of the Gâthic division (see Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 9, 12). It is a second commentary on the Gâthas, devoting a fargard to each hâ of the Gâthas and to each Gâthic formula, as in the Sûđkar Nask, but beginning with an extra fargard about the birth and calling of Zaratûst. Its chief object appears to be the quotation of texts, both from the Gâthas and from sources no longer known.

² Here written asrapâîtôs (B) and asrapâitis (K) in Pahlavi, which, no doubt, stand for Av. aêthrapaitis, Pers. hêrbad, 'a Zoroastrian priest.' This name may either refer to the general subject of the fargard, or have been the first word of its Avesta text; as it seems not intended to quote any section of the Yasna, although the guardian spirits of the priests are revered in Yas. XXVI, 7, 8, before commencing the recitation of the Gâthas.

³ Av. Maidhyô-maungha; he was first cousin of Zaratûst, and also his first disciple (see Bd. XXXII, 2, 3; Zs. XI, 10 n).

⁴ B has 'at the birth of his life.'

⁵ B has ham-vîsagîh, K ham-disagîh.

⁶ Assuming that vagânô stands for vagđânô, which word occurs in § 4, according to K.

*they considered it the shoulder of*¹ *Arekdviksûr*², *and his chest and back those of Ahartsvang*³, *and when they saw his full*⁴ *bosom they considered it that of the spirit of liberality*⁵; and by *his side was the Kayân glory*⁶ to rub (*mûstanö*) *his bosom*.

4. The speaking of Zaratûst spiritually, on the grievous bringing forth of *his head*⁷, thus: 'As a spiritual lord is *my* desire, do thou who art the Zôti speak forth to me⁸;' and the reply from Aûhar-mazd thus: 'So shouldst thou be the priestly master as regards whatever righteousness I speak forth with righteous intelligence; thou art of very much value, thou *art* very righteous, thou *art* most intelligent, and thou *will* state the religion of the Mazda-worshippers to creatures of every kind.' 5. Through that saying an arrow reaches spiritually unto the demons, just as from a mighty chief warrior of Kaî-Vistâsp⁹, like him in a mountain dwelling (*garânö mân*) who *has* shot an arrow for an attack (*patko-pisnö*) opposing those in coats of mail. 6. The evil spirit grumbled (*dandîdö*) to the demons thus: 'Evil *has* it become *for* you *who* are demons, but

¹ B omits 'the shoulder of.'

² Av. Aredvî sûra of Yt. V, a title of Anâhita, the female angel of the waters.

³ See Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3.

⁴ Pahl. aûrûkspar=Av. uruthware.

⁵ Av. Râta, who is associated with the archangel Speñta-Ârmaiti in Yt. II, 3, 8; Sîr. I, II, 5, and with Ashi Vanguhi in Yt. XXIV, 8.

⁶ Av. kavaêm hvarenô (see Chap. XXII, 7).

⁷ B has 'whenever *his birth occurred*.'

⁸ This, with the first clause of the response, is the Pahlavi version of the concluding formula of Yas. XXVI, 11, without the extra Pahlavi glosses.

⁹ See Bk. VIII, Chaps. XI, 1-4, XIII, 15.

you are unobservant.' 7. Even so Zaratûst proclaimed life *free* from the control of the demons, when this same *saying was* uttered by him, thus : ' As a spiritual lord is *my* desire ;' and, *at* the falling of the demons upon Zaratûst for *his* destruction, an incarnation (tanû) of *its* spiritual existence stood opposed to them, in that weapon *proceeding* from Zaratûst, to keep them back.

8. And he spoke again thus : ' The religion of the benefitters progresses there in him who, through good actions, *has* joyfulness owing to his righteousness¹ ;' and, through that saying, an arrow reaches spiritually unto the demons, equal to ten *of* that which *was* first spoken, and, *at* the falling of the demons upon Zaratûst for *his* destruction, it stood spiritually opposed to them, and that weapon *proceeding* from Zaratûst kept *them* back.

9. The third utterance of Zaratûst, on the bringing forth of *his* arms, *was* thus : ' That which the first existence produced is to be so practised, with attention, through actions to be concealed *by* him who is a priestly authority (radô)² ;' and through that saying an arrow reaches spiritually unto the demons, equal to one hundred *of* that which *was* first spoken, and, *at* the falling of a demon upon Zaratûst for *his* death, *its* spirit, *as* a sacred being, kept the demon away from Zaratûst.

10. And, when the whole body of Zaratûst *was* brought forth, trouble (âsi pō) fell among the demons, and the demons rushed back to hell in haste ; light

¹ This is the Pahlavi version of Yas. XXXIV, 13 b, without the glosses.

² This is the Pahlavi version of Yas. XXXIII, 1 a, b, without the glosses and incomplete.

increased among the creatures, and every creature of the beneficent sacred being is pleased and talked of virtuous conduct. 11. And Aûharmazd took away Zaratûst with joyfulness to provide security for *him*, and Arekdvîksûr, Ahartsvang, and the primitive and Kayân glory *in* the body of Zaratûst spoke to Zaratûst of *its* production *by* Aûharmazd thus: 'Thou shouldst think of him who is wise.' 12. Thereupon Zaratûst spoke spiritually, *in* reply, thus: 'I am a Mazda-worshipper, I profess the Mazda-worship of Zaratûst¹; *and* this *means* that I am an apostle of Aûharmazd, and am sent *by* Aûharmazd.'

13. And Aûharmazd spoke to Zaratûst thus: '*As to* the sacred beings *of* the worldly *existence*, do thou beg companionship from them; *but as to* the demons, do thou long for (dôsh)² separation from every one of them; practise good thoughts, good words, and good deeds, and abstain from evil thoughts, evil words, and evil deeds.' 14. Also about vigilantly reverencing the sacred beings, and the reward thereof; not strengthening the vile, nor weakening³ the good; expounding *for* the disturber of religion (dênô-padrêsh), and producing liberality for the accepters of religion; and not turning *away* from the religion on account of fondness for body and life.

15. The accepting of such advice spiritually *by* Zaratûst, and his glorifying Aûharmazd, for crea-

¹ This is the Pahlavi version of part of Yas. XII, 7, 8 (XIII, 25 Sp.) without the glosses.

² B has 'hope for' (nyôsh).

³ Assuming that nizôrînfîdanô (K) stands for nizârînfîdanô; B has zôrînfîdanô, which is synonymous with the previous nîrû-kînfîdanô, 'strengthening.'

tiveness, sovereignty, and all goodness, and the primary archangels *and* other good creations, each separately, for their own special glory¹. 16. And, afterwards, the grumbling of the evil spirit maliciously, at that vexation, thus: 'I have produced, for the annoyance² of *any* upholder of that religion of thine, 99,999 wizards, 99,999 wolf-worshippers³, and 99,999 apostates.'

17. Aûharmazd spoke to Zaratûst thus: 'Maintain this religion steadfastly, for through the assistance of this religion I, who am Aûharmazd, *will* be with thee, and the omniscient wisdom becomes thine, and extends to thy disciples, Maîdôk-mâh⁴, Parshad-gâvô⁵, Sênô⁶, Kai-Vistâsp, Frashôstar, and Gâmâsp⁷, the teacher of public observance and will to the righteous, *besides* many of the people who are diligent and even those who are idle, and their good works and praise *will* be owned by thee.' 18. Like-

¹ Or it may be 'in his own particular soul (nisman).'

² Pahl. rêshîdârîh, which B omits.

³ This term, gûrg-yazakô (=Av. vehrkayâza), does not occur in the extant Avesta.

⁴ See § 1.

⁵ Av. Parshad-gau of Yt. XIII, 96 (compare Pâz. Parsadgâ of Bd. XXIX, 5). This name can also be read Fradâdayânô and be compared with Av. Fradhidaya of Yt. XIII, 97.

⁶ Av. Saêna of Yt. XIII, 97, who is said to have 'first set forth upon this earth with a hundred disciples.' Further details about him are given in Chap. XXXIII, 5. In the third and seventh books of the Dinkard his name is written Sênôv (for Sênôk or Sênôê) which has been read Dâyn by Peshotan (Dk. pp. 308-314 of English translation), as pointed out by Darmesteter in his *Textes Pehlvis relatifs au Judaïsme*, p. 3, n. 2. In Dk. VII he is said to have been a high-priest who was born in the 100th year of the religion, and died in its 200th year.

⁷ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 68.

wise about the worldly display of the religion to Zaratûst *by* Aûharmazd, the accepting of the religion *by* Zaratûst through recitation and faith, and the reverence of the Ahunavair¹ *by* Zaratûst.

19. Also about Aûharmazd *having* created the creatures in the spiritual *existence*, and their allotment out to the worldly *existence*, the superiority of the righteous man as compared with other creatures, and, among mankind, *of* him who is relying on the provisions of the law and *its* unchangeableness from goodness, *and* who is a teacher and provider of teaching *as to* the pre-eminent existence of the good religion of the sacred beings.

20. And a summary about the bringing together of that fire which is the residue of a fire in a house, for the reverence of that water which is nearest to the dwelling, and *of* any spirit of a kinsman; and *as to him* who leaves that fire, water, and spirit, and, on account of a similar desire, reverences another fire, water, and spirit, *but* none of them can accept that ceremonial, and the acceptance of that man's ceremonial *by* the others *will have* occurred just when the *former* three are revered by him.

21. Righteousness is perfect excellence.

CHAPTER XXV.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The second fargard, Yathâ-ahû-vairyô², is about the worthiness, as to worldly and spiritual virtue, in a ruler and *in* the production of a high-

¹ See Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 7.

² The Ahunavair (see Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 7) upon which this fargard is a commentary quoting some text on the subject in § 2.

priest's efficiency; *and* they *have* been suitable for leadership and priestly authority with whom *there is* an existence of it; *also* other talent through which sovereignty and priestly authority are appropriated, and *which* the ruler *or* high-priest himself possesses.

2. 'My wish (dôsh), *O* Zaratûst! is *that* thou *be* in spiritual lordship and priestly authority, because thou art, *O* Zaratûst! provided with a spiritual lord *and* possessing priestly instruction—that is, they consider thee, too, as high-priest—*and* it is because thine is the accomplishment of rites, that thou art quite preserved when *there is* an encounter of the demons with thee—that is, a dispute of apostates with thee.' 3. It is non-possession of a ruler and high-priest, *or* non-possession of a ruler¹, *that* became the nature and law of the demons; and the maintenance of Aûharmazd *and* the archangels, as ruler and high-priest, and the dominion of Aûharmazd *are* combined with beneficence.

4. This, too, that through righteousness a priestly instructor (radô) is a ruler at will, a sage and benefactor, a cherisher and cleanser (âsnîdâr) of the poor; also the fitness for the supreme heaven (garôdmânîkîh) of all those who *are* accepting the religion which *proceeds* from Zaratûst.

5. Of righteousness the excellence is perfect.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The third fargard, Ashem-vohû², is about

¹ K omits these five words, and B has a blank space for the letters khûd in khûdâf, 'ruler.'

² See Chap. III, 1 n.

admonition as to the praising of righteousness, which is itself the production of true awe of Aûharmazd, the perfection of existences, the better state of prayers¹, and the greatest assemblage of righteousness, good breeding, humility (avöpatagîh), awe of the spiritual *existence*, extreme joyfulness, and comfort and enlightenment of soul. 2. *Also* the equipment (padmûkîh) of him who is practising as a high-priest is righteousness and the maintenance of the worship *and* obeisance for the spirit of righteousness.

3. Of righteousness perfect is the excellence.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The fourth fargard, Yênhê-hâtâm², *states that* Aûharmazd spoke to Zarâtûst the Spîtâmân thus: 'Utter the words of the ceremonial *and* obeisance *for* us who are Aûharmazd *and*³ the archangels, because they are, *O Zarâtûst!* thy ritual *for* water⁴, ritual *for* plants, ritual *for* a guardian spirit of the righteous, and ritual *for* an angel of a spiritual *existence*, or who is even appointed for a worldly *existence*.'

2. And Zarâtûst spoke thus: 'I *will* utter the words of Aûharmazd, which are opposed to harm

¹ K omits 'of prayers.'

² See Chap. IV, 1 n. The texts quoted in this fargard appear to be no longer extant.

³ B omits 'Aûharmazd *and*.'

⁴ K omits 'ritual *for* water.'

and are the ordinance of Aûharmazd, those of the ceremonial and obeisance *for* you who are arch-angels.'

3. Of righteousness perfect is the excellence.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The fifth fargard, Yântm-manô¹, is about the beneficence *and* worthiness of Zaratûst, through the virtuousness of his thoughts, words, *and* deeds²; the priority of Aûharmazd³, and the first possession of obeisance (nîyâyisnô) to him; the mindful performance of obeisance *to* the sacred beings, *and* all the merit *of* obeisance *to* the sacred beings; the excellence of receiving a righteous man, *of* bringing fire together, and *of* maintaining the good religion; the elementary (khâm) wisdom⁴ of the creator, and the consideration of every duty towards his will and creation; the outward indication as to propitious discrimination and *of what* is done *by* those who are propitious; *and* the existence of every kind *of* self-attraction *by* Zaratûst towards the religion, from first to last, through the complete reasoning thought that arose solely through obeisance *to* the sacred beings.

2. This, too, that 'thou art come to the supreme heaven (garôdmân)⁵, O righteous Zaratûst! thou

¹ See Chap. V, 1 n.

² See Pahl. Yas. XXVIII, o.

³ Ibid. 1 b.

⁴ Ibid. 1 c.

⁵ Ibid. 4 a.

art aware of the deeds, *O Zaratûst!* which *were* practised by those in the bodily existence, *and* which still they practise, and the sacred beings *have* placed upon mankind acquiring the power of good works.' 3. And about the wonderfulness of the supreme heaven *there is* this, too, that whoever is in that abode is not any one *that* passes away after *his* birth; at the time of the renovation *of the universe* the supreme heaven is lowered down to the star station¹, the earth *being* up to there, and Vohûman² is summoned for every purpose to the conference, and, when they call him, Mitrô's³ investigation as regards the existence of righteousness is on the spot; through the coming of that archangel⁴ of true statements for assistance, and through the co-operation of the *other* archangels and Srôsh² the righteous, is the overpowering of the vexing of distressers⁵; and the assistance of the archangels for Zaratûst *was* when he went forth for disabling the vicious law of Irân. 4. Concerning Zaratûst *there is* this, too, in the words of Aûharmazd, that is: 'Thou art our own, *O Zaratûst!* and this liberality *to* thee is ours; anything *one* gives to thee is given by him *to* us;' *also* the announcement to Zaratûst, *and* the bringing *of him to* Vistâsp⁶ for his assistance and likewise the strength⁷ of his sovereignty for him.

¹ The lowest grade of heaven (see Sls. VI, 3 n).

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3 for both angels.

³ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XLIV, 16.

⁴ Vohûman.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. XXVIII, 6 c.

⁶ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XI, 1; and compare Pahl. Yas. XXVIII, 6 b, 7 b, c.

⁷ So in K, but B has '*also* his announcement on *being* brought *to* Vistâsp, and Zaratûst *was* an assistance to him *and* the strength, &c.'

5. The discipleship and veneration of Frashôstar¹ also, and the laudation of Frashôstar for making the religion progressive and *for its* true transmission in the words of Aûharmazd; also the whole righteousness of those whom Frashôstar attracted to the religion.

6. About the laudation of Zaratûst *there is* this, too, that is: '*Thou art* not astray *from* us, neither in life, nor in enquiry, nor *in* openly announcing, even when demonstrating² the religion to others, nor in anything whatever, *O* Spîtâmân! *from* us who are archangels; and the donation of benefit to suppliants is the food, and the clothing for us, who are in the ceremonial *of* the sacred beings, is unworn (asûdakö)³.'

7. About guarding a friend, managing an unfriendly *person*, and affording a person shelter for the sake of protection, justice, and rectitude⁴; also the unworthy condition of that man who, requiring to perform those duties and good works that are important, shall perform those that are trivial. 8. And this, too, that is: '*Thou art* likewise aware, *and* thou also understandest it, *O* righteous Zaratûst! through the sagacity of my wisdom, which was the first among existences⁵, and which is also so unto the last existence.'

9. Righteousness is excellence *that is* perfect.

¹ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 68, and compare Pahl. Yas. XXVIII, 8 b, c.

² K has 'when thou wouldst demonstrate.'

³ See Pahl. Yas. XXVIII, 10 c.

⁴ Ibid. 11 a.

⁵ Ibid. 11 c.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The sixth fargard, Khshmaibyâ¹, is about the complaint of Gôš-aûrvan² to Aûharmazd, when she sat at the creation in the assembly of the arch-angels, as regards the abundant disease and misery which she saw spiritually *would* come upon her in a bodily existence, through beating, slaughtering, *and* wounding, stealing, plundering, and presenting, *by* him of vicious actions *and* worse desires, as a bribe to him who is an evil-ruling villain (mar), and the operation thereof: the bad ownership, wrongful investigation, false evidence, and making captive (vardakô), *by* him who is wrathful *and* oppressive through greed and envy, from the warm cowshed *and* the effective *and* diligent guardianship of the herd's dog (pasûs-haûrvô), to that which is a cold *and* hastily-constructed place; *or by* him who is seeking meat *with* a merciless hand through making *her* distantly separated from *her* young. 2. Also *their* explanation and extenuation (kâstanô)³, and the causing of misery of many kinds thereby, 'which is no affliction to them when the wind that is cold⁴, *or* even that which is hot, comes upon me; *which* is no affliction to them when, the *untimely offspring of*

¹ See Chap. VI, 1 n; it is here written khshmaîbâ (B) and khshmaîbê (K) in Pahlavi.

² See Chap. XV, 3; Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 1.

³ Or it may be 'fining and beating,' as K has kûstanô.

⁴ B has 'when *some* of that *which* is cold,' writing aîtô for vâdô in this first clause, and amat min for amatam in the first and third clauses.

my womb *being* cast away, they slaughter me; and is no affliction to them when the serpent, the leech (khun-garât)¹, *or* even the foulest of noxious creatures gnaws me.' 3. And the petition of Gôṣ-aûrvan *was* thus: 'Do not appoint me to a worldly *existence* and that awful misery, *or*, if thou appointest me to a worldly *existence*, produce it for me without life (aû-zûstânîhâ), so that I *may* be without feeling and *may* want that distressing² pain; *it is* created for the mighty, through whose assistance there is a capability of affording protection *to* me, even though the Kai and Karap³ exist.'

4. And, *together* with the just complaint of Gôṣ-aûrvan, and the compassion of the archangels as to that complaint, *there is* then the creation of the creatures, among whom the greatest and best⁴ is mankind, for fighting *and* subduing the destroyer, even though joined together with a complaint of wounding and affliction like *that of* Gôṣ-aûrvan, *and* Gôṣ-aûrvan arose with greater judiciousness than an absence of creation even with freedom from disturbance by the Kats⁵; on account of the necessity of preparing *for* the living of mankind through the assistance of cattle, Gôṣ-aûrvan *was* produced for the material bodily existence and assistance of mankind. 5. And, on account of little feeling for her worldly misery, the breeding (mâyînl'danö) of cattle *was* the arraying

¹ Doubtful.

² K has 'ill-passing.'

³ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXV, 13 n.

⁴ B has 'of whom the best.'

⁵ The obnoxious tribe, or class, mentioned in § 3. After the word 'affliction' K completes the clause to this point as follows:—'just as Gôṣ-aûrvan arose with greater judiciousness than an absence of creation even with an adversity of the primitive tendency.'

of strife; the advancement of the *Mazda*-worshipping religion of Zaratûst in the world *by* Gôš-aûrvan, on the production of Zaratûst for the assistance of cattle; *and* the preservation of cattle and other good creations through complete satisfaction *at* the progress *of* the religion.

6. This, too, *was* said to Gôš-aûrvan, that is: 'I assert unto thee the passing away of devastation, that is, the existence of a remedy *for* the misery owing to the evil spirit¹, *for* which no creature would be produced by me—me who am Aûharmazd—when a remedy *for* the misery owing to him had not been known to me.' 7. This, too, that the wish of the evil spirit was thus: 'Thou shouldst never produce a creature, *O* Aûharmazd! and *there* should be here no spiritual lordship, no priestly authority, and no desire for perfect righteousness, *or* necessity for duty and good works.' 8. The enquiry of Gôš-aûrvan, thus: 'For whom am I appointed and formed?'² and the reply to her, thus: 'For him who is diligent *and* moderate'³.

9. Also the friend and nourishment (srâyisnô) begged for cattle *by* Gôš-aûrvan, the righteous man produced for the assistance of cattle *by* Aûharmazd, and the sweetness in water and plants for the nourishment of cattle, so that he is privileged to feed *and* keep cattle who gives them pasture *in* reality, and is also diligent *in* the production of cattle, that is, he gives them pasture, and is thereby proclaimed a cattle-guardian (pasûs-haûrvô) for them who makes the cattle fully develope⁴; and also

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 6 a.

³ Ibid. 6 c.

² Ibid. 1 a.

⁴ Ibid. 2 b.

he who gives the wicked Wrath, the foreigner, a beating, so that he may make *him* stupefied¹.
 10. The development of cattle *by* Aûharmazd, advice to mankind as to moderate eating², and the grievous bridge *judgment* of him who *has* unlawfully produced distress *for* the cattle whom Gôš-aûrvan is kindly regarding, with loving eyes³, in the spiritual *existence*, in bodily contact with (ham-kerpôš) the arch-angels and in bodily contact with the light of the sun, so that *her* hands are more powerful; she who replies to the sacred beings, and the sacred beings reply to her⁴.

11. About the statements of Aûharmazd *there is* this, too, that is: 'I am a calculator of those words⁵ by which they assert *that* the existence of worldly beings is for the sake of that of both existences; I am aware *of* the actions which are practised by those in the material existence, *both* demons and men; of whatever they practise⁶ I am the decider *and* lord, and it is such as my will *requires*⁷, even for the last change of existence; and I look upon all that with that wisdom and sagacity of mine which was, which is, and which ever *will* be.'

12. The formation of a reward for worldly beings *by* Aûharmazd, through the propitious liturgy (mânsarspend)⁸ which has become the precursor of the beneficers; that is, their high-priest, who *has*

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 2 c.

² Ibid. 7 b.

³ Pahl. kâmakô-dôîsar = Av. vouru-dôithra, an epithet of Râta, 'liberality' (see Chap. XXIV, 3), and Saoka, 'prosperity;' but here applied to Gôš-aûrvan.

⁴ Some words in § 10 occur also in Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 3.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 4 a.

⁶ Ibid. 4 b.

⁷ Ibid. 4 c.

⁸ Ibid. 7 a.

a propitiousness and intelligence that are all-beneficial, is he *with* the liturgy. 13. And about the uniqueness and incomparableness of Zaratûst among mankind, through *his* desire for righteousness and *his* understanding the means of defeating the destroyer¹ and teaching the creatures.

14. Righteousness is perfect excellence.

CHAPTER XXX.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The seventh fargard, *Ad-tâ-vakhshyâ*², is regarding the maintenance of the worship and obeisance of the religion and the spirit of the liturgy; and this, too, that the spirit of the ceremonial of him who is a right-thinking, intelligent, and wise³ man is quickly mixed up with the light of the sun, and connected with the accomplishment of the wishes and the joy of the archangels.

2. About the choice of will *by* mankind, and the existence of a way to reward through *their* decision.

3. About advice to mankind as to seeking that position in which it is possible to remain long with fondness, and *as to* reciting and teaching⁴ the revelation of the sacred beings.

4. And, from the statement of Zaratûst, about the shouting of the demon Aresh⁵ to mankind, *thus*:

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 8 c.

² See Chap. VII, 1 n; it is here written at-tâg-vakhshê in Pahlavi in both MSS.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 1 a, c.

⁴ Ibid. 2 c.

⁵ See Chap. XXXI, 6; the demon of envy, or malice, called Arêshk, or Arashk, in Bd. XV, 18, XXVIII, 16.

'Aûharmazd and Aharman have been two brothers in one womb¹, and out of them the archangel² liked that which is evil³, through what *occurs* when the understanders of it *have* mentioned the worship of the demons and this, that, after it, you *should* present cattle to the planetary *bodies and* the demons.'

5. About the falsity of the demon Aresh, the separate origin of light and darkness, the goodness of the material *existence* of light for determining *what* is done, and the evil of that of darkness.

6. The grumbling of the evil spirit thus: 'I am he whose thoughts *are* evil, O beneficent spirit! he whose words *are* evil, and he whose deeds *are* evil⁴; what is dark is my garment which is very thick, with lower corners where, so far as many go, *it is still* darker⁵; evil thoughts, evil words, and evil deeds are my food, and I love those *of* them who are in *that place* through evil thoughts, evil words, and evil deeds.' 7. And the speaking of Aûharmazd thus: 'I am he whose thoughts *are* good, O evil spirit! he whose words *are* good, and he whose deeds *are* good⁶; the sky is my garment, which *was* first produced from that substance of the worldly *existences* which is created as the stone above all stones⁷, that is, every jewel is set in it; good thoughts, good words, and good deeds are my food, and I love those *of* them who are in *that place*

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 3 a. This materialization of the Gâthic text, here reported as the utterance of a malicious demon, corresponds very closely with the statement of the Armenian Eznik quoted in Haug's Essays, p. 13.

² That is, the arch-demon who was archangel of the demons.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 5 a. ⁴ Ibid. 3 b. ⁵ Referring to hell.

⁶ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 3 b.

⁷ Ibid. 5 b.

through good thoughts, good words, *and* good deeds.'

8. This, too, that true discrimination is not for them, the demons¹ astute in evil; and they never truly discriminate whose will is that of Akôman².

9. And about the sickening (*vîmârinîdanö*) of the patron spirits of mankind, *by* the demons³, through the deceit of man towards man owing to the deceit of the demons; and the approach of mankind to evil proceedings *on the part* of the spiritual lordship, through those patron spirits⁴.

10. Also the sending of monarchy and the wisdom of religion, *by* Aûharmazd, for the preservation of the creatures; the recurrence of the mission⁵ whereby *there are* injury and affliction for the demons and sovereignty again for Aûharmazd, and they possess the reward of Vohûman⁶ and *what* is required *by* the sacred beings; and the predominance of man over demon, in the end, the good over the evil, and the righteous over the wicked; also about the nature of those *who* are producing the renovation of the universe. 11. This, too, that is a declaration: 'They are those, O Zaratûst the Spîtâ-mân! who shall produce the renovation, they have escaped (*girekhtö*) among the existences, they are

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 6 a.

² Evil thought (see Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3).

³ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 6 c.

⁴ The ahû, or patron spirit, having become diseased and incapable of true ahvôîh, or spiritual lordship, through the action of the demons.

⁵ Reading lakhvar petamî-hastanö (or petam gâstanö) which probably refers to the later missions of Aûshêdar, Aûshêdar-mâh, and Sôshâns (see Bk. VIII, Chap. XIV, 12-14).

⁶ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 8 b.

vigilant¹ in seeking righteousness, and gentle-voiced; and, as regards righteousness in thought, they convert into righteousness anything virtuous which *belongs* to them.' 12. About the statement of *those* praised it is recited that it is thus mentioned in the Gâthas: 'So we are with *those* who are thine—that is, we are thine own—by us this renovation is to be produced in the existences².' 13. About the perpetual convocation *held by* the archangel regarding the production of the future existence³.

14. This, too, that *he* is an extender of the days of those who defeat the army of the fiend⁴ and clothe themselves *with* deeds of shining light, and also those of a virtuous body, who are these: the priest, the warrior, the husbandman, and the man who is a ruler; with whom are Aharisvang⁵ and the spirit of liberality (râdîh)⁶; they meditate with good thoughts (hû-mînisnîh)⁷ and joy, and, with pleasure to themselves, they give the world into the guardianship of Aûharmazd, and also of Ashavahist⁸, when they possess the religion of Aûharmazd as a ruler. 15. This, too, that *he*, whose thoughts are through a high-priest who possesses a patron spirit, always thinks that which is virtuous, *and* his sagacity increases⁹.

16. And about advice to mankind as to three things, through which the renovation and happy progress of the creatures arise, *namely*, seeking the

¹ Pahl. zên-hâvand=Av. zaênangha.

² See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 9 a. ³ Ibid. 9 b. ⁴ Ibid. 10 a.

⁵ The female angel of perfect rectitude (see Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3).

⁶ See Chap. XXIV, 3. ⁷ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 10 b.

⁸ Ibid. 10 c and Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVII, 14.

⁹ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 9 c.

true religion, abstaining from injuring the creatures, *and* striving for the benefit of mankind.

17. The excellence *of* righteousness is perfect.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The eighth fargard, Tâ-ve-urvâtâ¹, is about advice as to reciting² the revelation, the information therefrom for the faithful, about which *they have* to report to the unfaithful, by mentioning conspicuous specimens *and* explanatory knowledge, and *by* thinking *of* anything whatever which *they have* to accept, *or* even which *they have* not to accept³; *also*, for *one* called *to* the religion, the advantage owing to the attraction of mankind to the numerous actual discipleship of the religion, and the increasing greatness materially, and further reward spiritually, owing to the numerous discipleship; and the progress of the religion of Aûharmazd even among the irreligious (adênôân)⁴ and actual apostates⁵.

2. This, too, that the life of the creatures of Aûharmazd and also all other benefit are owing to Aûharmazd⁶ and the inclination (kâmvarîkakö) of Aûharmazd thereto; moreover, reward and recompense come from Aûharmazd. 3. And the creatures of Aharman proceed from Aharman, all misery is owing to Aharman, and Aharman becomes worse and more oppressive and a further producer of misery when they worship him.

¹ See Chap. VIII, 1 n; it is here written tâg-va-ratö in Pahlavi in both MSS.

² See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 1 a.

³ B omits these last eight words.

⁴ K has akdênôân, 'infidels.'

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 1 c.

⁶ Ibid. 2 c.

6. About the shouting of the demon Aresh⁷ to

⁷ The demon of envy, as in Chap. XXX, 4. The occurrence of his dialogue with Zarātūst in this place explains the word **𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬀** which is found twice in Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 5 b, and has been read *hû-vârh*, 'good judgment,' or *hû-vaharh*, 'good fortune.' In the MSS. called Pt₄ and Mf₄, in Geldner's edition of the Avesta, this Pahlavi word is both times separated into two thus: **𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬀** which may be read *avð Aresh*, 'to Aresh,' and the whole

Zaratûst and the reply of Zaratûst as to the advice of Aûharmazd and whatever is on the same subject, just as revelation (dênô) states it, that the demon Aresh spoke to him thus : ' Then the Franâmam ¹, *O Zaratûst ! is applicable to the assembly of demons who sit in the same place three nights and four days on account of thee.*' 7. Zaratûst enquired of him thus : '*O Aresh, thou most deceitful to me ! what recompense would there be for it to me, if I should worship you in words ?*' 8. And Aresh, the most deceitful of demons, spoke to him thus : '*Thou wouldst become predominant among mankind, through producing at will among the existences just as is requisite for thyself ; and thou wouldst become immortal, O Sptâmân !*' 9. Zaratûst also enquired of him thus : '*O Aresh, most deceitful of demons ! as to the people by whom you are worshipped, whether for the birth of a son, or even for a concubine sought for enjoyment, so that the favour is considered by them as your property, how can any one of them be immortal ?*' 10. And Aresh, the most deceitful of demons, *could* not tell him who *had* the more intelligence. 11. *So* Zaratûst spoke thus : ' I am *for* that *being* and I like him, that is, I am his

§ 5 b may be translated as follows :—' The gift of understanding through Good Thought is that *which* thou shouldst give unto me (that is, that wisdom thou shouldst proclaim to me as virtuousness), which is *to* me (through what *pertains* to it) that which is for Aresh (that is, through that wisdom which is virtuousness it shall become possible for me to give a reply to Aresh).' The reply here mentioned appears to be that given in § 11 of our text ; and the name Aresh explains the word *ereshi* in the original Avesta text as meaning 'envy' and being equivalent to *araska*.

¹ The *Mazda*-worshipper's profession of faith, beginning with the word Av. *fravarânê* (Yas. I, 23)=Pahl. *franâmam*.

own and would transact his affairs, and I *will* recite the law and the benedictions of the sagacious Aûharmazd, the gratifier of desires.'

12. About the deliverance of all creatures through the liturgy ¹, and, so long as it is continued by them, *it is* for the power through which the immortality of the separate creations is prepared in the renovation *of the universe*; the increase *of* the good creatures through the complete continuance *of* the liturgy, *and* the existence of purity and development of goodness in the world when he who is a good ruler arrives.

13. The arising of the spiritual creation, the first thought of Aûharmazd; *and, as to* the creatures of Aûharmazd, first the spiritual achievement, and then the material formation and the mingling of spirit with matter; [the advancement of the creatures thereby, through his wisdom *and* the righteousness of Vohûman being lodged ² in the creatures,] and all good creatures being goaded (zakhamt-hastanô) thereby into purity and joyfulness. 14. This, too, that a complete understanding of things arises through Vohûman having made a home in *one's* reason (vârôm).

15. About the great reward of him who shall produce benefit for cattle ³; also the deceitfully and seductively assuming of religion and colouring of thought, talking of righteousness and adopting evil practices, through the recitation of righteousness even hypocritically (davânsîhâ-kê); *and* an instance *of* the reward of an undutiful (avar'zîdâr) apos-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 6 b.

² Ibid. 6 c. The passage in brackets occurs only in K.

³ Ibid. 10 a, b.

tate¹. 16. About the work of the creator; *and*, for the completion thereof, the most eminent is understood *to be* when the world *and* religion *were* formed² by him, when life *was* given by him to those possessing bodies³, and ⁴ he provides instruction and employment⁵ for it, and when spiritual life (h û kō)⁶ *was* given by him to the wishful *man*, so that he may more *fully* appropriate a share of the worldly and spiritual *existences*.

17. *He* who makes complete mindfulness⁷ lodge in *his* body consults complete mindfulness, and⁸, through the much investigation of *his* spiritual life (ah vō) and mind into the attraction of both spirits—that which is good and also *that* which is evil—each separately for its own appliances, and *into* the duties of the religion of Aûharmazd, is explaining the inefficiency of mankind, as regards the dissipation of their sin, because Aûharmazd is aware of all they practise, that which is public and that, too, which is concealed⁹. 18. The great reward of him who is liberal of gifts (dâsar) from his own property to a

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 10 c. ² Ibid. 11 a. ³ Ibid. 11 b.

⁴ So originally in B, but altered into 'when,' by the repairer of the MS., so as to agree with K.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 11 c.

⁶ B has kâmak, 'desire,' with 'the wishful' in the plural, and this might agree better with Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 11 c, but not with the next clause in the sentence here, where both nominative and verb are in the singular.

⁷ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 12 c. This term is the Pahl. equivalent of Av. ârmaiti which is usually personified as the female archangel Spendarmad.

⁸ The MS. K is left unfinished at this point, merely adding the words expressed by 'into the attraction of,' in this translation. For the remainder of Bk. IX the only known MS. authority is B.

⁹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 13 a.

righteous man¹; and this, too, that whoever gives him who is wicked² a gift, for the sake of improper expectations, assists darkness and not light.

19. This, too, that the worst ruler is he of evil religion *and* evil deeds, who even for a bribe³ would not occasion happiness; he who is a destroyer of an innocent *man*; also the grievous state of punishment *of* that person, in hell, who shall make that wicked *one* a ruler⁴. 20. And advice to mankind as to providing a judge and guardian over every dwelling, the probation of a man for appointment *to* that important duty, *and* the development of all creations *in* the world when its ruler is sagacious⁵.

21. Also causing the disturbance (*va-siklīnt-danō*) of the evil spirit for satisfying a man who is rightly thinking, rightly speaking, *and* rightly acting; the opposition *to* a righteous *man of* a wicked *one belonging to* the evil spirit, who is an evil-reciting *and* improperly-disputing apostate; the enticement (*lūsīnt-danō*) of mankind to devious *ways* (*âvârtîhâ*), *by* an apostate, *being* more than that which attracts to the true way for a righteous *man*; and afterwards also, in the end, the defeat *of* the army of the fiend *by him* who is beneficial *to* mankind. 22. Advice to mankind about abstaining from the suite of him who is an apostate, not hearing and not solemnizing the Avesta and Zand of the sacred beings from him⁶; also the evil behaviour (*dûs-barisnîh*), slander, strife, death, and fear in the world owing to apostates⁷. 23. Advice to upholders of the religion about the means of thoroughly understanding apos-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 14 b.

² Ibid. 14 c.

³ Ibid. 15 b.

⁴ Ibid. 15 a.

⁵ Ibid. 16 a.

⁶ Ibid. 18 a.

⁷ Ibid. 18 b.

tates, and preparing *and* keeping a weapon for them¹, so that he who is authorised *and* fearless *may be* more eager for truthful speaking; *and*, when the religion of Aûharmazd is liked by him, his truthful speaking and other righteousness have then allured (kâmakînidö)².

24. Also *what* happens in the three *nights*³, for the assistance and preservation of the righteous, through *what* is accomplished *by* the propitious fire⁴; and the progress of his lamentation who deceives and vexes a righteous man⁵, *and* is leading the wicked *by* their own befitting deeds to hell⁶. 25. This, too, that the complete worthiness which *exists* in Khûrdad and Amûrdad⁷ arises *in* him who maintains the prerogative which is his⁸ through virtuousness, who must become such a friend of whatever is his own spirit, through *his* actions⁹, as the creator is *of* his own creatures. 26. This, too, that whatever is thus in the world is perfect, when every one thinks, speaks, *and* shall act just like his spiritual lord *and* high-priest¹⁰; so that a good ruler is he with whom virtuous speaking arises, as well as proper action¹¹. 27. *And* this, too, that the lodgment of Aûharmazd in the worldly *existence* is most in the person of that ruler¹², and that lodgment in him is manifest.

28. The excellence *of* righteousness is perfect.

¹ Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 18 c.

² Ibid. 19 b.

³ After death.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 19 c and Chap. XII, 4.

⁵ Ibid. 20 a.

⁶ Ibid. 20 c.

⁷ Ibid. 21 a and Chap. XIX, 1.

⁸ Ibid. 21 b.

⁹ Ibid. 21 c.

¹⁰ Ibid. 22 a.

¹¹ Ibid. 22 b.

¹² Ibid. 22 c.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The ninth fargard, *Hvaêtumaiti*¹, is about the coming of three deceitful demons, and *their* making supplication (lâgak-karîh) to Aûharmazd², so that he should consider and reward those aggrieved by him, and it would amount to strength for them in destroying the creatures. 2. The disgorging (akhvârdanô) of supplication *by* those demons clamorously upwards from an abyss, *and* the statement of one that *he is*³ the kindred that is undeceitful, of *another* one that *he is* the serfdom that is undeceitful, *and* of *the third* one that he is the confederacy that is undeceitful, *was* in these words, namely: 'We are those spirits when the kinsman, confederate, and serf⁴ do not break promises, one with the other; we are not really these that are no implements of thine, *but* our religion *and* law are thine, and we do thy will; we become assistants of *him* who is thy friend, and injurers of *him* who is thy enemy⁴; *and* from thee we beg a position in the existence that is best, the reward that is a reward of the worthy.'

3. The reply of Aûharmazd to them *was* thus: 'You rush out, astute in evil, to the extremity (bûn) of that horrible gloom⁵; so you are all from the demon, your race is really from Evil Thought, that

¹ See Chap. IX, 1 n.

² See Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 1 a.

³ Literally 'I am.'

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 1 c.

⁵ Compare Pahl. Vend. XIX, 147.

is, your race is from there where Evil Thought ¹, as well as Lust the destroyer and also Greed the well-accumulating, *resides*, and *where*, moreover, Îndar the fighter is the spirit of the religion of apostasy and further deceives the worldly *existence* of mankind, as to proper living and immortal progress ², and first confines their thoughts. 4. He shall first do this, so that he *may* restrain the thoughts of men from virtuous things ³, and their further words and perverted further deeds from the ceremonial of us who are archangels; they further lose *their* wisdom ⁴, and further consider even as perfect righteousness that which is loved *by* the demons; they utter the false words and consecrate with the worse deeds of mankind; *and* with the holy-water which *one* consecrates most *to* you, more falsely *and* more arrogantly ⁵ than that falsity and arrogance, do they enhance the greatest ceremonial, so that they shall make more of the most. 5. Owing to discord, through that love of you who are demons, they smite with destruction *him* who shall not be a satisfaction to you in the presidency; *and* the leader they take (girênd) becomes a destroyer, so in the sequel, too, there is *some one* that smites *him*; even though they

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 3 a. For the demons here mentioned, Akômanô, Varenô, and Âzô, see Bk. VIII, Chaps. IX, 3, XXXI, 44; Îndar is the same as Andar (in Chap. IX, 1), the arch-demon who perverts from virtue and despises the sacred shirt and girdle (Bd. I, 27, XXVIII, 8). With reference to the good old schism-hypothesis, that identified the Av. daêva Indra, or Andra, with the Sans. deva Indra, it is worthy of note that he is here represented as the pervading spirit of an apostate religion, and is termed the kûshîdâr, 'fighter, slayer.'

² See Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 5 a.

³ See Bd. XXVIII, 8.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 4 c.

⁵ Ibid. 3 b.

consider *him* as your follower, they shall occasion *his* destruction. 6. You are evil demons for a congregation when they speak of avoiding you, and worse for the ceremonial, *or* obeisance, when it occurs; that which becomes all clearness *to* the utterer of righteousness, in *this* existence, you utterly destroy; *and* the lodgment of complete mindfulness in the body is for admonition to human beings about abstaining from the demons.'

7. This, too, *is stated*, namely: 'Evil *are* you *who* are wicked *and* worship the demons with good holy-water *and* with words; through them the holy-water obtains evil recompense, even the hell that is horrible.' 8. This, too, *he spoke*, namely: 'Concerning those malicious demons¹ I *will* first mention intelligibly to thee when they have come to the world, that is, first when they have rushed in, how their jurisdiction arose. 9. *For* thirty centuries² those of my world were immortal *and* undecaying, O Zarātūst! *but* when the thirtieth century was accomplished³, O Spītāmān! the sweat (khvâe) produced by the demons then came on to my Gâyômarđ⁴, for his affliction, so long a time as a man speaks forth these words *of* the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô⁵, relating to the spiritual lord and priestly master. 10. And when he issued from that sweat he was shadowless, that is, darkness had entered⁶; and the words of the formula (âyīn) relating to the spiritual lord and priestly master *were* spoken forth by me, and when

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 7 a, 8 a.

² See Bd. I, 20, 21. But from § 10 it appears more probable that these are the three millenniums mentioned in Bd. I, 8.

³ Bd. III, 3.

⁴ Ibid. 19.

⁵ See Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 7 n.

⁶ Bd. III, 20.

vâstârem¹ was uttered by me the demons then fell² into the gloom.'

11. About the harm owing to the demons this, too, *he spoke*, namely: 'The destructiveness *of* the evil spirit is *his* evil teaching *by* statements³ *to* my creatures; and my riches (istö) plundered by him are the proportion of the production *and* possession of wealth *for* which a desire exists through Good Thought; that is, when they possess *it* with propriety *it is* desirable⁴. 12. And mankind *were* gratified by that son of Vîvanghau who *was* Yim⁵, and cattle *were* gratified by him, producing thus *the phrase* "you are mankind" in words, *O Zaratûst!* when he spoke to mankind thus: "You are the mankind for cattle, that is, you *who* are mankind eat meat of your own subdivision, and through subdivision by you there is a superabundant occurrence of meat⁶; you are mankind, neither for Greed (âzö), nor for Envy (arêshkö)⁷, do thou throw away the warm entrails (taftôg rûdik), nor do thou throw *them* away warm on account of custom (pîsakö), now you slay for slaughtering, so that thus *it may be* beneficial for you and your servant."'

13. This, too, *is stated*, namely: 'Even that man

¹ The last word of the formula. In Bd. I, 21, 22 this utterance seems to be placed before the attack upon Gâyômarz, but until the complete text of the Irânian Bundahis has been examined, some doubt as to the exact sequence of its statements may be entertained.

² Pahl. zîflûnîd, for yîflûnîd, formed from the aorist of Ch. 𐬵𐬀𐬎𐬎𐬀; instead of the usual neflûnast, formed from the preterit.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 9 a.

⁴ Ibid. 9 b. Instead of avôrdö, 'plundered,' B has the mis-writing spôrdö, 'consigned.'

⁵ Ibid. 8 a and Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 6.

⁶ Ibid. 8 b.

⁷ Alluding, perhaps, to the legend detailed in Bd. XV, 18, 19.

is produced for the destruction of mine¹, who is possessed *by* the wicked evil spirit; the want of discernment of that man is a tedious life, in which the utterance of the praise of righteousness is the want of ceremonial of which a righteous man spoke *thus*: "At *the place* where their pasture is you are the mankind, the all-producer that fully develops *them*, and the all-collector that would thoroughly set *them* moving; in their pasture you are the mankind, and they all remain²; with hospitality *for* the body they remain on account of their pasture, and in fighting they strike *their* heads together; you are the mankind of their pasture, it is expedient and you deprive *it* of moisture³ through fire; as to other things, it was also you that made one altogether believe that untrue statement which is a lie—the possession of material *existence by* life—owing to external seduction by the fiend who has come chiefly to you."

14. About the harm owing to the demons this, too, *is stated*, namely: 'Their accomplishment of arrogance over these creatures of mine, and also the unfitness for heaven (avahistih-ik) of a righteous man, and that, too, of a valiant *one*, are *due to* the burial of a corpse.' 15. This, too, namely: 'They who drag away a corpse⁴ are most hurtful for men, as regards the wealth of the religion in this world, and as regards sheep and beasts of *burden*.' 16. This, too, namely: '*As to* the people, assisted *by*

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 10 a.

² Or, perhaps, 'and they remain astonished,' (va-s/pō mânēnd).

³ Pahl. vīyāvânînd which, with vâstar, 'pasture,' occurs in Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 10 c.

⁴ They who carry a corpse alone, like the iristô-kasha of Vend. III, 15.

one living *in* terrible difficulty, who deliver the corpse of a dead *person*, on a sheep or beast of burden, at a village where they shall convey *it*, they distress the fire and also the water flowing *from* the hills¹, likewise those liquids of the body which are ten², and those saps (aêvanö) of *plants* which are fourfold in thousands, that is, they come out a thousand at one time.'

17. 'They are giving more assistance when³ *it is* the corpse of a wicked *person*; concerning them, too, I tell thee, O Zaratûst the Spîtâmân! that they *shall* arrive in the ninth and tenth centuries⁴ who are the spawn of the fiend (drûgô hûnôyâkô) and the cesspool (rîkhdâr) of the evil spirit; even one of them is more to be destroyed than ten idolators (dêviyastô) *by* him they shall make pure, that is, *the people* shall make him quite void of wealth who is a priest without recitation *and* commendation. 18. And they, who *will be* full

¹ Pahl. gêrân-tagisnô = Av. hebvainti in Yas. XXXVIII, 3 and Av. thraotô-stâd in Yas. LXVIII, 6, &c. It is the second species of liquid in Bd. XXI, 1.

² Only nine are mentioned in Bd. XXI, 1, namely: semen, urine, sweat, skin-fluid, tears, blood, oil, saliva, and milk.

³ Assuming that mûn stands for amat as in Bk. VIII, Chap. XXI, 10.

⁴ If these centuries are dated from 'the coming of the religion,' according to the incorrect Arabian chronology of the Bundahis, they extended from A.D. 393 or 435 to 593 or 635 (see Byt. III, 11 n). In the ninth century lived king Yazdakard (A.D. 399-420), surnamed 'the sinner' by the priesthood because he tolerated other religions, and the heretic Mazdak who was put to death in A.D. 528. In the tenth century the Muhammadan religion arose, and the Sasanian dynasty tottered to its fall. If it were not for the manifest errors in the Bundahis chronology, this passage in our text might be important for fixing the age of the Pahlavi version of this Nask.

many *in* the future, shall bring prostration upon him who is an innocent person, the husbandman who watches the frog of the ditch (*zak-ī gīlūgō vazagh*) so that he *may* keep *it* away from mankind; and they execute ill-contrived commands. 19. They also produce destruction for these of mine, *and* speak of the living state, to these of my religion, thus: "When living is an expediency *it is* in our way;" they are wicked, they dwindle through greatness and even terror, that is, they shall commit sin through leadership and vassalage¹ who are smiting thee, and they speak folly who are smiting this pure religion of thine, *O Sptāmān!*'

20. 'They, too, who recite this thy revelation of the Mazda-worshippers, say *that* the distinction (*ntsōn*) of those *others* from those *who are* thine, even those whom they hurt, is this, that they plunder, they *also* think scornfully *of* this thy ceremonial, and think scornfully *of* the obeisances (*ntyāyisnō*) and *of* both those blessings from me, the Avesta and Zand which I, who am the most propitious of spirits, spoke forth to thee. 21. They also injure the ceremonial of him who is perfectly righteous², even the obeisance arisen from a disciple of Zaratūst the Sptāmān; *and* they chant that which is a settled effusion (*barā-hankhetūntō rêgīh*) that is very evil, *as* a perfect deed for mankind³, which those of very evil deeds call joy⁴.'

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 11 a.

² Ibid. 11 c.

³ Ibid. 12 a, which has corrupted *rêgīh* into *rêsh*; the former, corresponding better with the original Av. *raunghayen*, can be compared with Pers. *rīhīdan*, *rêzīdan*; or it might mean 'imposture,' compare Pers. *rīgan*.

⁴ Ibid. 12 b.

22. 'They seek sovereignty as a devouring (grehmakö), that is, they seek privilege for a bribe, and in their abode is he who is very evil in thought, that is, they seek with this design, that, *for* the hundred which another gives up, they *may* take two hundred away *from* the other¹; they destroy the best existence², they destroy their own souls, *and* they destroy the world of material beings.

23. Then they who are privileged shall convey that sovereignty *of* the Kik and Karap³, even those that are the worst-ruling who are in the country, unto him who is best-ruling in house, village, community, *and* province; *and* then both shall keep up an uproar, he who is well-ruling and also he who is ill-ruling, and he who is ill-ruling is beaten, and he is delivered up to the best-ruling ruler. 24. *And* then, among them, *he* who seeks for a devouring (grehmakö) of all that which is animate, as well as that which is inanimate, is *he* who is desirous of assault *and* complaint; *and he* who fears him who is a righteous man of mine allots *him* comfort, and is *he* who watches those who are an exposition of righteousness⁴, and who would be wizards *or* witches, so that *the authorities* shall inflict punishment *upon* them.'

25. And this, too, *is stated*, namely: 'The malice of many malicious *ones* demands that they shall inflict punishment *on* sinners⁵ when they put (padmûgênd) life into the body, that is, they give life

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 13 a; the exact meaning of greh makö (Av. gerehma) is uncertain, and the last verb is literally 'I may take.'

² Ibid. 13 b.

³ Ibid. 14 a, 15 a, and Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXV, 13 n.

⁴ Ibid. 13 c.

⁵ Ibid. 16 c.

back to the body; but *for* that purpose the metal, melted forth, arises full upon the earth, which does not wreak vengeance *on* him who is righteous, and does wreak vengeance *on* him who is wicked, *when* I, who am Aûharmazd, produce the renovation among the existences¹. 26. Thus, too, that *which* becomes a healthful world—a healthful one that is thus mine—never first becomes that further sick *one* which, apart from me, is even now the immortal *and* manifest place *where* vengeance exists²; and they become also aware, through that sovereignty of mine, that, apart from me, even now immortal is the material world of righteousness.’

27. Excellence *that is* perfect is righteousness.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The tenth fargard, Yathâis³, is about the renovation *of the universe* in the words of Aûharmazd to Zaratûst, thus: ‘I *have* produced the effector of the renovation, the causer of righteousness, Sôshâns, *of* whom mankind say that he does not come; and *yet* he *will* come, for the righteous, with that glory *which* becomes all-brilliance.’

2. About the scrutiny and consideration for moderation in a high-priest’s performance *of* every

¹ At the resurrection all men are said to be purified in melted metal which hurts only those who have been wicked (see Bd. XXX, 19, 20).

² That is, the earth never becomes hell.

³ See Chap. X, 1 n; it is here written yasââfs in Pahlavi.

duty *there* is this, too, that the desire of that non-assailant, who is a producer of benefit among kinsmen, among confederates, *and* among serfs¹, as regards anything whatever, is accomplishing the will, and is a friend, of Aûharmazd; and the spirit lodging in him is not deceived by him. 3. And advice about distance from him in whom similarity of disposition *to* the fiend and arrogance are oppressive, *and who* is scorning kinsmen, a sharp liar with serfs², giving offence (vêshîn-dahisnô) *to* confederates, careless of cattle³, *and* unfriendly *to* the wretched.

4. About the bridge on which *there* is access to Aûharmazd⁴, *and* he who reaches the best existence is visibly, *or* invisibly, proceeding *while* offering up (aûzdahân-sagîtûn). 5. And the teaching of the primitive faith to Zaratûst *by* Aûharmazd, *who* remained embodying the Ahunavair (ahûnavair-tanû) *as* the Zôti⁵ of the world; *and* at the time of the renovation Zaratûst, who *was* from the sons of Aêzemnô, is in the position of Zôti⁶ of the whole

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIII, 3 a, b.

² Ibid. 4 b.

³ Ibid. 4 c.

⁴ Ibid. 5 c.

⁵ Ibid. 6 a. It is said, in Bd. XXX, 30, that Aûharmazd comes to the world as Zôti, or chief officiating priest, with Srôsh as assistant priest, just before the renovation. Here it is not absolutely certain whether Aûharmazd, or Zaratûst, is meant as Zôti on this first occurrence of the word.

⁶ Reading min Aê-zemnôân pavan zôt gâs; Ayazem being an ancestor of Zaratûst, eleven generations back, the grandfather of Spitama, and the name being variously written Aiazemn, Ayâzem, Nayâzem, and Aizim in different MSS. Another reading is min 3 zamôn khûpô zôt gâs, 'from three-fold *procreation*, has the happy position of Zôti,' referring to the legendary account of Zaratûst's origin, as detailed in the seventh book of the Dînkard. The position of the Zôti is at the north end of the ceremonial area.

world; Vohûvastô, *son* of Snôê¹, from the countries of those of the religion, in the post of Hâvanân²; Îsvand, son of Varâz, from the countries of Tûrân, in the post of Âtarevakhsh; Sênô, son of Hûmstûv, from the countries of the Sênân³, in the post of Frabarââr; and Vistâsp, who *was* from the sons of Nôâar⁴, in the post of Srôshâvar'z. 6. About the power and triumph which that ceremonial becomes, even through the all-brilliance of the immortal re-novation of the whole creation in that existence.

7. This, too, that the evil spirit⁵

¹ This and the two following persons are the Vohvasti *son* of Snaoya, Isvad *son* of Varâza, and Saëna *son* of Ahûm-stûd, of Yt. XIII, 96, 97.

² In the great ceremonies of ancient times the Hâvanân appears to have been the priest who attended to the Hôm-mortar, and his position was near the north-west corner of the ceremonial area; the Âtarevakhsh was the priest who fed the fire, and his position was near the south-west corner; the Frabarââr was the priest who brought the necessary utensils, and his position was near the north-east corner; and the Srôshâvar'z was the priest who kept general order, his position being at the south end, facing the Zôti at the north end. Besides these five priests, mentioned in our text, there were three others enumerated in Vîsp. III, 1; Vend. V, 58, VII, 17, 18, the water-bringer near the south-east corner, the washer on the west side, and the cleanser on the east side. In modern times the Zôti retains his ancient duties of chief priest, while the Râspî (Bk. VIII, Chap. VII, 5, 9) combines the duties of the seven others, being called by the Zôti (in Vîsp. III, 1) to take the place of each of them in succession.

³ Av. Sâininâm of Yt. XIII, 144, probably the people about Samarkand (see Bd. XII, 13 n, XV, 29).

⁴ See Yt. V, 98.

⁵ One folio of B is here lost, containing the end of this chapter and the beginning of the next. The passage missing was equivalent to about 100 lines of this translation, of which perhaps one-fourth belonged to this chapter and three-fourths to the next.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

Varastmânsar Nask.

. it is possible to come through
 virtuous deeds *and* through virtuous thoughts.’
n. And this, too, *he spoke*, namely: ‘That Good
 Thought’ of mine proceeds *and* notices the thoughts
 of the embodied existence, *and* of the good words
 and the deeds he reports again those referring to
 me, as often as three times in the same day, both
of those who are liberal to thee¹, *O Spîtâmân!* and
of those who are illiberal to thee.’

o. The struggling of the demons², for the putting
 down of all benefit from mankind, *has* not produced
 the obtainment of their capability for that benefit
 which arises *for* mankind through the future exist-
 ence; so that that one evil is more grievous than every
 evil which the demons imagine for mankind, when
the latter are frightened by them from the way of
 the sacred beings, and are wicked; and harder for
 them *are* the praisers of righteousness among the
 apostates *and* the rest *of* the creation, through *their*
 praise of righteousness, even when very many
 praise *it*.

p. About the progress of Ârmat³ and Târôkmat
 perpetually among the creatures, the disclosure of
 Ârmat to mankind, and *of* righteousness to Târôk-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIV, 7 a.

² Ibid. 10 c.

³ Ibid. 9a, 10b, 11b. Av. ârmaiti, ‘devotion,’ the female arch-angel Spendarmad, entitled ‘complete mindfulness’ in §§ 7, 8. Târôkmat (Av. tarômaiti), the arch-demon of contempt and disobedience (Bd. XXVIII, 14), is her special opponent.

mat; the listening of that vile Tārôkmat to falsehood, and the distance¹ of righteousness from him who is vile is like *that of* a sheep fled (sîsd)² from mankind. q. And this, too, that the evil spirit is beaten³ by complete mindfulness, in the struggle of those having mighty ones, just as a powerful man beats him who is a reverent creation (nīyâyīn dahisnō)⁴; and the pure Zaratûst is produced by Aûharmazd, as well as the power of Khûrdad and Amûrdad⁵, which acts forcibly for giving value (farg) and preparing the creatures.

r. About the opposition of Aûharmazd to the demons⁶, and the valuation of the deeds of mankind which exist for greater jurisdiction⁷ and more advantage of the primitive good creation; and in any doubtfulness *one is* to perform the ceremonial of the sacred beings. s. About cases where the good-will of the spirit of complete mindfulness makes mankind attain to the good religion; and their spiritual joy⁸ arises from the purification of their own religion through virtuous exercise of will.

t. About the desire for a reward for anything whatever, and the great advantage owing to a reward of the desires of mankind; also the appropriation of the reward through the operation of the sacred beings:—'Even through the ruler (pad) of that dominion of yours do I produce the renovation of the existences by my will⁹, I who am Aûharmazd.'

u. Excellence is righteousness *that is* perfect.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIV, 8 c.

² Ibid. 10 c.

³ Ibid. 11 a and Chap. XIX, 1.

⁷ Ibid. 12 a.

⁸ Ibid. 13 b.

³ Ibid. 9 c.

⁴ Ibid. 8 b.

⁶ Ibid. 11 c.

⁹ Ibid. 15 c.

CHAPTER XXXV.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The twelfth fargard, the Yasna¹, is about the manifestation of good thoughts, good words, *and* good deeds by the religion²; the lodgment of the religion in good thoughts, good words, and good deeds; *and* whoever possesses good thoughts, whoever *has* good words, *and* whoever *has* good deeds, by him righteousness and the reward of the righteous are possessed. 2. This, too, that neither is he, who is not to be born *for* Zaratûst, an issue from parents who are not righteous, nor yet is he, for him, who is a manifestation of the righteous.

3. This, too, *is said*, namely: 'Thou shouldst give a glad-thinking desire *for* a spiritual lord, and an easy-bodied constitution, to their minds, the religion which I spoke forth *to* thee; so that the greatest, best, and most beneficial of existences³, that *are* those which cattle *are* wanting from men, *are* water, pasture, and freedom from danger⁴; *and* those which men *are wanting* from cattle are also food and clothing.' 4. This, too, that that which mankind ought to give to the sacred beings is a power for completeness *of* control; and that which the sacred beings ought to give to men is ever that which is good for them. 5. And this, too, that thou who *art* Aûharmazd also suppliest *it* from those sacred beings, and *thou who art* Zaratûst also teachest *it* thoroughly to that best-ruling sovereignty⁵ and authority.

¹ See Chap. XII, 1 n; it is here written yast in Pahlavi.

² See Pahl. Yas. XXXV, 4-6.

³ Ibid. 9.

⁴ Ibid. 11.

⁵ Ibid. 13.

6. This, too, *is said*, namely: 'Let no *one* practise ill-perpetrated deeds, even though in a wilderness when far from publicity, nor in distress, *O Sptâ-mân!* because *Aûharmazd*, the observer of everything, is aware of them; and the rule is *that* just as any one whatever *of* the embodied existence thinks, speaks, *and* practises, so great is his punishment.'

7. And this, too, that the best ceremonial and obeisance¹ are the ceremonial *and* obeisance of a righteous man.

8. About begging for life and receiving *it*, *there* is this, that *it is* customarily due to two methods (*babâ*): one, through leadership of righteousness², is that *through* which *it* is evident that *it is* owing to virtuousness; and one, through service of righteousness², is that which is not an evidence that *it is* owing to viciousness. 9. About *the case* where virtuousness is producing authority over truth, and truth over the tongue, so that thou speakest words through the will of *Aûharmazd*. 10. And this, too, *is said*, namely: 'I am the propitious spirit who *was at first and ever will be*, and am not really deceived by anything.'

11. About fire *being* given *by* *Aûharmazd* for shelter and assistance *by* the protection of mankind; *its* maintenance and assistance *by* mankind; and the openheartedness of the spirit of fire for him who shall perform obeisance to it, and for him who is to perform obeisance to it³. 12. The work which is the greatest that exists, *and* is accomplished in the future existence⁴, whereby the creatures become pure,

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXV, 19.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XXXVI, 4, 5.

² Ibid. 22.

⁴ Ibid. 6.

occurs through fire; *and one prays for it* for the sake of the requirements which mankind acquired from the sacred beings. 13. This, too, *is said*, namely: 'Since thou *art* thus, *O Zaratûst!* most propitiatory, that is, able to perform most for our pleasure, we are more promptly coming than Mânûskîhar *was* able to come, when thou beggest of us who are archangels, *O Zaratûst!*¹'

14. About Aûharmazd's exhibiting the creatures in the future existence to Zaratûst. 15. *And this*, too, namely, the all-brilliance *of* the earth, the all-brilliance *of* the cattle, the all-brilliance *of* the plants, and the all-brilliance *of* every excellence² which is a manifestation of righteousness. 16. About the worshipping of Aûharmazd by worshippers, through advancing³ in the religion of Aûharmazd's covenant (paðmânö), which gave the world his righteousness; also the good protectiveness of his rule, and *of* the greatness therein, is owing to it⁴, and the name of the ruler is Wisdom⁵; likewise his ceremonial—performed while the creations owing to him live, when possessing bodies and possessing life⁶—is a benefit *to* all the worldly and spiritual *existences*.

17. *And this, too, is said*, namely: 'Thou art our own⁷, and also *our* confederate, *O Spîtâmân!* likewise unto us thou comest with the reverence that is good⁸; thine, *O Zaratûst!* are the greatness and completeness in performance⁹, so that they

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXVI, 9-14. For Mânûskîhar see Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 10, 12, 18.

² See Pahl. Yas. XXXVII (= V), 1, 2.

³ Ibid. 4.

⁴ Ibid. 3.

⁵ Ibid. 6.

⁶ Ibid. 7.

⁷ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIX, 13.

⁸ Ibid. 14.

⁹ See Pahl. Yas. XL, 1.

become thy greatness and completeness, that is, they are thine, *O Zaratûst!* and are boundless onwards from the middle, that is, we give thee a reward¹ so enormous that, when thou shouldst stand in the middle *of it*, thou *wouldst* not see to *its* limits, the width of the earth, the length of a river, and the height of the sun².'

18. Zaratûst begged of Aûharmazd thus: 'Give unto me him who becomes a disciple of men³ of the mighty through meditation for the religion, *of them* who shall produce the actual progress of this my religion of the Mazda-worshippers, *and* who *will* also explain the good practices to this *one* of mine, even the blessings set forth *by* me in the benedictions they possess.' 19. And Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'I *will* give unto thee him who becomes a disciple of other men of the mighty; they are thy kinsmen and those confederates *of* theirs, and thine are their companions and their serfs⁴, who produce the progress of this thy religion of the Mazda-worshippers. 20. Mostly thine, *O Zaratûst!* are their worship and their homage; and, through their ceremonial and obeisance, the liberality of him who is worshipped is given to thee, *and* righteousness for the soul is with thee; also thy life exists owing to us, and likewise *thy* body⁵, *O Zaratûst!* 21. Forth to thee *will* I, who am the creator Aûharmazd, come in both existences⁶, as assistance; thou becomest worthy, *O Zaratûst!* through Khûrdad and Amûrdad⁷, both of them, *and* through the gratification of

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XL, 3.

² This expression for boundless extent occurs in Yas. LX, 4, Yt. XIII, 32.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XL, 7.

⁴ Ibid. 10.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. XLI, 7.

⁶ Ibid. 8.

⁷ See Chap. XIX, 1.

me, who am Aûharmazd, by those sayings *and* deeds which I, *who* am the most propitious of spirits, proclaimed unto thee.'

22. Zaratûst spoke thus: 'They have become applicants on him who is powerful *with* thee¹.'

23. *And* Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'Thou becomest an applicant and powerful in the embodied existence.'

24. Zaratûst spoke thus: '*Be* thou a gratification to us in the slow progress *of* life, *thou* most beneficent (hû-dahâktûm) of existences! that is, thou shouldst give to us².'

25. *And* Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'I *will* gratify thee, O righteous Zaratûst! in that best existence³.'

26. Excellence *that* is perfect *is* righteousness.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The thirteenth fargard, Ustâvaiti⁴, is about the great reward of him who, through virtuous procedure, may occasion the benefit of a man⁵ *and of* the religion of righteousness also. 2. This, too, that the maintenance of righteousness⁶ is through the practice *of it*.

3. About the tokens of a righteous man—that is, the evidence of him—and *his* reverence for duty *and* good works; also his imperceptible perversion (kastârth)—that is, not a single sin is manifest

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLI, 10.

² Ibid. 11.

⁴ See Chap. XIII, 1 n.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 1 a.

³ Ibid. 15.

⁶ Ibid. 1 d.

man p 84?

in him—and *he is* an accomplisher *of* the stipulations of Vohûman¹, good thoughts, good words, and good deeds, and a comprisal of every goodness in the propitiation of the righteous. 4. About² . . .
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CHAPTER XXXVII.

Varstmânsar Nask.

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. ‘produced the dawn *and* noon-tide (aûsh rêpisþ)³. *e.* I fashioned sovereignty *and* the desired complete mindfulness together⁴, *and* produced, for more advantageous disclosure, a son (bermanar-aê) for a father⁵; the disclosure that discloses a male and the impregnation of a female, and in that disclosure a son *was* produced by me for the father, *O* Zaratûst!’ *f.* So the evil spirit observed, and he called upwards from the abyss thus: ‘*O* beneficent spirit! thou art the creator *of* all creatures, *but* I *will* make all thy creatures old, *O* beneficent spirit!’

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 2 d.

² Another folio of B is here lost, containing the end of this chapter and the beginning of the next. The passage missing was equivalent to about 100 lines of this translation, of which perhaps three-fourths belonged to this chapter and one-fourth to the next.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XLIII, 5 d: aûshahîno va-rapîspîno = Av. ushau arem-pithwa.

⁴ Ibid. 7 b.

⁵ Ibid. 7 c. The verbal causative stem vindîn, ‘cause to find, or obtain, disclose,’ is twice spelt without its first letter, out of four occurrences; and bermanar is hybrid Zvâris for pûsar, in which berman = pûs.

g. About the religion becoming progressive¹ in every one, through its renovation *of the universe and its future existence, there* is this, too, namely: 'This thy religion of Zaratûst is the width of the world, *and* righteousness is the best of religions; this thy religion of Zaratûst is the improvement of the world, which is first supplied *by* righteousness *and* complete mindfulness in the reason (*vârôm*) of those who recite this thy revelation (*dênô*)² of the Mazda-worshippers, *O* Zaratûst! this thy good religion is the best which it is possible to provide with righteousness for one's own. *h.* Thou shouldst proclaim this to kinsmen *and* confederates, to priests and him who is most active in the country; *as to those* who will dispute³ this thy religion of the Mazda-worshippers, thou shouldst proclaim this over the earth of seven regions, unto that which is the furthest of houses, villages, communities, and provinces: "Do thou openly curse⁴ these who are heretical *towards* me, *thou* united Mazda-worship *of* Zaratûst, opposed to the demons, which is the ordinance of Aûharmazd⁵!"'

i. Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'I *will* exalt this which is beloved by thee, the religion of the Mazda-worship *of* Zaratûst, opposed to the demons, which is the ordinance of Aûharmazd. *j.* If this which is thine had not been further loved by me, the Mazda-worship of Zaratûst, that is opposed to the demons *and is* the ordinance of Aûharmazd, would have lapsed into disaster (*vinâsisnô*)⁶, so that the pro-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIII, 8 c.

² Ibid. 11 d.

³ Ibid. 13 c.

⁴ Assuming that *nafrînô* stands for *nafrînô*.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. I, 65.

⁶ See Pahl. Yas. XLIII, 19 d.

fession of the religion *of* the Mazda-worshippers would be destroyed, that is, the religion would not have become progressive, *and* no one *would be* after the benefitters. *k.* But, owing to that *love*, *O Zaratûst!* the religion of the Mazda-worshippers becomes progressive ¹ even then up to the production of the renovation *of the universe*, even then until the perpetual life of the existences, even then till the raising up of the dead, *and* even then up to the full atonement of the spirits.'

l. About *being* despised in hell; the wicked are scornful to a wicked *one*, *and* to the spirits *apart* from the wicked; and it is the creator who, even after saving the others from hell, and the three nights stewing in hell ², *is* to cause the preservation of them also—after those three nights—from that misery, and *every one* attains to happiness. *m.* This, too, that Zaratûst enquired of Aûharmazd thus: 'How have the ignorant demons, *O Aûharmazd!* ever been good rulers ³? How do they think of them in the world thus, *that* their happiness arose from them?' *n.* And Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'They have been demons, *O Zaratûst!* *and* evil-ruling; not well-ruling, even for a reward, do they produce the work of righteousness ⁴.'

o. Perfect righteousness is excellence.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIII, 15 d, 17 d.

² The three nights' final punishment of those worthy of death, to be inflicted at the time of the resurrection (see Bd. XXX, 13, 16).

³ See Pahl. Yas. XLIII, 20 a.

⁴ Ibid. 20 e.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The fifteenth fargard, *Ad-fravakhshyâ*¹, is about the seven² perfections *of* the admonitions of the religion. 2. First, association with the beneficent spirit of the creator, through hearing³, learning, *and* practising his religion; *and* this, too, that thereby arises the preservation *of* the good creation when the destroyer is separated (*vangîd*). 3. Second, about separation from the destructive evil spirit⁴, *and* the contempt which is due to his arrogance and falsehood, the chief of all his vice. 4. Third, governing the temper⁵ by good thoughts, good words, and good deeds; and this, that, whoever *of* you does not so use this liturgy as thought and word⁶, they *will* not allot him light, they *will* not allot *him* the best existence, *and* he is miserable up to the last⁷. 5. Fourth, about the perfection *of* the nature of next-of-kin marriage⁸, which is when *it is* a giving of one's own (*khûdîh-dahisnîh*); and the decision

¹ See Chap. XV, 1 n; it is here written *ad-fravakhshê* in Pahlavi.

² Only six are numbered in our text, but the seventh seems to be detailed in § 9.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 1 a.

⁴ Ibid. 1 d, e.

⁵ Ibid. 3 a.

⁶ Ibid. 3 c, d.

⁷ Ibid. 3 e.

⁸ Ibid. 4 a. There is nothing whatever about next-of-kin marriage in the original Avesta text of this Gâtha, but the Pahlavi translators (in order to interpolate authority for such marriages) took advantage of the Avesta speaking metaphorically of *Mazda* as being father of Good Thought (*Vohûman*), and of Bountiful Devotion (*Spendarmad*) as being *Mazda's* daughter; while they ignored the old tradition that *Vohûman* was created *before* *Spendarmad* (see Bd. I, 23, 26). A translation of the Pahlavi version of this Gâtha passage is given in S. B. E., vol. xviii, pp. 392, 393.

given *about* it, which is the goodness of one's own progeny for the manifestation of progeny; also the relationship, sturdiness, effectiveness, advantageousness, ownership, and giving *in* next-of-kin marriage. 6. *Its* first accomplishment *was by* the creator Aûharmazd in the fatherhood of Vohûman¹ who *was* the first progeny, and from that arising of the practice (var'z-yehevûnth) *came* the progress of the spiritual and worldly creatures and much connected *therewith*, such as the arising of splendour from light, radiance from splendour, *and* lustrousness from radiance, *and* the fully progressive diffusion and succession *of* mankind till the renovation *of the universe*; also, through spiritual and worldly passing on in the spiritual and worldly *existences*, Spendar-mad's² acceptance of the motherly glory *was* an ennoblement. 7. Fifth, about providing *and* maintaining the high-priests³ who are provided with a spiritual lord and possessing priestly instruction; the listening of his authorities of every kind to Aûharmazd, and the reward of the beneficent good works⁴ of the high-priesthood, *are* authority for Aûharmazd; *and* the reward of the good works of the high-priesthood is *their* relation *to* the best existence. 8. Sixth, about the praise, obeisance, *and* ceremonial⁵ *for* the creator Aûharmazd; and this, too, that further conference *with* Vohûman⁶ arises, and wisdom *and* advantage⁷ are taught by

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 4 c.

² Ibid. 4 d.

³ Ibid. 5 a.

⁴ Rather doubtful, as the repairer of the MS. has omitted the first two Pahlavi letters of kirfakō, 'good works,' when writing the word on a patch.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 6 a, b, d.

⁶ Ibid. 6 d.

⁷ Ibid. 6 e, 7 a.

him thus: 'Thou shouldst be a supplicant for the immortal progress of the soul¹, *O Zaratûst!* so that *Aûharmazd may be* lord of the creatures², and the practice of propitiation *by* mankind *may be* that *for* him, also a proportion of the ordering of obeisance³.'

9. About the sovereignty of *Aûharmazd*⁴—even through the reward given *at* the bridge of judgment—which is in his good assemblies⁵, those of the restorer of the world, the destroyer of the evil one, and the benefiter.

10. This, too, *is said*, namely: 'Thou becomest, through complete mindfulness, *O Spîtâmân!* a perpetual adopter (*giriftâr*) of this ceremonial of mine⁶.'

11. About *Aûharmazd having* given power⁷ to the creatures, the preparation⁸ of the power, and the contempt⁹ *for* the evil spirit and his appliances; *Aûharmazd* and the creations gave that contempt back to the evil spirit and the primary (*kâdmon*) demons who are those produced by the demons.

12. About the glorification of *Zaratûst there is*

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 7 c. ² Ibid. 7 e. ³ Ibid. 8 a.

⁴ Ibid. 9 c. This appears to be the seventh 'perfection' mentioned in § 1.

⁵ Assuming that *hû-hambâmîhâ* stands for *hû-hangâmîhâ*, just as *hanbâm* is a common variant of *hangâm*. It might also mean 'good times,' but it seems to represent the incorrect word *amâvandîh* in Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 9 e, which each of the four MS. authorities spells differently. *Mf*₄ has *hû-dandîh* which, no doubt, stands for an original *hû-zandîh*, 'good community,' a fair translation of Av. *haozâthwa*, and well expressed by 'good assemblies.'

⁶ See Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 10 a.

⁷ Ibid. 10 e, in which *zakô-î* ought to be *zôr-î* according to *Pt*₄, *Mf*₄, with which *J*₂ partly agrees.

⁸ Assuming that *nîvârûnô* stands for *nîvârzanô*.

⁹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 11 b.

this, too, namely : 'Thou art beneficial, thou art high-priest and master, and through thee exists the religion which is propitious¹; thou art brother and companion *of* all the beneficers, and thus thy friend² is Vohûman.'

13. Perfect *is* the excellence *of* righteousness.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. *In* the sixteenth fargard, Kamnamaêza³, about departure to any land whatever⁴, in renewed search *of* fortune, *there is* also this, namely : 'Do not stay *away* discontentedly from this thy ceremonial and obeisance, O Zaratûst ! through love of us, when they do not satisfy thee—*neither* thy own, nor the confederate, nor the companion, nor the serf, nor the wicked tyrant⁵—by whom those who are demons are *wont* to be worshipped. 2. And where and when thou art far from us, even then do not stand aloof from our affairs ; and also when the affairs of the worldly *existence* shall not stand well for thee, even then thou shouldst reverence us and shouldst pay us homage.' 3. So also this, that the wish *of* the evil spirit is thus : 'Thou shouldst not reverence and shouldst not pay homage to the arch-angels ; and here⁶ *the people* shall possess neither lordship, nor priestly instruction—that is, ruler and

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 11 d.

² Ibid. 11 e.

³ See Chap. XVI, 1 n ; it is here written kâmnâmêzô in Pahlavi.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 1 a.

⁵ Ibid. 1 b, c, d.

⁶ In this world.

high-priest—and their desire is not *for* perfect righteousness.’

4. And this, too, *is said*, namely: ‘*Of* the contracted ¹ spirituality and deficient wealth ², owing to the little progress of men who are self-gratifiers, thou art aware, *O Zaratûst!* *thou* who art no seeker of this—that is, this want of opulence of thine—because thou dost not know *it* ³; *but* I perceive those words of complaint of thine, of which I demand an account from thee ⁴.’ 5. And this, *too*, namely: ‘Thou art aware *of* the gratification of desire ⁵ *by* us who are archangels, and *which* we give for the gratification that thou bringest forth (*zihih*); we also give thee the liberty which a friend gives to him who is a friend ⁶.’

6. About *what* occurs in *future* ages ⁶: the experienced (*arvandân*) who are beneficial through teaching *and* practising wisdom ⁷, and the thirst of youths is increased by them; by the assistance of complete mindfulness they improve the world of righteousness and produce distress for the fiend; and the advantage due to virtue extends to them ⁸.

7. And this, too, that he who is evilly oppressive has died off through his own deeds ⁹. 8. About always opposing villains with as much strength as exists, so that he who is a good ruler ¹⁰, whose high-priest is the bounteous liturgy (*Mânsarspend*), may become predominant ¹¹ over Wrath.

9. About the praise of the renovators *there* is this,

¹ Assuming that *tak* stands for *tang*.

² See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 2 b.

³ Ibid. 2 a.

⁴ Ibid. 2 c.

⁵ Ibid. 2 d.

⁶ Ibid. 3 a.

⁷ Ibid. 3 c.

⁸ Ibid. 3 d.

⁹ Ibid. 4 c.

¹⁰ Ibid. 4 d.

¹¹ Ibid. 5 a.

too, namely: 'Blessings on good understanding *and* also on Mitrô, whose punishment of sinners they shall inflict for this consideration, that *he is* intelligent *and* friendly (mitrô-pân)¹.' 10. And, about adjudication *as to* a kinsman (nafsman) of any one whatever, *there is* this, too, namely: 'Through a revival of Rashnû, whoever is righteous and also whoever is wicked—that is, every one—is to be kept for judicial investigation².' 11. This, too, namely: 'A kinsman is to be considered as virtuous³, by whom his own soul is preserved from wickedness⁴.' 12. *And* this, too, namely: 'So thy high-priest is he whose own religion is pure⁵.'

13. About the characteristics of the fiend, the broken-down (khas takô) Mânih⁶, and the destruction of the wicked who *were* listening to him, that which came from him who *was* monarch. 14. And this, too, namely: 'The wicked *one*, who gives my world to that which the malicious⁷ Aharman has established *as* supremacy (lâlâth), is he who is a self-wounding⁸ demon that is set going for the death of the world of righteousness which he praises. 15. The cere-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 5 b. For Mitrô see Bk. VIII, Chap. XLIV, 16 n.

² Ibid. 5 c. For Rashnû see Bk. VIII, Chap. XX, 153 n.

³ Ibid. 5 d.

⁴ Ibid. 5 e.

⁵ Ibid. 7 e.

⁶ The arch-heretic who was born in A.D. 215–6, first preached his doctrines on the coronation day of king Shahpûr I (20th March, 242), and was put to death by order of Bahrâm I in A.D. 276–7 (see Nöldeke's *Gesch. der Sas.* pp. 47, 412, 415). From the mode in which he and his followers are mentioned in §§ 13–16, it would seem that the original Pahlavi version of this Nask must have been made at a time when this heresy was still fresh in men's memories, as it would have been in the first half of the fourth century, when Âtûrpâd-i Mâraspendân was collecting and revising the sacred books.

⁷ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 8 a.

⁸ Ibid. 8 b.

monial of righteousness is not such as that he praises, *O Zaratûst!* the priestly authority of the worldly settlements (*gêhânân*) that he mentions thus: "In priestly authority and high-priestship I *am* better (*sapîr*) *and* am better suitable;" and not so, *O Zaratûst!* is that excretion (*mûtrîsnö*)¹ he stirs up for mankind; that *which* he mentions to them becomes a perpetual effusion from him, and they who stirred up the excretion afterwards think it theirs, *and* that which is a perfect ceremonial of the demons occurs. 16. Through the opposing arrival of *Srôsh*², the righteous, the ruler is in vexation with that person; that ruler who is a protection of these *others* through good emanation³—not through evil living—and at every time a distresser *of* the wicked⁴.

17. About the peculiarity of attracters *to* the religion, *and* the good works of those attracted⁵.

18. About the signs of the last times, which *are* the millenniums of the sons of Zaratûst.

19. This, too, that they cause disturbance (*aâramênd*) unto the sovereignty, and *they* who are *Kats* and *Karaps*⁶, those even who are the most evil-ruling in the country—who by villanous deeds are those *who* destroy the existence of mankind through statements, and destroy their own souls⁷—*also* destroy the material world which, confused by them,

¹ Compare Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 10 b.

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3 n.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 8 c, d. This last word (*hû-zahîsnfh*) ought certainly to be *hû-zîvisnfh*, 'good living.'

⁴ Ibid. 8 e.

⁵ Ibid. 10 d, e.

⁶ Ibid. 11 a; also see Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXV, 13 n.

⁷ Ibid. 11 b, c.

- is more beloved than righteousness; even the sovereignty is a scanty shelter, among the existences, from those whose command is villanous, when they produce *that* which is vicious and deliver their pupils (âmûkh tagânō) to that which is *their* end (afdûm), to the fiendish abode¹.

20. And here, too, about the praise of the family of the Fryânaks² it speaks thus: 'Righteousness comes up, *O* Sptâmân! from the descendants and posterity of Tûrân; when extracted by the Fryânaks *it* is stated³ just as *though* it were by Tûrân; through the assistance of complete mindfulness they develope the world⁴ of righteousness and produce distress for the fiend; they likewise think about *it* with Good Thought, *O* Zaratûst! *and* thou shouldst bring forth (zâyês) their gratification⁵ from us, who are archangels, by words, that is, do thou demand *it*.'

21. This, too, *is said*, namely: 'This liberality which is *for* thee is *for* us who are archangels; by him who shall provide liberality for thee⁶, it is provided for us.' 22. About the praise of Vistâsp *there* is this, too, namely: 'Kat-Vistâsp⁷ has propitiated thee, among the existences, by liberal giving; that Vistâsp, whose coming forth to thee in distress is through the reign of Vohûman, *has* develope the material world of righteousness; thou

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 11 e.

² A Tûrânian family of Mazda-worshippers, of whom Yôista is specially mentioned in the Avesta (see Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 18 n); and it appears from Dd. XC, 3 that Ashem-yahmâi-usta of Yt. XIII, 120 was another member of the same family.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 12 b.

⁴ Ibid. 12 c, and compare § 6.

⁵ Ibid. 12 d, e.

⁶ Ibid. 13 a.

⁷ See Bk. VIII, Chaps. XI, 1, XIII, 15.

shouldst think of him, the good companion, *O Zaratûst!* the pure friend who is *Kat-Vistâsp*¹; such is that *Kat-Vistâsp*, the active, who, when he praises the religion, is attracting fellow-dwellers *and* converts *them*, that is, he brings them on to the religion².'

23. About attracting the *Sptâmas* to the religion *there* is this, too, namely: 'Thou shouldst speak thus to the *Sptâmas*: "Praise righteousness with much homage about *it* mentally; and a concession is to be discriminated by you, as well as whatever is no concession; even for those deeds *of* yours righteousness is the reward given unto you, that reward which is much given by *Aûharmazd*³.'" 24. About the place of the four marvels produced by *Aûharmazd* *in yonder world*: there where is the reign of *Vohûman*⁴, there where is the hospitality of *Aûharmazd*⁵, there where religion is *along* with complete mindfulness⁶, *and* there where are the souls of the liberal⁷.

25. About advice to *Zaratûst* as to speech, made for mankind, which is proportionate—abandoning want of proportion—which is an appropriation of liberality with humility and a wise proportion⁸ for good works. 26. This, too, namely: 'To him who gives himself mentally up to thee in discipleship, thou also shouldst give up the best which *thou hast* to give of thine own; and thou shouldst give wealth to him who shall give wealth to thee⁹, because so thy soul would be perfect, *O* righteous *Zaratûst!* when it shall act thus.' 27. This, too: 'Thou

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 13 e. ² Ibid. 14 c, d. ³ Ibid. 15 b, c, d.

⁴ Ibid. 16 d.

⁵ Ibid. 16 e.

⁶ Ibid. 16 c.

⁷ Ibid. 16 a.

⁸ Ibid. 17 a, b, c, e.

⁹ Ibid. 18 a, b, c.

shouldst select this religion of mine with wisdom *and* also with thought¹.’ 28. This, too, that *as to* him who *has* to act with the freedom from effort (*apêsitûnagîh*) of righteousness² *and* owing to *it*, for the good works done by him the gift is good. 29. This, too, that whoever seeks by good works, *and* seeks good works by innocence, obtains freedom from harm (*a-nâstîh*); *and* whoever is liberal to the sacred beings³ is free from destruction (*a-nasînisnô*), owing to the liberality of the sacred beings. 30. *And* this, too, namely: ‘These *are* the rewards I am aware of⁴, which have been, which still are, and which ever *will* be.’

31. Perfect excellence is righteousness.

CHAPTER XL.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The seventeenth fargard, Spentâ-mainyû⁵, is about *this*, that Aûharmazd produced the creatures through wisdom, *and* maintains *them* in truth. 2. This, too, that the best thing⁶ *for* every one is thought in a high-priest who is the tongue of a spiritual lord⁷; in a high-priest, who *has* to maintain thought, no appliances of the body *are* to lie unto the spiritual lord on account of affection *for* the

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 18 e.

² Ibid. 19 a. All but the last syllable of *apêsitûnagîh* is written by the repairer of the MS. on one of his patches, but the word is a strange equivalent for Av. haithîm.

³ Ibid. 19 d.

⁴ Ibid. 19 e.

⁵ See Chap. XVII, 1 n; it is here written *spend-matô* in Pahlavi, and is called the 18th fargard by mistake.

⁶ See Pahl. Yas. XLVI, 2 a.

⁷ Ibid. 2 b.

worldly *existence*. 3. Also that the spiritual lord is always true; of the tongue—when he (*the priest*) speaks falsehood with the tongue—are those words which he does not believe through the spiritual lord, and *it is* owing to this, too, when, of all the body, the tongue first dies. 4. ‘I say unto thee, *O Spîtâmân!* that thou shouldst speak with the tongue just as thou thinkest with the mind, and thou shouldst accomplish work with both hands in complete mindfulness¹.’ 5. And this, too, that he who shall act thus is sagacious, and he is the father of righteousness through wisdom²; and whoever would do that which has happened, thoroughly observes *it* on account of that *which* has not happened. 6. Also this, *that* in the person of him who shall do that which he understands, *and* asks again about that which he does not understand, the propitious spirit of wisdom is lodging.

7. About cattle *being* produced for the assistance of mankind, and the pastures of pleasure for the assistance of cattle³. 8. This, too, that the arch-angels injure the evil demon and wicked people, *but* they do not injure righteous people⁴ and the sage. 9. This, too, *is said*, namely: ‘In scanty opulence do not murmur (*al mang*) owing to good works⁵, *and* thus in great opulence much good work arises.’ 10. This, too, that beneficence gives all to the good, *and* it is no further the villain whom the sacred beings maintain⁶.

11. About the tongue of a true speaker *being* given for the satisfying (*vigârisnô*) of disputants,

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVI, 2 c.

² Ibid. 2 d.

³ Ibid. 3 c.

⁴ Ibid. 4 a, b.

⁵ Ibid. 4 c.

⁶ Ibid. 5 b, c.

and for declaring who is acquitted *or* incriminated ; and the ordeal that is a demonstrator, to acquit *or* convict, which he whose tongue is truthful *has* accepted—and it shall make his statement current—has developed its jurisdiction in the world, *and* diminished distress. 12. *And* this, too, *is said*, that he gives out fire for disputes, so that it may make manifest the acquitted and incriminated, when he in whom are his immense complete mindfulness, and also righteousness, is guardian of the ordeal ; and, when many inspect it, that which is the ritual of the ordeal believes them wicked ¹.

13. Perfect is the excellence of righteousness.

CHAPTER XLI.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The eighteenth fargard, Yêzî², is about the existence of certain and doubtful evidence *and* indication as to the future existence³ arising. 2. About the great dignity *of* the spirit of good works, *and* that also of the person doing good works through the lodgment of that spirit in him. 3. This, too, that they praise, recount, and practise the religion of Mazda-worship at the time of the renovation *of the universe*, that of which the demons through deceitfulness, and then also wicked mankind deceived by those who are demons, *have* said that it does not occur ⁴.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVI, 6 b, c, d.

² See Chap. XVIII, 1 n ; it is here called the 19th fargard by mistake in the MS.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 1 a.

⁴ Ibid. 1 b.

4. About the triumph of the sacred beings over the demons at the end of *various* periods. 5. First, that which *occurs* when, on account of the preservation of mankind from hell, they praise the religion of Mazda-worship; *and* that which *occurs* when Zaratûst the Spîtâmân, *whose* guardian spirit is revered, came to the obedient king Kat-Vistâsp¹. 6. Second, when the power and triumph of renewed sovereignty are again connected with the religion, and mankind, on that account, return to the good religion; and this occurs on the near approach of Aushêdar², son of Zaratûst, when the righteous Kîtrag-miyân³ arrives. 7. Third, when mankind contentedly praise the religion of the Mazda-worshippers, and this occurs as Aûshêdar-mâh⁴, son of Zaratûst, arrives. 8. *And* fourth, that which *occurs* when every one shall practise the religion of Mazda-worship with eagerness; *at* that time arrives the beneficial *and* triumphant producer of the renovation, Sôshâns⁵, son of Zaratûst; *and* this becomes the consummation (sar-hômôndîh) *and* supreme triumph *of* the sacred beings.

9. About enquiring of him who is acquainted with religion *and* a wise priest *concerning* the religion, and hearing *of it* from him⁶; also well understanding *it* through wisdom. 10. About abstaining

¹ See Bk. VIII, Chaps. XI, 1, XIII, 15.

² See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIV, 12.

³ A title of Pêshyôtanû, son of king Vistâsp, who remains immortal as chief high-priest of Kangdez, whence he is expected to come to restore the religious rites in Irân and the rest of the world (see Bd. XXIX, 5, Byt. III, 25-32, 36-38, 41, 42, 51, 52).

⁴ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIV, 13.

⁵ Ibid. 14.

⁶ See Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 3 a, b.

from the secret proceedings (nṯhân-hômondîh) *of* a deceitful *and* seductive apostate¹. 11. This, too, *is said*, namely: 'Thou shouldst also not fall into the downcast imprisonment (nikûn alakîh) through the teaching they deceive, where they thus mislead thee to the downcast imprisonment which is hell.'

12. About mankind attaining to the wisdom of an angel (yêdatô dânôgîh)² through the grades of intellect, ability, *and* religion. 13. This, too, *is said*, namely: '*It is* for that way when mankind cause the disturbance (siklinênd) *of* that which is a vile religion for want of a way, when even this is produced from among the creatures, in which is the opening of a passage *for* mankind to him, where the evil spirit is dwelling *and* making thee surrender, and on account of the stupefying Akômanô³.' 14. This, too, that, through the sovereignty of sagacity, every one *at* last arrives at that way. 15. And this, too, that *by him*, who shall persistently perform good works or sin *with* fearlessness, *it is* to be hereupon considered that his performance is mindful⁴, *and* that the best thing *for* mankind, after birth, is purification from sin⁵.

16. This, too, that the food *and* maintenance of the priests *depend* upon the husbandmen⁶. 17. This, too, that coveted is now the pleasure and strength of mankind due to the cattle of Khûrdad *and*

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 3 c.

² The use of ô for â sometimes occurs in MSS. from Irân. The word can also be read shavandagîh, 'existence,' but this meaning is less likely.

³ See Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3 n.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 4 c.

⁵ Ibid. 5 c.

⁶ Ibid. 5 d.

Amûrdad¹. 18. About the oppressiveness of Wrath and Envy, *and* the destruction of both through complete mindfulness and possession of Good Thought². 19. *And this is said*, namely: 'I made the religion of righteousness a combining desire (vôyak-î hâm-dahisnô³), and all mankind's own selves *are* to be forced into that desire; also its involuntary seeking of immortality is the reign of the will of all mankind, and advantage always arises from it⁴.' 20. This, too, that the care of cattle is reverence of Aûharmazd⁵.

21. About the progress⁶ of righteousness *there* is this, too, that that greatness⁶ is generated therefrom, and its seekers—who are human beings—*have* demanded the supreme predominance in the best existence. 22. About the praise of the period of the renovation of the universe *there* is this, too, that, at that time, those who are doubtful about it are all disclosed to publicity⁷; *also* the last reward and bridge *judgment* of the worthy. 23. About the lawfulness of that which *occurs* through the destruction by Vohûman⁸, who is himself the spiritual lord of the arrangement, *there* is this, too, that the wicked,

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 6 a, b; also Chap. XIX, 1.

² Ibid. 7 a, b.

³ Ibid. 7 c, where, however, this last word can be read asamî-nisnô, 'unalarming' (asahamînisnô in Pt₄, Mf₄), and the corresponding word in Pahl. Yas. XXXIV, 10b can be read asamîsnô, 'intrepid'; but, as these meanings are difficult to reconcile with those of the original Av. hithaos, hithām, it seems more probable that the first syllables asam or asaham, should be read hisam or hisām, a mere transcript of Av. hithām.

⁴ Ibid. 8 a.

⁵ Ibid. 8 b.

⁶ Perhaps these two words, rūbâkîh, 'progress,' and rabâîh, 'greatness,' should be alike, but it is doubtful which is correct.

⁷ See Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 9 b.

⁸ Ibid. 9 c.

at that time, become aware of their own wickedness, when their bodies are dissipated. 24. About the destruction of the good works of the wicked, also that of their own souls, that of *their* spiritual existences, and that of *their* material bodies¹. 25. And this, too, that at the time of the renovation of the universe occurs the approach of the wisdom of our sovereignty to that of the best of mankind, and that glory is put on by it through which the destruction of the bad and the development of the good arise; also the sagacity which exists in Vohûman extends to those who are its friends².

26. This, too, that *there* are those who are extenders of the days, and they are beneficial in the country³; and their custom, where they have arisen, is an opponent of him who is a wrathful person⁴.

27. And this, too, that they shall thereupon excite (lâlâ vadîdûnâñd) a brother and sister with mutual desire, so that they shall form a next-of-kin marriage with unanimity; and before midday they generate a sublime radiance, centred in the face, and trembling passion⁵, and they make the radiance grow up, openly manifest, to an altitude of the height of three spears of the length of three reeds each⁶; and

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 11 c.

² Ibid. 11 d.

³ Ibid. 12 a.

⁴ Ibid. 12 d.

⁵ Reading as follows:—lâlâ zerkhûnd rôshanô pavan mîyân rôd bûland navêndakô khrôs, but some of the words can be read otherwise, as in S. B. E., vol. xviii, p. 395, or with further variations; and it is doubtful if the verb is to be construed with the words that follow it, contrary to the usual Pahlavi rule, as there is no other trace of Avesta construction in this section. Neither the Avesta, nor the Pahlavi, version of this chapter of the Gâthas makes any allusion to the subjects mentioned in §§ 27, 28.

⁶ It appears from Dd. XLIII, 5 that this total of nine reeds would be about forty-eight human feet of fourteen finger-breadths

after midday they have learnt expulsion (*rânakth*)¹, *and* shall remove the fiend who *was* before a destroyer. 28. About *those who* girdle themselves where they shall perform *their* proper duty, and are thus all-beneficent for *being* seen.

29. Perfect is the excellence *of* righteousness.

CHAPTER XLII.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The nineteenth fargard, *Ad mâ-yavâ*², is about the protection *by* a protector for the protection *of* the distressed *ones* of the renovation *of the universe*³. 2. About the impossibility of convincing those who have not attained to the fundamental reason (*bûn kîm*) of belief, before making them comprehensibly reliant upon the existence of the creator, which is the fundamental reason of belief.

3. About the grievous suffering (*vîmârth*) of the religion owing to him who is a wicked judge, whose effusions (*rêzîdanö*) on the judgment seat are injudicious, malevolent, *and* enemies of wisdom; also his wounding is owing to truth⁴, and *his* annoyance owing to the truthful, and the evil spirit is lodging in him; *likewise* the advantage *to* the religion and the great reward of just judges, and the introduction

(see Farh. Oîm, p. 41, l. 1), or 10½ inches, each; so that the height here mentioned would be about forty-two English feet.

¹ The capability of expelling fiends.

² See Chap. XIX, 1 n; it is here written *ad-mâg-yûv* in Pahlavi.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XLVIII, 1 a.

⁴ Ibid. 2 a, b.

(madam-barisn̄h) of a desire for leadership in virtuousness¹. 4. About separation from the friendship of a wicked, ill-judging, unintelligent, and idle *person*, in whom wrath and envy are coiled up (*avar-pêkō*)². 5. About the good government of securers of their own necks (*kavarman*) from viciousness, and the bad government of those repeatedly culpable (*lakhvâr-âhûgân*) owing to viciousness. 6. And this, too, that the wicked themselves are wicked to their own and make them fit for hell, even as to those who³ are precious to them and more beloved than righteousness; and *their* reign, too, is a scanty protection (*gasûkō srâyisnō*).

7. About the praise of Zaratûst *there* is this, too, namely: 'Thy sweetness and mildness are shown to the worldly existences, thy leadership of the religion is through Vohûman, *and* thou art well conversant with righteousness⁴.' 8. About the praise of Fra-shôstar's ardour in the leadership of good works, in virtuousness⁵, listening *to* instruction, and truthful speaking, and in pasturing (*fshegîh*), cultivating the world, achieving benefit (*sûdō tâshîdârîh*), and not giving leadership to villains⁶. 9. About the praise also of the energy *and* high-priestship of Gâmâsp⁷. 10. About the protection of the good

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVIII, 3 b, c.

² Ibid. 4 a.

³ Assuming that amat stands for mûn, their Irânian equivalents being much alike.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XLVIII, 5 a, b, c.

⁵ Ibid. 8 a, b, c and Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 68 n.

⁶ Ibid. 9 a, b, in which Pt₄, Mf₄ have tâshîdâr instead of the khvâstâr of K₅, J₂; regarding fshegîh (=Av. fsheng'hyô) see Bk. VIII, Chap. XXII, 6 n.

⁷ Ibid. 9 d and Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 68 n.

creations by Vohûman, *and* that, too, of the souls of the righteous *by* Spendarmad also¹.

11. About the punishment of the wicked *ruler* who is seizing anything unlawfully in his realm.

12. Also about the grievous punishment of the wicked, evil-thinking, evil-speaking, evil-doing, heretical (dûs-dênô), evil ruler in hell². 13. About the reply of the archangels to Zaratûst, as to the reward begged by him, to make *him* satisfied about it³.

14. It is righteousness *that is* perfect excellence.

CHAPTER XLIII.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The twentieth fargard, Kad-môî-urvâ⁴, is about anything whatever *being* begged *as* provision for the soul⁵, and as to the speaking of Shatraver⁶ to Zaratûst thus: 'Thou shouldst think thus, O Spîtâmân! that Aûharmazd assists thee.' 2. This, too, *is said*, that the creatures of Aûharmazd live through Khûrdad⁷, are immortal through Amûrdad⁷, possess complete mindfulness of Aûharmazd through

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVIII, 10 a, b, c and Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3 n.

² Ibid. 11 a, b.

³ Ibid. 12 b, d. In Pt4, Mf4, § b is as follows: 'Mûn Zaratûstô kîgûn lak Vohûman;' being correctly limited according to the Avesta text.

⁴ See Chap. XX, 1 n; it is here written kad-môg-ravakô in Pahlavî.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. XLIX, 1 a.

⁶ An archangel who is a personification of the Avesta phrase khshathra-vairya, 'desirable dominion.'

⁷ For these three archangels see Chaps. XII, 25 n, XIX, 1 n, and Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3.

Spendarmad¹, and *possess* him as ruler through Shatraver.

3. About wealth *being* begged owing to virtuousness *there* is this, too, that, to him who, owing to virtuousness, begs that which is not allowed to him owing to the oppressiveness *of* the vile, or on account of *some* other opposition, they then give essentially that reward, in the spiritual *existence which* is greater *and* better than that wealth. 4. About the cattle suitable *for* that warrior who possesses virtuous habits *and* strength², through the assistance of the will of the sacred beings and *for* the benefit of Irân *and* the defeat of the diminishing foreign force (kâstârth-i an-Aîrânö).

5. About the seizure³ of mankind for the advancement of the admonition *and* command *of* the sacred beings, so far as force is an assistant to them in knowledge due to the sacred beings⁴; *and* their appropriation *of* the best existence through the advancement of that admonition *and* command. 6. About the assistance of the righteous, on the passage to the best existence, by the spirit of the wisdom of sovereignty, liberality, *and* truth, Aharisvang⁵ and the angel Hôh⁶.

7. About the reason of the three steps walked forward *by* the Zôti from the place of the Zôti, while uttering the Avesta (*avistâkô-gôbisnâ*), after the

¹ See note 7, preceding page.

² See Pahl. Yas. XLIX, 3 a, c.

³ Ibid. 7 d.

⁴ This proviso implies some faint perception of the absurdity of trying to assist almighty beings by human force.

⁵ See Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3 n.

⁶ A personification of the Av. Haoma plant, an infusion of the dried twigs of which is used in the religious ceremonial. Yas. IX and X are devoted to his praise.

end of the ritual for the fire, on delivering (*parvâ-zisnō*) the offering of holy-water to the water¹, *being* the leading up of the archangels, always *at* the end of an assembly of conference *with* Zaratûst, by three steps from the earth to the sun station, through *the places of* good thoughts, good words, *and* good deeds².

8. Advice to Zaratûst also as to the nature of the archangels; likewise a reminder to worship on *their*

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIX, 8 a. This refers to the proceedings of the chief officiating priest in the ceremonial, after the conclusion of the Âtar Nyâyis (Yas. LXII) and just before the beginning of the Âbân Nyâyis (Yas. LXV), during the recital of Yas. LXIV which chiefly consists of a repetition of §§ 6-11 of this Gâthic hâ (Yas. L=XLIX of the Pahlavi version). These proceedings are detailed in the rubrics, partially in J2 and more fully in Pt4, Mf4, as follows:—After reciting Av. Yas. L, 7 d 'the Barsôm (Av. baresman, see Bk. VIII, Chap. XLIV, 65 n) is to be taken up from the Mâh-rû,' or crescent-topped Barsôm-stand, 'and one step is to be set forth in the direction of the Frabarââr' (the imaginary assistant priest whose station is near the north-east corner of the ceremonial area, or to the left of the Zôti, see Chap. XXXIII, 5 n), 'at this place of taking up the Barsôm from the Barsôm-stand, and of going on to the position of the Frabarââr, a beginning of Yas. L, 8 a is to be made in walking towards the beginning of the fire place, until Yas. L, 11 d is to be uttered,' in the following manner:—After 'ma d vau one step is to be set forth, and homage to be offered to the holy-water;' after 'padâis one step, and homage to be offered to the holy-water;' after 'yâ frasarûtâ îzayau one step is to be set forth, and he is to go on to the position of the Âbard' (the imaginary assistant priest whose station is near the south-east corner, so that the progress of the Zôti towards the fire is along the left-hand side of the ceremonial area), and, after reciting the rest of the Gâthic text to the end of Yas. L, 11 d, 'homage is to be offered to the fire, and he is to go away to the position of the Zôti.'

² The three lower grades of heaven, intermediate between the earth and the best existence or supreme heaven (Garôdmân), and situated in the stations of the stars, moon, and sun, respectively (see AV. VII-X, Mkh. VII, 9-12).

account after separation from the sight of *them*.
 9. And this, too, *is said*, that *there* arises therefrom a conception (ham-giriftârih), *by* him whose disposition and character are sagacious¹, also as to the adaptation of his own deeds to that nature of his. 10. And about the good affinity of Zaratûst, even for abundance of good works, *there* is this, too, namely: 'So, *for* all those deeds which *thou hast* to accomplish, *and* which are also accomplished, there is reward for thee through their righteousness, O Zaratûst!'

11. And about the advice to Zaratûst *there* is this, too, namely: '*Thou hast* to become reverent to them², so that mankind *may* become reverent to thee.'

12. About considering the time of the days *and* nights *as* all for good accumulation in good works *there* is this, too, that whoever is diligent *and* always doing good works, *and* that whoever shall perform as many good works as is possible for him, is given as much reward³ as is his desire.

13. It is righteousness *that is* perfect excellence.

CHAPTER XLIV.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. *In* the twenty-first fargard, Vohû-khshathrem⁴, *it* is said by Aûharmazd thus: 'I produced, O Zaratûst! the desire *for* a good ruler⁵;' and this, too, *is said*, that, when *there is* a desire *for* a

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIX, 9 d.

² Ibid. 10 d.

³ Ibid. 11 d.

⁴ See Chap. XXI, 1 n; it is here written vohû-khshatar in Pahlavi, and is called the 22nd fargard by mistake.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. L, 1 a.

good ruler suitable for a share of the world, whoever is suitable for a share of the world [is a development of that character also, owing to the share which is given him, and by him who is himself also developing the character, by giving him a share]¹, giving the share is producing a helper (*vigîdâr*), production of a helper is a perfect action², and superiority of action is owing to thought *and* speech.

2. About *the place* where the best wealth is the produce of water, earth, and plants; also its best supplication is lamentation for the religion, and the sovereignty is liberality. 3. About favours *being* begged from the sacred beings, even with words controverting the response of the sacred beings; the favours *for* the worthy are to be contended *for* worthily. 4. About the connection of the power of intelligent remembrance and wise discrimination, one with the other. 5. About the attraction of the mercy of the spirit *and* leadership³, together, into the supreme heaven (*garôdmânô*), for observation regarding the good creatures.

6. About the begging *and* teaching of that intelligence which is with the increase of good works; also the imperceptible acquirement⁴ of wealth occurs thereby. 7. This, too, that whoever gives himself up, with humility and reverence, to him who is a high-priest of the true religion, is proficient (*far'-zânakî-aitô*) in the religion⁵; and the benefit produced by him, for him who is good, is the liberality

¹ The passage in brackets was at first omitted in the MS. by mistake, and subsequently interlined and written in the margin with a different ink.

² See Pahl. Yas. L, 1 c.

³ Ibid. 4 a.

⁴ Ibid. 5 a.

⁵ Ibid. 5 c.

which is provided for the sacred beings¹. 8. About Aôharmazd *having* created water, plants, animals², *and* the law of the primitive religion *for* the nourishment, arrangement, and succession of the creatures. 9. About the comfort *of* the spirit *of* the liturgy of the religion when he who is a man of credible wisdom and superior disposition utters it³.

10. This, too, that the wicked *one* who does not believe the deception that he teaches to others, which is his through his own spiritual lord, yet, when he teaches multitudes (kabadân), is convinced by it, attains—as the end of that teaching—eminence (padgahîh) for bare-faced deceit (barâhnakô fradâpîh), public falsehood, and disjointed belief.

11. And about mankind *being* bodily prepared also for the future existence by fire and melted ore⁴; in the worldly *existence* the acquitted and incriminated, as regards the law, *have* become thereby manifest⁵, *and*, in the future existence, the torment of the wicked *and* the gratification of the righteous⁶. 12. About Vohûman *and* Ashavahist *being* invoked⁷ for assistance also in danger from the wicked, and about appropriating the best existence through righteousness alone. 13. And this, too, that a happy coming *of* men to the supreme heaven exists *for* the righteous, *but* no⁸ coming of any one from the wicked.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. L, 6 a.

² Ibid. 7 a.

³ Ibid. 8 c; nêvagtâr is written by mistake for nêvagtâr, 'superior,' in the MS.

⁴ Ibid. 9 b and Chap. XXXII, 25.

⁵ Ibid. 9 a.

⁶ Ibid. 9 c.

⁷ Ibid. 10 c.

⁸ Assuming that râf stands for lâ.

14. About the enmity of the Kaī¹ sodomite (vâêpö)² Akht, the heretic of the dark existence³, to Zaratûst; and the causing of disturbance (siklinîdanö), *by* him and the wicked of similar kinds to him, among those who *follow* Zaratûst is extreme, and the primeval hellish existence is *for* them⁴.

15. About the closing of the abode of the Kaī and Karap from virtuousness⁵; *and* this, too, that they do not develope the worldly *existences*, nor attend to the spirit, but they contract the world *and* dissipate the spirit⁶.

16. About the worthiness of the sovereignty of Kaī-Vistâsp⁷, on account of great ability and activity, apart even from superintending. 17. About the praise of Frashôstar⁸ for his *having* given Hvôbö⁹ in marriage to Zaratûst, the praise of Hvôbö for her complete reverence of Zaratûst, and admonition to Zaratûst as to making Hvôbö privileged for the post of house-mistress¹⁰. 18. About the praise of Gâmâsp¹¹ for begging fortune and *for* wisdom in appropriating the excellence of the primitive righteousness; *also* his affection for the sovereignty and *for* the recitation of revelation, in which *there* is assistance of Zaratûst through command of Vohû-

¹ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXV, 13 n.

² See Pahl. Yas. L, 12 a.

³ Akhtyô duzdau temanguhau of Yt. V, 82; the wizard Akht of the tale of Yôst-f Fryânö.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. L, 14 c.

⁵ Ibid. 14 a.

⁶ Ibid. 14 b.

⁷ Ibid. 16 a and Bk. VIII, Chap. XI, 1.

⁸ Ibid. 17 a and Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 68.

⁹ Ibid. 17 b. Av. Hvôvi of Yt. XIII, 139, XVI, 15; she was daughter of Frashôstar and wife of Zaratûst.

¹⁰ Ibid. 17 c.

¹¹ Ibid. 18 a and Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 68.

man¹. 19. About the praise of *Maīdōk-māh*² for his accepting *and* exercising—*and* on account of his exercising—the upholding and propagation of the religion; *also* the yelling, united assault, evil food, *and* other affliction owing to the wicked *in* the earlier half of the night, which is that which Zaratūst *had*, for a like reason, to bear; and the reciting of the law of *Aūharmazd*³, for the joy of the sacred beings, and his appropriation *of* the best existence.

20. About the abounding of Zaratūst in complete mindfulness of the origin of learning, and *its* development by him⁴; both the object and the advantage of knowledge—which is the reigning of Vohūman in the body—*being* the means *of* developing the world in righteousness⁵. 21. About the perfection of the ceremonial⁶ and obeisance of Zaratūst, *and* the superiority⁷ of his recompense⁸; *also* advice to him as to worshipping *Aūharmazd* pre-eminently, and the primeval angels by their own names⁹ according to their greatness.

22. It is the excellence *of* righteousness *that is* perfect.

CHAPTER XLV.

Varstmānsar Nask.

1. The twenty-second fargard, *Vahistōisti*¹⁰, is about the perfection of the prayers¹¹ of the good religion, and information thereon.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. L, 18 b.

² Ibid. 19 a and Chap. XXIV, 1.

³ Ibid. 19 c.

⁴ Ibid. 21 a.

⁵ Ibid. 21 b.

⁶ Ibid. 22 a.

⁷ Assuming that *avartfī* stands for *avartarfī*.

⁸ See Pahl. Yas. L, 22 b.

⁹ Ibid. 22 c.

¹⁰ See Chap. XXII, 1 n.

¹¹ See Pahl. Yas. LII, 1 a.

2. About the glory of a family of some houses *that* has come to the Spîtâmas¹, even before the coming of Zaratûst; the knowledge and habit of organization and priestly authority of those *arising* from that family; the existence therein of houses, villages, communities, *and* districts; *its* attracting *and* exalting mankind, from vice to virtue, by propriety of words and actions; *and* it convinces those of the world even till the arrival of the good religion. 3. And this, too, that the existence of Kaî-Vistâsp—that desire of Zaratûst²—and of Frashôstar of the Hvôbas³, is owing to it.

4. About the praise of Pôrûkâst⁴, daughter of Zaratûst, for loving the good religion with wisdom and acting *by* the advice of the religion, *having* given *herself* contentedly in womanly service (zanôih) to Zaratûst⁵; *her* complete accomplishment

¹ The family from which Zaratûst, Maîdôk-mâh, and Pôrûkâst were descended. Its name originated with Spîtâma, an ancestor of Zaratûst nine generations back. Compare Chap. XXXIX, 23.

² Perhaps we ought to read 'the Spîtâma Zaratûst,' substituting Spîtâmak for kâmak, 'desire,' which latter word is written on a patch by the repairer of the MS. who must have found the original word defective. See Pahl. Yas. LII, 2 c.

³ See Chap. XXI, 24.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. LII, 3 a. Av. Pourukîsta who became the wife of Gâmâsp, prime minister of king Vistâsp.

⁵ Ibid. 4 a. It seems unlikely that zanôih means 'marriage' here (the term being applied to her relation both to Zaratûst and Gâmâsp), unless we were to suppose that she married Gâmâsp after her father's death, which the phrase akhar min Zaratûst, 'after Zaratûst,' might possibly imply. And if zanôih means merely 'womanly service' here, its Zvâris equivalent nêsmânîh, applied to the seven sisters of Ardâ Virâf in AV. II, 10, may also not imply marriage, which is a view already suggested in S. B. E., vol. xviii, p. 398 n.

of duty and reverence *for* him, *and*, after Zaratûst, *her* also performing womanly service (zanîh) and reverence *for* Gâmâsp¹; *likewise* her great reward from Aûharmazd for religiousness and self-devotion (khvêstîh) to the sacred beings. 5. About the praise of Hûtôs² for the arising of the progress of the Mazda-worshipping religion through her, by the growth of righteousness and smiting *of* the primeval fiend; *also* the good works and advantage which have arisen in the world from *her* great possessions, and her equal praise and grand position here *and in* yonder world.

6. About the characteristics of those who are preparing the end *of time* and arranging *its* period *there* is this, too, namely: 'They are a manifestation *of* those, O Spîtâmân Zaratûst! who shall cause this renovation in the existences; they are observant, little afflictive in tormenting, *and* fully mindful, so that, when milk reaches them, they thoroughly digest *it*; they *have* no fear and accoutrements (afzâr), *nor* yet do they mention false *and* irreverent (anâstô) statements concerning those who are righteous through imploring righteousness.'

7. About the characteristics of those disturbing the end *of time* and opposing *its* period *there* is this, too, namely: 'They are a manifestation *of* those, O Spîtâmân Zaratûst! who are destroying the existences³; they are swiftly remedied, that is, they become very quickly devoured (khâîdô) and *are* in

¹ See Pahl. Yas. LII, 4 b.

² Ibid. 5 a. Av. Hutaosa, the wife of king Vistâsp, see Yt. IX, 26, XV, 35.

³ See Pahl. Yas. LII, 6 e.

the torment of the vicious *and* grievous abode; they are not fully mindful, so that *it* is not possible for them to digest milk, their fear is inevitable (*akâr*), *and* they mention even false *and* irreverent statements concerning those who are righteous through imploring righteousness.

8. About the craving for the fiend, the assistance of the fiend, and the gratification of the fiend *by* him who is an apostle of the demons, and his rendering the creatures of *Aûhar mazd* helpless¹ even through the want of progress (*anasakisnô*) which they lament; also the confusion owing to his speaking deceitfully in the world, *and* the connection with him of an awful and swift death², and the most grievous *and* hellish punishment. 9. About that wicked follower and assistant of theirs *in* defeating righteousness, and also in destroying the greater religiousness (*frêh-dênôth*) *of* the world and making the soul wicked in the end.

10. About the occurrence of the dissipation of the glory of him who is a well-ruling man, and the pacification (*âsûdanô*) of the creatures of the world by the sacred beings, it says this, too, namely: 'The persuader *to* evil³ and the organizer of distress (*veshisnô*)—where they shall make pain *and* distress current in the world—are the weakener (*nerefsinidâr*) and corrupter (*âlâyidâr*) for the

¹ Or it may be 'maintaining the affliction of the creatures,' if we read *âzârdârîh* instead of *akârgârîh*.

² See Pahl. Yas. LII, 8 d.

³ Ibid. 9 a. B has *avêhîh vêrenakînidâr*, but *avêhîh*, 'want of goodness,' ought to be *dûsîh*, 'evil,' which it resembles even more in appearance than in meaning, in Pahlavi letters.

righteous ; it is the ruler that is righteous who smites them and opposes them—that is, restrains them from sin—and causes hatred for them through *his* will¹ ; that, *O Aûharmazd!* is this dominion of thine *by* which you give benefits (vehîgânô) *to* him who is justly living *and* poor².’

11. It is perfect excellence *that is* righteousness.

CHAPTER XLVI.

Varstmânsar Nask.

1. The twenty-third fargard, Airyaman³, is the Aîrmân supplication⁴:—‘That is the greatest, I tell thee, *O Spîtâmân!* of the pure sayings of every kind, in so much Avesta lore, this is the best, because *it* is given forth by him who is a very eminent producer (madam-kârtar) of sayings of every kind. 2. Which Aîrmân supplication they should recite who are beneficial⁵, *and* the benefiter⁵, through the recital of it aloud, *O Spîtâmân!* becomes pre-dominant. 3. The evil spirit, who is heretical (dûs-dênô), *O Zaratûst!* with his own creatures, *O Spîtâmân!* becomes buried *in* the earth ; the evil spirit is among *those* buried *in* the earth—who are the demons—where their bodily form (kâlpudô) is com-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. LII, 9 c.

² Ibid. 9 d. Compare Chap. XLVII, 17.

³ See Chap. XXIII, 1 n; it is here written Aîremanô in Pahlavi.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. LIII, 1 and Bk. VIII, Chap. XLIV, 81.

⁵ Pahl. sût-hômônd=Av. saoshyâs, referring to the future restorer of religion to the world, just before the renovation of the universe.

pletely shattered. 4. And up the dead are arrayed by it; through its assistance they give life back unto the body, and the embodied life they *then* possess is *such* that they do not die.'

5. It is perfect *is* the excellence of righteousness; it is perfect excellence *that is* righteousness.

CHAPTER XLVII.

Bakō Nask.

1. Propitiation *for* the creator Aûharmazd and all angels.

2. The first of the twenty-two fargard's of the Bakō¹ is the Ahunavair² of the Bakân³, about the production *by* Aûharmazd, before every creation apart from the archangel⁴, *and* on the solicitation of

¹ The third of the Nasks and fourth of the Gâthic division (see Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 9, 12). It is an analytical commentary upon the Gâthas and the texts associated with them in the two preceding Nasks, devoting a separate fargard to each hâ, and selecting very short phrases, or portions (Av. bagha), for explanation and comment; so short that it is usually difficult to identify them in their Pahlavi disguise. The first three fargard's are still extant in Yas. XIX–XXI, and a translation of their Pahlavi versions will be found in the Nask Fragments at the end of this volume; but whether the Pahlavi versions, consulted by the writer of the Dinkard, were identical with those in the present Yasna is uncertain.

² The name of the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô formula (see Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 7). This fargard is still extant in Yas. XIX.

³ That is, 'of the apportionments,' or 'of those analyzed.'

⁴ Possibly the archangel Vohûman, the first of the creatures, may be meant; although the Bundahis places his creation after the recitation of the Ahunavair (see Bd. I, 21–23). That it was

the archangel, of the form *of* words (rastakō mi-layā) which is the innermost and most comprehensive encompassment (parvand) *and* best-congregated embodiment (vēh-ramaktūm kerpō) of the intelligent omniscience of the religion¹.

3. The divisions of *this* germ of germs, *and* the origin of the other primitive sayings of the good religion, are the divisibility of the portions (bakō) *of* the Ahunavair. 4. The Ahû of the Ahû-vairyô of the Ahunavair is the first creature² which, as regards the first, is specially that creature which is really *derived* from the creator Aûharmazd, and its adaptation is owing to mankind. 5. The thought (mit)³ that exists with the first is with the word that is Vairyô, his 'will,' which is in the second created existence (dâmth), which, as regards the first, is specially the primitive secondary state (dadt-garh) of those who are specially characterised by it, who exist as *it were* with *that* character, *and* have become, *in* that way, in association *with* the second creature. 6. The conjunction of the first creature—whose origin (yehevûnisnō), which is the liturgy, is a co-existence whose origin *had* occurred—is the source for the saying; and the distribution of the portions thereof is the whole saying of a liturgical kind; also its name is Yathâ-ahû-vairyô, the spirit through which it is set going is the lore *of* the religion, needful among the creatures, the creations *arose* through wisdom for that purpose, and they, too, *were* produced on the solicitation of

recited before the other creations is clearly stated in Pahl. Yas. XIX, 2-5, 17-20.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XIX, 24-27.

² Ibid. 29.

³ Ibid. Pâz. mit=Av. maiti=manas.

the archangel¹; besides this, that archangels *are* wise in speaking, and through wisdom are they archangels.

7. And this, too, about the same words, that the statement is the best-worded which is spoken, *or* to be spoken²; and the obscurity is not about the sound of the word-elements, but about the manifold nature of the actual meaning (kabadîh-i sang-îkô), which is the character of the statement, in the words of the epitome. 8. This, too, that mankind guard the soul from hell by learning, reciting, and practising *it*, and the body from death³ by likewise perpetually persevering therein.

9. This, too, that, *as to* the first apportionment of the Ahunavair, whose name is the Bakân Ahunavair, when, thoroughly accomplishing *it* (ava-vidâr) unanxiously (asûdakîhâ), *one* chants *it* in a ceremonial, the good work is as when *one* chants a hundred authorities (radîh) of the Gâthas, thoroughly accomplishing *them* unanxiously⁴; and when, accomplishing *it* (vidâr) anxiously, *one* chants *it*, such a ceremonial amounts to *as much* as ten *with any other authority*⁵. 10. This, too, that, through the same apportionment, while *one* solemnizes the summing up of the first completion⁶, which is the Stôd-yast, as it becomes the rite of *one* newly initiated (navak-nâpar)⁷, on that day

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XIX, 20. ² Ibid. 24. ³ Ibid. 25, 26.

⁴ Ibid. 6, 7. The MS. has ۴۱۵ instead of ۱۰۰, '100,' by mistake.

⁵ Ibid. 8. The MS. has 'unanxiously' by mistake.

⁶ Possibly Yas. LIX, 32-34.

⁷ Commonly called Nônâbar (see Sls. X, 2, XIII, 2; Dd. LXXIX, 4, 11, 12).

they make the soul of the solemnizer pass three times into the supreme heaven ¹.

11. About the grievous sinfulness of imperfectly accomplishing (*avidâr*) the Bakân Ahunavair ².

12. This, too, that it is made by him in subjection to Aûharmazd, as the first creature made, who gives the body in service to him who is the ruler, *and* in discipleship to him who is the high-priest of the religion ³; for this reason, because they are suitable *for* lordship and mastership in the worldly *existence*.

13. He who is the highest lord *and* master is the creator Aûharmazd, and, owing to the same reason, when it made their subjection that *to* the creator Aûharmazd, he has made *it* as the first creature made.

14. This, too, that it is taught by it to keep the body in the service of the king of kings ⁴, whose origin Aûharmazd keeps in *his* possession; for this reason, because, when *his* origin is kept in the possession of Aûharmazd, Aûharmazd is over his own if a good ruler is made; him who is thus prepared, when also the worldly existence is necessary *for* Aûharmazd, he maintains as ruler when the creation is instructed.

15. This, too, that the reward of Vohûman is appropriated (*khvêsinîdô*) by him who indicates anything which is virtuous, who also utters virtuous recitation, *and* who likewise teaches perfect abstinence from sin to mankind ⁵. 16. For this reason, because the indication of anything virtuous, the utterance of recitation wisely, *and* abstinence from

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XIX, 9-11.

³ Ibid. 28, 29.

⁴ Ibid. 30.

² Ibid. 12-15.

⁵ Ibid. 31, 32.

sin are, as *it were*, a lodgment materially in good people owing spiritually to the archangels, Vohûman *being* more particularly the instigator therein; and, owing to the same reason, *he* in whom there is a like proficiency is of like good works with Vohûman, and adapted to the good works arises the like reward.

17. This, too, that the dominion is given to Aûharmazd by him who may perform those *works*, is manifest from *the phrase* Tad mazdâ tavâ khshathrem, &c. and its meaning, which is this: 'That, O Aûharmazd! is this dominion of thine, by which benefits (vehagânö) are given *to* him who is justly living *and* poor¹.' 18. *Which* is a deliverance for this reason, because Aûharmazd created no dominion for the more particular preservation of the poor *and* the creatures of the worldly *existence* from the destroyer; *but*, for the purpose of control over the dominion of *him* whose strength of rule is the cause of preservation for the poor—which is continually the wish of Aûharmazd—the dominion is given to Aûharmazd.

19. *And* this, too, that, through preservation from the adversary, he has assisted his poor who have preserved friendship for the Sptâmân²; the adversity *of* the creatures is the advancement of religion, by supporting the religion; and a friend of the Sptâmân becomes an assistant of the supporters of religion. 20. About the entrance (dên yâtûn-dakîh) of the destroyer of the creatures from without³, *and* the helplessness of the beneficent spirit owing thereto.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XIX, 35, Yas. LIII, 9 d, and Chap. XLV, 10.

² Ibid. 36.

³ Ibid. 39.

21. About the girding on of this saying of the religion of Aûharmazd by the three degrees (*pad-mân*), which are good thoughts, good words, *and* good deeds; *by* the four classes, which are priesthood, warriorship, husbandry, and artisanship; and *by* the five chieftainships, which are house-rule, village-rule, tribe-rule, province-rule, and the supreme Zaratûstship; and the one summing up (*hangerdîkîh*) which is the liberality of the good ruler¹.

22. Righteousness is perfect excellence.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Bakš Nask.

1. The second *fargard* is the Ashem² of the Bakân³; it is by it *that* perfect excellence is produced for every one who produces for any one else that which is suitable for him⁴; for this reason, because, for the sake of perfect production, *there is* much unprofitable production, *but* profitable production is suitably producing. 2. This, too, that the reward of every good work is given by it to mankind, which keeps mankind in diligence when it instructs⁵; because, as the business *of* all good works is that which instructs and keeps mankind in diligence, the reward of good works which man-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XIX, 44-55.

² See Chap. III, 1 n; it is here expressed by its Pahlavi equivalent *aharâyîh*. This *fargard* is still extant in Yas. XX.

³ See Chap. XLVII, 2.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XX, 1.

⁵ Ibid. 2.

kind can appropriate by diligence is appropriated by it. 3. And this, too, that advancement is given by it to every good work ¹.

4. He who is understanding good works, and *yet* a suppliant, has thereby made the learned foolish (*âzân akhantdnîdö*); whoever possesses authority through virtuousness ² is more particularly for rewarding the doers of good works; whoever, too, can make true decision ³ and adjudication is more particularly for causing the bridge *judgment* of a criminal, and *for* thrusting *him* aside owing to the exhaustion of *his* good works; and whoever, too, can exercise mediation *and* wisdom is more particularly for the good government of the world.

5. Of righteousness the excellence is perfect.

CHAPTER XLIX.

Bakö Nask.

1. The third fargard is the Yênhê-hâtâm⁴: there is here taught by it the worship of Aûharmazd, which is the law of Aûharmazd, that is, its law is virtuous⁵. 2. This, too, that the worship of Aûharmazd is occasioned by it, which is the asking for life for beings *by* mankind⁵. 3. *And* this, too, that the ritual of the males and females of the righteous occurs *through* it, which is the obeisance for the archangels⁶. 4. And the atone-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XX, 3.

² Ibid. 4.

³ Ibid. 5.

⁴ See Chap. IV, 1 n; it is here written Yênhê-hâtâm in Pahlavi. This fargard is still extant in Yas. XXI.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. XXI, 1.

⁶ Ibid. 2, 3.

ment *for* crimes (*vagagânō*), because it is a gratification, is all for Aûharmazd personally therefrom; and in connection therewith it amounts to a gratification for Aûharmazd.

5. Here *one* mentions three particulars¹ which are in one's worship of Aûharmazd of every description. 6. One is when the design (*dâdō*) of the person is virtuous, because it is restrained by some virtuousness of thought; this is that which amounts to worship and obeisance *for* Aûharmazd personally. 7. One is when it teaches an asking for life for mankind, and its ordinance is the protection, nourishment, *and* other assistance *and* gratification *of* mankind; a friend of the primitive worldly creation of mankind produced it, *and* it comes into connection *with* the bridge *judgment* of mankind, for the worship *and* gratification of Aûharmazd. 8. *And* one is when *one* would celebrate the obeisance *for* the archangels, which is for the sake of strengthening the archangels, each separately, in *their* control of the business of preparing *and* managing the world; because *it* is declared by revelation *that* to worship is this, that the ceremonial *may* reach this bridge² in company with *one* (*padvand*), for the worship *and* gratification of Aûharmazd; the archangel who is to be strengthened by the ceremonial is one, *and* mankind are developed by the strength of the archangel.

9. Of righteousness perfect is the excellence.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXI, 3.

² The *K'invad* bridge (see Chap. XX, 3).

CHAPTER L.

Bakö Nask.

1. Propitiation *for* the creator Aûharmazd, and a scornful dole *for* the evil spirit.

2. The fourth fargard is the Yântm-manô¹ of the Bakö, about the praise of Zaratûst, that is, his jurisdiction, invocation of blessing (yânö)², and speaking *in* reply were such as are declared by the *sacred* text. 3. This, too, that that jurisdiction of his arose before the blessing, that is, this one decision is made by him about his own, that his own person is first made deserving by him through virtue, and then virtue is prayed for by him³.

4. This, too, that he has attributed the source *and* result to Aûharmazd, who gives joy to Aûharmazd; for the source and result *of* various advantages *and* various joys are desirable for joy itself, as joy is the acme (rôêsmān) of every happiness *of him* whose joy *has* made an offering (aûstôfrîdö) to Aûharmazd, because his decision is this, that by him whose joy arises from that thing which is the will of Aûharmazd, its source *and* result are attributed to Aûharmazd. 5. This, too, that the good work, which is a gratification *by* lawful gratifiers⁴, becomes appropriated by him who shall perform that which is truly reverent; even for this reason, because he who is a lawful gratifier of others, through true reverence, *has* intended to gratify through the practice of his reverence, and, when thus the gratifier of those persons, the good work of gratification

¹ See Chap. V, 1 n. ² See Pahl. Yas. XXVIII, o. ³ Ibid. 1 a.

⁴ Ibid. 2 c.

by lawful gratifiers becomes appropriated. 6. This, too, that the wisdom of Vohûman¹ is advanced by him who utters a discourse through Vohûman; for this reason, because the wisdom of Vohûman and its advancement are mostly through discourse. 7. This, too, that the plentifulness and satisfaction of cattle¹ are taught by him who properly maintains the cattle which are in his possession; even for this reason, owing to the multitudes thus *belonging* to *him* who properly maintains the cattle which are in his possession, he gains his profit *and* pleasure therefrom, *and* others, who see that gain, are instructed, even as much as he, about the proper maintenance of cattle for their own profit *and* pleasure.

8. This, too, that benefit² *being* given for the benefit *of* the worthy *man* is taught by him who keeps the benefit that is his as the property *of* the sacred beings; even for this reason, because he gives the benefit that is his unto the worthy *man* for the purpose of keeping *it* for the advantage of the sacred beings, and others are instructed about it. 9. This, too, that prosperity³ *being* given, in both existences², to him who is generous *and* worthy is taught by him who gives benefit to a worthy *man* possessing body and life; even for this reason, because a worldly *existence* and a spiritual *one* are both his, also his worldly *existence* is in this existence, *and* the spiritual *one* in that existence wherefrom satisfaction *for* the giving of benefit arrives. 10. This, too, that by him who shall cause reverence⁴ of the good, even this is taught, that the sacred

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXVIII, 1 c, where Pt₄ and Mf₄ have Vohûman instead of valman.

² Ibid. 2 b.

³ Ibid. 2 c.

⁴ Ibid. 4 b.

beings gratify him who is practising their will ; even for this reason, because good for him, by whom the reverence is practised, becomes the reply of satisfaction, *and* the throne of the sacred beings is certain.

11. This, too, that *he* who *was* at first has taught even this to mankind, that supplicants¹ *for* the favour of the sacred beings gratify the sacred beings by being contented (*padvâz*) ; even for this reason, because the welcome of a sacred being, supplied by command from the religion, is a virtuousness in the world distinct from that, and the production of a course of generosity, from the sacred beings to mankind, arises really through the contentment of the favoured ; *and* mankind thereby become freer from doubt, and believe more in the sacred beings.

12. This, too, that his soul is delivered, *or will* be delivered, into the supreme heaven², who *has* given something to him who praises the sacred beings *and* the good ; even for this reason, because even through liberality as to wealth, and the production of a way to the supreme heaven, *it* is manifest *that* anything given to the praisers of the sacred beings *and* the good is a greater liberality. 13. This, too, that the reverence³ of those needing reverence is occasioned by him who teaches the *sacred* word (*vâkakö*) to the good ; even for this reason, because he who is a good teacher of revelation (*dênô*) can bring *it* into use for the reverence, advantage, *and* joy of the sacred beings *and* the good.

14. This, too, that acquaintance with the religion of Aûhar Mazda³ is disclosed to his own by him who loves Vohûman ; even for this reason, because true

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXVIII, 4 c.

² Ibid. 4 a.

³ Ibid. 4 b.

knowledge arises from the discrimination of pure wisdom, and the pure attainment of the most discriminative spiritual lord (ah vō) to the mind, through the purity that constitutes the way within the mind of a spiritual lord, the purity which becomes that way through the lodgment of Vohūman there.

15. This, too, that righteousness is taught¹ *by him* who keeps *his* mind connected with righteousness; even for this reason, because his mind attains to an effort for authority, and, ridden by the effort, *attains* to *its* acquisition. 16. This, too, that by him who gives commands about the progress of the concerns of Aûharmazd, this is also taught to mankind, namely, when *one* sees the throne of Aûharmazd²; even for this reason, because it is possible to see that throne through the complete progress of the will of Aûharmazd in the world; *and* whoever gives commands about the progress of the concerns of Aûharmazd, the will of Aûharmazd is necessary in him, the progressive share of those concerns for the people of the world *being* shown, which is seen even through that foundation of completeness that becomes the throne of Aûharmazd *for* mankind.

17. This, too, that by him who welcomes Aûharmazd in *himself*³, matters only known by even a high-priest are then taught to mankind; even for this reason, because instruction and knowledge are mostly those through a high-priest, and by him who welcomes Aûharmazd in *himself*, a spiritual lord is then prayed for, who becomes glorious and praised for that which is to be taught, and mankind are taught by him. 18. This, too, that by any one good, who

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXVIII, 4 c.

² Ibid. 5 b.

³ Ibid. 6 a.

is a servant *and* pleaser of a good ruler, a good person may be brought forward, to him who is the ruler, for benefit¹; even for this reason, because a good *man* associates other good people with him in the benefit that happens to him, and *his* character, temper, *and* disposition are thus due to that; but when bringing himself forward to rulers, through reverence *and* gratification *of* the rulers, other good people may also be brought forward by him for that benefit. 19. This, too, that by him *who* shall virtuously make an accumulation, the way of prosperity² from the sacred beings is disclosed to his own; even for this reason, because virtuous accumulation is provided through unnumbered (*a pên avâ dō*) grants of a decider, and, when *it is* so, he becomes the treasurer of the sacred beings.

20. This, too, that by him who produces advantage for the archangels, the gift of him who is suitable for the sovereignty³ of the immature (*khâm*) world is solicited; even for this reason, because the advantage which is produced for the archangels *being* for the sake of his own, the advantage of the immature creation solicited—the supreme advantage of the primitive good creations—becomes a virtuous ruler. 21. This, too, that by him who is a praiser³ *of* an archangel, the good religion is praised; even for this reason, because the good religion is praise of the archangels, *and* the praise of the archangels is the good religion. 22. This, too, that the religion of the sacred beings is made progressive³ by him who shall make an offering (*aûstôfrîdō*) *to* the

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXVIII, 6 b.

² Ibid. 7 a.

³ Ibid. 7 c.

sacred beings ; even for this reason, because making an offering *to* the sacred beings strengthens the upholders of religion, and the progress of religion occurs through upholders of religion.

23. This, too, that by him who shall make mankind quite zealous (gare m ôk ö) for doing good works, the reward of the good works is also made liberal for mankind ; even for this reason, because the producer of the origin is also the producer of the result.

24. This, too, that above the multitude is the praise of the man who is assisting those of virtuous will, who is also the nourishment of the creatures through virtuousness, and whose accumulation is also owing to virtuousness ; even for this reason, because whoever is assisting those of virtuous will is an increaser of virtuousness in the world, whoever is the nourishment of the creatures through virtuousness is a producer of the paternity of creatures, *and he* whose accumulation is owing to virtuousness becomes an improver of the world.

25. This, too, that by him who assists him who is ignorant (khast), is given *and* taught to supplicants that which is suitable for them.

26. To assist him who is ignorant is this, such as forming the province, district, domain, *and* family ; maintaining the abode *and* house of a follower of Vistâsp (Vistâspân ö), the fortress *and* stronghold, and the homestead (khân) of the agricultural peasant ; repairing a rugged road ; building bridges over rivers ; managing a river, aqueduct, *or* brook ; populating desolate places ; *and* doing other things, owing to which any retention (gtrift-a ê) of the comfort and advantage of mankind in the world occurs.

27. And by him who shall do these things, the assistance even of him who is born afterwards,

the making of that which is a very advantageous thing suitable *for* mankind, and also the doing of *this* for others, are taught.

28. This, too, that it is revealed (*kâshtô*) of the spiritual existence *that* that which is wisdom is for Aûharmazd, for him who is wisdom—that is, it teaches *that* acquired wisdom is for him whose innate wisdom is good—even for this reason, because the spirit, this that has come into his possession, which is acquired wisdom, is given by it to the progeny of Aûharmazd, which is innate wisdom, to increase *it*; and Aûharmazd is gratified thereby.

29. Of a summary about the continuance *that* was, the progress of the material *existence*, and the continuance *that will* be¹, *there* is also this:—about the continuance *that* was, which is the beginning, *there are* the essential thought and beneficent production of the good and evil material *existence* of its good goodness, and that of *its* evil vileness; about the progress of the material *existence*, which is intermediate, *there are* the dutiful doing of good works, righteousness, and having reward, the committal of crime, wickedness, and having the bridge *penalty*; and about the continuance *that will* be, which is the last, *there are* the government, with wisdom, of that supremely good *one* who is the origin of all the multitudinous *creatures* (*vasîkân*), the triumph of goodness over vileness, the admissibility of the good, the inadmissibility of the bad, and the purity of the restoration of the good creatures.

30. Of righteousness perfect is the excellence.

¹ The three periods of the universe:—the past eternity, the present existence, and the future eternity.

CHAPTER LI.

Bakō Nask.

1. The fifth fargard, Khshmaibyâ¹, is about this, that complaint is made by Gôš-aûrvan² *that there* did not exist *any one* who properly keeps the cattle that are in his possession; even for this reason, because cattle are increased by such, and others, through design (âhang) and a desire for that increase, act by his example *and* keep cattle properly; *but* the complaint of Gôš-aûrvan is *that* he does not exist. 2. This, too, that by him who gives orders about the advancement *of* the concerns of the sacred beings, the care of cattle is produced, and his soul attains to the sacred beings; even for this reason, because the care of cattle is a principal thing in the advancement of the concerns of the sacred beings, *and* also for the preservation *of* the soul. 3. This, too, that by him who keeps cattle with a controller (das-tôbar) who is a cattle-master³, even a friend of him who is the creator of cattle is taught to the cattle—the cattle-master and he who is wise in the nourishment, protection, and multiplication of cattle—even for this reason, because when his cattle are kept with a controller who is a nourisher, protector, and multiplier of cattle, the friendship of a nourisher for the nourished, *of* a protector for the protected, and *of* a multiplier for the multipliable is also exhibited by him; *and* the design of the creator for the creation, through affection, is that of a nourisher for the nourished, *of* a protector for the protected, *and of* a multiplier for the multipliable.

¹ See Chap. VI, 1 n; it is here written khshmaîbê in Pahlavi.

² See Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 1.

³ Ibid. 2 a.

4. This, too, that by him who maintains an animal with propriety, it is presented to the sacred beings; even for this reason, because when *it* is maintained by him with propriety, the will of the sacred beings drives him on, and when the will of the sacred beings drives him on, it is presented by him to the sacred beings. 5. This, too, that when *one* shall admit the male of animals at the *proper* time, the mastery (*sardârîniðanö*) of the animal is also taught by him; even for this reason, because the admission of the male *of* the animals is the essential business in the multiplication of cattle, and he who is a multiplier has also taught the mastery of the animals. 6. This, too, that by him who does not slaughter an animal until it attains to full growth, the formation of a store for cattle is also taught; even for this reason, because, from the increasing cattle produced, the profit of mankind arises, *and* on account of the liking of mankind for profit, they persevere more fully in cultivating cattle, and provide a store for them.

7. This, too, that *it is he* who is the more powerful of beings—that is, strength is what is more in use *by* him¹—whose proceeding is for him who is his own, so that he supplies that which it is necessary to supply; even for this reason, because needful bountifulness *to* one's own needy ones arises through lawful thoughts, lawful thoughts are provided by expelling greed, lust, wrath, disgrace, envy, *and* other fiends from the body, and a man expelling a fiend from *his* body becomes of efficient strength. 8. This, too, that he is a very powerful person, for invocation¹, supplication, and attaining to good works,

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 3 c.

who possesses wealth for the high-priest of the priests, who shall also procure decisions and judgment always justly, and who likewise becomes humble *and* reverent *to* the good; even for this reason, because the wealth of multitudes of mankind is for maintaining the desires and pleasure of the body, *for* procuring decisions and judgment whereto their wishes tend, *and for* others becoming humble and reverent *to* them even when *their* design is vicious; *but he* who possesses wealth *for* invocation *and* connection *with* the wisdom of the religion, through the high-priest of the religion, and shall procure just decisions and judgment, *and* becomes humble and reverent *to* the good, is a putter away of that design and *one* who, through the putting away of that design, becomes a capable *and* very powerful person.

9. This, too, that every one is made to persevere at *his* proper duty, *as to* any excellent thing, by him who holds the reward of the diligent, as the sacred beings are proceeding *with* a pure needy *one*; for this reason, because the toiling of the body of a person at *his* proper duty is induced *by* a desire of reward. 10. This, too, that by him whose mouth (yôṅg)¹ and *its* appliances *are* for virtue, the possession of Vohûman is then explained, through this mode, because the maintenance of the mouth and *its* appliances as virtuous becomes so, when, through protection and assistance *of* the good, *and* defeat and smiting of the vile, the reformation of the world occurs; and this, too, is so, when *there is* an existence of preparation of the friend of the good and the enemy

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 7 c.

of the vile, and of friendship of the good and enmity of the vile, through understanding good and evil; and the understanding of good and evil is through possession of Vohûman, *and* that possession of Vohûman becomes also an explainer of Vohûman.

11. This, too, that by him who gives commands about the progress of the concerns of the sacred beings, his own knowledge of every kind is also developed; even for this reason, *because* the command *being* necessary *for* the personal duty of the good, they also develop the knowledge of every kind for which that commanding of duty and *its* auspiciousness are suitable. 12. This, too, that by him who teaches the good, the good work is then appropriated which is also an assistance of Zaratûst through speaking of the religion; even for this reason, because, on account of those of the religion of Zaratûst who really constitute the renovation of *the universe*, the speaking connected with Zaratûst—through the teaching of the good *and* teachers not of the same religion—*and* the assistance through speaking of the religion become the good work appropriated.

13. This, too, that by him who gives anything to that person who praises the sacred beings *and* the good, a throne is appropriated *in yonder world*¹, even on the mention of *it*. 14. This, too, that by him who is teaching that which is for the propitious, the damage that is owing to want of resources² in religion is shut out of the world; even for this reason, because, owing to that, he increases the resources of religion of every kind, *and* the ad-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 8 c.

² Ibid. 9 b.

vantage therefrom, in the world. 15. This, too, that by him who is bringing him who is righteous forth to the rulers, for beneficence, the utmost assistance is then afforded; even for this reason, because an expectation of the utmost beneficence is further attached by him to the place of obtainment¹.

16. This, too, that by him who gives *himself* in service unto him who is the supreme king of kings, the way of good thinking², *of* the assistance of pleasure, and *of* the production of sovereignty by Aûhar³mazd is disclosed to his own; even for this reason, because the original reason of virtue is the worthiness *of* mankind owing to the creator *and* their service unto the creator, and, therefore, as he who is a well-ruling monarch is a creator in the worldly *existence*, *and* a recompensing (pa⁴dô-dahâk) leader of the creatures who steadfastly give *themselves* in service to him, it is then given by him to the creator also; and I teach, besides, *that* the origin of the virtue of worthiness, which is attached by the creator to his own, is the way that is stated above, and other virtue is also disclosed to his own thereby.

17. Righteousness is excellence *that is* perfect.

CHAPTER LII.

Bakô Nask.

1. The sixth fargard, Ad-tâ-vakhshyâ³, is this, that by him who is a wise upholder of the dignity

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 10 c.

² Ibid. 10 b; we should probably read hû-mânisnîh, 'pleasant dwelling,' instead of hû-mînisnîh.

³ See Chap. VII, 1 n; it is here written at-takhshê in Pahlavi.

of a priest's leadership, the priestly assembly¹ wanted for performing religious rites (dênô) is enlarged; for this reason, because the nature of the person, whose resources are bounty for the needy, eagerly becomes a causer of exertion for the teaching (âmûkô) of accomplishments. 2. This, too, that by him whose habits are virtuous the glorification of Aûharmazd² is accomplished and taught; even on this account, for the sake of whatever advantage *and* pleasure are due to virtue, they, indeed, whose habits are virtuous, glorify him, moreover, who is the creator of those virtuous habits, who is Aûharmazd himself. 3. This, too, that by him who speaks virtuous words the performance even of the worship of Vohûman³ is also taught; even on this account, because of the comeliness and desirableness of virtue, the good make it an example and speak virtuous words, *and* virtuous speaking is the worship of Vohûman. 4. This, too, that the ceremonial which he whose way is virtuous shall accomplish becomes greater⁴ thereby; even for this reason, because the sacred beings come more particularly to the ceremonial of those of pure dispositions *and* virtuous ways, and accept *it*.

5. This, too, that he who is a producer of benefit for promoters of good works becomes an extender⁴ of the teaching of religion; even for this reason, because from producing benefit for promoters of good works *arises* an increase of good works, from an increase of good works *arises* further progress of the will of the sacred beings, from further progress of the will of the sacred beings *arises* more progress

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 1 a.

² Ibid. 1 b.

³ Ibid. 1 c.

⁴ Ibid. 2 a.

of the good religion, *and* from more progress *of* the good religion arises an extension of the teaching of the good religion in the world. 6. This, too, that by him who possesses authority through virtue, discrimination¹ as to the regulation of duties is taught to mankind; even for this reason, because the possessor of authority through virtue is a man *who* becomes a decider *and* ruler, *and* mankind learn and practise to exercise the disposition, habits, and custom of rulers.

7. This, too, that *he* who is a giver of the needful *to* his own needy ones has given himself to Zaratûst; even for this reason, because the needful *being* given *to* one's own needy ones is the existence of true liberality, which is a compendium of the religion of Zaratûst; by him who is thereby ennobled (*vâsṣû-harakânt-aitō*) the religion of Zaratûst is then put on, and whoever *has* put on the religion of Zaratûst [has given himself to Zaratûst. 8. This, too, that by him who]² gives the leadership [to him who is suitable for the leadership]² even the wisdom *of* that man is increased; for this reason, because even the wisdom of the suitable, through which they accomplish that leadership, when the leadership comes to them, grows further with the glory of that duty.

9. This, too, that he who *has* to select the better of two ways, which are good and bad³, is assisted

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 2 b.

² The words in brackets are the translation of a passage that was inserted in the MS. at the time the folios were patched. The original copyist of the MS. has evidently omitted a passage, but whether the repairer has made the insertion merely by guessing from the context (which is quite possible), or by referring to some other MS., is uncertain.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 3 b.

to do *so* by the benefitters' ordeal of fire and ore ; even for this reason, because that is discrimination by the eye of wisdom, which is the way of good intention, *and* the benefitters are decisive declarers of acquittal and incrimination through fire and metal, the two good discriminators ; and when the business *is of* a different kind, even then both *are* associates in discriminating, and are powerful connections of one another. 10. This, too, that he who shall do that thing from *which* advantage of the sacred beings *arises*, is empowered to discriminate truly that which is sagacious¹ in thought, word, *and* deed ; even for this reason, because from doing anything for the advantage of the sacred beings *arises* the reign of the will of the sacred beings in the world, from the reign of the will of the sacred beings in the world *arises* the freedom from danger *of* the temporal existence of the world, *and* the freedom from danger of the temporal existence of the world contributes also to the power of him who is sagacious in discriminating truly as to thought, word, *and* deed.

11. This, too, that by him who thinks of the affairs of Aûharmazd the eternity (hamâytkîh) *of* Aûharmazd² and also the consideration of his own eternity *by* Aûharmazd are thought of ; even on this account, because mankind mind and serve Aûharmazd for the sake of even the hope² of eternal benefit from him ; *and* they who think of him, through the eternal benefit due to him, are themselves increasing that benefit which is eternal, and it is thought eternal by him that thinks of that eternal *thing* his own eternity. 12. This, too, that

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 3 c.

² Ibid. 4 c.

he who restrains a person from reverence of the demons, has diverted him from making the world sickly; even for this reason, because whoever *has* restrained a person from reverence of the demons, has diverted a demon from making the world anarchical *and* from making the world sickly. 13. This, too, that by him who shall practise liberality benefit for the sun is caused, and by him who shall cause benefit for the sun benefit is caused also for the nature of the body of mankind; even for this reason, because *it is* declared *that* the sun *has* progressed through the radiance and glory of the liberal, and the nature of the body of mankind is preserved by the sun.

14. This, too, that by him whose desire is for anything virtuous, and who possesses authority through virtue, mankind are controlled to persist (*māntiṇḍanō*) in virtue for receiving a reward¹; even for this reason, because *he* whose desire is virtuous seeks happiness for every one—a pre-eminent desire for the happiness of human existence *being* the desire of mankind for virtue—and by him who requires that, *and* strives for *it* fully, so far as possible for him, any one whatever is brought to persist in virtue and to constrain the spirit for reward; and by him who possesses authority through virtue the continuance of mankind in authority *and* *their* persistence *and* instruction in virtue are attached to good works and are brought to reward. 15. This, too, that by him who possesses happiness through appropriation of the sacred beings mankind are attached to the sacred beings for receiving a reward²; even for this reason, because, on account of the possession of

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 10 b.

² Ibid. 10 c.

happiness through appropriation of the sacred beings, he possesses *it* through the assistance and gratification of the good, and mankind shall therefore make him an example; it also becomes a good work for them, *and* they adhere to the sacred beings for receiving a reward.

16. This, too, that by him who produces the benediction *of* him that is a conductor of investigation *and* a righteous judge, and who shall also occasion the reverence of the good, the teaching of the advantage of the righteous¹ is likewise performed; even for this reason, because the essentials (*mâdîgân*) of the advantage of the world are two—one owing to justice, *and* one owing to generosity—and it is declared *that* the advantage of *him* who possesses the blessings of the judges is owing to the justice of the judges, and the advantage of *him* who is reverent *to* the good is owing to the generosity of the good in developing the world, and the righteous teach about *it*.

17. Righteousness is perfect excellence.

CHAPTER LIII.

Bakš Nask.

1. The seventh fargard, Tâ-ve-urvâtâ², is *that* by him who possesses advantage through virtue, the world of righteousness is *freed* from³ destruction⁴; even for this reason, because the possession of advantage through virtue arises through the non-participation of the demons *and* the vile therein, and the participation of the sacred beings *and* the

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 11 c.

² See Chap. VIII, 1 n.

³ Assuming that *mûn*, 'which,' stands for *min*.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 1 b.

good; and, when *one* shall act so, the advantage of spiritual origin becomes more powerful through guarding the advantage from the destroyers. 2. This, too, that, by him who welcomes Aûharmazd in *his* person, apostates are likewise forced to make the religion of Aûharmazd progressive¹; even for this reason, because owing to² the apostasy of apostates *being* a religion produced *by* Aharman, *they are* only able to make the religion progressive through the appellation of Aûharmazd; apostasy *and* priesthood, *and* the apostates *and* priests, are fraternal opponents, and whenever the priesthood and multitudes of the priesthood are triumphant, multitudes of the apostates of apostasy perish (aôshênd), and when the multitudes of the apostates of apostasy are bold, the priests of the priesthood are weak; and the priests are superior *in* power *and* success when their priesthood is properly limited, and their properly-limited priesthood, too—which can arise through mankind—consists in the welcome precedence of Aûharmazd.

3. About the completeness (spôrikîh) of the priesthood in that quality now, when the priests of the multitude are the habitation (mêhônô) of Aûharmazd, *and* the power of the priests of the priesthood *has* increased, the valour of the apostates of apostasy is smitten, and the apostates are defeated *by* the abundant splendour of the priests, also their power as regards making the religion of Aharman progressive through the appellation of Aûharmazd is fettered, *and* they keep apostasy concealed³.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 1 c.

² Assuming that lâ, 'not,' stands for râf.

³ The passage in the Pahlavi commentary on this Nask, which

4. And then also they, with the appellation of priests, truly speak and teach the religion of Aûharmazd, and make *it* progressive, just as it is solemnized and made easy by them, even though the will of the sacred beings *be* unheard *and* undesired through apostasy.

5. This, too, that he proclaims the miraculousness of Aûharmazd¹, who shall appoint for ordeal that which is certainly a doubt; even for this reason, because, through accomplishing an ordeal, that which is doubtful is forcibly rendered visible (*vênâvda-hakî-attö*) to the eyes, *as* certain clearness, through the power of the spirit, *which* is itself a miracle of Aûharmazd. 6. This, too, that by him who shall make a public decision thereon, *as to* the acquitted and convicted², gratification is afforded to him whose maintenance of the dispute² is righteous; even for this reason, because the needful is delivered by him to its own requirer *who* thereby becomes even renowned. 7. This, too, that even the rite of ordeal [is produced]³ by him [who is an advantage to the righteous; for this reason, because the rite of ordeal is for the advancement of the ordeal, and the religious ordeal] proceeds through sovereignty; these righteous are those of the good religion, and their advantage is that belonging to the multitude, which is the sovereignty now, *and* every one who is given for that advantage, to the

is here described, must evidently have been written shortly after some great triumph of the priesthood over some heresy, probably either that of Mânî, or that of Mazdak.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 2 b.

² Ibid. 3 a.

³ Ibid. 3 b. The words in brackets translate a passage inserted in the MS. at the time the folios were patched, like that in Chap. LII, 7, 8.

righteous *of* those of the good religion, becomes the performer of any rite of ordeal really produced, because the origin of that giving of advantage is even the rite of ordeal. 8. This, too, that by him who gives a priest and righteous *man* for propagating the religion, the rite of ordeal is also proclaimed; even for this reason, because the teacher and *one* rightly merciful (hû-âmûr'ztâdâr) give¹ the sacred text by which even the rite of ordeal is declared.

9. This, too, that *he* who recites the revelation of Aûharmazd, and who shall do *it* with exceeding goodness, becomes an increaser of wisdom; even for this reason, because the wisdom of a man increases in these two ways, either he speaks *and* teaches himself, or he exemplifies the excellence of a portion to the wise who become speakers and teachers of wisdom. 10. This, too, that his homage is for Aûharmazd, who thoroughly teaches a righteous employer *of* animals and human beings (kîrâ va-vîr) that he considers *him* as their controller (da-stôbar); because, since the productiveness of the completion of the creatures is produced through the nourishment of the creatures *by* Aûharmazd through his fulfilling his own productiveness, that righteous employer *in* the world is *intended* for the nourishment of his creatures, owing to that outward subjection and propitiation of theirs, *and* the righteous employer is connected with *their* subjection and propitiation *for* the creator.

11. This, too, that by him who gives thought to the religion of Zaratûst, the soul is given to Zara-

¹ Assuming that yehevûnd, 'they are,' stands for yehabûnd.

tûst; even for this reason, because with a man's *having* given thought to the religion of Zaratûst is connected the receiving of his soul *by* Zaratûst for preservation from hell. 12. This, too, that by him who teaches the nature of the sacred beings to mankind, consultation with Aûharmazd is also further taught; even for this reason, because the nature of the sacred beings is consulting a spiritual lord, *and* becomes also the consulting of Aûharmazd.

13. This, too, that by him who keeps the produce of sheep as the property of Aûharmazd, a sheep is given to him who is diligent *and* moderate¹; even for this reason, because produce kept as the property of Aûharmazd is for *being* given for good works, *being* given for good works is *being* truly kept as a beginning for the possession of produce, and a beginning truly kept is kept even through a sheep, as a beginning of excellence, in the control (dastôbarîh) of him who is a diligent *and* moderate shepherd².

14. This, too, that by him who is liberal to the liberal the increase owing to developers is brought into the world; even for this reason, because a liberal *man*, on account of even that gift given back to the worthy, becomes even for us—through the development of the world—him who is first praised therein with the sacred beings. 15. This, too, that whoever shall form a store for sheep, becomes an agent even in the development *of* sheep *by* the creator; because, on account of the increase of sheep through the existence of nourishment for them *having* arisen, whoever has arranged nourishment for sheep, becomes an agent even in the de-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 10 a.

² Ibid. 10 b.

velopment *of* sheep *by* the creator. 16. This, too, that by him who teaches *inward* prayer (*vākakō*) to the good, it is also taught *to* eaters; even for this reason, because, everything connected with eating *being* declared by the religion, when the religion is taught by *any* one to the good, in which even that information is proclaimed, even eaters are taught about it. 17. This, too, that whoever maintains a sheep, *or* human being, as our property, is taught to maintain it through the high-priest of Zaratūst; even for this reason, because it *is* so maintained as the property of the sacred beings, when he maintains *it* as the property of Zaratūst.

18. This, too, that by him who gave predominance to those of the nature of Gâyômarđ¹, the sovereignty also of those of the religion of Zaratūst is desired; even for this reason, because the religion of Zaratūst is the nature of Gâyômarđ, and the nature of Gâyômarđ is the religion of Zaratūst. 19. This, too, that when *one is* alone among rulers a way of speaking to the rulers such words *as are* really true is thereby provided; even for this reason, because the utterance *of* blessings *by* a solitary *person* is for advantage. 20. This, too, that by him who keeps the sovereignty which is his within the will of Aûharmazd, the best thing is done unto Aûharmazd; even for this reason, because a sovereignty is so kept within the will of Aûharmazd when he who is the ruler gives to Aûharmazd the individuality in which is the sovereignty, and when its proximity and closeness have given to Aûharmazd that thing which is best *and* supreme.

21. This, too, that when *one* teaches the sayings

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 11 b, and Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 1.

(*vâkakô*) of the benefitters, the information which is owing to the religion is illustrated¹ by him to his own; even for this reason, because the knowledge of religion, which is in *its* causing liberality by him, is increased even by the repeated enquiry of disciples. 22. This, too, that by him who teaches an applicant the virtuous way and doctrine (*pand*) the liturgy is then taught; even for this reason, because knowledge arises through the virtuous course of the liturgy². 23. This, too, that by him who thinks of the affairs of virtue, the liturgy is maintained *and* taught with virtuousness²; even for this reason, because the maintenance of the liturgy with virtuousness arises through virtuous thinking.

24. This, too, that whoever shall provide the nourishment of creatures with propriety, his Vohûman (*good thought*) is Aûharmazd's progeny³; and whoever properly maintains those which are in his keeping, his position becomes Aûharmazd's fatherhood of Vohûman⁴; even for this reason, because every proper nourishing is that in which the nourished becomes an offspring such as Vohûman unto Aûharmazd; and every proper protection of the creatures, over those which are protected by it, is a fatherhood such as *that of* Aûharmazd over Vohûman. 25. This, too, that by him who shall provide nourishment with propriety *for* the creation which is good, it is taught *that* the good creation *was* produced *by* Aûharmazd; even for this reason, because from the nourishment of the creation with propriety, *together* with the discriminating action of the nourisher, the goodness of the nourished is also

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 6 a.

² Ibid. 6 b.

³ Ibid. 8 a.

⁴ Ibid. 8 b.

evident, from the goodness of the nourished creation the goodness *of* him who is its creator is evident, and the creator of the good creation is Aûharmazd himself.

26. This, too, that whoever shall spiritually make Aûharmazd the ruler over his own person becomes a ruler as to actions¹; even for this reason, because whoever is making Aûharmazd ruler over *his* person is a leader of wisdom, a leader of wisdom is a decider taking account of sin and good works, taking account of sin and good works is abstaining from sin *and* practising good works, and owing to abstinence *from* sin and practising good works *one* becomes a ruler over actions. 27. This, too, that Spendarmad² is given to Aûharmazd by him who is as reverent unto Aûharmazd as a daughter unto a father; even for this reason, because the Spendarmadic nature (*Spendarmadîh*) is provided by him *for* Aûharmazd.

28. This, too, that for him *who* thinks of the care of cattle *there* arises that wisdom³ which the control (*patîh*) of cattle gives; even for this reason, because the nature of the wisdom *for* a production of cattle is provided in mankind, and, when mankind apply *their* thoughts to seeking that wisdom, they obtain *it*. 29. This, too, that by him who is admitting the male *to* cattle at the *proper* time, the care of cattle is also thought of; even for this reason, because the admittance of the male becomes productiveness, and whoever⁴ would cause productiveness thinks also of nourishment.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 8 c.

² Ibid. 9 a, and Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3.

³ Ibid. 9 a.

⁴ Assuming that *min*, 'from,' stands for *mûn*.

30. This, too, that by him who *has* prepared *himself* for the priests the way to yonder¹ *world* is taught; even for this reason, because the way to yonder *world* is declared by the religion, and its indicator is the priest; therefore, by him who is prepared for the priests, through discipleship, that way is known and is made known. 31. This, too, that *in* him who shall do that which is something that is an assistance to the renovation *of the universe*, thoughts of the bounty (dahîh) of the creator arise; even for this reason, because creativeness is through thinking of the renovation, thinking of the renovation arises through the renovation, the renovation arises through anything which is done that is an assistance of the renovation, the doing of anything that is an assistance of the renovation is through thinking of sagacity, and thinking of sagacity becomes thoughts of the bounty of the creator.

32. This, too, that by him who loves the affairs of the archangels a heart and mind², *for* not being misled from the way of the sacred beings, are recommended to mankind; even for this reason, because from the religion of the sacred beings *being* loved *arises* increasing power of the sacred beings, from the increasing power of the sacred beings *arises* their greater authority among mankind, *and* from the greater authority of the sacred beings among mankind arises the resistance of heart and mind of mankind, even in their not being misled by the very demons. 33. This, too, that whoever shall act with reverence *to* Vohûman sees the sin which is concealed in *him* mingled with good works there-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 9 b.

² Ibid. 12 b.

by¹; even for this reason, because reverence for Vohūman becomes submission (hêrth) in virtuousness, with virtuous submission are connected freedom from Kikship and from Karapship², and with freedom from Kikship and from Karapship *is connected one* sound of life *and* eye, whereby *he* is an observant decider, and atonement *for* sin arises from good works.

34. This, too, that by him who shall provide liberality for the liberal, the giving of a loan³ to mankind is also taught; even for this reason, because liberal giving by any one is accounting for his own debt, and he endeavours to repay *it* fully observantly and with complete gratification; besides that, the power of liberality becomes extendible among mankind, *and* through loans and other gifts³ of generosity (dahisnikth) they become ardent.

35. This, too, that by him who pays homage (franâmêdō) to the affairs of Aûharmazd, as much as he is able, the non-injury of the innocent is also taught; even for this reason, because to intertwine further (frôvâftanō) with the affairs of Aûharmazd, as much as possible, is first *to commit* no sin *and* to perform as many good works as possible, *and* abstaining from the essentials of sin is non-injury of the innocent. 36. This, too, that by him who possesses a ruler and high-priest Aûharmazd is

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 13 c, where, after hômaniḥ, J₂, Pt₄, and Mf₄ insert the following words: vinâs dên avō kirfakō gûmikhthō yekavimûnêdō, madam aharâyih ak sardâr hômaniḥ.

² Pahl. akîkth va-akarapth; see Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXV, 13 n for the two idolatrous priestly tribes here alluded to. On its second occurrence the first word is corrupted into âkâs which closely resembles akîgth in Pahlavi letters.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 14 b.

spiritually made ruler over his person¹; even for this reason, because, through the requirement of *Aûharmazd*, the angels are lord and master of the worldly *existence* of that *man*.

37. This, too, that whoever decides duty and opinion becomes also an informer of others; even for this reason, because it informs others that *he* is possessing wisdom, and this is what is said, that 'the wisdom of a man is evident from *his* deciding as to affairs.' 38. This, too, that whoever shall provide nurture with propriety becomes also an indicator (*dakhshakintâdâr*)² *for* others; even for this reason, because the happiness of the nurturer becomes also a happy indicator even *for* thee; and this, too, is what *one* says, that 'always good, happy, *and* free from serfs³ is he who is not a master of vagabonds (*padô-t pûân*).'

39. This, too, that by him who is a ruler who, by a command given, appoints him who is liturgical (*mânsarik*), and gives anything to him which it is desirable to give, the necessary demeanour for true *and* virtuous statements⁴ is taught; even for this reason, because the uttering of true *and* virtuous statements, in fearlessness⁴ of rulers, is owing to a well-established sovereignty, and their well-established sovereignty is more particularly through these two *things*, good commanding and helpfulness; when they establish that liturgical *one* by a command given *it* is good commanding, and when they give

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 16 a.

² Ibid. 17 c.

³ Pahl. *avârûnô*; but, as freedom from servants is not exactly an Oriental idea of happiness, the word may also be read *anâlônô*, a possible variant of *anâlânô*, 'unlamenting.'

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 19 b.

anything to him which it is desirable to give the helpfulness is provided; also, owing to their good commanding, the helpfulness is a good establishment *of* the sovereignty, owing to a well-established sovereignty *there* is fearlessness also in uttering true *and* virtuous statements, and, owing to freedom from concealment in uttering true *and* virtuous statements, the necessary demeanour for true *and* virtuous statements arises. 40. This, too, that *he* who gives personal service unto the king of kings, and who considers the product (bar) as the property of Aûharmazd, is empowered for indicating the acquitted and convicted¹ *by* the spirits, his indicators of the acquitted *and* convicted; even for this reason, because the person *being* given in service to the king of kings is the preparation (ntvârisnô) of subjection, and the product *being* considered as the property of Aûharmazd is to consider the innocence of *its* origin (bûn) and to make the product well-selecting (hû-kînakô) through virtuousness; owing to the progress of these two, the virtuousness in the world becomes great *and* increasing productiveness for all the good spiritual and worldly *existences* which are in it, even those who are angels indicating the acquitted and convicted.

41. This, too, that by him who becomes immortal progress² for him who is immortally progressive, complete progress² is given to him who is completely progressive; and its routine (dâdîstân), too,

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 19 c.

² Ibid. 21 a; amarg-rûbisnîh and hamâk-rûbisnîh are Pahlavi translations of Av. ameretâd and haurvatâd, as may be seen in Ibid. 6 b.

is even this, that by him who wishes¹ to make that which is his own soul immortal, *and* would afford *it* assistance, every benefit is given to him who is a suppliant *for* every benefit *and* becomes a giver of every benefit which he begs, which becomes an assistance to him whom he asks in attaining thereto. 42. This, too, that whoever gratifies that which is enjoyment renders *his* soul immortal; even for this reason, because the soul subsists through good works, and good works are all those which gratify enjoyment. 43. This, too, that whoever keeps himself always in good works² has produced perfection and happiness by any goodness *and* worthiness of his; even for this reason, because keeping oneself always in good works becomes perfect diligence in industry, within perfect diligence in industry is also comprised opposition to any harm whatever, and it is opposition to harm and perfect goodness that are worthy of every happiness.

44. This, too, that by him who possesses wealth as high-priest of the priests, predominance as their high-priest is maintained³ *and* taught; even for this reason, because the provision of sovereignty and *its* progress are really through wealth. 45. This, too, that by him who would act for the pleasure of others, owing to virtue, the growth *and* increase owing to Vohûman⁴ are produced; even for this reason, because that which has given virtuous pleasure is the nourishment of the creatures by the producer of increase and growth.

46. This, too, that by him who welcomes Aûhar-

¹ Written yetîbunêd with mû above it as a partial correction into yezbemûnêd which is evidently the proper word.

² See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 21 a. ³ Ibid. 21 b. ⁴ Ibid. 21 c.

mazd in *himself*¹, and teaches good works to mankind, every virtuous instruction is taught; even for this reason, because the welcoming of Aûharmazd in *oneself* is the non-committal of sin, *and* the teaching of good works to mankind is more particularly the performance of good works oneself; innocence and the practising of good works are the end of every instruction, and *he* in whom they exist becomes a teacher of every goodness. 47. This, too, that by him who shall occasion benefit through him who is a propagator of good works, the evidence of him *who is* well-informed² is taught through *one* well-informed; even for this reason, because the chief evidence as to sagacity is to occasion benefit for the good. 48. This, too, that by him who gives commands as to the affairs of Aûharmazd, Aûharmazd is made welcome in *his* person¹; even for this reason, because the throne of Aûharmazd in the worldly *existence* is more particularly in a ruler of well-commanding person.

49. The excellence *of* righteousness is perfect.

CHAPTER LIV.

Bakō Nask.

1. The eighth fargard, *Hva êtumaiti*³, is *that* by him who teaches wisdom to others the not being deceived by an apostate into confusing a righteous *one* (aharûbō-bartîth) is also taught⁴; even for this reason, because he who *has* taught is not deceived.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 22 c.

² Ibid. 22 a.

³ See Chap. IX, 1 n; it is here written khvamaftō in Pahlavi.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 1-4.

2. This, too, that by him who is as reverent *unto* Aûharmazd as a daughter *unto* a father, and who is also a gratifier of virtuous doers, Spendarmad¹ is *made one* of the archangels, and *one* is also made to love *her*; even for this reason, because through that Spendarmadic *one being* reverent *unto* Aûharmazd, and the gratification of the good *by* him, the archangels love and preserve her Spendarmadic nature (Spendarmadīgih). 3. This, too, that he who is loving Vohûman is taught by his wisdom not to destroy (nasâninīdanō)² the religion of Aûharmazd; even for this reason, because wisdom maintains the religion in virtue, and others are taught about it.

4. This, too, that by him who gives *himself* in discipleship *unto* the priests, *and* who asks again that which he does not understand, learning (âmûkō) is taught; even for this reason, because the asking *for* knowledge again *by him* who *has* given *himself* in discipleship to a wise priest, increases knowledge; and the friends of knowledge, therefore, make him an example, and shall practise asking again, that which they do not understand, *from* the disciples of the priests.

5. This, too, that whoever is *in accordance* with Zaratûst, through pure affection, becomes, in like manner, *him* who is giving strength *to* the will of the archangels and the commands *of* the good; even for this reason, because these two capabilities *are* of the special nature of Zaratûst. 6. This, too, that through the discrimination of him who loves³ Vohûman Aû-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 2 c, and Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3.

² Ibid. 4 c.

³ Ibid. 8 c. It is possible to read the verbal stem gōsh, 'hear,'

harmazd is gratified ; even for this reason, because *one* loving Vohūman is loving wisdom and *has* taught wisdom, wisdom taught is discrimination, and the discriminator becomes a gratifier of Aûharmazd.

7. This, too, that whoever gives thought to the religion of Zaratûst is taught wisdom ; even for this reason, because all the wisdom of the good religion is taught to him by giving thought. 8. This, too, that whoever *has* kept wealth in the control¹ of Zaratûst becomes taught, *and* is *one* who is reverent *to* the benefitters ; even for this reason, because whoever is reverent *to* the supporters of religion keeps wealth in the control *of* the supporters of religion, *and*, when kept by him in their control, it is kept by him in that of Zaratûst.

9. This, too, that his destiny is connected with himself who practises industry. 10. This, too, that his good works *for* arranging the creation become his own who has fully prepared his own person.

11. The excellence *of* righteousness is perfect.

CHAPTER LV.

Bakō Nask.

1. The ninth fargard, Yathâis², is *that* by him who praises Aûharmazd *his* work in the Gâthic lore³ is taught ; even for this reason, because the reason of the praise even of Aûharmazd is for *his* works, *and* by him who extols any work the performance

instead of dōsh (Av. zush) ; but this is hardly possible in § 2, and gōshîdanō is not the usual Pahlavi for 'to hear.'

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXII, 9 b.

² See Chap. X, 1 n ; it is here written yatâyîs in Pahlavi.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIII, 1 a.

of that work is also taught; *moreover* the work of Aûharmazd, *which is* the Gâthic lore, is pure goodness. 2. This, too, that by him who increases the propagators of good works priestly-controlled action (radîk-kûnîsnîh)¹ is taught; even for this reason, because the advancement of merit and the action of priestly chieftainship are the two maxims (vâkākō) of one who, when *there is* reason, exalts progressive merit when he increases the propagators of good works; and when progressive merit is exalted priestly-controlled action is praised and also taught.

3. This, too, that what is worthy, *and* what is coveted for every worthy *man*, is produced by him for whom the command of the liturgy is the reckoning for him who is habitually sagacious; and this statement also indicates the explanation of rulers *and* all who are needing those of the world for one combined effort, who, in the immature world, *have to* trust a command that is *at* one time sagacious.

4. This, too, that personal assistance is liberally given (râdînîdō) to the creatures of the good *beings* by him whose deeds are an assistance of the renovation *of the universe*; and this statement, too, also indicates the great power *of* any good work whatever, because every good work, *being* an assistance of the renovation, becomes liberality *to* the immature (khâm) creation.

5. This, too, that whoever teaches to a son reverence unto *his* father has also appropriated the reward for reverence unto the creator for teaching that person; even for this reason, because express reverence unto parents and service to them are connected

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIII, 1 b.

with reverence unto the creator and service to him. 6. This, too, that whoever is personally progress for him who is his own¹—that is, for any one whatever among those who are needing him—becomes the happiness of the creator who is the maker of the original good creations; and this statement also indicates as to whom *it is*, when, through him whose decision is progress—which *arises* through that which *occurs* when the decision is given that becomes for every one that which is needful for him—there is happiness that is concentrated. 7. This, too, that by him who is causing benefit for him who is a cultivator cattle² are multiplied; even for this reason, because a gratifier of the performers of tillage is multiplying tillage, *and* cattle are the chief tillage of the world.

8. This, too, that the religion which is the way of righteousness is made his own³ by him who is a good thinker about the religion of righteousness; and this statement, too, also indicates the limit of reliance (*astisnō*) upon the good religion; because whoever is not a good thinker about the good religion, even though he be a reciter of revelation, becomes really an apostate; whoever is a good thinker, *but* not about the good religion, becomes really an infidel; and whoever thinks truly becomes a good thinker about religious righteousness and the statements in the good religion. 9. And about three statements, the bringer forward *for* all mankind is your submission to the sacred beings; one is of the produce (*bar*), one of the origin (*būn*), and

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIII, 3 a.

² Ibid. 3 b, c.

³ Ibid. 5 c.

one of the body and life ; that of the produce is the exertion from which *there* is produce, that of the origin is the advantage for which the origin is requisite, and that of the body and life is the thought of the proposer (râyīnīdār), which considered both as submission *to* the sacred beings. 10. This, too, that connected with the sitting-place of the sage is the excessiveness *of* the pleasure¹ for those causing pleasure, for the upper classes (*avarīgānō*) of Irân, *and* for the energy (patûkīh)¹ of the diligent.

11. Excellence *that is* perfect is righteousness.

CHAPTER LVI.

Bakō Nask.

1. The tenth fargard, Yâ-shyaothanâ², is *that*, for him who is practising good works³ as much as *it* is possible for him *to do*, an efficacious reason *for* the renovation *of the universe* is afforded assistance ; even for this reason, when every good work is an assistance *to* the renovation, then—according to the declaration *that* whoever *does* much more good work is more assisting the renovation—by him who is practising good works as much as *it* is possible for him *to do*, an efficacious reason for the renovation is afforded assistance. 2. This, too, that the apostate⁴, who is the seduction of mankind, is injured by him who devotes himself to Aûharmazd ; even for this reason, because he is dislodged *and* is elucidated

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIII, 13 a.

² See Chap. XI, 1 n ; it is here written yâ-shâôtnō in Pahlavi.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIV, 1 a.

⁴ Ibid. 8 a.

(adivâgi-aitō rôshant-aitō), *and there* arises a class of mankind *who* see the admission (parvânakih) of the apostate into hell, and he is disabled when *it* is seen by them.

3. This, too, that by him who is eager¹ for knowledge, knowledge is grasped *and* taught; even for this reason, because knowledge is taught through that which is the instruction of every science *and* the original desire for it, and mankind shall extol his knowledge; it is also coveted by them for *being* taught, and they mount and grasp *it*. 4. This, too, that to slay² an apostate is taught by the good *one* who is united (hami-ait) with a good *man*; even for this reason, because the destruction (aôsh) of Aharman arises from the union of the good. 5. This, too, that by him who is a disturber (vishûftâr) as to Vohûman the production of development through Vohûmanic rule³ is taught; sinners lawfully subjected to the bridge *judgment* (pûhalînidō) *for* Vohûmanic disturbance, and the command for it by rulers and high-priests, being a preparation *for* the development of the world.

6. This, too, that a great ordinance⁴ is taught by him whose ceremonial⁵ is for Aûharmazd; even for this reason, because a comprehension of Aûharmazd and serving him are the foundation of joy (parkân bûn), and the ownership and concentration (hangerdîkih) of all good works are themselves the great ordinance of the faithful whose preparation is through the ownership, and their welcome is more particularly in the ceremonial; owing to the same

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIV, 9 a.

² Ibid. 11 b.

³ Ibid. 12 a, b.

⁴ Ibid. 10 c.

⁵ Ibid. 12 a.

reason, the original possession of the great ordinance of the ceremonial which is Aûharmazd's own, and of other good works—even though *relating* to the ceremonial of Aûharmazd of every kind owing thereto—is necessary for the manifestation of the great ordinance, and is incorporated (ham-tanû) *with it* when it becomes manifest as a great ordinance, or as more than a great ordinance; even then its extent (vâlisnô) is over this joy. 7. This, too, that the performance (sakhtârîh) of a ceremonial¹ of the needy is a gift to the worthy of the creation, and a gift to the worthy of the creation is the attraction (hâkhtârîh) of a ceremonial of the needy.

8. This, too, that the way of righteousness², also that through which that way is seen, *and* likewise the reward of those lonely-labouring (aêvar'zîkân) therein are taught by him whose deeds are an advantage to the sacred beings; even for this reason, because the advantage of the sacred beings is the advantage of the multitude, and the advantage of the multitude, which is itself the religion of the sacred beings that is a guide, is the way of righteousness and also that through which is the reward of those lonely-labouring. 9. This, too, that even the reward of a teacher of professionals, which is the profit of the profession, is liberally given and appropriated for the professionals taught; even for this reason, because the business of the sacred beings has profited by the instruction (âmûkô).

10. Excellence *that is perfect* is righteousness.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIV, 12 a.

² Ibid. 12 c.

CHAPTER LVII.

Bakō Nask.

1. The eleventh fargard, the Yasna¹, is *that* the whole of the good works *which are* to accomplish, *and* those, too, which are accomplished², are appropriated *by* the righteous *man* who teaches virtue³ to the righteous; even for this reason, of the good works which *one* accomplishes, *and* those, too, which are accomplished, *there* is all one store (anbâr), from the work (var'zō) of the original good creation even to the renovation *of the universe*, *and* ever afresh the teaching of virtue *by those* who are righteous comes to the accumulation of the righteous and the accomplishment of that store, *and* they, too, are in possession of that store, *in* partnership with the other righteous. 2. This, too, that *it is* because he would do the best for his own⁴, whose meditation of the liturgy is for those who are archangels, and who also maintains, for the assistance of the good, the strength which is his for the existences. 3. And this statement indicates the great participation of any one in that store, because when that store is really an accumulation of work on the way, for the partners in that store who *have done* more, and also *those* who *have* accomplished less, *and* remains, moreover, in the possession of them all, then, *as to* those accomplishing more of it, through the original possession of most of that work, and also through that which *occurs* when the accomplishers have attained to that plenty more particularly owing to their more labour, and likewise through the property, liberally,

¹ See Chap. XII, 1 n; it is here written yastô in Pahlavi.

² See Pahl. Yas. XXXV, 5.

³ Ibid. 4.

⁴ Ibid. 6.

largely, and lordlily, of those accomplishing more, and the indigence, unafflictedly¹, scantily, and subordinately, of those accomplishing less, *it is* reasonable to speak of that store *as* in their possession, and *of their* superiority *as* greatly over those accomplishing less. 4. This, too, that his work is good work whose liberality is for the archangels; even for this reason, because through a little labour *for* the sacred beings, which is itself that liberality, he contributes duty and good works.

5. This, too, that it becomes best for him, in both existences², who teaches a wishing for living in diligence to mankind; even for this reason, because he is a preserver of them through the wishing for living, and *his* soul, through the diligence owing to him, attains perfection, here from mankind *and in* yonder *world* from the sacred beings. 6. This, too, that the ceremonial and obeisance of Aûharmazd³ are performed by him who is in the way of like thinking and like praising of the law of Aûharmazd with all the worshippers of Aûharmazd. 7. This, too, that he is in the leadership of his religion⁴ who makes the knowledge of religion ever afresh; even for this reason, because every item of knowledge which he provides increases some greatness of it. 8. This, too, that he is in the service of his religion⁴ who demands the knowledge of religion ever afresh; even for this reason, because so long as he demands more, he becomes nearer to a knowledge of religion.

¹ Pahl. abêshîhâ, but it should perhaps be avêshîhâ, 'unabundantly.'

² See Pahl. Yas. XXXV, 9.

³ Ibid. 19.

⁴ Ibid. 22.

9. This, too, that mankind's wishing for life is authorised (dastovarīntāð) by him who authorises the production of anything for mankind; even for this reason, because authority (dastōbarīh) over the production of anything is conjoined with that which is for the wishing for life; so that whosever production of anything is authorisedly, their life is *free* from any discomfort; and whosever wishing for life is authorisedly, his production of anything is also authorisedly. 10. This, too, that acceptance, hints, and words are given¹ to Aûharmazd by him who asks again, that which he does not understand of the religion, from him who does understand; even for this reason, because knowledge is completed through these three *things*: obtainment, hints, and speaking, and all three are asked again by him who does not understand. 11. This, too, that the words of Aûharmazd² are taught by him who teaches the acceptance, remembrance, and speaking *of* the religion; even for this reason, because this is the recital of that compendium (hangerdīkīh).

12. This, too, that the care³ *and* reverence of fire are provided by him who is liberal to a fire as regards anything he supplies *for* the care *and* reverence which *others* shall provide *for* the fire, and he becomes equally rewarded for it. 13. This, too, that by him who teaches the religion of Aûharmazd with joyfulness⁴, the care *and* reverence of fire are

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXV, 25.

² Ibid. 27.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XXXVI, 1. This section implies that the attendant who feeds a fire with fuel supplied by others, obtains an equal share of merit with them.

⁴ Ibid. 4, 5.

provided as declared by the religion; even for this reason, because even that *which* is taught by him combines with the action due to that teaching.

14. This, too, that the obeisance¹ to those requiring obeisance is arranged *by him* who loves Vohûman.

15. This, too, that fire is strengthened—for that work, achieved in the future existence, which is the greatest² that exists—by him who invokes fire with the title of fire; even for this reason, because the title is put by him upon a nature that is laudable, and when invoked by him with that title the praised *one* is then strengthened by him.

16. This, too, that he becomes informed as to the religion of Aûharmazd³, who teaches the religion of Aûharmazd with pleasure; even for this reason, because every knowledge is exercised *and* increased by teaching. 17. This, too, that Aûharmazd is propitiated by the excellent sagacity of him who teaches virtuous words and actions⁴; even for this reason, because sagacity *has* two parts, the speakable and the workable. 18. This, too, that the bodily form (kerpö) of Aûharmazd is praised as perfection (nêvakötûmth)⁵ by him who elevates (bâlistînêdö) his own soul⁶ to the station of the sun⁷; even for this reason, because that bodily form of Aûharmazd exists, and becomes the loftiest *and* most perfect in the station of the sun.

19. This, too, that all excellence is purely produced for Aûharmazd by him who has root in the

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXVI, 5.

² Ibid. 7.

³ Ibid. 14.

⁷ Ibid. 16; the highest grade of heaven below the supreme heaven, which latter is called Garôdmân (see Sls. VI, 3 n).

² Ibid. 6.

⁴ Ibid. 11.

⁵ Ibid. 15.

possession of *Aûharmazd*; even for this reason, because, when a root is given to him, fruit is also produced by him, and all excellence is *both* root and fruit¹. 20. This, too, that *Aûharmazd* is invoked with the title 'lord²' by him whom *Aûharmazd* calls; even for this reason, because the interpretation of '*Aûharmazd*' is really with *the words* 'greatly wise lord' (*mas dânâk khûdâi*). 21. This, too, that the names of the sacred beings *which are* invoked³ are the praise glorified by *any* one, and by him who glorifies them they are named; even for this reason, because the names of the sacred beings are the glorification due to their names of praise. 22. This, too, that among those of the same class (*ham-gôharân*), when he shall do *it* for one race⁴, benefit is produced by him for other races within that class; among those of the same races (*ham-tôkhmakânân*), when he shall produce benefit for one species, *it is done* by him also for other species within that race; and among the same species (*ham sarâd'akö*), when he shall produce benefit for one individual (*kerpö*), *it is done* by him for other individuals within that species.

23. This, too, that his personality (*khûdih*) is the sacred beings' own⁵, who maintains the rites⁶ with the assistance of the righteous. 24. This, too, that his own is in the guardianship⁷ of the sacred beings, whose vehemence is through Good Thought;

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXVII (=V), 2.

² Ibid. 6.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XXXVIII, 10-12.

⁴ Ibid. 13-15.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIX, 13.

⁶ Assuming that *𐭠𐭣* atân stands for *𐭠𐭣* âyinân, as *mûn atân* is ungrammatical.

⁷ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIX, 15.

even for this reason, because his bravery is for the law. 25. This, too, that life is given to mankind by him who shall do that which is able to remain good for them. 26. This, too, that the friendship of Aûharmazd is appropriated by him who has Aûharmazd as a guardian, and perpetual guardianship is appropriated by him who teaches to mankind that thing which becomes their perpetual guardianship *in yonder world*.

27. This, too, that he causes righteousness¹ who thinks of anything which is virtuous. 28. This, too, that he has caused the good commands and propitiousness² of Aûharmazd, who gives *his* body and life³ to the sacred beings; and body *and* life are given to the sacred beings by him who affords friendship to the religion of Zaratûst. 29. And this, too, that to him who affords friendship to Aûharmazd it occurs owing to the guardianship of Aûharmazd; and that guardianship is perpetually⁴ connected with him who teaches to others that thing which always constitutes their companionship with the sacred beings.

30. Excellence *that* is perfect *is* righteousness.

CHAPTER LVIII.

Bakō Nask.

1. The twelfth fargard, Ustavaiti⁵, is *that* the benefit of him who is reverent *to* the benefiter is the benefit of any one whatever⁶; even for this

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XL, 7.

² See Pahl. Yas. XLI, 6.

³ Ibid. 7.

⁴ Ibid. 17.

⁵ See Chap. XIII, 1 n; it is here written aûstâtō in Pahlavi.

⁶ See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 1 a.

reason, because the benefit of the immature creation is owing to carrying *out* the commands of a benefiting spiritual lord. 2. This, too, that whoever pleases superiors by submission, is pleased by inferiors. 3. This, too, that by him who gives thought to the religion of Zaratûst, that which is best for his own in every mode¹ is produced, because he has attained to the religion who is listening best. 4. This, too, that virtue is taught by him to all the creatures of the beneficent spirit, *to* the righteous whose stepping forth (fravâmisnō) is for the righteous; even for this reason, because the creatures of the beneficent spirit are all *of* one nature, *and* the stepping forth (fragâmisnō) and hastening of the limbs of one body become those of the whole *of* that body. 5. This, too, that his spirit is connected with Aûharmazd², and his knowledge is accepted, who loves Vohûman; even for this reason, because the spirit *who* is the original spiritual lord of knowledge is Vohûman. 6. This, too, that just giving is taught by him whose words are through Vohûman³; even for this reason, because the speaking of virtuous words becomes the teaching of knowledge in which *there* is also just giving.

7. This, too, that joy which is of long duration is produced⁴ for his own by him who brings forth strength through virtue, *and* who also assists him who is unborn; even for this reason, because joy which is perpetual increases by both. 8. This, too, that by him who is an assistance of those in the proper way, the proper way is taught to mankind⁵;

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 2 a.

³ Ibid. 2 d.

² Ibid. 2 c.

⁴ Ibid. 2 e.

⁵ Ibid. 3 b.

even for this reason, because *he is* making mankind long for *that* way. 9. This, too, that heat is given to fire¹ by him who *tells* truth to the invokers; even for this reason, because the adversary—owing to the heat of the fire achieved *by* the indicator of truth—is more particularly subdued by the strength of that just *one*.

10. This, too, that the assistants for the renovation *of the universe* are the decrees of Vistâsp²—which are through Vohûman—*of* Sôshâns³ and Kai-Khûsrôî⁴; even for this reason, because the fragments are possessing a renewer which is their own completion⁵, and the completion—which is through the assistance of the renovation by Vistâsp—is through what *occurs* when the religion is set going by him, through which the renovation arises; and the triumph of the completion, which is through an ordinance by Sôshâns, is through what *occurs* when through the ordinance *there* is thus a decree which sets aside all distress from the creatures, *and* gives the ordinance *to* the whole material existence, that which is living and also that which is dead. 11. This, too, that whoever intrusts it with a command given—which command given intrusts him who supplies the command from revelation—and it worships what is

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 4 d.

² See Bk. VIII, Chaps. XI, 1, XIII, 15.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 4 e, and Bk. VIII, Chap. XIV, 14.

⁴ In the MS. the letters srô are omitted from this name which might, therefore, be read Kayânag; but Kai-Khûsrôî (see Chap. XXIII) is considered as one of the assistants of the renovation (Dd. XXXVI, 3), probably on account of his opposition to idolatry (Bd. XVII, 7).

⁵ Pahl. maman bâharânô kashtâr-hômônd-î nafsman spôrikîh.

necessary to worship, is thereby displayed among the existences *as* the progeny of Aûharmazd¹.

12. This, too, that the defeat of the bad and the acceptance of the good² are taught by him who shall provide a righteous gift for the worthy; because both are therein. 13. This, too, that ability for even the transformation of the creatures³ of Aûharmazd is taught by him who loves Vohûman; even for this reason, because the forward-dragging, and also the backward-dragging, power—which is in mankind—is qualified, through changeableness of will, for even the actions of the Vohûmanic nature. 14. This, too, that power is taught, to that spirit through whom the creatures are changed, by him whose wisdom is for that which is wisdom; even for this reason, because that spirit is wisdom, *and* increases in mankind through instruction. 15. This, too, that by him who praises the religion like a disciple, and who also teaches *it* like a priest⁴, it is shown *that* Sôshâns⁴ really comes; even for this reason, because the religion, from the first praiser and teacher *down* to the last praiser and teacher, is connected by discipleship and priesthood, *and* Sôshâns becomes a disciple *in* the end, and the last priest.

16. This, too, that the wisdom of Aûharmazd⁵ is taught by him who shall supply decisions and adjudication from the religion; even for this reason, because the decision of religion is the wisdom of Aûharmazd. 17. This, too, that complete mindfulness, so that they are not deceived⁵, is taught

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 5 b.

² Ibid. 5 d.

³ Ibid. 5 e; assuming that dâm-var'zishn, 'accomplishment of the creatures,' stands for dâm-var'dishn.

⁴ Ibid. 6 d.

⁵ Ibid. 6 e.

through wisdom by him who is as reverent *to* Aûhar-mazd as a daughter *to* a father; even for this reason, because the reverence of a daughter unto a father arises mostly through natural sympathy (âhang-i êitrik), *and* through the intellectual complete mindfulness of the daughter.

18. This, too, that maintaining the destinies (vakhtân) of the body through the command of the creator is taught by him who teaches the righteous *man* and the wicked *one* that thing *which* becomes comfort to them, *to* the righteous *man* as *to his* body, *and to* the wicked *one* as *to his* soul; even for this reason, because he becomes a friend of the creatures, a friend of the creatures is also a friend of creativeness, *and* a friend of the creator maintains body *and* wealth through the command of the creator, *and* others are taught by him. 19. This, too, that joy owing to him who is powerful is taught him who is righteous only by him—that is, *he* is conveying him to the rulers for benefit¹—who is an assistance of him who is righteous through capability, that is, he shall do it through exertion of power; even for this reason, because, when he *has* provided as much assistance as *it* is possible for him *to do*, his praise arises through that benefit which is pre-eminent through his exertion. 20. This, too, that the benefit *of* sovereignty for that which arises² is taught only by him who always thoroughly teaches authority (patîh) up to dictatorship (vispô-farmânîh); that is, he teaches to others that thing which always arises for them up to dictatorial authority; this is where it is connected by them with the

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 8 c.

² Ibid. 8 d.

renovation of *the universe* through the control which is in the tree of germs¹.

21. This, too, that he becomes liberal to fire² who shall perform work for fire that is its protection, and so it is taught about *it* through the obeisance by him whose liberality—that is his through the obeisance—becomes liberal, *and* whose declaration, that arises as to Vohûman, possesses wealth through virtue.

22. This, too, *that* this thinking as to righteousness³ is taught only by him—that is, he thinks—whose petition for righteousness is ever afresh. 23. This, too, that the religion is interrogated⁴ by him who is submissive *to* superiors and similarly situated (*ham-gâk*) *to* inferiors.

24. This, too, that the state of the present *world* (*latammanh*) for the Mazda-worshipping religion is thoroughly taught where whatever becomes a progress⁵ of the religion is whatever is purification for mankind; even for this reason, because the want of progress of the religion is owing to the want of purification of mankind as to the fiend, and when a human being is purified from the fiend, the progress of the religion becomes different. 25. This, too, that pleasure is taught to him who is a friend⁶

¹ Evidently the many-seeded tree of all germs, opposed to harm and called the proper-curing, energetic-curing, and all-curing; it is renowned in *Afrân-vêg* and grows in the wide-formed ocean near the *Gôkerenô*, or white-*Hôm* plant, which latter is one of the ingredients of the elixir producing immortality in the future existence (see Bd. IX, 5, 6, XVIII, 9, XXVII, 2, XXIX, 5).

² See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 9 d which Pt₄ and Mf₄ supply as follows:—*Aêdûnô avô hanâ-î lak âtâr râdô hômônânam pavan nîyâ-yisnô*.

³ Ibid. 9 e.

⁴ Ibid. 10 c.

⁵ Ibid. 11 d.

⁶ Ibid. 14 a.

only by him—that is, he gives it—who is a pleasure to him who is a friend ; and its routine is really this, that by him who causes pleasure to friends, his *having* caused pleasure is taught also to them. 26. This, too, that, owing to him whom Aûharmazd teaches joy, it is taught *that* gratification¹ comes from Aûharmazd ; even for this reason, because he is exalted, even in the worldly *existence*, through that joy which is supreme, and mankind are thereby taught.

27. This, too, that the augmentation of indications as to intellect is taught to him who is a vigorous-minded (tûstō-minisnō) man², by him whose own progress is that towards his own sacred beings ; even for this reason, because he fully considers, *and* delivers the decision, of his own powers, of those, too, of *his* contemporaries (ham-budî-kânō), *and* likewise of the chivalry (êlrth) of the age ; and others are taught about *it* by him. 28. This, too, that the spirit of Aûharmazd³ is expounded only by him—that is, he loves *it*—whose close exposition is of Aûharmazd ; even for this reason, because he becomes similarly loved with Aûharmazd, so that⁴ . . . 29. And this, too, that the reward is taught in the publicity of the sun⁵ by him whose friendship is for the Spîtāmān, which also increases in the day—that is, it is necessary to perform duty and good works in the day—but he does not put *it* aside the second day ; even for this reason, because friendship for the religion is through kind regard ;

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 14 b.

² Ibid. 15 c.

³ Ibid. 16 a.

⁴ Some clause appears to be omitted here.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 16 d.

and duty in *one* day, only to put *it* aside for the second day, becomes affliction (*vêsh*) *at* the bridge of judgment; also the sun is the most kindly-regarding and swiftest of those visible.

30. Excellence *that* is perfect *is* righteousness.

CHAPTER LIX.

Bakō Nask.

1. The thirteenth fargard, *Tad-thwâ-peresâ*¹, is *that* the obeisance² of the archangels is performed by him who is educated in the recitation *for* the archangels of *one* learned in the religion, which is when *he has* to understand the recitation and to maintain the recitation of revelation with propriety, which is when an enumeration, or form (*âinakō*), as to the qualities of the archangels exists, which is the obeisance *for* the sacred beings. 2. For, on this subject, *one* mentions seven kinds of *men*³, educated, or well-educated, or ill-educated, who are connected with it in statements by those of the world; the merely educated *man*, particularly also the physician, explains this which is not mentioned *and* does not occur, that *it is* well, or ill, disposed⁴; the merely well-educated *man*, particularly also the physician, explains this which is mentioned *and* occurs, that *it is* well-disposed; the merely ill-educated *man*, *and*

¹ See Chap. XIV, 1 n; it is here written *tad-spâg-peres* in Pahlavi.

² See Pahl. Yas. XLIII, 1 b.

³ These appear to be the four kinds of ordinary men, and the three kinds of physicians, detailed in the following clauses.

⁴ *Khu* (Pâz.) *ayôv dūsîm*.

also the physician, explains this which is mentioned *and* occurs, that *it is* ill-disposed; and the merely uneducated *man* explains anything whatever that is really life¹. 3. *One* educated in the recitation *for* the sacred beings, who when—on account of the necessity of speaking evil about a learned man—he is mischievous (anâg), so that he keeps in viciousness, *and has* remained in the obeisance *for* the sacred beings, is called not ransomed (lâ tâkhtîk). 4. *One* ill-educated in the recitation *for* the sacred beings, which is when *it happens* that he keeps in viciousness, becomes even an apostate who is acquainted with the religion. 5. *One* uneducated in what *pertains to* the sacred beings is of two kinds, either good² and void of learning, or an evil *one* who is void of knowledge; the good *and* void of learning worships the sacred beings unobservantly with the proper rites, and the evil *one* who is void of knowledge thinks to worship the sacred beings unobservantly with improper rites, and *has* no means of trustworthy reliance upon the religion of the sacred beings and their obeisance. 6. And *one* well-educated in what *pertains to* the sacred beings, through the three words of the connected series (ham-paḍvandisñh) which is good (khu) and learned³, and through what *pertains to* the sacred beings, expounds faithfully the object of the obeisance *for* the sacred beings.

7. This, too, that, by him who teaches to mankind that thing which becomes their hope of eternity, mankind are taught to come to the religion of

¹ Apparently khayâ-â badly written in B.

² Pâz. khu.

³ Probably 'good thoughts, good words, and good deeds.'

the sacred beings ; even for this reason, because the Vohûmanic attainment¹ to the religion of the sacred beings is to be required wisely for them, its requirement wisely for them is a benefit for the steadfast and becomes a consideration (mînth) for them, and the consideration of the benefit of the steadfast is through hope of the eternity which is provided for the benefit, on account of which the hope of eternity—which is the basis—is the reason even of the acceptance of the religion.

8. This, too, that the perfection of the first among the existences² is taught by him who *has* retentively remembered his words ; even for this reason, because remembrance is the acme of every perfection.

9. This, too, that he becomes a nourisher of good works who shall perform good works publicly ; even for this reason, because others are taught thereby, and good works increase in the world. 10. This, too, that by him who has fruit in the possession of Aûharmazd the development of the world in virtue³ is taught ; even for this reason, because a lawful preserver and a producer of liberality arise through the fruit, they enlarge the root of the power of the angel *of* liberality, and pluck *its* fruit ; the world is improved thereby, *and* mankind are taught about *it*.

11. This, too, that, through complete mindfulness, words *and* actions⁴ are truly taught by him whose ceremonial is for complete mindfulness ; even for this reason, because there are both words *and* actions in the ceremonial.

12. This, too, that the sagacious creativeness (far'-zânak dahîh) of Aûharmazd is taught, which is

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIII, 1 e.

² Ibid. 2 b.

³ Ibid. 2 d.

⁴ Ibid. 6 c.

the exposition, to Aûharmazd¹, of the production of the renovation; even for this reason, because the advantage of the sagacity of Aûharmazd is the consequence of its beginning, and *its* middle is through the power of the goodness and knowledge of him himself, and because *it is* destiny as regards the creations; and whoever possesses that power for the assistance of the renovation, is extolled for that sagacity, and *people* are taught thereby. 13. This, too, that the reward of Zaratûst is appropriated by him who decides about duty and opinion²; even for this reason, because, through that discrimination, *he is* similar to Zaratûst.

14. This, too, that the recitation of revelation is performed *for* mankind by him who extends the propagation of the religion³; even for this reason, because, owing to the gratification of virtuous practisers, virtue increases. 15. This, too, that the religion of Aûharmazd is made progressive² by him who shall perform the ceremonial of Aûharmazd; even for this reason, because through that performance of his occurs the blessing of the provider of the rite (nîrangîndâr). 16. This, too, that that perfectly righteous *man* of just judgment is protected from the annoying spirit⁴ by him who possesses the resemblance (ângûnagîh) unto Vohûman that they behold and resources through virtue; even for this reason, because the vexation which is partaken by him (*the spirit*), owing to the just judgment among those of the nature (êtharîkân) of mankind, is redoubled (dôkânî-aitô) by their pleasure owing to the Vohûmanic resemblance, *and* the annoying spirit

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIII, 8 b.

³ Ibid. 15 d, 17 c.

² Ibid. 17 c.

⁴ Ibid. 11 e.

is disabled (akârt-hênd)¹ by that accumulated vexation *which* occurs for his annoyance.

17. This, too, that the exploits of the archangels are taught by him who is really capable in what *pertains to* the archangels; even for this reason, because they become the hope of a consoling (vêdvar) end, and are also indicative of the renovation *of the universe*, the hope of a virtuous end.

18. This, too, that the words of him who is Zaratûst, that '*people* shall become supplicant,' are taught by him who is for the benefitters; even for this reason, *because* they who are benefitters, on account of an inclination for the religion, make others eager for the religion, and make them mount for prayer.

19. And this, *too*, that by him who gives anything to a righteous man, this is also done that some one else *may* give even to him who is vile; even for this reason, because a foundation of liberality is thereby prepared for him².

20. Perfect righteousness is excellence.

CHAPTER LX.

Bakō Nask.

1. The fourteenth fargard, *Ad-fravakhshyâ*³, is *that* whatever is instruction is to be listened to⁴ here as much as is possible, *and* he who is not to be

¹ The Pâz. equivalent of akârîh-hômand.

² Implying that he is himself vile who gives to the righteous merely to induce others to give to himself.

³ See Chap. XV, 1 n; it is here written *ad-fravakhshê* in Pahlavi.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 1 a.

taught is allowed an opportunity *for* listening by Zaratuštr.

2. This, too, that by him who would be a causer of procreation for performers of labour, the perfect nature of the performance of the first next-of-kin marriage¹ is praised; because causing the procreation of performers of labour is the fatherhood of mankind, the proper fatherhood of mankind is through the proper production *of* progeny, the proper progeny of the producer is through the accomplishment of progeny among his own, according to the disposition of the first creatures, and the accomplishment of progeny among one's own is next-of-kin marriage; and that which *occurs*, when a causer of the procreation of performers of labour praises the fatherhood of mankind, *is that* next-of-kin marriage is also praised by him.

3. This, too, that by him whose creatures are in virtue, owing to his virtuous nourishment *of* the creatures, the performance of next-of-kin marriage² is taught, *and* the virtue is his virtue; even on this account, because, for the sake of keeping the creatures in virtue, he allows (*andâzêdô*) for the virtuous disposition pertaining to the multitude, *and* that which is born he produces (*dahêdô*) as lineage from the next-of-kin marriage pertaining to the multitude.

4. This, too, that Spendarmad is in daughterhood³ to Aûharmazd is taught by him whose wisdom is through complete mindfulness; even for this reason,

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 4 a.

² Ibid. 4 c. §§ 2-5 have been already translated, somewhat differently, in S. B. E., vol. xviii, pp. 395, 396.

³ Ibid. 4 d. For Spendarmad see Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3.

because *his* wisdom *and* complete mindfulness are within limits which are Aûharmazd and Spendarmad, the wisdom *being* that of Aûharmazd, the complete mindfulness that of Spendarmad, and the complete mindfulness *being* the offspring of the wisdom just as Spendarmad is *of* Aûharmazd; and, owing to this, the assertion is reasonable that, by him whose complete mindfulness is connected with wisdom, it is taught *that* Spendarmad is in daughterhood to Aûharmazd. 5. This, too, that thus the exercise of that daughterhood is taught by him whose righteousness is through complete mindfulness, and whose ceremonial is also through complete mindfulness; that is, he shall perform the ceremonial and other good works fully mindfully.

6. This, too, that mankind are attracted to religious good deeds by him who shall provide benefit for the people through actions *and* words; even for this reason, because those actions are religious good deeds, and, when instituted by him, *others* are also taught by him. 7. This, too, that reverence *for* Vohûman¹ is taught by him who shall make that which is contaminated obvious to the eye, so that what is dark *becomes* light; even for this reason, because the display of the work of Vohûman thereby has also taught the offer of reverence *for* Vohûman. 8. And this, too, that the ceremonial is taught with complete mindfulness² only *by him* who teaches words and actions with complete mindfulness.

9. Perfect righteousness is excellence.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 9 e.

² Ibid. 10 a.

CHAPTER LXI.

Bakō Nask.

1. The fifteenth fargard, Kamnamaêza¹, is about the reply of Aûtharmazd to Zaratûst, as to that which *was* asked by him thus: 'To which lands *do* I step²?' and it is *thus*: 'Do thou march (sagîtûn) there where the man, in whose person righteousness is *connected* with complete mindfulness, is welcome; this, too, is where happy is he from whom there is no complaint.'

2. This, too, that mankind are made diligent in good works by him who produces progress for good works; even for this reason, because mankind attain progress *in* manifest duty who engage more particularly *in* good works. 3. This, too, that the teaching of religion is the public action which is prescribed by him who would produce exertion for the righteous, that is, benefit for those of the good religion; even for this reason, because the multitude (kabadân) approach the religion, and are taught and practise *it*, on account of a desire *for* benefit.

4. This, too, that *it is* in a province of even exhausted production³ that it is taught by him who appoints a virtuous governor over the province; even for this reason, because a virtuous governor of a province becomes a teacher of ability and good works to those of the province.

¹ See Chap. XVI, 1 n; it is here written kâmnamêzō in Pahlavi.

² See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 1 a; reading val kadâr damîkân vâmam (=gâmam, see Chap. LVIII, 4).

³ Ibid. 4 b.

5. This, too, that the good protection of fire¹ is taught by him whose words are through Vohûman, *and* who also would provide a time for the ordeal of that which is doubtful; even for this reason, because *he* whose words are utterable through Vohûman, *and* who would provide a time *for* the ordeal of that which is doubtful, teaches the provision of care *for* the operative fire, owing to that *which occurs* when *what is* accomplished, about *one* acquitted *or* convicted *by* the fire, is declared, *and* mankind shall provide more particularly for the brilliancy of the fire, and the wicked more *for* assistance and protection from it.

6. This, too, that whoever shall provide about him who liberally gives *himself* in discipleship² unto the priests, has thereby taught even by the mention of the high-priest; even for this reason, because the person *being* given in discipleship unto the priests, the religion practised by the high-priest arises also *for* mention, *and* whoever shall provide generosity for that person, has increased *and* also taught that action, which is religion, even by the mention made.

7. This, too, that men and women³ are taught *as being* given in discipleship⁴ to Zaratûst by him who keeps his own males and females in the control of Zaratûst. 8. This, too, that goodness is taught by him to those (valman) who are good, so that they produce it who give to that righteous *one* the worthiness which is through that wealth; the righteous *one* who is worthy is *one* of the good religion for whose production of the worthiness which is through that wealth it is sought, and that wealth which is

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 7 c.

² Ibid. 10 a.

³ Ibid. 9 d.

⁴ Ibid. 10 b.

coveted is wealth of little trouble *and* much advantage, through the goodness and idea of virtue of the giver to the account of him who is the acceptor of the good worthiness. 9. This, too, that through his *Kinvad* passage (*Kis-vidarg*) it is taught that they shall step forth (*frôvâmând*)¹; *and* by him who goes on through anything (*kis*) openly, when he *has* proceeded publicly on the right path, *one* passed *away* on the *Kinvad* passage is taught.

10. This, too, that by him whose ceremonial is through complete mindfulness it is taught that the world produces abundance through complete mindfulness²; even for this reason, because it is taught by him, through that disposition of his *for* the sacred beings (*pavan zak-î valman yazdânô khtm*), *that* the developed world is shown *to be* theirs; *and* here *below* it is fully taught by him, *that* *Khûrdad* and *Amûrdad*³—that is, the sacred beings—produce *it* for the beneficers. 11. This, too, that thus he who is wicked, even he who is privileged, becomes unprivileged at that time when every one understands, that is, when righteousness is aloft. 12. This, too, that when he who is privileged is *Vistâsp*⁴, likewise he who is privileged is the righteous *Zarâtûst*⁵, *and* so he who is the wicked *Argâsp*⁶ is unprivileged.

13. This, too, that creation is taught by him to

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 10 e, and Bk. VIII, Chap. XIV, 8.

² Ibid. 12 c.

³ See Chap. XIX, 1.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 13 e.

⁵ Ibid. 14 a, which is supplied by Pt4, Mf4, thus:—*Zarâtûstô mûn lak aharûbô dôstô*.

⁶ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XI, 4.

Aôharmazd, so that he creates, and this, too, that the archangels are taught by his will, whose contentment¹ is through that of the archangels, so that he observes the conclusion in the affairs of the archangels. 14. And this, too, that wisdom is taught to him who is Zaratûst—so that it becomes his—by him whose thoughts are for Zaratûst² *and* for the religion of Zaratûst.

15. Perfect is the excellence *of* righteousness.

CHAPTER LXII.

Bakō Nask.

1. The sixteenth fargard, Spentâ-mainyû³, is *that* the religion is lodging in him who is himself wise, or becomes a hearer of the wise. 2. This, too, that the deeds of complete mindfulness are practised⁴ and taught by him who becomes himself completely mindful. 3. This, too, that *whoever* shall openly perform good works becomes a nourisher of good works.

4. This, too, that the spirit of fatherhood becomes lodging in him who nourishes the creatures with propriety⁵. 5. This, too, that pasture is given⁶ to cattle is taught by him who shall provide care *for* cattle, because the giving of pasture to them with care is advantageous.

6. This, too, that all for his good who becomes a benefit to him who is good⁷—*through* that which

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 19 e.

² Ibid. 19 b.

³ See Chap. XVII, 1 n; it is here written *spendmatō* in Pahlavi.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XLVI, 2 c.

⁵ Ibid. 2 d.

⁶ Ibid. 3 c.

⁷ Ibid. 5 b.

has come to him—is every benefit which occurs to him who is good; all *for* his good every benefit is given to every *one* good by way of similarity in race, species, and nature, and every benefit is given in the way of complete giving which is possible for it.

7. This, too, that whoever shall justly inflict sentence and judgment, really according to the declaration regarding *one* acquitted *or* convicted¹, becomes praiseworthy; even for this reason, because the origin of the judgment is the ritual of the ordeal. 8. And this, too, that by him who gives to him who is wise that which is needful for him, an immense² *and* strong foundation for learning is produced, *and* the knowledge in the world is augmented.

9. Perfect excellence is righteousness.

CHAPTER LXIII.

Bakš Nask.

1. The seventeenth fargard, Yêzi³, is *that* whoever maintains the benedictions of the religion⁴, and shall uphold its commands, has thereby made even others learn it; even for this reason, because through this *it* is much more possible for him to attract others to the religion; *and, as to* the origin and means of attraction, the attraction is this, that he himself maintains the benedictions of the religion, and the means of attraction are this, that he is an upholder of the commands of the religion.

2. This, too, that by him who shall perform the ritual of an ordeal which is accomplished, the *Kin-*

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVI, 6 b.

² Ibid. 6 c.

³ See Chap. XVIII, 1 n.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 1 d.

vad passage¹ is made known; even for this reason, because those even *who have* accomplished what is a work of the spirit become witnesses, one about the other, as to the facts. 3. This, too, that by him who shall perform that thing whereby a change occurs from evil to good², even that change which is the renovation *of the universe* is made known, by means even of the evidence of a partial change as regards a perpetual change.

4. This, too, that by him who shall produce generosity for the tillers³ of the world it is then developed; even for this reason, because they become more diligent *in* tilling the world. 5. This, too, that by him who shall produce benefit for the poor, a development⁴ of the world is produced for them; even for this reason, because through that reason they increase more.

6. This, too, that the creature-forming (*dāmth*) of *Aûharmazd*⁵ is occasioned by him whose rule⁶ is for *Aûharmazd*; even for this reason, because he becomes a holder and attendant of good works. 7. This, too, that the devastation by *Vohûman*⁷ is taught *by* him whose rule is for *Aûharmazd*; even for this reason, because he smites sinners *and* destroys among villains.

8. This, too, that virtuous people are increased in a province⁸ by him who appoints a virtuous governor of the province. 9. This, too, that virtuous instruction is provided *and* explained by him who loves *Vohûman*⁹. 10. And this, too, that vir-

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 2 b.

² Ibid. 4 a.

³ Ibid. 5 d.

⁴ Ibid. 6 c.

⁵ Ibid. 7 d.

⁶ Ibid. 8 a.

⁷ Ibid. 9 c.

⁸ Ibid. 12 a, and compare Chap. LXI, 4.

⁹ Ibid. 12 b.

tuous deeds¹ are set going by him who teaches learned sayings *and* virtuous deeds to him who is good; even for this reason, because the reception of the progressive supply of virtue by the learned becomes more complete.

11. Perfect is the excellence of righteousness.

CHAPTER LXIV.

Bakō Nask.

1. The eighteenth fargard, *A d-mâ-yavâ*², is *that*, through his complete mindfulness³, the teaching of mankind in virtue is by him, and they become properly intelligent³ through him, whose actions are those which are more daughterly, that is, as reverent unto *Aûharmazd* as a daughter unto a father; even for this reason, because his display of the complete mindfulness which is instinctive (*âsnik*) is through action, *and* that action, acquired (*srûtik*) for the thoughts of mankind, is kindled by him and *has* become properly intelligent. 2. This, too, that proper intelligence of things arises for *one* completely mindful³, even for a daughter to a father, through that complete mindfulness which is instinctive, whereby that lust is excluded which is most violently revered by the male (*kûsnö*), and, devoid of that, the reverence is assimilated (*âgunthtntdö*) most strongly to one's reverence unto the creator.

3. This, too, that discrimination of the affairs of the sacred beings through wisdom⁴ is taught by him

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 12 c.

² See Chap. XIX, 1 n; it is here written *a d-mâ-yâv* in Pahlavi.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XLVIII, 5 c.

⁴ Ibid. 6 b.

whose learning is in the affairs *of* the sacred beings ; even for this reason, because discrimination of the affairs of the sacred beings is specially that which is advantageous *in* the end, and the advantageousness *in* the end is seen through learning ; *and*, apart from that, he who is learned in the affairs of the sacred beings has taught discrimination of the affairs of the sacred beings through his wisdom ¹.

4. This, too, that the joyfulness in righteousness is taught to Frashôstar by him—that is, he would make him ardent in the performance of duty and good works ²—who *has* thoroughly expounded Khûr-dad and Amûrdad to Frashôstar ³, that is, he maintains *him* as his high-priest. 5. This, too, that he who shall perform good works ever afresh, has taught him to become ardent in duty and good works ². 6. This, too, that Aûharmazd supplies guardianship ⁴ to him who gives pleasure to Aûharmazd ; even for this reason, because a giver of pleasure to Aûharmazd is any one *who is* a true servant of Aûharmazd, *and* Aûharmazd becomes the guardian of a true servant.

7. This, too, that they ever amount to a master of all commands ⁵ for him who is a benefit *and* sovereignty for that which arises ; even owing to this reason, because, in establishing *and* arranging that which is an absurd (âskûn) or a virtuous law, the command issued, which is another *and* further observation of the advantage of the creatures, prepares

¹ Assuming that ar'gô, 'value,' stands for khiraðô, which is very similarly written in Pahlavi letters.

² See Pahl. Yas. XLVIII, 8 a.

³ See Chap. XIX, 1, and Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 68.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XLVIII, 8 b.

⁵ Ibid. 8 d.

that which is ever an attainable benefit among the creatures, by means of which, even after symptoms of the life of one's body, it is governed through setting going the usage of that law, and is connected *with* his mastery of command and *his* sovereignty.

8. This, too, that Vohûman's *having* guarded the creature-forming (dâmîh) of Aûharmazd¹ is taught *by him* whose rule is for Aûharmazd; on this account, because he whose rule is for Aûharmazd has taught the inclination for (padîsât) *being* guarded, on this account, because the inclination of the creatures of that ruler for *being* guarded by the power of goodness, *and* the creatures being guarded by the power of goodness have published the power of goodness, which is Vohûman, to the multitude.

9. Here is about the reply to Zaratûst concerning the wicked, thus: 'Upon arrival in the fiend's abode², through an immature (khâm) death, they are unprivileged, so that every misery is theirs, and *it* is not possible for them to seek a remedy.'

10. This, too, that the spirit of reverence comes through invocation to the assistance³ of him who is reverent unto the benefitters; even for this reason, because the spirits respond more particularly to that invoker who becomes their worshipper preponderantly (vâsþûharakânîhâ); and for each one of the spirits there is preponderantly a *form of* worship, as the spirit of liberality is more particularly worshipped through helpfulness (vigîdâr-dahisnîh), the spirit of truth through exact truth (hû-râstîh), the spirit of a promise through true promising (hû-mitrôîh),

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVIII, 10 a, b, and Chap. LXIII, 6.

² Ibid. 11 d.

³ Ibid. 12 a.

and the spirit of sovereignty through good sovereignty; and, even so, the worship of the spirit of reverence consists preponderantly in reverence unto the benefiter. 11. This, too, that he whose rule is for Aûharmazd becomes a suppliant *for* that which is coveted (1stð) *from* Aûharmazd¹; even for this reason, because *what* is wisely begged from the sacred beings *and* rulers, for rendering one's own self worthy, occurs as a benefit owing to the sacred beings *and* rulers.

12. About the reply of Aûharmazd to Zaratûst, when asked by him about his own, *his* confederate², and *his* serf, thus: 'He is thine own, he *thy* confederate, and he *thy* serf, even when *and* where *he is* a righteous offspring who produces the progress of this thy religion of Mazda-worship, *and* recites it openly even unto *him* he knows, who provides the public benedictions, this good practice of thine, that is, he maintains *what is* provided *by* thee as benedictions³.'

13. Perfect is the excellence *of* righteousness.

CHAPTER LXV.

Bakš Nask.

1. The nineteenth fargard, Kad-mô-i-urvâ⁴, is *that* the sheep-nature (pâhîh)⁵ is taught to him *who*

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVIII, 12 d. ² Ibid. 7 c. ³ Ibid. 7 d.

⁴ See Chap. XX, 1 n; it is here written kad-môk-ravð in Pahlavi.

⁵ See Pahl. Yas. XLIX, 1 b. The distinction made in the Pahlavi text, here and in § 3, by using the scriptural term pâh and the general word gôspend for the sheep, might perhaps be imitated in English by using the word 'flock' for pâh, but this would not express the meaning exactly.

is a sheep (gôspend), even for this reason, because the sheep is still among sheep (pâh-iê dên). 2. This, too, that by him who provides pasture for sheep, mankind are nourished (srâyinîdô)¹ through the sheep; even for this reason, because the nourishment of mankind is through the sheep, and *that* of the sheep through pasture. 3. This, too, that the sheep of the present *worldly* state is expounded to him who is a sheep (pâh) to Zaratûst, that is, he has Zaratûst as a high-priest; even for this reason, because still a sheep (pâh-iê) is a sheep.

4. This, too, that strength in virtue is increased *and* taught by him who produces joyfulness² through seeking gradual development, so that he would do that thing which gives him joyfulness, that is, he would do that thing which becomes his long-continued joy; even for this reason, because increase of strength arises more particularly from pleasure, the pleasure that *one is* gradually attaining (dêr-pađât). 5. This, too, that by him who shall provide the ceremonial of the sacred beings, the joyfulness² owing to the sacred beings is then connected with his own; even for this reason, because the coming of the sacred beings to it occurs.

6. This, too, that the wisdom³ of Zaratûst is taught *and* displayed by him who gives thought to the religion of Zaratûst. 7. This, too, that the tongue³ is instructed (farhângîndô) in speech by him who becomes discriminating through wisdom. 8. And this, too, that preparation⁴ is taught to them who are beneficers of Zaratûst, *or* who are *so* of the religion; even for this reason, because, owing to

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIX, 1 b.

² Ibid. 5 b.

³ Ibid. 6 c.

⁴ Ibid. 6 d.

that action, disposition, and attraction which are now theirs, they prepare mankind for the religion of Zaratûst. 9. This, too, that whoever teaches the virtuous way to others, they become his through the knowledge of being instructed; even for this reason, because through the enlightenment of that way, they see and act, and are thereby instructed.

10. This, too, that the obeisance¹ *for* the archangels is performed by him who is a praiser *of* the archangels. 11. This, too, that assistance is taken² from the sacred beings by him who gives to him who is a suppliant that which is dear to him, because he himself is made worthy by his assistance, and, when made worthy by it, it is then taken by him; and the suppliant is he who is not a suppliant through his mouth, but through worthiness, and *what is dear is that which is good about him.*

12. This, too, that *its being* within the day till dawn (*val aûsh*)³ is taught by him—that is, he would make *it* as a signal (*dakhshakô*)³—who is in obeisance, so that he *may* not neglect till another day the duty and good works which it is requisite for him to perform within the day; even for this reason, because to cause the preservation of the dawn from debased incompatibility (*hêr hanbêshth*) of duties, it is made exalted by him over the duties.

13. This, too, that complete mindfulness is taught among the existences⁴ by him whose thought among the existences is that he shall perform that thing which is possible to remain good in the world, such as the provision of good sovereignty, orthodoxy, the

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLIX, 7 b.

³ Ibid. 10 c.

² Ibid. 7 d.

⁴ Ibid. 11 c.

law of virtuous usage, *and* others, through which the dwelling, preparation, and living of mankind in the world arise, *and* the appropriation of any complete mindfulness of that performer is the exaltation which is his owing to that great performance.

14. It is righteousness *that is* perfect excellence.

CHAPTER LXVI.

Bakō Nask.

1. *In* the twentieth fargard, Vohû-khshathrem¹, *it is* also stated by Aûharmazd to Zaratûst the Spîtâmân thus: 'They who are now in sovereignty are privileged, the human being who is a wicked lying tyrant *being* not now in sovereignty; moreover, thou shouldst cause *some one* to thoroughly smite (barâ vâñn-aê) him who is causing deception in the embodied world by lamentation (sîvan), and they cause the preservation of death, ruin, and falsehood because they would cause the preservation of his effects (mamanas var ae bôgînênd).' 2. And this, too, namely: 'When the sovereignty should be given by them unto him who is good², *they* would be preserved through that sovereignty of his; moreover, thou shouldst cause *some one* to thoroughly smite him who is made deceitful by lamentation, and *so also* death, ruin, and falsehood.'

3. This, too, that by him who shall provide complete mindfulness³ for his own, righteousness is produced; even for this reason, because, through

¹ See Chap. XXI, 1 n; it is here written vohû-khshatar in Pahlavi.

² See Pahl. Yas. L, 1 a.

³ Ibid. 2 b.

complete mindfulness, the discerning eye of life, which is righteousness, is enlightened. 4. This, too, that the coveted *thing* (īstō) which it is expedient for sovereignty to give away¹ is taught by him who shall provide sovereignty for him who is all-progressive (hamâk-rûbisnō); even for this reason, because the observation, consideration, and action of him who is an all-progressive ruler are about that which is coveted *by* the multitude and is an advantage for the sovereignty which it is expedient to produce.

5. This, too, that *what* is produced by the words of Vohûman² is taught by him who shall perform the ceremonial of the sacred beings with the thoughts of Vohûman; even for this reason, because, the mind *being* with the thoughts of Vohûman, the tongues of the faithful are habituated (khûkīntakō) in the statements of Vohûman. 6. This, too, that innocence from discontinued (amând) good works is taught by him who remains in virtue; even for this reason, because *they are* atoned for by him even among important good works.

7. This, too, that the original causer of goodness is assisted in causing goodness by him whose fundamental gift (bûn dahisnō) among the existences is that he supplies that which it is requisite for him to give; even for this reason, because *in* a work, upon which *one* remains with a thousand men, when one *man* is bringing his own strength to the labour therein, the 999 *other* men are assisted by him in that work.

8. This, too, that the way of righteousness³ is

¹ See Pahl. Yas. L, 2 b.

² Ibid. 3 b.

³ Ibid. 13 c.

not concealed, *but* taught, by him who is a good considerer as to righteousness; even for this reason, because the sap and root of his righteousness are owing to undiverted thought. 9. This, too, that its *being* unnecessary to provide repletion for those who are cattle¹ is taught by him who keeps cattle as a controller *for* benefitters; even for this reason, because they teach and command him.

10. This, too, that housewifery² *being* performed is taught by that wife who shall joyfully pay reverence *to her* husband; even for this reason, because her housewifery is for the satisfaction of the husband, the satisfaction is through her reverence, and the reverence arises through joy. 11. This, too, that to love the religion through knowledge³ is taught by him who is peaceful (*padmântk*) and Vohûmanic *to* it; even for this reason, because Vohûmanic peacefulness is understood *as* religion. 12. And this, too, that the gratification of Aûhar-mazd⁴ is caused by him who teaches for Aûhar-mazd.

13. It is righteousness *that is* perfect excellence.

CHAPTER LXVII.

Bakš Nask.

1. *In* the twenty-first fargard, Vahistôisti⁵, it is proclaimed by the righteous Zaratûst, that the ceremonial is performed by him owing to whom our

¹ See Pahl. Yas. L, 14 b.

² Ibid. 18 b.

³ See Chap. XXII, 1 n.

⁴ Ibid. 17 c.

⁵ Ibid. 20 c.

worship is good thinking. 2. This, too, that Vohûman and the liturgy are lodging in the body of him in whose body the religion is lodging; *and so is* the spirit of goodness, which is peace (padmân). 3. This, too, that the good religion is taught in word and deed by him who shall achieve the giving of thought (mînîsn-dahîh) *to* Vohûman *in* the ceremonial. 4. This, too, that the archangels become lodging in the body of him who loves Vohûman; even for this reason, because their lodging is in light, purity, and perfume, and the body is illuminated, purified, and perfumed by Vohûman.

5. This, too, that mankind are made diligent in the performance of good works by him who shall provide gifts for the doers of good works. 6. This, too, that by him who loves the beneficial way¹, even others are put *in* the same way *and* taught. 7. This, too, that he gives his daughter in daughterhood to *his* fatherhood², who teaches to the daughter reverence towards *her* father; even for this reason, because she is made steadfast in daughterhood by him. 8. This, too, that the authority of Vohûman is taught by him who keeps the talent which is his for virtue; even for this reason, because from the authority of goodness arise the advantage *and* freedom from strife of the sciences (h ûnarânö).

9. This, too, that a daughter is given to a father for womanly service (nêsmânîh²), *and* so also a wife to another man, by him who teaches reverence, towards father and husband, to the daughter and the other woman; and so, too, *by him* who instructs

¹ See Pahl. Yas. LII, 2 d.

² Ibid. 4 a. In § 9 (as in Chap. XLV, 4) there appears to be no confinement of the meaning to matrimony.

the wife of a man in housewifery ; because the advantageous womanly service of a woman *for* a man arises through reverence towards *her* husband and good training in housewifery. 10. This, too, that even the reverence *of* a wife towards a husband is produced by him *who* gives a woman unto a man ; because the giver of possession (khûdîh) becomes praiseworthy even by the act of *having* given that possession.

11. This, too, that origin and effect (bûn va-bar) are produced for Aûharmazd by him who gives *what* is necessary unto Aûharmazd and teaches perpetual preservation ; *what* is properly necessary *being* the origin of the preservation *which* is the effect of *what* is properly necessary. 12. This, too, that dominion is acquired for the house of him who keeps the door of the house an opening for the wise ; the house *being* the body, *and* the door of the house *being* the ear, eye, and mouth.

13. It is the excellence *of* righteousness *that* is perfect.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

Bakō Nask.

1. The beginning of the twenty-second fargard, the Airyaman¹, is the last question (frasnō) beyond the five Gâthas ; it is taught for the dominion of Aûharmazd only by him—that is, it is making him ruler of himself—who shall do that which is declared by the passage:—Yâ erezegyôî dâht

¹ See Chap. XXIII, 1 n ; it is here written airemanō in Pahlavi.

drigaovê vahyô¹: who gives delights (vâyagânô) to him who is a right-living poor *man*²—preservation from the destroyer, *and* the consummation of every happiness.

2. It is perfect excellence *that is* righteousness.

CHAPTER LXIX.

1. About a selection from the whole Yast³ referring to the developer (vakhshîntââr-hômônd).

2. Those are beneficial who increase for the developer, that is, they shall occasion benefit (nê-vakth) for him who would occasion that benefit which is for others⁴. 3. Thus the righteous *man* who produces perfect thought is *he* who comes upon it through Vohûman⁵, *and* the benefit of him who is an open annoyer⁶—the righteous man who is a smiter *of* the wicked, *and* who developes as to what is Aûharmazd's and as to what is Zaratûst's—is that he slays in moderation.

4. Regarding him who is an oppressive man who is righteous, the reply spoken is *thus*: 'The reward of the smiter and developer—that man of whom *one*

¹ See Yas. LIII, 9 d.

² See Pahl. Yas. LII, 9 d, and Chaps. XLV, 10, XLVII, 17.

³ The twenty-first Nask, or original Yasna (see Bk. VIII, Chap. XLVI, 1). It is not very clear, from this chapter and from what is stated about it in Chap. I, 2, whether this selection was compiled by the author of the Dînkard, or by some earlier writer. So far as its statements have yet been traced, nearly all of them originate in the Gâthas, or in the Yasna Haptanghâiti; but § 45 quotes a passage from the Bakō Nask (Yas. XIX).

⁴ Compare Pahl. Yas. XLII, 1 a.

⁵ Compare Pahl. Yas. XXVIII, 2 a, where J₂, Pt₄, Mf₄ have *barâ yehamtûnânê pavan Vohûman*.

⁶ Compare Pahl. Yas. XLII, 8 b.

knows the smiting and developing—is the very evil reward *of* him who is wicked; just as his smiting, as an evil reward for him from those two spirits, is that very evil practice loved by him who is wicked; even for this reason every righteous individual is Gâthic¹, because, when privileged (pâdôkhshât), he who is wicked is thus he *who* is righteous, *and* also he who is privileged is unprivileged².’

5. Zaratûst proceeded with the smiting at the wicked, *and* as to that proceeding Aûharmazd spoke thus: ‘Thou shouldst thus proceed with smiting at the wicked by ordinance (dâdîstân), because thus they have thee and the righteous of every kind as ruler. 6. Also through my decree (pavan-ik man vigîr) *one* produces the ritual of ordeal, which realizes that which is real, so that *one* may make that which is dark fully light. 7. Thine, too, is so much the sovereignty of Aûharmazd, thus through worship, that its requisite (khvâstakô) privilege is thus maintained through virtue, because thou, who *art* thus, *art* more unconfined (anâkôsidar) to the world through the furtherance *and* development of righteousness; great, indeed, is he who trusts the righteous *man* for righteousness, and great is he who *trusts* the wicked *man* for wickedness.’

8. As to that utterance (farmâyisnô) Zaratûst spoke thus: ‘An open annoyer is the righteous man—the benefiter disclosed *by* Aûharmazd—that loves the embodied world of righteousness, and demands its reverence (tarsakâyîh) for the proportion of righteousness therein, that is, he knows the proportion of duty and good works.’ 9. Re-

¹ See Bk. VIII, Chap. I, 5 n.

² See Chap. LXI, 11.

garding the worldly *existence*, the reply spoken is thus: 'That which is again contaminated (*gûmîkht-êd*) by the demons becomes abundant so long as that which is proper is again contaminated with the demons; *and*, so long as *there is* a developer, they subsist for their own substances, so that *it* is possible for them to seek benefit for their own, *and* they are smiters of the righteous.'

10. Regarding him who is a wise smiter, Sôshâns¹ spoke *in* reply thus: 'It arises through his way when it is again contaminated.'

11. As to that mischief (*drûgisnô*) Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'Happy is he from whom there is no mischief.' 12. Regarding² him who has come, the Yim of splendour³, he spoke thus: 'He attains his reward who is no smiter and no developer, not privileged and not unprivileged.'

13. As to that disclosure (*hâkîsnô*) Vohûman⁴ spoke thus: 'I aggrandize that spiritual lord and that priestly master who is my righteousness in person.'

14. As to that utterance Spendarmad⁴ spoke thus: 'So do thou perfect (*barâ vadîdûn*) him whose information subsists—a man that becomes wise—who is as an emblem of my religion; because he *has* worshipped that which is ours, so that he has retained property in our possession, through whose words *there* is a furtherance of the world of righteousness. 15. That is my arrangement, and that my wish—that is, what is necessary for me—and I

¹ See Bk. VIII, Chap. XIV, 14.

² Assuming that lâ, 'not,' stands for râî.

³ Av. Yimô khshaêtô (see Bk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 6, 7).

⁴ See Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3.

love that which thou fully understandest, that is, that arrangement which is righteousness; also whatever discourse and perfect performance, thou askest of us, *O Zaratûst!* in complete mindfulness, I now practise by the work of each hand; observe thoroughly that which I *am* performing, *and* thou, too, *art* accomplishing. 16. In worship thou, *O Zaratûst!* art liberal, who art liberal in ceremonial; *for* thee, whose body believes, controversy is not lavish (*râd*) for the sake of the wealth bestowed; the reward of Zaratûst the developer is for developing, the reward of Zaratûst the smiter is for smiting, *and* the reward of Zaratûst the smiter and developer is for smiting and developing. 17. At the bridge *judgment* of him whose name the fire calls for participation, as when they repeatedly pour the melted ore upon him in the throat, thou shouldst pray near him alive—him whose love is for virtue—so that he may perform duty and good works with fearlessness; with his desire, too, it is expedient to know that *it is* done by him on account of necessity.’

18. As to that utterance *Aûharmazd* spoke thus: ‘Such is the upward attraction (*lâlâ-hangisnîh*) of Shatraver¹ for him who is ours.’ 19. As to that question (*frashnô*) *Aûharmazd* spoke thus: ‘Such has happened to him who is ours through Vohûman; he ought to come to our religion through virtue. 20. Truly he, *O Zaratûst!* is privileged for the sovereignty, who confines *his* ears to this religion, that he may make *it* fully progressive; who is given immortality through this, and kind regard *for* the will of him *who* is the best of that religion of mine,

¹ See Chap. XLIII, 1. It is here written Shatrôver.

O Zaratûst! and who assists the furtherance of this world of mine in righteousness.'

21. As to those of that *other one*¹ Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'As regards that which is great evidence, when wicked they consider *it* as unattested for him who is wicked himself; *and* the thoughts² of him, whose deeds are those of that *other one*, are due to Akômanô³. 22. Owing also to this, when both Khûrdad and Amûrdad⁴ are given to thee, *it is* in that way—when thou art of the propitious spirit and the best thought—that what thou understandest thou shouldst be accomplishing, and what thou dost not understand thou askest again.'

23. Of him whose wisdom exists (aitō)—of Aûharmazd—he whose wisdom arises (yehevûnêd)—Zaratûst—enquired concerning him who is unreal (an-aitō) *and* who does not subsist (yehevûnêd) *hereafter*, who *has* thus never become a material existence for those *on* the side of virtue, and does not subsist for them henceforth.

24. As to that reverse description (padtrakō-nisânisnē) Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'Among men of every kind say unto the righteous who are smiting the wicked, *that* we improve the measure of any milk they propitiate, even by the holy-water which is the sustenance (barisnō) of milk, *in order* to cause much happiness of life.'

25. As to that utterance Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'Happy is he from whom there is no complaint, and a life which is like this the text Gerezōi . . .

¹ The followers of Aharman.

² Assuming that mânisnō, 'dwelling,' stands for mīnisnō.

³ See Bk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3 n.

⁴ See Chap. XIX, 1.

ākhsô . . .¹ implores. 26. To thee, *O Zaratûst!* my protection is given *in* the reply of the *Kem-nâ*² which, before the companionship of *Kat-Vistâsp*³—that righteous friend of mine⁴—*was* a published thing of those which are used, *and* of those such as it is requisite to use. 27. The talk of a man which is immoderate is false, everything immoderate is *so* for this reason, everything is not that which the good man possesses, because, when privileged, the wicked *one* is he who is righteous, and he who is privileged becomes unprivileged; he who is righteous is thus he who is wicked, and becomes him who is privileged and unprivileged, so that he is fully incriminated, and they shall carry off his possessions.'

¹ Yas. XLVI, 2 c-e; its Pahlavi version (Pahl. Yas. XLV, 2 c-e) may be translated as follows:—'I complain to thee, behold it and this *one*, *O Aôharماسد!* (that is, seek a remedy for me); *that* pleasure is my desire, which a friend gives to his friend; through the instruction of *Vohûman* (when I am instructed in virtue) is the coveted *thing* of righteousness (thou shouldst give me).' The words in parentheses have no equivalents in the Avesta text.

² Yas. XLVI, 7; its Pahlavi version (Pahl. Yas. XLV, 7 a-e) may be translated as follows:—'Who is given to me (and mine, my disciples) *as* protector by thee, *O Aôharماسد!* when that wicked (*Aharman*) retains malice *for* me in possession (that is, maintains malice with me? Who shall provide me protection), other than thy fire and *Vohûman*? (Because I know that they would provide me protection for your sake) when I nourish righteousness through deeds *for* them, *O Aôharماسد!* (that is, should I perform duty and good works, who shall provide me protection?) Thou shouldst proclaim to me that high-priest of the religion; (this thou shouldst state thus: "Maintain the religion as high-priest").'

³ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 13 e, and Bk. VIII, Chaps. XI, 1, XIII, 15.

⁴ Compare Ibid. 14 a which is given in Pt4, Mf4, as follows:—*Zaratûstô mûn lak aharûbô dôstô.*

28. Regarding the benefitters the reply spoken is *thus*: 'They are owing to the reward of the smiter and developer; those are beneficial whose smiting and developing are those of the developer Aûharmazd, who understands smiting and development.'

29. When through smiting by Aûharmazd, on account of the wicked, a question (frashnō) about *it* arose, the reply spoken, as to the smiting of the present *world* by means of him who is ruler, *was*: 'The reward which the judgment that is perfect teaches is thus, that he who is the smiter and developer, Sôshâns¹, shall make the decision.' 30. Zaratûst spoke *in* reply thus: 'He gives a reward.' 31. And that wise smiter, Sôshâns, spoke *in* reply thus: 'He shall inflict punishment.'

32. Even he who is an ox of many cattle has openly *and* publicly wailed this complaint² on account of the righteous *one*: 'How long *is it* till *the time* when a developer arises, even he who is an irresolute ruler (akâmakō khûdât)? How long is the time till he arises, until the wicked *one* who is a smiter *and* privileged corrupter is he *who is* unprivileged?' 33. Because, for the sake of producing resolution (kâmak-dahth), he complains that, until the developer shall arise, even he who is irresolute is ruler, that is, until he who is the developer shall become privileged.

34. As to that complaint of his Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'Not so *as by* this complaint is the obtainment of spiritual lordship (ahûtkih), for this reason, when they do not consider the ruler as a ruler, and *there is* no giving of priestly authority (radōth) by any

¹ See § 10.

² Compare Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 1, 9.

righteousness whatever¹, it is requisite, on account of the many righteous, to speak henceforth, until *the time* when the developer arises, even *of* him who is an irresolute ruler.'

35. On account of the many statements of the spirits, even as to thought, word, *and* deed, it is requisite to say that they shall always render an account until even some obtainment *of* a smiter and developer, privileged *or* unprivileged. 36. Some arise *of* whom it is requisite to ask this question (frashnō)² while he who is righteous *and* he who is wicked are two witnesses, *and* they make the righteous *one* manifest by his evidence, *or* they molest him who is righteous by smiting. 37. Some arise when it is requisite to speak this reply³ during the smiting *of* the maintainer of strife and *of* the kinsman. 38. *And* some arise while that individual⁴ is loved, though a righteous *one and* a developer arise, *and* it is requisite to produce a provider of benefit on account of the many, both wicked and righteous, so long as a wicked *one* of the smiting which is maintaining strife is privileged.

39. Because, regarding the production of resolution, *it* is proclaimed that *it is* so that they shall fully understand that Aûharmazd discriminates truly, *and* Aharman does not discriminate truly. 40. And that *it is* so that they shall fully understand that the punishment of the wicked is for teaching *them* that they *will* attain to the existence of darkness, that even *to* him who belongs to the ever-stationary they *may* give his reward, that they are for smiting the wicked *one*, that they are very powerful to give, that

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 6 b.

² That in § 32.

³ That in § 34.

⁴ The irresolute ruler.

they *should* kill the apostate, that *one has to be* converted from vileness to goodness, that he who would be wicked is made to believe by the tongue, that for the sake of proper nurture of the creatures next-of-kin marriage is provided, that the demons are despised, that thus he who is evil-ruling is wicked, and that they are approaching *the place* where Aûharmazd shall provide for the account of sin and good works.

41. They shall become more diligent in the performance of duty and good works, and abstain more from sin, always until *one* attains even to some acquirement *for* those in life and those in a lifeless state¹. 42. And they shall not inflict their punishment completely in the embodied state, and the fiend does not pity the worldly *existence*; every individual is counted up, and every one is fully completed for the affairs of Aûharmazd, *but* the fiend is not smitten, and they shall not fully inflict the punishment.

43. No one thinks thou shouldst remain for the propitious Aûharmazd, and no one completely presents *himself*; they attack through the fiend, and arise for the foolish *one*. 44. No one arises for the goodness of him who is good, *but* for the vileness of the fiend they destroy *what is* good, and do not understand evil *and* good; they recite the revelation for a wicked *one*, they do not bestow friendship for labour, *but* are for the evil-doer.

45. And the righteous *one*, who is the best of spiritual *and* worldly *existences*, becomes a privileged

¹ By accumulating more good works than are necessary to balance one's own sins.

developer, even he who is an irresolute ruler¹; and so he who is wicked, even he who is privileged, becomes unprivileged, at that time when *one* gives the soul of every one unto the supreme heaven², and when thou shouldst, every one, know that the affliction of the annoyers arises³, so that when, owing thereto, they beseech the sacred beings, *it is* only hell that they supply.

46. When every one shall provide the ceremonial of the archangels unworriedly, and when every one knows that Gôš-aûrvan complained⁴—so that he who is the fashioner of cattle enquired thus: 'Whose is the guardianship of cattle⁵?' *and* 'Not without annoyance' *was* the reply of Ashavahist, 'that is, they shall inflict his punishment⁶'—every one *also* knows that in their light is joyfulness for the sight⁷.

47. When every individual (ko/â ats-1) becomes aware *of* the priestly authority of Aûharmazd; and when every individual knows that his remedy *for* the devastation owing to the evil spirit is comprehensibly stated⁸; when every individual knows that Aûharmazd fashioned the propitiousness in the liturgy⁹; and when every one knows that the priest is perfect, that Aûharmazd enhances both of them in spirituality¹⁰, that Vohûman is the offspring of Aûharmazd¹¹, that Spendarmad is Aûharmazd's own¹², that all three of them are the life *of* him who

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XIX, 58, XX, 10.

² See Pahl. Yas. XXVIII, 4 a.

³ Ibid. 6 c.

⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 1 a, and Chap. XV, 3.

⁵ Ibid. 2 a.

⁶ Ibid. 3 a, and Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVII, 14.

⁷ See Pahl. Yas. XXX, 1 c.

⁸ See Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 6 a.

⁹ Ibid. 7 a.

¹⁰ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 7 c.

¹¹ Ibid. 8 a.

¹² Ibid. 9 a.

has wandered forth¹—that is, life is given by the thought and wisdom² which are his own—and that the sacred beings are they who are supporting *it*.

48. When every one of this existence must act for the sake of that *other* existence, *and* knows *how* to act; when every one is a friend, through deeds, of the spirit which is his own³; and when every one becomes a person supporting Aûharmazd⁴. 49. When every individual knows that they give no reward to him in whose body a demon is lodging who is not listening⁵; when every one shall make his own soul immortal⁶; and when every one has advantage through possession of Aûharmazd⁷.

50. When every one becomes a Zôti unsullied in righteousness⁸; when every one gives a sacred cake to the archangels⁹; when every one knows that co-operation is due to him who is their servant; and when they are together *in* soul¹⁰. 51. When every individual gives *his* body¹¹; when every one proceeds to their ceremonial and glorification¹²; when every individual knows that 'other than they' is *meant by* naêkîm tem anyem¹³; and when every one knows

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 10 a.

² Ibid. 11 b, c.

³ Ibid. 21 c.

⁴ Ibid. 22 c.

⁵ Compare Pahl. Yas. XXXIII, 4 a, XLIII, 13 c.

⁶ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIV, 1 a.

⁷ Ibid. 3 a.

⁸ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIII, 6 a, and Bk. VIII, Chap. VII, 5.

⁹ Ibid. 8 c.

¹⁰ Ibid. 9 c.

¹¹ Ibid. 10 c.

¹² See Pahl. Yas. XXXIV, 6 c.

¹³ Yas. XXXIV, 7 c, the Pahlavi version of which may be translated as follows :—' I am aware of no one (above), other than you (that is, I know no one from whom my benefit is such as from you, and when they shall cause) righteousness (that is, they shall perform duty and good works, it) thus produces shelter for us.' The MS. has naêkîd.

that, through that sovereignty of his, the renovation of *the universe* is produced by *his* will among the existences¹.

52. When every one knows the elucidation (rô-shanô) of the religion; when every one considers the religion as governor and serf²; when every one knows that the manifestation of this ought to arise in him; when every one thinks Aûharmazd auspicious³; and when every one knows that, when it occurs, benefit is produced, through resolute sovereignty⁴, where and when it gives him a reward for the performance of the duty and good works they should call for. 53. When every one gives⁵ the sacred beings *and* the good a sheep; when every one knows that, for him whose righteousness is in action, immense *and* complete mindfulness arises⁶; when every one thinks of much assistance from Aûharmazd⁷; when every one speaks to restore *his* temper⁸; when every one speaks to provide the ceremonial⁹; and when every one produces that advantage by liberal giving¹⁰. 54. When every one knows that *one* grants him the obeisance which is *due* to him when in a condition for the supreme heaven (amat dên garôdmânîkîh)¹¹; when every one knows that *it* is done by those in the realm of Aûharmazd¹²; and when every individual knows

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XXXIV, 15 c.

² See Pahl. Yas. XXXV, 22.

³ See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 7 a.

⁴ Ibid. 8 d.

⁵ Assuming that yehevûnêd, 'becomes,' stands for yehabûnêd.

⁶ See Pahl. Yas. XLIII, 6 c.

⁷ Ibid. 7 d.

⁸ See Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 3 a.

⁹ Ibid. 6 a.

¹⁰ Ibid. 7 a.

¹¹ Ibid. 8 e.

¹² Ibid. 9 c.

that, so long as the religion of the first creation¹ shall exist (ae), this characteristic is to be considered thus: Hvô zi dregvau, &c.²

55. When every individual keeps no wealth for a high-priest of the apostates³; when every one knows that, when above, *there* is righteousness⁴; when they shall make intercession⁵ *for* every individual, and when every individual becomes aware⁶ *of it*; when every individual sees that he is a father of righteousness⁷; and when every individual knows that the propitious spirit is in him⁸. 56. When every one knows that, when a supplicant, he is more a smiter of the wicked⁹; when every individual utters the salutation (nīyâyisnō) of Aûharmazd¹⁰; when every individual knows that that is our comfort¹¹, *and* that it is Aûharmazd's own creature¹²; and when every individual is taught¹³, *and* every individual joins in the perfect religion¹⁴.

57. When every individual knows that Vohûman

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 6 e.

² Yas. XLVI, 6 c-e; its Pahlavi version (Pahl. Yas. XLV, 6 c-e) may be translated as follows:—'For he is wicked whose best nature is for the wicked, and he is righteous whose homage (franâmisnō in Pt4, Mf4) is for the righteous (in any doubtfulness, whoever gives anything to the wicked is to be considered as wicked, and whoever gives to the righteous is to be considered as righteous) so long as the religion of the first creation, O Aûharmazd! (until the time when Sôshâns arrives *one* is ever to be considered in this way).'

³ See Pahl. Yas. XLV, 8 a. The MS. has 'the righteous' by mistake.

⁴ Ibid. 12 a.

⁵ Compare Pahl. Yas. XLVIII, 6 a.

⁶ Compare Pahl. Yas. XLV, 17 e.

⁷ See Pahl. Yas. XLVI, 2 d.

⁸ Ibid. 3 a.

⁹ Ibid. 4 d.

¹⁰ See Pahl. Yas. XLVII, 1 d.

¹¹ Ibid. 6 a.

¹² Ibid. 7 d.

¹³ Ibid. 12 c.

¹⁴ See Pahl. Yas. XLVIII, 9 c.

guards the creatures¹; when every individual becomes privileged by will² for the reward; when every individual knows that gain is through giving away³; when every individual transacts, *or* shall transact, the affairs of the archangels⁴; and when every individual knows that when he who is intelligent speaks to him⁵, it becomes a possession for the benefit of righteousness⁶.

58. When, for equal meritoriousness, it is necessary to give sooner to Magian men⁷—so that on account even of the Magianship of Kaī-Vistâsp *he was* suitable for the sovereignty⁸, that Zaratûst *was* given a wife by Frashôstar⁹, that *it was* the learned Gâmâsp¹⁰ that Aûharmazd gave—and that every individual shall provide the ceremonial of Aûharmazd¹¹. 59. And when every individual knows that *they are* the best prayers which are the words of Zaratûst¹², and, even so, his is a wise reward for those which are yours¹³.

60. It is perfect *is* the excellence of righteousness; it is perfect excellence *that is* righteousness.

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLVIII, 10 a, b.

² See Pahl. Yas. XLIX, 9 c.

³ See Pahl. Yas. L, 1 b. The MS. has bûn, instead of barâ, by mistake.

⁴ Ibid. 3 c.

⁵ Ibid. 8 a.

⁶ Ibid. 8 b.

⁷ Ibid. 15 a.

⁸ Ibid. 16 a, and Bk. VIII, Chap. XI, 1.

⁹ Ibid. 17 a, and Bk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 68.

¹⁰ Ibid. 18 a.

¹¹ Ibid. 20 c.

¹² See Pahl. Yas. LII, 1 a.

¹³ Ibid. 7 a.

DETAILS OF THE NASKS

FROM

OTHER SOURCES.

OBSERVATIONS.

1-5. (The same as on page 2.)

6. The manuscripts mentioned are :—

B (written A. D. 1659), see page 2.

B₂₉ (written A. D. 1679), a Persian Rivâyat, No. 29 in the University Library at Bombay.

DH (written A. D. 1813), a Dîn-vigirgârd in the library of Dastûr Hôshangji Jâmâspji at Poona.

K₃₅ (probably written A. D. 1572), a Dâdîstân-î Dînîk, No. 35 in the University Library at Copenhagen.

Mf₄, Pt₄ (written about A. D. 1780), in the Mullâ Fîrûz Library and in that of Dastûr Peshotanji Behramji in Bombay, respectively, both copied from a Yasna with Pahlavi, written in Irân and brought to India about A. D. 1478, which was a descendant of an ancestor of J₂ and K₅, and independent of those two authorities.

MH₁₀ (about 150 years old), a Persian Rivâyat, No. 10 of Haug's Collection in the State Library at Munich.

O₂₂₅, a Persian Rivâyat in No. 225 of Ouseley's Collection in the Bodleian Library at Oxford.

FROM THE SELECTIONS

OF

ZÂD-SPARAM¹.

1. About the three divisions of revelation there is a condensed medium, beneficial *and* small, of whose subdivision one category (ragistakö) is collection together; that is, the Ahunavair² itself is a symbol of the Nasks.

2. First, the Ahunavair is apportioned into its three degrees (padmân), as shown in another chapter; *and* by a like system (ragistak) the Gâthas³, too, are into three, which are the three-lined, four-lined, and five-lined⁴; even so the Nasks

¹ Who was high-priest of Sirkân, in the south of Persia, towards the end of the ninth century, being contemporary with the last reviser of the Dînkard (see S. B. E., vol. xviii, p. xxvii). This extract from his Selections constitutes the 'particulars about the Gâthas and the connection of the Ahunavair with the Nasks,' mentioned in the final footnote to Zs. XI, 10. For the Pahlavi text the translator is dependent upon a single MS., copied from K₃₅ when this latter MS. was complete, and said to be now in the library of Dastûr Jâmâspji Minochiharji in Bombay.

² See Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 7.

³ The word gâsânö is usually written like dahisnö in the MS.

⁴ The three-lined stanzas of the Gâthas are 100 in the Ahunavairi (Yas. XXVIII-XXXIV), 40 in the Yasna of seven hâs (Yas. XXXV-XLI), and 22 in the Vohû-khshathra (Yas. LI), altogether 162 three-lined stanzas; the four-lined are one in the Ustavaiti (Yas. XLVI, 15), 41 in the Spentâ-mainyô (Yas. XLVII-L), and nine in the Vahistôisti (Yas. LIII), altogether 51 four-lined stanzas;

are denominated Gâthic, Hadha-mâthric, and Law. 3. Then the Ahunavair is apportioned into six which they call half-lines (nêm-gâs); so, too, the Gâthas are into six, which are called the Ahunavaiti Gâtha, the Yasna, the Ustavaiti¹ Gâtha, the Spentâ-mainyû (Spetamatō) Gâtha, the Vohû-khshathra Gâtha, and the Vahistōisti Gâtha; even so the Nasks are into six, as the Gâthas are into two, which are called one the Gâthic creation—which is the Yast²—and one the rest of the Gâthic; also the Hadha-mâthric into two, one the Mâthra of the arranger—which is the Pâkīnō and Radō-dādō-aitō³—and one the Mâthra full of good tokens, which is the rest of the Hadha-mâthra; and also the Law into two, one the law against the demons—which is the Vendīdād⁴—and one the law of Zarātūst, which is the rest of the Law. 4. Then it is apportioned into twenty-one, such as the twenty-one words (mârik) of the Ahunavair; also the Gâthas are into twenty-one, which are the Ahunavair, the praise of righteousness, the performance of the good, and from Yânm-manō unto Airyaman⁵ which, being

and the five-lined stanzas are the remaining 65 in the Ustavaiti (Yas. XLIII–XLVI); making the total of 278 stanzas mentioned in § 5. Yas. XLII is a later supplement to the Yasna of seven hâs, and, in the MSS. Pt₄, Mf₄, it is headed as follows:—*Avar vaharakō-î haft hādō Yastō yazisnīk būn*, ‘the beginning of worshipping as regards the portions of the Yasna of seven hâs.’

¹ The MS. corrupts these two names into the one word asnavatō by omitting the syllables aûsta.

² The Stōd-yast, or first of the Gâthic Nasks (see Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 9).

³ The third and fourth of the Hadha-mâthric Nasks (ibid. 10).

⁴ The fifth of the Legal Nasks (ibid. 11).

⁵ The three sacred formulas, Yathâ-ahû-vairyō, Ashem-vohû,

accomplished (*âkarðö*), are twenty-one; and the Nasks are twenty-one.

5. Then the Gâthas are apportioned into 278¹ stanzas (*vêhêstö*); and the Nasks also into 278 categories, every single category *having* borne a form like a single verse², as regards how much and how *anything* good is indicated, such as the Patkâr-radistân³, in which *what* is legally disputable is reported (*pêdâkö*); the Zâkhmistân⁴, by which the penalty of assault (*zâkhm*) is reported; the Stôristân⁵, by which the sin and amount of penalty *for* a wound, as regard beasts *of burden and* cattle, are reported; the Aratêstâristân⁶, by which battle is reported; the Pasûs-haûrvastân⁷, by which the customary keeping of sheep in control is reported; the Gûrðât-zarîttunistân ('*corn-sowing code*')⁸, by which agriculture is reported; the Varistân⁹, by which an ordeal *being* accomplished is reported; *and* others of a like description.

and Yênhê-hâtâm, with the seventeen hâs of the five real Gâthas, and either the Yasna of seven hâs, counted as a single item, or the Airyaman, will make up the twenty-one divisions (compare the names applied to each fargard of the Sûðkar, Varstmânsar, and Bakö Nasks in Dk. IX).

¹ See § 2 n; here the MS. has 288, by miswriting, in both occurrences of the ciphers.

² Doubtful; the text appears to be as follows:—*ko/â ragistakö-âê bûrðö san mânâk ak gâh.*

³ See Dk. VIII, Chap. XVI.

⁴ Equivalent to Zatamistân (*ibid.* Chap. XVII), see Darmesteter's suggestion (*ibid.* Chap. XVI, 8 n).

⁵ *Ibid.* Chap. XXIV; here spelt Stôritân by mistake.

⁶ *Ibid.* Chap. XXVI.

⁷ *Ibid.* Chap. XXIII; here written Pasûs-haûristân.

⁸ *Ibid.* Chap. XXXI, 30-32.

⁹ *Ibid.* Chap. XLII; here written Varistân.

6. Then the Gâthas are apportioned into 1016¹ metrical lines (gâs), and the Nasks into 1000 Hâs *and* Fargards², *and*, since the Hâdôkht³ is the priestly master (radô) of the Nasks, *and* the remedy⁴ (darmôn) which is a perfect statement about the master of the resurrection, the existence of *its* fargards about the other fargards is therefore 1000 remedies fully combined, *being* the corn and fodder that are shut up (bastakô) when, over that thousand, they supply one that is great, which *in* every way protects *them* from hail and rain, *from* the wind which is hot *and* that which is cold.

7. Then the Gâthas are apportioned into 6666 words (mârîk)⁵, and *as to* the Nasks, too, their own 6666 ordinances (dâdistânô) are therein severed.
8. And the 6666 words, which are in the Gâthas, are

¹ See Sls. XIII, 50; that this number is correct may be seen from the details given in § 2 n.

² See Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 20; here the MS. has âyûînô instead of hâtô, by miswriting.

³ The sixth of the Gâthic Nasks (see Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 9).

⁴ See Dk. VIII, Chap. XLV, 13, where the word used is bêshâzô.

⁵ According to Sls. XIII, 50 the six Gâthas (including the Yasna of seven hâs) contain 5567 vâkâk, 9999 mârîk, and 16,554 khûrdak; which enumeration makes the meaning of mârîk doubtful. In our present text, however, it must have its usual meaning of 'word,' as the number of 6666 words in the six Gâthas can be obtained by including the customary repetition of the first stanza of each Hâ of the five real Gâthas, with the text of the Airyaman and of the introductions to Yas. XXVIII, XXXV, and probably the homage formula prefixed to each Gâtha; also by considering each component of a compound as a separate word, and all verbal prefixes as separable; and by counting all enclitics except -kâ, in accordance with the different modes of treating -kîd and -kâ in counting the words of the Ahunavair. If the three sacred formulas were included, and the Airyaman and five homage formulas were omitted, the total would be nearly the same.

an indicator of *the period* from the adversary *having* come to the creatures, as far as unto the end of the six millenniums¹—each millennium *being* ten centuries—which amount to 60 single centuries—a century *being* ten tens²—and up to *the time* when its³ cold and distress arrive, which become awful; the 600, including the excess as far as one ten⁴, are years of the 6000 years which are the words of the six Gâthas that are the first indicator of the six millenniums; therefore of the 60 centuries are then the 600 *and* those which are *added to them* (zak-1 ghał).

9. And after those 6000, which are the 6000 years, are the Airyaman⁵ of Ashavahist *and* the accompanying sayings (ham-vâkō) which are at the end of the Gâthas; those are the 57 years of Sôshâns⁶, and for the sake of them, too, are the Airyaman *and* from the praise of righteousness at *its* end *to* the consecration of the Airyaman, originally 57 words (mârik), because the praise of righteousness for the Airyaman is 12, and the consecration of the Airyaman is 21, *of* the original 57⁷.

¹ The three millenniums during which Aûharmazd and Aharman had nearly equal influence, and the last three millenniums during which the power of Aharman diminishes (see Bd. I, 20).

² Assuming that 𐬨𐬭 stands for 𐬨𐬭𐬭.

³ Assuming that mûnas, 'whose,' stands for a matas.

⁴ As the cipher for 'one' precedes that for 'ten,' it may possibly mean 'one less than ten,' as in the Roman IX. At any rate, 6609 years with the 57 accounted for in § 9 make up the requisite total of 6666; but the mode of making this number correspond with the six millenniums is not very clear.

⁵ Yas. LIV, 1.

⁶ See Dk. VIII, Chap. XIV, 14; Bd. XXX, 7.

⁷ The Airyaman contains 24 words, its Ashem-vohû 12, and its consecration (Yas. LIV, 2) 21 words, making altogether 57 words.

DĪNKARD.—BOOK III.

CHAPTER VII¹.

The ninth question.

1. Another apostate enquired thus: 'When there is Māthra that is said *to be* all in the words of Aûharmazd to Zaratûst, *whether* it be in the words of Frashôstar and Gâmâsp², *or* be in the words of Vohû-man³ and the sacred beings, *or* be in words of theirs published before *the time of* Zaratûst, *or* even after *that of* Sênô⁴, is *it to be* considered *by* us, as to that which is relating to us, *that* what is the utterance of Aûharmazd to Zaratûst is only the Gâthic, and the rest is composed *by* Zaratûst and his disciples from the world, even statements due to a good inclination for conversion (vastakth)?'

2. The reply is *that* the other Māthra which is separate from the Gâthas, if it *be apart* from the Gâthas, is *still* owing to the composition of the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô⁵; *and* the same separate Māthra, which is from a witness about *it*, is the evidence with Aûharmazd himself in vigorous omniscience and composition, and not owing to the knowledge of mankind, which shall not attain even to an atom of the atoms thereof. 3. The arising of the Māthra, through the speaking of many voices, is not all the speaking of Aûharmazd to Zaratûst through those

¹ According to Peshotan's notation; the text followed is that of the MS. B, written A. D. 1659.

² See Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 68.

³ This seems a more likely reading than 'Hôm' for the imperfect word 𐬨𐬀𐬎𐬌.

⁴ See Chap. CXCVII, 6 n.

⁵ See Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 7 n.

voices, but the speaking of several separately, through which the speaking of the voice would be evidently *that of Aûharmazd*; that is this Māthra. 4. *And* just as the speaking forth of Zaratûst and other good *men*, as well as evil *ones*, likewise *of* those who are demons, even as far as the evil spirit, is stated by Aûharmazd in public, that statement would become even that of the evil spirit and demons, *and* the Māthra and Law against the demons *would* likewise *become* spoken *by* the demons. 5. And the Māthra is all *confided by* Aûharmazd to Zaratûst through many voices, *being* an avowal of Aûharmazd to Zaratûst, and an existence which is not inconsistent (han-bêshin); just as the Gāthas, which even you *admit to be*, as a whole, *confided by* Aûharmazd to Zaratûst, are spoken through the voice of Zaratûst, be they through the voices of the archangels, be they through the voice of Gôs-aûrvan¹, or be they *through* the voices of other sacred beings, to all *they* are spoken *by* Aûharmazd to Zaratûst, *and* are not inconsistent. 6. *But* owing to the disposition of an apostate *there* is a longing scrutiny about his own *statements*, *and* evil-thinking scrutiny about the statements protecting the spiritual lord.

CHAPTER CLXI.

1. About *one* supremely² acquainted with the three³ codes (dâdō) of the Mazda-worshipping religion there is *this*:—*One* supremely acquainted

¹ See Dk. IX, Chap. XV, 3.

² Perhaps we should read *avîrtar*, 'more particularly,' instead of *avartar*.

³ B has 'four' by mistake here, but not afterwards.

with the three codes of the Mazda-worshipping religion is he *of* the primitive faith whose insight into the good religion is even such that he knows *how* to discriminate *and* announce the statements (*vâkakö*) of the Hadha-mâthric and Gâthic from *those of* the Law, *those of* the Legal *and* Gâthic from *those of* the Hadha-mâthric, and *those of* the Hadha-mâthric and Legal from *those of* the Gâthas. 2. Also to the statements (*vâkakö*) in the Law—which is superior¹ knowledge about the worldly *existences*—is allotted (*vakhtö*) the worldliness *of* the Hadha-mâthric and also *of* the Gâthic; *to those* in the Gâthas—which are superior knowledge about the spiritual *existences*—is *allotted* the spirituality *of* the Hadha-mâthric and even that of the Law; and *to those* in the Hadha-mâthra—which is superior knowledge about *things* intermediate *between* the spiritual and worldly *existences*—is *allotted* the intermediate matter (*mîyânîkîh*) *of* the Gâthic *and* also *of* the Legal².

CHAPTER CLXV.

1. About the purport *of* the evidence of the three codes of the Mazda-worshipping religion, one as regards the other, there is verbal evidence of the Gâthic from the Hadha-mâthric and the Law, and about the Hadha-mâthric and the Law from the Gâthas. 2. The purport, too, of the statement *that* occurs is this of a ruler putting aside the commands of an enemy—which are declared, *in* many passages (*dîvâk*) of the Hadha-mâthric and even of the Legal, *to be* worthiness of death—the purport *being* in the words of a Gâthic phrase (*nisang*) *that* is

¹ See p. 407, n. 2.

² Compare Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 13, 14.

even this :—‘ He who is a good ruler is a desire *and* bringing on of fortune for me (va/am)¹.’ 3. All rulers also for the world have arisen *for* their own, and for maintaining him who is high-priest; they are submissive, and *any one* accomplishing their commands—which are putting aside the commands of their enemy—is, owing to their submissiveness, authorisedly maintaining his own person *and* wealth *in* the world thereby, *and* in the world there is no place, *nor* yet a share of anything therefrom, on account of which he becomes offended by the world.

4. The evidence of the Hadha-māthric and of the Legal about a Gāthic statement is the purport *of* these words in a Gāthic phrase, that ‘not *for* him who is rightly proceeding is *there* further ruin²;’ *and* the evidence from the Hadha-māthric is even this which states that ‘rectitude assists a man like a regiment a thousand strong³;’ also for the proportion of rectitude in *his* possession there is no disturbance whatever, and from the hurtful (vinâsīgânō) from without *he* is thus protected, because fully-worshipping (pûr-yazân) performance is freedom from danger from the want of freedom from wickedness (*a*-adarvandih) of the enemy, as regards benefit, through the doing of injury by him.

5. And on account of the superior knowledge of the spiritual *existence*, moreover, for the Gāthas, above the intermediate Hadha-māthric *and* the lower knowledge of the Law, the purpose of the Gāthic *was* for the statements of the Legal *and* the Hadha-māthric, and the provision of the Hadha-māthric

¹ Pahl. Yas. L, 1 a.

² Pahl. Yas. XXIX, 5 c.

³ Dk. IX, Chap. XX, 4.

and the Legal was evidently for the statements of the Gâthas.

CHAPTER CXCVII.

6. One¹ is *that*, on account of him who gave the Legal, and is also the protector of a priestly master who is given over to the Hadha-mâthric, *and* the Gâthic, through which the purity of the good creations arises, *one* is more steadfastly to aggrandise and develope *them*.

DĪNKARD.—BOOK IV².

1. Obeisance *to* the Mazda-worshipping religion which is opposed to the demons *and* is the ordinance of Aûharmazd.

¹ This is the fourth of 'the ten admonitions of the righteous Sênôv about the law of the Mazda-worshipping religion.' In the seventh book of the *Dînkard* it is stated that 'as regards the high-priests this, too, is said on the subject of Sênôv, that one hundred years of the religion elapse when Sênôv is born, and two hundred years when he passes away; he was also the first Mazda-worshipper with a life of a hundred years (100 khayâ), *and* who walks forth upon this earth with a hundred disciples.' This last clause clearly identifies him with the 'Saêna, son of Ahûm-stud, who first appeared upon this earth with a hundred pupils,' as stated in Yt. XIII, 97 (see Darmesteter, *Textes pehlvis relatifs au Judaïsme*, première partie, p. 3, n. 2).

² This book commences with an account of the seven arch-angels, and, illustrative of the 'desirable dominion' personified in Shatraver, the fourth of them, a statement is made of the legendary history of the efforts made by the good rulers, from Vistâsp to Khûsrôî Anôsharavân, for the preservation of Avesta and Pahlavi

2. The fourth *book* is matter for instruction from the statements selected, from the instruction of the good religion, by the saintly (hû-fravardō) Âtûr-farnbag¹, son of Farukhō-zâd and leader of those of the good religion.

3. From the Selection of Customary Instruction² there is *this*:—*Number* one is the actual original evolution³, resembling only himself and not designed (kimik). 4. *Number* two, the duplication of the first among those akin (khvēstgân) owing to the consciousness of creation—which is the first—is Vohûman; but *it is* his origin, concealed from the destroyer, which is the reason of the creation.

10. *Number* three is the original creature Ashavahist⁴—due to development among those akin, one out of another—who possesses the third place among the archangels, for the reverence of the first.

12. *Number* four, the perfect sovereignty among

literature. Most of this statement has been already translated at the end of Haug's Essay on Pahlavi, from a less perfect MS. than B, but, as some of the accompanying text is obscure, it has now been necessary to translate the whole of it to ascertain its connection clearly, although only so much of this translation is here given as will indicate this connection in a general way.

¹ Who held a religious disputation with the accursed Abâlis in the presence of the Khalifah Al-Mâmûn (A. D. 813–833), as stated in the Mâdîgân-i Gugastak Abâlis. He appears to have been the first compiler of the Dînkard, especially of its first two Books which are still undiscovered (see Dk. III, Chap. last, 9, in Introduction; Sg. IV, 107, IX, 3, X, 55). Dk. IV, V are taken from his statements, as well as a portion of Dk. III, Chap. CXLII.

² Âyûtnō âmûkō vigîñō, evidently the name of a treatise compiled by Âtûr-farnbag.

³ That is, Aûharmazd.

⁴ See Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXVII, 14.

those akin, is named Shatraver¹, the necessity of the stored-up (*avar-gûdô*) nature of a spiritual lord arisen from the reverence of the perfectly just doer Ashavahist, who is the third in arising from him who is the second, Vohûman, who is the first creature. . . . 19. So, too, the sovereignty of the religion is ever specially good sovereignty *and* triumphant, and the true religion is confident; the will of the sacred beings in the world is progress, and the comprisal of every knowledge is in the *Mazda*-worshipping religion; the correct attainment of its good sovereignty and their joint statement are together really on account of their concealed good protection and progressive production, one for the other. 20. They strive for the powerful maintenance of the religious good monarchy of rulers, trusty *in* religion through practising *Mazda*-worship; the law of the rulers is custom, and their custom is religious.

21. Vistâsp², the king when he became relieved (*pardakhtô*) from the war with Ar'gâsp³, sent to the chief rulers about the acceptance of the religion, 'and the writings⁴ of the *Mazda*-worshipping religion, which are studded with all knowledge through resources and learning of many kinds, and *also* the tongue of a Magian man (*Magôî-gabrâ*), arisen *in* the very same instructed duty, it is expedient you *should* send (*sedrûnêdô*) therewith.' 22. Now

¹ See Dk. IX, Chap. XLIII, 1.

² See Dk. VIII, Chaps. XI, 1, XIII, 15.

³ Ibid. XI, 4.

⁴ Haug's MS. omits this passage: *va/ sar-khûdâyân madam padîrôstanô-î dênô firîstakô, va-nipikîhâ-î*; and, even when it is supplied from B, a few more words appear to be still wanting.

*Arezrâspô*¹, and others from outside of Khvanîras², came to Frashôstar for religious enquiry, with complete intelligence *for* the most who did *so*.

23. Dârâi³, son of Dârât, ordered the preservation of two written copies of the whole Avesta and Zand, according to the receiving of *it* by Zaratûst from Aûharmazd; one in the treasury of Shapîgân⁴, and one in the fortress of written *documents*.

24. Valkhas⁵, descendant of Askân, in *each* district, just as he had come forth, ordered the careful preservation, and making of memoranda for the royal city (shatrô shahag), of the Avesta and Zand as it had purely come unto *them*, and also of whatever instruction (âmûkô-k), due to it, had remained written about, as well as deliverable by the tongue through a high-priest, in a scattered state in the country of Irân, owing to the ravages and devastation of Alexander and the cavalry and infantry of the Arûmans⁶.

¹ Evidently the same person as Arezrâspâh (Dk. IX, Chap. XXI, 24), the supreme high-priest of the northern region Vîdazafsh (Bd. XXIX, 1). In Dk. VII it is also stated that Spîtdôis and Arezrâspô came to Frashôstar, seeking information about the religion, 57 years after it had been received by Zaratûst who appears to have departed to the best existence ten years before.

² See Dk. VIII, Chap. VIII, 2.

³ According to Bd. XXXIV, 8 and the Persian Rivâyats, which teach a chronology of their own, this Dârâi was the predecessor of Alexander and reigned fourteen years; his father reigning twelve years.

⁴ It is hazardous to read 'the royal (shâyagân) treasury' because the name, which occurs seven times in the *Dînkard*, is five times spelt Shapîgân, and twice Shasîgân.

⁵ Probably Vologeses I, who was a contemporary of Nero and appears to have been a Mazda-worshipper (see S. B. E., vol. iv, p. xxxiv).

⁶ The older Greeks were so called by the Persians in Sasanian

25. That (valman-1-1) Artakhshatar¹, king of kings, who *was* son of Pâpak, summoned Tôsar, *and* also all that scattered instruction (âmûkō), as true authority, to the capital; Tôsar *having* arrived, him alone he approved, and, dismissing the rest of the high-priests, he also gave this command, namely: 'For us every other exposition of the Mazda-worshipping religion becomes removed, because even now there is no information *or* knowledge of it below.'

26. Shahpûhar², king of kings *and* son of Artakhshatar, again brought together also the writings which *were* distinct from religion, about the investigation of medicine and astronomy, time, place, *and* quality, creation (dahisnō), existence, *and* destruction (vinâsisnō), the submission of a wild beast³, evidence, and other records and resources *that* were scattered among the Hindûs, *and in* Arâm⁴ and other lands; and he ordered *their* collocation again with the Avesta, *and* the presentation of a correct copy of each to the treasury of Shapîgân⁵; and the settlement (astînidanō) of all the erring upon the Mazda-worshipping religion, for proper consideration, *was* effected.

27. Shahpûhar⁶, king of kings *and* son of Aûhar-mazd, instituted a tribunal (âvân âhankō kardō) for the controversy of the inhabitants of all regions,

times, because they came from the same quarter as the later armies of the eastern empire of the Romans.

¹ The first Sasanian king, who reigned A. D. 226-240.

² The second Sasanian king, who reigned A. D. 240-271.

³ Doubtful; but it is difficult to find a more probable meaning for dadakō hêrîh.

⁴ The eastern empire of the Romans.

⁵ See § 23.

⁶ The ninth Sasanian king, who reigned A. D. 309-379.

and brought all statements to proper consideration and investigation; *and* after the preservation of Âtûrpâd¹, through the statement which he maintained (pasâkhtö) with all those *of* different sects, and the Nasks *were* enumerated, he also spoke this even *to* those who *were* heterodox, namely: 'Now, when the religion is recognised by us in the worldly *existence*, we do most diligently endeavour *that* they shall not allow the infidelity (agdênôih) of any one whatever;' and he acted accordingly.

28. This (le-denman-1-i²) Khûsrôï³, king of kings *who is* son of Kavâd, as apostasy and tyranny *were* fully antagonistically smitten by him⁴, and information and redoubled proper consideration *were* abundantly augmented—through a declaration from the religion unto every apostasy *of* the four classes (ptsakö)—also spoke even this as to winning the sacred beings (yazdân kharîdih), namely: 'The truth of the Mazda-worshipping religion is fully understood, *and* the intelligent *are* steadfastly capable through proper consideration; but recognition by the worldly *existence has* mostly become exceedingly scattered, *and* the particulars are not possible through proper consideration, but through purity *of* thought,

¹ See Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 22.

² Literally 'this one who is,' which, applied to a person near at hand, is a phrase analogous to valman-1-i, 'that one who is,' applied in § 25 to a person more remote. The oblique case le-denman of the demonstrative pronoun, which occurs very rarely, is analogous to the oblique cases li, lanman, lak, lekûm of the personal pronouns, which occur constantly.

³ The twentieth Sasanian king, who reigned A. D. 531-579; he was surnamed Anôsharavân, 'immortal-souled.'

⁴ Referring to his extirpation of the heresy of Mazdak, A. D. 528, before he came to the throne.

word, and deed, and the statements of the good spirit, the liturgical ceremonial of the sacred beings with purity.

29. 'We also call, each of those called by us, a priest of *Aûharmazd*, whose perception of the spiritual *existence* is manifested unto us; and our wide resources, the perception of the spiritual *existence* and the example of the worldly *one*, are likewise indications *of* both natures *that are* complete. 30. And we invite (*bavîhûnêm*) those invited¹, even with that excellence *and* efficiency which are due to them, on account of which the sacred beings are predominantly over Irân; the country of Irân *having* proceeded onwards through instruction from the *Mazda*-worshipping religion which the ancients celebrated. 31. The knowledge *of* the sociable ceremonial (*ham-yazisnîh*)—for which, indeed, those of the intelligent of disunited *Khvanîras* are not in a dispute of antagonism—is, *in* that way, mostly the sonorous (*aêvâzîk*) *Avesta*, in the pure statement *of* the writing adornable by memoranda of particulars; and even the simple wordless (*avâkîk*) mode is maintained in the announcement of the statement.

32. 'Even then all the domestic (*khânîk*) knowledge of the *Mazda*-worshipping religion is really on this account, which is understood by us, that, when all are intellectual (*vîr-hômônd*), and the proper consideration of a stranger (*bîgânakô*) is owing to the world of the *Mazda*-worshipping religion, they arrive at this place. 33. *But* through the new possession and proper consideration *of* the stranger, owing to the *Mazda*-worshipping religion, they are

¹ As in *Yas. II.*

not capable of bringing about so much acquirement *and* manifestation of knowledge, for the advantage and open duty of the worldly *existence*, as is in the recitation of a priestly master through much investigation, and is abundantly well-considered. 34. And if we command, with the utmost solicitude, the proper consideration of the Avesta and Zand of the primitive Magian statements (Magôl-gobisnô), which are more humbly observant, better disposed, good, *and* ever renewed uneffacedly, *as well as* an increase of acquirement worthily therefrom, for the knowledge *of* those of the world, *there is* no necessity of first acquiring the quality of creation from the creator, *by* those who are worldly *existences*, for understanding the creator and the marvellousness *of* the spiritual *existences*; or all necessity of acquiring is said *to be* longing through scanty knowledge.

35. 'They who are a counterpart (aêdûnôih) of manifestation from the religion—and even through the resemblance *there is* a possibility of the existence of understanding—are mentioned as effecting proper consideration (hû-sikâl-gar); and he who *has* to exhibit enlightenment (rôshanô) through knowledge, *has* to maintain acquaintance *with* the religion. 36. And since the origin of every knowledge is the religion, alike through spiritual power, and alike through worldly manifestation¹, that which any one *has* wisely spoken—even though not considered by him *as* similarly beheld (ham-dîdô) by any Avesta declaration—is still then accounted as a manifestation from the religion, whose business is

¹ Assuming that pêdâkîh-inîdârîh stands for pêdâkinîdârîh.

bringing forth offspring for the sacred beings through instruction.'

37¹.

FROM PERSIAN RIVÂYATS².

I. FROM THE RIVÂYAT OF BAHMAN PŪNGYAH³.

The names of the twenty-one Nasks, from the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô :—Yathâ, the Stûdkar; ahû, the Varstah-mânthrah; vairyô, the Bagh; athâ, the Dâmdâd; ratus, the Nâdûr; ashâd, the Pâzûn; kîd, the Ratustâyîd; hakâ, the Baris; vangheus, the Kassrôb; dazdâ, the Vistâspâd; mananghô, the Dâd; shyaothananâm, the Kîdrast; anghêus, the Spentah; mazdâi, the Bayân-yast; khshathremkâ, the Niyâdâm; ahurâi, the Duvâsarôgîd; â, the Hûspârâm; yim, the Sakadâm; drigubyô, the Gud-dêv-dâd⁴; dada, the Hâdokht of the Dvâzdah-hâmâspah; vâstârem, the Yast⁵.

¹ Then follows a briefer account of the remaining three arch-angels.

² These extracts from the Persian Rivâyats are taken from MS. 29 belonging to the Bombay University Library, which is a copy, made A. D. 1679, from a long Rivâyat said to have been compiled by Barzû Kâmdîn. The same extracts are to be found in many other MSS.

³ Bahman Pûngyah of Surat, a layman whose father's name appears to have been Isfendyâr, returned from Persia A. D. 1627, with letters and MSS. from priests in Irân in reply to letters from priests in India.

⁴ The Vendîdâd.

⁵ The order in which the Nasks are here arranged is the same as that employed in Dk. VIII, Chap. I, 12, and was in general

II. FROM THE RIVÂYAT OF KÂMAH BAHRAH¹.

1. The name of the first of these books is Stôd-yast², and this is a book of thirty-three compilations (îûrat), that is, of thirty-three subdivisions (kardah). The sending down of this book *was* for the description of the Lord³ and his angels; *and* he made *it* an indispensable duty for the whole world that they learn this book by heart, and for this purpose they form an assembly. Of this total of twenty-one Nasks it is one Nask of the Avesta, and in that mode they recite this.

2. The name of the second is Stûdgar⁴, and this is of twenty-two subdivisions, which God, the praise-

use 600 years ago, as we find that Rûstâm Mitrô-âpân (the writer of the original from which K1 was copied A.D. 1324) considered the Vendîdâd as the nineteenth Nask, corresponding to the Avesta word drigubyô in the Ahunavair. In Olshausen and Mohl's *Fragments relatifs à la religion de Zoroastre*, a similar list of the Nasks is extracted from Anquetil's Great Rivâyat, in which the order and orthography of the names of the Nasks are the same as those adopted by the later writers of the Persian Rivâyats, beginning with the Stôd-yast and ending with the Hâdokht (which makes the Vendîdâd the twentieth Nask), and reversing the order of the Kîdrast and Spentah, as well as that of the Duvâsarôgîd and Hûspârâm.

¹ This writer is often quoted in the Rivâyats, but no particulars about him have been noticed. Another copy of this text occurs in MS. 225 of Ouseley's Collection (O225, fols. 15-19) in the Bodleian Library at Oxford; Olshausen and Mohl (OM) combine the information given in II and III; and MS. 10 of Haug's Collection in the State Library at Munich (MH10, fols. 55-57) combines II and IV.

² See Dk. VIII, Chap. XLVI.

³ Assuming that 'âvêš, 'his own,' stands for 'hūdâf, as in Riv. IV, 2.

⁴ See Dk. VIII, Chap. II, and IX, Chaps. II-XXIII.

worthy *and* exalted, sent down for prayer and virtue, authority and intercession, and giving union to kindred.

3. The name of the third is Vahist-mânthrah ¹, and that is of twenty-two subdivisions, which God, the praiseworthy *and* exalted, sent down for faith and heedfulness in religion. *One* is reminded, in this book, about the intention and character of Zaratust; also the goodness of the creation, and the good actions before Zaratust; and the narrative of this book extends in this manner up to the resurrection.

4. The name of the fourth is Bagh ²; this book is of twenty-one parts (pârah) *or* subdivisions, and its explanation is about whatever is in the religion; also a declaration of God, the praiseworthy *and* exalted, and *of* whatever the Lord *has* made incumbent on mankind as to devotion and heedfulness, as to justice and virtue, *and* as to good actions, closing the path of Satan to oneself, *and* approaching the last abode, that is, the other world.

5. The name of the fifth is Dvâzdah-hâmâst ³, and the commentary of this book is for assistance ⁴. This book is of thirty-two subdivisions, which God, the praiseworthy *and* exalted, sent down in remembrance of the beginning of the creatures of the upper world and lower world. Also a description of the whole of them, and *of* whatever the Most Just, the praiseworthy and exalted, *has* made mention in the

¹ See Dk. VIII, Chap. III, and IX, Chaps. XXIV-XLVI.

² Ibid. Chap. IV and Chaps. XLVII-LXVIII.

³ Ibid. Chap. V.

⁴ Written dar-imdâd; but, omitting the letter r, we should have 'the Dâmdâd.'

lawful, which is lawful and which unlawful, *and* how they slaughter *them*; which it is and how it is necessary to slaughter *it* for the sake of a season-festival, and whatever is about a season-festival; how it is necessary to celebrate *it*, and the person who takes the things¹; the expense of a season-festival and how much the reward is; how it is necessary to give to the priests, controllers (*radân*), and high-priests, and to any persons who are without doubts, who in speech, action, and intention are virtuous, and any persons who recite the season-festival *liturgy*. And everything wise is in this book; and this is incumbent on all people that they learn this, and *it is* the same for all till the days of the guardian spirits; and every one who possesses knowledge seeks for this, and causes intercession by mankind, for the sake of the worthy, such as clothing *for* a righteous gift, so that *one* obtains recompense in the end from heaven; and it is necessary to give this clothing *for* a righteous gift to relations and the worthy.

8. The name of the eighth is *Ratustâyî*², and this is of fifty subdivisions, *but* when, after *the time of* Alexander, they held an enquiry, they found no more *than* thirteen subdivisions. And these are about the affairs of the king and obedience, judges and whatever becomes important in holding enquiries, philosophers and devotees; about the edifices of cities, constructed and made magnificent, birds and species of animals, fish *and* whatever is

¹ O225 has *kîzhâ*, the others only *hâ*; but compare Dk. VIII, Chap. VII, 5.

² See Dk. VIII, Chap. VIII.

Ormazd's, the fowls of Ormazd besides the creatures of Aharman; likewise mountains, rivers, and land, and the like of these.

9. The name of the ninth is Baris¹, and this is a book of sixty subdivisions, *but after the time of Alexander they found again no more than* twelve subdivisions. And these are about descriptions of kings and judges, and an investigation of their authority and their sufficiency; also the relations of a peasant with peasants, of a king with the kingdom, of judges with a judge, and whatever remains therein. Any actions that are for every nation, how they are ordered, and the option as to their species and nature; also whatever the people know, and the advantage *that* arises therefrom; besides the sins of people, deceit, telling lies, and whatever remains therein.

10. The name of the tenth is Kaskaśtrah², and this is a book of sixty subdivisions, *but after the calamity of Alexander they found again no more than* fifteen. Its explanation is about the distinction (faḥl) of natural wisdom and knowledge³ from acquired knowledge, that is, the knowledge born from the mother, and the knowledge and instruction they learn; *one* learned in purity and truthful speaking, and anything that *has* brought mankind with virtue out of evil, and with purity out of defilement, and this keeps the doctrine praised *and* great, and whoever is in the vicinity of a king, and is a peasant, becomes greater *in* honour and dignity; and, in like manner, any things from which advan-

¹ See Dk. VIII, Chap. IX.

² Ibid. Chap. X.

³ So in OM, MH10; but O225, B29 are corrupted.

tage arises for mankind; and, *as to* those who tell lies, how it occurs in the vicinity of kings and peasants.

11. The eleventh is the Vistâsp-shâh¹, and that is of sixty compilations, *but* after the calamity of Alexander they found again no *more than* ten subdivisions. It is about Gustâsp's acceptance of the sovereignty, and as to the religion of Zaratust—who *was* skilful in reciting the religion, and maintaining *it* and making *it* current in the world—he chose the religion of Zaratust.

12. The name of the twelfth is 'Hast², and this is of twenty-two subdivisions, which are sent down in six portions (*guzû*). The first is about knowing the Lord, may he be honoured and glorified! and faith on account of Zaratust. The second portion is about the obedience of kings, the truth of the religion, complying *with* commands and resisting them, and restraining *one's* hand from bad actions. The third portion is about the promise *to* benefactors and their recompense, evildoers and punishment, and escaping hell. The fourth portion is about the mansions of the world, agriculture, trimming trees, such as the date tree, and whatever remains thereof; the trouble and power of mankind and quadrupeds therefrom, and the obedience they exercise; they are the people to whom heedfulness is attributed, and whatever remains thereof; and the high-priests perform *their* duty by the law of the religion. The fifth portion is about the ranks of mankind, and

¹ See Dk. VIII, Chap. XI. In Riv. IV the surviving subdivisions are said to be only eight, so as to correspond with the sections of the extant Vistâsp Yast.

² Ibid. Chap. XII. O225 has 'Hast.

those are four ranks: the first is to maintain the king grandly, and, next, the judges and the learned *in* religion; the second rank is to keep watch *over* the cities, and to annihilate the enemy; of the third rank are writers and, secondarily, cultivators and the society of cities; of the fourth rank are the people of trade, artisans, market-dealers, and tax-gatherers, in war they appear excited, and it is requisite to give a tithe *to* the high-priests and king; they keep on foot the obeisances and good works of which we have spoken, and, when they act thus, they obtain great rewards in the end¹.

13. The name of the thirteenth is Sfind², and that is of sixty subdivisions which are sent down for the information of people who are in want of it, and for the knowledge of those persons who become covetous of virtuous actions, and act after the proceedings of the learned and people of religion, and receive advantage therefrom; also as reminders that there is advantage from the daily practice of them. And this book is our reminder about the accounts of the apostle Zaratust by religious people, and whatever is the allotment of God, the exalted; about the false speaking of the people of the world, and about the goodness of the condition of the people of the world. Also whatever becomes manifest in ten years, about the miracles of Zaratust, by the seven reports that they recite.

14. The name of the fourteenth is Girast³, and this is of twenty-two subdivisions sent down for the

¹ Nothing is said of the sixth portion, either in the Rivâyats or the Dîn-vigirgârd.

² See Dk. VIII, Chap. XIV.

³ Ibid. Chap. XIII. MHro has *Kirast*.

understanding of the causes of mankind, which *have* made people manifest in the mother's womb, and afterwards those who come out of the womb, some of whom are apostles, some kings, and some peasants; and whatever remains therein.

15. The name of the fifteenth is Baghân-yast¹, and it is of seventeen subdivisions in praise of the creations of God, the praiseworthy *and* exalted, and the angels admitted to him; also thanksgiving *for* his favours, and that which he makes expedient in the religion, augments the thanksgiving *for* his favour, until *one* obtains *it* back in the end; likewise the appearance of the angels, and this is noble. Praise be to the sacred being, the exalted!

16. The name of the sixteenth is Niyâram², and that is of fifty-four subdivisions, about decrees *as to* riches, introducing inmates among outsiders, and whatever is made lawful by the exalted Lord; obtaining deliverance from hell, performing service, slavery, and the nature of wayfarers, and every one who performs service and produces remembrance for mankind; whatever is in the thoughts of mankind, and whatever is in the bodies of mankind.

17. The seventeenth is Aspâram³, and this is of sixty-four subdivisions, which are sent down about rituals, those which are in the book of the people of the religion, and an examination of the people's expense they know of, for the safety and punishment they order in the world until they obtain deliverance in the end; and whatever they do lawfully and do unlawfully they know; also decrees

¹ See Dk. VIII, Chap. XV.

² Ibid. Chaps. XVI-XX.

³ Ibid. Chaps. XXVIII-XXXVII.

as to inheritances and the limits of faith, about anything which they sow and whatever they grow, *and* about regulating nativity; whatever *one* makes incumbent on memory, and whatever *one* makes incumbent on memoranda prepared; also how it is necessary to produce whatever tokens *there are* at the time of childbirth.

18. The name of the eighteenth is Duvâsarôni-gad¹, *and* it is of sixty-five subdivisions; robbers of human beings and quadrupeds, whatever *one* makes incumbent that they shall give, and an enumeration of what *one* makes incumbent on each one of them, owing to theft and terror, obstructing the roads, the dread of the wayfarers, *and* the disturbance of prisons; and whatever remains therein.

19. The name of the nineteenth is Askâram², *and* it is of fifty-two subdivisions, about judges and philosophers, the method of examining decrees, the knowledge of definitions, and an opinion of those in other matters.

20. The name of the twentieth is Vendîdâd³, *and* that is of twenty-two subdivisions, for causing the abstinence of mankind from bad actions, from the devil and disgrace, foreign magicians and those who act after their proceedings and become com-mitters of crime; and we are told of their crime among the whole of the goodness and purity, and the whole of the wickedness and defilement, and the explanation of them.

¹ See Dk. VIII, Chaps. XXI-XXVII. MH₁₀ has Duvâsrôb, and OM Duvâsarôgad; duvâ standing for dûbâ, or zûbâ, the traditional reading of the Zvâris ganabâ, 'a thief.'

² Ibid. Chaps. XXXVIII-XLIII.

³ Ibid. Chap. XLIV.

21. The name of the twenty-first is Hâdokht¹, and this is a book of thirty subdivisions, about the manner of bringing together and the abundance of miracles, also the excellence and connections of them. And the accursed devil goes far from every one who recites this book together with the Yast², and this person is near *to* the rank (pâtgâh) of a sacred being, and his sins become pure; also in this book the accursed devil becomes cursed, and God knows *it*.

III. FROM THE RIVÂYAT OF NARÊMÂN HÔSHANG³.

1. Again, that which is in Pahlavi characters is clear *in* that manner, that in the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô there are twenty-one vocables, that is, twenty-one words, and beneath each word there is an equivalent meaning; it is also known to the devout *that* there are twenty-one Nasks of the Avesta.

2. The first Nask is of thirty-three subdivisions, that is, it is of thirty-three compilations, and its name is Stôd-yast, that is, 'producing the praise of the sacred beings;' and the words of the book *have* come down for the majesty of the sacred beings and angels, and they recite *them* in that manner; and *in* the presence of every high-priest of the pure ritual, who rightly understands its Avesta and Zand,

¹ See Dk. VIII, Chap. XLV. O225 has Hâdôkht.

² The Yasna, or Stôd-yast of § 1.

³ Narê mân Hôshang of Bharôk returned from Persia, A.D. 1478, with letters from priests in Irân in reply to those from priests in India. His account of the Nasks is more abbreviated than the others, and appears to be derived from a Pahlavi original.

as he recites *them* correctly on three occasions, the angels come down ; of this there is no doubt.

3. The name of the second is Istûdgar, and it is of twenty-two subdivisions ; its statements are for the admonition of the people.

4. The name of the third Nask is Vahist-mânthrah, and it is of twenty-two subdivisions ; its purport is to bring confirmation of the religion.

5. The name of the fourth is Bagh, and this is of twenty-one subdivisions ; its explanation is about heedfulness.

6. The name of the fifth is Dvâzdah-hâmâst, and it is of thirty-two subdivisions ; its explanation is in remembrance of the upper world, and about the lower world.

7. The name of the sixth is Nâdar, and that is of thirty-five compilations ; its explanation is about the interpretation of the world of the stars, the planets and constellations, and understanding the arrangement of the sky.

8. The seventh is the Pâgam ; this Nask is of twenty-two subdivisions, and its explanation is with regard to lawful and unlawful animals, whenever they slaughter *them* for the sake of solemnizing a season-festival ; and, again, whatever is manifold reward and good work ; also about the reason of the five days of the guardian spirits, which they call the select, *and* wherefore they are appointed.

9. The name of the eighth is Ratustâyî, and it is of fifty subdivisions, of which, after *the time of* Alexander, they preserved and found no more *than* thirteen subdivisions ; its explanation is about maintaining devotion, and *of* obedience to kings, high-priests, and governors.

10. The name of the ninth is Baris, and this Nask was of sixty subdivisions, *but after the time of Alexander* they found no more *than* twelve subdivisions; its explanation is *of* those who are kings and high-priests, leaders and princes, judges and messengers, what is the nature of the authority of peasants and princes, and what kind of towns they possess.

11. The name of the tenth is Kassrôb, and this Nask has been of sixty subdivisions, *but after the time of Alexander* they found again no more *than* fifteen subdivisions; its explanation is about the distinction of natural wisdom and knowledge from acquired knowledge; that which makes mankind pure from defilement, and the usage that maintains the proceedings of mankind.

12. The eleventh is the Nask of Vistâsp-shâh, and it has been of sixty subdivisions, *but after the time of Alexander* they found again no more *than* ten subdivisions, and *their* statements are with regard to king Gustâsp making the religion current.

13. The name of the twelfth is 'Hast, and it is of twenty-two subdivisions; its explanation is about enquiry of wisdom, maintaining devotion in the world, *and* the punishment for every sin *such* as they supply *it*.

14. The name of the thirteenth is Sfind, and it is of sixty subdivisions; its explanation is *of* that which they demonstrate *as* miracles from this Nask, that every requirement comes to pass *which* every high-priest—*who* shall recite this Nask for several days with sevenfold voice, according to that which has been written—shall solicit for the world.

15. The name of the fourteenth is Girast, and

this is of twenty-two subdivisions, its explanation is about the creation of the people of mankind in the day of the Eternal, until the last day of the resurrection occurs; their becoming manifest in the mother's womb, *and* why some die in the womb and some are born, some are kings and some are peasants.

16. The name of the fifteenth is Baghân-yast, *and* this is of seventeen subdivisions; its explanation is about the praise of the angels admitted, and, *as to* the servants of the Most Glorious, *at* what period they each become manifest, and what duty they perform, till the resurrection.

17. The name of the sixteenth is Niyâram, and this is of fifty-four subdivisions; its explanation is about decrees *as to* traders, covenants and decisions, that is, awards with regard to the creatures *and* how they act.

18. The name of the seventeenth is Aspâram, and this is of sixty-four subdivisions; its explanation in these is well-directed and a good *thing*; and whatever remains therein.

19. The eighteenth is the Duvâsarôgad, and it is of sixty-five subdivisions; its explanation is that which is a statement on the subject of Khêdyôdath, that is, forming a union with each other *by* relations and those next *one another*.

20. The name of the nineteenth is Askâram, and it is of fifty-two subdivisions; its explanation is about the occurrence of the production of the renovation of *the universe*, up to the resurrection *and* future existence which are the converting of the dead alive, Aharman *and* the demons becoming extinct, and the circumstances of those *events*.

21. The name of the twentieth is *Gud-dêv-dâd*¹, and that is of twenty-two subdivisions; its explanation is of causing the abstinence of mankind from pollution, that is, from defilement, and the assault of evil peculiarly owing to the great; *from* the sight of a menstruous woman, and the like of these, whenever harm and injury happen to the creation.

22. The name of the twenty-first is *Hâdokht*, and this is a book of thirty subdivisions; its explanation is such that the accursed devil goes far from every one *who* shall recite this book together with the *Yast*, and this person becomes near unto the sacred being, the praiseworthy *and* exalted, and in such manner as *he is* near the sacred being in like manner he obtains rank.

23. And the purpose of this *being* written is so, that it is known to these humble individuals² in this manner, that these books are of those tendencies, and it has been written *by* those devout *ones*³ in such manner that 'among us no one is able to read the Pahlavi characters, and the interpretation of these Nasks is in Pahlavi; any one who does not know the Pahlavi characters is high-priest and is not able to demonstrate the miracles of the religion, nor that which was written with regard to the commentary of these Nasks.'

¹ Pâz. *gud* is a translation of Av. *vi* which is merely transliterated by *vîk* in *Vîk-dêv-dâd*, the original form of *Vendîdâd*.

² The priests in Irân who supplied this information to *Narê mân*.

³ The priests in India who had applied for the information, using the words about to be quoted.

IV. FROM THE RIVÂYAT OF DASTÛR BARZÛ
QIYÂMU-D-DÎN¹.

1. The reply about the Nasks of the Avesta. The Yathâ-ahû-vairyô is *of* twenty-one words, and the Avesta is similarly *of* twenty-one Nasks.

2. The name of the first Nask is Stôd-yast, and that book is of thirty-three compilations, that is, it is of thirty-three subdivisions, and the description of the Lord and the angels is in it.

3. The name of the second Nask is Stûdgar, and that is of twenty-two subdivisions; its description is about prayer, virtuous authority, and intercession.

4. The third Nask is the Vahist-mânthrah, and that is of twenty-two subdivisions about faith and heedfulness; and *one* is reminded [*&c., very nearly the same as in II, 3*].

5. The fourth Nask is the Bagh, and that is of twenty-one subdivisions; its explanation is about the religion and *its* intention, and whatever the Lord *has* made incumbent on mankind as to devotion and heedfulness; also about closing the path of Satan to oneself, and approaching the last abode.

6. The name of the fifth book is Dvâzdah-hâmâst, and that is of thirty-two subdivisions in remembrance of the beginning [*&c., very nearly the same as in II, 5*].

7. The name of the sixth Nask is Nâdar, *and* that is of thirty-five compilations about the stars

¹ This Dastûr appears to have been one of several residing at Nausârî A.D. 1614-1646; his father's name is more usually written Qavâmu-d-dîn, and his account of the Nasks closely resembles that of Kâmah Bahrah.

and the disposition and life of the sky. [*&c., very nearly the same as in II, 6 to*] Bavaštâl, and in Persian the name of that book is Favâmsa'hân, that is, instruction arises therefrom for the moderns.

8. The name of the seventh Nask is Pâgam, *and* that is of twenty-two subdivisions; its description is about quadrupeds *and how they are* made lawful, which is lawful [*&c., as in II, 7, to*] for the sake of a season-festival, and how it is necessary to perform whatever is in a season-festival; the expense of a season-festival [*&c., as in II, 7, to*] high-priests, and a description of the clothing *for* a righteous gift, so that they *may* obtain recompense in the end from heaven.

9. The eighth Nask is the Ratustâyî, *and* that is of fifty subdivisions; its purport is about the affairs of the king and obedience, cities constructed and made magnificent, birds, animals, and fish, and whatever is Ormazd's, besides the creatures of Aharman; [*&c., as in II, 8*].

10. The name of the ninth book is Baris, *and* that is of sixty subdivisions, and about descriptions of kings and judges, and an investigation of their authority; also the relations of a peasant [*&c., as in II, 9, to*] deceit, and telling lies.

11. The name of the tenth book is Kaskantîz, *and* that is of sixty subdivisions, about the advantage (faïl) of natural wisdom and knowledge *as distinguished* from acquired knowledge, that is, the knowledge born from the mother, and the knowledge which they learn *by* instruction; doctrine about purity and truth, and anything [*&c., as in II, 10, to*] how it occurs.

12. The name of the eleventh Nask is Vistâsp,

and that is of sixty compilations, *but* after the calamity of Alexander, when they sought *them* again, they found no more *than* eight subdivisions, and those are about Gustâsp's acceptance [*&c.*, as in II, 11].

13. The name of the twelfth book is '*Hast*, and that is of twenty-two fargards in six portions. The first portion is about knowing the Lord, may he be honoured and glorified! and faith in the mission of Zaratust and any duties which are ordered in a book of the religion. The second portion is about the obedience of kings, the truth of the religion, and complying *with* commands. The third portion is about the promise *to* benefactors and their recompense, the punishment of evildoers, and escaping from hell. The fourth portion is about the mansions of the world, agriculture and trimming trees, the power of mankind and quadrupeds arisen therefrom, the obedience they exercise, and whatever duty they perform for the high-priests of the religion. The fifth portion [*&c.*, as in II, 12, *to*] the obeisances, so that they obtain great rewards in the end.

14. The name of the thirteenth book is *Sfend*, and that is of sixty subdivisions, for the information of people who are in want of it, and for their knowledge; also for any persons who become covetous as to virtuous actions, and proceed after the footsteps of the learned and people of religion, and receive advantage therefrom; and as reminders of the celestial sphere that there is advantage from the daily practice of them. Also about the accounts of the evil of mankind, by the apostle Zaratust, about the false speaking [*&c.*, as in II, 13].

15. The fourteenth Nask is the *Girast*, and that

is of twenty-two subdivisions, for the understanding of the causes of mankind [*&c., as in II, 14*].

16. The name of the fifteenth book is Baghân-yast, and that is of seventeen subdivisions, in praise of the Lord, the praiseworthy *and* exalted, and the admitted angels; also thanksgiving *for* the favours due to that which he makes expedient in the religion, and the thanksgiving *for* his favour *lasts* until *one* obtains *it* back in the end; likewise the appearance of the angels, and these are nobles for the praise of the sacred being.

17. The name of the sixteenth book is Niyâram, and that is of fifty-four subdivisions, about decrees *as to* riches, bringing abroad, and whatever is made lawful; obtaining deliverance from hell, performing service, slavery, and the nature of wayfarers; whatever is in the thoughts of mankind, and whatever is in the bodies of mankind.

18. The name of the seventeenth book is Aspâram, and that is of sixty subdivisions about rituals [*&c., very nearly the same as in II, 17*].

19. The name of the eighteenth Nask is Duvâsrôb, and that is of sixty-five subdivisions, about robbers (duvâyân?) of human beings [*&c., very nearly the same as in II, 18*].

20. The name of the nineteenth Nask is Askâram, and that is of fifty-two fargards [*&c., very nearly the same as in II, 19*].

21. The name of the twentieth Nask is Vîndâd, *and* that is of twenty-two subdivisions [*&c., very nearly the same as in II, 20*]. And *as to* this book Vîndâd, *which* is the twentieth book of the Nasks, out of the twenty-one Nasks of the Avesta, we and you are now using *it* in the ceremonial, and when,

after the calamity of Alexander, they sought for the books again, they found a portion of each Nask, *but* did not find any Nask in completeness except the Vîndâd which they found complete.

22. The name of the twenty-first Nask is Hâdokht, *and* that is of thirty subdivisions, about the manner of bringing together and the many miracles, and *their* excellences *and* connections; and in this book the accursed devil becomes cursed and becomes annihilated.

23. At present, since the Nasks *have* not remained perfect in the midst *of us*, it is not possible to solemnize *them*, because Alexander the Rûman¹ carried off a rough draft, in Rûman characters, of those of the twenty-one Nasks of the Avesta which were *about* the stars and medicine, and repeatedly burnt the books of the Avesta, so that the soul of Alexander burns in hell; and after his calamity, every one of the high-priests, in council together, preserved something of the Avesta in *his* mind, *and* the aggregate *has* disclosed the books of the Yasna (yast), Visperad, Vendîdâd, Fravash, Khûrdah Avesta, Darûn, Âfrîngân, Kîdah Vagarkardan, and Bundahis, *which* they wrote correctly; *as to* the remainder (tatammah) which they did not write, it was on this account, that they did not preserve *it* correctly in *their* minds. And the expectation, descended from the midst *of them* in the court of Ormazd and the archangels, is thus, that Vargâvand, Peshôtan, and Hushêdar² *will* arrive in haste *for* the manifestation of the religion, and the goodness

¹ See Dk. Bk. IV, 24 n.

² The three chief producers of the future and final triumph of the religion (see Byt. III, 13-52).

of the religion again assumes splendour from a new head; the good and those of the good religion become cheerful and happy, and the bad and wicked become extinct and disappearing. Amen.

FROM THE DÎN-VIGIRGARD¹.

In the name and *for* the propitiation of the creator Aûharmazd these several commentaries (zand) are published from revelation (dênô).

The names of the twenty-one Nasks.

1. One is this that is Yathâ, that is, the Stôd-yast, *and* the subdivisions of this Stôd-yast are thirty-three. In that Nask are the blessing *and* propitiation of Aûharmazd and the archangels, and they are *for* the utterance of praise. Aûharmazd sends this Nask into the world, which is suitable for every one, *and* whoever has committed this Nask to memory recites *it*. And to every one who, *being* a high-priest, becomes a reciter of both the Avesta and Zand, *and* shall recite that Nask three times with correctness, the archangels will come near; as to this they know *it* without doubt.

2. The second Nask is that *which is* Ahû, the Stûdgar, *and* the subdivisions of that Nask are

¹ A Rivâyât in Pahlavi writing, but its language is more Persian than Pahlavi; it commences with this account of the Nasks, combining most of the information contained in the four preceding extracts from the Persian Rivâyats. For this text the translator is indebted to a MS. written A.D. 1813 and belonging to Dastûr Hôshangji Jâmâspji of Poona; a previous translation, in Haug's Essays, was from a transliteration of the same text prepared by Haug some 25 years ago.

twenty-two. In it are the giving of advice *to* mankind, the performance of prayer and virtue, the doing of good actions, intercession, producing union among relations, *and* such-like topics.

3. The third is Vairyô, the Vahist-mânsar, *and* the subdivisions of this Nask are twenty-two. In this is the topic of those who are becoming without doubt as to the religion of Mazda-worship, causing heedfulness, and thinking about the religion; also the production of the benediction and attributes (*sifât*) of the blessedness of Zaratûst, every action which was declared virtuous before Zaratûst, and all actions which have to occur after Zaratûst until the future existence; the benefit of his world, and such-like topics.


4. The fourth Nask is this *which is* Athâ, the Bagh, *and* the subdivisions of that Nask are twenty-one. In this the topic is this which is the purpose of the religion of Mazda-worship, and the ideas which Aûharmazd caused *to be* taught unto mankind; the exercise of reverence, heedfulness, adjudication, and justice; the performance of the proper duty of decision, doing good actions (*kâr-i khvaîr*), closing the way of Aharman into oneself, attaining unto the spiritual *existence* for oneself, *and* such as are like *these*.

5. The fifth Nask is Ratus, the Dvâzdak-hômâst, *and* the subdivisions of that Nask are thirty-two. In that Nask are all the topics of the spiritual *existence and* the heavenly state, virtue and vileness, the material *existence* of this worldly state, about the sky and about the earth, and everything which Aûharmazd produced *and which* exists in the water, fire, and plants; human beings and

quadrupeds, grazing animals and birds, and everything which is similarly produced from any (*aêk*) of *them*, and the characteristics of all things. Secondly, that which is the production of the resurrection and future existence, and the coming together and separation *at* the *Kinvad* pass; the recompense for the doers of good works and the punishment for sinners occur through the future existence, *and* such-like topics as *these* are.

6. The sixth Nask is *Ashâd*, the *Nâdûr*, *and* the subdivisions of that are thirty-five. In this Nask are the purposes of the stars (*nugûm*), the zodiac, and the planets, the goodness and evil of each constellation, and the movement of all the planets in the signs of the zodiac (*bûrg*) and lunar mansions (*mahîgân nugûm*). They have translated *it* into Arabic and Persian, and the name they have adopted *for* this book is *Bûtâl*, *and* in Persian the name which is appointed for it is *Kapâmâgân*.

7. The seventh is this *which is Kîd*, *and* is the *Pâgam*, and its subdivisions are twenty-two. In this *Pâgam* Nask is the topic of the slaughtering of quadrupeds *and* sheep, how *they* are to be slaughtered, of which among the quadrupeds the command is that it is allowable to eat, and of which kind the eating is not allowable; how *he* who slaughters shall strike at the time of the expiring of the sheep. The more expenditure (*saraf*) *one* makes upon a season-festival, so much the more is the reward; how much it is expedient to bestow upon the *Dastûrs*, *Môbads*, and *Hêrbads*, and upon the unwavering practisers of good works *in* the good religion; what merit accrues *to* every one



who celebrates a season-festival and consecrates clothing for a soul, *and* who, *for* that reason, is in the supreme heaven *in* the last times; and it is necessary to give clothing to relations *and* the righteous as a righteous gift, *and* to exercise mediation on the part of the righteous; the five greater and lesser days of the guardian spirits, and the practice of good works on *these* ten days is enjoined in this Nask. It is requisite for all people that they shall read this book with good and wise understanding, that all *may* become aware of *its* topics.

8. The eighth Nask is that *which is* Hakâ, the Ratustâth, *and* the subdivisions of that Nask *were* fifty when the accursed Alexander had the Nasks burnt up, *but* after that, *as* they sought out this Nask, *only* thirteen of those subdivisions came to hand, and no *more* remained of those previously *existing*. In this Nask are the reasons of performing service, giving orders, and remaining at the command of kings and at the command of high-priests and judges; the adornment-preserving¹ purpose of cities is declared, the command of religion, and things made magnificently (*agîzîhâ*), grazing animals, birds, cattle, and fish; everything which is a production of Aûharmazd *or* Aharman; all the purposes of all the seas, mountains, and lands; *and matters* similar to such as are mentioned.

9. The ninth Nask is this *which is* Vangheus, *and* is the Baris; the subdivisions of that Nask were first sixty, *but* after the accursed Alexander *only* twelve remained. *As to* the information in this Nask, just as there is the sovereignty for *those*

¹ Assuming that *frêvvânîk*, which might mean 'important,' stands for *pardazânîk*.

who are kings, so *there* is the usage which it is necessary *for them* to practise, and the command of the sentence of judges of the religion such *as* is necessary to be executed; the custody and protection for the world, and making each new city flourishing; also the reasons of people, who are false-speaking, sinners, *and* such-like, are mentioned in this Nask.

10. The tenth Nask is that *which* is Dazdâ, the Kassrôb, *and* the subdivisions of that Nask were formerly sixty, *but* after the accursed Alexander *only* fifteen subdivisions remained. In that Nask the topic is that which is wisdom and knowledge, the reason of *its* being brought forth from the mother, and the teaching of wisdom *by* demonstration, the performance of purification and the speaking of truth; bringing people from vileness unto virtue, and bringing *them* from defilement and pollution unto purity; greatness and good progeny arise for people near kings, and how the habit of people telling lies, to others and to kings, arises; *and* such-like as *these*.

11. The eleventh Nask was Mananghô, the Vîstâspâd, *and* the subdivisions of that Nask were sixty, *but* after the accursed Alexander *only* ten remained. In this Nask is the topic of the sovereignty of Gûstâsp, and Zaratûst the Spîtâmân, *having* brought the religion from Aûharmazd, king Gustâsp accepted *it*, and made *it* current in the world; *and* such-like as *these*.

12. The twelfth is Shyaothananâm, the Khûst, *and* the subdivisions of that Nask were first twenty-two, *but* after the accursed Alexander *only* six remained. Among those six, which are the first

portions (zizp = Ar. *gizb*), the topics in *one* portion are the attributes (*sifât*) of the creator Aûharmazd, and the understanding *of them*; also being without doubt about the religion of Zaratûst, the Spîtâmân, all the duty and good works which are prescribed in the religion, *and* such-like. In the second portion is the reason of service for kings, the truth of the religion, submission *to* all *its* commands, and withholding *one's* hand from evil actions, so that it *has* become far from mischief. In the third portion is that which is the debt for performers of virtuous position, the advantage *of* good works, the final release from hell, *and* such-like. The fourth is the reason of the creation of the world, the practice of agriculture, the cultivation of trees, the date-tree and every fruit-tree; whence arises most strength for people and animals; being under the command of the practisers of good works *and* the virtuous, and being under the command of the high-priests, *and* such-like as they are. In the fifth portion all the specimens of mankind are mentioned: *they* who are of great knowledge, who are kings, judges, and the sages of the religion; in the second specimen are *they* that *have* to keep watch *over* all the cities, and to make the enemy confounded; in the third specimen are these whose object *one* mentions *in the term* 'husbandmen;' the fourth specimen which *one* mentions *are* these who are the greatly-skilled and sitters in the market, grandiloquent to repel loss, giving one-tenth to the high-priest and king, and offering praise on hardened knees, the last reward of which is that *one* obtains in the spiritual existence.

13. The thirteenth Nask is that which is Angheus,

the Spend; its subdivisions are sixty which are precious unto people of pedigrees (mâyagân) and *those who* possess much avidity for virtuous actions and *have* to proceed *in* the footsteps (pât-rapîh) of the great and religious; *also* accounts of Zaratûst, who is born from the womb of Dûghdâvô, till ten years *of age*. Every Dastûr and Môbad shall recite this Nask in purity, and with ease and the proper words, *for* several days, and shall obtain every desire of his own, or *any* wish which he claims on account of (barâ râî-t) others.

14. The fourteenth Nask is that *which is* Mazdâi; the name Zirast is appointed *for it, and* the subdivisions of that Nask are twenty-two. In like manner this Nask is sent *by* Aûharmazd, which is to make manifest to the people what is the purpose *of* that science through which mankind are born from the womb of a mother, how many individuals among them will die *away* from the womb, and how many individuals will live; how many persons *and* people among them become kings, and how many, meanwhile (fîmâ), exercise apostleship, that is, the high-priesthood; how many are the grandest of people, and how many are the meanest *of* mankind, *and* in what mode this occurs; from first to last, the time people are born and all those topics are in this Nask.

15. The fifteenth is Khshathremkâ, *and* the name of that Nask is Baghân-yast, *and* its subdivisions are seventeen. In it are the topics of Aûharmazd the lord and the archangels, the knowledge of their attributes, and the service *and* sublimity *of* Aûharmazd; at what time every Gâh occurs until the future existence, and what duty is

performed; offering praise *for* every benefit *from* Aûharmazd, and obtaining benefit from him; the appearance of the archangels, and knowing what is such-and-such an appearance of such-and-such an archangel in the future existence. This Nask used in the service of Aûharmazd and the archangels is very excellent.

16. The sixteenth is Ahurâi, *and* they have appointed it the name Niyârâm; the subdivisions of that Nask are fifty-four, about the reason of preserving wealth and placing *it* out, agreement *and* measure *by* the cubit *and* handful; everything the creator Aûharmazd has ordained *as* uncontaminated, release from hell, and how to walk in the path of reverence and worship; what is in the mind of man, and what is everything in the body of man; *and* such-like *as these that* are mentioned.

17. The seventeenth Nask is that which is Â, *and* the name they have appointed *for* it is Aspârûm; *one* mentions sixty-five subdivisions of it, *and* in this Nask is every religious topic which all persons well understand, and the punishment suffered *by* sinners, which they receive in *their* last career; everything which is uncontaminated is allowable, *and what* is not uncontaminated is not allowable; the stars preside over the destiny of mankind; and such-like *as these*.

18. The eighteenth Nask is that *which is* Yim, that *has* the name Duvâsarôzad appointed *for it*, *and* the subdivisions of it are likewise sixty-five. In this Nask are the reasons of next-of-kin marriage, forming connections among relations, *and* such-like *as these*.

19. The nineteenth Nask is Drigubyô, the name

of which is Askâram, *and* is of fifty-two stanzas (*vêkastihâ*), *about* the giving of orders, exercise of authority, and practising wisdom in everything; producing the resurrection, *by* which every person passed *away* is made living again, and the malformations of Aharman and the demons are withered away; *and* such-like.

20. The twentieth Nask is that *which is* Dadad, that they call *by* its name of Vendîdâd, where the meaning *of* this is 'the law against the demons,' which is of twenty-two fargards. The topic *of* it is what preserves mankind from evil *and* pollution, and will restrain *them* from the menstruous, dead matter, pestilence, and running sores. Of all the twenty-one Nasks the Nask of 'the law against the demons' has *alone* remained entire; while several remain scattered by the wickedness (*sûmth*) of the accursed Alexander, this Nask of the Vendîdâd remained in hand, *and* owing to its elucidation the religion of Mazda-worship exists now.

21. The twenty-first Nask is Vâstârem, whose name *one* calls Hâdôkht, *and its* fargards are said *to be* thirty. In it are much excellence and many miracles, *and* the vile Aharman becomes far from every one who recites this Hâdôkht, and it makes *him* extinct, and *the reciter* comes near *unto* Aûhar-mazd and becomes purified from sin.

22. Now, alas! if all these Nasks do not remain, so that *one* is not able to solemnize *them*, that is for this reason, that the accursed Alexander, the Arûman, took several transcripts—in the Arûman language and characters (*hurûfö*)—of any among those twenty-one Nasks which were *about* the stars and medicine, and burnt up the other Nasks; and

the soul of the accursed Alexander, the Rûman, will remain wretched and burnt in gloomy hell till the resurrection, owing to his own vileness which injured the religion of Zaratûst.

23. After the villany of Alexander, an assemblage of several high-priests, who were sages of the religion, brought the Avesta of all *of them* from various places, *and* made a collection *of* so much Avesta and Zand *as* the sacred (yastô) Yasna, Visperad, Vendîdâd, Ardâ-fravard, and other scraps of the Avesta, the Darûn, Âfrîngân, and the Commands of the religion; all these *were* written, and the Bûndahis book *was* correctly written; *and* all such, among them, as *were* not written, which did not come into the thoughts of the sages, departed, on that account, from the midst of the many topics of revelation.

24. Just as it is said that *there* were twenty-one Nasks, there are first, in seven Nasks, the topics of the religion *of* Mazda-worship, in the second seven Nasks are the topics of medical practice, *and* in the third seven Nasks the topics and capabilities of the stars are mentioned.

NASK-FRAGMENTS

THAT ARE

STILL EXTANT.

EXTANT FRAGMENTS¹.

I. SŪDKAR NASK².

Dk. IX, Chap. II, 3-15, referring to the useful effect of reciting the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô as a spell, on various occasions, is quoted in Sls. XIX, 1-14, and also in the Persian Rivâyat of Bahman Pûngyah³, with some slight variations.

Dk. IX, Chap. VI, 2, refers to the passage thus mentioned in Sls. IX, 2, 3:—‘The priest who passes away in an out-district (aûzdehîkîh) thou hast considered as desolate (vîrân); and there is a high-priest who is of a different opinion, there is *one* who says *it is as* a non-Irânian (anâîrân) country. *It is* declared that, when a supreme high-priest (zaratûstrotûm) passes away in an out-district, an apostate will be born in that dwelling, and this calamity is only (aêvâk) mentioned as to the supreme high-priest⁴.’

Dk. IX, Chap. VIII, 1-6, refers to Zaratûst’s

¹ Only the Pahlavi versions of these fragments are extant, unless it be otherwise stated.

² The detailed account of this Nask, in Dk. IX, contains about 5,400 Pahlavi words, and, if these represent the same proportion of original text as those in the accounts of the first three fargard’s of the Bakö Nask do, they would indicate about 4,700 words of Avesta text and 10,500 of Pahlavi version as the original extent of this Nask.

³ See p. 418, n. 3.

⁴ This translation has been corrected in accordance with p. 178, n. 2.

prophetic vision of the golden, silver, steel, and mingled-iron periods of his millennium, quoted at length in Byt. I, 1-5, with variations indicative of the date of the Bahman Yast being later than that of this Nask.

Dk. IX, Chap. X, 3, refers to the detailed account of the seven most heinous evil-doers, quoted in Dd. LXXII, 3-9.

Dk. IX, Chap. XV, refers to the supplication of the soul of Keresâsp for admittance into heaven, on account of his heroic deeds, quoted at length in the Dâdistân Pahlavi Rivâyat and the Persian Sad-dar-band-i Hûsh (see S. B. E., vol. xviii, pp. 373-381).

Dk. IX, Chap. XVIII, 2, refers to the passage thus quoted in Sls. X, 8:—‘For in the Stûdgar it is said, concerning those who *have* unlawfully slaughtered animals, the punishment is such that *each* hair of those animals becomes like a sharp dagger (têkh), and he who is unlawfully a slaughterer is slain.’

No allusion has been noticed in Dk. IX to another passage which is thus quoted in Sls. XII, 32:—‘In the Stûdgar it says thus: “What prepares sneezing? that is, through what process (kâr) does it come?” And Aûhar Mazda spoke thus: “Hungry living, O Zaratûst! moreover, the remedy for its existence is the Ahunavair, O Zaratûst! and the Ashem (aharâyih).”’

II. VARSTMÂNSAR NASK¹.

No quotation from this Nask has yet been noticed.

¹ The detailed account of this Nask, in Dk. IX, contains about

III. BAKÖ NASK¹.

Dk. IX, Chaps. XLVII—XLIX, describe the contents of the first three fargard's of this Nask, which are still extant in the Avesta text of Yas. XIX—XXI, whose Pahlavi version may be translated as follows :—

Pahl. Yas. XIX = Bakö I.

The beginning of the Ahunavair of the Bakân².

1. Zaratûst enquired of Aûharmazd thus: '*O Aûharmazd*,³ propitious spirit, creator of the world of embodied existences, *and* righteous⁴! (2) which were those words, *O Aûharmazd*! that *were* spoken by thee for me, (3) before the sky, before the water, before the earth, before the (well-yielding) cattle, before the plants, before the fire which is Aûhar-

9,600 Pahlavi words, and, if these represent the same proportion of original text as those in the accounts of the first three fargard's of the Bakö Nask do, they would indicate about 8,300 words of Avesta text and 18,500 of Pahlavi version as the original extent of this Nask.

¹ As the detailed account of the first three fargard's of this Nask, in Dk. IX, contains about 840 Pahlavi words, and represents about 730 words of the original Avesta text in Yas. XIX—XXI, with 1630 in its Pahlavi version, it may be assumed that the detailed account of the whole Nask, extending to nearly 11,000 words, indicates about 9,500 words of Avesta text and 21,200 of Pahlavi version as the total extent of this Nask.

² The heading of this first hâ is given in J₂, Pt₄, Mf₄ which have been consulted by the translator in addition to Spiegel's text representing K₅. The division into sections is that adopted by Spiegel, and the passages in parentheses have no equivalents in the Avesta text.

³ Sp., J₂ insert 'good *and*.'

⁴ J₂ adds '(this is, Aûharmazd the creator is righteous; the rest is through the praise which says the creator is righteous);' compare Pahl. Vend. II, 1.

mazd's son, before the righteous man (Gâyômarđ), before the demons, (who remain) noxious creatures¹, and mankind, before all embodied existence (the creation of sovereignty), *and* before all the excellence created by Aûharmazd, (which is owing to) the manifestation of righteousness?'

4. And Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'They were the apportionment of the Ahunavair, *O Sptâmân Zaratûst!* (that spirit who would make the religion current, who has formed that religion from the Ahunavair) which was spoken out by me for thee; (5) (that is,) before the sky, (&c., *as in* § 3).

6. 'Whoever chants that apportionment of the Ahunavair, *O Sptâmân Zaratûst!* without talking (that is, he does not speak out in the middle of any of its difficult Avesta²) *and* not without anxiety (that he *may* slumber), (7) *it is* like a hundred above any other authority of those of the Gâthas, when *one* chants *them* without talking, *or* not without anxiety³; (thus it becomes *fit* for the ceremonial).

8. Whoever chants *it* while talking, *or* without anxiety, (thus it becomes *fit* for the ceremonial,) *it is* like ten above any other authority of those of the Gâthas.

9. 'Whoever in that embodied existence of mine, *O Sptâmân Zaratûst!* recalls the apportionment of

¹ Assuming that the khrafstardō, or khrafôstardō, of Pt₄, Mf₄, stands for khrafstarânō, as required by the Avesta text. Sp., J₂ have 'who were confounded by wisdom.'

² So in Pt₄, Mf₄; but Sp., J₂ may mean 'he strictly does not speak out in the middle of its Avesta.'

³ All the MSS. have 'while talking, *or* without anxiety,' as in § 8; but this does not correspond with the Avesta text. The repetition of the parenthetical clause, about the ceremonial, which also occurs in § 8, is likewise suspicious.

the Ahunavair, (that is, seeks for *it*,) and, further, mutters that which he recalls, (that is, shall accomplish *it* easily,) and, further, chants that which he mutters, (that is, fully understands its ritual,) and, further, reverences that which is chanted, (that is, shall celebrate the ceremony,) (10) his soul I pass on to the best existence, three times over the *Kinvad* bridge, I who am Aûharmazd, (that is, on that day *in* which he shall faithfully¹ provide the ceremony, it shall² lead his soul three times unto *the world* yonder, and shall³ cause its happiness therein,) (11) to the best existence, the best righteousness, and the best light. 12. Also whoever in that embodied existence of mine, O Spitâmân Zaratûst! mutters the apportionment of the Ahunavair, (that is, shall accomplish *it* easily,) *and* drops³, (that is, cuts off⁴), (13) either⁵ as much as a half, or as much as a third, or as much as a fourth, or as much as a fifth, (at a fifth the foundation *of the sin* is laid, at a half it becomes quite complete, and when he shall cut off the whole *it is* a Tanâpûhar⁶ *sin*.) (14) I twirl⁷ away the soul of him, I who am Aûharmazd, from the best existence, (that is, I would put it out;) (15) to such an extent and width is the twirling away as *that of* this earth, *and* even so the extent of this earth is as much as its width.'

16. This saying is proclaimed (a revelation) pos-

¹ Pt4, Mf4 vâvar; Sp., J2 have va-aêvar, 'and certainly.'

² So in Pt4, Mf4; Sp., J2 have 'I would,' which may be right.

³ Pt4, Mf4 aparôdinêd; Sp., J2 have barâ âpahlûkinêd, 'puts quite aside.'

⁴ Pahl. barâ yangêd (Pers. yangad).

⁵ Only in J2.

⁶ See Dk. VIII, Chap. XX, 65.

⁷ Pahl. tanôm (Pers. tanam).

sessing an Ahu *and* possessing a Ratu, (from which this is manifest, namely, the possession of a ruler and high-priest. 17. This, too, is said, that *it was*) before that sky *was* created, before the water, before the earth, before the plants, (18) before the creation of the four-legged ox (which *was* the sole-created ox), (19) before the creation of the two-legged righteous man (who *was* Gâyômarô), (20) *and* before that sun of definite form (the body of the sun) *was* created as an acquirement of the archangels. 21. It *was* (likewise) proclaimed to me by the spirituality of propitiousness, (it likewise became possible for the spirituality of propitiousness to say (22) *what was* said¹ to Zaratûst,) concerning the whole material *existence* of the righteous who are, who have been, and who *will* arise, (23) as to the progress of work, (that is, while they shall perform for it that which is specified by it, and good works shall arise through them,) *that* this work, among the living, is for Aûharmazd, (that is, that which they may perform, suitable for Aûharmazd, they shall so perform as is declared by this fargard).

24. This, too, is the most expressive (most in effect) of those statements which *were* ever spoken forth (till now), *or which one* speaks forth (at present)², *or shall* speak forth³ (even henceforth); (25) for it is *through* such a statement (such in effect) as that, *if* the whole embodied existence (26) learnt it *and*, having learnt⁴, (that is, they shall accomplish *it* easily,) they retain *it*, (that is, they

¹ J2 omits gûftô, 'what was said.'

² Pahl. avô kevan in Pt4.

³ 'Or is spoken forth' in Pt4, Mf4.

⁴ 'Have learnt that which they should have learnt' in Pt4, Mf4.

should rely upon it,) abstinence from passing *away* would be quite masterful, (that is, they become immortal). 27. This, too, is our saying spoken forth, (preserved¹ among the revelation mentioned *in* this² fargard,) which is learnt, (that is, they shall accomplish *it* easily,) and *one* recites, (that is, he utters it in a ceremonial,) thus *for* any one whatever of the beings whose righteousness is best, (that is, should he do it for a ceremonial, he becomes *fit* for it; it is when he utters this in a ceremonial *that* his soul becomes immortal).

28. As *it is* here spoken forth, (that a ruler and high-priest are to be maintained; as these things are so spoken, *and* as this law is so,) (29) even when it gives him an Ahu and a Ratu, (that is, it gives up *his* person to the priestly assembly,) so it is thereby taught to him *that* the thought of Aûharmazd is the creature *with* the first thinking, (that is, the Gâthic lore is set going by him;) (30) whatever teaches³ this (is the person of him who is king of kings, who) is the greatest (of men) of every description⁴, (that is, it possesses³ a person in the king of kings;) *and* so it is taught *that* the creatures⁵ are for him, (where the Gâthic lore is set going by him).

31. Whatever is a good emanation for³ Aûharmazd, (that is, has an origin in his personality,) is through *the word* vangheus, (which in the division becomes the beginning of) the third assertion here, whose recital is 'he gives through Vohûman,' (that is, the recitation which he utters properly is accomplished by him,) and, besides, here is that which

¹ J₂ has 'given.'

² Pt₄, Mf₄ insert 'very.'

³ So in J₂, Pt₄, Mf₄.

⁴ Pt₄, Mf₄, 'the greatest of all men.'

⁵ See p. 458, n. 3.

Vohûman has taught, (that is, the reward and recompense which they give Vohûman, they attribute also to him;) (32) whatever¹ is a further indication by Vohûman, (that is, anything which he may accomplish¹ properly as a token, and is performed by him,) became so through this summing up (that is, its end occurred) in *shyaothananãm*; (33) here among the existences was the summing up², (that is, it was its end).

34. What it teaches to the creatures³ of him who is Aûharmazd, is thus: he *who is* like him is he who is his own creature³, (that is, even these people it tells something so, *and* thus¹ they attain again, through purity, to the possession of Aûharmazd, just as Aûharmazd produced *them* through purity).

35. *By* 'the dominion is for Aûharmazd' it has taught, that he has made Aûharmazd his ruler⁴, over his own person, (who shall perform that which is revealed by the Avesta;) and this is taught, *that* through him is the ministration of the poor, (that is, happiness is thereby caused by him,) (36) which is friendship *for* the Spîtâmân; (and the religion of the Spîtâmân became) *these* five assertions, (that is, the decrees in it were five,) (37) *which* were the

¹ So in J₂, Pt₄, Mf₄.

² Sp., J₂ add 'of the sacred beings.'

³ Only here, and in § 30, *dâhm*, 'a member of the community,' is substituted for the usual *dâm*, 'a creature.' Either meaning might suit the context, but the Avesta text clearly has 'creature,' and would require more alteration, to suit it to the Pahlavi version, than *vice versa*. Dk. IX, Chap. XLVII, affords no assistance, as it does not allude to this passage.

⁴ The Pahlavi version of the Av. *tað mazdâ tavâ khshathrem* quoted in Dk. IX, Chap. XLVII, 17.

whole enunciation of the saying, *and* the whole saying was that of Aûharmazd¹.

38. For the sake of development Aûharmazd, (for cherishing the creatures,) pronounced the Ahunavair, and in its development *there* was a summing up, (that is, its end occurred). 39. Quickly, when² destruction arose, (that is³, the destroyer,) *and* rushed in, even among the wicked he uttered (*as* resistance) (40) this interdict:—(41) ‘Neither our thoughts, nor³ teachings, (*as* I have not taught that which thou hast taught,) nor wisdoms, (for I consider wisdom as virtuousness, and thou considerest *it* as viciousness,) (42) nor wills, (for my will is a virtuous wish, and thine a vicious *one*,) nor words, (for I speak that which is virtuous, and thou speakest that which is vicious,) nor actions, (for my actions are virtuous, and thine are vicious,) (43) nor religions, (for my religion is the Gâthic lore, and thine is witchcraft,) nor souls are themselves in unison, (for *as to* those who rely upon my things, and those who rely upon thy things, their souls are not in one place;’ he who said this, that even their souls exist, must thus say that *they are* not souls in unison *with* ours).

44. Also this saying, which Aûharmazd uttered, *has* the three degrees, the four classes, (priest, warrior, husbandman, and artisan,) the five chieftainships, (house-ruler, village-ruler, tribe-ruler, province-ruler,

¹ As the Pahlavi text of the foregoing interpretation is a commentary upon an Avesta commentary on an obscure Avesta text, it must be expected to be difficult to translate with certainty.

² Pt₄, Mf₄ omit ‘when;’ but the speaker of the interdict is Aûharmazd in Pahl. Yas. XLIV, 2 c-e.

³ So in J₂, Pt₄, Mf₄.

and supreme Zaratûst,) and its summing up is with liberality, (thus it is possible to make *it* completely for their own, when they deliver themselves up to the priests). 45. Which are the degrees of it? Good thoughts, good words, and good deeds; (they are¹, indeed, virtuous among the degrees of religion). 46. Which are the classes? The priest, warrior, husbandman, and artisan, (47) who are the whole day *and* night with a righteous man, who are thinking rightly, speaking rightly, and acting rightly, (48) who *have* recognised a priestly authority, (that is, possess a high-priest,) who *have* taught the religion, (that is, have provided a ceremony,) (49) *and* who, through their actions, are a furtherance of the world of righteousness, (owing to the work they accomplish). 50. Which are the chiefs? The house-ruler, village-ruler, tribe-ruler, province-ruler, and the Zaratûst is the fifth (51) *in* those provinces which are other than the Ragha² of Zaratûst; *with* four chieftainships is the Ragha of Zaratûst. 52. Which are the chiefs of that? The house-ruler, village-ruler, tribe-ruler, and the Zaratûst is the fourth; (that is, when he was in his own province, he also produced its period of *prosperity*, who arises fourth).

53. How *was it* when through good thought, (that is, the religion remained in the degree of good thought)? When it arose first in a righteous thinker, (it arose in Gâyômarđ, and he thought for it). 54. How, when through good words? When *it was* the bounteous text, (doing good). 55. How,

¹ J₂, Pt₄, Mf₄ indicate hômant (=aît).

² The ancient city of Raî which stood not far from Teherân.

when through good deeds? When *it was* the praise even of righteousness *by* the first creature, (that is, they shall perform the ceremonial, and also other good works, through the Gâtha lore).

56. Aûharmazd^d proclaimed; for what *was it* proclaimed by him? For the righteous spiritual and worldly *existence*, (*for* the benefit of the spiritual and worldly *existence*). 57. Owing to what desire (owing to what necessity) *was* the said announcement proclaimed¹ by him? (So that he shall become) the privileged developer, (he who is a resolute ruler). 58. For how many righteous (is it requisite to utter *it*)? (So that *one may* become) a developer, (even he who may be) an irresolute ruler², (to whom they reveal these words. So that the glory of the Kayâns, such as *it is* with good rulers, should be even so with evil rulers; with good rulers for this purpose, that so they shall produce more benefit; and with evil rulers for this purpose, that so they shall produce less harm)³.

Pahl. Yas. XX = Bakö II.

The beginning of the second subdivision⁴.

1. It was a proclamation of Aûharmazd^d, the Ashem vohû vahistem asti⁵; besides perfect excellence is taught by it to him, (that is, benefit is

¹ Pt₄, Mf₄ have *frdš gûftō*, as in Pahl. Yas. XX, 9.

² Quoted in Dk. IX, Chap. LXIX, 45.

³ §§ 56–58 are repeated at the end of Pahl. Yas. XX, with reference to the Ashem.

⁴ So in Pt₄, Mf₄.

⁵ This Avesta is quoted as part of the Pahlavi version, and is translated, in Pt₄, Mf₄, by the usual Pahlavi for 'righteousness is perfect excellence.'

produced by it for him,) who shall make self-progress his own, (that is, shall produce that which is necessary to produce,) through *vohû vahistem astî*¹, thus become the summing up of the assertion, (that is, it became its end). 2. *Ustâ astî, ustâ ahmâi*² has, besides, taught the righteous of every kind the happy progress which is necessary to arise for the righteous of every kind, (so that³ happiness *may* be caused thereby); whatever endurance of man (*or* diligence) it is necessary for the righteous of every kind to occasion is, besides, taught to the righteous of⁴ every kind, (so that one's happiness *may* be caused thereby). 3. *Hyad' ashâi vahistâi ashem*² has, besides, taught *that* all (the duty and good works which are revealed in the text are the whole text (for him whose Avesta and Zand are easy, so that, through *its* Avesta and Zand, he can make manifest all the duty and good works of that whole text,) (4) which teaches⁵ *that* the dominion is for righteousness⁶, (so that, *one* may exercise authority through virtuousness, that is, it should be the opinion that it teaches a dominion through virtuousness, so that *one may* possess authority through virtuousness;) (5) which also teaches the truth to that righteous invoker, (so that he may make a true decision;) (6) *and* which also teaches the truth to you that are

¹ So in Pt₄, Mf₄; J₂ has 'through one *vohû vahistem*; *and vahistem astî*.'

² This phrase of the Ashem, which begins the Avesta of this section, must also be understood as beginning its Pahlavi version.

³ Only Sp. adds 'one's' here.

⁴ Only Sp. has 'the righteous of,' but it is in the Avesta text.

⁵ So in Pt₄, Mf₄.

⁶ Just as the Ahunavair states that 'the dominion is for *Aûhar-mazd'* (see Pahl. Yas. XIX, 35).

fraught with advantage, (so that it may produce true judgment). *These* were the three assertions, (that is, three decrees were in it,) (7) *and* the whole saying was a proclamation, the whole saying was that of Aûharmazd.

8. Aûharmazd proclaimed; (&c., as in *Pahl. Yas. XIX*, 56-58).

Pahl. Yas. XXI = Bakö III.

The beginning of the third subdivision¹.

1. A saying of the righteous Zaratûst, to be revered, was: 'Whoever of those existing is thus in worship as regards *the good*².' Here what is taught by it is the worship of Aûharmazd, (that *it* is that which *one* should provide for,) which is the law of Aûharmazd, (that is, his virtuous law,) whereby the reverence *of* existence is taught, (that is, that which he would most occasion, which is the ever-asking for progeny *by* mankind; and he mentions that thing to them,) *through* which *it* is possible for them to live well. 2. Here, besides, the reverence of those males *and* females of the righteous, through complete devotion³ who *was* the first, is taught by it, (3) which is the obeisance *for* the archangels, (that is, it would occasion the propitiation of the archangels). *These* were the three assertions, (that is, three decrees were in it,) *and* it was *in* every way a saying to be revered. Unto whom was the reverence? *Unto* the archangels in that worship.

4. And Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'Happy is he

¹ So in Pt₄, Mf₄.

² The beginning of the Yênhê-hâtâm (see Dk. IX, Chap. IV, 1 n).

³ The archangel Ârmaîti, or Spendarmad.

whose happiness is the happiness of any one whatever, (5) and *may* Aûharmazd grant it, through predominance of will, (through his requirement)¹. 6. What reply did he speak through that utterance of words, (what *was* the thing he spoke about²)? 7. He spoke the reply of happy progress, the happy progress of the righteous of every kind, who are, who have been, and who *will* arise. 8. The developer told (that man, as) the development, *in* reply; *and* (the reward as) the development that Aûharmazd mentioned *in* reply *was*: 'That development³ (I call) righteous, (which) is a development for the righteous.'

Dk. IX, Chap. XLVII, 11, refers to Pahl. Yas. XIX, 12-15, which is thus quoted in Sls. X, 26, in a shorter and altered form:—'As it says in the Bak thus: "Whoever shall mutter, *O Zaratûst!* my apportionment of the Ahunavair, (that is, shall softly take *it inwardly*,) *and* shall let *it* escape⁴ again, (that is, shall utter *it aloud*,) so much as a half, or a third, or a fourth, or a fifth, his soul will I shield⁵, I who am Aûharmazd, from the best existence, (that is, I *will* keep it away,) by such an extent as the width of this earth."'

¹ Quoted from Pahl. Yas. XLII, 1 a, b.

² Pt₄, Mf₄ have madam in place of maman.

³ So in Pt₄, Mf₄.

⁴ Pahl. rahôînêd, or râînêd, 'reject.' It is the alteration in this verb that changes the meaning of the original text; as the preceding and following verbs, vakhdûnêd and gôyêd, do not differ in Pahlavi writing from the vadîdûnêd and yangêd of Pahl. Yas. XIX, 12.

⁵ Pahl. netrûnam.

IV. DÂMDÂD NASK¹.

From the very short account of this Nask, given in Dk. VIII, Chap. V, it appears that its contents were very similar to those of the original Bundahis, so far as we find them in the imperfect Indian Bd. I-XXX. And this connection between the two works is further testified by Zs. IX, 1, 16-23, which attributes to the Dâmdâd many statements, regarding plants and animals, which are detailed in Bd. XIV, 1, 2, 14-18, 21-24.

Owing to the brief character of the account in Dk. VIII, Chap. V, it is impossible to trace any allusion to two passages quoted from the Dâmdâd as follows:—

In Sls. X, 22, XII, 15, it is said that ‘in the Dâmdâd *it* is revealed thus: “Likewise, too, the good works, *in* like measure (*or* manner), which come into the father’s possession (*or* to the father as his own).”’

In Sls. XII, 5, it is said that ‘in the Dâmdâd *it* is revealed that when they sever the consciousness of men it goes out to the nearest fire, then out to the stars, then out *to* the moon, and then out *to* the sun;

¹ The very short account of this Nask, in Dk. VIII, contains 75 Pahlavi words, and, if these represent the same proportion of original text as those in the very short accounts of Nasks I, II, III, XXI in the same book, they would indicate about 8,900 words of Avesta text. But, as this is a Hadha-mâthric Nask, the proportion of its Pahlavi text is best ascertained from that of Nask X, belonging to the same division, which indicates about 29,300 words for the Pahlavi version. The actual original extent of the Irânian Bundahis (which may be considered as a descendant of the Dâmdâd) appears to have been about 28,000 Pahlavi words.

and *it* is needful that the nearest fire, that to which it *has* come out, *should* become stronger.'

V. NÂDAR NASK¹.

No quotation from this Nask has yet been noticed.

VI. PÂGAG NASK².

Dk. VIII, Chap. VII, 4, or 5, probably refers to the passage which contained the statement thus quoted in Sls. IX, 9, 10:—'In a passage of the fifth fargard of the Pâgôn *it* is declared that *one* mentions these characteristics of four kinds of worship of the sacred beings:—one is that whose Avesta is correct, *but* the man is bad; the second is that whose Avesta is faulty, *but* the man is good; the third is that whose Avesta is correct, *and* the man is good; *and* the fourth is that whose Avesta is faulty, *and* the man is bad. *That* whose Avesta is correct, *but* the man bad, the archangels will approach and will listen to,

¹ As there is no account of this Nask in Dk. VIII, we can only guess that its extent was about the average length of the other Hadha-mâthric Nasks, or about 6,800 words of Avesta text and 22,200 of Pahlavi version.

² The account of this Nask in Dk. VIII (like those of Nasks VIII, XII, XIII, XX), though four or five times as long as the very short accounts, is still short, and the data for estimating the original extent of these five Nasks are very inadequate. We may, perhaps, guess that the two Nasks VI, VIII were together equal to half the length of the four other Hadha-mâthric Nasks IV, VII, IX, X, and then proceed to apportion the extent, thus guessed, between the two in proportion to the number of Pahlavi words in the short account of each. In this way we shall find that the 505 Pahlavi words in the short account of the Pâgag may indicate about 9,100 words of Avesta text and 29,800 of Pahlavi version.

but do not accept; *that* whose Avesta is faulty, *but* the man good, the archangels *and* sacred being will approach, *but* do not listen to, *and* will accept; *that* whose Avesta is correct, *and* the man good, the archangels *and* sacred being will approach, will come to, will listen to, and will accept; *and that* whose Avesta is faulty, *and* the man bad, they do not approach, do not listen to, and do not accept.'

VII. RADÖ-DÂD-AÎTAG NASK¹.

Dk. VIII, Chap. VIII, 4, probably refers to the passage containing the statement thus mentioned in Sls. X, 29:—'In the Radö-dâd-aîth many harsh things are said about the severe punishment of the unhelpful *ones* (avigîdâr-dahtsnânö)² in the spiritual *existence*.'

VIII, IX. BARIS³ AND KASKÎSRÔBÔ⁴ NASKS.

No quotation from these Nasks has yet been noticed.

¹ The very short account of this Nask, in Dk. VIII, contains 88 Pahlavi words, from which the extent of its original text may be estimated (in the same way as in the case of Nask IV) at about 10,500 Avesta and 34,300 Pahlavi words.

² Otherwise read hangîdâr-dahîsnânö, 'producers of irritation,' in S. B. E., vol. v, p. 330.

³ The short account of this Nask, in Dk. VIII, contains 248 Pahlavi words, from which the extent of its original text may be guessed (in the same way as in the case of Nask VI) at about 4,400 Avesta and 14,600 Pahlavi words.

⁴ The very short account of this Nask, in Dk. VIII, contains 46 Pahlavi words, from which the extent of its original text may be estimated (in the same way as in the case of Nask IV) at about 5,500 Avesta and 17,900 Pahlavi words.

X. VISTÂSP-SÂSTÔ NASK ¹.

The first half of this Nask (as described in Dk. VIII, Chap. XI, 1, 2) appears to be still extant in the Vistâsp Yast, 1-44; but the remainder of that Yast does not correspond with the description of the latter half of the Nask.

XI. VASTAG NASK ².

No quotation from this Nask has yet been noticed.

XII. KITRADÂD NASK ³.

Dk. VIII, Chap. XIII, 10, probably refers to the passage that contained the statement thus quoted in Sls. X, 28 :—‘ Even so it is revealed in the *Kîtradâd* that Spendarmad spoke to Mânûs’êlhar thus : “ Even the swiftest horse requires the whip, the sharpest

¹ As half this Nask consists of the Vistâsp Yt. 1-44, which contains about 1,100 Avesta and 3,600 Pahlavi words, the contents of the whole Nask may be estimated at about 2,200 Avesta and 7,200 Pahlavi words.

² As there is no account of this Nask in Dk. VIII, we can only guess that its extent was about the average length of the other Gâthic Nasks, or about 8,900 words of Avesta text and 18,400 of Pahlavi version.

³ The short account of this Nask, in Dk. VIII, contains 396 Pahlavi words, which may be guessed to represent the same proportion of Pahlavi version as in Nasks VI, VIII, the accounts of which are also short. And, as this is a Legal Nask, it may be assumed that the proportion of Avesta text to Pahlavi version would be the same as in the other Legal Nasks, which is the proportion still extant in the Nîrangistân section of Nask XVII. Based upon these assumptions, the probable extent of the *Kîtradâd* would be about 2,600 words of Avesta text and 23,400 of Pahlavi version.

steel knife requires the whetstone, and the wisest man requires counsel.”’

XIII. SPEND NASK¹.

Dk. VIII, Chap. XIV, 1, probably refers to the passage that contained the statement thus quoted in Sls. X, 4, XII, 11 :—‘*It is revealed in the Spend that towards Dûkdâv, the mother of Zaratûst, when she was pregnant with Zaratûst, every night for three nights a leader with a hundred and fifty demons rushed (or came) for the destruction of Zaratûst, yet, owing to the existence of the fire in the dwelling, they knew no means of accomplishing it.*’

Dk. VIII, Chap. XIV, 8, probably refers to the passage that contained the statement alluded to in AV. XXXII and thus quoted in Sls. XII, 29 :—‘*As in the Spend it was shown to Zaratûst about one man, that all his limbs were in torment, but one foot was outside ; and Zaratûst enquired of Aûharmazd about the cause of it ; and Aûharmazd said that he was a man, Davâns² by name ; he was a ruler over thirty-three districts, and no good work was ever practised by him, except one time when fodder was conveyed by him to a sheep with that one foot.*’

¹ The short account of this Nask, in Dk. VIII, contains 347 Pahlavi words, which would represent about 20,500 words of Pahlavi version, according to the proportion guessed in the case of Nask XII. But, this being a Gâthic Nask, the proportion of Avesta to Pahlavi ought to be that calculated for the Gâthic Nasks I, II, III, XXI, which would give about 9,900 words of Avesta text for this Nask. The seventh book of the *Dînkard*, whose contents are very similar to those attributed to the Spend Nask, contains about 16,000 Pahlavi words.

² A personification of the Av. *daṵās* of Yas. XXXI, 10 c.

No allusion to the following two passages, quoted from the Spend, has been noticed in Dk. VIII, Chap. XIV :—

In Sls. XII, 3, it is said that ‘in the Spend *it* is revealed that a fire, when they shall make it quite clean from its chilled charcoal, *has* as much comfort as a man whose clothing they shall make clean.’

In Sls. XII, 15, it is said that ‘in the Spend and Nihâdûm the high-priests *have* taught that the duty and good works which a son performs become as much the father’s as though they had been done by his own hand.’

XIV. BAKÂN-YAST NASK¹.

No allusion to the following three passages, quoted from this Nask, could be expected in the very short account of it, given in Dk. VIII, Chap. XV ; and they can hardly be traced, with any certainty, in the Avesta texts of the Yasts themselves :—

It is just possible that a commentary on Yt. I, 17 may have contained the Av.-Pahl. passage thus quoted in Vig.² pp. 160, 161 :—‘By the Avesta of

¹ The account of this Nask in Dk. VIII, though very short, is a fair description of the extant Yasts I–XX, and their general character is also indicated by the name of the Nask, which means ‘the worship of the divinities.’ The extent of these Yasts may be estimated at about 22,000 words of Avesta text, and, from the Pahlavi versions of the few Yasts that still possess one, it may be calculated that about 44,000 words of Pahlavi version would have been required for the whole collection.

² Vigirkard-i Dinik, ed. Peshotan, Bombay, 1848 ; printed in Pahlavi type from a copy, transcribed in 1754, from an Irânian MS. written in 1240, which the transcriber found in the Modî library at Surat. The Avesta quotations are here transliterated without any attempt at amendment.

the Baghân-yast *it* is declared : *Yad aêtê yô mazda-yasnô aperênâyûkô avi hê hapta saredha fragasâiti, stehr-paêsanghô aiwyaunghânô paitis hê maidhyâi bûgyamanô, avi hê nara paskaiti nemanghentî* : Whoever of those Mazda-worshippers is a child who attains unto the age of seven years, *and* ties the *thread-girdle* on his waist, upon that man there is thenceforth the maintenance of the obeisances.'

A Pahlavi commentary on Yt. VI, 2 may have formerly contained the passage thus mentioned in Sls. XII, 17 :—'As in the Bâg-yasnô notice is given about the uncleanness of well-water at night.'

Perhaps one of the five Yasts, XI, XII, XIII, XV, XVIII, respectively dedicated to Srôsh, Rashnû, the guardian spirits, the good Vâê, and Âstâd—the sacred beings specially propitiated by the ceremonies after a death—may have included a commentary containing the passage thus quoted in Vig. pp. 157–158, about the necessity of appointing some one to provide such ceremonies for a man who dies without a son, and to administer his estate :—'By the Avesta of the Bagân-yast *it* is declared : *Yêzi narô pankada-sanghô saredhô irîraithyâd avi hê urvânem bûgyânem thrâyô ayara uzayarana rathwô hangamanem fragasôid, âad hê aputhra anghad puthra fradadhâiti yathaka nara irista vîspanãm avaretanãm shaêtavaitanãm avi hê frazaintîm fragasôid, paskaiti nemanguhaiti baoidhyêitaka urvâsnayau*.'

XV. NĪKÂDŪM NASK¹.

Dk. VIII, Chap. XVIII, 3, refers to the passage which, no doubt, contained the statement thus quoted

¹ The very long account of this Nask, in Dk. VIII, contains

in Farh. Otm, pp. 6, l. 11-7, l. 13 :—‘Aêdha is the skin of the head, and there is *part* of it which is large and *part* which is small, as it says in the Nihâdûm :—“Kaya henti masyanghô aêdha, which are those *parts with* the larger skin? Yô aparaya paiti mastraghnaya, whatever is behind the skull; (*Afarg*¹ said, from the ear backwards). Kaya kasyanghô, *which are those with the smaller?* Yô paouruya paiti mastraghnaya, whatever is before *the skull*². Vaghdhanem is the head, *and one* says nars vaghdhanem, &c., this is: Sinful are they *who* penetrate (sûmbênd) a man’s head, astem aêvô mastravanãm, *or one bone of* the skull; vîspaķa yô mastraghnãm amâsta, all those *are* to be smitten who *have* penetrated into the skull, *and* to be given up *as* outcast³; hvarô-ķithanãm⁴ aêteê anyê ķikayatô, the penalties of a Khôr⁵ *sin* chastise those who *hurt* other *parts*, (such as the brain which is in the skull of the head, and the *marrow* of the other members *that are* to be mentioned, just as it mentions this :—Sinful are they who strike through the bone, or flesh, or marrow of a leg, and every *one* of those is to be smitten who strikes

4,876 Pahlavi words, from which the extent of its original text may be estimated (in the same way as in the case of Nask XVII) at about 62,600 Avesta and 562,900 Pahlavi words.

¹ One of the old commentators whose statements are frequently quoted in the Pahlavi versions of the Avesta. The reading of his name and the age in which he lived are alike uncertain, but he appears to have been one of the earliest commentators whose opinions now survive.

² Perhaps the quotation ends at this point; but Dk. VIII, Chap. XVIII, 3, is equally applicable to what follows.

³ Tanâpûhar, see Dk. VIII, Chap. XX, 65.

⁴ So in Kzo.

⁵ See Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXI, 39.

through the bone of one fleshy *part*, and he is to be given up *as* outcast; *while* the penalties of a Khôr *sin*¹ chastise those who *hurt* other *parts*.”’

Dk. VIII, Chap. XX, 116, probably refers to the passage which contained the statement thus quoted in Pahl. Vend. IV, 35 :—‘ That is, this is the account of the number of years, *according to* that which is in the Hûspârûm as regards the account of the number; and *according to* that which is in the Nihâdûm *it is* the account of the number of men.’

Dk. VIII, Chap. XX, 124, possibly refers to the passage which contained the statement thus quoted in Sls. X, 3 :—‘ In the exposition of the Nihâdûm Nask it says that a man is going to commit robbery, *and* a wall falls in upon him, *it is* his destroyer; when a man strikes at him *he* is his adversary, *and* both are in sinfulness; when he is going to perform the ceremonial of the sacred beings both are in innocence *towards* him.’

No allusion to the following six passages, quoted from this Nask, has been noticed in Dk. VIII, Chaps. XVI–XX :—

In Sls. X, 22, XII, 15, it is said as in the last fragment of the Spend Nask, already quoted.

In Sls. X, 23, XII, 16, it is said that ‘in the Nihâdûm the high-priests *have* taught thus :—“A man gives a hungry *one* bread, *and it is* too much, yet (*or* when a man gives bread to a man, even though that man *has* too much bread) all the good works, which he shall perform through that super-

¹ MH6 has va-aêvak kerp after mazg, and both K2o and MH6 have valman barâ yehabûnisn; khôr tôgisnîhâ after tanâpûhar.

abundance, become as much his *who gave it* as though they had been done by his own hand.”

In Pahl. Vend. V, 73, it is said ‘like unto this earth and that (sky) which would also cover over *it* (ever in all *places*; there is *some one* who says this is as to dead matter, that in the Nihâdûm *says it is* as to decision and judgment, and that in the Hûspârûm *says it is* as to the ritual of the ceremonial).’

In Vig. p. 136, it is said that ‘*it* is declared by the Avesta *of the Nihâdûm thus*:—“Âad yad draonô Vanantô stârô mazdadhâtô frâyazyâd, kathwârô draonô frakerententi aiwi-hvarenti, yad aêshô nâ yô yaozdâthryô:—So when he, who is that man who is a purifier, shall consecrate the sacred cake of Vanand¹, the star produced by Aûharmazd, they cut up and shall eat up four sacred cakes.”’

In Vig. pp. 180, 181, it is said that ‘in the Nihâdûm it is stated:—Âad aokhta Ahurô Mazdau: “Yad aêtê yô mazdayasna aêtem srîrem vastrem stehr-paêsanghem hvãm tanûm bâdha paoirm vanghanemka hadha varanô paitanemka, paskaiti aiwyaunghânô ava hê maidhyânem bûgyamanô.” Aêtem zî srîrem vastrem mainyutâstem haça mainyavanãm dâmanãm avi mê fradadhâd Ahurô Mazdau ashava. “Yatha hê varanô paitanem asti mănayen hvare-khshaêtahê, adhâd hadha hê vastranãm yaozdâthranãm frâyaza vâ nizbaya vâ Ahurâi Mazdâi ameshanãm spentanãm, Spitama Zarathustra!”—Thus spoke Aûharmazd: “When *for* him, of those who are Mazda-worshippers, *there is* this beneficial, star-spangled (that is, wrought) garment², always (after seven years *of age*, that is,

¹ The southern leader of the stars, probably Fomalhaut (see Bd. II, 7, V, 1).

² The sacred shirt.

after seven years *of age*) first he covers up (that is, clothes) his own body in it, and with (that *he* is properly) a preserver of faith (that is, a preserver of attachment, and) he afterwards ties¹ (that) girdle (over that starry *garment*) at the waist (as a waist-belt)." That, even this well-looking garment, spiritually formed by the creatures of the spirits, is really (that which) the righteous Aûharmazd granted me (who am Zaratûst). "Since it is his preserver of faith, (that is, preserver of attachment), he is like (him who is as) the sun, (a preserver of beneficial faith, an implorer of the splendid heaven, and is *one* who is an acceptor *of* the religion); therefore, with that garment, which is purified (that is, pure), do thou worship, or practise invocation, as regards Aûharmazd and as regards the archangels, O Spîtâmân Zaratûst!"'

In Vig. pp. 184, 185, it is said that '*it is* declared by the Avesta of the Nihâdûm *thus*:—Âad aêtahê *panka* ayara hamaspathmaidhem paiti ratûm *spen-tayau* ârmatôis mâunghô nôid frasrâvayôid:—So *one* does not chant forth (that is, does not invoke) the month of (the completely mindful) Spendarmad² (that is, the Spendarmad month) in the reign of those five Hamaspadmêdêm days³; (for if *one* invokes *it*, owing to forgetfulness, the Avesta is not accepted).'

¹ This appears to be the reverse of the meaning of Av. būgya-manô in Yt. I, 17, but see the first fragment of Nask XIV, quoted in Vig. pp. 160, 161.

² The last month of the Parsi year, named after the archangel Spendarmad (see Dk. VIII, Chap. IX, 3).

³ The five intercalary days that follow the last month, in order to make the twelve months, of thirty days each, correspond with a year of 365 days. They coincide with the Hamaspadmêdêm season-festival, originally intended to celebrate the vernal equinox.

XVI. GANABÂ-SAR-NIGAD NASK¹.

Dk. VIII, Chap. XXII, 2, probably refers to the passage which contained the statement thus quoted in Sls. X, 13:—'*It is revealed in the Ganabâ-sar-nigêd, where a day in the year is indicated, that the sacred thread-girdle of every one who shall be one day more than fourteen years and three months old*² is to be tied on—it is better so than when he remains unto fifteen years, and then ties on the girdle—who is more cared for, that way, than those of five (or nine) months in the womb of the mother, on whom they should put it.'

XVII. HÛSPÂRAM NASK³.

A small portion of this Nask is still preserved and known by the name of Nîrangistân. The last seven-eighths of this text corresponds with the description of the Nîrangistân section of the Hûspâram, given in Dk. VIII, Chap. XXIX, 1-17, although a few folios of its commencement are probably lost. And

¹ The very long account of this Nask, in Dk. VIII, contains 2,179 Pahlavi words, from which the extent of its original text may be estimated (in the same way as in the case of Nask XVII) at about 28,000 Avesta and 251,500 Pahlavi words.

² So as to include the nine months' existence, before birth, in the prescribed fifteen years.

³ As the 212 Pahlavi words in Dk. VIII, Chap. XXIX, 1-17, represent about 2,722 words of the original Avesta text of this Nask, with 24,472 of its Pahlavi version, it may be fairly assumed that the 3,496 Pahlavi words of the whole account of the Nask in Chaps. XXVIII-XXXVII, must represent about 44,900 Avesta and 403,600 Pahlavi words of original text. And the same proportion probably holds good with regard to the other Legal Nasks, XV, XVI, XVIII, of which very long accounts are given.

the earlier portion of the text begins with a fragment of a passage ; which appears to correspond with part of the description of the Aêrpatistân section, given in Chap. XXVIII, 1 ; but also contains passages that are difficult to trace in any part of that description. The Nîrangistân portion of this text is divided into three fargards, and Dd. LXVI, 1 mentions 'five fargards of the Avesta of the correct law of the Nîrangistân, *which are easy through the Zand;*' so that the missing portion of this section of the Nask, described in Chap. XXIX, 18-25, must have contained two fargards. With regard to the unidentified passages, preceding the Nîrangistân portion of the extant text, it may be remarked that they include several of the statements about 'unseasonable chatter' contained in Sls. V, 3-6, where they are differently arranged.

Dk. VIII, Chap. XXIX, 2, refers to a passage which may have contained the statement thus mentioned in Sls. XII, 1 :—'Of the merit of a threefold *consecration of the sacred cake* the high-priests *have specially taught in the Hûspâram that it is as much as that of a lesser form of worship.*'

Dk. VIII, Chap. XXIX, 8, refers to the passage which probably contained the statement thus quoted in Sls. XII, 31 :—'Of the ceremonies which go to the bridge *as sin* it says this in the Hûspâram, that *they are* the non-celebration of the rites of the season-festivals, the Rapitvîn, the three nights *after a death, the days of the guardian spirits, and the sun and moon.*'

Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXII, 1, refers to the passage which must have contained the statement thus mentioned in Sls. XIII, 17 :—'The six hot ordeals

which, in the Hûspâram, are effected by *kathrayâim âthraiãm*¹.'

Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXIII, 4, refers to the passage which must have contained the statement thus mentioned in Pahl. Vend. XV, 67:—'What is as to the sick *dog* in the Hûspâram is, "*when* several doors are together, *it is* just *if* the nourishment *at* each one *be* only *for* three nights, and then, when opulence is manifest, the delivery *be* unto that opulent *one*, and when not, the delivery *be* unto him *who is* good.'"'

Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXV, 2, probably refers to the passage which contained the statement thus mentioned in Sls. XII, 7:—'In the twentieth² of the Hûspâram it is shown *that* over the soul of him who works in the dark *there is* more predominance of the evil spirit.'

Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXVI, 7, or 13, probably refers to the passage thus mentioned in Dd. LXI, 3:—'Nearer details of the family guardianship which is proper *and* which is not proper for an adopted son's duty, of the child of the good religion with whose business *it* is connected, *and* of the fathers for whom a family guardian is to be appointed, are *in* the recital of five fargards³ of the Hûspâram.'

Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXVI, 8-12, probably refers to the passage which contained the statement thus quoted in Sls. X, 21, XII, 14:—'In the fourteenth⁴

¹ This corrupt Avesta means probably 'fourfold fire.'

² The first section mentioned of these twenty is that described in Chap. XXXII.

³ See Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXVI, 1 n.

⁴ That is, in one of the last fourteen sections of the Nask. If it were not for this number, and the fact that the passage is understood to apply to the children of a concubine, it might be connected with Chap. XXXIV, 4, 5.

of the Hûspâram Nask the high-priests *have* taught thus: "My son is suitable even *as* thy son, *but* my daughter is not suitable even *as* thy daughter."

No allusion has been noticed in Dk. VIII, Chaps. XXVIII–XXXVII, to the two passages in Pahl. Vend. IV, 35, V, 73, referring to this Nask, which have been already quoted as also referring to Nask XV.

XVIII. SAKÂDÛM NASK¹.

Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 1, 2, refer to passages, one of which may possibly have contained the statement thus quoted in Sls. XII, 2:—'It says in the Sakâdûm that no one of them, that is an inattentive man who has no high-priest, attains to the best existence, not though his recitation should be so much that it has made his duty *and* good works as much as the verdure of the plants when it shoots forth in spring, the verdure which is given abundantly by Aûharmazd.'

Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 3, refers to a passage which is thus quoted in Sls. X, 25:—'When an action or an opinion comes forward, and *one* does not know whether *it be* a sin or a good work, when possible *it* is to be abandoned *and* not carried out by him, as it says in the Sakâdûm that Zaratûst *has* not provided about anything whatever as regards everything, but three times *it has been done* by Zaratûst about this duty, that is, so that the Avesta

¹ The very long account of this Nask, in Dk. VIII, contains 4,129 Pahlavi words, from which the extent of its original text may be estimated (in the same way as in the case of Nask XVII) at about 53,000 Avesta and 476,600 Pahlavi words.

and Zand, when made quite easy by *any* one, are for recitation, but are not to be mumbled, for, in mumbling, the portions *of* the Ahunavair are more chattering.'

Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 6, refers to the passage thus mentioned in Sls. XII, 12 :—'Where a child is born, *during* three days, for protection from demons, wizards, and witches, a fire is to be made at night until *daylight*, and is to be maintained there by day, and pure incense is to be put upon it, as is revealed in the thirtieth¹ of the Sakâdûm.'

Dk. VIII, Chaps. XXXVIII, 13, XLI, 19, refer to passages which seem both to be partially quoted in Farh. Oîm, p. 38, ll. 4-10, thus :—'The period is eagerly proclaimed in another place, as it says in the Sakâdûm thus :—"Thripithwô zi asti âtars Ahurahê Mazdau hama, bipithwô aiwi-gâmê, atha narô asha-vanô :—For thrice-supplied is the fire of Aûharmazd *in* summer², twice in winter; so is the righteous man. (Whoever has become a depriver of food (atapdâd) four *times*, which are successive, should be in doubtfulness as to unrestricted (aband) maintenance *vi-kithrem-kid*: without any publicity; as much as *it is* possible to see *being* the original minimum of any other)."'

Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 33, refers to the passage which contained the statements thus quoted in Ep. I, viii, 1, 7;—'*It is* declared in the Sakâdûm, that the consecrated bull's urine, when it becomes

¹ That is, in one of the first thirty sections (see Dk. VIII, Chap. XXXVIII, 1).

² Both K20 and MH6 have amat, 'though,' instead of pavan hamfn. This first sentence corresponds with part of Chap. XLI, 19, and the following sentence with part of Chap. XXXVIII, 13.

fetid, is to be stirred up ¹, *and* they should not carry *it* forth so to the fire, so that the stench extends to the fire; because, if that stench extends to the fire, on account of the moisture *and* through carrying bodily refuse over and forth to the fire, it overwhelms it. And that which the Sakâdûm *has* declared is, specially, that one of the high-priests *has* individually said: "That stench is mentioned with reference to the *occasion* when a stench reaches it of a different kind *from that* which exists naturally in it."'

Dk. VIII, Chap. XLIII, 33, refers to the passage which contained the statements thus mentioned in Sls. XII, 10, XIII, 30:—'In the twenty-two² *sections* of the Sakâdûm grievous things are shown about those who do not make offerings unto the sacred beings.' And, again, 'while those nineteen (*stanzas of Yas. XLVI*) are our offering, which it says in the Sakâdûm should be my own, the strength and power of the sacred beings shall become more considerable, and the destroyer more perishable.'

XIX. VENDÎDÂD NASK ³.

The whole of this Nask (as described in Dk. VIII, Chap. XLIV) is still extant, and is considered by the writers of the Persian Rivâyats to be a complete work. Its fragmentary character, which is obvious enough to European scholars, must, therefore, be

¹ This statement is again mentioned in § 6.

² The *last* twenty-two (see Dk. VIII, Chap. XLI, 1).

³ The extent of this Nask appears to be the same now as it was in Sasanian times, and may be estimated at about 23,000 Avesta and 48,000 Pahlavi words. The moderately long account of it in Dk. VIII, contains 1,272 Pahlavi words.

attributed, in all probability, to losses it sustained before the revival of *Mazda*-worship by the Sasanian dynasty. It is remarkable that the compiler of the account in the *Dīnkard* makes no allusion to the twelfth fargard of the *Vendīdād*, which is also omitted in all old MSS. of the *Vendīdād* with Pahlavi that have been examined, although the copyists appear to have been aware of the existence of a twelfth fargard.

XX. HÂDÔKHT NASK¹.

It is doubtful how much of this Nask is still extant. Traditionally, the two fragments published by Westergaard as Yt. XXI, XXII (excepting XXII, 37-42), and by Haug as Hn. I, II, III, are said to belong to this Nask; but no allusion to Hn. II, III can be found in the account given in Dk. VIII, Chap. XLV, and Hn. I can be traced in that account only by assuming that the Ahunavair is therein mentioned (in § 1) instead of its accompanying Ashem-vohû, as it appears to be in Hn. I, 4. In Yt. XI we also appear to have a form of the Srôsh Yast derived from the Hâdôkht Nask, or used in the liturgy when that Nask was recited, and this Yast likewise refers (in § 3) to the Ahunavair in similar terms to those used in Hn. I, 4.

Dk. VIII, Chap. XLV, 1, refers to the passage which contained the statement about the Ahunavair already mentioned and also thus quoted in Sls.

¹ The short account of this Nask, in Dk. VIII, contains 295 Pahlavi words which, according to the proportions adopted in the case of Nask XIII, would represent about 8,400 Avesta and 17,400 Pahlavi words of original text.

XII, 19:—‘It says in the Hâdôkht that of the sayings which are spoken out the Ahunavair is that *which is* most triumphant.’

Dk. VIII, Chap. XLV, 4, refers to the passage which probably contained the statements thus quoted in the Âfrîn-i Gahanbâr, 14–19 (Sp.), concerning the righteous gifts to be given away, for the sake of the soul, at each of the six season-festivals:—‘There is an Avesta witness manifest in the Hâdôkht from the passage (*in the case of the Maidhyô-zaremaya festival*): “Hazangrem maêshinãm daênunãm paiti-puthranãm narãm ashaonãm ashaya vanghuya urunê para-daithyâd, aêvahê hâtãm kinmânahê yad ashahê vahistahê.”’ During the other five festivals the gifts, instead of ewes, are to be cows, mares, camels, and all kinds of herds and seeds, respectively, as appears from the corresponding passages. All six passages, mingled with further Avesta text, occur in several MSS. of the Âfringân-i Gahanbâr (see the earlier part of each section of Âf. Gah. 7–12, ed. Geldner).

Dk. VIII, Chap. XLV, 9, probably refers to the passage which contained the statement thus quoted in Sd. XL, 4:—‘In the commentary of the Hâdôkht it says:—“Mâ âzârayôis, Zarathustra! mâ Pourushaspem, mâ Dughdhovãm¹, mâ aêthrapaitis:—It is not desirable that thou, O Zaratûst! *shouldst* distress *thy* father, *or* mother, *or* priest.”’

Dk. VIII, Chap. XLV, 10, may possibly refer to

¹ The orthography of these three Avesta names has been amended in accordance with the Persian version accompanying them, but all the four MSS. consulted have the first two in the genitive, and one MS. uses a masculine genitive form also for the third name.

the passage which contained a statement that is often partially quoted in Pahlavi colophons, and the Avesta text of which constitutes Yas. LXXII, 11 (Gld.); the first part of the statement, with a translation of its Pahlavi version, is here quoted from Mitro-ôpân's colophon to a volume of miscellaneous Pahlavi texts, usually called the Vistâsp-shâhnâmak from the subject of its first text, and written A. D. 1322, in which the writer mentions the source from which he quotes; and the second part is taken from the same writer's colophon to the Yasna MS. K5, written thirteen months later, which is the only known authority for this part of the text:—'In one passage of the Hâdôkht *it* is declared that Aûharmazd spoke to Zaratûst thus:—"Aêvô pantau yô ashahê vîspê anyaêshâm apantâm:—one only is the way of righteousness, all those are no ways:—angrahê mainyeus nasistâm¹ daênâm daêvayasnanâm parâg'itîm mash'yânâm² frâkereitîm:—which the evil spirit of the heretical demon-worshippers, the wizard, has forced on to mankind."'

Dk. VIII, Chap. XLV, 13, must refer to the passage which contained the statement thus mentioned in Sls. XIII, 10:—'The fifteen stanzas of Yâ-s'hyaathanâ³ are for this reason, because it is given for the destruction of those fifteen fiends who are declared in the medical part of the Hâdôkht.'

No allusion to the following seven passages, quoted from this Nask, has been noticed in Dk. VIII, Chap. XLV:—

In Sls. XII, 30, it is stated that 'in the Hâdôkht

¹ Only the first and last letters of this word are clearly legible.

² The first syllable is illegible.

³ Yas. XXXIV.

it says that a woman who shall be reverent is to be considered as much as she who is suitable.'

In Sls. XIII, 6, it is said that 'the twenty-two stanzas of Tâ-*ve-urvâtâ*¹ are the twenty-two judgments of which it speaks in the Hâdôkht thus: "Anaomô mananghê daya vîspâi kva, kva parô?—Lodging in the judge, that while *he has* twenty-two judgments *he may be* more just."

In Sd. XXII, 3, 4, it is stated that 'in the commentary of the Hâdôkht it says, that every one who performs intercession, and extracts anything from a person on their account, and conveys *it* to them is as much without dishonesty towards them, as he who may have given to them out of his own property. And *in* the spiritual *existence* they take account of that profit for him, and just as they make *out* the account of the good work of that person who may have given *it*, even so much is his good work.'

In Vig. p. 12, it is said, with reference to Aharman, 'that he is a creature *of* Aûharmazd is manifest from the Avesta *of* the Hâdôkht: "Dâta, Ahura spenta! Mazdau."

In Vig. pp. 23–25, it is said that, 'if any one passes away from the bodily existence, as much of his wealth comes to his son, wife, and daughter as is declared by the Avesta *of* the Hâdôkht²:—"Âad yêzi avi hê anguhê astvainti, Spitama Zarathustra!—So if in that bodily existence, *O* Spîtâmân Zaratûst!—narãm vâ nâirinãm vâ para-irithyâd,—*of* males or

¹ Yas. XXXI.

² It is perhaps necessary to repeat that no attempt is made to correct the Avesta orthography, except in the case of a few obvious misprints.

females *one* expires,—*kvad* aêtaêshâm yaunghuyanâm avaretanâm maêthananâmka vastranâm paiti-raêkyâd,—however much of their wealth and things, houses and clothing he abandons (that is, he leaves such in this world)—avatha hê *kvatô* puthrem anghad, aêvô-baghem haka avaretanâm nistrinuyâd; âad yêzi hvâm nâirika bavaiti, aêvô-baghem paiti-nidadhâiti; yêzi dughdhrâm henti, naêmem baghem fragasâd:—in such a case, *should* there be a son of his, himself, *one* delivers up to him one share of the property; if the wife herself (that is, his privileged wife) exists, *one* gives up to her one share in it; if there are daughters, a half-share comes on to each of them.—Âad yêzika hê narô irista hva hizva ukhdhem vâkem nazdasaka narô danghrem paiti-dyaêti, vispanâm vakâm ukhdhanâmka avi yâm astvaitîm gaêthâm harethrem frabarâd;—So also, if that dead man gives over a verbal statement by his own tongue to the nearest wise man (that is, speaks his own will), all his words and statements, when in control of his bodily existence, *one* carries out (that is, *one* shall confer authority on his words);—yêzi nôid harethrem baraiti anâperetha haka shyaothana:—if *one* shall not confer the authority, he becomes an unpardonable sinner (owing to doing this deed; that is, the person who, when there is a will, does not carry it out).—Avad yad hê narô irista aputhrâi anghad, upa hê puthrem fradadhâd, Spitama Zarathustra! yahmad haka puthrô haom urvânem Kînvad peretûm vidhâryad:—So when that dead man is without a son (that is, there is no son of his), *one* gives forth the share over to the son, O Spîtâmân Zaratûst! by whom, as a son (that is, an adopted son), they pass on the man's own soul from that

Kinvad bridge (that is, it departs *by* the passage of the bridge).”’

In Vig. p. 83, it is said that ‘hair from an ox *or* a horse is suitable, as *it* is declared by the Hâdôkht: “Gæus vâ aspahê vâ varesa.”’

In Vig. pp. 144, 145, it is said, with reference to announcing the name of the deceased during the celebration of the Srôsh Yast after a death, that ‘*it* is declared by the Avesta of the Hâdôkht:—“Yêzi narô mazdayasnô haêa gaêthâbyô para-irithyêiti, âad hê nâma hadha pitô frageurvayâd; yêzi nâirika para-irithyêiti, âad yad hê nâma hadha pathanô uzgeurvayâd, Spitama Zarathustra! aêtem vâkem nî antare mazdayasnanâm frasastayâd:—If a man who is a Mazda-worshipper passes away from the worldly *existence*, in such a *case one* holds out his name with *that of* his father; and if *it be* a woman who passes away, in such a *case one* upholds whatever is her name with *that of* her husband, O Spitâmân Zaratûst! *one* shall further bless this statement (that is, *its being* revered is important) among the Mazda-worshippers, (do thou proclaim and further bless this statement).”’

XXI. STÔD-YAST NASK¹.

It has been already shown, in Dk. VIII, Chap. XLVI, 1 n, that the whole of this Nask is probably still extant in the Yasna and Vispêrad. About half of the present Yasna appears to consist of five-sixths of this Stôd-yast, to which have been added three

¹ The actual extent of those portions of the Yasna and Vispêrad which appear to have constituted this Nask, may be estimated at about 12,500 Avesta and 22,400 Pahlavi words.

fargard's of the Bakö (Nask III), with the Hô'm and Srôsh Yasts, extracted probably from the Bakân-yast (Nask XIV), and the greater part of the Âtas and Âbân Nyâyises; the whole collection being provided with an introductory and concluding ritual, compiled from other sources, to form the complete ceremonial liturgy of the present Yasna.

There appears to be no sufficient evidence, either internal or external, for ascribing this collection of the liturgy to so late a date as the end of the ninth century, when the compilation of the *Dînkard* was completed. It is therefore safer, for the present, to assume that the *Stôd*-yast existed for a long period as a separate Nask (the form described by the *Dînkard*), even after the greater part of its text had been incorporated with others to form the collected liturgy now known as the Yasna.

Besides the fragments which are specially attributed to particular Nasks, there are also a few writings which closely resemble the Nasks, or their fragments, in general character, but which can hardly be traced to their actual source by means of the accounts given in the *Dînkard*. Thus, the *Aogema-daêkâ* might perhaps be supposed to have been extracted from the *Baris* (see Dk. VIII, Chap. IX, 18), if it did not contain a few Avesta quotations from the Yasna, *Vendîdâd*, and Yasts. While the quotations from the *Ashem-staota*, given in Vig. pp. 89, 90, 125-129, 177, 178, are difficult to trace, owing to the name of their source.

INDEX.

OBSERVATIONS.

The references are to the pages of the introduction and extant fragments, and to the books, chapters, and sections of the translations; the chapters being denoted by the larger ciphers. The letters ch. stand for chapter, com. for commentator, Dk. for *Dīnkar*, Dv. for *Dīn-vigirgārd*, Fr. for Fragments, Int. for Introduction, lun. man. for lunar mansion, m. for mountain, meas. for measure, n for foot-note, Riv. for *Rivâyat*, and Zs. for Selections of *Zâd-spāram*.

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Zand, commentary, Dk. VIII, 1, 3; 3, 3; Fr. 477. See *Avesta and Zand*.

Zaratûst, apostle, Int. 32; Dk. VIII, 1, 20; 10, 3; 11, 2, 4; 20, 114; 38, 68 n; 45, 3, 14; IX, 2, 17; 12, 3 n; 13, 1, 8, 9; 15, 1, 4; 16, 19 n; 20, 5; 25, 4; 28, 3; 29, 5, 13; 30, 4; 33, 5; 34, 7; 35, 2, 5; 43, 7; 44, 14, 17-21; 45, 2-4; 53, 17; 54, 5, 8; 59, 13, 18; 60, 1; 61, 7, 12; 65,

3; 67, 1; 69, 3, 23, 59; accepts religion, Dk. IX, 24, 18; IV, 22 n, 23; advised, Dk. IX, 12, 13; 24, 15, 17; 25, 2; 27, 1; 39, 25; 43, 8, 11; birth, Dk. VIII, 3, 1; 14, 1, 2; 44, 79; IX, 24, 1, 2, 4, 7-13; coming, Dk. VIII, 18, 16, 20; conflict with demons, Dk. VIII, 44, 74, 75; his family, Dk. VIII, 29, 25; his successors, Dk. VIII, 14, 12-14; IX, 39, 18; 41, 6-8; killed, Dk. VIII, 35, 13 n; law of, Zs. 3; life and actions, Dk. VIII, 14, 3-10; praise of, Dk. IX, 28, 1, 6; 42, 7; 50, 2; religion of, Dk. IX, 37, 8-9; 51, 12; 52, 7; 53, 11, 18; 54, 7; 57, 28; 58, 3; 61, 14; speaks, Dk. IX, 12, 23; 27, 2; 31, 7, 9, 11; 35, 18, 22, 24; 37, m; 69, 8, 30; III, 7, 4; spoken to, Dk. IX, 28, 2, 4, 8; 31, 6; 32, 9, 12; 33, 1; 35, 13, 17, 20, 21, 25; 37, c, k, n; 39, 1, 4, 15, 20, 22, 26; 42, 13; 43, 10; 44, 1; 46, 3; 61, 1; 64, 9, 12; 65, 6, 8; 69, 5, 15, 16, 20, 26; III, 7, 1, 3, 5; vision of the future, Dk. IX, 8, 1-3; 35, 14.

Zaratûst the Spitâmân, Int. 34; Dk. VIII, 13, 16; IX, 27, 1; 30, 11; 32, 17, 21; 41, 5; 66, 1.

Zaratûst, priest, Int. 32.

Zaratûst-î Âtûr-pâdân, Dk. VIII, 13, 18 n.

Zârîkô, demon, Dk. IX, 9, 1; 21, 4 n.

Zarmân, demon, Dk. IX, 21, 4 n.

Zatamistân ch., Dk. VIII, 17, 1.

Zirast nask, Dv. 14.

Ziyânakistân ch., Dk. VIII, 40, 1.

Zôti, priest, Dk. VIII, 7, 5, 9; 8, 3; 29, 1, 5, 13; 31, 20; IX, 12, 26-28; 24, 4; 33, 5; 43, 7; 69, 50.

ERRATA.

- P. 89, ll. 9, 10, for 'the Irânian nationality (Aîrîh)' read 'subjection (hêrih)'
 P. 186, ll. 19, 20, for 'preparation' read 'bespattering'

In several places it would be better to read âmûkô, 'teaching,' instead of hamô-kun, 'every kind (or mode),' so as to obtain the following amended passages :—

- P. 23, ll. 14-16. Then the exalting chanted teaching of Aûharmazd for Zarâtûst is called, &c.
 P. 24, l. 1, the teaching for Kaî-Vîrtâsp; &c.
 P. 114, ll. 15-18, the meritoriousness in the guardianship and teaching *by* the keepers *of* those flocks; the happy effect of the flock and that of the keeper's teaching; &c.
 „ ll. 23-28, that of the disciple through the teaching by the priestly instructor; the teaching of the priestly instructor for the pupil, *and* the happy effect of the priestly instructor's teaching in similar matters.
 P. 119, ll. 2-5, the want of eminence of any one through a teaching that is an offence to others, which is owing to his closed doors and evil eminence in teaching; &c.

Professor Darmesteter has suggested the following correction :—


- P. 26, ll. 22, 23, for '*based* upon the traditional early law (vâsarîd pêsâdâdô)' read '*dependent* upon Vâêgerêd the Pêsdâdîan;' [who was the twin brother of Hôshâng; see Sachau's *Albûûnî's Chronology of Ancient Nations*, pp. 206, 211].

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zeml.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.	
	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.										
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.								
Gutturales.											
1 Tenuis	k	.	.	क	𐬕	𐬕	ک	ک	כ	k	
2 " aspirata	kh	.	.	ख	𐬕𐬀	𐬕𐬀	کھ	...	כּ	kh	
3 Media	g	.	.	ग	𐬑	𐬑	گ	...	ג	...	
4 " aspirata	gh	.	.	घ	𐬑𐬀	𐬑𐬀	گھ	...	גּ	...	
5 Gutturo-labialis	q	.	.	...	𐬑𐬆	𐬑𐬆	ق	...	ק	...	
6 Nasalis	h (ng)	.	.	...	{ 3 (ng) 𐬑𐬆𐬀 } 𐬑𐬆𐬀 (N)	...	...	...	...	...	
7 Spiritus asper	h	.	.	ह	𐬕𐬀 (ho)	𐬕𐬀	ه	...	ח	h, hs	
8 " lenis	,	.	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
9 " asper faucalis	'h	.	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
10 " lenis faucalis	'h	.	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
11 " asper fricatus	...	'h	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
12 " lenis fricatus	...	'h	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)											
13 Tenuis	k	.	.	च	𐬕	𐬕	چ	...	...	k	
14 " aspirata	kh	.	.	छ	...	...	چھ	...	...	kh	
15 Media	g	.	.	ज	...	...	...	...	...	g	
16 " aspirata	gh	.	.	झ	...	...	...	...	...	gh	
17 " Nasalis	ṅ	.	.	ञ	...	...	...	...	...	ṅ	

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y	. . .		य	𐬨 𐬨𐬀 𐬨𐬀	𐬨	ي	ي	י	γ
19 Spiritus asper	. . .	(y)		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
20 " lenis	. . .	(y)		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
21 " asper assibilatus	. . .	s		श	𐬨𐬀	𐬨𐬀	ش	ش	. . .	. . .
22 " lenis assibilatus	. . .	z		. . .	𐬨𐬀	𐬨𐬀	ز	ز	. . .	s
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t	. . .		त	𐬥	𐬥	ت	ت	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th	. . .		थ	𐬥𐬥	𐬥𐬥	. . .	. . .	ת	th
25 " assibilata	. . .	. . .	TH	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
26 Media	d	. . .		द	𐬥𐬥	𐬥𐬥	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
27 " aspirata	dh	. . .		ध	𐬥𐬥	𐬥𐬥	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
28 " assibilata	. . .	. . .	DH	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
29 Nasalis	n	. . .		न	𐬥	𐬥	ن	ن	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l	. . .		ल	𐬥	𐬥	ل	ل	ל	l
31 " mollis 1	. . .	l		ळ	𐬥𐬥	𐬥𐬥	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
32 " mollis 2	. . .	. . .	L	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
33 Spiritus asper 1	s	. . .		स	𐬥	𐬥	س	س	ס	s
34 " asper 2	. . .	. . .	s (S)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
35 " lenis	z	. . .		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
36 " asperimus 1	. . .	. . .	z (z)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
37 " asperimus 2	. . .	. . .	z (z)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.		III Class.							
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	0									ǎ . . .
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ě									. . .
3 " labialis	ø									. . .
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			अ	ا	ا	ا	ا	א	ā . . .
5 " longa	ā	(a)		ā	ā	ā	ā	ā	א	ā . . .
6 Palatalis brevis	i			י	י	י	ي	ي	י	i . . .
7 " longa	ī	(i)		ī	ī	ī	ي	ي	י	ī . . .
8 Dentalis brevis	ē			ē	ē	ē	ي	ي	י	. . .
9 " longa	ē			ē	ē	ē	ي	ي	י	. . .
10 Lingualis brevis	ri			רי	רי	רי	ي	ي	י	. . .
11 " longa	ī			י	י	י	ي	ي	י	. . .
12 Labialis brevis	u			ו	و	و	و	و	ו	. . .
13 " longa	ū	(u)		ū	ū	ū	و	و	ו	. . .
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	o			و	و	و	و	و	ו	. . .
15 " longa	ō (ai)	(e)		و	و	و	و	و	و	. . .
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi	(ai)		אי	אי	אי	اي	اي	א	āi . . .
17 " " " "	ei (ēi)			י	י	י	ي	ي	י	ei, ēi . . .
18 " " " "	oi (ōu)			י	י	י	و	و	ו	. . .
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			و	و	و	و	و	و	. . .
20 " longa	ō (au)	(o)		و	و	و	و	و	و	. . .
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu	(au)		א	א	א	او	او	א	āu . . .
22 " " " "	eu (ēu)			י	י	י	ي	ي	י	. . .
23 " " " "	ou (ōu)			י	י	י	و	و	ו	. . .
24 Gutturalis fracta	ä			א	א	א	ا	ا	א	. . .
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			י	י	י	ي	ي	י	. . .
26 Labialis fracta	ü			י	י	י	ي	ي	י	. . .
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ö			י	י	י	و	و	ו	. . .



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
TRANSLATED

BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MÜLLER

VOL. XXXVIII



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TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS.

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	0			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
2 Laryngo-palatalis	æ			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
3 " labialis	ø			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
5 " longa	ā	(a)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
6 Palatalis brevis	i			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
7 " longa	ī	(i)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
8 Dentalis brevis	h			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
9 " longa	h			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
10 Lingualis brevis	ri			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
11 " longa	ri			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
12 Labialis brevis	u			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
13 " longa	ū	(u)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 " longa	é (ai)	(e)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi	(ai)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
17 " "	ei (ēi)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
18 " "	oi (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20 " longa	ō (au)	(o)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu	(au)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
22 " "	eu (ēu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
23 " "	ou (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
24 Gutturalis fracta	ä			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Labialis fracta	ü			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ö			...	...	...	...	...	...	...

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.					Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
				III Class.								
	I Class.	II Class.										
Gutturales.												
1 Tenuis	k					क	𐬕	𐬎	𐬎	𐬎	𐬎	k
2 " aspirata	kh					ख	𐬖	𐬏	𐬏	𐬏	𐬏	kh
3 Media	g					ग	𐬗	𐬐	𐬐	𐬐	𐬐	
4 " aspirata	gh					घ	𐬘	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	
5 Gutturo-labialis	q								𐬚	𐬚	𐬚	
6 Nasalis	h (ng)					ङ	{ 𐬙 (ng) }					
7 Spiritus asper	h					ह	𐬛 (h)	𐬛				h, hs
8 " lenis	'											
9 " asper faucalis	h											
10 " lenis faucalis	h											
11 " asper fricatus		'h										
12 " lenis fricatus		'h										
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)												
13 Tenuis		k				𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	k
14 " aspirata		kh				𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	kh
15 Media		g				𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	
16 " aspirata		gh				𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	
17 " Nasalis		h				𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlevi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y	...	...	य	𐬶 𐬶 𐬶 init.	𐬵	𐬵	ي	י	י
19 Spiritus asper	...	(y)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20 " lenis	...	(y)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 " asper assibilatus	...	s	...	श	𐬰	𐬰	𐬰	س	ס	ס
22 " lenis assibilatus	...	z	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t	...	...	त	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	ت	ת	ת
24 " aspirata	th	...	...	थ	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	ת	ת	ת
25 " assibilata	...	...	TH	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Media	d	...	...	द	𐬌	𐬌	𐬌	ד	ד	ד
27 " aspirata	dh	...	...	ध	𐬍	𐬍	𐬍	ד	ד	ד
28 " assibilata	...	...	DH	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
29 Nasalis	n	...	...	न	𐬎	𐬎	𐬎	ن	נ	נ
30 Semivocalis	l	...	...	ल	𐬏	𐬏	𐬏	ل	ל	ל
31 " mollis 1	...	l	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
32 " mollis 2	...	...	L	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
33 Spiritus asper 1	s	...	...	स	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	س	ס	ס
34 " asper 2	...	...	s (S)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
35 " lenis	z	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
36 " asperimus 1	...	...	z (z)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
37 " asperimus 2	...	...	z (z)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...

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
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SANĀKARÂKÂRYA

TRANSLATED BY

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VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS

WITH

SAÑKARA BHÂSHYA.

SECOND ADHYĀYA.

THIRD PĀDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF !

1. Ether ¹ (does) not (originate), on account of the absence of scriptural statement.

In the Vedānta-texts we meet in different places with different statements concerning the origination of various things. Some of those passages declare that ether originated; some do not. Some record the origination of air; others do not. Other passages again make analogous statements concerning the individual soul and the vital airs.—Similarly we observe that other scriptural texts contradict one another concerning order of succession and the like.—Now, as we ourselves have inferred the worthlessness of other philosophical doctrines from their mutual contradictions, a suspicion might arise that our doctrine is equally worthless, owing to its intrinsic contradictions. Hence a new discussion is begun in order to clear from all doubt the sense of all those Vedānta-texts which refer to creation, and thus to remove the suspicion alluded to.

Here we have to consider in the first place the question

¹ Here, as generally in the preceding parts of this translation, *ākāśa* is rendered by 'ether.' There is no doubt that occasionally the appropriate—and in some cases the only possible—rendering is not 'ether' but 'space;' but the former rendering, after all, best agrees with the general Vedāntic view of *ākāśa*. The Vedāntins do not clearly distinguish between empty space and an exceedingly fine matter filling all space, and thus it happens that in many cases where we speak of the former they speak of *ākāśa*, i.e. the all-pervading substratum of sound; which howsoever attenuated is yet one of the material elements, and as such belongs to the same category as air, fire, water, and earth.

whether ether has an origin or not.—The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that ether does not originate, since there is no scriptural statement to that effect. For in the chapter which treats of the origin (of the world) ether is not mentioned at all. In the passage ‘In the beginning there was that only which is, one only, without a second’ the *Khândogya* at first introduces Brahman as the general subject-matter, by means of the clause ‘that which is,’ and thereupon (in the passages ‘It thought,’ ‘It sent forth fire,’ &c.) records the origin of three elements, viz. fire, water, and earth; giving the first place to fire which (ordinarily) occupies the middle place among the five elements¹. Now, as scriptural statement is our (only) authority in the origination of the knowledge of supersensuous things, and as there is no scriptural statement declaring the origin of ether, ether must be considered to have no origin.

2. But there is (a scriptural statement of the origination of ether).

The conjunction ‘but’ indicates the adoption of another alternative.—The origin of ether may not be stated in the *Khândogya*; but it is stated in other scriptural passages. For the text of the *Taittirīyikas*, after having introduced Brahman as the general subject-matter,—in the words, ‘The true, knowledge, without end is Brahman,’—goes on to say, ‘From that Self sprang ether’ (*Taitt. Up. II, 1*).—Hence there arises a conflict of scriptural passages, the creation sometimes being said to begin with fire, sometimes with ether.—But may we not appropriately assume the two scriptural passages to form one syntactical whole?—It would be well indeed if we could do so, but a unity of the kind desired cannot be admitted, because the creator who is mentioned only once—in the passage ‘he sent forth fire’—cannot be connected with two things to be created, as if the construction were ‘He sent forth fire, he sent forth ether.’—But—an objection may be raised—we see that sometimes an agent, although mentioned once only, is yet

¹ The usual order being ether, air, fire, water, earth.

connected with two objects ; as when we say 'after having cooked broth he now cooks rice.' We therefore may combine the two scriptural sentences into one, 'Brahman having created ether created fire.'—Such a combination of sentences, we reply, is not admissible here, because the *Khândogya* intimates that fire was created first, while the *Taittirīyaka* assigns the same position to ether, and because it is impossible that both should have been created first.—The same remarks apply to a further contradiction involved in the other scriptural passage, 'From that Self sprang ether,' &c. ; for there also the material cause and the fact of origination, being mentioned only once, cannot be connected with fire as well as ether, so as to effect a sentence of the following kind, 'from that there sprang ether, from that there sprang fire.' Moreover the *Taittirīyaka* states separately that 'fire (sprang) from air¹.'—With regard to this conflict of statements somebody now maintains the following view.

3. (The Vedic statement concerning the origination of ether) has a secondary sense, on account of the impossibility (of the origination of ether).

The ether does not originate on account of the absence of scriptural statement.—That other passage which (apparently) declares the origination of the ether must be taken as having a secondary (figurative) meaning.—Why?—On account of the impossibility. The origination of ether cannot be shown to be possible as long as there exist followers of the opinion of the reverend *Kaṇabhūg* (*Kaṇāda*). For the latter deny the origination of ether on the ground that it is impossible to demonstrate the existence of the required apparatus of causes. Whatever is originated, they say, is originated from inherent causes, non-inherent causes, and operative causes. Of a substance the inherent causes are substances belonging to the same class and more than one in number. But for ether there are no such originating substances, belonging to the same

¹ While the *Khând.* says that fire sprang from the Self.

class and more than one in number, from which, as its inherent cause, it could originate, and consequently there also exists no non-inherent cause of ether; for the latter would have to be looked for in the conjunction of the primary substances. And as thus there exist no inherent cause and no non-inherent cause, there is absolutely no room for an operative cause; for the only function of the latter is to assist the two other causes. Those elements moreover which have an origin, as fire and the like, we may conceive to exist in different conditions at an earlier and a later time; we may conceive e.g. that fire, previously to its origination, did not give light or produce any other effects, while it does do so subsequently to its origination. Of the ether, on the other hand, no such difference between an earlier and a later period can be conceived; for, we ask, would it be possible to maintain that before its alleged origination there were no large, minute, and atomic spaces?—That ether is without an origin further follows from its characteristic qualities, such as all-pervadingness and so on, which altogether distinguish it from earth and the other elements.—Hence, as the word ‘ether’ (ākāśa) is used in a secondary sense in such phrases as ‘make room’ (ākāśa), ‘there is room,’ and as space although one only is designated as being of different kinds when we speak of the space of a jar, the space of a house, &c.—a form of expression met with even in Vedic passages such as ‘he is to place the wild animals in the spaces’ (ākāśeshu)—we conclude that those Vedic passages also which speak of its origination must be supposed to have a secondary meaning.

4. And on account of the word (of the Veda).

The word of the Veda also proclaims the non-originatedness of ether; for it declares that ‘air and ether (antariksha) are immortal’ (*Bṛi. Up. II, 3, 3*), and what is immortal cannot have an origin. Another scriptural passage (‘omnipresent and eternal like ether’), by comparing two attributes of Brahman, viz. omnipresence and eternity with the other, intimates that those qualities belong to the ether

also ; in which case no beginning can be attributed to it. Other passages to be quoted in this connexion are, 'As this ether is infinite, so the Self is to be known as infinite ;' and 'Brahman has the ether for its body, the ether is the Self.' For if the ether had a beginning, it could not be predicated of Brahman (as is done in the last passage), as we predicate blueness of a lotus ('the lotus is blue'). Hence we understand that the eternal Brahman is of the same nature as ether.

5. The one (word 'sprang') may be (taken in its secondary as well as in its primary sense), like the word 'Brahman.'

This Sûtra contains the reply to a doubt.—If we admit the opinion maintained hitherto, how can one and the same word 'sprang' ('from that Self sprang the ether') be used, in the same chapter, in its primary (real) meaning with regard to fire and so on, and in a secondary meaning with regard to ether?—The answer to this objection is that the one word 'sprang' may, according to the nature of the things to which it refers, be used in its primary as well as its secondary sense, just as the word 'Brahman' is used. For the one word 'Brahman' is, in the passage Taitt. Up. III, 2-6 ('Try to know Brahman by penance, for penance is Brahman'), used in a secondary sense with regard to food, &c., and in its primary sense with regard to bliss ; and the same word Brahman is, in the way of figurative identification (bhakti), applied to penance, which is merely the means of knowing Brahman, and again directly to Brahman as the object of knowledge.—But how—to raise another question—can we, on the supposition of ether having no beginning, uphold the validity of the statement made in the clause 'one only, without a second?' For if ether is a second entity (co-existing with Brahman from eternity), it follows that Brahman has a second. And if so, how can it be said that when Brahman is known everything is known? (*Kh. Up. VI, 1*).—The word 'one,' the pûrva-pakshin replies, may be used with reference to (the absence of) effects. As in ordinary life a person, who on a certain

day sees in a potter's house a lump of clay, a staff, a wheel and so on, and on the following day a number of finished vessels, might say, 'Yesterday there was only clay,' meaning thereby only that on the preceding day there were no things made of clay, not that there were no staff, wheel and the like ; so the passage under discussion also is to be understood.—The term 'without a second' (does not exclude the existence from eternity of ether, but) excludes the existence of any other superintending being (but Brahman). While there is a superintending potter in addition to the material cause of the vessels, i. e. the clay, there is no other superintendent in addition to Brahman, the material cause of the world. Nor does the existence of ether as a second entity involve Brahman's being associated with a second (and therefore not being of a simple nature). For diversity is founded on difference of characteristic attributes, and before the origin (of the creation) no difference of attributes separating Brahman and ether exists ; the two being mixed like water and milk, and having the common attributes of all-pervadingness, immateriality and so on. At the time of creation however a certain diversity of the two determines itself, Brahman putting forth energy in order to produce the world, while the ether remains immoveable.—And also from the passages quoted above—such as 'Brahman has the ether for its body'—it follows that the two are identical. Thence again it follows that through the knowledge of Brahman everything is known.—Moreover every effect, which is produced, is produced in such a way as not to be separated from ether in place as well as in time, and ether itself is non-separated in place and time from Brahman ; hence, if there are known Brahman and its effects, the ether also is known. The case is similar to that of a few drops of water poured into a jug full of milk. Those drops are taken when the milk is taken ; the taking of the drops does not constitute something additional to the taking of the milk. Analogously the ether, as being non-separate in place and time from Brahman and its effects, is comprised within Brahman, and consequently we have to understand the passages

about the origin of the ether in a secondary sense.—To this argumentation we make the following reply.

6. The non-abandonment of the promissory statements (results only) from the non-difference (of the entire world from Brahman), according to the words of the Veda.

In all the Vedânta-texts we meet with promissory statements of the following nature:—‘That by which we hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not known’ (*Kh. Up.* VI, 1, 3); ‘When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known’ (*Bri. Up.* IV, 5, 6); ‘Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known?’ (*Mu. Up.* I, 1, 3); ‘Outside that which is there is no knowledge.’ These promissory statements are not abandoned, i.e. not stultified, only if the entire aggregate of things is non-different from Brahman, the object of knowledge; for if there were any difference, the affirmation that by the knowledge of one thing everything is known, would be contradicted thereby. Non-difference again of the two is possible only if the whole aggregate of things originates from the one Brahman. And we understand from the words of the Veda that that affirmation can be established only through the theory of the non-difference of the material cause and its effects. For the affirmation contained in the clause ‘That by which we hear what is not heard,’ &c., is proved by the analogous instances of clay, &c., which all aim at showing the identity of effect and cause. In order to establish this, the subsequent clauses also (‘Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second; it thought; it sent forth fire,’ &c.) at first state that the aggregate of effects belongs to Brahman, and then declare its identity with Brahman, viz. from the passage ‘In it all that exists has its Self’ (VI, 8, 7), up to the end of the *prapâṭhaka*.—If, now, the ether were not one of the effects of Brahman, it could not be known by Brahman being known, and that would involve an abandonment of a (previous) affirmation; an

alternative which, as invalidating the authoritativeness of the Veda, is of course altogether unacceptable.—Similarly in all the Vedānta-texts certain passages are to be found which, by means of various instances, make the same affirmation, so e.g. ‘This everything, all is that Self’ (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 6*); ‘Brahman alone is that Immortal before’ (*Mu. Up. II, 2, 11*).—Hence, like fire and the other substances, the ether also is a product.—The averment made by the *pūrvapakshin* that on account of the absence of scriptural statements the ether is not a product is unfounded, since a scriptural passage referring to the origin of ether has already been pointed out, viz. ‘from that Self sprang ether.’—True,—the *pūrvapakshin* may reply,—such a statement has indeed been pointed out, but it is contradicted by another statement, viz. ‘It sent forth fire,’ &c. Should it be alleged that there can be no contradiction, because all scriptural passages form one whole, the reply is that all non-contradictory passages form a whole; in the present case, however, a contradiction has been shown to exist, because the creator, who is mentioned only once, cannot be connected with two things created; because two things cannot both be created first; and because an option is, in that case, inadmissible¹.—This reply, we rejoin, is without force. It is indeed true that it is impossible to explain the passage of the *Taittirīyaka* in any modified sense; for it distinctly declares that fire was produced in the third place, ‘From that Self sprang the ether, from ether air, from air fire.’ But, on the other hand, it is possible to give a different turn to the passage from the *Kāṇḍogya*, which may be explained to mean that ‘Brahman, after having created ether and air, created fire.’ For as the purport of this passage is to relate the origin of fire, it cannot at the same time impugn the account of the origin of ether given in another passage; according to the principle that to one and the same sentence a double purport must not be ascribed. As, on the

¹ For we cannot maintain that optionally either the one or the other was created first.

other hand, one creator may successively create more than one thing, and as on that ground the combination of the two passages into one syntactical whole is possible, we are not obliged to disregard any scriptural statement on account of its meaning being contradicted (by other scriptural passages). Nor do we mean to say that a creator mentioned only once is to be connected with two created things; for the other (second) created thing is supplied from another scriptural passage. And, in the same way as the fact of the whole aggregate of things being produced from Brahman—which is stated directly in the passage ‘Let a man meditate with calm mind on that as beginning, ending and breathing in it’ (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 1*)—does not impugn the order of creation stated elsewhere to begin with fire; so also the statement as to fire being produced from Brahman has no force to impugn the order of creation which, in another scriptural passage, is said to begin with ether.

But, it may be objected, the passage ‘Let a man meditate with calm mind,’ &c. has the purpose of enjoining calmness, and does not state anything with regard to creation; it need not therefore adapt itself to the order (of creation) established by another passage¹. On the other hand, the passage ‘It sent forth fire’ refers to the creation, and we must therefore accept the order exactly as stated there.—This objection we refute by the remark that it is not legitimate to abandon, from deference to the circumstance of fire occupying the first place (in the *Kh. Up.*), the thing, viz. the ether which is known (to have been created) from another passage; for order of succession is a mere attribute of things (and therefore subordinate to the latter). Moreover, in the passage ‘It sent forth fire’ we meet with no word directly indicating the order of succession; but we merely infer the latter from the sense, and this (merely inferred) order is impugned by the order established by another direct scriptural state-

¹ Yatparaḥ sabdaḥ sa sabdārtho na kāyam sabdaḥ sṛishṭiparo to na prasiddham kramam bādhitum alam iti. Ân. Gi.

ment, viz. 'From air there sprang fire.' Now with regard to the question whether ether or fire were created first, neither option nor addition are permissible, because the former is impossible in itself, and the latter non-admitted by the texts¹. Hence the two scriptural passages are not contradictory.—Moreover, in order to justify the promise made in the *Khândogya* in the beginning of the chapter ('That instruction by which we hear what is not heard'), we have to count the ether, although 'not heard' (i. e. not mentioned in the text) among the things produced; how much more impossible then is it for us not to accept the statement actually made about the ether in the *Taittiriya*!—To the assertion, made above by the *pûrvapakshin*, that the ether as occupying the same space with everything is known together with Brahman and its effects, and that thus the assertion (of everything being known through Brahman) is not contradicted; and that moreover the scriptural passage 'one only, without a second' is not contradicted, because Brahman and the ether may be considered as non-separate, like milk and water, we make the following reply. That knowledge of everything through the knowledge of one thing (of which scripture speaks) cannot be explained through the analogy of milk mixed with water, because we understand from the parallel instance of a piece of clay being brought forward (*Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4*) that the knowledge of everything has to be explained through the relation of the material cause and the material effect (the knowledge of the cause implying the knowledge of the effect). Moreover, the knowledge of everything, if assumed to be analogous to the case of the knowledge of milk and water, could not be called a perfect knowledge (*samyag-vigñāna*), because the water which is

¹ An optional proceeding, i. e. the doctrine that either ether or fire was the first product is impossible because only actions to be done, not existing things, fall within the sphere of option; addition, i. e. the fact of fire and ether together being the first creation is not admitted by scripture, which teaches a successive creation of the elements.

apprehended only through the knowledge of the milk (with which it is mixed) is not grasped by perfect knowledge¹. Nor can Vedic affirmations about things be viewed, like ordinary human statements, as mixed up with error, untruth, and deceit². And we should do violence to the emphatic assertion made in the passage 'one only, without a second,' if we explained it according to the analogy of milk mixed with water.—Nor must we explain the cognition of everything (through one thing), and the assertion as to the one without a second, as referring only to a part of existing things, viz. the avowed effects of Brahman (to the exclusion of ether), on the ground that such is the case in the parallel instances of clay and the like. For what is said about clay and the like is not something altogether new and independent; but has to be understood in connexion with the previous passage 'Svetaketu, as you are so conceited,' &c. We therefore must conclude that the 'knowledge of everything' has all things whatever for its objects, and is here introduced with a view to showing that everything is the effect of Brahman.

The next Sûtra replies to the assertion, made by the pûrvapakshin, that the passage which speaks of the origin of ether is to be understood in a secondary sense, on account of the impossibility (of ether having an origin).

7. But wherever there are effects, there is division; as in ordinary life.

The conjunction 'but' is meant to exclude the suspicion of impossibility.—We must not imagine the origin of ether to be impossible, because wherever we observe effects (modifications of a substance), such as jars, pots and urns, or bracelets, armlets and earrings, or needles, arrows and swords, we also observe division; while, on the other hand,

¹ For the water, although mixed with the milk, yet is different from it.

² But the promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known is to be taken in its full literal meaning.

nothing which is not an effect is seen to be divided ¹. Now, we apprehend ether as divided from earth and so on; hence ether also must be an effect. Thereby (i. e. by the circumstance of their being divided) place (dis), time, mind (manas) and the atoms also are shown to be effects.

But—an objection may be raised—the Self also is divided from ether and so on, and hence it follows that it is an effect like jars and the like.—This objection we refute by pointing to the scriptural statement that ‘ether sprang from the Self’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1). For if the Self also were a mere modification (of something else), it would follow that all effects such as the ether and so on are without a Self ²; for scripture mentions nothing beyond the Self, and that Self itself would (on the supposition stated) be a mere effect. And thus we should be driven to the hypothesis of a general void (śūnyavāda). Just because it is the Self, it is impossible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable of refutation. For the (knowledge of the) Self is not, in any person’s case, adventitious, not established through the so-called means of right knowledge; it rather is self-established. The Self does indeed employ perception and the other means of right knowledge for the purpose of establishing previously non-established objects of knowledge; for nobody assumes such things as ether and so on to be self-established independently of the means of right knowledge. But the Self, as being the abode of the energy that acts through the means of right knowledge, is itself established previously to that energy. And to refute such a self-established entity is impossible. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be refuted, but not that which is the essential nature (of him who attempts the refutation); for it is the essential nature of him who refutes. The heat of a fire is not refuted (i. e. sublated) by the fire itself.—Let us further consider the relation expressed in the following clauses: ‘I know at the present moment whatever is present; I knew (at former moments) the nearer and the remoter past; I shall know

¹ Whatever is divided, is an effect, as jars, pots, &c. Whatever is not an effect, is not divided, as the Self.

² I. e. without a material cause.

(in the future) the nearer and the remoter future.' Here the object of knowledge changes according as it is something past or something future or something present ; but the knowing agent does not change, since his nature is eternal presence. And as the nature of the Self is eternal presence, it cannot undergo destruction even when the body is reduced to ashes ; nay we cannot even conceive that it ever should become something different from what it is.—It thus follows from the essential irrefutability of its nature that the Self is not an effect. The ether, on the other hand, falls under the category of effected things.

To the objection, raised above by the pûrvapakshin, that there is no plurality of homogeneous substances out of which the ether could originate, we reply that it is not an absolute law that effects should originate only from things belonging to the same genus, not from such as belong to different genera. Threads for instance and the conjunctions of threads¹ do not belong to the same genus, the former being admitted to belong to the genus 'substance,' the latter to the genus 'quality.' Nor again is there a binding rule that the operative causes such as the shuttle, the loom and so on should belong to the same genus.—Well then let the doctrine that the causes must belong to the same genus extend to the inherent causes only, not to the other causes².—But here also there is no absolute rule. For we see that one and the same rope is made of things belonging to different genera, such as threads and cow-hair, and several kinds of cloth are woven of vegetable thread and wool.—If it were assumed that the postulate of the inherent causes belonging to the same genus refers only to the genera of essentiality, substantiality, &c., the rule would be a superfluous one ; for in that sense every inherent cause belongs to the same genus as every other³.

¹ Threads are the inherent cause of a piece of cloth ; the conjunction of the threads constitutes the non-inherent cause ; the loom, shuttle, &c. are the operative causes.

² So much only was in fact insisted upon by the pûrvapakshin, II, 3, 3.

³ An inherent cause is always a substance (dravya), and as such

—Nor again is there an absolute rule that only a plurality of inherent causes, not one such cause, is able to originate an effect. For it is admitted that an atom as well as the mind (*manas*) originate their first activity; i. e. one atom by itself, and also the mind by itself, give rise to their primary actions, without being in conjunction with other substances.—And, should it be said that there is an absolute rule as to several causes only having originating power in the case of the origination of substances only (not in the case of the origination of actions, &c.), we again deny that, because it is admitted that there is such a thing as change (transformation). An absolute rule, such as maintained by you, would exist if substances did originate other substances, only when assisted by conjunction (a non-inherent cause). But, as a matter of fact, one and the same substance, when passing over into a different state distinguished by peculiar characteristic marks, is admitted to be an effect. In some cases more substances than one undergo the change, as when a young plant springs from seed and earth; in other cases one substance only changes, as when milk turns into curds.—In short it is none of the Lord's laws that only several causes in conjunction should produce an effect. We therefore decide, on the authority of scripture, that the entire world has sprung from the one Brahman, ether being produced first and later on the other elements in due succession. A statement to that effect has already been made above (II, 1, 24).

The further assertion made by the *pūrvapakshin*, that on the assumption of ether having had an origin it is impossible to conceive a difference between the former and later periods (the time before and after the origination of ether) is likewise unfounded; for we have to understand that that very specialising difference¹, from which we ascertain at present that there is a thing such as ether, different from earth and the other elements, did not exist before the

always falls under the notion of essentiality (*sattā*), which constitutes the summum genus for substances, qualities, and actions.

¹ Viz. the quality of sound.

origination of ether. And just as Brahman's nature does not participate in the nature of earth and the other elements characterised by grossness and similar qualities,—according to such scriptural passages as 'It is not gross, it is not subtle,'—so also it does not participate in the nature of ether, as we understand from the passage 'it is without ether' (*Bri. Up. III, 8, 8*). It therefore remains a settled conclusion that, before ether was produced, Brahman existed without ether.

The inference, drawn by the *pûrvapakshin*, that ether has no beginning, because it differs in nature from those substances which avowedly have a beginning, such as earth and so on, is without any value; for, as it is contradicted by scripture, it must be considered fallacious. We, on our part, have brought forward arguments showing that ether is an originated thing; and we may moreover reason as follows: Ether is non-eternal, because it is the substratum of a non-eternal quality, viz. sound, just as jars and other things, which are the substrata of non-eternal qualities, are themselves non-eternal.—Nor is there any danger of this latter reasoning being extended to the Self also, for the philosopher who takes his stand on the Upanishads does not admit that the Self is the substratum of non-eternal qualities. Moreover, those who teach ether to have an origin do not consider it proved that it is all-pervading and so on.

In reply to the remarks made under II, 3, 4 we point out that those scriptural passages which speak of the 'immortality of ether' are to be understood in the same way as the analogous statements about the immortality of the gods¹, since the origin and destruction of the ether have been shown to be possible. And if it is said of Brahman that 'it is omnipresent and eternal like ether,' Brahman is there compared to ether, whose greatness is well known, merely in order to indicate its supereminent greatness, not in order to maintain its being equal to ether. Similarly, when we say that the sun moves with the speed of an

¹ I.e. as referring to a relative immortality only.

arrow, we merely mean that he moves fast, not that he moves at the same rate as an arrow. This remark explains that scriptural passage also in which Brahman is declared to be infinite like ether.—On the other hand, such passages as ‘It is greater than ether’ prove that the extent of ether is less than that of Brahman; passages like ‘there is no image of him’ (Sve. Up. IV, 19) show that there is nothing to compare Brahman to; and passages like ‘Everything else is of evil’ (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2) show that everything different from Brahman such as ether, &c. is of evil.—All which serves to refute the assertion that the passage which declares ether to have originated has to be taken in a secondary sense, as the word Brahman actually has to be taken in some passages. Scripture and reasoning in combination rather show that ether has an origin, and the final conclusion therefore is that ether is an effect of Brahman.

8. Hereby air (also) is explained.

The present Sūtra extends the reasoning concerning ether to the air of which the ether is the abode.—The different views about air also are to be arranged in an analogous manner. The pûrvapakshin maintains that the air is not a product, because it is not mentioned in that chapter of the *Khândogya* which treats of the origination of things.—The opposite opinion is, that the air is mentioned in the parallel chapter of the *Taittiriya* (‘from the ether sprang the air’).—The two scriptural passages being of a conflicting nature, the pûrvapakshin maintains that the passage which declares the air to have originated must be taken in a secondary sense; firstly on account of the impossibility (of the literal sense being adopted), as shown (in the *adhikarana* treating of the ether); secondly on account of that passage which denies that it ever sets, ‘Vāyu (the air) is the deity that never sets’ (Bri. Up. I, 5, 22); and thirdly on account of those passages which declare it to be immortal. The final opinion on the other hand is, that air is a product; in the first place because this conclusion is conformable to the general tendency of scripture; and, in the second place, because it is generally admitted that whatever

is divided is an effect.—The denial of its ever setting refers to the lower knowledge (*aparā vidyā*¹) and is merely a relative one, *Vāyu* not setting in the same way as fire, &c. The statement as to the immortality, &c. of air has already received its reply (in the *adhikarāṇa* treating of the ether).—Here it may be asked why, ether and air being equally mentioned and not mentioned in the chapters treating of the origin of the world, one *adhikarāṇa* is not considered to suffice for both, and why instead of that there is made a formal extension of the former reasoning to the latter case, although there is no difference between the two cases.—To this we reply that there is indeed some reason for the question; that, however, the formal extension is made for the purpose of removing any doubts which might possibly be engendered in the minds of slow-witted people by mere words². For as, in the *Saṁvargavidyā* and other passages, the glory of *Vāyu* is referred to as an object of worship; and as scripture says that he never sets, &c., some men might think that he is eternal.

9. But there is no origin of that which is (i.e. of Brahman), on account of the impossibility (of such an origin).

Somebody, who has learned from scripture that ether and air, although not in themselves likely to have originated, yet actually are things with a beginning, might feel inclined to suspect that Brahman itself has sprung from something else.—And further somebody, who has learned from scripture that from ether and the other elements which are themselves mere effects further effects are produced, might think that also Brahman, from which ether has sprung, is a mere effect.—In order to remove this doubt the *Sūtra* declares that Brahman, whose Self is Being, must not be suspected to have sprung from anything else 'on account of the impossibility.' Brahman which is mere Being cannot spring from mere

¹ In which Brahman is spoken of as to be meditated upon under the form of *Vāyu*.

² *Sabdānurodhiny eva saṅkā na vastvanurodhinīti. Ān. Gi.*

being, since the relation of cause and effect cannot exist without a certain superiority (on the part of the cause). Nor again can Brahman spring from that which is something particular, since this would be contrary to experience. For we observe that particular forms of existence are produced from what is general, as, for instance, jars and pots from clay, but not that what is general is produced from particulars. Nor again can Brahman spring from that which is not (*asat*), for that which is not is without a Self¹, and moreover scripture expressly rejects that view, in the passage 'How could that which is spring from that which is not?' (*Kh. Up. VI, 2, 2*). Another passage, moreover, expressly denies that Brahman has any progenitor, 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither progenitor nor lord' (*Sve. Up. VI, 9*).—With regard to ether and air the possibility of an origin has been shown; but in Brahman's case there is no such possibility; hence the cases are not parallel. Nor does the fact of other effects springing from effects imply that Brahman also must be an effect; for the non-admission of a fundamental causal substance would drive us to a retrogressus in infinitum. And that fundamental causal substance which as a matter of fact is generally acknowledged to exist, just that is our Brahman.—Thus there is not any contradiction.

10. Fire (is produced) thence (i.e. from air); for thus (the text) declares.

In the *Khândogya* it is said that fire has for its source that which is (Brahman), in the *Taittiriya* that it has the air for its source. There being thus a conflict of scriptural passages with regard to the origin of fire, the *pûrvapakshin* maintains that fire has Brahman for its source.—Why?—Because the text, after having stated at the outset that there existed only that which is, teaches that it sent forth fire; and because the assertion of everything being known through Brahman is possible only in case of every-

¹ And cannot therefore constitute a cause; for a cause is the Self of its effects.

thing being produced from Brahman; and because the scriptural statement as to the 'Taggalān' (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 1*) specifies no difference¹; and because another scriptural passage (*Mu. Up. II, 1, 3*) teaches that everything without exception is born from Brahman. The *Taittiriyaka* also makes a statement about the entire world without any exception, 'after having brooded he sent forth all whatever there is' (*Taitt. Up. II, 6*). Hence the statement that 'fire was produced from air' (*Taitt. Up. II, 1*) must be considered to teach the order of succession only 'fire was produced subsequently to air.'

To this the *Sūtra* replies that fire was produced thence, i.e. from air, because the text declares it to be so—'from air sprang fire.' For if fire had sprung directly from Brahman and not from air, the scriptural statement that 'fire sprang from air' would be contradicted thereby. That that statement should intimate the order of succession merely, as maintained by the *pūrvapakshin*, we cannot admit. For as in the preceding sentence ('from that Self sprang ether') the fifth case (*ātmanaḥ*) denotes the Self as that from which the origination proceeds, and as the same verb ('sprang') governs our sentence also, and as in the following sentences also—such as 'from earth the herbs'—the fifth case (*prithivyāḥ*) denotes that from which something proceeds, we understand that in our sentence also the fifth case (*vāyoḥ*) denotes that from which fire proceeds. Moreover, if we should explain our sentence to mean 'after air fire was produced,' we should have to supply some preposition (or adverb as 'after,' 'subsequently'), while that construction which rests on the proper sense of the fifth case-affix is ready made at hand and does not require anything to be supplied. The passage therefore intimates that fire springs from air.—But, it may be said, the other scriptural passage ('it sent forth fire') intimates that fire springs from Brahman.—Not so, we reply; for this latter passage remains uncontradicted, even if we assume that fire sprang from Brahman only through intermediate links (not directly).

¹ But implies the whole world to have sprung from Brahman.

Even the supposition that Brahman, after having created ether and air, assumed the form of air and thus created fire would not be opposed to fire having sprung from Brahman; for we may say equally that milk comes from the cow, that curds come from the cow, that cheese comes from the cow. There is, moreover, a scriptural passage declaring that Brahman abides as the Self of its effects, viz. Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'That made itself its Self.' And analogously Smṛiti—in the passage beginning 'Cognition, knowledge, steadiness of mind' (Bha. Gī. X, 4)—says about the Lord, 'From me only spring the manifold states of the beings.' For although cognition and so on are observed to spring directly from their immediate causes, yet (the assertion made in the passage quoted holds good), since the entire aggregate of beings is, directly or indirectly, derived from the Lord.—Thereby those scriptural passages are accounted for which speak of the creation (on the whole) without specifying the order of succession¹; for they may be explained anyhow, while on the other hand the passages specifying the order of creation cannot be turned in any other way (i.e. not away from their direct sense). The general assertion, moreover, of everything springing from Brahman requires only that all things should ultimately proceed from that which is, not that they should be its immediate effects.—Thus there remains no difficulty.

11. Water (is produced from fire).

We have to supply from the preceding Sūtra the words 'thence' and 'for thus the text declares.'—Water is produced from fire; for the text says, 'it sent forth water' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 2, 3), and 'from fire (sprang) water' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). These explicit statements allow no room for doubt². The Sūtrakāra, however, having explained the creation of fire, and being about to explain the creation of

¹ I.e. it appears from the preceding discussion that those passages have to be explained in such a way as to agree with those other passages which state the order of the created beings.

² So that the Sūtra might possibly be looked upon as not called for.

earth, propounds this Sûtra in order to insert water (and thus to point out its position in the *srīṣṭīkrama*).

12. The earth (is meant by the word 'anna'), on account of the subject-matter, the colour, and other passages.

We read, 'Water thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth food (anna)' (*Kh. Up. VI, 2, 4*).—Here a doubt arises, whether the word 'anna' denotes things fit to be used as food, such as rice, barley and the like; or cooked food; or else the earth.

The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that the word is to be understood in the former sense; for, he says, the word 'anna' means 'food' in ordinary language, and is moreover confirmed in that sense by the complementary passage, 'Therefore whenever it rains anywhere, most food is then produced;' for when it rains, rice, barley and the like, but not earth, are produced in abundance.

To this we reply that by the word 'anna' we have to understand earth as being produced from water.—Why?—On account of the subject-matter, on account of the colour, and on account of other passages.—The subject-matter, in the first place, is clearly connected with the elements, as we see from the preceding passages, 'it sent forth fire, it sent forth water.' It would therefore be improper to pass over a further element, viz. earth, when its turn has come, and to assume without reason that rice and the like are meant by the word 'anna.'—In the second place, we find that in a complementary passage there is mentioned a colour which agrees with earth, 'the black colour (of fire) is the colour of anna.' Eatable things on the other hand, such as cooked dishes, and rice, barley and the like, are not necessarily black.—But earth too is not necessarily black; for the soil of some fields has a whitish colour like milk, and that of others looks red like glowing coals!—True, but that does not affect our argument, since what we have to look to is the predominant colour. Now the predominant colour of earth is black, not either white or red. The *Paurāṇikas* also designate the colour of the earth by the term 'night'

(*sarvarī*); now the night is black, and we therefore conclude that black is the colour of earth also.—In the third place other scriptural passages also, which refer to the same subject, declare that ‘from water (*sprang*) earth’ (*Taitt. Up. II, 1*), and that ‘what was there as the froth of the water, that was hardened and became the earth’ (*Bṛi. Up. I, 2, 2*). On the other hand the text declares that rice and the like were produced from the earth, ‘From earth sprang herbs, from herbs food’ (*Taitt. Up. II, 1*).—As, thus, the general subject-matter as well as other arguments clearly proves that the word ‘*anna*’ here denotes earth, we can in no way accept the view that rice and the like are referred to. The common use of language to which the *pūrvapakshin* appeals is of no avail against the arguments favouring our interpretation. The complementary passage also (‘whenever it rains,’ &c.) is to be viewed as pointing out that, owing to the earthy nature of food (rice, &c.), earth itself mediately springs from water.—For all these reasons the word ‘*anna*’ denotes this earth.

13. But on account of the indicatory mark supplied by their reflecting (i.e. by the reflection attributed to the elements), he (i.e. the Lord is the creative principle abiding within the elements).

A doubt here arises whether ether and the other elements do themselves send forth their effects, or if the highest Lord abiding within certain Selfs produces, after reflection, certain effects.

Here the *pūrvapakshin* maintains that the elements themselves send forth, because the texts speak of them as acting independently; compare, for instance, ‘from ether sprang air, from air fire,’ &c. The objection that non-intelligent beings cannot enter on independent activity is invalidated by the fact that the elements also are spoken of in the sacred texts as endowed with intelligence, cf. for instance, ‘fire thought,’ ‘water thought’ (*Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4*).

To this we reply that the highest Lord himself abiding within certain Selfs sends forth, after reflection, certain effects.—Why?—On account of the indicatory marks. For

texts such as 'he who dwells in the earth, and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is and who rules the earth within' show that the elements enter on their activity only if presided over by an intelligent principle. Texts such as 'He became sat and tyat' (which occurs in the passage, 'he wished may I be many, may I grow forth,' Taïtt. Up. II, 6) and 'It made itself its Self' (i. e. the Self of everything which exists; II, 7) show that he (the highest Lord) is the Self of everything. The thinking and hearing which the texts attribute to water and fire must be viewed as due to the fact of the highest Lord having entered them; for the passage, 'there is no other seer but he,' denies there being any other seer (thinker), and that which is (i. e. Brahman), in the character of seer (or thinker), constitutes the subject-matter of the whole chapter; as we conclude from the introductory passage, 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 2, 3).

14. The order (in which the elements are retracted into Brahman) is the reverse of that (i. e. the order in which they are created); this is proved (by its agreement with observation).

Having considered the order of the creation of the elements we now proceed to consider the order of their retraction.—The question here is whether their retraction takes place in an indefinite order, or in the order of the creation, or in the inverse order. That the origin, the subsistence and the retraction of the elements all depend on Brahman, scripture declares 'That from whence these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death.'

The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that the retraction of the elements is not bound to any definite order, because scripture contains no specific information on the point. Or else, he says, let him who wishes to know the order of the retraction accept the order of creation, since the latter is expressly mentioned in the texts.

To this we reply that the order of retraction must be viewed as the reverse of the order of creation. For we see

in ordinary life that a man who has ascended a stair has, in descending, to take the steps in the reverse order. Moreover we observe that things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, &c., on being destroyed pass back into clay, and that things which have originated from water, such as snow and hailstones, again dissolve into water. Hence we rightly assume that earth which has (according to scripture) sprung from water passes back into water when the period of its subsistence comes to an end, and that water which has sprung from fire passes back into fire. In this way each particular effect passes back into its immediately antecedent cause—each cause being of a subtler nature than its effect—until in the end the last cause is refunded into Brahman, the ultimate and most subtle of all causes. It certainly would be irrational to assume that an effect, passing over its immediate cause, should at once refund itself into the cause of the cause. *Smṛiti* also declares that the order of retraction is the order of origination inverted, ‘The earth, the basis of the world, is dissolved into water, O divine *Rishi*, the water into fire, the fire into air.’ The order of creation is indeed stated in the sacred texts, but that statement refers to creation only, and can therefore not be extended to retraction. We, moreover, cannot even desire to apply the order in which the elements are created to their retraction also since it is clearly unsuitable in the latter case. For, as long as an effect subsists, it is impossible to assume the dissolution of the cause, since on the dissolution of the latter the effect also cannot exist. On the other hand, we may assume a continued existence of the cause although the effect be destroyed; for that is actually observed in the case of clay (and the things made of it).

15. If it be said that between (Brahman and the elements) the intellect and mind (are mentioned; and that therefore their origination and retraction are to be placed) somewhere in the series, on account of there being inferential signs (whereby the order of the creation of the elements is broken); we

deny that, on account of the non-difference (of the organs and the elements).

In what precedes we have said that the creation and the retraction of the elements take place in direct and reverse order; further that the creation proceeds from the Self, and that the retraction terminates in the Self.—Now *Śruti* as well as *Smṛiti* enlightens us concerning the existence of the mind (*manas*) together with the senses, and of the intellect (*buddhi*); compare, for instance, the indicatory marks contained in the passage, *Ka. Up. I, 3, 3, 4*, ‘Know the intellect to be the charioteer and the mind the reins; the senses they call the horses,’ &c. And as the whole aggregate of beings avowedly springs from Brahman, we must assume that the mind, the intellect and the senses also originate from it and are again merged in it in due order, occupying a definite place among the things created and retracted. Moreover the *Ātharvāna* (*Mundaka*), in the chapter treating of the creation, mentions the organs between the Self and the elements, ‘From him is born breath, mind and all organs of sense, ether, air, light, water and the earth the support of all’ (*II, 1, 3*). And from this there results a break in the previously stated order of the creation and the retraction of the elements.

This we deny, on account of the non-difference (of the organs from the elements). If the organs themselves are of the nature of the elements, their origination and retraction are the same as those of the elements, and we therefore have not to look out in their case for a different order. And that the organs are of the nature of the elements, for that we have inferential marks, in passages such as the following, ‘for mind, my child, consists of earth, breath of water, speech of fire’ (*Kh. Up. VI, 6, 5*). That the organs (although in reality belonging to the elements) are sometimes mentioned separately from them, is to be understood in the same way as when the *Parivṛāgakas* (mendicant *Brāhmaṇas*) are spoken of separately from the *Brāhmaṇas*. And supposing even that the organs are not of the nature of the elements, still the order of the origin of the elements

would not be interfered with by the organs ; for we might assume either that the organs are produced first and the elements last ; or else that the elements are produced first and the organs last. In the *Ātharvāna-upanishad* quoted above we have merely a serial enumeration of the organs and the elements, not a statement as to the order of their origination. Similarly in other places also the series of the organs is recorded apart from the series of the elements ; so, for instance, in the following passage, ' *Pragāpati* indeed was all this in the beginning, he reflected on himself ; he sent forth mind ; there was mind only ; mind reflected on itself ; it sent forth speech,' &c.—Hence the origination of the organs does not cause a break in the order of the origination of the elements.

16. But the designation (as being born and dying) abides in the (bodies of beings) moving and non-moving ; it is secondary (metaphorical) if applied to the soul, as the existence (of those terms) depends on the existence of that (i.e. the body).

On account of certain popular modes of expression such as ' *Devadatta* is born,' ' *Devadatta* has died,' and the like, and on account of certain ceremonies such as the *Gātaka-karman*, some people might fall into the error of thinking that the individual soul has a beginning, and in the end undergoes destruction. This error we are going to dispel.—The individual soul has no beginning and is not subject to dissolution, since thus only it can be connected with the results of actions, as the *Sāstra* teaches. If the individual soul perished after the body, there would be no sense in the religious injunctions and prohibitions referring to the enjoyment and avoidance of pleasant and unpleasant things in another body (another birth). And scripture says, ' This body indeed dies when the living soul has left it, the living soul does not die ' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 11, 3).—But it has been pointed out above that ordinary language speaks of the birth and the death of the individual soul !—True ; but the terms ' birth ' and ' death,' if applied to the soul, have to

be taken in a secondary sense.—What then is that thing to which those words apply in their primary sense, and with reference to which we can speak of a secondary sense?—They apply, we answer, to whatever moves and whatever does not move. The words ‘birth’ and ‘death’ have reference to the bodies of moving and non-moving beings; for such beings are born (produced) and die. To them the terms ‘birth’ and ‘death’ apply in their primary sense; while they are used metaphorically only with reference to the soul dwelling in them. For their existence (i. e. their being used) depends on the existence of the body; i. e. the words ‘birth’ and ‘death’ are used where there take place the manifestation and disappearance of bodies, not where they are absent. For nobody ever observes a soul being born or dying, apart from its connexion with a body. That the words ‘birth’ and ‘death’ have reference to the conjunction with—and separation from—a body merely, is also shown by the following passage: ‘On being born that person assuming his body, &c.; when he passes out (of the body) and dies,’ &c. (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 8). The *gâta*-ceremony also is to be viewed as having reference to the manifestation of the body only; for the soul is not manifested.—Whether the individual soul is produced from the highest Self like ether, &c. or not, will be discussed in the next Sûtra; the present Sûtra merely states that the gross origination and dissolution which belong to the body do not affect the soul.

17. The (living) Self is not (produced) as there is no scriptural statement, and as it is eternal according to them (i. e. scriptural passages).

There is a Self called the living one (the individual soul), which rules the body and the senses, and is connected with the fruits of actions. With regard to that Self the conflict of scriptural passages suggests the doubt, whether it is produced from Brahman like ether and the other elements, or if, like Brahman itself, it is unproduced. Some scriptural passages, by comparing it to sparks proceeding from a fire and so on, intimate that the living soul is produced

from Brahman; from others again we learn that the highest Brahman, without undergoing any modification, passes, by entering into its effects (the elements), into the condition of the individual soul. These latter passages do not thus record an origination of the individual soul.

The pūrvapakshin maintains that the individual soul is produced, because on that view the general promissory statement is not contradicted. For the general assertion that 'by one thing being known all this is known' is not contradicted, only if the entire aggregate of things springs from Brahman; while it would be contradicted by the assumption of the individual soul being a thing of a different kind. Nor can the individual soul be conceived as mere unmodified highest Self, on account of the difference of their respective characteristics. For the highest Self is characterised by freedom from sin and so on, while the individual soul possesses the opposite attributes. That it is an effect, follows moreover from its being divided. For ether and all other things, in so far as divided, are effects, and we have concluded therefrom that they have an origin. Hence the soul also, which is distributed through all the bodies, doing good and evil and experiencing pleasure and pain, must be considered to originate at the time when the entire world is produced. We have moreover the following scriptural passage, 'As small sparks come forth from fire, thus from that Self all vital airs,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up. II, 1, 20*). This text teaches first the creation of the aggregate of objects of fruition, beginning with the vital airs, and then (in the words, 'all the Selves') separately teaches the creation of all the enjoying souls. Again we have the passage, 'As from a blazing fire sparks, being of the same nature as fire, fly forth a thousandfold, thus are various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, my friend, and return hither also' (*Mu. Up. II, 1, 1*); a passage descriptive of the origin and the retractation of the souls, as we infer from the statement about the sameness of nature¹.

¹ That the word bhāvāḥ 'beings' here means 'individual souls,' we conclude from their being said to have the same nature as the Imperishable.

For the individual souls are of the same nature as Brahman, because they are endowed with intelligence. Nor can the fact that in some places (as, for instance, in the accounts of the creation of the elements) the creation of the soul is not mentioned, invalidate what is stated about it in other places; it being a general principle of interpretation that whatever new, and at the same time non-contradictory, matter is taught in some scriptural passage has to be combined with the teaching of all other passages. Hence that passage also which speaks of the Self entering (into its effects and thus becoming *gīva*) must be explained as stating the Self's passing over into an effect (*viz.* the soul), analogously to such passages as 'that made itself its Self,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 7).—From all which it follows that the individual soul is a product.

To all this we reply, that the individual soul is not a product.—Why?—On account of the absence of scriptural statement. For in the chapters which treat of the creation, the production of the soul is, in most cases, not mentioned.—But, it was admitted above that the circumstance of something not being stated in some places does not invalidate the statements made about it elsewhere.—True, that was admitted; but we now declare that the production of the soul is not possible.—Why?—'On account of the eternity, &c., resulting from them' (*i.e.* the scriptural passages). The word ' &c.' implies non-originatedness and similar attributes. For we know from scriptural passages that the soul is eternal, that it has no origin, that it is unchanging, that what constitutes the soul is the unmodified Brahman, and that the soul has its Self in Brahman. A being of such a nature cannot be a product. The scriptural passages to which we are alluding are the following:—'The living Self dies not' (*Kh.* Up. VI, 11, 3); 'This great unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman' (*Bri.* Up. IV, 4, 25); 'The knowing Self is not born, it dies not' (*Ka.* Up. I, 2, 18); 'The Ancient is unborn, eternal, everlasting' (*Ka.* Up. I, 2, 18); 'Having sent forth that he entered into it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6); 'Let me now enter those with this living Self and let me then

evolve names and forms' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 3, 2); 'He entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails' (*Bri. Up.* I, 4, 7); 'Thou art that' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman' (*Bri. Up.* I, 4, 10); 'This Self is Brahman knowing all' (*Bri. Up.* II, 5, 19).—All these texts declare the eternity of the soul, and thus militate against the view of its having been produced.—But it has been argued above that the soul must be a modification because it is divided, and must have an origin because it is a modification!—It is not, we reply, in itself divided; for scripture declares that 'there is one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings' (*Sve. Up.* VI, 11); it only appears divided owing to its limiting adjuncts, such as the mind and so on, just as the ether appears divided by its connexion with jars and the like. Scripture (*viz. Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 5, 'that Self is indeed Brahman, made up of knowledge, mind, life, sight, hearing,' &c.) also declares that the one unmodified Brahman is made up of a plurality of intellects (*buddhi*), &c. By Brahman being made up of mind and so on is meant, that its nature is coloured thereby, while the fact of its being entirely separate from it is non-apparent. Analogously we say that a mean, cowardly fellow is made up of womanishness.—The casual passages which speak of the soul's production and dissolution must therefore be interpreted on the ground of the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts; when the adjunct is produced or dissolved, the soul also is said to be produced or dissolved. Thus scripture also declares, 'Being altogether a mass of knowledge, having risen from out of these elements it again perishes after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 5, 13). What is meant there, is only the dissolution of the limiting adjuncts of the Self, not the dissolution of the Self itself¹. The text itself explains this, in reply to Maitreyi's ques-

¹ Hence the phrase, 'there is no more knowledge,'—which seems to contradict the term 'a mass of knowledge,'—only means that, on the limiting adjuncts being dissolved, there is no longer any knowledge of distinctions.

tion ('Here, Sir, thou hast landed me in utter bewilderment. Indeed I do not understand him, that when he has departed there is no more knowledge'), in the words, 'I say nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is imperishable and of an indestructible nature. But it enters into contact with the sense organs.'—Non-contradiction moreover of the general assertion (about everything being known through one) results only from the acknowledgment that Brahman is the individual soul. The difference of the attributes of both is also owing to the limiting adjuncts only. Moreover the words 'Speak on for the sake of final deliverance' (uttered by *Ganaka* with reference to the instruction he receives from *Yāgñavalkya* about the *vigñāna-maya* ātman) implicitly deny that the Self consisting of knowledge (i.e. the individual soul) possesses any of the attributes of transitory existence, and thus show it to be one with the highest Self.—From all this it follows that the individual soul does not either originate or undergo destruction.

18. For this very reason (the individual soul is) intelligent.

Owing to the conflicting views of the philosophical schools there arises a doubt whether, as the followers of *Kaṇāda* think, the soul is in itself non-intelligent, so that its intelligence is merely adventitious; or if, as the *Sāṅkhyas* think, eternal intelligence constitutes its very nature.

The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that the intelligence of the Self is adventitious, and is produced by the conjunction of the Self with the mind (*manas*), just as, for instance, the quality of redness is produced in a jar by the conjunction of the jar with fire. For if the soul were of eternal (essential) intelligence, it would remain intelligent in the states of deep sleep, swoon, and possession, while as a matter of fact, men when waking from sleep and so on declare in reply to questions addressed to them that they were not conscious of anything. Men in their ordinary state, on the other hand, are seen to be (actively) intelligent. Hence, as intelli-

gence is clearly intermittent, we conclude that the Self's intelligence is adventitious only.

To this we reply that the soul is of eternal intelligence, for that very reason that it is not a product but nothing else but the unmodified highest Brahman which, owing to the contact with its limiting adjuncts, appears as individual soul. That intelligence constitutes the essential nature of the highest Brahman, we know from scriptural passages such as 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss' (*Bri. Up.* III, 9, 28, 7); 'Brahman is true, knowledge, infinite' (*Taitt. Up.* II, 1); 'Having neither inside nor outside, but being altogether a mass of knowledge' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 5, 13). Now, if the individual soul is nothing but that highest Brahman, then eternal intelligence constitutes the soul's essential nature also, just as light and heat constitute the nature of fire. In the chapter treating of that which consists of knowledge, there are, moreover, passages (directly declaring that the individual soul is of the nature of self-luminous intelligence), 'He not asleep himself looks down upon the sleeping (senses)' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 11); 'That person is self-illuminated' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 14); 'For there is no intermission of the knowing of the knower' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 30). That the soul's nature is intelligence, follows moreover from the passage (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 12, 4) where it is represented as connected with knowledge through all sense-organs, 'He who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self,' &c. &c.—From the soul's essential nature being intelligence it does not follow that the senses are useless; for they serve the purpose of determining the special object of each sense, such as smell and so on. This is expressly declared by scripture, 'Smell is for the purpose of perceiving odour' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 12, 4).—The objection that sleeping persons are not conscious of anything is refuted by scripture, where we read concerning a man lying in deep sleep, 'And when there he does not see, yet he is seeing though he does not see. For there is no intermission of the seeing of the seer, because it cannot perish. But there is then no second, nothing else different from him that he could see' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 23). That means:

The absence of actual intelligising is due to the absence of objects, not to the absence of intelligence ; just as the light pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of things to be illuminated, not to the absence of its own nature. —The reasoning of the Vaiseshikas and others is, as contradicting scripture, merely fallacious, and we therefore decide that eternal intelligence is the essential nature of the soul.

19. (On account of the scriptural declarations) of (the soul's) passing out, going and returning, (the soul is of atomic size).

We now have to consider of what size the soul is, whether of atomic size or of a medium size, or of great (infinite) size.—But, it has been shown above that the soul is not a product and that eternal intelligence constitutes its nature, whence it follows that it is identical with the highest Self. Now the infinity of the highest Self is clearly stated in scripture ; what need then is there of a discussion of the soul's size?—True, we reply ; but certain scriptural passages which speak of the soul's passing out, going and returning, establish the *primâ facie* view that the soul is of limited size, and moreover in some places scripture expressly declares it to be of atomic size. The present discussion is therefore begun for the purpose of clearing up this doubtful point.

The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that, on account of its being said to pass out, go and return, the soul must be held to be of limited, atomic size. Its passing out is mentioned (*Kau. Up. III, 3*), 'And when he passes out of this body he passes out together with all these ;' its going (*Kau. Up. I, 2*), 'All who depart from this world go to the moon ;' its returning (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 6*), 'From that world he returns again to this world of action.' From these statements as to the soul's passing out, going and returning it follows that it is of limited size. For motion is impossible in the case of an all-pervading being. And a limited size being once admitted, we have to conclude more especially that the size is atomic, since the hypothesis

of the soul being of the same size as the body has already been refuted in our examination of the Ārṇata-system.

20. And on account of the two latter (i.e. going and returning) being connected with their Self (i.e. the agent), (the soul is of atomic size).

We admit that 'passing out' might possibly be attributed to the soul even if it does not move, viz. if that expression be taken to mean the soul's ceasing to be the ruler of the body, in consequence of the results of its former actions having become exhausted; just as somebody when ceasing to be the ruler of a village may be said to 'go out.' But the two latter activities, viz. going and returning, are not possible in the case of something which does not move; for they are both connected with the own Self (of the agent), going (and coming back) being activities abiding in the agent¹. Now going and coming are possible for a being that is not of medium size, only if it is of atomic size. And as going and coming must be taken in their literal sense, we conclude that the passing out also means nothing but the soul's actual moving out of the body. For the soul cannot go and return without first having moved out of the body. Moreover certain parts of the body are mentioned as the points from which the soul starts in passing out, viz. in the following passage, 'Either from the eye or from the skull or from other places of the body (the Self passes out)' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 2*). Other passages mention that the embodied soul goes and comes within the body also; so, for instance, 'He taking with him those elements of light descends into the heart' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 1*); 'Having assumed light he again goes to his place' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 11*).—Thereby the atomic size of the soul is established as well.

21. If it be said that (the soul is) not atomic, on account of scriptural statements about what is not that (i.e. what is opposed to atomic size); we deny

¹ Going is known to be an activity inherent in the agent, from the fact of its producing effects inherent in him, such as his conjunction with— or disjunction from—other things.

that, on account of the other one (the highest Self) being the subject-matter (of those passages).

Nevertheless, it may be objected, the soul cannot be of atomic size, because there are scriptural statements of what is not that, i.e. because there are scriptural statements of its size being the opposite of atomic size. So that by accepting the alternative of atomic size we should place ourselves in opposition to scriptural passages such as the following, 'He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by the *Prāṇas*, the ether within the heart' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22*); 'Like the ether he is omnipresent, eternal'; 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (*Taitt. Up. II. 1*).

This objection, the *pūrvapakshin* replies, is not valid 'on account of the other one forming the subject of discussion.' For those statements about a size different (from the atomic one) occur under the heading of the highest Self which on account of its pre-eminence constitutes the general object of knowledge in all Vedānta-texts; and moreover the passage, 'It is spotless, beyond the ether' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 20*), specially proves that the highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (in the passage quoted above from the *Bṛi. Up.*). Thus with regard to the other passages also.—But from the expressions, 'consisting of knowledge, surrounded by the *prāṇas*,' it appears that the embodied Self only (not the highest Self) is designated as connected with greatness.—That designation, the *pūrvapakshin* replies, is founded on an intuition, vouched for by scripture, as in the case of *Vāmadeva*¹.—As therefore the statements of a different size refer to the highest Self (*prāgñā*), they do not militate against the view of the individual soul being of atomic size.

22. And also on account of direct statement, and of inference.

The soul is of atomic size for that reason also that scripture contains a direct statement to that effect, 'By

¹ Who '*paramārthadrishṭyā*' identifies himself with everything in the universe. (*Rīg-veda Samhita IV, 26. 1 ff.*).

thought is to be known that atomic Self into which breath has entered fivefold' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 9). That the Self spoken of there as atomic is the living Self, i.e. the individual soul, we see from its connexion with breath.—Inference also favours the conclusion that the soul is of atomic size; i.e. we infer that from such passages as 'That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times' (Sve. Up. V, 9), and, 'That lower one also is seen small even like the point of a goad.'—But, an objection may here be raised, if the soul is assumed to be of atomic size, and therefore to occupy one point of the body only, the fact of sensation extending over the whole body would appear contrary to reason. And yet it is a matter of experience that men bathing in the Ganges or in a pond experience the sensation of cold over their whole bodies, and again that in summer people feel hot all over the body.—To this objection the following Sūtra replies.

23. There is no contradiction, as in the case of sandal-ointment.

Just as a drop of sandal-ointment, although in actual contact with one spot of the body only, yet produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body; so the soul, although abiding in one point of the body only, may be the cause of a perception extending over the entire body. And as the soul is connected with the skin (which is the seat of feeling), the assumption that the soul's sensations should extend over the whole body is by no means contrary to reason. For the connexion of the soul and the skin abides in the entire skin, and the skin extends over the whole body.

24. If it be said (that the two cases are not parallel), on account of the specialisation of abode (present in the case of the sandal-ointment, absent in the case of the soul); we deny that, on account of the acknowledgment (by scripture, of a special place of the soul), viz. within the heart.

Here it may be objected that the argumentation relied upon in the last Sûtra is not admissible, because the two cases compared are not parallel. If it were a settled matter that the soul dwells in one point of the body, the drop of sandal-ointment might be adduced as a parallel instance. But, as a matter of fact, we know from perception that the drop of sandal-ointment is in contact with one spot of the body only, just as we know that it refreshes the whole body; while in the case of the soul observation tells us only that it is percipient all over the body, but not that it abides in one spot.—Should it be said that the latter point must be settled by inference, we reply that inference is here of no use, because it is not capable of removing the doubt whether the perception extending over the whole body belongs to a soul which extends over the whole body like the skin and the sense of touch inhering in it, or to a soul which is all-pervading like ether, or to a soul which, like a drop of ointment, is minute and abides in one spot only¹.

This objection, the pûrvapakshin replies, is unfounded 'on account of the acknowledgment of a speciality of abode,' an abiding in one spot of the body being admitted in the case of the soul no less than in the case of a drop of ointment. For we read in the Vedânta-texts that the soul abides within the heart; cp. for instance, the information given (in Pr. Up. III, 6), 'The Self is in the heart;' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 3, 3), 'That Self abides in the heart;' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 7), 'Who is that Self?—He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Prâṇas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge.'—As therefore the two cases compared are not devoid of parallelism, the argumentation resorted to in Sûtra 23 is unobjectionable.

25. Or on account of (its) quality (viz. intelligence), as in cases of ordinary experience.

¹ We cannot reason as follows, 'The soul is atomic because it produces effects extending (over the whole body), like a drop of sandal-ointment;' for that reasoning would apply to the sense of touch (the skin) also, which we know not to be of atomic size.

That the soul although atomic produces effects extending over the whole body, is not contrary to reason, on account of the pervadingness of intellect which is its quality. From ordinary experience we know that luminous things, such as lamps or gems, although occupying only one spot of a chamber, produce, by means of their light which fills the chamber, an effect in every part of the chamber.—This Sūtra has the purpose of removing the doubts of those who might object that sandal-ointment, because consisting of parts, may perhaps refresh the entire body by the diffusion of imperceptible particles; that, however, the soul as a mere atom does not possess any parts by means of which it could diffuse itself through the whole body.—But how can a quality extend beyond that in which it inheres, and abide elsewhere? We certainly do not see that the whiteness which is the quality of a piece of cloth extends beyond that piece of cloth to other places. Nor must you say that the case of the soul is analogous to that of the light diffused from a lamp; for that light itself is admitted to be (not a quality but) a substance. The flame of a lamp is substantial light with its particles crowded close to one another; the light diffused from that flame is substantial light whose particles are thin and scattered.—The reply to this objection is given in the next Sūtra.

26. The extending beyond is as in the case of odour.

Just as odour, although a quality, extends beyond the odorous substance—as appears from the fact of our perceiving odour even without actually grasping flowers which are the seat of odour—so the quality of intelligence also may extend beyond the soul although the latter be atomic. It therefore is an undue stretch of inference to maintain that a quality, such as colour and the like, cannot separate itself from the substratum in which it inheres, because it is a quality; for we see that odour although a mere quality does separate itself from its substratum.—The objection that odour also separates itself from its substance

only with the substance (i. e. parts of the substance) we do not admit, because that would involve the dwindling away of the fundamental substance from which the separation of parts takes place. But that it does not so dwindle away, we conclude from its remaining in its former condition ; otherwise it would lose the heaviness and other qualities belonging to it in its former state.—Well, but perhaps the separation of the particles in which odour resides is not noticed on account of their minuteness. Nevertheless the fact may be that minute odorous atoms spreading in all directions enter the cavity of the nose and there produce the sensation of smell.—This we cannot admit, because the atoms are suprasensible, and because in some cases, as, for instance, from the blossoms of the *nâgakesara*-tree, a very strong odour is perceived ¹. According to the generally prevailing idea, moreover, it is not the odorous substance which is smelled, but ordinary people rather think that they smell the odour only.—The objection that, because we do not perceive colour and so on to extend beyond their substratum, we have no right to assume that odour does so, we cannot admit, because there is no room for that conclusion ², on account of the (actually existing) perception (of the smell apart from the odorous substance). Logicians must shape their inferences in such a way as to make them agree with ordinary observation, not in any other way. For, to quote another instance, the circumstance that one of the qualities, viz. taste, is perceived by the tongue, certainly does not entitle us to draw the general inference that colour and the other qualities also are perceived by means of the tongue.

27. And thus (scripture also) declares.

Scripture also, after having signified the soul's abiding in the heart and its atomic size, declares by means of such

¹ Single atoms could not produce any sensations ; *trasareṇus*, i. e. combinations of three atoms even could not produce lively sensations.

² Viz. that smell cannot exist apart from the odorous substance, because it is a quality like colour.

passages as 'Up to the hairs, up to the tips of the nails' (Kau. Up. IV, 20; *Bri. Up.* I. 4, 7), that the soul pervades the entire body by means of intelligence which is its quality.

28. On account of the separate statement (of soul and intelligence).

From the passage 'Having by knowledge taken possession of the body' which represents the soul and intelligence as separate, viz. as respectively the agent and the instrument of action, we understand that the soul pervades the body only by means of intelligence, its quality. Again the passage 'Then (the intelligent person) having through the intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all intelligence' (*Bri. Up.* II, 1, 17) shows intelligence to be different from the agent, i.e. the embodied soul, and so likewise confirms our view.—The reply to all this is as follows.

29. But it is designated thus (i.e. as atomic), on account of its having for its essence the qualities of that (i.e. the buddhi); as in the case of the intelligent Self (i.e. Brahman).

The word 'but' is meant to set aside the opinion maintained hitherto.—The soul is not of atomic size, since scripture does not declare it to have had an origin. On the contrary, as scripture speaks of the highest Brahman entering into the elements and teaches that it is their Self, the soul is nothing else but the highest Brahman. And if the soul is the highest Brahman, it must be of the same extent as Brahman. Now scripture states Brahman to be all-pervading. Therefore the soul also is all-pervading.—On that view all the statements about the all-pervadingness of the soul made in *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* are justified, so, for instance, the passage, 'He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by the *prāṇas* &c.' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 22). Nor again could the soul, if it were of atomic size, experience sensations extending over the whole body. If it be said that that is possible owing to the soul's connexion

with the sense of touch (the skin), we deny that assertion. For from that it would follow that, when we tread on a thorn, the sensation extends over the whole body, since the connexion of the thorn and the skin abides in the entire skin, and the skin extends over the whole body. While as a matter of fact, when treading on a thorn we experience a sensation in the sole of the foot only.—Nor again is it possible that a quality of an atom should diffuse itself beyond the atom. For qualities occupy the same place with the substances of which they are qualities, and a quality not abiding in its substance would no longer be a quality. Concerning the light emitted from a lamp we have already shown that it is, not a quality, but rather a different kind of substance. Hence odour also, being avowedly a quality, can exist in so far only as it inheres in its substance; otherwise it would cease to be odour. Thus the reverend Dvaipâyana also says, 'Having perceived odour in water some unthinking people ascribe it to the latter; but know that it is in the earth only, and (merely) passes over into air and water.' If the intelligence of the soul pervades the whole body, the soul cannot be atomic; for intelligence constitutes the soul's proper nature, just as heat and light constitute that of fire. A separation of the two as quality and that which is qualified does not exist. Now it has already been shown (II, 2, 34) that the soul is not of the same size as the body; the only remaining alternative therefore is that it is all-pervading (infinite). But why then, our opponent asks, is the soul designated (in some scriptural passages) as being of atomic size, &c.?—It is designated as such 'on account of being of the nature of the essence of that (i.e. the buddhi).—The Self is here said to be of the nature of the essence of the mind's (buddhi) qualities, because those qualities, such as desire, aversion, pleasure, pain and so on, constitute the essence, i.e. the principal characteristics of the Self as long as it is implicated in transmigratory existence. Apart from the qualities of the mind the mere Self does not exist in the *samsâra* state; for the latter, owing to which the Self appears as an agent and enjoyer, is altogether due to the circumstance of

the qualities of the buddhi and the other limiting adjuncts being wrongly superimposed upon the Self. That the non-transmigrating eternally free Self which neither acts nor enjoys is declared to be of the same size as the buddhi, is thus due only to its having the qualities of the buddhi for its essence (viz. as long as it is in fictitious connexion with the buddhi). Moreover we have the scriptural passage, 'That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair, divided a hundred times, and yet it is to be infinite' (Sve. Up. V, 9), which at first states the soul to be atomic and then teaches it to be infinite. Now this is appropriate only in the case of the atomicity of the soul being metaphorical while its infinity is real; for both statements cannot be taken in their primary sense at the same time. And the infinity certainly cannot be understood in a metaphorical sense, since all the Upanishads aim at showing that Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul. —The other passage also (Sve. Up. V, 8) which treats of the measure of the soul, 'The lower one, endowed with the quality of mind and the quality of body, is seen small even like the point of a goad,' teaches the soul's small size to depend on its connexion with the qualities of the buddhi, not upon its own Self. The following passage again, 'That small (anu) Self is to be known by thought' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 9), does not teach that the soul is of atomic size, since the subject of the chapter is Brahman in so far as not to be fathomed by the eye, &c., but to be apprehended by the serene light of knowledge, and since moreover the soul cannot be of atomic size in the primary sense of the word. Hence the statement about *anutva* (smallness, subtlety) has to be understood as referring either to the difficulty of knowing the soul, or else to its limiting adjuncts. Similarly such passages as 'Having by knowledge taken possession of the whole body' (Kau. Up. III, 6), which mention a difference (between the soul and knowledge), must be understood to mean that the soul takes possession of the whole body through the buddhi, its limiting adjunct; or else they must be considered as mere modes of expression, as when we speak of the body of a stone statue. For we have

already shown that the distinction of quality and thing qualified does not exist in the case of the soul.—The statements as to the soul abiding in the heart are likewise to be explained on the ground of the buddhi abiding there.—That also the soul's passing out and so on depend on the limiting adjuncts, is shown by the passage, 'What is it by whose passing out I shall pass out, and by whose staying I shall stay? He sent forth *prāṇa*, &c. (Pr. Up. VI, 3, 4). For where there is no passing out, no going and returning are known; for what has not left the body cannot go and return¹.—As thus the soul (as long as involved in the *samsāra*) has for its essence the qualities of its limiting adjuncts, it is spoken of as minute. The case is analogous to that of Brahman (*prāgñā*). Just as in those chapters whose topic is the meditation on the qualified Brahman, the highest Self is spoken of as possessing relative minuteness and so on, because it has the qualities of its limiting adjuncts for its essence (cp. 'Smaller than a grain of rice or barley,' 'He who consists of mind, whose body is *prāṇa*, &c., *Kh. Up. III, 14, 2; 3*); so it is also with the individual soul.—Very well, let us then assume that the transmigratory condition of the soul is due to the qualities of the buddhi forming its essence. From this, however, it will follow that, as the conjunction of buddhi and soul—which are different entities—must necessarily come to an end, the soul when disjoined from the buddhi will be altogether undefinable and thence non-existing or rather non-existing in the *samsāra* state².—To this objection the next Sūtra replies.

30. The objection (raised above) is not valid, since (the connexion of the soul with the buddhi) exists as long as the soul; it being thus observed (in scripture).

We need not fear that the objection formulated above can be proved.—Why?—'On account of the existence of the connexion of the soul with the buddhi, as long as the

¹ So that the distinction insisted on in Sūtra 20 is not valid.

² *Katham asattvam svarūpena sattvād ity āsaṅkhyāha samsāritvam veti. Ān. Gi.*

soul exists.' That means : as long as this Self is in the *samsāra*-state, as long as the *samsāra*-state is not brought to an end by means of perfect knowledge, so long the connexion of the soul with the buddhi does not cease. And as long as its connexion with the buddhi, its limiting adjunct, lasts, so long the individual soul remains individual soul, implicated in transmigratory existence. In reality, however, there is no individual soul but in so far as it is fictitiously hypostatized by the buddhi, its limiting adjunct. For in attempting to determine the object of the Vedānta-texts we meet with no other intelligent substance but the one omniscient Lord whose nature is eternal freedom. This appears from innumerable texts, such as the following :—'There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he, there is no other knower but he' (*Bri. Up.* III, 7, 23); 'There is nothing that sees, hears, perceives, knows but it' (*Bri. Up.* III, 8, 11); 'Thou art that' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman' (*Bri. Up.* I, 4, 10).—How again is it known that the soul is connected with the buddhi as long as it exists?—We reply : because that is seen (*viz.* in scripture). For scripture makes the following declaration : 'He who is within the heart, consisting of knowledge, surrounded by the *prāṇas*, the person of light, he remaining the same wanders along the two worlds as if thinking, as if moving' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 7). Here the term 'consisting of knowledge' means 'consisting of buddhi,' as we infer from another passage, *viz.* 'The Self consisting of knowledge, mind, life, sight, hearing' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 5), where knowledge is enumerated among mind and so on¹. By 'being made up of buddhi' is meant 'having for one's essence the qualities of buddhi.' Similarly a phrase like 'Devadatta is made up of womanishness,' which may be made use of in ordinary language, means that in Devadatta feminine attributes such as softness of voice and the like prevail. Moreover, the passage, 'He remaining the same wanders along the two worlds,' declares that the Self, even

¹ And therefore has to be understood in the sense of buddhi.

when going to another world, is not separated from the buddhi, &c. For if we ask whereby it does remain the same, the answer, based on proximity¹, is 'by means of the buddhi.'—Further, such modes of expression, 'as if thinking,' 'as if moving,' lead us to the same conclusion; for they mean that the Self does not think and move on its own account, but thinks as it were and moves as it were, because the buddhi to which it is joined really moves and thinks.—Moreover, the connexion of the Self with the buddhi, its limiting adjunct, depends on wrong knowledge, and wrong knowledge cannot cease except through perfect knowledge; hence as long as there does not rise the cognition of Brahman being the universal Self, so long the connexion of the soul with the buddhi and its other limiting adjuncts does not come to an end. Thus scripture also says, 'I know that great person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness. A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go' (Sve. Up. III, 8).

But, an objection is raised, in the states of deep sleep and retraction (pralaya) no connexion of the Self with the buddhi can be acknowledged, since scripture declares that 'then he becomes united with the True, he is gone to his own' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 1), and as then all modifications have avowedly passed away. How then can it be said that the connexion with the buddhi exists as long as the Self?—To this objection the following Sûtra replies.

31. On account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that (connexion) which exists (potentially); like virile power.

As in ordinary life virile power and so on, existing potentially only in young children, and being then looked upon as non-existing, become manifest at the time of puberty—and do not originate at that time from previous non-existence, because in that case they might originate in eunuchs also—; so the connexion of the soul with the

¹ I.e. on the proximity of terms clearly indicating the buddhi, viz. *vigñāna-mayaḥ prāṇeshu*.

buddhi exists potentially merely during deep sleep and the period of general retraction, and again becomes manifest at the time of waking and the time of creation.—This explanation is appropriate, because nothing can be assumed to spring up unless from something else ; otherwise we should have to suppose that effects spring up without causes. That the rising from deep sleep is due to the existence of potential avidyā, scripture also declares, 'Having become merged in the True they know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion or a wolf,' &c. (*Kh. Up. VI, 9, 2 ; 3*).—It is therefore a proved matter that the connexion of the soul with the buddhi and the other adjuncts lasts as long as the soul (in its *samsāra*-state).

32. Otherwise (if no *manas* existed) there would result either constant perception or constant non-perception, or else a limitation of either of the two (i.e. of the soul or of the senses).

The internal organ which constitutes the limiting adjunct of the soul is called in different places by different names, such as *manas* (mind), *buddhi* (intelligence), *viñāna* (knowledge), *kitta* (thought). This difference of nomenclature is sometimes made dependent on the difference of the modifications of the internal organ which is called *manas* when it is in the state of doubt, &c., *buddhi* when it is in the state of determination and the like.—Now we must necessarily acknowledge the existence of such an internal organ ; because otherwise there would result either perpetual perception or perpetual non-perception. There would result perpetual perception whenever there is a conjunction of the soul, the senses and the objects of sense—the three together constituting the instruments of perception ; or else, if on the conjunction of the three causes the effect did not follow, there would take place perpetual non-perception. But neither of these two alternatives is actually observed.—Or else we should have to assume that there are obstacles in the way of the energy either of the Self or the sense-organs. But the former is not possible, as the

Self is not capable of any modification ; nor the latter, as we cannot assume that the energy of the sense-organ which is non-obstructed in the preceding and the following moment should, without any cause, be obstructed (in the intervening moment). Hence we have to acknowledge the existence of an internal organ through whose attention and non-attention perception and non-perception take place. Thus scripture declares, ' My mind was elsewhere, I did not see ; my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear ; for a man sees with his mind and hears with his mind ' (*Bri. Up. I, 5, 3*). Scripture moreover shows that desire and similar states are modifications of the mind, ' Desire, representation, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness, shame, reflection, fear, all this is mind.' The explanation given in Sūtra 29 is therefore an appropriate one.

33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of scripture having a purport (thereby).

In connexion with the doctrine that the soul possesses for its essence the qualities of the buddhi, another attribute of the soul is set forth.—The individual soul is an agent, because thus scripture has a purport. For only on that assumption scriptural injunctions (such as ' He is to sacrifice,' ' He is to make an oblation into the fire,' ' He is to give,' &c.) acquire a purport ; otherwise they would be purportless. For they all teach special acts to be done by agents ; which would not be possible if the soul did not possess the quality of being an agent.—On that supposition a meaning belongs to the following passage also, ' For it is he who sees, hears, perceives, conceives, acts, he the person whose Self is knowledge ' (*Pr. Up. IV, 9*).

34. And on account of (the text) teaching its wandering about.

The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the soul for that reason also, that, in a chapter treating of the soul, the text declares it to wander about in the state of sleep, ' The immortal one goes wherever he likes ' (*Bri. Up.*

IV, 3, 12); and again, 'He moves about, according to his pleasure, within his own body' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 1, 18*).

35. On account of its taking.

The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the soul for that reason also that in the same chapter treating of the soul the text speaks of the soul taking its instruments, 'Having taken, through the intelligence of the senses, intelligence,' and 'having taken the senses' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 1, 18; 17*).

36. (The soul is an agent) also because it is designated as such with regard to actions; if it were not such, there would be a change of designation.

The quality of being an agent belongs to the soul for that reason also that the sacred texts speak of its agency in sacred and secular actions, 'Understanding performs the sacrifice, it performs all acts' (*Taitt. Up. II, 5*).—But, an objection may here be raised, we have seen that the word 'understanding' applies to the buddhi; how then can it indicate the circumstance of the soul being an agent?—The soul only, we reply, is designated there, not the buddhi. If the soul were not meant to be designated, there would be a change in the designation, i. e. the passage would run, 'through understanding it performs,' &c. For we see that in another passage where the buddhi is meant the word 'understanding' is exhibited in the instrumental form, 'Having through the understanding (intelligence) of these senses taken all understanding' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 1, 17*). In the passage under discussion, on the other hand, the word 'understanding' is given in the case characteristic of the agent (viz. the nominative), and therefore indicates the Self which is distinct from the buddhi. Hence your objection is not valid.—Another objection is raised. If the soul in so far as distinct from the buddhi were the agent, it would, because it is independent, bring about exclusively what is pleasant and useful to itself, not the opposite. We, however, observe that it does bring about the opposite also. But such an unrestricted proceeding does not become

the independent Self.—To this objection the following Sûtra replies.

37. The absence of restriction is as in the case of perception.

Just as this Self, although free with regard to perception, yet perceives unrestrictedly what is unpleasant as well as what is pleasant, so we assume that it also brings about what is unpleasant as well as what is pleasant.—The objection that in the act of perception also the soul is not free because it depends on the employment of the causes of perception (i.e. the sense-organs), we invalidate by the remark that the use of the causes of perception is merely to present the objects of perception, that however in the act of perception the soul because endowed with intelligence does not depend on anything else¹.—Moreover in actions also the soul is not absolutely free, as it depends on differences of place, time, and efficient causes. But an agent does not cease to be so because he requires assistance. A cook remains the agent in the action of cooking although he requires fuel, water, and so on. The presence of a plurality of co-operating factors is therefore not opposed to the activity of the soul unrestrictedly extending to actions productive of pleasant as well as unpleasant results.

38. On account of the reversal of power.

The soul distinct from 'understanding' has to be viewed as an agent for the following reason also. If the buddhi which is denoted by the term 'understanding' were the agent, there would take place a reversal of power, i.e. the instrumental power which appertains to the buddhi would have to be set aside, and to be replaced by the power of an agent. But if the buddhi has the power of an agent, it must be admitted that it is also the object of self-conscious-

¹ *Kakshurâdînâm vishayopanâyakatvât tadupalabdhou kâmanas ketanatvena svâtantryâd udâharasiddhir ity âha neti. Ân. Gi.*

ness (ahampratyaya)¹, since we see that everywhere activity is preceded by self-consciousness, 'I go, I come, I eat, I drink,' &c. But if the buddhi is endowed with the power of an agent and effects all things, we have to assume for it another instrument by means of which it effects everything. For we see that agents although themselves capable of acting yet become really active only through making use of instruments.—Hence the whole dispute is about a name only, and there is no real difference, since in either case that which is different from the instrument of action is admitted to be the agent.

39. And on account of the impossibility of meditation (samādhi).

Moreover the meditation taught in the Vedānta-texts, whose aim is the realisation of the Self as represented by the Upanishads, is possible only if the Self is the agent². Compare the following passages, 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 5*); 'The Self we must seek out, we must try to understand' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1*); 'Meditate on the Self as Om' (*Mu. Up. II, 2, 6*).—Therefrom also it follows that the Self is an agent.

40. And as the carpenter, in double fashion.

That the embodied Self is an agent, has been proved by the reasons set forth in Sūtra 33, &c. We now have to consider whether this agency depends on the fundamental nature of the Self, or is due to its limiting adjuncts.—If here it be maintained that for the same reasons which were employed to prove the Self's being an agent its agency must be held to be natural, there being no reasons to the contrary, we reply as follows.

¹ And that would virtually identify the buddhi with the *gīva*, the individual soul.

² The Self which enjoys the fruit of final release must be the agent in the meditation which is instrumental in bringing about final release.

The Self's being an agent cannot be founded on its real nature, because (if it were so) the impossibility of final release would follow. For if being an agent belongs to the soul's nature, it can never free itself from it—no more than fire can divest itself of heat,—and as long as man has not freed himself from activity he cannot obtain his highest end, since activity is essentially painful.—But, an objection will be raised, the end of man may be obtained, even as long as the potentiality of activity remains, viz. by man avoiding the effects of activity, and this he may accomplish by avoiding its occasions, just as fire, for instance, although endowed with the potentiality of burning, does, if fuel is withheld from it, not produce its natural effect, i.e. burning.—This objection we invalidate by the remark that the occasions, because connected (with the soul) by means of the peculiar connexion called 'potentiality' (power), cannot be avoided absolutely¹.—Nor can it be said that release will be obtained through the means effecting it being employed, because whatever depends on means to be employed is non-eternal. Scripture moreover declares that release results from the instruction about the eternally pure, intelligent, free Self. Now instruction of this nature would not be possible, if the agentship of the Self formed part of its nature. The agentship of the Self is therefore due to the attributes of its adjuncts being ascribed to it, and does not form part of its nature. Hence scripture says of the Self, 'As if thinking, as if moving' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 7*), and 'He (the Self) when in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, is called the enjoyer by wise people' (*Ka. Up. I, 3, 4*); which passages show that the Self passes into the special condition of being an enjoyer, &c., only through its

¹ *Kartṛitvasya dharmādīni nimittāni teshām gñānānivartyatve muktāv api sambhavāt kartṛitvam syāt gñānena tannivṛttau teshām agñānakāryatvāt kṛitam kartṛitvam api tathā syāt, sakter ā saktarākyaśāpekshatayā sanimittakriyālakṣaṇasakyaśāpekshakatvād anirmokṣas tasmān nimittaparihārasya duranushānatvān na śaktivāde muktir iti. Ān. Gi.*

Śaktarākyaśārayā śaktiḥ svasattayāśāśāmyam śakyam ākshipati. Bhā.

connexion with the limiting adjuncts. For to the discerning there is no Self called the living Self and being either agent or enjoyer, apart from the highest Self ; according to the scriptural passage 'There is no other seer but he,' &c. (*Bri. Up.* III. 7, 23). Nor must we suppose that, if there were no intelligent individual Soul, different from the highest Self and distinct from the aggregate consisting of buddhi, &c., it would follow that the highest Self is involved in the *samsāra*-state as agent and enjoyer. For the conditions of being agent and enjoyer are presented by Nescience merely. Scripture also, after having declared (in the passage, 'For where there is duality, as it were, there one sees the other,' &c., *Bri. Up.* IV, 5, 15) that the conditions of being an agent and an enjoyer belong to the state of Nescience only, excludes them from the state of knowledge, 'But where the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' And again, after having declared that the Self, in the states of waking and of dreaming, suffers weariness owing to the contact with its limiting adjuncts, like a falcon flying about in the air, scripture teaches that that fatigue ceases in deep sleep when the soul is embraced by the intelligent (highest) Self. 'This indeed is his true form in which his wishes are fulfilled, in which the Self only is his wish, in which no wish is left,—free from any sorrow'—up to 'This is his highest goal, this is his highest success, this is his highest world, this is his highest bliss' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 21-32).—This the teacher intimates in the Sūtra, 'and as the carpenter in both ways.' 'And' is here used in the sense of 'but.' It is not to be supposed that the agentship of the Self belongs to its true nature, as heat belongs to the nature of fire. But just as in ordinary life a carpenter as long as working with his axe and other tools undergoes pain, while on the other hand he enjoys ease and leisure after having finished his work, laid his tools aside and returned to his home ; so the Self also, as long as it is joined with duality presented by Nescience and is an agent in the states of waking and dreaming, undergoes pain ; but as soon as, for the purpose of shaking off its weariness, it enters into its own highest Self, it frees itself from the complex of effects and instruments, and enjoys full ease in

the state of deep sleep. And in the state of final release also, the Self, having dispelled the darkness of ignorance by the light of knowledge, and having reached the state of absolute isolation and rest, enjoys full ease.—The case of the carpenter must be considered as being parallel to the following extent. The carpenter is, in certain kinds of work, such as cutting wood, &c., an agent with regard to certain definite tools, such as the axe and so on, but a non-agent with his mere body ; so this Self also is an agent in all its functions with regard to its instruments, such as the mind, &c., but is a non-agent by its own Self. On the other hand, the Self has no parts corresponding to the hands and other limbs of the carpenter, by means of which it could take up or put aside its instruments, as the carpenter takes up and puts aside his tools.

In reply to the reasons brought forward in favour of the soul's agentship being natural, as, for instance, the reason based on scripture having a purport, we remark that the scriptural injunctions in prescribing certain acts presuppose an agentship established somehow, but do not themselves aim at establishing the (direct) agentship of the Self. Now we have shown that the agentship of the Self does not constitute part of its real nature because scripture teaches that its true Self is Brahman ; we therefore conclude that the Vedic injunctions are operative with reference to that agentship of the soul which is due to Nescience. Such scriptural passages also as 'The agent, the person whose Self is understanding' (Pr. Up. IV, 9), must be assumed, because being of the nature of anuvādas¹, to refer to an agentship already established elsewhere, and being the product of Nescience.

The preceding remarks refute also the reasons founded on 'the wandering about' and the 'taking' (Sûtras 34, 35), as the statements about them also are mere anuvādas.—But, an objection may be raised, the passage which teaches that the soul while its instruments are asleep, 'moves about,

¹ I.e. being only incidental remarks about matters established or taught elsewhere.

according to its pleasure, within its own body' (*Bṛi. Up. II. 1, 18*), clearly implies that the pure Self is an agent. And in the passage relative to the taking ('(the puruṣa) having through the intelligence of the senses absorbed all intelligence'), the fact of the instruments appearing in the objective and instrumental cases likewise intimates that the pure Self is the agent.—To this we reply that even in the state of dream the instruments of the Self are not altogether at rest; for scripture states that even then it is connected with the buddhi, 'Having become a dream, together with buddhi it passes beyond this world.' *Smṛiti* also says, 'When, the senses being at rest, the mind not being at rest is occupied with the objects, that state know to be a dream.' And scripture says that desire, &c., are modifications of the mind (cp. *Bṛi. Up. I, 5, 3*). Now these are observed in dreams; therefore the Self wanders about in dreams together with the mind only. That wandering about moreover is founded on the mental impressions (*vāsanā*) only, is not real. Thus scripture also in describing our doings in dreams qualifies them by an 'as it were.' 'As it were rejoicing together with women, or laughing as it were, or seeing terrible sights' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 13*). Ordinary people also describe their dreams in the same manner, 'I ascended as it were the summit of a mountain,' 'I saw a tree as it were.'—And although it is true that, in the statement about the taking, the instruments are exhibited in the objective and instrumental cases, still the agentship of the Self must be considered as connected with those instruments, since we have shown that the pure Self cannot be an agent.

In ordinary language also we meet with similar variations of expression; the two sentences, for instance, 'the warriors fight' and 'the king fights by means of his warriors,' really have the same meaning. Moreover, the statement about the taking means to express only the cessation of activity on the part of the instruments, not the independent activity of any one.—The passage referred to above, 'understanding performs the sacrifice,' establishes the agentship of the buddhi merely, as the word 'understanding' is known to

have that sense, and as the mind is mentioned close by, and as in the passage, 'Faith is its head,' &c., faith and so on are declared to be the members of the Self which consists of understanding, and as faith, &c., are known to be attributes of the buddhi. Another reason is furnished by the complementary sentence, 'All gods worship understanding as the oldest, as Brahman' (Taïtt. Up. II, 5), for buddhi is known to be the oldest, i. e. the first produced¹. Another scriptural passage also avers that that sacrifice is accomplished by means of speech and buddhi, 'The sacrifice is what results from speech and mind.' Nor can it rightly be maintained (cp. Sûtra 38) that to view the instruments as agents would lead to an exchange of power on the part of the buddhi; for all instruments must necessarily be considered as agents in regard of their special functions². But with reference to perception (upalabdhi) those instruments are (not agents, but) mere instruments, and perception belongs to the Self. Nor can agentship be ascribed to the Self on account of perception, since permanent perception constitutes its nature (and hence cannot be viewed as a mere transitory activity). Nor can the agentship which has self-consciousness for its antecedent belong to the perceiving principle (upalabdhri); for self-consciousness itself is an object of perception (on the part of the upalabdhri, i. e. the pure, isolated, intelligent Self). And on this doctrine there is no occasion for assuming a further instrument, as we maintain the buddhi itself to be the instrument.

The objection founded on the impossibility of meditation (Sûtra 39) is already refuted by the fact, pointed out above, of scripture having a purport, meditation being enjoined by scripture with reference to such agentship as is already established by other passages.—The result of all this is

¹ According to the *sruti*: mahad yaksham prathamagam veda yo ha vai gyesh/ham ka sresh/ham ka veda.

² Wood, for instance, is an 'agent' in regard of the function of burning, while it is a mere instrument with reference to the action of cooking.

that the agentship of the Self is due to its limiting adjuncts only.

41. But from the highest (Lord there result *samsāra* and *moksha*), because scripture teaches that.

We now enter on the discussion whether the agentship, characterising the individual soul in the state of Nescience and founded on its limiting adjuncts, is independent of the Lord or dependent on him.

The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that the soul as far as it is an agent does not depend on the Lord, because the assumption of such a dependence would serve no purpose. For as the individual soul has motives in its own imperfections, such as passion, aversion, and so on, and is furnished with the whole apparatus of the other constituents of action¹, it is able to occupy on its own account the position of an agent; and what then should the Lord do for it? Nor does ordinary experience show that in addition to the oxen which are required for such actions as ploughing and the like the Lord also is to be depended upon. Moreover (if all activity depended on the Lord) it would follow that the Lord is cruel because imposing on his creatures activity which is essentially painful, and at the same time unjust because allotting to their activities unequal results.—But it has already been shown (II, 1, 34) that the Lord cannot be taxed with cruelty and injustice, on account of his dependence.—True, that has been shown, but only on the condition of the dependence on the Lord being possible. Now such dependence is possible only if there exist religious merit and demerit on the part of the creatures, and these again exist if the soul is an agent; if then the agentship of the soul again depends on the Lord, whereupon will the Lord's dependence depend? And (if we should assume the Lord to determine the souls without reference to their merits and demerits) it would follow that the souls have to undergo

¹ I.e. the constituents of action such as instrument, object, &c., exclusive of the agent.

consequences not due to their actions.—Hence the soul's activity is independent.

Setting aside this *primâ facie* view by means of the word 'but,' the Sûtrakâra asserts 'from the highest.' For the soul which in the state of Nescience is blinded by the darkness of ignorance and hence unable to distinguish itself from the complex of effects and instruments, the *samsâra*-state in which it appears as agent and enjoyer is brought about through the permission of the Lord who is the highest Self, the superintendent of all actions, the witness residing in all beings, the cause of all intelligence; and we must therefore assume that final release also is effected through knowledge caused by the grace of the Lord.

Why so?—'Because scripture teaches that.' For although the soul has its own imperfections, such as passion and so on, for motives, and is furnished with the whole apparatus of action, and although ordinary experience does not show that the Lord is a cause in occupations such as ploughing and the like, yet we ascertain from scripture that the Lord is a causal agent in all activity. For scripture says, 'He makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed' (Kau. Up. III, 8); and again, 'He who dwelling within the Self pulls the Self within' (Sat. Br. XIV, 6, 7, 30).

But if causal agency thus belongs to the Lord, it follows that he must be cruel and unjust, and that the soul has to undergo consequences of what it has not done.—This objection the following Sûtra refutes.

42. But with a view to the efforts made (by the soul) (the Lord makes it act), on account of the (otherwise resulting) purportlessness of the injunctions and prohibitions, &c.

The word 'but' removes the objections started.—The Lord makes the soul act, having regard to the efforts made by it, whether meritorious or non-meritorious. Hence

there is no room for the objections raised. Having regard to the inequality of the virtuous and vicious actions of the souls, the Lord, acting as a mere occasional cause, allots to them corresponding unequal results. An analogous case is furnished by rain. As rain constitutes the common occasional cause for shrubs, bushes, corn, and so on, which belong to different species and spring each from its particular seed—for the inequality of their sap, flowers, fruits, and leaves results neither when rain is absent nor when the special seeds are absent—; so we also must assume that the Lord arranges favourable or unfavourable circumstances for the souls with a view to their former efforts.—But if the activity of the soul is dependent on something else, this having regard (on the part of the Lord) to former effort is inappropriate.—By no means, we reply; for although the activity of the soul is not independent, yet the soul does act. The Lord indeed causes it to act, but it acts itself. Moreover, the Lord in causing it to act now has regard to its former efforts, and he caused it to act in a former existence, having regard to its efforts previous to that existence; a regressus against which, considering the eternity of the *samsāra*, no objections can be raised.—But how is it known that the Lord has regard to the efforts made (in former existences)?—The Sūtra replies: from the purportlessness, &c., of injunctions and prohibitions. For thus (i.e. if the Lord has regard to former actions) injunctions such as ‘he who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice,’ and prohibitions such as ‘a Brāhmaṇa must not be killed,’ are not devoid of purport. On the other alternative they would be without purport, and the Lord would in fact be enjoined in the place of injunctions and prohibitions¹, since the soul would be absolutely dependent. And then the Lord might requite with good those who act according to the injunctions, and with evil men doing what is forbidden; which would

¹ *Īśvara eva vidhinishedhayoḥ sthāne niyugyeta yad vidhinishedhayoḥ phalam tad īśvareṇa tatpratipāditadharmādharmanirapekṣheṇa kṛtam iti. Bhā.*

subvert the authoritativeness of the Veda. Moreover, if the Lord were absolutely without any regard, it would follow that also the ordinary efforts of men are without any purport; and so likewise the special conditions of place, time, and cause. And also the difficulty mentioned above¹ would present itself.—All these latter difficulties the Sûtrakâra comprises in his ‘&c.’

43. (The soul is) a part of the Lord, on account of the declarations of difference, and (because) in a different way also some record that (Brahman) is of the nature of slaves, fishers, and so on.

We have shown that the individual soul and the Lord stand to each other in the relation of what is being acted upon and what is acting upon. This relation is observed in ordinary life to exist only between things connected, such as a master and a servant, or a fire and its sparks. Now as the soul and the Lord also are acknowledged to stand in the relation of what is acted upon and what is acting, a doubt arises whether their connexion is analogous to that of a master and a servant, or to that of a fire and its sparks.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that either the matter is to be considered as undetermined, or that the connexion is like that of master and servant, because that connexion only is well known to be the relation of ruler (Lord) and subject ruled.

To this the Sûtra replies that the soul must be considered a part of the Lord, just as a spark is a part of the fire. By ‘part’ we mean ‘a part as it were,’ since a being not composed of parts cannot have parts in the literal sense.—Why, then, do we not view the Lord, who is not composed of parts, as identical with the soul?—‘On account of the declarations of difference.’ For such scriptural passages as ‘That (self) it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand’ (*Kh. Up.*

¹ I.e. the objectionable assumption that men have to undergo consequences not resulting from their own former actions.

VIII, 7); 'He who knows him becomes a muni' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22*); 'He who dwelling within the Self pulls the Self within' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 23*); which all of them refer to a difference (between the highest and the individual Self) would be inappropriate, if there were no difference.—But, it may be said, these statements of difference would agree better with a relation similar to that of master and servant.—Hence the sūtrakāra adds, 'and otherwise also.' That the soul is a part (of the Lord) we learn not only from the passages declaring their difference, but there are other statements also which teach their non-difference. The members of a certain śākhā of the Atharva-veda record in a Brahma-sūkta that 'Brahman are the fishermen, Brahman the slaves, Brahman these gamblers,' &c. Here low creatures such as fishermen, and slaves depending on their masters, and gamblers are called Brahman; whence it appears that all individual souls which have entered into aggregates of effects and instruments (i.e. bodies) depending on name and form are Brahman. The same view is set forth in other passages such as 'Thou art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff, thou art born with thy face turned everywhere' (*Sve. Up. IV, 3*), and 'The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling (the things by their names)' (*Taitt. Âr. III, 12, 7*). Passages such as 'There is no other seer but he' and other similar ones establish the same truth.—Non-differenced intelligence belongs to the soul and the Lord alike, as heat belongs to the sparks as well as the fire.—From these two views of difference and non-difference there results the comprehensive view of the soul being a part of the Lord.—The following Sūtra supplies a further reason.

44. And on account of the mantra.

A mantra also intimates the same view. 'Such is the greatness of it; greater than it is the Person. One foot of it are all beings, three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven' (*Kh. Up. III, 12, 6*). Here the word 'beings'

denotes all moving and non-moving things, among which the souls occupy the first place ; in accordance with the use of the word in the following passage, ' Not giving pain to any being (bhūta) except at the tīrthas ' (*Kṛ. Up. VIII, 15*). Herefrom also we conclude that the individual soul is a part of the Lord.—And again from the following reason.

45. Moreover it is so stated in *Smṛiti*.

In the *Īsvara-gītā* (*Bhagavad-gītā*) also it is said that the soul is a part of the Lord, ' an eternal part of me becomes the individual soul in the world of life ' (*Bha. Gī. XV, 7*). With regard to the assertion made above, viz. that in ordinary life the relation of ruler and ruled is known to hold good in the case of master and servant &c. only, we remark that, although that may be the case in ordinary life, we ascertain from scripture that the relation of part and whole and that of ruler and ruled may go together. Nor is there anything contradictory in assuming that the Lord who is provided with superexcellent limiting adjuncts rules the souls which are connected with inferior adjuncts only.

Here the *pūrvapakshin* raises another objection. If we admit that the souls are parts of the Lord, it follows that the Lord also, whose part the soul is, will be afflicted by the pain caused to the soul by its experience of the *samsāra*-state ; as we see in ordinary life that the entire *Devadatta* suffers from the pain affecting his hand or foot or some other limb. Herefrom it would follow that they who obtain *Brahman* obtain a greater pain¹ ; so that the former *samsāra*-condition would be preferable, and complete knowledge be devoid of purpose.—To this the following *Sūtra* replies.

46. (As the soul is affected by pleasure and pain) not so the highest (Lord) ; as in the case of light and so on.

We maintain that the highest Lord does not feel the pain of the *samsāra*-state in the same way as the soul does. The soul being engrossed by *Nescience* identifies itself as it were

¹ Viz. by participating in all pain.

with the body and so on, and imagines itself to be affected by the experience of pain which is due to Nescience, 'I am afflicted by the pain due to the body;' the highest Lord, on the other hand, neither identifies himself with a body, nor imagines himself to be afflicted by pain. The pain of the individual soul also is not real, but imaginary only, caused by the error consisting in the non-discrimination of (the Self from) the body, senses, and other limiting adjuncts which are due to name and form, the effects of Nescience. And as a person feels the pain of a burn or cut which affects his body by erroneously identifying himself with the latter, so he feels also the pain affecting others, such as sons or friends, by erroneously identifying himself with them, entering as it were into them through love, and imagining 'I am the son, I am the friend.' Wherefrom we infer with certainty that the feeling of pain is due merely to the error of false imagination. At the same conclusion we arrive on the ground of negative instances. Let us consider the case of many men, each of whom possesses sons, friends, &c., sitting together, some of them erroneously imagining that they are connected with their sons, friends, &c., while others do not. If then somebody calls out 'the son has died,' 'the friend has died,' grief is produced in the minds of those who are under the imagination of being connected with sons and friends, but not in the minds of religious mendicants who have freed themselves from that imagination. From this it appears that perfect knowledge is of use even to an ordinary man; of how much greater use then will it be to him (i.e. the Lord) whose nature is eternal pure intelligence, who sees nothing beside the Self for which there are no objects. Hence it follows that perfect knowledge is not purposeless. —To illustrate this view the Sūtra introduces a comparison 'like light,' &c. Just as the light of the sun or the moon which pervades the entire space becomes straight or bent as it were when the limiting adjuncts with which it is in contact, such as a finger, for instance, are straight or bent, but does not really become so; and just as the ether, although imagined to move as it were when jars are being moved, does not really move; and as the sun does not tremble,

although its image trembles when you shake the cup filled with water in which the sun's light is reflected ; thus the Lord also is not affected by pain, although pain be felt by that part of him which is called the individual soul, is presented by Nescience, and limited by the buddhi and other adjuncts. That also the soul's undergoing pain is due to Nescience only, we have already explained. Accordingly the Vedānta-texts teach that, when the soul's individual state, due to Nescience, is sublated, it becomes Brahman, 'Thou art that &c.'—Thus there is no occasion to conclude that the highest Self is affected by the pain of the individual soul.

47. And the Smṛitis state (that).

Vyāsa and others state in their smṛitis that the highest Self is not afflicted by the pain of the individual soul, 'That highest Self is said to be eternal, devoid of qualities, nor is it stained by the fruits of actions any more than a lotus leaf by water. But that other Self whose essence is action is connected with bondage and release ; again and again it is joined with the seventeenfold aggregate¹.—On the ground of the particle 'and' (in the Sūtra) we have to supply 'and scripture also records that.' So, for instance, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), and 'The one Self within all things is never contaminated by the misery of the world, being himself without' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 11).

Here the pūrvapakshin raises a new objection.—If there is only one internal Self of all beings, what room is there for permissions and prohibitions, worldly as well as Vedic ? You must not reject this objection on the ground of your having proved that the individual soul is a part of the Lord, and that thus injunctions and prohibitions may, without any mutual interference, apply to the soul which is different from the Lord. For there are other scriptural passages which teach that the soul is not different from the Lord, and therefore not a part of him, as, for instance, the following ones :

¹ I.e. the subtle body consisting of the ten sense-organs, the five prāṇas, manas, and buddhi.

'Having sent forth that he entered into it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6); 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 23); 'From death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'Thou art that' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). Should you say that just from this concurrence of intimations of difference on the one hand and non-difference on the other hand it follows that the soul is a part of the Lord, we reply that such might be the case if the intention of the texts were to teach difference as well as non-difference. But the fact is that the texts aim solely at teaching non-difference, because through the knowledge of Brahman being the universal Self the highest end of man is obtained. About difference on the other hand mere occasional statements (anuvāda) are made as about something already established naturally (i.e. apart from scripture). Moreover, we have already maintained that Brahman as not composed of parts can have no parts. Hence it follows that the one highest Self which is within all beings appears as individual soul, and it therefore remains to show how injunctions and prohibitions are possible.

48. (The possibility of) injunctions and prohibitions (results) from the connexion (of the Self) with bodies; as in the case of light and so on.

Passages such as 'He is to approach his wife at the proper time,' and 'he is not to approach the wife of his guru,' are examples of permissions (or injunctions) and prohibitions; or again passages such as 'He is to kill the animal devoted to Agnīshomau,' and 'He is not to hurt any being.' Corresponding examples from ordinary life are: 'A friend is to be served,' and 'Enemies are to be shunned.' Permissions and prohibitions of this kind are possible, because the Self although one only is connected with various bodies.—Of what kind then is that connexion?—It consists in the origination in the Self of the erroneous notion that the Self is the aggregate consisting of the body and so on. This erroneous notion is seen to prevail in all living beings, and finds its expression in thoughts such as the following: 'I go,' 'I come,' 'I am blind,' 'I am not blind,' 'I am con-

fused,' *'I am not confused.'* That erroneous notion cannot be removed by anything but perfect knowledge, and before the latter supervenes, it remains spread among all living beings. And thus, although the Self must be admitted to be one only, injunctions and prohibitions are possible owing to the difference effected by its connexion with bodies and other limiting adjuncts, the products of Nescience.—It then follows that for him who has obtained perfect knowledge, injunctions and prohibitions are purportless.—No, we reply, (they are not purportless for him, but they do not refer to him), since to him who has obtained the highest aim no obligation can apply. For obligations are imposed with reference to things to be avoided or desired; how then should he, who sees nothing, either to be wished or avoided, beyond the universal Self, stand under any obligation? The Self certainly cannot be enjoined on the Self.—Should it be said that injunctions and prohibitions apply to all those who discern that the soul is something different from the body (and therefore also to him who possesses perfect knowledge), we reply that (such an assertion is too wide, since) obligation depends on a man's imagining his Self to be (actually) connected with the body. It is true that obligation exists for him only who views the soul as something different from the body; but fundamentally all obligation is an erroneous imagination existing in the case of him only who does not see that his Self is no more connected with a body than the ether is with jars and the like. For him, on the other hand, who does not see that connexion no obligation exists, much less, therefore, for him who discerns the unity of the Self.—Nor does it result from the absence of obligation, that he who has arrived at perfect knowledge can act as he likes; for in all cases it is only the wrong imagination (as to the Self's connexion with a body) that impels to action, and that imagination is absent in the case of him who has reached perfect knowledge.—From all this it follows that injunctions and prohibitions are based on the Self's connexion with the body; 'as in the case of light.' The case under discussion is analogous to cases such as the following: Light is one only, and yet we shun

a fire which has consumed dead bodies, not any other fire. The sun is one only ; yet we shun only that part of his light which shines on unholy places, not that part which falls on pure ground. Some things consisting of earth are desired, e.g. diamonds and beryls ; other things likewise consisting of earth are shunned, e.g. dead bodies. The urine and dung of cows are considered pure and used as such ; those of other animals are shunned. And many similar cases.

49. And on account of the non-extension (of the individual soul), there is no confusion (of the results of actions).

Well, let it be granted that injunctions and prohibitions are valid, because the Self although one is joined with particular bodies.—From the admission, however, of the unity of the Self it follows that there must be a confusion of the fruits of actions, there being only one master (i.e. one soul to enjoy the fruits of action).—This is not so, we reply, because there is no extension of the acting and enjoying Self, i.e. no connexion on its part with all bodies. For, as we have shown, the individual soul depends on its adjuncts, and owing to the non-extension of those adjuncts there is also non-extension of the soul. Hence there is no confusion of actions or fruits of actions.

50. And (the individual soul is) an appearance (reflection) only.

And that individual soul is to be considered a mere appearance of the highest Self, like the reflection of the sun in the water ; it is neither directly that (i.e. the highest Self), nor a different thing. Hence just as, when one reflected image of the sun trembles, another reflected image does not on that account tremble also ; so, when one soul is connected with actions and results of actions, another soul is not on that account connected likewise. There is therefore no confusion of actions and results. And as that 'appearance' is the effect of Nescience, it follows that the *samsāra* which is based on it (the appearance) is also the

effect of Nescience, so that from the removal of the latter there results the cognition of the soul being in reality nothing but Brahman.

For those, on the other hand, who maintain that there are many Selfs and all of them all-pervading, it follows that there must be a confusion of actions and results.—In what way?—According to the opinion of the Sāṅkhyas there exist many all-pervading Selfs, whose nature is pure intelligence, devoid of qualities and of unsurpassable excellence. For the common purpose of all of them there exists the *pradhāna*, through which the souls obtain enjoyment and release.—According to the followers of *Kaṇāda* there exist many all-pervading Selfs, but they are, like so many jars or stools, mere substances and unintelligent in themselves. With those Selfs there co-operate the internal organs (*manas*), atomic and also unintelligent. From the conjunction of these two classes of substances, viz. the Selfs and the internal organs, there spring the nine special qualities of the Selfs, viz. desire, &c.¹ These qualities inhere in the individual Selfs separately, without any confusion, and that constitutes the *samsāra*-state. Final release, on the other hand, consists in the absolute non-origination of those nine qualities.

With regard to these opinions we remark that, as far as the Sāṅkhyas are concerned, their doctrine that all Selfs are of the nature of intelligence, and that there is no difference between them in the point of proximity (to the *pradhāna*), &c.², implies that, if one Self is connected with pleasure and pain, all Selfs will be so connected.—Well but, the Sāṅkhya might reply, a difference (in the connexion of the individual Selfs with pleasure and pain) may result from the circumstance that the activity of the *pradhāna* aims at the isolation (emancipation) of the Selfs³. Other-

¹ Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, endeavour, merit, demerit, and *bhāvanā*.

² The &c. implies the non-activity (*audāsīnya*) of the Selfs.

³ And therefore proceeds in a special definite direction capable of effecting in the end the emancipation of some particular Self.

wise the activity of the *pradhāna* would serve no other end but to manifest the *pradhāna*'s power, in consequence whereof no final release would ever take place.—This argumentation, we reply, is not sound. For we have no right to assume a difference which has for its only motive the accomplishment of an end desirable (to us, viz. the emancipation of the Self), but we must rather bring forward some proof for that difference. If no such proof can be brought forward, the desired end, i.e. the emancipation of the soul, must be supposed not to take place; while at the same time the absence of any cause of difference establishes the confusion of actions and their results.—Against the *Kāṇādas* we urge that if, on their theory, the internal organ is connected with one soul, it must in the same way be connected with all other souls as well, as there is no difference in the point of proximity, &c.¹ Hence, there being no difference of cause and consequently no difference of effect, it follows that, when one soul is connected with pleasure and pain, all souls are thus connected.—But may not the limitation (of actions and their results) be caused by the unseen principle (*adrishṭa*)? By no means, the following Sūtra replies.

51. On account of the unseen principle being non-limitative.

While there are many souls, all-pervading like ether, and in equal proximity to all bodies from within as well as without, the so-called unseen principle (*adrishṭa*), which is of the nature of religious merit or demerit, is acquired through mind, speech, and body (i.e. thoughts, words, and actions).—Now, according to the *Sāṅkhyas*, that principle inheres not in the Self, but abides in the *pradhāna* and cannot, on account of the *pradhāna* being the same (for all souls), be the limitative cause of the enjoyment of pleasure and pain for each individual Self.—And according to the *Kāṇādas* also the unseen principle is due to the non-particular conjunction of the Selfs with the internal

¹ The ' &c.' implies substantiality and so on.

organs, and as thus there is no limitative reason for any particular *adrishṭa* belonging to any particular soul, the doctrine is open to the same objection.—Well, but there are at work in every particular Self resolutions, &c., such as, ‘I wish to obtain that result,’ ‘I wish to avoid that other result,’ ‘I am striving for that purpose,’ ‘I wish to act in that way,’ &c. &c., and these may, we assume, define the relation of ownership in which particular Selves stand to particular *adrishṭas*.—This objection is negatived in the following Sūtra.

52. And this is also the case in resolutions, &c.

The objection pointed out before applies also to resolutions, &c., for they also are made through the non-particular conjunction of the internal organ and the Self, in proximity to all Selves. Hence they also cannot furnish a reason for limitation.

53. (Should it be said that distinction of pleasure, pain, &c., results) from (difference of) place; we say no, on account of the (Self’s) being within (all things).

Here it might be objected that, although all Selves are all-pervading, yet their conjunction with the internal organ which is seated in the body must take place in that part of each Self which is limited by the body; and that thus there may result from difference of locality a limitative distinction of resolutions, &c., of the *adrishṭa*, and of pleasure and pain.—This also, we reply, is not possible ‘on account of the being within.’ For, as being equally infinite, all Selves are within all bodies. Thus the *Vaiśeṣikas* have no right whatever to assume any part of the Self to be limited by the body. And if they do assume such a part of the Self which in reality is without any parts, that part because merely assumptive will be incapable of limiting a real effect. Moreover, it is impossible to limit the body which originates in proximity to all (omnipresent) Selves to one particular Self to the exclusion of all others. Moreover, on the doctrine of limitation due

to difference of place, it would follow that sometimes two Selfs enjoying the same pleasure or pain might effect their fruition by one and the same body, since it may happen that the unseen principle of two Selfs occupies the same place. For we may observe, e.g. that after Devadatta's body has moved away from a certain spot in which Devadatta had enjoyed a certain amount of pleasure or pain, and the body of Yağñadatta has moved into that very same place, Yağñadatta enjoys an equal amount of pleasure or pain; a thing which (on the theory discussed) could not happen if the unseen principles of the two men did not occupy the same place. From the doctrine that the unseen principles occupy fixed places it would, moreover, follow that no enjoyment of the heavenly world, &c. can take place; for the *adrishṭa* is effected in definite places such as e.g. the body of a Brāhmaṇa, and the enjoyment of the heavenly world is bound to a definite different place.—It further¹ is impossible to maintain that there exist many all-pervading Selfs², as there are no parallel instances. Mention if you can a plurality of other things occupying the same place!—You will perhaps bring forward colour and so on³. But we refuse to accept that instance as parallel, because colour, &c., although non-different in so far as they are attributes of one substance, yet differ through their essential characteristics. On the other hand there is no difference of characteristics between your (alleged) many Selfs. If you say that a difference of characteristics can be established on the ground of the ultimate special differences (of all substances), we point out that you implicate yourself in a logical circle as the assumption of difference of characteristics and the assumption of ultimate differences presuppose each other.

¹ And this is an attack on the basis of the position of the Sāṅkhyas as well as of the Vāireśhikas.

² Which being equally omnipresent would all occupy the same space.

³ Many attributes such as colour, smell, touch, &c. reside in one place as belonging to one material object.

Should you adduce as parallel instances the all-pervadingness of ether, &c. (the ' &c.' implying place and time), we reply that their all-pervadingness is not proved for him who holds the doctrine of Brahman and looks upon ether and so on as mere effects.

All which establishes the conclusion that the only doctrine not open to any objections is the doctrine of the unity of the Self.

FOURTH PĀDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. Thus the vital airs.

In the third pāda it has been shown that a conflict of Vedic passages as to ether, &c., does not exist. The same is now done in this fourth pāda with regard to the vital airs. On the one hand the chapters treating of the origin of things do not record an origin of the vital airs; so e.g. (*Kh. Up.* VI, 2, 3) 'It sent forth fire,' &c.; and (*Taitt. Up.* II, 1) 'From that Self sprang ether,' &c. On the other hand it is said expressly in some places that the vital airs were not produced. The following passage, e.g. 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning; they say: what was that non-being? those *rīshis* indeed were the non-being in the beginning; they say: who are those *rīshis*? the vital airs indeed are the *rīshis*' (*Sat. Br.* VI, 1, 1, 1), states that the vital airs existed before the origin of things.—In other passages again we read of the origin of the vital airs also, so e.g. 'As small sparks come forth from fire, thus do all vital airs come forth from that Self' (*Bṛi. Up.* II, 1, 20); 'From that is born the vital air, mind, and all organs of sense' (*Mu. Up.* II, 1, 3); 'The seven vital airs also spring from him' (*Mu. Up.* II, 1, 8); 'He sent forth the vital air; from the vital air *śraddhā*, ether, air, light, water, earth, sense, mind, food' (*Pr. Up.* VI, 4). Hence as there is a conflict of scriptural passages, and as no reason can be made out for deciding in favour of either alternative, the *pūrvapakshin* thinks that either no opinion can be formed, or that the passages relative to the origin of the vital airs must be taken in a metaphorical sense, since scripture expressly states the *prāṇas* to have existed before the creation.

In reply to this the author of the Sūtras says, 'thus the

prāṇas.—What then, it will be asked, is the fitness of the word ‘thus,’ as there is no point of comparison with the matter under discussion? The matter under discussion at the conclusion of the preceding pāda was the refutation of those who maintain a plurality of omnipresent Selfs, and with this no comparison can be instituted because there is no similarity. For a comparison is possible only where there is similarity; as when we say, e.g. ‘as a lion so is Bala-varman.’ Possibly it might be said that the comparison is meant to intimate similarity with the *advīṣṭa*; the meaning being that as the *advīṣṭa* is not limited because it is produced in proximity to all Selfs, so the *prāṇas* also are not limited with regard to all the different Selfs. But, on that explanation, the Sūtra would be an idle repetition, as it has already been explained that that absence of limitation is due to the non-limitation of bodies.—Nor can the *prāṇas* be compared with the individual soul, because that would be contrary to the conclusion about to be established. For it has been shown that the individual soul is without an origin, while the intention is to declare that the *prāṇas* have an origin. Hence it appears that the word ‘so’ is devoid of connexion.—Not so, we reply. A connexion may be established by means of a comparison based on the exemplifying passages. Under that category fall those passages which state the origin of the *prāṇas*, as e.g. ‘From that Self come forth all *prāṇas*, all worlds, all gods, all beings’ (*Bṛi. Up. II, 1, 20*); which passage means that as the worlds and so on are produced from the highest Brahman so the *prāṇas* also. Such passages also as (*Mu. Up. II, 1, 3*) ‘From him are born *prāṇa*, mind and all organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth the support of all,’ are to be considered as intimating that the origin of the *prāṇas* is analogous to that of the ether, &c.—Or else, as a connexion with a somewhat remote object of comparison is resorted to in such cases as the one treated of in *Pū. Mī. Sū. III, 4, 32* (‘and the accident in drinking Soma, in the same manner’)¹, we may construe our Sūtra in the following

¹ The ‘*tadvat*’ in the quoted Sūtra refers not to the immediately preceding *adhiparāṇa* but to Sūtra III, 4, 28.

way: in the same way as ether and so on, which are mentioned in the beginning of the preceding pāda, are understood to be effects of the highest Brahman, so the prāṇas also are effects of the highest Brahman. And if it be asked what reason we have for assuming the prāṇas to be so, we reply: the fact of this being stated by scripture.—But it has been shown above that in some places the origin of the prāṇas is not mentioned.—That is of no weight, we reply, as it is mentioned in other places. For the circumstance of a thing not being stated in some places has no power to invalidate what is stated about it in other places. Hence, on account of equality of scriptural statement, it is proper to maintain that the prāṇas also are produced in the same way as ether and so on.

2. On account of the impossibility of a secondary (origin of the prāṇas).

Against the objection that the origin of the prāṇas must be understood in a secondary sense because the text states that they existed before the origin of the world, the Sūtra-kāra declares 'on account of the impossibility of a secondary origin.' The statement as to the origin of the prāṇas cannot be taken in a secondary sense because therefrom would result the abandonment of a general assertion. For after the text has asserted that the knowledge of everything depends on the knowledge of one ('What is that through which when it is known everything else becomes known?' Mu. Up. I, 1, 3), it goes on to say, in order to prove that assertion, that 'From him is born prāṇa,' &c. (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3). Now the assertion is made good only if the whole world including the prāṇas is an effect of Brahman, because then there is no effect independent of the material cause; if on the other hand the statement as to the origin of the prāṇas were taken in a secondary sense, the assertion would thereby be stultified. The text, moreover, makes some concluding statements about the matter asserted, 'The Person is all this, sacrifice, penance, Brahman, the highest Immortal' (II, 1, 10), and 'Brahman alone is all this; it is the Best.'—That same

assertion is to be connected with such passages as the following, 'When we see, hear, perceive, and know the Self, then all this is known' (*Bṛi.* Up. II, 4, 5).—How then have we to account for the statement that the *prāṇas* existed before the creation?—That statement, we reply, does not refer to the fundamental causal substance; for we ascertain from scriptural passages, such as *Mu.* Up. II, 1, 2 ('That heavenly Person is without breath and without mind, pure, higher than the high Imperishable'), that the fundamental causal substance is devoid of all distinctions such as breath and the like. We must rather view the statement about the existence of the *prāṇas* before the creation as having for its object a subordinate causal substance¹, and being made with reference to the effects of the latter only. For it is known from *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* that even in the universe of evolved things many states of being may stand to each other in the relation of causal substance and effect. —In the *adhikāraṇa* treating of the ether there occurred a *Sūtra* (composed of the same syllables) '*gauṇyasambhavāt*,' which as being the *pūrvapakṣa-sūtra* had to be explained as '*gauṇī asambhavāt*,' 'the statement about the origin of ether must be taken in a secondary sense on account of the impossibility (of the primary sense).' There the final conclusion was established by means of the abandonment of the general assertion. Here on the other hand the *Sūtra* is the *Siddhānta Sūtra* and we have therefore explained it as meaning 'on account of the impossibility of a secondary meaning.'—Those who explain the present *Sūtra* in the same way as the previous *Sūtra* overlook the fact of the general assertion being abandoned (*viz.* if the passages referring to the origin of the *prāṇas* were taken in a secondary sense).

3. On account of that (word which indicates origin) being enunciated at first (in connexion with the *prāṇas*).

That the scriptural statement about the origin of the

¹ Such as *Hiranyagarbha*.

prāṇas is to be taken in its literal sense just as the statements about the ether, &c., appears from that circumstance also that the one word which (in the passage from the Mu. Up.) indicates origination, viz. 'is born' (*gāyate*), is in the first place connected with the *prāṇas* and has afterwards to be joined with ether, &c., also ('from him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air,' &c.). Now as it is a settled matter that the phrase 'is born' must be taken in its primary sense with reference to ether and so on, it follows that the origin of the *prāṇas* also to which the same word is applied must be understood as a real origin. For it would be impossible to decide that a word enunciated once only in one chapter and one sentence, and connected with many other words, has in some cases to be taken in its primary sense, and in others in a secondary sense; for such a decision would imply want of uniformity.—So likewise in the passage, 'He sent forth *prāṇa*, from *prāṇa* *śraddhā*,' &c. (Pr. Up. VI, 4), the phrase 'he sent forth' which the text exhibits in conjunction with the *prāṇas* has to be carried on to *śraddhā* and the other things which have an origin.—The same reasoning holds good in those cases where the word expressing origination occurs at the end and has to be connected with the preceding words; as e.g. in the passage ending 'all beings come forth from the Self,' where the word 'come forth' must be connected with the *prāṇas*, &c., mentioned in the earlier part of the sentence.

4. Because speech is preceded by that (viz. fire and the other elements).

Although in the chapter, 'That sent forth fire,' &c., the origin of the *prāṇas* is not mentioned, the origin of the three elements, fire, water, and earth only being stated, nevertheless, the fact of the text declaring that speech, *prāṇa*, and mind presuppose fire, water, and earth—which in their turn have Brahman for their causal substance—proves that they—and, by parity of reasoning, all *prāṇas*—have sprung from Brahman. That speech, *prāṇa*, and mind presuppose fire, water, and earth is told in the same chapter, 'For truly, my child, mind consists of earth, breath of water,

speech of fire' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 5, 4). If their consisting of earth and so on is taken literally, it follows at once that they have sprung from Brahman. And if it be taken in a metaphorical sense only, yet, as the sentence forms part of the chapter which treats of the evolution of names and forms effected by Brahman; and as the introductory phrase runs, 'That by which we hear what is not heard' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 1, 3); and as the concluding passage is 'In it all that exists has its Self' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 7); and as the matter is moreover known from other scriptural passages; we understand that also the statement about mind and so on consisting of earth, &c., is meant to teach that they are products of Brahman.—It is therefore an established conclusion that the *prāṇas* also are effects of Brahman.

5. (The *prāṇas* are) seven, on account of this being understood (from scriptural passages) and of the specification (of those seven).

So far we have shown that there is in reality no conflict of scriptural passages regarding the origin of the *prāṇas*. It will now be shown that there is also no conflict regarding their number. The chief vital air (*mukhya prāṇa*) will be discussed later on. For the present the *Sūtrakāra* defines the number of the other *prāṇas*. A doubt arises here owing to the conflicting nature of the scriptural passages. In one place seven *prāṇas* are mentioned, 'The seven *prāṇas* spring from him' (*Mu. Up.* II, 1, 8). In another place eight *prāṇas* are mentioned as being *grahas*, 'Eight *grahas* there are and eight *atigrahas*' (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 2, 1). In another place nine, 'Seven are the *prāṇas* of the head, two the lower ones' (*Taitt. Samh.* V, 3, 2, 5). Sometimes ten, 'Nine *prāṇas* indeed are in men, the navel is the tenth' (*Taitt. Samh.* V, 3, 2, 3). Sometimes eleven, 'Ten are these *prāṇas* in man, and *Ātman* is the eleventh' (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 9, 4). Sometimes twelve, 'All touches have their centre in the skin,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up.* II, 4, 11). Sometimes thirteen, 'The eye and what can be seen,' &c. (*Pr. Up.* IV, 8).—Thus the scriptural passages disagree about the number of the *prāṇas*.

Here the pūrvapakshin maintains that the prānas are in reality seven in number, on account of understanding, i.e. because they are understood to be so many, from passages such as 'The seven prānas spring from him,' &c. These seven prānas are moreover specified in the other passage quoted above, 'Seven indeed are the prānas of the head.'—But in the same passage we meet with the following reiteration, 'Resting in the cave they are placed there seven and seven,' which intimates that there are prānas in addition to the seven.—No matter, we reply; that reiteration is made with reference to the plurality of men, and means that each man has seven prānas; it does not mean that there are two sets of seven prānas each of different nature.—But, another objection will be raised, other scriptural passages speak of the prānas as eight in number; how then should they be seven?—True, we reply, the number of eight also is stated; but on account of the contradictory nature of the statements we have to decide in favour of either of the two numbers; hence we decide in favour of the number seven, in deference to the (simpler) assumption of a low number, and consider the statements of other numbers to refer to the difference of modifications (of the fundamental seven prānas).—To this argumentation the next Sūtra replies.

6. But (there are also, in addition to the seven prānas mentioned,) the hands and so on. This being a settled matter, therefore (we must) not (conclude) thus (viz. that there are seven prānas only).

In addition to the seven prānas scripture mentions other prānas also, such as the hands, &c., 'The hand is one graha and that is seized by work as the atigraha; for with the hands one does work' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 2, 8*), and similar passages. And as it is settled that there are more than seven, the number seven may be explained as being contained within the greater number. For wherever there is a conflict between a higher and a lower number, the higher number has to be accepted because the lower one is contained within it; while the higher is not contained within the lower. We therefore must not conclude that, in deference to the lower

number, seven *prāṇas* have to be assumed, but rather that there are eleven *prāṇas*, in deference to the higher number. This conclusion is confirmed by one of the passages quoted, 'Ten are these *prāṇas* in man, and *Ātman* is the eleventh.' By the word *Ātman* we have to understand the internal organ, on account of its ruling over the organs. Should it be objected that scripture also mentions numbers higher than eleven, viz. twelve and thirteen, we admit that, but remark that there are no objective effects in addition to the eleven (well-known) objective effects on account of which additional organs would have to be assumed. There are five distinctions of *buddhi* having for their respective objects sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, and on their account there are the five intellectual organs; again there are five classes of action, viz. speaking, taking, going, evacuation, and begetting, and on their account there are the five organs of action; finally there is the *manas* which has all things for its objects and extends to the past, the present, and the future; it is one only but has various functions. On account of the plurality of its functions we find it designated by different terms in different places, as *manas* or *buddhi* or *ahamkāra* or *kitta*. Thus scripture also after having enumerated the various functions such as desire, &c., says at the end, 'All this is *manas* only.'—That passage again which speaks of the *prāṇas* of the head as seven means four *prāṇas* only, which on account of the plurality of their places may be counted as seven; viz. the two ears, the two eyes, the two nostrils, and speech.—Nor can it be maintained that there are in reality only so many (i.e. seven), the other *prāṇas* being mere functions of the seven; for the functions of the hands and so on are absolutely different (from the functions of the seven senses admitted by the *pūrvapakshin*).—Again, in the passage 'Nine *prāṇas* indeed are in man, the navel is the tenth,' the expression 'ten *prāṇas*' is used to denote the different openings of the human body, not the difference of nature of the *prāṇas*, as we conclude from the navel being mentioned as the eleventh. For no *prāṇa* is known that bears the name of navel; but the navel as being one of the special abodes of the chief *prāṇa* is here enu-

merated as a tenth *prāna*.—In some places so and so many are counted for the purpose of meditation ; in other places so and so many for the purpose of illustration ¹. As the statements concerning the number of the *prānas* are of so varying a nature we must therefore distinguish in each case what the object of the statement is. Meanwhile it remains a settled conclusion that that statement which makes the *prānas* to be eleven is authoritative, on account of the objective effects (being eleven also).

The two Sūtras (referring to the number of the *prānas*) may be construed in the following manner also. The *prānas* are seven because scripture mentions the going (*gati*) of seven only, 'When he thus departs life departs after him, and when life thus departs all the other *prānas* ² depart after it' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 2*).—But, it may be objected, this passage says 'all the other *prānas*;' how then does it declare the going of seven only?—The Sūtra replies, 'on account of their being specified.' Seven senses only, from seeing up to feeling, are specified there because so many only are under discussion ; as we see from the enumeration given in the passage, 'When that person in the eye turns away then he ceases to know any forms. He has become one they say, he does not see' &c. The word 'all' refers here only to what is under discussion, i.e. only to the seven *prānas* mentioned before, not to any other. Analogously when we say 'all the Brāhmanas have been fed,' we mean only those Brāhmanas who have been invited and concern us at the time, not any other.—If it be objected that the passage quoted mentions understanding (*viṣṇāna*) as the eighth thing departing, and that we therefore have no right to speak of the departing of seven only, we reply that *manas* and understanding differ not in essential nature but only in function, and that on this account we are entitled to speak of seven *prānas* only.—The answer to this

¹ *Sapta prānāḥ prabhavāntīty āder gatim āha kvaṇid iti, ashṭau grahā ityāder gatim sūtrayati gatim iti. Ān. Gi.*

² I.e. seeing, smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, feeling, and the *manas*.

pūrvapaksha is as follows.—In addition to the seven senses, other *prāṇas* also, such as the hands, are known to exist, as we see from such passages as ‘The hands are one *graha*,’ &c. (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 2, 8). By their being a *graha* (seizer) is meant that they are bonds by which the individual soul (*kshetragñā*) is tied. Now the individual soul is tied not in one body only, but is equally tied in other bodies also. Hence it follows that that bond called *graha* (i.e. among other things the hands) moves over into other bodies also. *Smṛiti* also (‘He—the Self—is joined with the aggregate of eight, comprising breath, &c.¹, as his mark; his bondage consists in being bound by it, his release in being freed from it’) shows that the Self is, previous to final release, not freed from the bonds called *grahas*. And also in the enumeration of the senses and their objects given by the *Atharvāna Upanishad* (‘The eye and what can be seen,’ &c., *Pr. Up.* IV, 8), the organs of action such as the hands and so on, together with their objects, are specified as well, ‘the hands and what can be grasped; the member and what can be delighted; the anus and what can be evacuated; the feet and what can be walked.’ Moreover the passage, ‘These ten vital breaths and *ātman* as the eleventh; when they depart from this mortal body they make us cry’ (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 9, 4), shows that eleven *prāṇas* depart from the body.—Moreover the word ‘all’ (which occurs in the passage, *Bṛi. Up.* IV, 4, 2) must, because connected with the word ‘*prāṇas*,’ denote all *prāṇas*, and cannot, on the ground of general subject-matter, be limited to the seven *prāṇas*; for a direct statement has greater force than the subject-matter. Even in the analogous sentence, ‘all *Brāhmaṇas* have been fed,’ we have, on the ground of the words, to understand all *Brāhmaṇas* living on the earth; but because it is impossible to feed all *Brāhmaṇas* in the latter sense, we accept that meaning of

¹ The eightfold aggregate of which the Self is freed in final release only comprises the five *prāṇas* (vital airs), the pentad of the five subtle elements, the pentad of the organs of intellect, the pentad of the organs of action, the tetrad of internal organs (*manas*, &c.), *avidyā*, desire (*kāma*), and *karman*.

'all,' according to which it denotes all invited Brāhmaṇas. In our case on the other hand there is no reason whatever for narrowing the meaning of 'all.'—Hence the word 'all' includes all prāṇas without exception. Nothing on the other hand prevents the enumeration of seven prāṇas being taken as illustrative only. It is therefore an established conclusion, resting on the number of the effects as well as on Vedic statement, that there are eleven prāṇas.

7. And (they are) minute.

The author of the Sūtras adds another characteristic quality of the prāṇas. The prāṇas under discussion must be viewed as minute. By their minuteness we have to understand subtilty and limited size; but not atomic size, as otherwise they would be incapable of producing effects which extend over the whole body. They must be subtle; for if they were big the persons surrounding a dying man would see them coming out from the body at the moment of death, as a snake comes out of its hole. They must be limited; for if they were all-pervading the scriptural statements as to their passing out of the body, going and coming, would be contradicted thereby, and it could not be established that the individual soul is 'the essence of the qualities of that' (i. e. the manas; cp. II, 3, 29). Should it be said that they may be all-pervading, but at the same time appear as functions (*vr̥tti*) in the body only, we rejoin that only a function can constitute an instrument. Whatever effects perception, may it be a function or something else, just that is an instrument for us. The disagreement is therefore about a name only, and the assumption of the instruments (prāṇas) being all-pervading is thus purposeless.—Hence we decide that the prāṇas are subtle and of limited size.

8. And the best (i. e. the chief vital air).

The Sūtra extends to the chief vital air (*mukhya prāṇa*) a quality already asserted of the other prāṇas, viz. being an effect of Brahman.—But, an objection may be raised, it has already been stated of all prāṇas without difference that they are effects of Brahman; e. g. the passage, 'From him

is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3), states the origin of *prāṇa* separately from the senses and the *manas*; and there are other passages also such as 'He sent forth *prāṇa*' (Pr. Up. VI, 4). Why then the formal extension?—We reply: For the purpose of removing further doubt. For in the *Nāsadiya-sūkta* whose subject is Brahman there occurs the following mantra: 'There was neither death nor the Immortal; nor manifestation of either night or day. By its own law the One was breathing without wind; there was nothing different from that or higher than it' (*Ri. Samh.* X, 129, 2). Here the words, 'was breathing,' which denote the proper function of breath, intimate that breath existed as it were before the creation. And therefrom it might be concluded that *prāṇa* is not produced; an idea which the *Sūtrakāra* discards by the formal extension (to *prāṇa* of the quality of having originated from Brahman).—Moreover the word 'breathed' does not intimate that *prāṇa* existed before the creation; for in the first place it is qualified by the addition 'without wind,' and in the second place scriptural passages—such as 'He is without breath, without mind, pure' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2)—declare expressly that the causal substance is without any qualifications such as *prāṇa* and so on. Hence the word 'breathed' has merely the purpose of setting forth the existence of the cause.—The term 'the best' (employed in the *Sūtra*) denotes the chief vital air, according to the declaration of scripture, 'Breath indeed is the oldest and the best' (*Kh. Up.* V, 1, 1). The breath is the oldest because it begins its function from the moment when the child is conceived; the senses of hearing, &c., on the other hand, begin to act only when their special seats, viz. the ears, &c., are formed, and they are thus not 'the oldest.' The designation 'the best' belongs to the *prāṇa* on account of its superior qualities and on account of the passage, 'We shall not be able to live without thee' (*Bṛi. Up.* VI, 1, 13).

9. (The chief *prāṇa* is) neither air nor function, on account of its being mentioned separately.

An inquiry is now started concerning the nature of that chief *prāṇa*.—The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that the *prāṇa* is, according to *Sruti*, nothing but air. For *Sruti* says, 'Breath is air; that air assuming five forms is *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, *samāna*.'—Or else the *pūrvapaksha* may be formulated according to the view of another philosophical doctrine, and *prāṇa* may be considered as the combined function of all organs. For so the followers of another doctrine (*viz.* the *Sāṅkhyas*) teach, 'The five airs, *prāṇa*, &c., are the common function of the instruments¹.'

To this we reply that the *prāṇa* is neither air nor the function of an organ; for it is mentioned separately. From air *prāṇa* is distinguished in the following passage, 'Breath indeed is the fourth foot of Brahman. That foot shines as *Agni* with its light and warmth.' If *prāṇa* were mere air, it would not be mentioned separately from air.—Thus it is also mentioned separately from the functions of the organs; for the texts enumerate speech and the other organs and mention *prāṇa* separately from them, and the function and that to which the function belongs (the organ) are identical. If it were a mere function of an organ, it would not be mentioned separately from the organs. Other passages also in which the *prāṇa* is mentioned separately from air and the organs are here to be considered so, e.g. 'From him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air,' &c. (*Mu. Up.* II, 1, 3). Nor is it possible that all the organs together should have one function (and that that function should be the *prāṇa*); for each organ has its own special function and the aggregate of them has no active power of its own.—But—an objection may be raised—the thing may take place in the manner of the moving bird-cage. Just as eleven birds shut up in one cage may, although each makes a separate effort, move the cage by the combination of their efforts; so the eleven

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sū.* II, 31; where, however, the reading is '*sāmānya-karavṛtīḥ*,' explained by the Comm. as *sādhārāṇī karavṛtīḥ antaḥ-karavṛtīḥ* *parivāṇabhedā itī*. *Sāṅkara*, on the other hand, understands by *karava* the eleven *prāṇas* discussed previously.

prāṇas which abide in one body may, although each has its own special function, by the combination of these functions, produce one common function called prāṇa.—This objection, we reply, is without force. The birds indeed may, by means of their separate subordinate efforts, which all favour the movement of the cage, move the cage by combination; that is a matter of observation. But we have no right to assume that the different prāṇas with their subordinate functions such as hearing &c. can, by combination, produce the function of vital breath; for there is no means to prove this, and the vital breath is in kind absolutely different from hearing and so on.—Moreover, if the vital breath were the mere function of an organ (or the organs) it could not be glorified as the ‘best,’ and speech and so on could not be represented as subordinate to it. Hence the vital breath is different from air and the functions (of the organs).—How then have we to understand the scriptural passage, ‘The prāṇa is air,’ &c.?—The air, we reply, passing into the adhyātma-state, dividing itself fivefold and thus abiding in a specialized condition is called prāṇa. It therefore is neither a different being nor is it mere air. Hence there is room for those passages as well which identify it with air as those which do not.—Well, let this be granted. The prāṇa then also must be considered to be independent in this body like the individual soul, as scripture declares it to be the ‘best’ and the organs such as speech, &c., to be subordinate to it. For various powers are ascribed to it in scriptural passages. It is said, for instance, that when speech and the other (organs) are asleep the prāṇa alone is awake; that the prāṇa alone is not reached by death; that the prāṇa is the absorber, it absorbs speech, &c.; that the prāṇa guards the other senses (prāṇas) as a mother her sons¹. Hence it follows that the prāṇa is independent in the same way as the individual soul.—This view is impugned in the next Sūtra.

¹ Cp. Ka. Up. II, 5, 8; Bri. Up. I, 5, 21; Kh. Up. IV, 3, 3; Pr. Up. II, 13.

10. But (the *prāṇa* is subordinate to the soul) like the eye, &c., on account of being taught with them (the eye, &c.), and for other reasons.

The word 'but' sets aside the independence of the *prāṇa*. As the eye and so on stand, like the subjects of a king, in mere subordinate relation to the acting and enjoying of the soul and are not independent, so the chief vital air also, occupying a position analogous to that of a king's minister, stands in an entirely subordinate relation to the soul and is not independent.—Why?—Because it is taught (spoken of) together with them, i. e. the eye and the other organs, in such passages as the colloquy of the *prāṇas*, &c. For to be mentioned together is appropriate only in the case of things with the same attributes, as e. g. the *Bṛihat-sāman* and the *Rathantara-sāman*¹. The words 'and so on' (in the *Sūtra*) indicate other reasons refuting the independence of the *prāṇa*, such as its being composed of parts, its being of a non-intelligent nature and the like.—Well, but if it be admitted that the *prāṇa* stands to the soul in the relation of an instrument as the eye and so on, it will follow that we must assume another sense-object analogous to colour and so on. For the eyes, &c., occupy their specific subordinate position with regard to the soul through their functions which consist in the seeing of colour and so on. Now we can enumerate only eleven classes of functions, viz. the seeing of colour and so on, on whose account we assume eleven different *prāṇas*, and there is no twelfth class of effects on account of which a twelfth *prāṇa* could be assumed.—To this objection the following *Sūtra* replies.

11. And on account of (its) not being an instrument the objection is not (valid); for thus (scripture) declares.

The objection urged, viz. that there would result another sense-object, is not valid; because the *prāṇa* is not an

¹ Which go together because they are both *sāmans*.

instrument. For we do not assume that the *prāṇa* is, like the eye, an organ because it determines a special sense-object. Nor is it on that account devoid of an effect; since scripture declares that the chief vital air has a specific effect which cannot belong to the other *prāṇas*. For in the so-called colloquies of the *prāṇas* we read in the beginning, 'The *prāṇas* quarrelled together who was best;' after that we read, 'He by whose departure the body seems worse than worst, he is the best of you;' thereupon the text, after showing how, on the successive departure of speech and so on, the life of the body, although deprived of one particular function, went on as before, finally relates that as soon as the chief *prāṇa* was about to depart all other *prāṇas* became loosened and the body was about to perish; which shows that the body and all the senses subsist by means of the chief *prāṇa*. The same thing is declared by another passage, 'Then *prāṇa* as the best said to them: Be not deceived; I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it' (Pr. Up. II, 3). Another passage, viz. 'With *prāṇa* guarding the lower nest' (*Bṛi.* Up. IV, 3, 12), shows that the guarding of the body depends on *prāṇa*. Again, two other passages show that the nourishing of the body depends on *prāṇa*, 'From whatever limb *prāṇa* goes away that limb withers' (*Bṛi.* Up. I, 3, 19), and 'What we eat and drink with it supports the other vital breaths.' And another passage declares that the soul's departing and staying depend on *prāṇa*, 'What is it by whose departure I shall depart, and by whose staying I shall stay?—The created *prāṇa*' (Pr. Up. VI, 3; 4).

12. It is designated as having five functions like mind.

The chief vital air has its specific effect for that reason also that in scripture it is designated as having five functions, *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, *samāna*. This distinction of functions is based on a distinction of effects. *Prāṇa* is the forward-function whose work is aspiration, &c.; *apāna* is the backward-function whose work is inspiration, &c.; *vyāna* is that which, abiding in the junction of the two,

is the cause of works of strength¹; udāna is the ascending function and is the cause of the passing out (of the soul); samāna is the function which conveys the juices of the food equally through all the limbs of the body. Thus the prāṇa has five functions just as the mind (manas) has. The five functions of the mind are the five well-known ones caused by the ear, &c., and having sound and so on for their objects. By the functions of the mind we cannot here understand those enumerated (in *Bṛi. Up. I, 5, 3*), 'desire, representation,' &c., because those are more than five.—But on the former explanation also there exists yet another function of the mind which does not depend on the ear, &c., but has for its object the past, the future, and so on; so that on that explanation also the number five is exceeded.—Well, let us then follow the principle that the opinions of other (systems) if unobjectionable may be adopted, and let us assume that the five functions of the manas are those five which are known from the *Yogaśāstra*, viz. right knowledge, error, imagination, slumber, and remembrance. Or else let us assume that the *Sūtra* quotes the manas as an analogous instance merely with reference to the plurality (not the fivefoldness) of its functions.—In any case the *Sūtra* must be construed to mean that the prāṇa's subordinate position with regard to the soul follows from its having five functions like the manas.

13. And it is minute.

And the chief vital air is to be considered as minute like the other prāṇas.—Here also we have to understand by minuteness that the chief vital air is subtle and of limited size, not that is of atomic size; for by means of its five functions it pervades the entire body. It must be viewed as subtle because when passing out of the body it is not perceived by a bystander, and as limited because scripture speaks of its passing out, going and coming.—But, it may be said, scripture speaks also of its all-pervadingness; so,

¹ Viz. the holding in of the breath; cp. *Kh. Up. I, 3, 3-5*.

e.g. 'He is equal to a grub, equal to a gnat, equal to an elephant, equal to these three worlds, equal to this Universe' (*Bṛi.* Up. I, 3, 22).—To this we reply that the all-pervadingness of which this text speaks belongs to the Self of the *prāṇa* in its *adhidaivata* relation, according to which it appears as *Hiraṇyagarbha* in his double—universal and individual—form, not in its *adhyātma* relation. Moreover the statements of equality 'equal to a grub,' &c., just declare the limited size of the *prāṇa* which abides within every living being.—Thus there remains no difficulty.

14. But there is guidance (of the *prāṇas*) by fire, &c., on account of that being declared by scripture.

Here there arises a discussion whether the *prāṇas* of which we have been treating are able to produce their effects by their own power or only in so far as guided by divinities.—The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that the *prāṇas* being endowed with the capacity of producing their effects act from their own power. If we, moreover, admitted that the *prāṇas* act only in so far as guided by divinities, it would follow that those guiding divinities are the enjoyers (of the fruits of the actions), and the individual soul would thus cease to be an enjoyer. Hence the *prāṇas* act from their own power.—To this we reply as follows. 'But there takes place guidance by fire,' &c.—The word 'but' excludes the *pūrvapaksha*. The different classes of organs, speech, &c., the *Sūtra* says, enter on their peculiar activities, guided by the divinities animating fire, and so on. The words, 'on account of that being declared by scripture,' state the reason. For different passages declare this, cp. *Ait. Ār.* II, 4, 2, 4, 'Agni having become speech entered the mouth.' This statement about Agni (fire) becoming speech and entering the mouth is made on the assumption of Agni acting as a ruler with his divine Self (not as a mere element). For if we abstract from the connexion with the divinity we do not see that there is any special connexion of fire either with speech or the mouth. The subsequent passages, 'Vāyu having become breath entered into the nostrils,' &c., are to be explained in the same way.

—This conclusion is confirmed by other passages also, such as ‘Speech is indeed the fourth foot of Brahman; that foot shines with Agni as its light and warms’ (*Kh. Up.* IV, 18, 3), which passage declares that speech is made of the light of Agni. Other passages intimate the same thing by declaring that speech, &c., pass over into Agni, &c., cp. *Bṛi. Up.* I, 3, 12, ‘He carried speech across first; when speech had become freed from death it became Agni.’ Everywhere the enumeration of speech and so on on the one side and Agni and so on on the other side—wherein is implied a distinction of the personal and the divine element—proceeds on the ground of the same relation (viz. of that which is guided and that which guides). *Smṛiti*-passages also declare at length that speech, &c., are guided by Agni and the other divinities, cp. for instance, ‘*Brāhmaṇas* knowing the truth call speech the personal element, that which is spoken the natural element and fire (Agni) the divine element.’—The assertion that the *prāṇas* being endowed with the capability of producing their effects act from their own power is unfounded, as we see that some things which possess the capability of motion, e.g. cars, actually move only if dragged by bulls and the like. Hence, as both alternatives are possible¹, we decide on the ground of scripture that the *prāṇas* act under the guidance of the divinities.—The next *Sūtra* refutes the assertion that from the fact of the divinities guiding the *prāṇas* it would follow that they—and not the embodied soul—are the enjoyers.

15. (It is not so) (because the *prāṇas* are connected) with that to which the *prāṇas* belong (i.e. the individual soul), (a thing we know) from scripture.

Although there are divinities guiding the *prāṇas*, yet we learn from scripture that those *prāṇas* are connected with the embodied soul which is the Lord of the aggregate of

¹ Viz. that something should act by itself, and that it should act under guidance only.

instruments of action. The following passage, e.g. 'where the sight has entered into the void there is the person of the eye; the eye itself is the instrument of seeing. He who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self; the nose is the instrument of smelling,' declares that the *prânas* are connected with the embodied soul only. Moreover the plurality of the divinities guiding the organs renders it impossible that they should be the enjoyers in this body. For that there is in this body only one embodied enjoyer is understood from the possibility of the recognition of identity and so on¹.

16. And on account of the permanence of this (viz. the embodied soul).

This embodied soul abides permanently in this body as the enjoyer, since it can be affected by good and evil and can experience pleasure and pain. Not so the gods; for they exist in the state of highest power and glory and cannot possibly enter, in this wretched body, into the condition of enjoyers. So scripture also says, 'Only what is good approaches him; verily evil does not approach the devas' (*Bri. Up.* I, 5, 20).—And only with the embodied soul the *prânas* are permanently connected, as it is seen that when the soul passes out &c. the *prânas* follow it. This we see from passages such as the following: 'When it passes out the *prâna* passes out after it, and when the *prâna* thus passes out all the other *prânas* pass after it' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 2). Hence although there are ruling divinities of the organs, the embodied soul does not cease to be the enjoyer; for the divinities are connected with the organs only, not with the state of the soul as enjoyer.

17. They (the *prânas*) are senses, on account of being so designated, with the exception of the best (the *mukhya prâna*).

We have treated of the *mukhya prâna* and the other

¹ Yo=ham rūpam adrākṣham so=ham sṛinomīty ekasyaiva praty-abhigñānam pratisamdhānam. Go. Ân.

eleven *prāṇas* in due order.—Now there arises another doubt, viz. whether the other *prāṇas* are functions of the mukhya *prāṇa* or different beings.—The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that they are mere functions, on account of scriptural statement. For scripture, after having spoken of the chief *prāṇa* and the other *prāṇas* in proximity, declares that those other *prāṇas* have their Self in the chief *prāṇa*, ‘Well, let us all assume his form. Thereupon they all assumed his form’ (*Bṛi. Up. I, 5, 21*).—Their unity is moreover ascertained from the unity of the term applied to them, viz. *prāṇa*. Otherwise there either would result the objectionable circumstance of one word having different senses, or else the word would in some places have to be taken in its primary sense, in others in a derived sense. Hence, as *prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, &c. are the five functions of the one chief *prāṇa*, so the eleven *prāṇas* also which begin with speech are mere functions of the chief *prāṇa*.—To this we reply as follows. Speech and so on are beings different from the chief *prāṇa*, on account of the difference of designation.—Which is that difference of designation?—The eleven *prāṇas* remaining if we abstract from the best one, i.e. the chief *prāṇa*, are called the sense-organs (*indriya*), as we see them designated in *Sruti*, ‘from him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense’ (*Mu. Up. II, 1, 3*). In this and other passages *prāṇa* and the sense-organs are mentioned separately.—But in that case the mind also would have to be excluded from the class of sense-organs, like the *prāṇa*; as we see that like the latter it is separately mentioned in the passage, ‘The mind and all organs of sense.’ True; but in *Smṛiti* eleven sense-organs are mentioned, and on that account the mind must, like the ear, and so on, be comprised in the sense-organs. That the *prāṇa* on the other hand is a sense-organ is known neither from *Smṛiti* nor *Sruti*.—Now this difference of designation is appropriate only if there is difference of being. If there were unity of being it would be contradictory that the *prāṇa* although one should sometimes be designated as sense-organ and sometimes not. Consequently the other *prāṇas* are different in being from the chief *prāṇa*.—For this conclusion the following *Sūtra* states an additional reason,

18. On account of the scriptural statement of difference.

The *prāṇa* is everywhere spoken of as different from speech, &c. The passage, e.g. beginning with 'They said to speech' (*Bṛi.* Up. I, 3, 2), enumerates speech, &c., which were overwhelmed by the evil of the Asuras, concludes thereupon the section treating of speech, &c., and then specially mentions the *mukhya prāṇa* as overcoming the Asuras, in the paragraph beginning 'Then they said to the breath in the mouth.'—Other passages also referring to that difference may be quoted, so, for instance, 'He made mind, speech, and breath for himself' (*Bṛi.* Up. I, 5, 3).—For this reason also the other *prāṇas* are different in being from the chief *prāṇa*.—Another reason follows.

19. And on account of the difference of characteristics.

There is moreover a difference of characteristics between the chief *prāṇa* and the other *prāṇas*. When speech &c. are asleep, the chief *prāṇa* alone is awake. The chief *prāṇa* alone is not reached by death, while the other *prāṇas* are. The staying and departing of the chief *prāṇa*—not that of the sense-organs—is the cause of the maintenance and the destruction of the body. The sense-organs, on the other hand, are the cause of the perception of the sense-objects, not the chief *prāṇa*. Thus there are manifold differences distinguishing the *prāṇa* from the senses, and this also shows the latter to be different in being from the *prāṇa*.—To infer from the passage, 'thereupon they all assumed his form,' that the sense-organs are nothing but *prāṇa* is wrong, because there also an examination of the context makes us understand their difference. For there the sense-organs are enumerated first ('Voice held, I shall speak,' &c.); after that it is said that speech, &c. were seized by death in the form of weariness ('Death having become weariness held them back; therefore speech grows weary'); finally *prāṇa* is mentioned separately as not having been overcome by death ('but death did not seize the central breath'), and is

asserted to be the best ('he is the best of us'). The assuming of the form of *prāṇa* has therefore, in accordance with the quoted passages, to be understood to mean that the energizing of speech and so on depends on the *prāṇa*, but not that they are identical with it.—Hence it follows that the word '*prāṇa*' is applied to the sense-organs in a secondary sense. Thus *Sruti* also says, 'Thereupon they all assumed his form, and therefore they are called after him *prāṇas*;' a passage declaring that the word *prāṇa*, which properly refers to the chief *prāṇa*, is secondarily applied to the sense-organs also. Speech and the other sense-organs are therefore different in being from the *prāṇa*.

20. But the fashioning of names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite, on account of the teaching (of scripture).

In the chapter treating of the Being (*sat*), subsequently to the account of the creation of fire, water, and food (earth), the following statement is made, 'That divinity thought, let me now enter those three beings with this living Self (*gīva ātmā*), and let me then evolve names and forms¹;—let me make each of these three tripartite' (*Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2 ; 3*).—Here the doubt arises whether the agent in that evolution of names and forms is the *gīva* (the living, i.e. the individual Self or soul) or the highest Lord.—The *pūrvapakshin* maintains the former alternative, on account of the qualification contained in the words 'with this living Self.' The use of ordinary language does, in such phrases as 'Having entered the army of the enemy by means of a spy I count it,' attribute the counting of the army in which the spy is the real agent to the Self of the king who is the causal agent; which attribution is effected by means of the use of the first person, 'I count.' So here the sacred text attributes the evolving of names and forms—in which the *gīva* is the real agent—to the Self of the divinity which is the causal agent; the attribution being effected by means

¹ Literally, with this living Self having entered let me evolve, &c.

of the use of the first person, 'let me evolve.'—Moreover we see in the case of names such as *Dittha*, *Davittha*, &c., and in the case of forms such as jars, dishes and the like that the individual soul only is the evolving agent¹. Hence the evolution of names and forms is the work of the *gīva*.

To this the Sūtra replies: 'But the fashioning of names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite.' The particle 'but' discards the *pūrvapaksha*. Fashioning means evolving. The term 'he who renders tripartite' denotes the highest Lord, his agency being designated as beyond contradiction in the case of the rendering tripartite (of fire, &c.). The entire evolution of names and forms which is seen, e.g. in fire, sun, moon, lightning, or in different plants such as kusa-grass, kâsa-grass, palâsa-trees, or in various living beings such as cattle, deer, men, all this manifold evolution according to species and individuals can surely be the work of the highest Lord only, who fashioned fire, water, and earth.—Why?—On account of the teaching of the sacred text.—For the text says at first 'that divinity,' &c., and then goes on in the first person 'let me evolve;' which implies the statement that the highest Brahman only is the evolving agent.—But we ascertain from the qualification contained in the words 'with this living Self,' that the agent in the evolution is the living Self!—No, we reply. The words 'with this living Self' are connected with the words 'having entered,' in proximity to which they stand; not with the clause 'let me evolve.' If they were connected with the former words, we should have to assume that the first person, which refers to the divinity—viz. 'let me evolve'—is used in a metaphorical sense. And with regard to all the manifold names and forms such as mountains, rivers, oceans, &c., no soul, apart from the Lord, possesses the power of evolution; and if any have such power, it is dependent on the highest Lord. Nor is the so-called 'living Self' absolutely different from the highest Lord, as the spy is from the king; as we see from its being qualified

¹ Names being given and vessels being shaped by a class of *gīvas*, viz. men.

as the living Self, and as its being the *gīva* (i. e. an individual soul apparently differing from the universal Self) is due to the limiting adjuncts only. Hence the evolution of names and forms which is effected by it is in reality effected by the highest Lord. And that the highest Lord is he who evolves the names and forms is a principle acknowledged by all the Upanishads ; as we see from such passages as 'He who is called ether is the evolver of all forms and names' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 14*). The evolution of names and forms, therefore, is exclusively the work of the highest Lord, who is also the author of the tripartite arrangement.—The meaning of the text is that the evolution of names and forms was preceded by the tripartition, the evolution of each particular name and form being already explained by the account of the origin of fire, water, and earth. The act of tripartition is expressly described by *Sruti* in the cases of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, 'The red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire, the white colour of fire is the colour of water, the black colour of fire the colour of earth,' &c. In this way there is evolved the distinctive form of fire, and in connexion therewith the distinctive name 'fire,' the name depending on the thing. The same remarks apply to the cases of the sun, the moon, and lightning. The instance (given by the text) of the tripartition of fire implies the statement that the three substances, viz. earth, water, fire, were rendered tripartite in the same manner ; as the beginning as well as the concluding clause of the passage equally refers to all three. For the beginning clause says, 'These three beings became each of them tripartite ;' and the concluding clause says, 'Whatever they thought looked red they knew was the colour of fire,' &c. &c., up to 'Whatever they thought was altogether unknown they knew was some combination of these three beings.' Having thus described the external tripartition of the three elements the text goes on to describe another tripartition with reference to man, 'those three beings when they reach man become each of them tripartite.' This tripartition in man the teacher sets forth (in the following *Sūtra*) according to scripture, with a view to the refutation of some foreseen objection.

21. The flesh, &c., originates from earth, according to the scriptural statement; and (so also) in the case of the two other (elements).

From tripartite earth when assimilated by man there are produced as its effects flesh, &c., according to scripture. For the text says, 'Food (earth) when eaten becomes three-fold; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion mind.' The meaning is that the tripartite earth is eaten in the shape of food such as rice, barley, &c.; that its grossest parts are discharged in the form of feces, that its middle parts nourish the flesh of the body, and its subtlest parts feed the mind. Analogously we have to learn from the text the effects of the two other elements, viz. fire and water; viz. that urine, blood, and breath are the effects of water; bone, marrow, and speech those of fire.—Here now an objection is raised. If all material things are tripartite (i.e. contain parts of the three elements alike)—according to the indifferent statement, 'He made each of these tripartite'—for what reason then has there been made the distinction of names, 'this is fire, this is water, this is earth?' And again, why is it said that among the elements of the human body, flesh, &c., is the effect of the eaten earth only; blood, &c., the effect of the water drunk; bone, &c., the effect of the fire eaten?—To this objection the next Sûtra replies.

22. But on account of their distinctive nature there is a (distinctive) designation of them.

The word 'but' repels the objection raised. By 'distinctive nature' we have to understand preponderance. Although all things are tripartite, yet we observe in different places a preponderance of different elements; heat preponderates in fire, water in all that is liquid, food in earth. This special tripartition aims at rendering possible the distinctions and terms of ordinary life. For if the tripartition resulted in sameness, comparable to that of the three strands of a tripartite rope, we could not distinguish—and speak of as distinguished—the three elements.—Hence,

although there is a tripartition, we are enabled 'on account of distinctive nature' to give special designations to the three elements, viz. fire, water, and earth and their products.—The repetition (of 'designation of them') indicates the termination of the adhyāya.

THIRD ADHYĀYA.

FIRST PĀDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF !

1. In obtaining a different (body) (the soul) goes enveloped (by subtle parts of the elements), (as appears from) question and explanation.

In the second adhyāya we have refuted the objections raised against the Vedāntic view of Brahman on the ground of *Smṛiti* and reasoning; we have shown that all other opinions are devoid of foundation, and that the alleged mutual contradictions of Vedic texts do not exist. Further we have demonstrated that the entities different from—but subordinate to—the individual soul (such as *prāṇa*, &c.) spring from Brahman.—Now in the third adhyāya we shall discuss the following subjects: the manner in which the soul together with its subordinate adjuncts passes through the *samsāra* (III, 1); the different states of the soul and the nature of Brahman (III, 2); the separateness or non-separateness of the *vidyās* and the question whether the qualities (of Brahman) have to be cumulated or not (III, 3); the accomplishment of man's highest end by means of perfect knowledge (*saṃyagdarsana*), the different injunctions as to the means of perfect knowledge and the absence of certain rules as to release which is the fruit (of perfect knowledge¹) (III, 4). As occasion leads some other matters also will be explained.—The first pāda explains, on the ground of the so-called *vidyā* of the five fires (*Kh. Up. V, 3-10*), the different modes of the soul's passing through the *samsāra*; the reason of that doctrine being (the inculcation of) absence

¹ I.e. the absence of a rule laying down that release consequent on knowledge takes place in the same existence in which the means of reaching perfect knowledge are employed.

of all desire (*vairāgya*), in accordance with the scriptural remark at the end (of the *vidyā*), 'hence let a man take care to himself.'—The soul accompanied by the chief vital air, the sense-organs and the mind, and taking with itself nescience (*avidyā*), moral good or ill-desert (*karman*), and the impressions left by its previous existences¹, leaves its former body and obtains a new body; this is known from the scriptural passage extending from *Bṛi.* Up. IV, 4, 1 ('Then those *prāṇas* gather around him') up to IV, 4, 4 ('It makes to itself another newer and more beautiful shape'); which passage forms part of a chapter treating of the *samsāra*-state. And it moreover follows from the possibility (thus resulting) of the soul enjoying the fruits of good and evil actions.—Here the question arises whether the soul when going to the new body is enveloped or not by subtle parts of the elements constituting the seeds of the body.—It is not so enveloped, the *pūrvapakshin* says.—Why?—Because scripture, while stating that the soul takes the organs with itself, does not state the same with regard to the elements. For the expression 'those parts of light' (*tegomâtrāḥ*) which occurs in the passage 'He taking with him those parts of light,' &c., intimates that the organs only are taken (and not the elements), since in the complementary portion of the passage the eye, &c., are spoken of, and not the subtle parts of the elements. The subtle parts of the elements can moreover easily be procured anywhere; for wherever a new body is to be originated they are present, and the soul's taking them with itself would, therefore, be useless. Hence we conclude that the soul when going is not enveloped by them.

To this the teacher replies, 'in obtaining another it goes enveloped.' That means: we must understand that the soul when passing from one body to another is enveloped by the subtle parts of the elements which are the seeds of the new

¹ I read *avidyā* with the commentators (*Go. Ān.*, however, mentions the reading '*vidyā*' also); although *vidyā* appears preferable. Cp. Max Müller's note 2, p. 175, Upan. II; Deussen, p. 405.—*Pūrvapragñā ganmāntariya-samskāraḥ.* Ān. Gi.

body.—How do we know this?—‘From the question and the explanation.’ The question is, ‘Do you know why in the fifth libation water is called man?’ (V, 3, 3.) The explanation, i.e. answer, is given in the entire passage which, after having explained how the five libations in the form of *śraddhā*, Soma, rain, food, seed are offered in the five fires, viz. the heavenly world, Parganya, the earth, man and woman, concludes, ‘For this reason is water in the fifth oblation called man.’ Hence we understand that the soul goes enveloped by water.—But—an objection will be raised—another scriptural passage declares that like a caterpillar the soul does not abandon the old body before it makes an approach to another body¹. (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 3*, ‘And as a caterpillar.’)—We reply that what there is compared to the (action of the) caterpillar is (not the non-abandonment of the old body but) merely the lengthening out of the creative effort whose object is the new body to be obtained, which (new body) is presented by the *karman* of the soul². Hence there is no contradiction.—As the mode of obtaining a new body is thus declared by *Sruti*, all hypotheses which owe their origin to the mind of man only are to be set aside because they are contradicted by scripture. So e.g. the opinion (of the *Sāṅkhyas*) that the Self and the organs are both all-pervading³, and when obtaining a new body only begin to function in it in consequence of the *karman*; or the opinion (of the *Bauddhas*) that the Self alone

¹ *Evam hi sūkshmadehaparishvaktō ramhet yady asya sthūlam sarīram ramhato na bhavet, asti tv asya vartamānasthūlasarīrayogaś ādehāntaraprāptes trinagalāyukānidarsanena, tasmān nidarsana-srutivirodhān na sūkshmadehaparishvaktō ramhatīti. Bhā.*

² *Pratipattavyaś prāptavyo yo dehas tadviśayaṣā bhāvanāyā utpādanāyā dīrghibhāvamātram galūkayopamīyate. Bhā.—Ān. Gi.* explains: *prāptavyo yo dehas tadviśayaś bhāvanāyā devo+ham ityādikāyā dīrghibhāvo vyavahitārthālambanatvam tāvanmātram ityādi.*

³ *Karānānām āhamkārikatvāt tasya vyāpītvāt teshām api tadāt-makānām vyāpītvam. Go. Ān.—*The organs are, according to the *Sāṅkhya*, the immediate effects of the *āhamkāra*, but why all-pervading on that account?

(without the organs) begins to function in a new body, and that as the body itself, so new sense-organs also are produced in the new abode of fruition¹; or the opinion (of the Vaiseshikas) that the mind only proceeds to the new abode of fruition²; or the opinion (of the Digambara Gainas) that the individual soul only flying away from the old body alights in the new one as a parrot flies from one tree to another.—But—an objection will be raised—from the quoted question and answer it follows that the soul goes enveloped by water only, according to the meaning of the word made use of by scripture, viz. water. How then can the general statement be maintained that the soul goes enveloped by subtle parts of all elements?—To this doubt the next Sūtra replies.

2. But on account of (water) consisting of three (elements) (the soul is enveloped not by water merely; the latter alone is, however, mentioned) on account of preponderance.

The word 'but' disposes of the objection raised.—Water consists of three elements, as we know from the scriptural statement regarding tripartition. If, therefore, water is admitted to originate (the new body) the other two elements also have necessarily to be admitted (as taking part in the origination). The body moreover consists of three elements, as the effects of the three, i.e. fire, water, and earth, are observed in it, and further as it contains three materials, viz. wind, bile, and phlegm³. Being such it cannot originate from mere water, the other elements being left aside. Hence the term water made use of in the scriptural question and answer refers to the fact of water preponderating,

¹ Ātmā khalv ālayaḥ śāśanasamtānas tasya vṛttayaḥ sabdādiguḥ śāśanāni tallābhāḥ sarīrāntare bhavati, kevalasābhas tu karaṇasāhityam ātmano vārayati. Go. Ān.

² Kevalam karaṇair ātmanā ka rahitam iti yāvat, karaṇāni nūtanany eva tatrārabhyante ātmā tu vibhutvād akriyoḥpi tatra vṛttimātram āpnoti. Ān. Gi.

³ The last of which only is of prevailing watery character.

not to its being the only element. As a matter of fact we see that in all animated bodies liquid substances such as juices, blood, and the like preponderate.—But we likewise observe in bodies a large amount of earthy matter!—True, but the amount of water is larger than that of any other matter. Moreover, liquid matter prevails in that which is the seed of the body. Further, we know that works (karma) constitute the efficient cause for the origination of a new body, and (sacrificial) works such as the agnihotra, &c., consist in the offering of liquid substances such as Soma, butter, milk and the like. Thereby also the preponderance of water is established. And on account of that preponderance the word ‘water’ implies the subtle parts of all the elements which constitute the seed of the body.

3. And on account of the going of the prānas.

Scripture states that, when a new body is obtained, the prānas also go (from the old body to the new one). Cp. ‘When he thus departs the (chief) prāna departs after him, and when the prāna thus departs all the other prānas depart after it’ (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 2*), and similar passages. Now this going of the prānas is not possible without a base; hence we infer that water also—mixed with parts of the other elements—goes (from the old body to the new one), serving the purpose of supplying a base for the moving prānas. For the prānas cannot, without such a base, either move or abide anywhere; as we observe in living beings.

4. If it be said (that the prānas do not go) on account of the scriptural statement as to entering into Agni, &c., we deny this on account of the metaphorical nature (of those statements).

Well, the pûrvapakshin resumes, we deny that at the time when a new body is obtained the prānas go with the soul, because scripture speaks of their going to Agni, &c. For that at the time of death speech and the other prānas go to Agni and the other gods the following passage expressly declares: ‘When the speech of the dead person

enters into the fire, breath into the air,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 2, 13).—To this we reply that the objection is of no force on account of the metaphorical character of those statements. The entering of speech, &c., into Agni is metaphorical, because we observe no such entering in the case of the hairs of the head and body. For although the text says that 'the hairs of the body enter into the shrubs and the hairs of the head into the trees;' still we cannot understand this to mean that the hairs actually fly away from the body and enter into trees and shrubs. On the other hand, the soul could not go at all if we denied to it the limiting adjunct formed by the *prāṇas*, and without the latter it could not, in the new body, enter into the state of fruition. Besides, other passages distinctly declare that the *prāṇas* go with the soul.—From all this we conclude that the passage about speech, &c. entering into Agni, metaphorically expresses that Agni and the other divinities who act as guides of the *prāṇas* and co-operate with them stop their co-operation at the time of death.

5. If an objection be raised on the ground of (water) not being mentioned in the first fire, we refute it by remarking that just it (*viz.* water) (*is meant*), on the ground of fitness.

Well, the *pūrvapakshin* resumes, but how can it be ascertained that 'in the fifth oblation water is called man,' considering that water is not mentioned by scripture with reference to the first fire (altar)? For the text enumerates five fires—the first of which is the heavenly world—as the abodes of the five oblations. With reference to the first of those fires—introduced by the words 'The fire is that world, O Gautama,' it is stated that *śraddhā* (faith) is the material constituting the oblation ('on that altar the *devas* offer *śraddhā*'); while nothing is said about water being the offered material. If, with reference to the four following fires, *viz.* *Parganya*, &c., water is assumed to constitute the offering, we have no objection because in the substances stated there as forming the oblations, *viz.* *Soma*, and so on, water may preponderate. But to set aside, in the case of

the first fire, *śraddhâ* (i.e. faith) which is directly mentioned in the text, and to substitute in its place the assumption of water, about which the text says nothing, is an arbitrary proceeding. In reality *śraddhâ* must be explained, in conformity with its ordinary meaning, as a kind of mental state, viz. faith. Hence it is objectionable to maintain that water, in the fifth oblation, becomes man.

To this view of the *pûrvapakshin* we demur, because, in the case of the first fire, the word *śraddhâ* is to be taken in the sense of 'water.'—On what ground?—On the ground of fitness. For on that explanation only beginning, middle, and end of the passage harmonise so that the syntactical unity of the whole remains undisturbed. On the other explanation (i.e. *śraddhâ* being taken in the sense of 'faith'), if the question were asked how water, in the fifth oblation, can be called man, and if, in way of reply, the text could point only to faith, i.e. something which is not water, as constituting the material of the oblation; then question and answer would not agree, and so the unity of the whole passage would be destroyed. The text, moreover, by concluding 'For this reason is water in the fifth oblation called man,' indicates the same interpretation¹.—Further, the text points out, as effects of *śraddhâ*, substances in which water in its gross form preponderates, viz. Soma, rain, &c. And this again furnishes a reason for interpreting *śraddhâ* as water, because the effect generally is cognate in nature to the cause. Nor again can the mental conception called faith be taken out from the mind or soul, whose attribute it is, and be employed as an offering, as the heart can be cut out of the sacrificial animal. For this reason also the word *śraddhâ* must be taken to mean 'water.' Water can, moreover, be fitly called by that name, on the ground of Vedic usage, cp. '*śraddhâ* indeed is water' (Taitt. *Samh.* I, 6, 8, 1). Moreover, water when forming the seed of the body enters into the state of thinness, subtilty, and herein again resembles faith, so that its being called *śraddhâ*

¹ *Upasamhârâlokanâyâm api śraddhâśraddatvam apâm evety âha tv iti. Ân. Gi.*

is analogous to the case of a man who is as valiant as a lion being himself called a lion.—Again, the word *śraddhā* may fitly be applied to water, because water is intimately connected with religious works (sacrifices, &c.) which depend on faith; just as the word ‘platform’ is applied to men (standing on the platform). And finally the waters may fitly be called *śraddhā*, on account of their being the cause of faith, according to the scriptural passage, ‘Water indeed produces faith in him for holy works¹.’

6. (Should it be said that the souls are not enveloped by water) on account of this not being stated by scripture, we refute the objection on the ground of those who perform *ishṭis*, &c., being understood.

Well, let it be granted that, on account of question and answer, water, passing through the forms of *śraddhā*, &c., may in the fifth oblation obtain the shape of man. But still we cannot allow that the souls when moving from one body into another are enveloped by water. For this is not directly stated by scripture, there being in the whole passage no word referring to the souls, while there are words referring to water. Hence the assertion that the soul goes enveloped by water is unfounded.—This objection is invalid, we reply, ‘on account of those who perform *ishṭis*, &c., being understood.’ For in the passage beginning ‘But they who living in a village practise sacrifices, works of public utility and alms, they go to the smoke’ (V, 3, 10), it is said that those who perform *ishṭis* reach, on the road of the fathers leading through smoke, &c., the moon, ‘From ether they go to the moon; that is Soma, the king.’ Now these same persons are meant in the passage about the five fires also, as we conclude from the equality of scriptural statement in the passage, ‘In that fire the devas offer

¹ *Āpo heti, asmai pumse-dhikāṛiṇe saṁnamante ganayanti darsanamātreṇa snānādipunya-karmasiddhyartham śraddhām ity arthaḥ. Ān. Gi.*

śraddhā. From that oblation rises Soma the king¹. To those² (persons who have performed ishṭis, &c.) water is supplied in the shape of the materials employed to perform the agnihotra, the darsapûrnamâsa and other sacrifices, viz. sour milk, milk, &c., which substances, as consisting mostly of water, may directly be considered as water. Of these, when offered in the âhavanīya, the subtle parts assume the form of an apûrva resulting from the oblation³, and attach themselves to the performer of the sacrifice. Then (when the sacrificer dies) the priests offer his body, with the funeral ceremonies⁴, into the crematory fire, with the mantra, '(may) he (go) to the heavenly world, svâhâ.' Then the water forming the oblation—which was connected with deeds resulting from faith⁵—having assumed the form of an apûrva envelops the souls of those who had performed the sacrifices, and leads them up to the heavenly world to receive their reward.—In accordance with the preceding interpretation scripture says in the agnihotra chapter also—in the complementary passage constituting the reply to the six questions—that the two agnihotra-oblations go up to the other world in order to originate the fruit (of the work of the sacrificer), 'Those two oblations when offered go up, &c.' (Sat. Br. XI, 6, 2, 6).—Hence we conclude that the

¹ Both passages speak of something reaching, i.e. becoming the moon. Now, as that something is, in the passage about the road of the fathers, the gîvas of those who have performed ishṭis, &c., we conclude that by the śraddhā also, from which in the other passage the moon is said to rise, those gîvas are meant, or, properly speaking, the subtle body of water which envelops those gîvas.—Dhûmâdivâkye pañkâgnivâkye ka somarâgatvaprapṭisravanâvireśhād ishṭîdikârinâḥ śraddhârabditâdbhir veshiṭitâ dyulokam yāntīti bhātīty arthaḥ. Ân. Gi.

² Ân. Gi. introduces this clause by: nanu mahad iha śrutyor vailakshanyam, śraddhârabditânâm apâm kvaṭid dyuloke homaḥ śrutaḥ kvaṭid ishṭîdikârinâḥ dhûmâdikramenâkâsaprâptir na ka teshâm âpaḥ santi yena tadveshiṭitânâm gatis tatrâha teshâm keti.

³ I read, with a MS. of Ân. Gi., âhutypûrvarûpâḥ.

⁴ The so-called antyeshṭi.

⁵ And is on that account properly called śraddhā.

souls, when going to the enjoyment of the fruits of their works, are enveloped by the water of which the oblations consist¹.

But how can it be maintained that those who perform sacrifices, &c., go to the enjoyment of the fruit of their works, considering that scripture declares them when having reached the moon—by the path leading through smoke, &c.—to become food, ‘That is Soma the king; that is the food of the gods; the gods do eat it’ (*Kh. Up.* V, 10, 4); and the corresponding passage, ‘Having reached the moon they become food, and then the Devas feed on them there as sacrificers feed on Soma as it increases and decreases’ (*Bri. Up.* VI, 2, 16)? If, in accordance with these passages, they are eaten by the gods as by tigers, &c., it is not possible that they should enjoy the fruit of their deeds.—To this the following Sūtra replies.

7. Or (the souls’ being the food of the gods is) metaphorical, on account of their not knowing the Self. For thus (scripture) declares.

The word ‘or’ is meant to set aside the started objection. The souls’ being food has to be understood in a metaphorical, not a literal, sense, as otherwise all scriptural statements of claims (*adhikāra*)—such as ‘He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice’—would be contradicted. If

¹ Śaṅkara’s attempts to render plausible the interpretation of *śraddhā* by ‘water,’ and to base thereon the doctrine of the souls when going to a new body being enveloped by a subtle involucrum of water (and the other elements contained therein) are, of course, altogether artificial. I do not, however, see that he can be taxed with inconsistency (as he is by Deussen, p. 408). *Śraddhā* is to him in the first place the gross water which constitutes the chief material employed in the sacrifices; in the second place the *apūrva* which results from the sacrifice, and which is imagined to consist of the subtle parts of the water whose gross parts have been consumed by the sacrificial fire. These subtle parts attach themselves to the soul, accompany it as an involucrum when it goes to another world, and form the base of any new body which the soul may have to assume in accordance with its previous deeds.

the performers of sacrifices, &c., did not, in the sphere of the moon, enjoy the fruits of their works, why should they undertake works such as sacrifices, which are to him who performs them the cause of great trouble? We see, moreover, that the word 'food,' as denoting in general whatever is the cause of enjoyment, is metaphorically used of that also which is not food (in the narrower sense), as, for instance, in such phrases as 'the Vaisyas are the food of kings, the animals are the food of the Vaisyas.' Hence what is meant there by the term 'eating' is the rejoicing of the gods with the performers of sacrifices, &c., who stand in a subordinate (instrumental) relation to that rejoicing—a rejoicing analogous to that of an ordinary man with beloved persons such as wife, children, friends, and so on—not actual eating like the chewing and swallowing of sweet-meats. For that the gods eat in the ordinary way a scriptural passage expressly denies (*Kh. Up. III, 6, 1*), 'The gods do not eat or drink; by seeing the nectar they are satisfied.' At the same time the performers of sacrifices, although standing in a subordinate relation to the gods, may themselves be in a state of enjoyment, like servants who (although subordinate to the king) themselves live on the king.—That the performers of sacrifices are objects of enjoyment for the gods follows, moreover, from their quality of not knowing the Self. For that those who do not know the Self are objects of enjoyment for the gods the following scriptural passage shows, 'Now, if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he is another, he does not know. He is like a beast for the Devas' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 10*). That means: he, in this life, propitiating the gods by means of oblations and other works, serves them like a beast, and does so in the other world also, depending on them like a beast and enjoying the fruits of his works as assigned by them.—The latter part of the Sûtra can be explained in another manner also¹. Those who do not know the Self are those who perform works only, such as sacrifices, &c.,

¹ Anâtmasabdâsruter mukhyârthatvânurodhena sâtâmsasyârtham uktvâ prakaraṇânurodhenârthântaram âha. Ân. Gi.

and do not join knowledge to works. We then take the expression, 'the knowledge of the Self,' as indirectly denoting the knowledge of the five fires; an explanation which rests on the general subject-matter. And on account of the performers of sacrifices being destitute of the knowledge of the five fires the circumstance of their serving as food is brought forward as a mere *gunavāda*¹ for the purpose of glorifying the knowledge of the five fires. For the latter is what the text aims at enjoining, as we infer from the general purport of the passage.—'For thus' another scriptural passage 'declares,' viz. that enjoyment (on the part of the *gṛīva*) takes place in the sphere of the moon, 'Having enjoyed greatness in the Soma world he returns again' (Pr. Up. V, 4). Another scriptural passage also declares that the performers of sacrifices dwelling together with the gods obtain enjoyment, 'A hundred blessings of the fathers who have conquered this world make one blessing of the work-gods, who obtain their godhead by work' (Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 33).—As thus the statement about the performers of sacrifices becoming food is metaphorical only, we understand that it is their souls which go, and hence there is no longer any objection to the doctrine that they go enveloped by water.

8. On the passing away of the works (the soul redescends) with a remainder, according to scripture and *Smṛiti*, as it went (i.e. passing through the same stations) and not thus (i.e. in the inverse order).

Scripture states that the souls of those who perform sacrifices, and the like, rise on the road leading through smoke, and so on, to the sphere of the moon, and when they have done with the enjoyment (of the fruits of their works) again descend, 'Having dwelt there, *yāvatsampātam*², they return again that way as they came,' &c., up to 'Those whose conduct has been good obtain some good birth, the

¹ See part i, p. 221.

² About which term see further on.

birth of a Brāhmaṇa, &c.—Those whose conduct has been evil obtain the birth of a dog, &c.' (*Kh. Up. V, 10, 5-7*). Here it must be considered whether the souls, after having enjoyed the fruits of all their works, descend without a remainder (*anuraya*, of their works), or with such a remainder (of unrequited works).—The *pūrvapakshin* says: without such a remainder.—Why?—On account of the specification 'yāvat sampātām.' The word *sampāta* here denotes the aggregate of works (*karmāśaya*)¹, which is so called because by it the souls pass from this world to that world for the purpose of enjoying the fruits of the works. So that the entire clause 'Having dwelt there as far as the aggregate of the works extends' indicates their works being completely requited there. The same thing is indicated by another scriptural passage, 'But when in their case that (i.e. the effect of their works) ceases' (*Bṛi. Up. VI, 2, 16*).—Well, but why should we not assume that these passages (do not mean that all works are requited there but) only indicate that the soul enjoys in the other world so long as there are works to be enjoyed there?—It is impossible to assume this, because elsewhere a reference is made to the totality of works. For the passage, *Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 6*, 'Having obtained the end of whatever deed he does here on earth, he again returns from that world to this world to action,' intimates, by means of the comprehensive term 'whatever,' that all works done here are exhausted there.—Moreover, death has the power of manifesting those works whose fruit has not yet begun²; the manifestation of those works not being possible previously to death because then they are obstructed by those works whose fruits have already begun. Now death must manifest alike all works whose fruits had not begun previously, because the cause being the same the effects cannot be different. Analogously a lamp which is placed at the same distance from a jar and a piece of cloth

¹ The Comm. on *Kh. Up. V, 10, 5*, explains it by 'sāmpatanti yeneti sampātāḥ karmanāḥ kshayaḥ, yāvat sampātām yāvat karmanāḥ kshayaḥ.'

² *Abhivyaktis ka karmanām phaladānāyonmukhatvam. Ān. Gi.*

illuminates the latter as well as the former.—Hence it follows that the souls descend without a remainder of unrequited works.

To this we reply as follows : ‘ On the passing away of the works with a remainder.’ That means : when the aggregate of works with which the souls had risen to the moon for the purpose of the enjoyment of their fruits is, by such enjoyment, exhausted, then the body, consisting of water, which had originated in the moon for the purpose of such enjoyment, is dissolved by contact with the fire of the grief springing from the observation that the enjoyment comes to an end ; just as snow and hail are melted by contact with the rays of the sun, or the hardness of ghee by contact with the heat of fire. Then, at the passing away of the works, i. e. when the works performed, such as sacrifices, &c., are, by the enjoyment of their fruits, exhausted, the souls descend with a remainder yet left.—But on what grounds is that remainder assumed ?—On the ground of what is seen (*Sruti*) and *Smṛiti*. For scripture declares manifestly that the souls descend joined with such a remainder, ‘ Those whose conduct (*karana*) has been good will quickly attain some good birth, the birth of a Brāhmaṇa, or a Kshattriya, or a Vaiśya. But those whose conduct has been evil will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, or a hog, or a *Kāṇḍāla*.’ That the word *karana* here means the remainder (of the works) will be shown later on. Moreover, the different degrees of enjoyment which are implied in the difference of birth on the part of the living beings point, as they cannot be accidental, to the existence of such a remainder of works. For we know from scripture that good fortune as well as misfortune is caused by good and evil works. *Smṛiti* also teaches that the members of the different castes and āśramas do, in accordance with their works, at first enjoy the fruit of their works and then enter into new existences, in which they are distinguished from each other by locality, caste, family, shape, length of life, knowledge, conduct, property, pleasure, and intelligence ; which doctrine implies that they descend with a remainder of their works.—Of what kind then is that so-called re-

mainder?—Some say that thereby we have to understand a remainder of the works which had been performed (in the previous existence) for the sake of the heavenly world, and whose fruits have (for the greater part) been enjoyed. That remainder might then be compared to the remainder of oil which sticks to the inside of a vessel previously filled with oil even after it has been emptied.—But you have no right to assume a remainder in the case of works, the fruits of which have been enjoyed already, since the *adrishṭa* (which springs from works) is opposed to the works (so as to destroy them completely¹).—This objection, we reply, is not valid, as we do not maintain that the works are completely requited (previously to the new existence).—But the souls do ascend to the sphere of the moon for the express purpose of finding there a complete requital of their works!—True; but when only a little of the effects of their works is left, they can no longer stay there. For as some courtier who has joined the king's court with all the requisites which the king's service demands is unable to remain at court any longer, when in consequence of his long stay most of his things are worn out, so that he is perhaps left with a pair of shoes and an umbrella only; so the soul, when possessing only a small particle of the effects of its works, can no longer remain in the sphere of the moon.—But all this reasoning is in fact altogether unfounded². For it has already been stated that, on account of (the *adrishṭa*) being opposed to the work, the continued existence of a remainder cannot be admitted in the case of works which had been performed with a view to the heavenly world, and which have been requited in the moon.—But has it not also been said above that not all the work whose fruit the heavenly world is meets with requital there?—Yes, but that statement is not defensible. For works which are performed for

¹ *Bhāṇḍānusāriṇaḥ snehasyāvirodhād yuktaḥ seshah, karma tu phalodayavirodhitvāt phalam keḡ gâtam nashṭam eveti na tasya seshasiddhir iti saṅkate nanv iti. Ān. Gi.*

² *Īvakāro madhuroktyā prayukto vastutas tv evakāro vivakshitaḥ. Ān. Gi.*

the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world produce their entire heavenly fruit for the soul only as long as it stays in heaven, and if we take our stand on scripture we have no right to assume that they produce even a particle of fruit for the souls after those have again descended from heaven. That some part of the oil continues to remain in the vessel is unobjectionable because we see it, and we likewise see that some part of the courtier's equipment continues to remain with him ; but that some part of those works which led the soul to heaven continues to exist, that we neither see nor are able to surmise, because it would contradict the texts declaring that the heavenly world (alone) is the fruit of the works.—That of works whose fruit is heaven, such as sacrifices and the like, no remainder continues to exist, we must necessarily acknowledge for the following reason also. If some part of those good works, such as sacrifices, &c., on account of which the agents enjoyed the heavenly world, were surmised to continue in existence as a remainder, that remainder would in all cases be itself a good one, would never be of a contrary nature. But then our supposition would be in conflict with the scriptural passage which distinguishes remainders of a different kind, viz. 'Those whose conduct has been good ;—those whose conduct has been evil,' &c. Hence after the fruits of that set of works which is required in the other world have been (completely) enjoyed, the remaining other set of works whose fruits are to be enjoyed in this world constitutes the so-called *anusaya* with which the souls re-descend.—It was said above that we must assume the souls to descend without any such remainder, after having reached, by the enjoyment of the fruits, the end of all the works done here below, on account of the comprehensive statement implied in the expression 'whatever.' But that assertion cannot be upheld as the existence of such a remainder has been proved. Hence we have to understand that the souls re-descend after having exhausted, by the enjoyment of its fruits, only that entire part of the works done here below whose fruit belongs to the other world and is begun to be enjoyed there.—The proof given by us of the existence of the remainder refutes at the same

time the other assertion made above, viz. that death manifests equally all works the enjoyment of whose fruits was not begun here below, and that on that account we are not entitled to draw a line between works whose fruits begin in the other world and works whose fruits begin in this world only (i.e. in a new existence on earth).—We, moreover, have to ask for what reason it is maintained that death manifests (i.e. lays open and makes ready for requital) those works whose fruits have not begun here below. The answer will be that in this life the operation of certain works cannot begin because it is obstructed by other works whose fruits already begin here below, that, however, that operation does begin as soon as, at the moment of death, the obstruction ceases. Well, then, if previously to death those actions whose fruits have already begun prevent other actions from beginning their operation, at the time of death also certain works of less force will be obstructed in their operation by other works of greater force, it being impossible that the fruits of works of opposite tendency should begin at the same time. For it is impossible to maintain that different deeds whose fruits must be experienced in different existences should, merely because they have this in common that their fruits have not begun (previously to death), become manifest on the occasion of one and the same death, and originate one new existence only; against this militates the fact of the definite fruits (attached to each particular work) being of contrary natures¹. Nor, on the other hand, can we maintain that at the time of death some works manifest themselves while others are altogether extinguished; for that would contradict the fact that absolutely all works have their fruits. No work in fact can be extinguished except by means of expiatory actions, &c.² *Smṛiti* also declares that works whose operation is ob-

¹ On which account they cannot be experienced in one and the same existence.

² Works are extinguished either by expiatory ceremonies or by the knowledge of Brahman or by the full fruition of their consequences.

structed by other works leading to fruits of a contrary nature last for a long time, 'Sometimes a good deed persists immovable as it were, the doer meanwhile remaining immersed in the *samsāra*, until at last he is released from pain.'

Moreover, if all unrequited works becoming manifest on the occasion of one and the same death were to begin one new existence only, the consequence would be that those who are born again in the heavenly world, or in hell, or as animals, could, as not entitled thereto, perform no religious works, and being thus excluded from all chance of acquiring religious merit and demerit could not enter on any new forms of existence, as all reason for the latter would be absent¹. And that would further contradict *Smṛiti*, which declares that some single actions, such as the murder of a *Brāhmaṇa*, are the causes of more than one new existence. Nor can we assume, for the knowledge of the particular results springing from religious merit and demerit, any other cause than the sacred texts². Nor, again, does death manifest (bring about the requital of) those works whose fruit is observed to be enjoyed already here below, as, for instance, the *kārireshī*, &c.³ How then can we allow the assumption that death manifests all actions? The instance of the lamp (made use of by the *pūrvapakshin*) is already refuted by our having shown the relative strength of actions⁴. Or else we may look on the matter as analogous to the manifestation (by a lamp) of bigger and smaller objects. For as a lamp, although equally distant from a big and a very small thing, may manifest the former only

¹ And in consequence of this they could never obtain final release.

² We have the sacred texts only to teach us what the effects of particular good or evil actions may be.

³ The *kārireshī* is a sacrifice offered by those who are desirous of rain.

⁴ I.e. by our having shown that death does not equally manifest all works, but that, after death has taken place, the stronger works bring about their requital while the operation of the weaker ones is retarded thereby.

and not the latter, so death provokes the operation of the stronger works only, not of the weaker ones, although an equal opportunity presents itself for both sets of works as hitherto unrequited.—Hence the doctrine that all works are manifested by death cannot be maintained, as it is contradicted by *Sruti*, *Smṛiti*, and reason alike. That the existence of a remainder of works should stand in the way of final release is a misplaced fear, as we know from *Sruti* that all works whatever are destroyed by perfect knowledge. It therefore is a settled conclusion that the souls re-descend with a remainder of works. They descend ‘as they came’ (mounted up); ‘not thus,’ i.e. in inverted order. We conclude that they descend ‘as they came’ from the fact of ether and smoke, which the text includes in the road of the fathers, being mentioned in the description of the descent also, and from the expression ‘as they came.’ That they follow the inverted order we conclude from night, &c., not being mentioned, and from the cloud, &c., being added.

9. Should it be objected that on account of conduct (the assumption of a remainder is not needed), we deny this because (the scriptural expression ‘conduct’) is meant to connote (the remainder); so *Kārshnâgini* thinks.

But—an objection may be raised—the scriptural passage, which has been quoted for the purpose of proving that the existence of a remainder of works (‘those whose conduct has been good,’ &c.), declares that the quality of the new birth depends on *karana*, not on *anusaya*. Now *karana* and *anusaya* are different things; for *karana* is the same as *karitra*, *ākāra*, *śīla*, all of which mean conduct¹, while *anusaya* denotes work remaining from required work. Scripture also speaks of actions and conduct as different things, ‘According as he acts and according as he conducts himself so will he be’ (*Bṛi. Up.* IV, 4, 5); and ‘Whatever

¹ *Śīla* also means here ‘conduct’ only, as we see from its being co-ordinated with *karana*, *karitra*, &c.; not character.

works are blameless those should be regarded, not others ; whatever our good conduct was that should be observed by thee' (Taitt. Up. I, 11, 2). From the passage which proclaims the dependence of the quality of birth on conduct the existence of an unrequited remainder of works cannot therefore be proved.—This objection is without force, we reply, because the scriptural term 'conduct' is meant to connote the remainder of the works. This is the opinion of the teacher Kârṣṇāgini.

10. If it be said that purposelessness (of conduct would result therefrom), we deny this on account of the dependence (of work) on that (conduct).

That may be ; but for what reason should we abandon that meaning which the term '*karana*' directly conveys, viz. the meaning 'conduct,' and accept the merely connotative meaning 'remainder of the works?' Conduct, which the text directly mentions, may be supposed to have for its fruit either a good or an evil birth, according as it is enjoined or prohibited, good or evil. Some fruit will have to be allowed to it in any case ; for otherwise it would follow that it is purposeless.—This objection is without force 'on account of the dependence on it.' Such works as sacrifices, and the like, depend on conduct in so far as somebody whose conduct is not good is not entitled to perform them. This we know from *Smṛiti*-passages, such as the following, 'Him who is devoid of good conduct the Vedas do not purify.'—And also if conduct is considered as subservient to man¹ it will not be purposeless. For when the aggregate of works such as sacrifices, &c., begins to originate its fruit, the conduct which has reference to the sacrifice will originate there (i.e. in the fruit) some addition.

¹ I.e. as something which produces in man a *samskāra* analogous to that produced by other preparatory or purificatory rites such as bathing, &c.—In the preceding sentences conduct had been spoken of not as *purushārtha* but as *karmāṅga*. In that case it produces no separate result ; while if considered as *purushārtha* it has a special result of its own.

And it is known from *Sruti* as well as *Smṛiti* that work effects everything¹. It is, therefore, the opinion of *Kārsh-nāgini* that the remainder of works only—which is connoted by the term ‘conduct’—is the cause of the souls entering on new births. For as work may be the cause of new births, it is not proper to assume that conduct is the cause. If a man is able to run away by means of his feet he will surely not creep on his knees.

11. But (*karana* means) nothing but good and evil works; thus *Bādari* opines.

The teacher *Bādari*, however, thinks that the word ‘*karana*’ denotes nothing else but good works and evil works. It means the same as *anushthāna* (performance) or *karman* (work). For we see that the root *kar* (to walk, to conduct oneself) is used in the general sense of acting. Of a man who performs holy works such as sacrifices, &c., people say in ordinary language, ‘that excellent man walks in righteousness.’ The word *ākāra* also denotes only a kind of religious duty. That works and *karana* (conduct) are sometimes spoken of as different things is analogous to the distinction sometimes made between *Brāhmanas* and *Pari-vrāgakas*². We, therefore, decide that by men of good *karana* are meant those whose works are worthy of praise, by men of evil *karana* those whose works are worthy of blame.

12. Of those also who do not perform sacrifices (the ascent to the moon) is stated by scripture.

It has been said that those who perform sacrifices, &c., go to the moon. The question now arises whether those also who do not perform sacrifices go to the moon or not.—The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that it cannot be asserted that men belonging to the former class only go to the moon,

¹ A clause added to guard against the assumption—which might be based on the preceding remarks—that conduct is, after all, the cause of the quality of the new birth.

² Although the latter are a mere sub-class of the former.

because scripture speaks of the moon as being resorted to by those also who have not performed sacrifices. For the Kāushītakins make the following general statement, 'All who depart from this world go to the moon' (Kau. Up. I, 2). Moreover, the origination of a new body in the case of those who are born again is not possible without their having (previously) reached the moon, on account of the precise definition of number contained in the statement, 'In the fifth oblation' (*Kh. Up. V, 9, 1*)¹. Hence all men must be supposed to resort to the moon. If it be objected that it does not appear proper that those who perform sacrifices and those who do not should go to the same place, we reply that there is no real objection, because those who do not perform sacrifices do not enjoy anything in the moon.

13. But of the others, after having enjoyed the fruits of their actions in *Samyamana*, ascent and descent take place; as such a course is declared (by scripture).

'But' discards the *pūrvapaksha*. It is not true that all men go to the moon. For the ascent to the moon is for the purpose of enjoyment only; it is neither without a special purpose nor for the mere purpose of subsequent re-descent. Just as a man climbs on a tree for the purpose of breaking fruit or blossoms, not either without any aim or for the mere purpose of coming down again. Now it has been admitted already that for those who do not offer sacrifices there is not any enjoyment in the moon; hence those only who perform sacrifices rise to the moon, not any other persons. The latter descend to *Samyamana*, the abode of Yama, suffer there the torments of Yama corresponding to their evil deeds, and then again re-ascend to this world. Such is their ascent and descent; as we maintain on the ground of such a course being declared by scripture. For a scriptural passage embodying Yama's own words declares that those who die without having offered sacrifices fall into Yama's

¹ Which statement presupposes four other oblations, the first of which is the one from which 'Soma the king rises.'

power. 'The other world never rises before the eyes of the careless child deluded by the delusion of wealth. This is the world, he thinks, there is no other; thus he falls again and again under my sway' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 6). Scripture contains many other passages likewise leading us to infer that men fall into Yama's power; cp. e.g. 'Yama, the gathering-place of men' (*Ri. Samh.* X, 14, 1).

14. The *Smṛiti*s also declare this.

Moreover, authorities like Manu, Vyāsa, &c., declare that in the city *Samyamana* evil works are requited under Yama's rule; cp. the legend of *Nāṅiketa* and others.

15. Moreover there are seven (hells).

Moreover, the *purāṇa*-writers record that there are seven hells, *Raurava*, &c., by name, which serve as abodes of enjoyment of the fruits of evil deeds. As those who do not sacrifice, &c. go there, how should they reach the moon?—But, an objection is raised, the assertion that evil doers suffer punishments allotted by Yama is contradicted by the circumstance that *Smṛiti* mentions different other beings, such as *Kiṭragupta*, &c., who act as superintendents in *Raurava* and the other hells.—This objection the next *Sūtra* refutes.

16. On account of his activity there also no contradiction exists.

There is no contradiction, as the same Yama is admitted to act as chief ruler in those seven hells. Of *Kiṭragupta* and others *Smṛiti* merely speaks as superintendents employed by Yama.

17. But on (the two roads) of knowledge and works, those two being under discussion.

In that place of the knowledge of the five fires, where the answer is expected to the question, 'Do you know why that world never becomes full?' the text runs as follows: 'On neither of these two ways are those small creatures continually returning, of whom it may be said, Live and die. Theirs is a third place. Therefore that world never becomes full.'

By the two ways mentioned in this passage we have to understand knowledge and works.—Why?—On account of their being the subjects under discussion. That means : knowledge and works are under discussion as the means for entering on the road of the gods and the road of the fathers. The clause, 'those who know this,' proclaims knowledge to be the means whereby to obtain the road of the gods ; the clause, 'sacrifices, works of public utility, and alms,' proclaims works to be that by which we obtain the road of the fathers. Under the heading of these two paths there stands the subsequent passage, 'on neither of these two ways, &c.' To explain. Those who are neither entitled, through knowledge, to follow the road of the gods, nor, by works, to follow the road of the fathers, for those there is a third path on which they repeatedly return to the existence of small animals. For this reason also those who do not perform sacrifices, &c. do not reach the moon.—But why should they not first mount to the sphere of the moon and thence descending enter on the existence of small animals? —No, that would imply entire purposelessness of their mounting.—Moreover, if all men when dying would reach the sphere of the moon, that world would be filled by the departed, and from that would result an answer contrary to the question (viz. 'why does not that world become full?'). For an answer is expected showing that that world does not become full.—Nor can we admit the explanation that the other world possibly does not become full because re-descent is admitted ; since this is not stated by scripture. For it is true, indeed, that the not becoming full might be explained from their re-descending ; but scripture actually explains it from the existence of a third place, 'Theirs is a third place ; therefore that world never becomes full.' Hence the fact of the other world not becoming full must be explained from their not-ascending only. For, otherwise, the descent equally taking place in the case of those who do perform sacrifices, &c., it would follow that the statement of a third place is devoid of purpose.—The word 'but' (in the Sūtra) is meant to preclude the idea—arising from the passage of another śākhā (i.e. the Kaush. Up.)

—that all departed go to the moon. Under the circumstances the word ‘all’ which occurs in that passage has to be taken as referring only to those qualified, so that the sense is ‘all those who depart from this world properly qualified go to the moon.’—The next Sûtra is directed against the averment that all must go to the moon for the purpose of obtaining a new body, in accordance with the definite statement of number (‘in the fifth oblation &c.’).

18. Not in (the case of) the third place, as it is thus perceived.

With regard to the third place, the rule of the oblations being five in number need not be attended to for the purpose of obtaining a new body.—Why?—On account of it being perceived thus. That means: because it is seen that the third place is reached in the manner described without any reference to the oblations being limited to the number five, ‘Live and die. That is the third place.’—Moreover, in the passage, ‘In the fifth oblation water is called man,’ the number of the oblations is stated to be the cause of the water becoming the body of a man, not of an insect or moth, &c.; the word ‘man’ applying to the human species only.—And, further, the text merely teaches that in the fifth oblation the waters are called man, and does not at the same time deny that, where there is no fifth oblation, they are not called man; for if it did the latter, the sentence would have the imperfection of having a double sense. We therefore have to understand that the body of those men who are capable of ascending and descending originates in connexion with the fifth oblation, that in the case of other men, however, a body forms itself from water mixed with the other elements even without a settled number of oblations.

19. It is, moreover, recorded in the (ordinary) world.

There are, moreover, traditions, apart from the Veda, that certain persons like Drona, Dhṛishṭadyumna, Sitā, Draupadī, &c., were not born in the ordinary way from

mothers. In the case of Drona and others there was absent the oblation which is made into the woman ; while in the case of Dhr̥ishṭadyumna and others, even two of the oblations, viz. the one offered into woman and the one offered into man, were absent. Hence in other cases also birth may be supposed to take place independently of the number of oblations.—It is, moreover, commonly known that the female crane conceives without a male.

20. And on account of observation.

It is, moreover, observed that out of the four classes of organic beings—viviparous animals, oviparous animals, animals springing from heat, and beings springing from germs (plants)—the two latter classes are produced without sexual intercourse, so that in their case no regard is had to the number of oblations. The same may therefore take place in other cases also.—But, an objection may here be raised, scripture speaks of those beings as belonging to three classes only, because there are three modes of origin only ; ' That which springs from an egg, that which springs from a living being, that which springs from a germ ' (*Kh. Up. VI, 3, 1*). How then can it be maintained that there are four classes?—To this objection the next Sūtra replies.

21. The third term comprises that which springs from heat.

The third term in the scriptural passage quoted, i.e. ' that which springs from a germ,' must be understood as implying those beings also which spring from heat ; the two classes having in common that they spring from earth or water, i.e. from something stable. Different from their origin is the origin of those beings which spring from moving things (viz. animals).—In other places the beings springing from heat and those springing from germs are spoken of as constituting separate classes.—Hence there is no contradiction.

22. (On the part of the soul's descending from the

moon) there is entering into similarity of being (with ether and so on); as this (only) is possible.

It has been explained that the souls of those who perform sacrifices, &c., after having reached the moon dwell there as long as their works last and then re-descend with a remainder of their works. We now have to inquire into the mode of that descent. On this point scripture makes the following statement: 'They return again the way they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. Then the sacrificer having become air becomes smoke, having become smoke he becomes mist, having become mist he becomes a cloud, having become a cloud he rains down.'—Here a doubt arises whether the descending souls pass over into a state of identity with ether, &c., or into a state of similarity.—The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that the state is one of identity, because this is directly stated by the text. Otherwise there would take place so-called indication (*lakṣhaṇā*). Now whenever the doubt lies between a directly expressed and a merely indicated meaning the former is to be preferred. Thus the following words also, 'Having become air he becomes smoke,' &c., are appropriate only if the soul be understood to identify itself with them.—Hence it follows that the souls become identical with ether, &c.—To this we reply that they only pass into a state of similarity to ether, &c. When the body, consisting of water which the soul had assumed in the sphere of the moon for the purpose of enjoyment, dissolves at the time when that enjoyment comes to an end, then it becomes subtle like ether, passes thereupon into the power of the air, and then gets mixed with smoke, &c. This is the meaning of the clauses, 'They return as they came to the ether, from the ether to the air, &c.'—How is this known to be the meaning?—Because thus only it is possible. For it is not possible that one thing should become another in the literal sense of the word. If, moreover, the souls became identified with ether they could no longer descend through air, &c. And as connexion with the ether is, on account of its all-pervadingness, eternal, no other connexion (of the souls) with it can here be meant

but their entering into a state of similarity to it¹. And in cases where it is impossible to accept the literal meaning of the text it is quite proper to assume the meaning which is merely indicated.—For these reasons the souls' becoming ether, &c., has to be taken in the secondary sense of their passing into a state of similarity to ether, and so on.

23. (The soul passes through the stages of its descent) in a not very long time ; on account of the special statement.

A doubt arises with reference to the period beginning with the soul's becoming ether and extending up to its entering into rice, &c., viz. whether the soul remains a long time in the state of similarity to each of the stages of its way before it enters into similarity to the next one, or only a short time.—The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that, on account of the absence of a definite text, no binding rule exists.—To this we reply that the souls remain in the state of similarity to ether, &c., for a short period only before they fall to the earth in raindrops. We infer this from the circumstance of the text making a special statement. For after having said that the souls enter into rice, &c., it adds, 'From thence the escape is beset with more pain ;' a statement implying that the escape from the previous states was comparatively easy and pleasant. Now this difference in point of pleasantness must be based on the comparative shortness or length of the escape ; for as, at that time, the body is not yet formed, enjoyment (in the ordinary sense) is not possible. Hence we conclude that, up to the moment when the souls enter into rice, &c., their descent is accomplished in a short time.

¹ It might be said that the relation to ether, &c., into which the souls enter, is the relation of conjunction (*samyoga*), not the relation of similarity. But as nothing can enter into the relation of *samyoga* with ether (everything being in eternal *samyoga* with it) we must assume that 'becoming ether' means 'becoming like ether,' and by parity of reasoning, that 'becoming air, &c.,' means 'becoming like air.'

24. (The descending souls enter) into (plants) animated by other (souls), as in the previous cases, on account of scriptural declaration.

In the description of the souls' descent we read, after their coming down in raindrops has been mentioned, 'Then they are born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and beans.'—Here a doubt arises whether, at this stage of their descent, the souls to which a remainder of their works continues to cling really pass over into the different species of those immoveable things (plants) and enjoy their pleasures and pains, or if they enter merely into a state of conjunction with the bodies of those plants which are animated by different souls.—The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that they pass over into those species and enjoy their pleasures and pains, on account of the remainder of works still attaching to them ; firstly, because that enables us to take the verb 'to be born' in its literal sense ; secondly, because we know from *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* that the condition of a plant may be a place of enjoyment (of the fruits of actions) ; and thirdly, because sacrifices and similar actions, being connected with harm done to animals, &c., may lead to unpleasant results. We therefore take the 'being born as rice,' &c., of those to whom a remainder of their works attaches, in its literal sense, and consider the case to be analogous to that of a man who is born either as a dog or a hog or a *Kândâla*, where we have to understand that the man really becomes a dog, and so on, and experiences the pleasures and pains connected with that condition.

To this reasoning we reply as follows:—The souls to which a remainder attaches enter merely into conjunction with rice plants, &c., which are already animated by other souls ; and do not enjoy their pleasures and pains ; 'as in the previous cases.' As the souls' becoming air, smoke, &c., was decided to mean only that they become connected with them ¹, so here too their becoming rice, &c. merely means that they

¹ This does not agree well with what had been said above about the souls becoming similar to ether, air, &c.

become connected with those plants.—How is this known? —From the fact of the statement here also being of the same nature.—Of what nature?—Here, also, as in the case of the souls becoming ether, &c., down to rain, the text does not refer to any operation of the works; hence we conclude that the souls do not enjoy pleasure and pain. Where, on the other hand, the text wants to intimate that the souls undergo pleasure and pain, there it refers to the operation of the former works; so, e.g. in the passage which treats of men of good or evil conduct. Moreover, if we should take the souls' being born as rice, &c., in its literal sense, it would follow that when the rice plants are reaped, unhusked, split, cooked and eaten, the souls which have descended into them and are animating them would have to leave them; it being generally known that when a body is destroyed the soul animating it abandons it. And then (if the souls left the plants) the text could not state (as it does state, V, 10, 6) that the souls which had entered into the plants are transmitted by animal generation (on the part of those who eat the plants). Hence it follows that the souls which have descended are merely outwardly connected with the plants animated by other souls. This suffices to refute the assertions that 'to be born' must be taken in its literal sense; and that the state of vegetable existence affords a place for enjoyment. We do not entirely deny that vegetable existence may afford a place for enjoyment; it may do so in the case of other beings which, in consequence of their unholy deeds, have become plants. We only maintain that those souls which descend from the moon with an unrequited remainder of works do not experience the enjoyment connected with plant life.

25. Should it be said that (sacrificial work is) unholy; we deny this on the ground of scripture.

We proceed to refute the remark made by the pūrvapakshin that sacrificial works are unholy because involving harm done to animals, &c., that they may therefore lead to unpleasant results, and that hence the statement as to the souls being born as plants, &c., may be taken in its

literal sense; in consequence of which it would be uncalled-for to assume a derived sense.—This reasoning is not valid, because our knowledge of what is duty and the contrary of duty depends entirely on scripture. The knowledge of one action being right and another wrong is based on scripture only; for it lies out of the cognizance of the senses, and there moreover is, in the case of right and wrong, an entire want of binding rules as to place, time, and occasion. What in one place, at one time, on one occasion is performed as a right action, is a wrong action in another place, at another time, on another occasion; none therefore can know, without scripture, what is either right or wrong. Now from scripture we derive the certain knowledge that the *gyotishṭoma*-sacrifice, which involves harm done to animals (i.e. the animal sacrifice), &c., is an act of duty; how then can it be called unholy?—But does not the scriptural precept, ‘Do not harm any creature,’ intimate that to do harm to any being is an act contrary to duty?—True, but that is a general rule, while the precept, ‘Let him offer an animal to Agnīshomau,’ embodies an exception; and general rule and exception have different spheres of application. The work (i.e. sacrifice) enjoined by the Veda is therefore holy, being performed by authoritative men and considered blameless; and to be born as a plant cannot be its fruit. Nor can to be born as rice and other plants be considered analogous to being born as dogs, &c. For the latter birth scripture teaches with reference to men of evil conduct only; while no such specific qualification is stated in the case of vegetable existence. Hence we conclude that when scripture states that the souls descending from the moon become plants, it only means that they become enclosed in plants.

26. After that (there takes place) conjunction (of the soul) with him who performs the act of generation.

The conclusion arrived at under the preceding Sūtra is confirmed also by scripture stating that the souls, after having entered into plants, ‘become’ beings performing the

act of generation, 'for whoever eats the food, whoever performs the act of generation, that again he (the soul) becomes.' Here again the soul's 'becoming' he who performs the act of generation cannot be taken in its literal sense; for a person becomes capable of generation a long time after his birth only, viz. when he reaches puberty. How then should the soul contained in the food eaten enter into that condition in its true sense? Hence we must interpret the passage to mean only that the soul enters into conjunction with one who performs the act of generation; and from this we again infer that the soul's becoming a plant merely means its entering into conjunction with a plant.

27. From the yoni a (new) body (springs).

Then, subsequently to the soul having been in conjunction with a person of generative power, generation takes place, and a body is produced in which the soul can enjoy the fruits of that remainder of works which still attaches to it. This scripture declares in the passage, 'Those whose conduct has been good,' &c. From this, also, it appears that the souls to which a remainder clings, when descending and becoming rice plants, and so on, do not enter into the state of forming the body of those plants with its attendant pleasure and pain, but are 'born as plants' in so far only as they enter into conjunction with them.

SECOND PÂDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. In the intermediate place there is (a real) creation ; for (scripture) says (that).

In the preceding pâda we have set forth, with reference to the knowledge of the five fires, the various stages of the soul's passing through the *samsâra*. We shall now set forth the soul's different states (waking, dreaming, &c.)—Scripture says (*Bri. Up. IV, 3, 9; 10*), 'When he falls asleep—; there are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads,' &c.—Here a doubt arises whether the creation thus taking place in dreams is a real one (*pâramârthika*) like the creation seen in the waking state, or whether it consists of illusion (*mâyâ*).—The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that 'in the intermediate place (or state) there is (a real) creation.' By intermediate place we have to understand the place of dreams, in which latter sense the word is used in the Veda, 'There is a third intermediate state, the state of dreams' (*Bri. Up. IV, 3, 9*). That place is called the intermediate place because it lies there where the two worlds, or else the place of waking and the place of bliss (deep sleep), join. In that intermediate place the creation must be real ; because scripture, which is authoritative, declares it to be so, 'He creates chariots, horses, roads,' &c. We, moreover, infer this from the concluding clause, 'He indeed is the maker' (*Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10*).

2. And some (state the Self to be) the shaper (creator); sons and so on (being the lovely things which he shapes).

Moreover the members of one *śākhâ* state that the Self is, in that intermediate state, the shaper of lovely things, 'He, the person who is awake in us while we are asleep, shaping one lovely thing after another' (*Ka. Up. II, 5, 8*).

Kāma (lovely things) in this passage means sons, &c., that are so called because they are beloved.—But may not the term ‘kāmaḥ’ denote desires merely?—No, we reply; the word kāma is here used with reference to sons, &c.; for those form the general subject of discussion, as we see from some preceding passages, ‘Choose sons and grandsons,’ &c., and ‘I make thee the enjoyer of all kāmās’ (Ka. Up. I, 1, 23 ; 24).—And that that shaper is the highest Self (prāgñā) we infer from the general subject-matter and from the complementary sentence. That the highest Self is the general subject-matter appears from II, 14, ‘That which thou seest as neither this nor that.’ And to that highest Self there also refers the complementary sentence II, 5, 8, ‘That indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond.’—Now it is admitted that the world (creation) of our waking state of which the highest Self (prāgñā) is the maker is real; hence the world of our dreaming state must likewise be real. That the same reasoning applies to the waking and the sleeping state a scriptural passage also declares, ‘Here they say: No, this is the same as the place of waking, for what he sees while awake the same he sees while asleep’ (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14).—Hence the world of dreams is real.—To this we reply as follows.

3. But it (viz. the dream world) is mere illusion (māyā), on account of its nature not manifesting itself with the totality (of the attributes of reality).

The word ‘but’ discards the pûrvapaksha. It is not true that the world of dreams is real; it is mere illusion and there is not a particle of reality in it.—Why?—‘On account of its nature not manifesting itself with the totality,’ i.e. because the nature of the dream world does not manifest itself with the totality of the attributes of real things.—What then do you mean by the ‘totality’?—The fulfilment of the conditions of place, time, and cause, and the circumstance of non-refutation. All these have their sphere in real things, but cannot be applied to dreams. In the first place there is, in a dream, no space for chariots and the like; for

those cannot possibly find room in the limited confines of the body.—Well, but why should not the dreaming person see the objects of his dream outside of his body? He does as a matter of fact perceive things as separated from himself by space; and, *Sruti*, moreover, declares that the dream is outside the body, ‘Away from the nest the Immortal moves; that immortal one goes wherever he likes’ (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 12*). And this distinction of the conceptions of staying and going would have no good sense if the being (the soul) did not really go out.—What you maintain is inadmissible, we reply. A sleeping being cannot possibly possess the power to go and return in a moment the distance of a hundred *yoganas*. Sometimes, moreover, a person recounts a dream in which he went to some place without returning from it, ‘Lying on my bed in the land of the Kurus I was overcome by sleep and went in my dream to the country of the *Pañkâlas*, and being there I awoke.’ If, now, that person had really gone out of his country, he would on waking find himself in the country of the *Pañkâlas* to which he had gone in his dream; but as a matter of fact he awakes in the country of the Kurus.—Moreover, while a man imagines himself in his dream going, in his body, to another place, the bystanders see that very same body lying on the couch. Further, a dreaming person does not see, in his dream, other places such as they really are. But if he in seeing them did actually go about, they would appear to him like the things he sees in his waking state. *Sruti*, moreover, declares that the dream is within the body, cp. the passage beginning ‘But when he moves about in dream,’ and terminating ‘He moves about, according to his pleasure, within his own body’ (*Bṛi. Up. II, 1, 18*). Hence the passage about the dreamer moving away from his nest must be taken in a metaphorical sense, as otherwise we should contradict scripture as well as reason; he who while remaining within his own body does not use it for any purpose may be said to be outside the body as it were. The difference of the ideas of staying within the body and going outside must, therefore, be viewed as a mere deception.—In the second place we see that dreams are in conflict with

the conditions of time. One person lying asleep at night dreams that it is day in the Bhārata Varsha ; another lives, during a dream which lasts one muhūrta only, through many crowds of years.—In the third place there do not exist in the state of dreaming the requisite efficient causes for either thought or action ; for as, in sleep, the organs are drawn inward, the dreaming person has no eyes, &c. for perceiving chariots and other things ; and whence should he, in the space of the twinkling of an eye, have the power of—or procure the material for—making chariots and the like ?—In the fourth place the chariots, horses, &c., which the dream creates, are refuted, i.e. shown not to exist by the waking state. And apart from this, the dream itself refutes what it creates, as its end often contradicts its beginning ; what at first was considered to be a chariot turns, in a moment, into a man, and what was conceived to be a man has all at once become a tree.—Scripture itself, moreover, clearly declares the chariots, &c., of a dream to have no real existence, ‘There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, &c.’—Hence the visions of a dream are mere illusion.

4. (Not altogether) for it (the dream) is indicative (of the future), according to Śruti ; the experts also declare this.

Well then, as dreams are mere illusion, they do not contain a particle of reality ?—Not so, we reply ; for dreams are prophetic of future good and bad fortune. For scripture teaches as follows, ‘When a man engaged in some work undertaken for a special wish sees in his dreams a woman, he may infer success from that dream-vision.’ Other scriptural passages declare that certain dreams indicate speedy death, so, e.g. ‘If he sees a black man with black teeth, that man will kill him.’—Those also who understand the science of dreams hold the opinion that to dream of riding on an elephant and the like is lucky ; while it is unlucky to dream of riding on a donkey, &c. ; and that certain other dreams also caused by special mantras or devatās or substances contain a particle of truth.—In all

these cases the thing indicated may be real ; the indicating dream, however, remains unreal as it is refuted by the waking state. The doctrine that the dream itself is mere illusion thus remains uncontradicted.—On this account the Vedic passage to which the first Sûtra of this pâda refers is to be explained metaphorically. When we say ‘the plough bears, i.e. supports the bullocks,’ we say so because the plough is the indirect cause of the bullocks being kept¹, not because we mean that the plough directly supports the bullocks. Analogously scripture says that the dreaming person creates chariots, &c., and is their maker, not because he creates them directly but because he is the cause of their creation. By his being their cause we have to understand that he is that one who performs the good and evil deeds which are the cause of the delight and fear produced by the apparition, in his dream, of chariots and other things².—Moreover, as in the waking state, owing to the contact of the senses and their objects and the resulting interference of the light of the sun, &c., the self-luminousness of the Self is, for the beholder, difficult to discriminate, scripture gives the description of the dreaming state for the purpose of that discrimination. If then the statements about the creation of chariots, &c., were taken as they stand (i.e. literally) we could not ascertain that the Self is self-luminous³. Hence we have to explain the passage relative to the creation of chariots, &c., in a metaphorical sense, so as to make it agree with the statement about the non-existence of chariots, &c. This explains also the scriptural passage about the shaping (III, 2, 2). The statement made above that in the Kâtaka the highest Self is spoken of as the shaper

¹ Bullocks have to be kept because the fields must be tilled.

² The dreams have the purpose of either cheering or saddening and frightening the sleeper ; so as to requite him for his good and evil works. His *adrishâ* thus furnishes the efficient cause of the dreams.

³ Because then there would be no difference between the dreaming and the waking state.

of dreams is untrue; for another scriptural passage ascribes that activity to the individual soul, 'He himself destroying, he himself shaping dreams with his own splendour, with his own light' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 9*)¹. And in the *Kāṭhaka Upanishad* itself also we infer from the form of the sentence, 'That one who wakes in us while we are asleep,'—which is an *anuvāda*, i.e. an additional statement about something well known—that he who is there proclaimed as the shaper of lovely things is nobody else than the (well-known) individual soul. The other passage which forms the complementary continuation of the one just quoted ('That indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman') discards the notion of the separate existence of the individual soul and teaches that it is nothing but Brahman, analogously to the passage 'That art thou.' And this interpretation does not conflict with Brahman being the general subject-matter.—Nor do we thereby deny altogether that the highest (*prāgñā*) Self is active in dreams; for as being the Lord of all it may be considered as the guide and ruler of the soul in all its states. We only maintain that the world connected with the intermediate state (i.e. the world of dreams) is not real in the same sense as the world consisting of ether and so on is real. On the other hand we must remember that also the so-called real creation with its ether, air, &c., is not absolutely real; for as we have proved before (*II, 1, 14*) the entire expanse of things is mere illusion. The world consisting of ether, &c., remains fixed and distinct up to the moment when the soul cognizes that Brahman is the Self of all; the world of dreams on the other hand is daily sublated by the waking state. That the latter is mere illusion has, therefore, to be understood with a distinction.

5. But by the meditation on the highest that which is hidden (*viz.* the equality of the Lord and

¹ *Svayam yihatya pūrvadeham nīśkeshāṁ kṛtvā svayam nirmāyāpūrvam vāsanāmayam deham sampādya svena bhāsā svakīyabuddhivṛttiyā svena ghyotishā svarūpatāitanyenety arthaḥ. Ān. Gi.*

the soul, becomes manifest); for from him (the Lord) are its (the soul's) bondage and release.

Well, but the individual soul is a part of the highest Self as the spark is a part of the fire. And as fire and spark have in common the powers of burning and giving light, so the individual soul and the Lord have in common the powers of knowledge and rulership; hence the individual soul may, by means of its lordship, effect in the dreaming state a creation of chariots and the like, springing from its wishes (*samkalpa*).—To this we reply that although the Lord and the individual soul stand to each other in the relation of whole and part, yet it is manifest to perception that the attributes of the two are of a different nature.—Do you then mean to say that the individual soul has no common attributes with the Lord?—We do not maintain that; but we say that the equality of attributes, although existing, is hidden by the veil of Nescience. In the case of some persons indeed who strenuously meditate on the Lord and who, their ignorance being dispelled at last, obtain through the favour of the Lord extraordinary powers and insight, that hidden equality becomes manifest—just as through the action of strong medicines the power of sight of a blind man becomes manifest; but it does not on its own account reveal itself to all men.—Why not?—Because 'from him,' i.e. from the Lord there are bondage and release of it, viz. the individual soul. That means: bondage is due to the absence of knowledge of the Lord's true nature; release is due to the presence of such knowledge. (Thus Sruti declares, 'When that god is known all fetters fall off; sufferings are destroyed and birth and death cease.) From meditating on him there arises, on the dissolution of the body, a third state, that of universal Lordship; he who is alone is satisfied' (*Svet. Up. I, 11*), and similar passages.

6. Or that (viz. the concealment of the soul's powers springs) from its connexion with the body.

But if the soul is a part of the highest Self, why should its knowledge and lordship be hidden? We should rather

expect them to be as manifest as the light and the heat of the spark.—True, we reply ; but the state of concealment of the soul's knowledge and lordship is due to its being joined to a body, i.e. to a body, sense-organs, mind, buddhi, sense-objects, sensations, &c. And to this state of things there applies the simile : As the heat and light of the fire are hidden as long as the fire is still hidden in the wood from which it will be produced by friction, or as long as it is covered by ashes ; so, in consequence of the soul being connected with limiting adjuncts in the form of a body, &c., founded on name and form as presented by Nescience, its knowledge and lordship remain hidden as long as it is possessed by the erroneous notion of not being distinct from those adjuncts.—The word 'or' in the Sūtra is meant to discard the suspicion that the Lord and the soul might be separate entities.—But why should not the soul be separate from the Lord, considering the state of concealment of its knowledge and power? If we allow the two to be fundamentally separate, we need not assume that their separateness is due to the soul's connexion with the body.—It is impossible, we reply, to assume the soul to be separate from the Lord. For in the scriptural passage beginning with 'That divinity thought' &c. (*Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2*) we meet with the clause, 'It entered into those beings with this living Self' (*gīva ātman*) ; where the individual soul is referred to as the Self. And then we have the other passage, 'It is the True ; it is the Self ; that art thou, O Svetaketu,' which again teaches that the Lord is the Self of the soul. Hence the soul is non-different from the Lord, but its knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with the body. From this it follows that the dreaming soul is not able to create, from its mere wishes, chariots and other things. If the soul possessed that power, nobody would ever have an unpleasant dream ; for nobody ever wishes for something unpleasant to himself.—We finally deny that the scriptural passage about the waking state ('dream is the same as the place of waking' &c.) indicates the reality of dreams. The statement made there about the equality of the two states

is not meant to indicate that dreams are real, for that would conflict with the soul's self-luminousness (referred to above), and scripture, moreover, expressly declares that the chariots, &c., of a dream have no real existence; it merely means that dreams, because due to mental impressions (*vāsanā*) received in the waking state, are equal to the latter in appearance. (From all this it follows that dreams are mere illusion.)

7. The absence of that (i.e. of dreams, i.e. dreamless sleep) takes place in the *nāḍis* and in the Self; according to scriptural statement.

The state of dream has been discussed; we are now going to enquire into the state of deep sleep. A number of scriptural passages refer to that state. In one place we read, 'When a man is asleep, reposing and at perfect rest so that he sees no dream, then he has entered into those *nāḍis*' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 6, 3). In another place it is said with reference to the *nāḍis*, 'Through them he moves forth and rests in the surrounding body' (*Bri. Up.* II, 1, 19). So also in another place, 'In these the person is when sleeping he sees no dream. Then he becomes one with the *prāṇa* alone' (*Kau. Up.* IV, 20). Again in another place, 'That ether which is within the heart in that he reposes' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 22). Again, 'Then he becomes united with that which is; he is gone to his Self' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 1). And, 'Embraced by the highest Self (*prāgñā*) he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 21). Here the doubt arises whether the *nāḍis*, &c., mentioned in the above passages are independent from each other and constitute various places for the soul in the state of deep sleep, or if they stand in mutual relation so as to constitute one such place only. The *pūrvapakshin* takes the former view on account of the various places mentioned serving one and the same purpose. Things serving the same purpose, as, e.g. rice and barley¹, are never seen to be dependent

¹ Either of which may be employed for making the sacrificial cake.

on each other. That the *nâḍis*, &c., actually serve the same purpose appears from the circumstance of their being all of them exhibited equally in the locative case, 'he has entered into the *nâḍis*,' 'he rests in the pericardium,' &c.¹—But in some of the passages quoted the locative case is not employed, so, e.g. in 'He becomes united with that which is' (*satâ*, instrumental case)!—That makes no difference, we reply, because there also the locative case is meant. For in the complementary passage the text states that the soul desirous of rest enters into the Self, 'Finding no rest elsewhere it settles down on breath' (*Kh. Up. VI, 8, 2*); a passage in which the word 'breath' refers to that which is (*the sat*). A place of rest of course implies the idea of the locative case. The latter case is, moreover, actually exhibited in a further complementary passage, 'When they have become merged in that which is (*sati*), they know not that they are merged in it.'—In all these passages one and the same state is referred to, viz. the state of deep sleep which is characterised by the suspension of all special cognition. Hence we conclude that in the state of deep sleep the soul optionally goes to any one of those places, either the *nâḍis*, or that which is, &c.

To this we make the following reply—'The absence of that,' i.e. the absence of dreams—which absence constitutes the essence of deep sleep—takes place 'in the *nâḍis* and in the Self;' i.e. in deep sleep the soul goes into both together, not optionally into either.—How is this known?—'From scripture.'—Scripture says of all those things, the *nâḍis*, &c., that they are the place of deep sleep; and those statements we must combine into one, as the hypothesis of option would involve partial refutation². The assertion

¹ The argument of the *pûrvapakshin* is that the different places in which the soul is said to abide in the state of deep sleep are all exhibited by the text in the same case and are on that account co-ordinate. Mutual relation implying subordination would require them to be exhibited in different cases enabling us to infer the exact manner and degree of relation.

² By allowing option between two Vedic statements we lessen the

made above that we are compelled to allow option because the *nâḍis*, &c., serve one and the same purpose, is without foundation; for from the mere fact of two things being exhibited in the same case it does not follow by any means that they serve the same purpose, and that for that reason we have to choose between them. We on the contrary see that one and the same case is employed even where things serve different purposes and have to be combined; we say, e.g. 'he sleeps in the palace, he sleeps on the couch'¹. So in the present case also the different statements can be combined into one, 'He sleeps in the *nâḍis*, in the surrounding body, in Brahman.' Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'In these the person is when sleeping he sees no dream; then he becomes one with the *prâṇa* alone,' declares, by mentioning them together in one sentence, that the *nâḍis* and the *prâṇa* are to be combined in the state of deep sleep. That by *prâṇa* Brahman is meant we have already shown (I, 1, 28). Although in another text the *nâḍis* are spoken of as an independent place of deep sleep as it were ('then he has entered into those *nâḍis*'), yet, in order not to contradict other passages in which Brahman is spoken of as the place of deep sleep, we must explain that text to mean that the soul abides in Brahman through the *nâḍis*. Nor is this interpretation opposed to the employment of the locative case ('into—or in—those *nâḍis*'); for if the soul enters into Brahman by means of the *nâḍis* it is at the same time in the *nâḍis*; just as a man who descends to the sea by means of the river Gaṅgā is at the same time on the Gaṅgā.—Moreover that passage about the *nâḍis*, because its purpose is to describe the road, consisting of the rays and *nâḍis*, to the Brahma world, mentions the entering of the soul into the *nâḍis* in order to glorify the latter (not in order to describe the state of deep sleep); for the clause following upon the one which refers to the enter-

authority of the Veda; for the adoption of either alternative sublates, for the time, the other alternative.

¹ Where the two locatives are to be combined into one statement, 'he sleeps on the couch in the palace.'

ing praises the *nâḍis*, 'There no evil touches him.' The text, moreover, adds a reason for the absence of all evil, in the words, 'For then he has become united with the light.' That means that on account of the light contained in the *nâḍis* (which is called bile) having overpowered the organs the person no longer sees the sense-objects. Or else Brahman may be meant by the 'light;' which term is applied to Brahman in another passage also, 'It is Brahman only, light only' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 7*). The passage would then mean that the soul becomes, by means of the *nâḍis*, united with Brahman, and that hence no evil touches it. That the union with Brahman is the reason for the absence of all contact with evil, is known from other scriptural passages, such as, 'All evils turn back from it; for the world of Brahman is free from all evil' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 4, 1*). On that account we have to combine the *nâḍis* with Brahman, which from other passages is known to be the place of deep sleep.—Analogously we conclude that the pericardium also, because it is mentioned in a passage treating of Brahman, is a place of deep sleep only in subordination to Brahman. For the ether within the heart is at first spoken of as the place of sleep ('He lies in the ether which is in the heart,' *Bṛi. Up. II, 1, 17*), and with reference thereto it is said later on, 'He rests in the pericardium' (*II, 1, 19*). Pericardium (*purītat*) is a name of that which envelops the heart; hence that which rests within the ether of the heart—which is contained in the pericardium—can itself be said to rest within the pericardium; just as a man living in a town surrounded by walls is said to live within the walls. That the ether within the heart is Brahman has already been shown (*I, 3, 14*).—That again the *nâḍis* and the pericardium have to be combined as places of deep sleep appears from their being mentioned together in one sentence ('Through them he moves forth and rests in the *purītat*'). That that which is (*sat*) and the intelligent Self (*prāgñā*) are only names of Brahman is well known; hence scripture mentions only three places of deep sleep, viz. the *nâḍis*, the pericardium, and Brahman. Among these three again Brahman alone is the lasting place of deep sleep; the

nāḍīs and the pericardium are mere roads leading to it. Moreover (to explain further the difference of the manner in which the soul, in deep sleep, enters into the nāḍīs, the pericardium and Brahman respectively), the nāḍīs and the pericardium are (in deep sleep) merely the abode of the limiting adjuncts of the soul; in them the soul's organs abide¹. For apart from its connexion with the limiting adjuncts it is impossible for the soul in itself to abide anywhere, because being non-different from Brahman it rests in its own glory. And if we say that, in deep sleep, it abides in Brahman we do not mean thereby that there is a difference between the abode and that which abides, but that there is absolute identity of the two. For the text says, 'With that which is he becomes united, he is gone to his Self;' which means that the sleeping person has entered into his true nature.—It cannot, moreover, be said that the soul is at any time not united with Brahman—for its true nature can never pass away—; but considering that in the state of waking and that of dreaming it passes, owing to the contact with its limiting adjuncts, into something else, as it were, it may be said that when those adjuncts cease in deep sleep it passes back into its true nature. Hence it would be entirely wrong to assume that, in deep sleep, it sometimes becomes united with Brahman and sometimes not². Moreover, even if we admit that there are different places for the soul in deep sleep, still there does not result, from that difference of place, any difference in the quality of deep sleep which is in all cases characterised by the cessation of special cognition; it is, therefore, more appropriate to say that the soul does (in deep sleep) not cognize on account of its oneness, having become united with Brahman; according to the Sruti, 'How should he know another?' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 5, 15*).—If, further, the sleeping soul did rest in the nāḍīs and the purītat, it would be impossible

¹ Ān. Gi. explains karaṇāni by karmāni: nāḍīṣhu purītatī ka gīvasyopādhyantarbhūtāni karaṇāni karmāni tishṭhantīty upādhyādhāratvam, gīvasya tv ādhāro brahmaiva.

² But with the nāḍīs or the pericardium only.

to assign any reason for its not cognizing, because in that case it would continue to have diversity for its object; according to the *Sruti*, 'When there is, as it were, duality, then one sees the other,' &c.—But in the case of him also who has diversity for his object, great distance and the like may be reasons for absence of cognition!—What you say might indeed apply to our case if the soul were acknowledged to be limited in itself; then its case would be analogous to that of *Vishnumitra*, who, when staying in a foreign land, cannot see his home. But, apart from its adjuncts, the soul knows no limitation.—Well, then, great distance, &c., residing in the adjuncts may be the reason of non-cognition!—Yes, but that leads us to the conclusion already arrived at, viz. that the soul does not cognize when, the limiting adjuncts having ceased, it has become one with Brahman.

Nor do we finally maintain that the *nāḍis*, the pericardium, and Brahman are to be added to each other as being equally places of deep sleep. For by the knowledge that the *nāḍis* and the pericardium are places of sleep, nothing is gained, as scripture teaches neither that some special fruit is connected with that knowledge nor that it is the subordinate member of some work, &c., connected with certain results. We, on the other hand, do want to prove that that Brahman is the lasting abode of the soul in the state of deep sleep; that is a knowledge which has its own uses, viz. the ascertainment of Brahman being the Self of the soul, and the ascertainment of the soul being essentially non-connected with the worlds that appear in the waking and in the dreaming state. Hence the Self alone is the place of deep sleep.

8. Hence the awaking from that (viz. Brahman).

And because the Self only is the place of deep sleep, on that account the scriptural chapters treating of sleep invariably teach that the awaking takes place from that Self. In the *Bṛi. Up.* when the time comes for the answer to the question, 'Whence did he come back?' (II, 1, 16), the text

says, 'As small sparks come forth from fire, thus all *prāṇas* come forth from that Self' (II, 1, 20). And *Kh. Up.* VI, 10, 2, we read: 'When they have come back from the True they do not know that they have come back from the True.' If there were optional places to which the soul might resort in deep sleep, scripture would teach us that it awakes sometimes from the *nāḍis*, sometimes from the pericardium, sometimes from the Self.—For that reason also the Self is the place of deep sleep.

9. But the same (soul returns from Brahman); on account of work, remembrance, text, and precept.

Here we have to enquire whether the soul when awaking from the union with Brahman is the same which entered into union with Brahman, or another one.—The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that there is no fixed rule on that point. For just as a drop of water, when poured into a large quantity of water, becomes one with the latter, so that when we again take out a drop it would be hard to manage that it should be the very same drop; thus the sleeping soul, when it has become united with Brahman, is merged in bliss and not able again to rise from it the same. Hence what actually awakes is either the Lord or some other soul.—To this we reply that the same soul which in the state of sleep entered into bliss again arises from it, not any other. We assert this on the ground of work, remembrance, sacred text, and precept; which four reasons we will treat separately. In the first place the person who wakes from sleep must be the same, because it is seen to finish work left unfinished before. Men finish in the morning what they had left incomplete on the day before. Now it is not possible that one man should proceed to complete work half done by another man, because this would imply too much¹.

¹ There would follow from it, e.g. that in the case of sacrifices occupying more than one day, there would be several sacrificers, and that consequently it would be doubtful to whom the fruit of the sacrifice, as promised by the Veda, belongs. And this would imply a stultification of the sacred text.

Hence we conclude that it is one and the same man who finishes on the latter day the work begun on the former.—In the second place the person rising from sleep is the same who went to sleep, for the reason that otherwise he could not remember what he had seen, &c., on the day before ; for what one man sees another cannot remember. And if another Self rose from sleep, the consciousness of personal identity (*âtmanusmarāṇa*) expressed in the words, 'I am the same I was before,' would not be possible.—In the third place we understand from Vedic texts that the same person rises again, 'He hastens back again as he came, to the place from which he started, to be awake' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 16*) ; 'All these creatures go day after day into the Brahma-world and yet do not discover it' (*Kṛ. Up. VIII, 3, 2*) ; 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again and again' (*Kṛ. Up. VI, 10, 2*). These and similar passages met with in the chapters treating of sleeping and waking have a proper sense only if the same soul rises again.—In the fourth place we arrive at the same conclusion on the ground of the injunctions of works and knowledge, which, on a different theory, would be meaningless. For if another person did rise, it would follow that a person might obtain final release by sleep merely, and what then, we ask, would be the use of all those works which bear fruit at a later period, and of knowledge?—Moreover on the hypothesis of another person rising from sleep, that other person would either be a soul which had up to that time carried on its phenomenal life in another body ; in that case it would follow that the practical existence carried on by means of that body would be cut short. If it be said that the soul which went to sleep may, in its turn, rise in that other body (so that B would rise in A's body and A in B's body), we reply that that would be an altogether useless hypothesis ; for what advantage do we derive from assuming that each soul rises from sleep not in the same body in which it had gone to sleep, but that it goes to sleep in one body and rises in another?—Or else the soul rising (in A's body) would be

one which had obtained final release, and that would imply that final release can have an end. But it is impossible that a soul which has once freed itself from Nescience should again rise (enter into phenomenal life). Hereby it is also shown that the soul which rises cannot be the Lord, who is everlastingly free from Nescience.—Further, on the hypothesis of another soul rising, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that souls reap the fruits of deeds not their own, and, on the other hand, are not required for what they have done.—From all this it follows that the person rising from sleep is the same that went to sleep.—Nor is it difficult to refute the analogical reasoning that the soul, if once united with Brahman, can no more emerge from it than a drop of water can again be taken out from the mass of water into which it had been poured. We admit the impossibility of taking out the same drop of water, because there is no means of distinguishing it from all the other drops. In the case of the soul, however, there are reasons of distinction, viz. the work and the knowledge (of each individual soul). Hence the two cases are not analogous.—Further, we point out that the flamingo, e.g. is able to distinguish and separate milk and water when mixed, things which we men are altogether incapable of distinguishing.—Moreover, what is called individual soul is not really different from the highest Self, so that it might be distinguished from the latter in the same way as a drop of water from the mass of water ; but, as we have explained repeatedly, Brahman itself is on account of its connexion with limiting adjuncts metaphorically called individual soul. Hence the phenomenal existence of one soul lasts as long as it continues to be bound by one set of adjuncts, and the phenomenal existence of another soul again lasts as long as it continues to be bound by another set of adjuncts. Each set of adjuncts continues through the states of sleep as well as of waking ; in the former it is like a seed, in the latter like the fully developed plant. Hence the proper inference is that the same soul awakes from sleep.

10. In him who is senseless (in a swoon, &c.)

there is half-union ; on account of this remaining (as the only possible hypothesis).

There now arises the question of what kind that state is which ordinarily is called a swoon or being stunned. Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that we know only of three states of the soul as long as it abides in a body, viz. the waking state, dreaming, and deep dreamless sleep ; to which may be added, as a fourth state, the soul's passing out of the body. A fifth state is known neither from *Sruti* nor *Smṛiti* ; hence what is called fainting must be one of the four states mentioned.—To this we make the following reply. In the first place a man lying in a swoon cannot be said to be awake ; for he does not perceive external objects by means of his senses.—But, it might be objected, may not his case be analogous to that of the arrow-maker ? Just as the man working at an arrow, although awake, is so intent on his arrow that he sees nothing else ; so the man also who is stunned, e.g. by a blow, may be awake, but as his mind is concentrated on the sensation of pain caused by the blow of the club, he may not at the time perceive anything else.—No, we reply, the case is different, on account of the absence of consciousness. The arrow-maker says, ' For such a length of time I was aware of nothing but the arrow ; ' the man, on the other hand, who returns to consciousness from a swoon, says, ' For such a length of time I was shut up in blind darkness ; I was conscious of nothing.'—A waking man, moreover, however much his mind may be concentrated on one object, keeps his body upright ; while the body of a swooning person falls prostrate on the ground. Hence a man in a swoon is not awake.—Nor, in the second place, is he dreaming ; because he is altogether unconscious.—Nor, in the third place, is he dead ; for he continues to breathe and to be warm. When a man has become senseless and people are in doubt whether he be alive or dead, they touch the region of his heart, in order to ascertain whether warmth continues in his body or not, and put their hands to his nostrils to ascertain whether breathing goes on or not. If, then, they perceive

neither warmth nor breath, they conclude that he is dead, and carry off his body into the forest in order to burn it; if, on the other hand, they do perceive warmth and breath, they decide that he is not dead, and begin to sprinkle him with cold water so that he may recover consciousness.—That a man who has swooned away is not dead follows, moreover, from the fact of his rising again (to conscious life); for from Yama's realm none ever return.—Let us then say that a man who has swooned lies in deep sleep, as he is unconscious, and, at the same time, not dead!—No, we reply; this also is impossible, on account of the different characteristics of the two states. A man who has become senseless does sometimes not breathe for a long time; his body trembles; his face has a frightful expression; his eyes are staring wide open. The countenance of a sleeping person, on the other hand, is peaceful, he draws his breath at regular intervals; his eyes are closed, his body does not tremble. A sleeping person again may be waked by a gentle stroking with the hand; a person lying in a swoon not even by a blow with a club. Moreover, senselessness and sleep have different causes; the former is produced by a blow on the head with a club or the like, the latter by weariness. Nor, finally, is it the common opinion that stunned or swooning people are asleep.—It thus remains for us to assume that the state of senselessness (in swooning, &c.) is a half-union (or half-coincidence)¹, as it coincides in so far as it is an unconscious state and does not coincide in so far as it has different characteristics.—But how can absence of consciousness in a swoon, &c., be called half-coincidence (with deep sleep)? With regard to deep sleep scripture says, 'He becomes united with the True' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 1); 'Then a thief is not a thief' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 22); 'Day and night do not pass that bank, nor old age, death, and grief, neither good nor evil deeds' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 4, 1). For the good and evil deeds reach the soul in that way that there arise in it the ideas of being affected by pleasure or pain. Those ideas are absent in deep sleep, but

¹ Viz. with deep sleep, as will be explained below.

they are likewise absent in the case of a person lying in a swoon ; hence we must maintain that, on account of the cessation of the limiting adjuncts, in the case of a senseless person as well as of one asleep, complete union takes place, not only half-union.—To this we make the following reply. —We do not mean to say that in the case of a man who lies in a swoon the soul becomes half united with Brahman ; but rather that senselessness belongs with one half to the side of deep sleep, with the other half to the side of the other state (i.e. death). In how far it is equal and not equal to sleep has already been shown. It belongs to death in so far as it is the door of death. If there remains (unrequited) work of the soul, speech and mind return (to the senseless person) ; if no work remains, breath and warmth depart from him. Therefore those who know Brahman declare a swoon and the like to be a half-union.—The objection that no fifth state is commonly acknowledged, is without much weight ; for as that state occurs occasionally only it may not be generally known. All the same it is known from ordinary experience as well as from the *Āyurveda* (medicine). That it is not considered a separate fifth state is due to its being avowedly compounded of other states.

11. Not on account of (difference of) place also twofold characteristics can belong to the highest ; for everywhere (scripture teaches it to be without any difference).

We now attempt to ascertain, on the ground of *Sruti*, the nature of that Brahman with which the individual soul becomes united in the state of deep sleep and so on, in consequence of the cessation of the limiting adjuncts.—The scriptural passages which refer to Brahman are of a double character ; some indicate that Brahman is affected by difference, so, e.g. ‘ He to whom belong all works, all desires, all sweet odours and tastes ’ (*Kh. Up.* III, 14, 2) ; others, that it is without difference, so, e.g. ‘ It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long,’ &c. (*Bri. Up.* III, 8, 8). Have we, on the ground of these passages, to assume that Brah-

man has a double nature, or either nature, and, if either, that it is affected with difference, or without difference? This is the point to be discussed.

The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that, in conformity with the scriptural passages which indicate a double nature, a double nature is to be ascribed to Brahman.

To this we reply as follows.—At any rate the highest Brahman cannot, by itself, possess double characteristics; for on account of the contradiction implied therein, it is impossible to admit that one and the same thing should by itself possess certain qualities, such as colour, &c., and should not possess them.—Nor is it possible that Brahman should possess double characteristics ‘on account of place,’ i.e. on account of its conjunction with its limiting adjuncts, such as earth, &c. For the connexion with limiting adjuncts is unavailing to impart to a thing of a certain nature an altogether different nature. The crystal, e.g. which is in itself clear, does not become dim through its conjunction with a limiting adjunct in the form of red colour; for that it is pervaded by the quality of dimness is an altogether erroneous notion. In the case of Brahman the limiting adjuncts are, moreover, presented by Nescience merely¹. Hence (as the *upâdhis* are the product of Nescience) if we embrace either of the two alternatives, we must decide in favour of that according to which Brahma is absolutely devoid of all difference, not in favour of the opposite one. For all passages whose aim it is to represent the nature of Brahman (such as, ‘It is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay,’ *Ka. Up. I, 3, 15*) teach that it is free from all difference.

12. If it be objected that it is not so, on account of the difference (taught by the Veda); we reply that it is not so on account of the declaration of (Brahman)

¹ The limiting adjunct of the crystal, i.e. the red colour of a thing, e.g. a flower with which the crystal is in contact, is as real as the crystal itself; only the effect is an illusion.—But the limiting adjuncts of Brahman are in themselves illusion.

being not such, with reference to each (declaration of difference).

Let this be, but nevertheless it cannot be maintained that Brahman is devoid of difference and attributes, and does not possess double attributes either in itself or on account of difference of station.—Why not?—‘On account of difference.’ The various vidyās teach different forms of Brahman; it is said to have four feet (*Kh. Up.* III, 18, 1); to consist of sixteen parts (*Pr. Up.* VI, 1); to be characterised by dwarfishness (*Ka. Up.* V, 3); to have the three worlds for its body (*Bṛi. Up.* I, 3, 22); to be named Vaisvanara (*Kh. Up.* V, 11, 2), &c. Hence we must admit that Brahman is qualified by differences also.—But above it has been shown that Brahman cannot possess twofold characteristics!—That also does not contradict our doctrine; for the difference of Brahman’s forms is due to its limiting adjuncts. Otherwise all those scriptural passages which refer to those differences would be objectless.

All this reasoning, we say, is without force ‘on account of the declaration of its being not such, with reference to each,’ i.e. because scripture declares, with reference to all the differences produced by the limiting adjuncts, that there is no difference in Brahman. Cp. such passages as the following: ‘This bright immortal person in this earth, and that bright immortal person incorporated in the body; he indeed is the same as that Self’ (*Bṛi. Up.* II, 5, 1). It, therefore, cannot be maintained that the connexion of Brahman with various forms is taught by the Veda.

13. Some also (teach) thus.

The members of one sākḥā also make a statement about the cognition of non-difference which is preceded by a censure of the perception of difference, ‘By the mind alone it is to be perceived, there is in it no diversity. He who perceives therein any diversity goes from death to death’ (*Bṛi. Up.* IV, 4, 19). Others also (‘By knowing the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the ruler, everything has been declared to be threefold, and this is Brahman,’ *Svet. Up.* I, 12)

record in their text that the entire world, characterised by enjoyers, things to be enjoyed, and a ruler, has Brahman for its true nature.—But as among the scriptural passages referring to Brahman, there are some which represent it as having a form, and others teaching that it is devoid of form, how can it be asserted that Brahman is devoid of form, and not also the contrary?—To this question the next Sûtra replies.

14. For (Brahman) is merely devoid of form, on account of this being the main purport of scripture.

Brahman, we must definitively assert, is devoid of all form, colour, and so on, and does not in any way possess form, and so on.—Why?—‘On account of this being the main purport (of scripture).’—‘It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long’ (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 8, 8); ‘That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay’ (*Ka. Up.* I, 3, 15); ‘He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names. That within which forms and names are, that is Brahman’ (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 14, 1); ‘That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and within, not produced’ (*Mu. Up.* II, 1, 2); ‘That Brahman is without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside, this Self is Brahman, omnipresent and omniscient’ (*Bṛi. Up.* II, 5, 19). These and similar passages have for their purport the true nature of Brahman as non-connected with any world, and have not any other purport, as we have proved under I, 1, 4. On the ground of such passages we therefore must definitively conclude that Brahman is devoid of form. Those other passages, on the other hand, which refer to a Brahman qualified by form do not aim at setting forth the nature of Brahman, but rather at enjoining the worship of Brahman. As long as those latter texts do not contradict those of the former class, they are to be accepted as they stand; where, however, contradictions occur, the passages whose main subject is Brahman must be viewed as having greater force than those of the other kind.—This is the reason for our deciding that although there are two different classes of scriptural texts, Brahman must be held to be altogether without form, not

at the same time of an opposite nature.—But what then is the position of those passages which refer to Brahman as possessing form?—To this question the next Sūtra replies.

15. And as light (assumes forms as it were by its contact with things possessing form, so does Brahman;) since (the texts ascribing form to Brahman) are not devoid of meaning.

Just as the light of the sun or the moon after having passed through space enters into contact with a finger or some other limiting adjunct, and, according as the latter is straight or bent, itself becomes straight or bent as it were; so Brahman also assumes, as it were, the form of the earth and the other limiting adjuncts with which it enters into connexion. Hence there is no reason why certain texts should not teach, with a view to meditative worship, that Brahman has that and that form. We thus escape the conclusion that those Vedic passages which ascribe form to Brahman are devoid of sense; a conclusion altogether unacceptable since all parts of the Veda are equally authoritative, and hence must all be assumed to have a meaning. —But does this not imply a contradiction of the tenet maintained above, viz. that Brahman does not possess double characteristics although it is connected with limiting adjuncts?—By no means, we reply. What is merely due to a limiting adjunct cannot constitute an attribute of a substance, and the limiting adjuncts are, moreover, presented by Nescience only. That the primeval natural Nescience leaves room for all practical life and activity—whether ordinary or based on the Veda—we have explained more than once.

16. And (scripture) declares (Brahman) to consist of that (i.e. intelligence).

And scripture declares that Brahman consists of intelligence, is devoid of any other characteristics, and is altogether without difference; 'As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus, indeed, has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is alto-

gether a mass of knowledge' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 5, 13*). That means: That Self has neither inside nor outside any characteristic form but intelligence; simple non-differentiated intelligence constitutes its nature; just as a lump of salt has inside as well as outside one and the same saltish taste, not any other taste.

17. (This scripture) also shows, and it is likewise stated in *Smṛiti*.

That Brahman is without any difference is proved by those scriptural passages also which expressly deny that it possesses any other characteristics; so, e.g. 'Next follows the teaching by No, no' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 3, 6*); 'It is different from the known, it is also above the unknown' (*Ke. Up. I, 4*); 'From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach it' (*Taitt. Up. II, 9*). Of a similar purport is that scriptural passage which relates how Bâhva, being questioned about Brahman by Vâshkalin, explained it to him by silence, 'He said to him, "Learn Brahman, O friend," and became silent. Then, on a second and third question, he replied, "I am teaching you indeed, but you do not understand. Silent is that Self."' The same teaching is conveyed by those *Smṛiti*-texts which deny of Brahman all other characteristics; so, e.g. 'I will proclaim that which is the object of knowledge, knowing which one reaches immortality; the highest Brahman without either beginning or end, which cannot be said either to be or not to be' (*Bha. Gîtâ XIII, 12*). Of a similar purport is another *Smṛiti*-passage, according to which the omniform Nârâyana instructed Nârada, 'The cause, O Nârada, of your seeing me endowed with the qualities of all beings is the Mâyâ emitted by me; do not cognize me as being such (in reality).'

18. For this very reason (there are applied to Brahman) comparisons such as that of the images of the sun and the like.

Because that Self is of the nature of intelligence, devoid of all difference, transcending speech and mind, to be

described only by denying of it all other characteristics, therefore the Moksha Śāstras compare it to the images of the sun reflected in the water and the like, meaning thereby that all difference in Brahman is unreal, only due to its limiting conditions. Compare, e.g. out of many, the two following passages: 'As the one luminous sun when entering into relation to many different waters is himself rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts; so also the one divine unborn Self;' and 'The one Self of all beings separately abides in all the individual beings; hence it appears one and many at the same time, just as the one moon is multiplied by its reflections in the water.'

The next Sūtra raises an objection.

19. But there is no parallelism (of the two things compared), since (in the case of Brahman) there is not apprehended (any separate substance) comparable to the water.

Since no substance comparable to the water is apprehended in the case of Brahman, a parallelism between Brahman and the reflected images of the sun cannot be established. In the case of the sun and other material luminous bodies, there exists a separate material substance occupying a different place, viz. water; hence the light of the sun, &c., may be reflected. The Self, on the other hand, is not a material thing, and, as it is present everywhere and all is identical with it, there are no limiting adjuncts different from it and occupying a different place.—Therefore the instances are not parallel.

The next Sūtra disposes of this objection.

20. Since (the highest Brahman) is inside (of the limiting adjuncts), it participates in their increase and decrease; owing to the appropriateness (thus resulting) of the two (things compared) it is thus (i.e. the comparison holds good).

The parallel instance (of the sun's reflection in the water) is unobjectionable, since a common feature—with reference to which alone the comparison is instituted—does exist.

Whenever two things are compared, they are so only with reference to some particular point they have in common. Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated; indeed if it could be demonstrated there would be an end of that particular relation which gives rise to the comparison. Nor does the sūtrakāra institute the comparison objected to on his own account; he merely sets forth the purport of a comparison actually met with in scripture.—Now, the special feature on which the comparison rests is ‘the participation in increase and decrease.’ The reflected image of the sun dilates when the surface of the water expands; it contracts when the water shrinks; it trembles when the water is agitated; it divides itself when the water is divided. It thus participates in all the attributes and conditions of the water; while the real sun remains all the time the same.—Similarly Brahman, although in reality uniform and never changing, participates as it were in the attributes and states of the body and the other limiting adjuncts within which it abides; it grows with them as it were, decreases with them as it were, and so on. As thus the two things compared possess certain common features no objection can be made to the comparison.

21. And on account of the declaration (of scripture).

Scripture moreover declares that the highest Brahman enters into the body and the other limiting adjuncts, ‘He made bodies with two feet, he made bodies with four feet. Having first become a bird he entered the bodies as purusha’ (*Bṛi.* Up. II, 5, 18); and ‘Having entered into them with this living (individual) Self’ (*Kh.* Up. VI, 3, 2).—For all these reasons the comparison set forth in Sūtra 18 is unobjectionable.

Some teachers assume that the preceding discussion (beginning from Sūtra 11) comprises two *adhikaraṇas*, of which the former discusses the question whether Brahman is an absolutely uniform being in which all the plurality of the apparent world vanishes, or a being multiform as the apparent world is; while the latter tries to determine

whether Brahman—whose absolute uniformity was established in the former *adhikaraṇa*—is to be defined as that which is (sat), or as thought (intelligence ; bodha), or as both.—Against this we remark that in no case there is a valid reason for beginning a second *adhikaraṇa*. For what should be the subject of a special second *adhikaraṇa*? Sūtra 15 and foll. cannot be meant to disprove that Brahman possesses a plurality of characteristics; for that hypothesis is already sufficiently disposed of in Sūtras 11–14. Nor can they be meant to show that Brahman is to be defined only as ‘that which is,’ not also as ‘thought ;’ for that would imply that the scriptural passage, ‘consisting of nothing but knowledge’ (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 12*), is devoid of meaning. How moreover could Brahman, if devoid of intelligence, be said to be the Self of the intelligent individual soul? Nor again can the hypothetical second *adhikaraṇa* be assumed to prove that Brahman must be defined as ‘thought’ only, not at the same time as ‘that which is ;’ for if it were so, certain scriptural passages—as e.g. *Ka. Up. II, 6, 13*, ‘He is to be conceived by the words, He is’—would lose their meaning. And how, moreover, could we admit thought apart from existence?—Nor can it be said that Brahman has both those characteristics, since that would contradict something already admitted. For he who would maintain that Brahman is characterised by thought different from existence, and at the same time by existence different from thought, would virtually maintain that there is a plurality in Brahman, and that view has already been disproved in the preceding *adhikaraṇa*.—But as scripture teaches both (viz. that Brahman is one only and that it possesses more than one characteristic) there can be no objection to such a doctrine!—There is, we reply, for one being cannot possibly possess more than one nature.—And if it finally should be said that existence is thought and thought existence and that the two do not exclude each other ; we remark that in that case there is no reason for the doubt¹ whether Brahman is that which is, or intelligence,

¹ And hence no reason for a separate *adhikaraṇa*.

or both.—On the other hand we have shown that the Sūtras can be explained as constituting one *adhikarāṇa* only. Moreover, as the scriptural texts concerning Brahman disagree in so far as representing Brahman as qualified by form and again as devoid of form we, when embracing the alternative of a Brahman devoid of form, must necessarily explain the position of the other texts, and if taken in that sense the Sūtras (15–21) acquire a more appropriate meaning. And if it is maintained that those scriptural passages also which speak of Brahman as qualified by form have no separate meaning of their own, but likewise teach that Brahman is devoid of all form, viz. by intimating that the plurality referred to has to be annihilated; we reply that this opinion also appears objectionable. In those cases, indeed, where elements of plurality are referred to in chapters treating of the highest knowledge, we may assume them to be mentioned merely to be abstracted from; so e.g. in the passage, *Bṛi. Up. II, 5, 19*, ‘His horses are yoked hundreds and ten. This is the horses, this is the ten and the thousands, many and endless,’ which passage is immediately followed by the words, ‘This is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside.’ But where elements of plurality are referred to in chapters treating of devout meditation, we have no right to assume that they are mentioned only to be set aside. This is the case e.g. in the passage, ‘He who consists of mind, whose body is *prāṇa*, whose form is light’ (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 2*), which is connected with an injunction of devout meditation contained in the preceding passage, ‘Let him have this will and belief.’ In passages of the latter kind, where the determinations attributed to Brahman may be taken as they stand and viewed as subserving the purposes of devout meditation, we have no right to assume that they are mentioned with the indirect purpose of being discarded. Moreover, if all texts concerning Brahman equally aimed at discarding all thought of plurality, there would be no opportunity for stating the determinative reason (why Brahman is to be viewed as devoid of all form) as was done in Sūtra 14. And further scripture

informs us that devout meditations on Brahman as characterised by form have results of their own, viz. either the warding off of calamities, or the gaining of power, or else release by successive steps. All these reasons determine us to view the passages concerning devout meditation on the one hand and the passages concerning Brahman on the other hand as constituting separate classes, not as forming one whole. In what way moreover, we ask, could the two classes of texts be looked upon as constituting one whole?—Our opponent will perhaps reply, 'Because we apprehend them to form parts of one injunction, just as we do in the case of the darsapûrnamâsa-sacrifice and the oblations called prayâgas.'—But this reply we are unable to admit, since the texts about Brahman, as shown at length under I, 1, 4, merely determine an existing substance (viz. Brahman), and do not enjoin any performances. What kind of activity, we moreover ask, are those texts, according to our opponent's view, meant to enjoin? For whenever an injunction is laid upon a person, it has reference to some kind of work to be undertaken by him.—Our opponent will perhaps make the following reply. The object of the injunction is, in the present case, the annihilation of the appearance of duality. As long as the latter is not destroyed, the true nature of Brahman is not known; hence the appearance of duality which stands in the way of true knowledge must be dissolved. Just as the Veda prescribes the performance of certain sacrifices to him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so it prescribes the dissolution of the apparent world to him who is desirous of final release. Whoever wants to know the true nature of Brahman must first annihilate the appearance of plurality that obstructs true knowledge, just as a man wishing to ascertain the true nature of some jar or similar object placed in a dark room must at first remove the darkness. For the apparent world has Brahman for its true nature, not vice versa; therefore the cognition of Brahman is effected through the previous annihilation of the apparent world of names and forms.

This argumentation we meet by asking our opponent

of what nature that so-called annihilation of the apparent world is. Is it analogous to the annihilation of hardness in butter which is effected by bringing it into contact with fire? or is the apparent world of names and forms which is superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience to be dissolved by knowledge, just as the phenomenon of a double moon which is due to a disease of the eyes is removed by the application of medicine¹? If the former, the Vedic injunctions bid us to do something impossible; for no man can actually annihilate this whole existing world with all its animated bodies and all its elementary substances such as earth and so on. And if it actually could be done, the first released person would have done it once for all, so that at present the whole world would be empty, earth and all other substances having been finally annihilated.—If the latter, i.e. if our opponent maintains that the phenomenal world is superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience and annihilated by knowledge, we point out that the only thing needed is that the knowledge of Brahman should be conveyed by Vedic passages sublating the apparent plurality superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience, such as ‘Brahman is one, without a second;’ ‘That is the true, it is the Self and thou art it.’ (*Kh. Up.* VI, 2, 1; 8, 7.) As soon as Brahman is indicated in this way, knowledge arising of itself discards Nescience, and this whole world of names and forms, which had been hiding Brahman from us, melts away like the imagery of a dream. As long, on the other hand, as Brahman is not so indicated, you may say a hundred times, ‘Cognize Brahman! Dissolve this world!’ and yet we shall be unable to do either the one or the other.

But, our opponent may object, even after Brahman has been indicated by means of the passages quoted, there is room for injunctions bidding us either to cognize Brahman or to dissolve the world.—Not so, we reply; for both these

¹ I. e. does the injunction bidding us to annihilate the phenomenal world look on it as real or as fictitious, due to Nescience only?

things are already effected by the indication of the true nature of Brahman as devoid of all plurality ; just as the pointing out of the true nature of the rope has for its immediate result the cognition of the true nature of the rope, and the dissolution of the appearance of a snake or the like. And what is done once need not be done again¹. —We moreover ask the following question : Does the individual soul on which the injunction is laid belong to the unreal element of the phenomenal world or to the real element, i.e. Brahman, which underlies the phenomenal world? If the former, the soul itself is dissolved just as earth and the other elements are, as soon as the knowledge of Brahman's true nature has arisen, and on whom then should the dissolution of the world be enjoined, or who should, by acting on that injunction, obtain release?—If the latter, we are led to the same result. For as soon as there arises the knowledge that Brahman, which never can become the subject of an injunction, is the true being of the soul while the soul as such is due to Nescience, there remains no being on which injunctions could be laid, and hence there is no room for injunctions at all.

What then, it may be asked, is the meaning of those Vedic passages which speak of the highest Brahman as something to be seen, to be heard, and so on?—They aim, we reply, not at enjoining the knowledge of truth, but merely at directing our attention to it. Similarly in ordinary life imperative phrases such as 'Listen to this!' 'Look at this!' are frequently meant to express not that we are immediately to cognize this or that, but only that we are to direct our attention to it. Even when a person is face to face with some object of knowledge, knowledge may either arise or not ; all that another person wishing to inform him about the object can do is to point it out to him ; knowledge will thereupon spring up in his mind of itself, according to the object of knowledge and according

¹ I.e. after the true nature of Brahman has been once known, there is no longer room for a special injunction to annihilate this apparent world.

to the means of knowledge employed.—Nor must it be said that an injunction may have the purpose of modifying the knowledge of a thing which was originally obtained by some other means of knowledge¹. For the modified knowledge due to such injunctions is not knowledge in the true sense of the word, but merely a mental energy (i.e. the product, not of an object of knowledge presented to us through one of the means of true knowledge, but of an arbitrary mental activity), and if such modification of knowledge springs up in the mind of itself (i.e. without a deliberate mental act) it is mere error. True knowledge on the other hand, which is produced by the means of true knowledge and is conformable to its object, can neither be brought about by hundreds of injunctions nor be checked by hundreds of prohibitions. For it does not depend on the will of man, but merely on what really and unalterably exists.—For this reason also injunctions of the knowledge of Brahman cannot be admitted.

A further point has to be considered here. If we admitted that injunctions constitute the sole end and aim of the entire Veda, there would remain no authority for the, after all, generally acknowledged truth that Brahman—which is not subject to any injunction—is the Self of all.—Nor would it be of avail to maintain that the Veda may both proclaim the truth stated just now and enjoin on man the cognition of that truth; for that would involve the conclusion that the one *Brahma-sāstra* has two—and moreover conflicting—meanings.—The theory combated by us gives moreover rise to a number of other objections which nobody can refute; it compels us to set aside the text as it stands and to make assumptions not guaranteed by the text; it implies the doctrine that final release is, like the results of sacrificial works, (not the direct result of true knowledge but) the mediate result of the so-called unseen

¹ The *pûrvapakshin* might refer e.g. to the Vedic injunction, 'he is to meditate upon woman as fire,' and maintain that the object of this injunction is to modify our knowledge of woman derived from perception &c., according to which a woman is not fire.

principle (*adrishṭa*), and non-permanent &c. &c.—We therefore again assert that the texts concerning Brahman aim at cognition, not at injunction, and that hence the pretended reason of ‘their being apprehended as parts of one injunction’ cannot induce us to look upon the entire Veda as one whole.

And finally, even if we admitted that the texts concerning Brahman are of an injunctive character, we should be unable to prove that the texts denying plurality, and the texts setting forth plurality enjoin one and the same thing ; for this latter conclusion cannot be accepted in the face of the several means of proof such as difference of terms¹, and so on, which intimate that there is a plurality of injunctions. The passages respectively enjoining the *darsapûrnamâsa*-sacrifice and the offerings termed *prayâgas* may indeed be considered to form one whole, as the qualification on the part of the sacrificer furnishes an element common to the two². But the statements about the Brahman devoid of qualities and those about the qualified Brahman have not any element in common ; for qualities such as ‘having light for one’s body’ contribute in no way towards the dissolution of the world, nor again does the latter help in any way the former. For the dissolution of the entire phenomenal world on the one hand, and regard for a part of that world on the other hand do not allow themselves to be combined in one and the same subject.—The preferable theory, therefore, is to distinguish with us two classes of texts, according as Brahman is represented as possessing form or as devoid of it.

22. For (the clause ‘Not so, not so’) denies (of Brahman) the suchness which forms the topic of

¹ ‘Difference of terms’ (*śabdântaram*) is according to the Pûrva Mîmâṃsâ the first of the six means of proof showing karmabheda or niyogabheda. Cp. Sabara bhâshya on II, 1, 1.

² For the sacrifice as well as its subordinate part—the offering of the *prayâgas*—has to be performed by a sacrificer acting for one end, viz. the obtainment of the heavenly world.

discussion ; and (the text) enounces something more than that.

We read, *Bṛi. Up. II, 3*, 'Two forms of Brahman there are indeed, the material and the immaterial, the mortal and the immortal, the solid and the fluid, *sat* and *tya*.' The text thereupon divides the five elements into two classes, predicates of the essence of that which is immaterial—which it calls *puruṣa*—saffron-colour, and so on, and then goes on to say, 'Now then the teaching by Not so, not so! For there is nothing else higher than this (if one says): It is not so.' Here we have to enquire what the object of the negative statement is. We do not observe any definite thing indicated by words such as 'this' or 'that'; we merely have the word 'so' in 'Not so, not so!' to which the word 'not' refers, and which on that account indicates something meant to be denied. Now we know that the word 'so' (*iti*) is used with reference to approximate things, in the same way as the particle '*evam*' is used; compare, e.g. the sentence 'so (*iti*) indeed the teacher said' (where the 'so' refers to his immediately preceding speech). And, in our passage, the context points out what has to be considered as proximate, viz. the two cosmic forms of Brahman, and that Brahman itself to which the two forms belong. Hence there arises a doubt whether the phrase, 'Not so, not so!' negatives both Brahman and its two forms, or only either; and if the latter, whether it negatives Brahman and leaves its two forms, or if it negatives the two forms and leaves Brahman.—We suppose, the *pūrvapakṣin* says, that the negative statement negatives Brahman as well as its two forms; both being suggested by the context. As the word 'not' is repeated twice, there are really two negative statements, of which the one negatives the cosmic form of Brahman, the other that which has form, i.e. Brahman itself. Or else we may suppose that Brahman alone is negated. For as Brahman transcends all speech and thought, its existence is doubtful, and admits of being negated; the plurality of cosmic forms on the other hand falls within the sphere of perception and the other means of right

knowledge, and can, therefore, not be negated.—On this latter interpretation the repetition of 'not' must be considered as due to emphasis only.

To this we make the following reply. It is impossible that the phrase, 'Not so, not so!' should negative both, since that would imply the doctrine of a general Void. Whenever we deny something unreal, we do so with reference to something real; the unreal snake, e.g. is negated with reference to the real rope. But this (denial of something unreal with reference to something real) is possible only if some entity is left. If everything is denied, no entity is left, and if no entity is left, the denial of some other entity which we may wish to undertake, becomes impossible, i.e. that latter entity becomes real and as such cannot be negated.—Nor, in the second place, can Brahman be denied; for that would contradict the introductory phrase of the chapter, 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 1, 1*); would show disregard of the threat conveyed in *Taitt. Up. II, 6*, 'He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing;' would be opposed to definitive assertions such as 'By the words "He is" is he to be apprehended' (*Ka. Up. II, 6, 13*); and would involve a stultification of the entire Vedānta.—The phrase that Brahman transcends all speech and thought does certainly not mean to say that Brahman does not exist; for after the Vedānta-part of scripture has established at length the existence of Brahman—in such passages as 'He who knows Brahman obtains the highest;' 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'—it cannot be supposed all at once to teach its non-existence. For, as the common saying is, 'Better than bathing it is not to touch dirt at all.' The passage, 'from whence all speech with the mind turns away unable to reach it' (*Taitt. Up. II, 4*), must, therefore, rather be viewed as intimating Brahman.

The passage of the *Bṛi. Up.* under discussion has, therefore, to be understood as follows. Brahman is that whose nature is permanent purity, intelligence, and freedom; it transcends speech and mind, does not fall within the category of 'object,' and constitutes the inward Self of all. Of this Brahman our text denies all plurality of forms; but

Brahman itself it leaves untouched. This the Sûtra expresses in the words, 'for it denies the suchness which forms the topic of discussion.' That means: The passage 'Not so,' &c., denies of Brahman the limited form, material as well as immaterial, which in the preceding part of the chapter is described at length with reference to the gods as well as the body, and also the second form which is produced by the first, is characterised by mental impressions, forms the essence of that which is immaterial, is denoted by the term purusha, rests on the subtle Self (liṅgātman) and is described by means of comparisons with saffron-colour, &c., since the purusha, which is the essence of what is immaterial, does not itself possess colour perceivable by the eye. Now these forms of Brahman are by means of the word 'so' (iti), which always refers to something approximate brought into connexion with the negative particle 'not.' Brahman itself, on the other hand (apart from its forms), is, in the previous part of the chapter, mentioned not as in itself constituting the chief topic, but only in so far as it is qualified by its forms; this appears from the circumstance of Brahman being exhibited in the genitive case only ('These are two forms of Brahman'). Now, after the two forms have been set forth, there arises the desire of knowing that to which the two forms belong, and hence the text continues, 'Now then the teaching by means of "Not so, not so."' This passage, we conclude, conveys information regarding the nature of Brahman by denying the reality of the forms fictitiously attributed to it; for the phrase, 'Not so, not so!' negatives the whole aggregate of effects superimposed on Brahman. Effects we know to have no real existence, and they can therefore be negated; not so, however, Brahman, which constitutes the necessary basis for all fictitious superimposition.—Nor must the question be asked here, how the sacred text, after having itself set forth the two forms of Brahman, can negative them in the end, contrary to the principle that not to touch dirt is better than bathing after having done so. For the text does not set forth the two forms of Brahman as something the truth of which is to be established, but merely mentions those two forms, which in

the sphere of ordinary thought are fictitiously attributed to Brahman, in order finally to negative them and establish thereby the true nature of the formless Brahman.

The double repetition of the negation may either serve the purpose of furnishing a special denial of the material as well as the immaterial form of Brahman ; or the first 'Not so' may negative the aggregate of material elements, while the second denies the aggregate of mental impressions. Or else the repetition may be an emphatic one, intimating that whatever can be thought is not Brahman. This is, perhaps, the better explanation. For if a limited number of things are denied each individually, there still remains the desire to know whether something else may not be Brahman ; an emphatic repetition of the denial on the other hand shows that the entire aggregate of objects is denied and that Brahman is the inward Self ; whereby all further enquiry is checked.—The final conclusion, therefore, is, that the text negatives only the cosmic plurality fictitiously superimposed on Brahman, but leaves Brahman itself untouched.

The Sūtra gives another argument establishing the same conclusion, 'and the text enounces something more than that,' i.e. more than the preceding negation. The words of the text meant are '(not) is there anything beyond.'—If the negation, 'Not so, not so !' were meant to negative all things whatever, and this terminated in absolute non-existence, the text could not even allude to 'anything beyond.'—The words of the text are to be connected as follows. After the clause, 'Not so, not so !' has given information about Brahman, the clause next following illustrates this teaching by saying : There is nothing beyond or separate from this Brahman ; therefore Brahman is expressed by 'Not so, not so !' which latter words do not mean that Brahman itself does not exist. The implied meaning rather is that different from everything else there exists the 'non-negated' Brahman.—The words of the text admit, however, of another interpretation also ; for they may mean that there is no teaching of Brahman higher than that teaching which is implied in the negation of plurality expressed by 'Not so, not so !' On this latter interpretation

the words of the Sūtra, 'and the text enounces something more than that,' must be taken to refer to the name mentioned in the text, 'Then comes the name, the True of the True; the senses being the True and he the True of them.'—This again has a sense only if the previous negative clause denies everything but Brahman, not everything but absolute non-existence. For, if the latter were the case, what then could be called the True of the True?—We therefore decide that the clause, 'Not so, not so!' negatives not absolutely everything, but only everything but Brahman.

23. That (Brahman) is unevolved; for (thus scripture) says.

If that highest Brahman which is different from the world that is negated in the passage discussed above really exists, why then is it not apprehended?—Because, the Sūtrakāra replies, it is unevolved, not to be apprehended by the senses; for it is the witness of whatever is apprehended (i.e. the subject in all apprehension). Thus Sruti says, 'He is not apprehended by the eye, nor by speech, nor by the other senses, not by penance or good works' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8); 'That Self is to be described by No, no! He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 26); 'That which cannot be seen nor apprehended' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6); 'When in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Similar statements are made in Smṛiti-passages; so e.g. 'He is called unevolved, not to be fathomed by thought, unchangeable.'

24. And in the state of perfect conciliation also (the Yogins apprehend the highest Brahman), according to Sruti and Smṛiti.

At the time of perfect conciliation the Yogins see the unevolved Self free from all plurality. By 'perfect conciliation' we understand the presentation before the mind (of the highest Self), which is effected through meditation and devotion.—This is vouched for by Sruti as well as

Smṛiti. So, e.g. Ka. Up. IV, 1, 'The Self-existent pierced the openings of the senses so that they turn outward; therefore man looks without, not within himself. Some wise man, however, with his eyes closed and wishing for immortality, saw the Self within.' And Mu. Up. III, 1, 8, 'When a man's mind has become purified by the serene light of knowledge then he sees him, meditating on him as without parts.' Smṛiti-passages of the same tendency are the following ones, 'He who is seen as light by the Yogins meditating on him sleepless, with suspended breath, with contented minds, with subdued senses; reverence be to him¹!' and 'The Yogins see him, the august, eternal one.'

But if in the state of perfect conciliation there is a being to be conciliated and a being conciliating, does not this involve the distinction of a higher and a lower Self?—No, the next Sūtra replies.

25. And as in the case of (physical) light and the like, there is non-distinction (of the two Selves), the light (i.e. the intelligent Self) (being divided) by its activity; according to the repeated declarations of scripture.

As light, ether, the sun and so on appear differentiated as it were through their objects such as fingers, vessels, water and so on which constitute limiting adjuncts², while in reality they preserve their essential non-differentiatedness; so the distinction of different Selves is due to limiting adjuncts only, while the unity of all Selves is natural and original. For on the doctrine of the non-difference of the individual soul and the highest Self the Vedānta-texts insist again and again³.

¹ Whose Self is Yoga.

² Light is differentiated as it were by the various objects on which it shines; the all-pervading ether is divided into parts as it were by hollow bodies; the sun is multiplied as it were by its reflections in the water.

³ It certainly looks here as if the Bhāṣyakāra did not know what to do with the words of the Sūtra. The 'karmāni,' which is

26. Hence (the soul enters into unity) with the infinite (i.e. the highest Self); for this scripture indicates.

Hence i.e. because the non-difference of all Selfs is essential and their difference due to Nescience only, the individual soul after having dispelled Nescience by true knowledge passes over into unity with the highest Self. For this is indicated by scripture, cp. e.g. *Mu. Up. III, 2, 9*, 'He who knows that highest Brahman becomes even Brahman;' *Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6*, 'Being Brahman he goes to Brahman.'

27. But on account of twofold designation, (the relation of the highest Self to the individual soul has to be viewed) like that of the snake to its coils.

In order to justify his own view as to the relation of the conciliating individual soul and the conciliated highest Self, the *Sūtrakāra* mentions a different view of the same matter.—Some scriptural passages refer to the highest Self and the individual soul as distinct entities, cp. e.g. *Mu. Up. III, 1, 8*, 'Then he sees him meditating on him as without parts,' where the highest Self appears as the object of the soul's vision and meditation; *Mu. Up. III, 2, 8*, 'He goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great;' and *Bri. Up. III, 7, 15*, 'Who rules all beings within;' in which passages the highest Self is represented as the object of approach and as the ruler of the individual soul. In other places again the two are spoken of as non-different, so e.g. *Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7*, 'Thou art that;' *Bri. Up. I, 4, 10*, 'I am Brahman;' *Bri. Up. III, 4, 1*, 'This is thy Self who is within all;' *Bri. Up. III, 7, 15*, 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal.'—As thus difference and non-difference are equally vouched for by scripture, the acceptance of absolute non-difference would render futile all those

as good as passed over by him, is explained by *Go. Ân.* as 'dhyānādikarmāṇy upādhan.' *Ân. Gi.* says, 'ātmāprakāśarabdito-gñānatatkārye karmāṇy upādhan savishesha' &c.

texts which speak of difference. We therefore look on the relation of the highest Self and the soul as analogous to that of the snake and its coils. Viewed as a whole the snake is one, non-different, while an element of difference appears if we view it with regard to its coils, hood, erect posture and so on.

28. Or else like that of light to its substratum, both being fire.

Or else the relation of the two may be viewed as follows. Just as the light of the sun and its substratum, i.e. the sun himself, are not absolutely different—for they both consist of fire—and yet are spoken of as different, so also the soul and the highest Self.

29. Or else (the relation of the two is to be conceived) in the manner stated above.

Or else the relation of the two has to be conceived in the manner suggested by Sūtra 25. For if the bondage of the soul is due to Nescience only, final release is possible. But if the soul is really and truly bound—whether the soul be considered as a certain condition or state of the highest Self as suggested in Sūtra 27, or as a part of the highest Self as suggested in Sūtra 28—its real bondage cannot be done away with, and thus the scriptural doctrine of final release becomes absurd.—Nor, finally, can it be said that Śruti equally teaches difference and non-difference. For non-difference only is what it aims at establishing; while, when engaged in setting forth something else, it merely refers to difference as something known from other sources of knowledge (viz. perception, &c.).—Hence the conclusion stands that the soul is not different from the highest Self, as explained in Sūtra 25.

30. And on account of the denial.

The conclusion arrived at above is confirmed by the fact of scripture expressly denying that there exists any intelligent being apart from the highest Self. Cp. 'There is no other seer but he' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 23*). And the same

conclusion follows from those passages which deny the existence of a world apart from Brahman and thus leave Brahman alone remaining, viz. 'Now then the teaching, Not so, not so !' (*Bri. Up.* II, 3, 6); 'That Brahman is without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside' (*Bri. Up.* II, 5, 19).

31. Beyond (Brahman, there is something) further, on account of the designations of bank, measure, connexion, separation.

With reference to this Brahman which we have ascertained to be free from all plurality there now arises the doubt—due to the conflicting nature of various scriptural statements—whether something exists beyond it or not. We therefore enter on the task of explaining the true meaning of those scriptural passages which seem to indicate that there is some entity beyond, i.e. apart from Brahman.

The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that some entity must be admitted apart from Brahman, because Brahman is spoken of as being a bank; as having size; as being connected; as being separated.—As a bank it is spoken of in the passage, *Kh. Up.* VIII, 4, 1, 'That Self is a bank, a boundary.' The word 'bank' (*setu*) ordinarily denotes a structure of earth, wood and the like, serving the purpose of checking the flow of water. Here, being applied to the Self, it intimates that there exists something apart from the Self, just as there exists something different from an ordinary bank. The same conclusion is confirmed by the words, 'Having passed the bank' (*VIII, 4, 2*). For as in ordinary life a man after having crossed a bank reaches some place which is not a bank, let us say a forest; so, we must understand, a man after having crossed, i.e. passed beyond the Self reaches something which is not the Self.—As having size Brahman is spoken of in the following passages, 'This Brahman has four feet (quarters), eight hoofs, sixteen parts.' Now it is well known from ordinary experience that wherever an object, a coin, e.g. has a definite limited size, there exists something different from that object; we therefore must assume that there also

exists something different from Brahman.—Brahman is declared to be connected in the following passages, 'Then he is united with the True' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 1), and 'The embodied Self is embraced by the highest Self' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 21). Now we observe that non-measured things are connected with things measured, men, e.g. with a town. And scripture declares that the individual souls are, in the state of deep sleep, connected with Brahman. Hence we conclude that beyond Brahman there is something unmeasured.—The same conclusion is finally confirmed by those texts which proclaim difference, so e.g. the passage, I, 6, 6 ff. ('Now that golden person who is seen within the sun' &c.), which at first refers to a Lord residing in the sun and then mentions a Lord residing in the eye, distinct from the former ('Now the person who is seen within the eye'). The text distinctly transfers to the latter the form &c. of the former¹ ('The form of that person is the same as the form of the other' &c.), and moreover declares that the lordly power of both is limited, 'He obtains through the one the worlds beyond that and the wishes of the devas' &c.; which is very much as if one should say, 'This is the reign of the king of Magadha and that the reign of the king of Videha.'

From all this it follows that there exists something different from Brahman.

32. But (Brahman is called a bank &c.) on account of (a certain) equality.

The word 'but' is meant to set aside the previously established conclusion.—There can exist nothing different from Brahman, since we are unable to observe a proof for such existence. That all existences which have a beginning spring from, subsist through, and return into Brahman we have already ascertained, and have shown that the effect is non-different from the cause.—Nor can there exist, apart from Brahman, something which has no beginning, since scripture affirms that 'Being only this was

¹ Which would be unnecessary if the two were not distinct.

in the beginning, one, without a second.' The promise moreover that through the cognition of one thing everything will be known, renders it impossible that there should exist anything different from Brahman.—But does not the fact that the Self is called a bank, &c. indicate that there exists something beyond the Self?—No, we reply; the passages quoted by the pûrvapakshin have no power to prove his conclusion. For the text only says that the Self is a bank, not that there is something beyond it. Nor are we entitled to assume the existence of some such thing, merely to the end of accounting for the Self being called a bank; for the simple assumption of something unknown is a mere piece of arbitrariness. If, moreover, the mere fact of the Self being called a bank implied the existence of something beyond it, as in the case of an ordinary bank, we should also be compelled to conclude that the Self is made of earth and stones; which would run counter to the scriptural doctrine that the Self is not something produced.—The proper explanation is that the Self is called a bank because it resembles a bank in a certain respect; as a bank dams back the water and marks the boundary of contiguous fields, so the Self supports the world and its boundaries. The Self is thus glorified by the name of bank because it resembles one.—In the clause quoted above, 'having passed that bank,' the verb 'to pass' cannot be taken in the sense of 'going beyond,' but must rather mean 'to reach fully.' In the same way we say of a student, 'he has passed the science of grammar,' meaning thereby that he has fully mastered it.

33. (The statement as to Brahman having size) subserves the purpose of the mind; in the manner of the four feet (quarters).

In reply to the pûrvapakshin's contention that the statements as to Brahman's size, prove that there exists something different from Brahman, we remark that those statements merely serve the purposes of the mind, i.e. of devout meditation.—But how can the cognition of something con-

sisting of four, or eight, or sixteen parts be referred to Brahman?—Through its modifications (effects), we reply, Brahman is assumed to be subject to measure. For as some men are of inferior, others of middling, others again of superior intelligence, not all are capable of fixing their mind on the infinite Brahman, devoid of all effects. ‘In the manner of the four feet,’ i.e. in the same way as (*Kṛ. Up. III, 18*), for the purpose of pious meditation, speech and three other feet are ascribed to mind viewed as the personal manifestation of Brahman, and fire and three other feet to the ether viewed as the cosmic manifestation of Brahman.—Or else the phrase, ‘in the manner of the four quarters,’ may be explained as follows. In the same way as to facilitate commerce, a *kārshāpāna* is assumed to be divided into four parts—for there being no fixed rule as to the value of bargains, people cannot always carry on their transactions with whole *kārshāpānas* only—, (so, in order to facilitate pious meditation on the part of less intelligent people, four feet, &c., are ascribed to Brahman).

34. (The statements concerning connexion and difference) are due to difference of place; in the manner of light and so on.

The present Sūtra refutes the allegation that something different from Brahman exists, firstly, because things are said to be connected with Brahman, and secondly, because things are said to be separate from it. The fact is, that all those statements regarding connexion and difference are made with a view to difference of place. When the cognition of difference which is produced by the Self’s connexion with different places, i.e. with the buddhi and the other limiting adjuncts, ceases on account of the cessation of those limiting adjuncts themselves, connexion with the highest Self is metaphorically said to take place; but that is done with a view to the limiting adjuncts only, not with a view to any limitation on the part of the Self.—In the same way, all statements regarding difference have reference to the difference of Brahman’s limiting adjuncts only, not to any difference affecting Brahman’s own nature.—All this

is analogous to the case of light and the like. For the light of the sun or the moon also is differentiated by its connexion with limiting adjuncts, and is, on account of these adjuncts, spoken of as divided, and, when the adjuncts are removed, it is said to enter into connexion (union). Other instances of the effect of limiting adjuncts are furnished by the ether entering into connexion with the eyes of needles and the like.

35. And because (only such a connexion) is possible.

Moreover, only such a connexion as described above is possible. For scriptural passages, such as 'He is gone to his Self' (*Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1*), declare that the connexion of the soul with the highest Self is one of essential nature. But as the essential nature of a thing is imperishable, the connexion cannot be analogous to that of the inhabitants with the town, but can only be explained with reference to an obscuration, owing to Nescience, of the soul's true nature.—Similarly the difference spoken of by scripture cannot be real, but only such as is due to Nescience; for many texts declare that there exists only one Lord. Analogously, scripture teaches that the one ether is made manifold as it were by its connexion with different places 'The ether which is outside man is the ether which is inside man, and the ether within the heart' (*Kh. Up. III, 12, 7 ff.*).

36. (The same thing follows) from the express denial of other (existences).

Having thus refuted the arguments of the *pûrvapakshin*, the *Sûtrakâra* in conclusion strengthens his view by a further reason. A great number of Vedic passages—which, considering the context in which they stand, cannot be explained otherwise—distinctly deny that there exists anything apart from Brahman; 'He indeed is below; I am below; the Self is below' (*Kh. Up. VII, 25, 1; 2*); 'Who-soever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self was abandoned by everything' (*Bri. Up. II, 4, 6*); 'Brahman

alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'The Self is all this' (*Kh.* Up. VII, 25, 2); 'In it there is no diversity' (*Bri.* Up. IV, 4, 19); 'He to whom there is nothing superior, from whom there is nothing different' (Svet. Up. III, 9); 'This is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside' (*Bri.* Up. II, 5, 19).—And that there is no other Self within the highest Self, follows from that scriptural passage which teaches Brahman to be within everything (*Bri.* Up. II, 5, 19).

37. Thereby the omnipresence (of Brahman is established), in accordance with the statements about (Brahman's) extent.

The preceding demonstration that the texts calling Brahman a bank, and so on, are not to be taken literally, and that, on the other hand, the texts denying all plurality must be accepted as they stand, moreover, serves to prove that the Self is omnipresent. If the former texts were taken literally, banks and the like would have to be looked upon as belonging to the Self, and thence it would follow that the Self is limited. And if the texts of the latter class were not accepted as valid, there would be substances exclusive of each other, and thus the Self would again be limited.—That the Self is omnipresent follows from the texts proclaiming its extent, &c., cp. *Kh.* Up. VIII, 1, 3, 'As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart'; 'Like the ether, he is omnipresent and eternal'; 'He is greater than the sky, greater than the ether' (*Sat. Br.* X, 6, 3, 2); 'He is eternal, omnipresent, firm, immoveable' (*Bha. Gitā* II, 24); and other similar passages from *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*.

38. From him (i.e. the Lord, there comes) the fruit (of works); for (that only) is possible.

We now turn to another characteristic belonging to Brahman, in so far as it is connected with the every-day world in which we distinguish a ruler and the objects of his rule.—There arises the question whether the threefold fruits of action which are enjoyed by the creatures in their

samsāra-state—viz. pain, pleasure, and a mixture of the two—spring from the actions themselves or come from the Lord.—The *Sūtrakāra* embraces the latter alternative, on the ground that it is the only possible one. The ruler of all who by turns provides for the creation, the subsistence and the reabsorption of the world, and who knows all the differences of place and time, he alone is capable of effecting all those modes of requital which are in accordance with the merit of the agents; actions, on the other hand, which pass away as soon as done, have no power of bringing about results at some future time, since nothing can spring from nothing. Nor can the latter difficulty be overcome by the assumption that an action passes away only after having produced some result according to its nature, and that the agent will at some future time enjoy that fruit of his action. For the fruit of an action is such only through being enjoyed by the agent; only at the moment when some pleasure or some pain—the result of some deed—is enjoyed by the doer of the deed people understand it to be a ‘fruit.’—Nor, in the second place, have we the right to assume that the fruit will, at some future time, spring from the so-called supersensuous principle (*apūrva*), which itself is supposed to be a direct result of the deed; for that so-called supersensuous principle is something of non-intelligent nature, comparable to a piece of wood or metal, and as such cannot act unless moved by some intelligent being. And moreover there is no proof whatever for the existence of such an *apūrva*.—But is it not proved by the fact that deeds are actually requited?—By no means, we reply; for the fact of requital may be accounted for by the action of the Lord.

39. And because it is declared by scripture.

We assume the Lord to bring about the fruits of actions, not only because no other assumption appears plausible, but also because we have direct scriptural statement on our side. Cp. e.g. the passage, ‘This indeed is the great, unborn Self, the giver of food, the giver of wealth’ (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 24*).

40. Gaimini (thinks) for the same reasons that religious merit (is what brings about the fruits of actions).

Gaimini bases a contrary opinion on the reasons specified in the last two Sūtras. Scripture, he argues, proclaims injunctions such as the following one, 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.' Now as it is admitted that such scriptural injunctions must have an object, we conclude that the sacrifice itself brings about the result, i. e. the obtainment of the heavenly world ; for if this were not so, nobody would perform sacrifices and thereby scriptural injunctions would be rendered purposeless.—But has not this view of the matter already been abandoned, on the ground that an action which passes away as soon as done can have no fruit?—We must, the reply is, follow the authority of scripture and assume such a connexion of action and fruit as agrees with scriptural statement. Now it is clear that a deed cannot effect a result at some future time, unless, before passing away, it gives birth to some unseen result ; we therefore assume that there exists some result which we call *apūrva*, and which may be viewed either as an imperceptible after-state of the deed or as an imperceptible antecedent state of the result. This hypothesis removes all difficulties, while on the other hand it is impossible that the Lord should effect the results of actions. For in the first place, one uniform cause cannot be made to account for a great variety of effects ; in the second place, the Lord would have to be taxed with partiality and cruelty ; and in the third place, if the deed itself did not bring about its own fruit, it would be useless to perform it at all.—For all these reasons the result springs from the deed only, whether meritorious or non-meritorious.

41. Bādārayana, however, thinks the former (i. e. the Lord, to be the cause of the fruits of action), since he is designated as the cause (of the actions themselves).

The teacher Bādārayana thinks that the previously-mentioned Lord is the cause of the fruits of action. The word 'however' sets aside the view of the fruit being produced either by the mere deed or the mere apūrva.—The final conclusion then is that the fruits come from the Lord acting with a view to the deeds done by the souls, or, if it be so preferred, with a view to the apūrva springing from the deeds. This view is proved by the circumstance of scripture representing the Lord not only as the giver of fruits but also as the causal agent with reference to all actions whether good or evil. Compare the passage, Kau. Up. III, 8, 'He makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed.' The same is said in the Bhagavadgītā (VII, 21), 'Whichever divine form a devotee wishes to worship with faith, to that form I render his faith steady. Holding that faith he strives to propitiate the deity and obtains from it the benefits he desires, as ordained by me.'

All Vedānta-texts moreover declare that the Lord is the only cause of all creation. And his creating all creatures in forms and conditions corresponding to—and retributive of—their former deeds, is just what entitles us to call the Lord the cause of all fruits of actions. And as the Lord has regard to the merit and demerit of the souls, the objections raised above—as to one uniform cause being inadequate to the production of various effects, &c.—are without any foundation.

THIRD PĀDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. (The cognitions) intimated by all the Vedānta-texts (are identical), on account of the non-difference of injunction and so on.

In the preceding part of this work we have explained the nature of the object of cognition, i.e. Brahman. We now enter on the discussion of the question whether the cognitions of Brahman, which form the subject of the different Vedānta-texts, are separate cognitions or not.

But, an objection may here be raised, so far we have determined that Brahman is free from all distinctions whatever, one, of absolutely uniform nature like a lump of salt; hence there appears to be no reason for even raising the question whether the cognitions of Brahman are separate cognitions or constitute only one cognition. For as Brahman is one and of uniform nature, it certainly cannot be maintained that the Vedānta-texts aim at establishing a plurality in Brahman comparable to the plurality of works (inculcated by the *karmakāṇḍa* of the Veda). Nor can it be said that although Brahman is uniform, yet it may be the object of divers cognitions; for any difference in nature between the cognition and the object known points to a mistake committed. If, on the other hand, it should be assumed that the different Vedānta-texts aim at teaching different cognitions of Brahman, it would follow that only one cognition can be the right one while all others are mistaken, and that would lead to a general distrust of all Vedānta.—Hence the question whether each individual Vedānta-text teaches a separate cognition of Brahman or not cannot even be raised.—Nor, supposing that question were raised after all, can the non-difference of the cognition of Brahman be demonstrated (as the Sūtra attempts) on the ground that all Vedānta-texts are equally injunctions, since the cognition of Brahman is not of the nature of an injunction. For the teacher has proved at

length (I, 1, 4) that the knowledge of Brahman is produced by passages which treat of Brahman as an existing accomplished thing and thus do not aim at enjoining anything.—Why then begin at all this discussion about the difference or non-difference of the cognitions of Brahman?

To all this we reply that no objection can be raised against a discussion of that kind, since the latter has for its object only the qualified Brahman and *prāṇa* and the like. For devout meditations on the qualified Brahman may, like acts, be either identical or different. Scripture moreover teaches that, like acts, they have various results; some of them have visible results, others unseen results, and others again—as conducive to the springing up of perfect knowledge—have for their result release by successive steps. With a view to those meditations, therefore, we may raise the question whether the individual Vedānta-texts teach different cognitions of Brahman or not.

The arguments which may here be set forth by the *pûrvapakshin* are as follows. In the first place it is known that difference may be proved by names, as e.g. in the case of the sacrificial performance called 'light' (*gyotis*)¹. And the cognitions of Brahman which are enjoined in the different Vedānta-texts are connected with different names such as the *Taittirīyaka*, the *Vāgasaneyaka*, the *Kauthumaka*, the *Kaushītaka*, the *Sātyāyanaka*, &c.—In the second place the separateness of actions is proved by the difference of form (characteristics; *rûpa*). So e.g. with reference to the passage, 'the milk is for the *Viśvedevas*, the water for the *vâgins*'².

¹ See the *samgṛāhṛtakarmabhedādhikaraṇa*, Pû. Mî. Sû. II, 2, 22, where the decision is that the word *gyotis* (in 'athaisha *gyotir*' &c.) denotes not the *gyotishoma* but a separate sacrificial performance.

² See Pû. Mî. Sû. II, 2, 23. The offering of water made to the divinities called *vâgin* is separate from the offering of milk to the *Viśvedevas*; for the material offered as well as the divinity to which the offering is made (i.e. the two *rûpa* of the sacrifice) differs in the two cases.

Now similar differences of form are met with in the Vedānta-texts; the followers of one Sākhā, e.g. mention, in the chapter called 'the knowledge of the five fires,' a sixth fire, while other Sākhās mention five only; and in the colloquy of the prāṇas some texts mention a lesser, others a greater number of organs and powers of the body.—In the third place differences in qualifying particulars (dharma) are supposed to prove difference of acts, and such differences also are met with in the Vedānta-texts; only in the *Mundaka-Upanishad*, e.g. it is said that the science of Brahman must be imparted to those only who have performed the rite of carrying fire on the head (*Mu. Up. III, 2, 10*).—In the same way the other reasons which are admitted to prove the separateness of actions, such as repetition and so on, are to be applied in a suitable manner to the different Vedānta-texts also.—We therefore maintain that each separate Vedānta-text teaches a different cognition of Brahman.

To this argumentation of the pūrvapakshin we make the following reply.—The cognitions enjoined by all the Vedānta-texts are the same, owing to the non-difference of injunction and so on. The 'and so on' refers to the other reasons proving non-difference of acts which are enumerated in the *Siddhānta-sūtra* of the *adhikaraṇa* treating of the different Sākhās (*Pū. Mī. II, 4, 9*, '(the act) is one on account of the non-difference of connexion of form, of injunction, and of name'). Thus, as the *agnihotra* though described in different Sākhās is yet one, the same kind of human activity being enjoined in all by means of the words, 'He is to offer;' so the injunction met with in the text of the *Vāgasaneyins* (*Bṛi. Up. VI, 1, 1*), 'He who knows the oldest and the best,' &c., is the same as that which occurs in the text of the *Khândogas*, 'He who knows the first and the best' (*Kh. Up. V, 1, 1*). The connexion of the meditation enjoined with its aim is likewise the same in both texts, 'He becomes the first and best among his people.' In both texts again the cognition enjoined has the same form. For in both the object of knowledge is the true nature of the prāṇa which is characterised by

certain qualities such as being the first and best, and just as the material and the divinity constitute the form of the sacrifice, so the object known constitutes the form of the cognition. And finally both cognitions have the same name, viz. the knowledge of the *prāṇa*.—For these reasons we declare that the different Vedānta-texts enjoin identical cognitions.—A similar line of reasoning applies to other cognitions which are met with in more than one Vedānta-text, so e.g. to the knowledge of the five fires, the knowledge of Vaisvānara, the knowledge of *Sāṇḍilya* and so on.—Of the apparent reasons on the ground of which the *pūrvapakshin* above tried to show that the meditations are not identical but separate a refutation is to be found in the *Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* II, 4, 10 ff.

The next *Sūtra* disposes of a doubt which may remain even after the preceding discussion.

2. (If it be said that the *vidyās* are separate) on account of the difference (of secondary matters), we deny that, since even in one and the same *vidyā* (different secondary matters may find place).

In spite of the preceding argumentation we cannot admit that the different cognitions of Brahman are equally intimated by all Vedānta-texts, because we meet with differences in secondary matters (*guṇa*). Thus the *Vāgasaneyins* mention in their text of the knowledge of the five fires a sixth fire ('And then the fire is indeed fire,' *Bṛi. Up.* VI, 2, 14), while the *Kṛandogas* mention no sixth fire but conclude their text of the *pañcāgnividya* with the express mention of five fires ('But he who thus knows the five fires,' *Kṛ. Up.* V, 10, 10).

Now it is impossible to admit that the cognition of those who admit that particular qualification (i.e. the sixth fire) and of those who do not should be one and the same. Nor may we attempt to evade the difficulty by saying that the sixth fire may be tacitly included in the *vidyā* of the *Kṛandogas*; for that would contradict the number 'five' expressly stated by them.—In the colloquy of the *prāṇas*

again the *Khândogas* mention, in addition to the most important *prâṇa*, four other *prâṇas*, viz. speech, the eye, the ear, and the mind ; while the *Vâgasaneyins* mention a fifth one also, 'Seed indeed is generation. He who knows that becomes rich in offspring and cattle' (*Bri. Up.* VI, 1, 6).—Now a difference of procedure in the point of addition and omission effects a difference in the object known, and the latter again effects a difference in the *vidyâ*, just as a difference in the point of material and divinity distinguishes one sacrifice from another.

To this we make the following reply.—Your objection is without force, since such differences of qualification as are met with in the above instances are possible even in one and the same *vidyâ*. In the *Khândogya*-text a sixth fire is indeed not included ; yet, as five fires, beginning with the heavenly world, are recognised as the same in both texts the mentioned difference cannot effect a split of the *vidyâ* ; not any more than the *atirâtra*-sacrifice is differentiated by the *shodasin*-rite being either used or not-used. Moreover, the *Khândogya*-text also actually mentions a sixth fire, viz. in the passage, V, 9, 2, 'When he has departed, his friends carry him, as appointed, to the fire.'—The *Vâgasaneyins*, on the other hand, mention their sixth fire ('and then the fire is indeed fire, the fuel fuel,' &c.) for the purpose of cutting short the fanciful assumption regarding fuel, smoke, and so on, which runs through the description of the five fires with which the heavenly world and so on are imaginatively identified. Their statement regarding the sixth fire (has therefore not the purpose of enjoining it as an object of meditation but) is merely a remark about something already established (known)¹. And even if we assume that the statement about the sixth fire has the purpose of representing that fire as an object of devout meditation, yet the fire may be inserted in the *vidyâ* of the *Khândogas* without any fear of its being in conflict with the number five mentioned there ;

¹ Viz. the real fire in which the dead body is burned and which is known from perception.

for that number is not an essential part of the injunction¹, but merely makes an additional statement regarding something known already from the text, viz. the five fires with which the heavenly world and so on are identified². Similarly nothing stands in the way of some additional qualification being included in the vidyā concerning the colloquy of the prāṇas and so on. The addition or omission of some particular qualification is unable to introduce difference into the object of knowledge and thereby into the knowledge itself; for although the objects of knowledge may differ partly, yet their greater part and at the same time the knowing person are understood to be the same. Hence the vidyā also remains the same.

3. (The rite of carrying fire on the head is an attribute) of the study of the Veda (of the Ātharvanikas); because in the Samākhāra (it is mentioned) as being such. (This also follows) from the general subject-matter, and the limitation (of the rite to the Ātharvanikas) is analogous to that of the libations.

With reference to the pūrvapakshin's averment that the rite of carrying fire on the head is connected with the vidyā of the followers of the Atharva-veda only, not with any other vidyā, and that thereby the vidyā of the Ātharvanikas is separated from all other vidyās, the following remarks have to be made.—The rite of carrying fire on the head is an attribute not of the vidyā, but merely of the study of the Veda on the part of the Ātharvanikas. This we infer from the circumstance that the Ātharvanikas, in the book called 'Samākhāra' which treats of Vedic observances, record the above rite also as being of such a nature, i.e. as constituting an attribute of the study of the Veda. At the close of the Upanishad moreover we have the following sentence, 'A

¹ I.e. the *Khândogya*-text contains no injunction that five fires only are to be meditated upon.

² So that there stands nothing in the way of our amplifying our meditation by the addition of a sixth fire.

man who has not performed the rites does not read this;’ here we conclude from the word ‘this’ which refers to the subject previously treated, and from the fact of ‘reading’ being mentioned, that the rite is an attribute of the study of the Upanishad of the *Ātharvavikās* (but has nothing to do with the Upanishad itself).—But what about the immediately preceding passage, ‘Let a man tell this science of Brahman to those only by whom the rite of carrying fire on the head has been performed according to rule?’ Here the rite in question is connected with the science of Brahman, and as all science of Brahman is one only, it follows that the rite has to be connected with all science of Brahman!—Not so, we reply; for in the above passage also the word ‘this’ refers back to what forms the subject of the antecedent part of the Upanishad, and that subject is constituted by the science of Brahman only in so far as depending on a particular book (viz. the *Mundaka-Upanishad*); hence the rite also is connected with that particular book only.—The Sūtra adds another illustrative instance in the words ‘and as in the case of the libations there is limitation of that.’ As the seven libations—from the saurya libation up to the sataudana libation—since they are not connected with the triad of fires taught in the other Vedas, but only with the one fire which is taught in the *Atharvan*, are thereby enjoined exclusively on the followers of the *Atharvan*; so the rite of carrying fire on the head also is limited to the study of that particular Veda with which scriptural statements connect it.—The doctrine of the unity of the vidyās thus remains unshaken.

4. (Scripture) also declares this.

The Veda also declares the identity of the vidyās; for all Vedānta-texts represent the object of knowledge as one; cp. e.g. *Kā. Up.* I, 2, 15, ‘That word which all the Vedas record;’ *Ait. Ār.* III, 2, 3, 12, ‘Him only the *Bahvrikās* consider in the great hymn, the *Adhvaryus* in the sacrificial fire, the *Khandogas* in the *Mahāvratā* ceremony.’—To quote some other instances proving the unity of the vidyās: *Kā. Up.* I, 6, 2, mentions as one of the Lord’s qualities that he

causes fear; now this very same quality is referred to in the Taitt. Up. II, 7, in order to intimate disapprobation of those who are opposed to the absolute unity of that which is, 'For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it (the Self), there is fear for him. But that fear is only for him who knows (a difference) and does not know (the oneness).'—Similarly the Vaisvânara, who in the Vâgasaneyaka is imaginatively represented as a span long, is referred to in the *Khândogya* as something well known, 'But he who worships that Vaisvânara Self which is a span long,' &c. (*Kh. Up. V, 18, 1*).

And as, on the ground of all Vedânta-texts intimating the same matters, hymns and the like which are enjoined in one place are employed in other places (where they are not expressly enjoined) for the purposes of devout meditation, it follows that all Vedânta-texts intimate also (identical) devout meditations.

5. In the case of (a devout meditation) common (to several *Sâkhâs*) (the particulars mentioned in each *Sâkhâ*) have to be combined, since there is no difference of essential matter; just as in the case of what is complementary to injunctions.

[This Sûtra states the practical outcome of the discussion carried on in the first four Sûtras.] It having been determined that the cognitions of Brahman are equally intimated by all Vedânta-texts, it follows that as long as the cognition is one and the same its specific determinations mentioned in one text are to be introduced into other texts also where they are not mentioned. For if the matter of these determinations subserves some particular cognition in one place, it subserves it in another place also, since in both places we have to do with one and the same cognition. The case is analogous to that of the things subordinate to some sacrificial performance, as, e.g. the *agnihotra*. The *agnihotra* also is one performance, and therefore its subordinate members, although they may be mentioned in different texts, have to be combined into one whole.—If the

cognitions were separate, the particulars mentioned in different texts could not be combined; for they would be confined each to its own cognition and would not stand to each other in that relation in which the typical form of a sacrifice stands to its modifications¹. But as the cognitions are one, things lie differently.—The above Sūtra will be explained and applied at length further on, in Sūtra 10 ff.

6. If it be said that (the udgītha vidyā of the *Bṛi. Up.* and that of the *Khând. Up.*) are separate on account (of the difference) of the texts; we deny this on the ground of their (essential) non-difference.

We read in the *Vāgasaneyaka* I, 3, 1, 'The Devas said, well, let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means of the Udgītha. They said to speech: Do thou sing out for us.—Yes, said speech,' &c. The text thereupon relates how speech and the other prāṇas were pierced by the Asuras with evil, and therefore unable to effect what was expected from them, and how in the end recourse was had to the chief vital air, 'Then they said to the breath in the mouth: Do thou sing for us.—Yes, said the breath, and sang.'—A similar story is met with in the *Khândogya* I, 2. There we read at first that 'the devas took the udgītha, thinking they would vanquish the Asuras with it;' the text then relates how the other prāṇas were pierced with evil and thus foiled by the Asuras, and how the Devas in the end had recourse to the chief vital air, 'Then comes this chief vital air; on that they meditated as udgītha.'—As both these passages glorify the chief vital air, it follows that they both are injunctions of a meditation on the vital air. A doubt, however, arises whether the two vidyās are separate vidyās or one vidyā only.

Here the pūrvapakshin maintains that for the reasons specified in the first adhikaraṇa of the present pāda the two

¹ The *Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā* teaches that all subordinate things which the Veda prescribes for some typical sacrifice are eo ipso prescribed for the modified forms of the sacrifice also.

vidyās have to be considered as one.—But, an objection is raised, there is a difference of procedure which contradicts the assumption of unity. The Vāgasaneyins represent the chief vital air as the producer of the udgītha ('Do thou sing out for us'), while the *Khândogas* speak of it as itself being the udgītha ('on that they meditated as udgītha'). How can this divergence be reconciled with the assumption of the unity of the vidyās?—The difference pointed out, the pūrvapakshin replies, is not important enough to bring about a separation of the two vidyās, since we observe that the two both agree in a plurality of points. Both texts relate that the Devas and the Asuras were fighting; both at first glorify speech and the other prāṇas in their relation to the udgītha, and thereupon, finding fault with them, pass on to the chief vital air; both tell how through the strength of the latter the Asuras were scattered as a ball of earth is scattered when hitting a solid stone. And, moreover, the text of the Vāgasaneyaka also co-ordinates the chief vital air and the udgītha in the clause, 'He is udgītha' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 3, 23*). We therefore have to assume that in the *Khândogya* also the chief prāṇa has secondarily to be looked upon as the producer of the udgītha.—The two texts thus constitute one vidyā only.

7. Or rather there is no (unity of the vidyās), owing to the difference of subject-matter.

Setting aside the view maintained by the pūrvapakshin, we have rather to say that, owing to the difference of subject-matter, the two vidyās are separate.—In the *Khândogya* the introductory sentence (I, 1, 1), 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgītha,' represents as the object of meditation the syllable Om which is a part of the udgītha; thereupon proceeds to give an account of its qualities such as being the inmost essence of all ('The full account, however, of Om is this,' &c.); and later on tells, with reference to the same syllable Om which is a part of the udgītha, a story about the Gods and Asuras in which there occurs the statement, 'They meditated on the udgītha

as that breath¹. If now we should assume² that the term 'udgītha' denotes here the whole act of worship (not only the syllable Om which is a part of the udgītha), and that (in the passage, 'they meditated on the udgītha as that breath') the performer of that worship, i.e. the Udgātri-priest, is said to be meditated upon as breath; our interpretation would be open to two objections: in the first place it would be opposed to the introductory sentence (which directly declares the syllable Om to be the object of devotion); and in the second place it would oblige us to take the word udgītha (in 'they meditated on the udgītha'), not in its direct sense, but as denoting by implication the udgātri. But the rule is that in one and the same connected passage the interpretation of later passages has to adapt itself to the earlier passages. We therefore conclude the passage last quoted to teach that the syllable Om which is a part of the udgītha is to be meditated upon as prāṇa.—In the Vāgasaneyaka on the other hand there is no reason for taking the word udgītha to denote a part of the udgītha only, and we therefore must interpret it to denote the whole; and in the passage, 'Do thou sing out for us,' the performer of the worship, i.e. the Udgātri-priest, is described as prāṇa. In reply to the pūrvapakshin's remark that in the Vāgasaneyaka also the udgītha and the prāṇa occur in co-ordination (in the passage, 'He is udgītha'), we point out that that statement merely aims at showing that the Self of all is that prāṇa which the text wishes to represent as udgātri. The statement, therefore, does not imply the unity of the two vidyās. Moreover, there also the term udgītha denotes the whole act of worship (while in the *Khândogya* it denotes the omkāra only). Nor must it be said that the prāṇa can

¹ From which it appears that the *Khândogya* enjoins throughout a meditation on the syllable Om which is only a part of the udgītha; while the object of meditation enjoined in the *Bṛihad-āraṇyaka* is the whole udgītha.

² Viz. for the purpose of making out that the object of meditation is the same in the *Khândogya* and the *Bṛihad-āraṇyaka*.

impossibly be an udgâtri, and that on that account our interpretation of the *Bṛihad-Āraṇyaka* passage is erroneous; for with a view to pious meditation scripture may represent the *prâṇa* as udgâtri as well as udgîtha. And, moreover, the Udgâtri actually performs his work by the strength of his breath; hence the *prâṇa* may be called udgâtri. In accordance with this the text says (I, 3, 24), 'He sang it indeed as speech and breath.'—And if we understand that the text clearly intends to convey a difference of matter we have no right to conclude from merely apparent similarities of expression that only one matter is intended to be expressed. To quote an analogous instance from the *karmakāṇḍa*: In the section relative to the unexpected rising of the moon during the *darsa*-sacrifice, as well as in the section about the offering to be made by him who is desirous of cattle, we meet with identical injunctions such as the following one, 'He is to divide the grains into three portions, and to make those of medium size into a cake offered on eight potsherds to Agni the Giver,' &c.; nevertheless it follows from the difference of the introductory passages of the two sections that the offerings to be made on account of the moon's rising are indeed not connected with the divinities of the *darsa*-sacrifice (but do not constitute a new sacrifice separate from the *darsa*), while the section about him who is desirous of cattle enjoins a separate sacrificial performance¹.—Analogously a difference in the nature of the introductory clauses effects a difference of the *vidyās*, 'As in the case of that which is greater than great.' That means: Just as the meditation on the udgîtha enjoined in the passage, 'Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest; he is indeed the udgîtha, greater than great, he is without end' (*Kh. Up.* I, 9, 1), and the other meditation on the udgîtha as possessing the qualities of abiding within the eye and the sun, &c. (*Kh. Up.* I, 6), are separate meditations, although in both the udgîtha is identified with the highest Self; so it is with *vidyās* in general. The special features of different *vidyās* are not to be combined even when the

¹ Cp. *Taitt. Samh.* II, 5, 5, 2; *Pû. Mî. Sû.* VI, 5, 1.

vidyās belong to one and the same Sākhā ; much less then when they belong to different Sākhās.

8. If it be said (that the vidyās are one) on account of (the identity of) name ; (we reply that) that is explained (already) ; moreover that (identity of name) is (found in the case of admittedly separate vidyās).

Here it might be said that after all the unity of the two vidyās discussed must be admitted, since they are called by one and the same name, viz. 'the science of the udgītha.'—But this argument is of no avail against what has been said under the preceding Sūtra. The decision there advocated has the advantage of following the letter of the revealed text ; the name 'udgītha-vidyā' on the other hand is not a part of the revealed text, but given to the vidyās for convenience sake by ordinary men for the reason that the word 'udgītha' is met with in the text.—Moreover, we observe that admittedly separate meditations such as the two mentioned under the last Sūtra have one and the same name. Similarly altogether separate sacrificial performances, such as the agnihotra, the darsapūṛṇamāsa, and so on, are all comprised under the one name Kāṭhaka, merely because they are recorded in the one book called Kāṭhaka.—Where, on the other hand, there is no special reason for assuming the difference of vidyās, their unity may be declared on the ground of identity of name ; as, e.g. in the case of the Saṃvargavidyās.

9. And on account of the (omkāra) extending over the whole (Veda), (the view that the term udgītha expresses a specialisation) is appropriate.

In the passage, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgītha,' the two words 'omkāra' and 'udgītha' are placed in co-ordination¹. The question then arises

¹ Sāmānādhikaranyā, i.e. literally, 'the relation of abiding in a common substratum.'—The two words are shown to stand in that relation by their being exhibited in the same case.

whether the relation in which the ideas conveyed by these two words stand to each other is the relation of superimposition (*adhyāsa*) or sublation (*apavāda*) or unity (*ekatva*) or specification (*viśeṣaṇa*); for *primā facie* each of these relations may present itself to the mind.—*Adhyāsa* takes place when the idea of one of two things not being dismissed from the mind, the idea of the second thing is superimposed on that of the first thing; so that together with the superimposed idea the former idea remains attached to the thing on which the second idea is superimposed. When e.g. the idea of (the entity) Brahman superimposes itself upon the idea of the name, the latter idea continues in the mind and is not driven out by the former. A similar instance is furnished by the superimposition of the idea of the god Viṣṇu on a statue of Viṣṇu. So, in the case under discussion also, the idea of the *udgītha* may be superimposed on the *omkāra* or the idea of the *omkāra* on the *udgītha*.—We, in the second place, have *apavāda* when an idea previously attached to some object is recognised as false and driven out by the true idea springing up after the false one. So e.g. when the false idea of the body, the senses, and so on being the Self is driven out by the true idea springing up later—and expressed by judgments such as ‘Thou art that’—that the idea of the Self is to be attached to the Self only. Or, to quote another example, when a previous mistaken notion as to the direction of the points of the compass is replaced by the true notion. So here also the idea of the *udgītha* may drive out the idea of the *omkāra* or vice versa.—The relation would, in the third place, be that of ‘unity’ if the terms ‘*omkāra*’ and ‘*udgītha*’ were co-extensive in meaning; just as the terms, ‘the Best of the Twice-born,’ ‘the *Brāhmaṇa*,’ ‘the god among men,’ all denote an individual of the noblest caste.—The relation will, finally, be that of specification if, there being a possibility of our understanding the *omkāra* in so far as co-extensive with all the Vedas, the term ‘*udgītha*’ calls up the idea of the sphere of action of the *udgātṛi*. The passage would then mean, ‘Let a man meditate on that *omkāra* which is the *udgītha*,’ and would

be analogous to an injunction such as 'Let him bring that lotus-flower which is blue.'

All these alterations present themselves to the mind, and as there is no reason for deciding in favour of any one, the question must remain an unsettled one.

To this pûrvapaksha-view the Sûtra replies, 'And on account of extending over the whole, it is appropriate.'

The word 'and' stands here in place of 'but,' and is meant to discard the three other alternatives. Three out of the four alternatives are to be set aside as objectionable; the fourth, against which nothing can be urged, is to be adopted.—The objections lying against the first three alternatives are as follows. In the case of adhyâsa we should have to admit that the word which expresses the idea superimposed is not to be taken in its direct sense, but in an implied sense¹; and we should moreover have to imagine some fruit for a meditation of that kind². Nor can it be said that we need not imagine such a fruit, as scripture itself mentions it in the passage, 'He becomes indeed a fulfiller of desires' (I, 1, 7); for this passage indicates the fruit, not of the ideal superimposition of the udgîtha on the omkâra, but of the meditation in which the omkâra is viewed as the fulfilment of desires.—Against the hypothesis of an apavâda there likewise lies the objection that no fruit is to be seen. The cessation of wrong knowledge can certainly not be alleged as such; for we see no reason why the cessation of the idea that the omkâra is udgîtha and not omkâra or vice versâ should be beneficial to man. Sublation of the one idea by the other is moreover not even possible in our case; for to the omkâra the idea of the omkâra remains always attached, and so to the udgîtha the idea of the udgîtha. The passage, moreover, does not aim at teaching the true

¹ I.e. in the present case we should have to assume that the word udgîtha means, by implication, the omkâra.—Recourse may be had to implied meanings only when the direct meaning is clearly impossible.

² For a special adhyâsa-meditation must be attended with a special result.

nature of something, but at enjoining a meditation of a certain kind.—The hypothesis of unity again is precluded by the consideration that as in that case one term would suffice to convey the intended meaning, the employment of two terms would be purposeless. And moreover the term ‘udgîtha’ is never used to denote the omkāra in its connexion with the *Rîg-veda* and *Yagur-veda*; nor is the word ‘omkāra’ used to denote that entire second subdivision of a *sâman* which is denoted by the word ‘udgîtha.’ Hence it cannot be said that we have to do with different words only denoting one and the same thing.—There thus remains the fourth alternative, ‘On account of its comprising all the Vedas.’ That means: In order that the omkāra may not be understood here as that one which comprises all the Vedas, it is specified by means of the word ‘udgîtha,’ in order that that omkāra which constitutes a part of the udgîtha may be apprehended.—But does not this interpretation also involve the admission of implication, as according to it the word ‘udgîtha’ denotes not the whole udgîtha but only a part of it, viz. the omkāra?—True, but we have to distinguish those cases in which the implied meaning is not far remote from the direct meaning and those in which it is remote. If, in the present case, we embrace the alternative of *adhyâsa*, we have to assume an altogether remote implication, the idea of one matter being superimposed on the idea of an altogether different matter. If, on the other hand, we adopt the alternative of specification, the implication connected therewith is an easy one, the word which in its direct sense denotes the whole being understood to denote the part. And that words denoting the whole do duty for words denoting the part is a matter of common occurrence; the words ‘cloth,’ ‘village,’ and many others are used in this fashion¹.—For all these reasons we declare that the appropriate view of the *Khândogya*-passage is to take the word ‘udgîtha’ as specialising the term ‘omkāra’².

¹ We say, e.g. ‘the cloth is burned,’ even if only a part of the cloth is burned.

² We therefore, according to *Saṅkara*, have to render the passage

10. Those (qualities which are attributed to the subject of a vidyā in one Sākhā only) (are to be inserted) in other places (also), since (the vidyās) are non-different on the whole.

In the colloquy of the prāṇas recorded by the Vāgasaneyins and the Kāṇḍogas the prāṇa, endowed with various qualities such as being the best and so on, is represented as the object of meditation, and various qualities such as being the richest and the like are ascribed to speech and the other organs. And these latter qualities are in the end attributed to the prāṇa also, 'If I am the richest thou art the richest,' &c. Now in other Sākhās also, as e.g. that of the Kaushītakins, the former set of qualities such as being the best and so on is ascribed to the prāṇa (cp. Kau. Up. II, 14, 'Now follows the Nisṛeyasādāna,' &c.), but at the same time the latter set of attributes, viz. being the richest and so on, is not mentioned.—The question then is whether those qualities which are mentioned in some places only are, for the purposes of meditation, to be inserted there also where nothing is said about them.

They are not so to be inserted, the pūrvapakshin maintains, on account of the employment of the word 'thus.' In the Kaushītakin-text we meet with the clause, 'He who knows thus, having recognised the pre-eminence in prāṇa.' Now the word 'thus' which here indicates the object of knowledge always refers to something mentioned not far off, and cannot therefore denote a set of qualities mentioned in other Sākhās only. We therefore maintain that each of the colloquies of the prāṇas must be considered complete with the qualities stated in itself.

To this we make the following reply. The qualities mentioned in one text are to be inserted in the other corresponding texts also, 'Since on the whole they are non-different,' i.e. because the prāṇa-vidyās are recognised to be the same in all essential points. And if they are the same,

under discussion as follows, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om which is (i.e. which is a part of) the udgītha.'

why should the qualities stated in one not be inserted in the others also?—But how about the objection founded by the pûrvapakshin on the employment of the word ‘thus?’—Although it is true, we reply, that the word ‘thus’ in the Kaushitakin-brāhmaṇa does not denote the set of qualities mentioned in the Vāgasaneyin-brāhmaṇa, yet that set of qualities is denoted by the ‘thus’ met with in the Vāgasaneyin-brāhmaṇa, while the vidyā is, as proved by us, one and the same; hence no difference has to be made between qualities mentioned in one’s own Sākhā and qualities mentioned in another Sākhā, as long as the vidyā is one and the same. Nor does this by any means imply a disregard of the text of scripture, and the assumption of things not warranted by the text. The qualities declared in one Sākhā are valid for all scripture as long as the thing to which the qualities belong is the same. Devadatta, who in his own country is known to possess valour and certain other qualities, does not lose those qualities by going to a foreign land, although the inhabitants of that land may know nothing about them. And through better acquaintance his qualities will become manifest to the people of the foreign country also. Similarly the qualities stated in one Sākhā may, through special application, be inserted in another Sākhā.—Hence the attributes belonging to one and the same subject have to be combined wherever that subject is referred to, although they may be expressly stated in one place only.

11. Bliss and other (qualities) as belonging to the subject of the qualities (have to be attributed to Brahman everywhere).

Those scriptural texts which aim at intimating the characteristics of Brahman separately ascribe to it various qualities, such as having bliss for its nature, being one mass of knowledge, being omnipresent, being the Self of all and so on. Now the doubt here presents itself whether in each place where Brahman is spoken of we have to understand only those qualities which actually are mentioned there, or whether we have to combine all qualities of Brahman mentioned anywhere.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that only the attributes actually stated are to be understood as referred to in each particular scriptural text.—But this view the Sûtrakâra discards by declaring that delight and all the other qualities which belong to the subject, i.e. Brahman, are all of them to be understood in each place. The reason for this conclusion is the one given in Sûtra 10. In all the passages treating of Brahman the subject to which the qualities belong is one, non-different; hence, as explained at length under the preceding Sûtra, the qualities attributed to Brahman in any one place have to be combined wherever Brahman is spoken of.

But in that case also such qualities as having joy for its head, &c., would have to be ascribed to Brahman everywhere; for we read in the Taittiriyaka with reference to the Self consisting of Bliss, 'Joy is its head, satisfaction is its right arm, great satisfaction its left arm, bliss is its trunk, Brahman is its tail, its support' (II, 5).

To this objection the next Sûtra replies.

12. (Such qualities as) joy being its head and so on have no force (for other passages); for increase and decrease belong to plurality (only).

Attributes such as having joy for its head and so on, which are recorded in the Taittiriyaka, are not to be viewed as having force with regard to other passages treating of Brahman, because the successive terms, 'Joy,' 'Satisfaction,' 'Great Satisfaction,' 'Bliss,' indicate qualities possessing lower and higher degrees with regard to each other and to other enjoyers. Now for higher and lower degrees there is room only where there is plurality; and Brahman is without all plurality, as we know from many scriptural passages ('One only, without a Second').—Moreover, we have already demonstrated under I, 1, 12, that having joy for one's head and so on are qualities not of Brahman, but of the so-called involucrum of delight. And further, those qualities are attributed to the highest Brahman merely as means of fixing one's mind on it, not as themselves being objects of

contemplation, and from this also it follows that they are not valid everywhere¹.—That the Âkârya refers to them, in the Sûtra, as attributes of Brahman (while in reality they are attributes of the ânandamaya kosa) is merely done for the purpose of establishing a general principle to be extended to all attributes of Brahman—also the undoubted ones—which are stated with a view to a special form of meditation only; such as the quality of being that towards which all blessings go (*Kh. Up. IV, 15, 2*), or he whose desires are true (*Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1*). For those passages may all indeed have to do with the one Brahman as the object of meditation, but as owing to the different nature of the opening sentences the meditations are different ones, the attributes mentioned in any one are not valid for the others. The case is analogous to that of two wives ministering to one king, one with a fly-flap, the other with an umbrella; there also the object of their ministrations is one, but the acts of ministration themselves are distinct and have each their own particular attributes. So in the case under discussion also. Qualities in which lower and higher degrees can be distinguished belong to the qualified Brahman only in which plurality is admitted, not to the highest Brahman raised above all qualification. Such attributes therefore as having true desires and the like which are mentioned in some particular place only have no validity for other meditations on Brahman.

13. But other (attributes are valid for all passages relative to Brahman), the purport being the same.

Other attributes, however, such as bliss and so on which scripture sets forth for the purpose of teaching the true nature of Brahman are to be viewed as valid for all passages referring to Brahman; for their purport, i.e. the Brahman

¹ For if they are not real attributes of Brahman there is all the less reason to maintain them to be universally valid. The mere means of fixing the mind, moreover, are special to each separate upâsana.

whose nature is to be taught, is one. Those attributes are mentioned with a view to knowledge only, not to meditation.

14. (The passage, Kāṇḍaka I, 3, 10, gives information about the person) for the purpose of pious meditation, as there is no use (of the knowledge of the objects being higher than the senses and so on).

We read in the Kāṇḍaka (I, 3, 10), 'Higher than the senses are the objects, higher than the objects there is the mind, &c. &c.; higher than the person there is nothing—this is the goal, the highest road.'—Here the doubt arises whether the purport of the passage is to intimate that each of the things successively enumerated is higher than the preceding one, or only that the person is higher than all of them.

The pūrvapakshin maintains the former alternative, for the reason that the text expressly declares the objects to be higher than the senses, the mind higher than the objects and so on.

The objection that the assumption of the passage intending to represent many things as successively superior to their antecedents would involve a so-called split of the sentence, he meets by the remark that the passage may be viewed as containing a plurality of sentences. Many sentences may represent many things as superior to their antecedents, and hence each clause of the passage must be viewed as containing a separate statement of the superiority of something to other things.

To this we reply as follows.

We must assume that the whole passage aims at intimating only that the person is higher than everything. Any information as to the relative superiority of the preceding members of the series would be devoid of all purpose; for of the knowledge derived from such observation a use is neither to be seen nor declared by scripture. Of the knowledge, on the other hand, of the person being higher than the senses and everything else, raised above all evil, we do see a purpose, viz. the accomplishment of final release. And so scripture also says, 'He who has perceived that is freed

from the jaws of death' (I, 3, 15). Moreover, the text by declaring that nothing is higher than the person and that he is the highest goal intimates reverence for the person, and thereby shows that the whole series of objects is enumerated only to the end of giving information about the person.—'For the purpose of pious meditation,' i.e. for the purpose of perfect knowledge which has pious meditation for its antecedent. For the passage under consideration does not teach pious meditation by itself.

15. And on account of the word 'Self.'

The above conclusion is confirmed by the circumstance that the person under discussion is called the Self in I, 3, 12, 'That Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect.' From this we conclude that the text wishes to represent the other beings enumerated as the Non-Self. The passage quoted, moreover, indicates that the person is hard to know, and to be reached by sharp minds only.—Again, the passage (I, 3, 13), 'A wise man should keep down speech and mind,' enjoins pious meditation as a means of the knowledge of the highest person, as we have explained under I, 4, 1.—It thus follows that scripture indicates various excellences in the case of the purusha only, and not in that of the other beings enumerated.—The passage, moreover, 'He reaches the end of his journey and that is the highest place of Vishṇu,' suggests the question as to who is the end of the journey and so on, and we therefore conclude that the enumeration of the senses, objects, &c., has merely the purpose of teaching the highest place of Vishṇu (not of teaching anything about the relation of the senses, objects, and so on).

16. The (highest) Self has to be understood (in Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1), as in other places; on account of the subsequent (qualification).

We read in the Aitareyaka (II, 4, 1), 'Verily, in the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing

else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds, the (heavenly) waters, the rays, the mortal (earth), and water.'—Here the doubt presents itself whether the term 'Self' denotes the highest Self or some other being.

The pûrvapakshin maintains the latter view, which is borne out, he says, by an examination of the connected sense of the whole passage.—But, an objection is raised, an examination of that kind rather leads to the conclusion that the highest Self is meant; for the passage says that before the creation the Self only existed and that the creation was preceded by thought.—No such conclusion is possible, the pûrvapakshin replies, since the passage relates the creation of the worlds. If it aimed at representing the highest Self as the creator, it would speak of the creation of the elements, of which the worlds are only certain combinations. That the worlds are meant by the terms 'water,' &c., appears from the subsequent clause (4), 'That water is above the heaven,' &c.—Now *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* teach that the creation of the worlds is accomplished by some inferior Lord different from—and superintended by—the highest Self; cp. e.g. *Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 1*, 'In the beginning this was Self alone, in the shape of a person,' and the *Smṛiti*-passage, 'He is the first embodied soul, he is called the person; he the prime creator of the beings was in the beginning evolved from Brahman.' And the *Aitareyins* themselves record in a previous *prakaraṇa* (II, 1, 3, 1, 'Next follows the origin of seed. The seed of *Pragâpati* are the *Devas*') that this manifold creation was accomplished by *Pragâpati*. That to the latter being the word 'Self' is sometimes applied appears from the passage quoted above from the *Bṛi. Up.* And *Pragâpati* also may be spoken of as being before the creation one only, if we consider that then his products did not yet exist; and thought also may be ascribed to him as he, of course, is of an intelligent nature. Moreover, the passages, 'He led a cow towards them; he led a horse towards them; he led man towards them; then they said,' &c. (II, 4, 2, 2), which are in agreement with what is known about the various activities of particular qualified Selfs be-

longing to the apparent world, show that in the Aitareyaka also some such qualified Self is meant.

To this we reply that the highest Self is meant in the Aitareyaka 'as in other places.' As in other accounts of the creation ('From that Self ether was produced,' Taitt. Up. II, 1, &c.) the highest Self has to be understood, and, as in other cases where the term 'Self' is applied to particular Selves, the 'Self within' (i.e. the highest Self) has to be understood in the first place; so it is here also.—In those passages, on the other hand, where the Self is qualified by some other attribute, such as 'having the shape of a person,' we must understand that some particular Self is meant.—In the Aitareyaka, however, we meet with a qualification, subsequent to the first reference to the Self, which agrees only with the highest Self; we mean the one implied in the passage, 'He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds.'—Hence we maintain that the highest Self is meant.

17. Should it be said that on account of the connected meaning (of the whole passage) (the highest Self cannot be meant); (we reply that) it is so, on account of the assertion.

We now have to refute the objection, made above by the pûrvapakshin, that the highest Self cannot be meant 'on account of the connected meaning of the passage.'—The Sûtrakâra remarks, 'It is so, on account of the assertion.' That means: It is appropriate to understand the passage as referring to the highest Self, because thus the assertion that the Self, previously to the creation, was one only, gives a fully satisfactory sense, while on the other interpretation it would be far from doing so. The creation of the worlds recorded in the Aitareyaka we connect with the creation of the elements recorded in other Vedic texts, in that way that we understand the worlds to have been created subsequently to the elements; just as we showed above (II, 4, 1) that the passage, 'It sent forth fire,' must be understood to say that the creation of fire followed on the creation of ether

and air as known from other texts. For, as proved by us before, particulars mentioned in one scriptural text have to be combined with particulars mentioned in other texts, if only the chief subject of the passages is the same.—The details about the activity of the Self referred to by the *pûr-vapakshin* have likewise to be understood in such a way as to agree with the general matter about which the text desires to make assertions. For we must by no means assume that the text is interested in setting forth all the details of the story on their own account; the knowledge of them would be in no way beneficial to man. The only thing the text really means to teach is the truth that Brahman is the Self of everything. Hence it first relates how the different worlds and the guardians of the worlds, viz. Agni and so on, were created; explains thereupon the origination of the organs and the body, their abode; and shows how the creator having thought, 'How can all this be without me?' (II, 4, 3, 4), entered into this body, 'Opening the suture of the skull he got in by that door' (7). Then again the text relates how the Self after having considered the activities of all the organs ('if speech names,' &c.; 6) asked himself the question, 'What am I?' and thereupon 'saw this person as the widely spread Brahman' (10). The aim of all which is to declare that Brahman is the universal Self. The same truth is inculcated in a subsequent passage also, viz. II, 6, 1, 5; 6, where the text at first enumerates the whole aggregate of individual existences together with the elements, and then continues, 'All this is led by knowledge (i.e. the highest Self); it rests on knowledge. The world is led by knowledge, knowledge is its rest, knowledge is Brahman.'—For all these reasons the view that the highest Brahman is meant in the *Aitareyaka* is not open to any objections.

The two preceding *Sûtras* may also be explained with reference to some other Vedic passages. We read in the *Vâgasaneyaka* (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 7), 'Who is that Self?—He who is within the heart, surrounded by the *prâṇas*, consisting of knowledge, the person of light.' Of the Self here first mentioned the text goes on to show that it is free from all contact and thus proves it to have Brahman

for its Self, the concluding statement being, 'This great unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman' (IV, 4, 25).—In the *Khândogya* again we have a chapter in which the introductory statement does not use the term 'Self' ('Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second'), while at the conclusion the term 'Self' is used in the declaration of identity ('That is the Self. Thou art that').—A doubt here arises whether these two scriptural texts treat of the same matter or not.

They do not, the *pûrvapakshin* maintains, since they are not equal. Since the determination of the sense depends on the letter of the text, we have no right to maintain equality of sense where the texts differ. In the *Vâgasaneyaka* the initial statement about the Self shows that the whole passage conveys instruction about the true nature of the Self. In the *Khândogya*, on the other hand, the initial clause is of a different kind, and we therefore must assume that the whole passage imparts instruction differing in nature from that of the *Vâgasaneyaka*.—But has it not been said that the *Khândogya*-passage also teaches in the end the doctrine of universal identity with the Self?—That has been said indeed (but wrongly); for as the concluding passage must be made to agree with the initial passage (which latter does not say anything about the identity of the Self and Brahman), we assume that the concluding passage merely enjoins an imaginative combination (*sampatti*) of the Self and Brahman.

To this we reply that also the passage, 'Being only this was in the beginning,' has to be understood as referring to the Self; 'as other places,' i.e. in the same way as the passage quoted from the *Vâgasaneyaka*. For what reason?—'On account of the subsequent (statement),' viz. the statement as to identity. And if it be said that 'on account of the connected meaning' of the initial passage in which no mention is made of the Self, the chapter cannot be understood to refer to the Self; we reply 'that it may be so understood on account of the assertion' made in the passage about that 'by which we hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not

known.' For this passage asserts that through the knowledge of one thing all things become known, and to make good this assertion the text later on declares that 'Being only this was,' &c. Now this knowledge of all things through one thing is possible only if we understand the passage last quoted to refer to the Self; for if the principal Self were not known, how could all things be known? Moreover the assertion that, before creation, there existed one thing only, and the reference to the individual soul by means of the word 'Self,' and the statement that in deep sleep the soul becomes united with the True, and the repeated inquiries on the part of Svetaketu, and the repeated assertions, 'Thou art that,'—all this is appropriate only if the aim of the whole section is not to enjoin an imaginative meditation on all things as identical with the Self, but to teach that the Self really is everything.—Nor must it be said that, in the section under discussion, the concluding passage must be interpreted so as to agree with the introductory clause (and cannot on that account teach anything about the Self); for the introductory passage declares neither that the Self is everything, nor that the Non-self is everything (but merely makes a statement regarding what is in general), and such an altogether general statement cannot be in conflict with any particular statement made in a supplementary passage, but rather is in want of some such particular statement whereby to define itself¹.—And moreover (to view the matter from a different point of view), the word 'Being' if looked into closely can denote nothing else but the principal Self, since we have proved, under II, 1, 14, the unreality of the whole aggregate of being different from the Self.—Nor, finally, does a difference of expression necessarily imply a difference of sense; not any more than in ordinary language the two phrases, 'Bring that vessel

¹ I.e. the definite statement about the Self in the concluding passage may be used for defining the sense of the indefinite initial statement about that which is. 'That which is' comprises the Self as well as the Not-Self.

over there,' and, 'That vessel over there, bring it,' have different meanings.—It therefore remains a settled conclusion that in texts such as discussed above, the matter of instruction is the same, however much the mode may vary in which the instruction is conveyed.

18. As (scripture where speaking of the rinsing of the mouth with water) makes a reference to an act (established by *Smṛiti*), (that act is not enjoined by *Sruti*, but rather) the new (act of meditation on the water viewed as the dress of *prāṇa*).

The *Khandogas* as well as the *Vāgasaneyins* record, in the colloquy of the *prāṇas*, that the food of Breath comprises everything even unto dogs and birds, and that water is its dress. To this the *Khandogas* add, 'Therefore when going to eat food they surround it before and after with water' (*Kh. Up. V, 2, 2*). And the *Vāgasaneyins* add (*Bṛi. Up. VI, 1, 14*), 'Srotṛiyas who know this rinse the mouth with water when they are going to eat and rinse the mouth with water after they have eaten, thinking that thereby they make the breath dressed. Therefore a man knowing this is to rinse the mouth with water when going to eat and after having eaten; he thereby makes that breath dressed.'—These texts intimate two things, rinsing of the mouth and meditation on the breath as dressed. The doubt then arises whether the texts enjoin both these matters, or only the rinsing of the mouth, or only the meditation on breath as dressed.

The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that the text enjoins both, since the one as well as the other is intimated by the text, and since both matters not being settled by any other means of knowledge are worthy of being enjoined by the *Veda*.—Or else, he says, the rinsing of the mouth only is enjoined, since with reference to the latter only the text exhibits the particular injunctive verbal form ('he is to rinse'). In this latter case the mention made in the text of the meditation on breath as dressed has merely the purpose of glorifying the act of rinsing.

To this we make the following reply.—The rinsing of the mouth cannot possibly be enjoined by the quoted passages ‘since they merely contain references to an act,’ i.e. since they merely contain remarks concerning the purificatory act of rinsing the mouth which is known from and settled by *Smṛiti*.—But are not the very *Sruti*-passages under discussion to be looked upon as the fundamental texts on which the *Smṛiti*-injunctions regarding the rinsing of the mouth are based?—This is not possible, we reply, since the *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*-passages refer to different matters. All the *Smṛiti*-passages enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth only in so far as it purifies man; while the quoted *Sruti* texts which occur in *prāṇa*-vidyās, if enjoining the rinsing of the mouth at all, enjoin it with reference to the knowledge of *prāṇa*. And a *Sruti*-passage cannot constitute the basis of a *Smṛiti*-passage referring to an altogether different matter. Nor can it be maintained that the *Sruti*-passage enjoins some altogether new rinsing of the mouth connected with the *prāṇa*-vidyā, as we recognise the rinsing mentioned in *Sruti* as the ordinary rinsing performed by men for the sake of purification.—The preceding argumentation already precludes the alternative of two matters being enjoined, which would moreover lead to a so-called split of the sentence.—We therefore conclude that the text—with reference to the rinsing of the mouth before and after eating which is enjoined by *Smṛiti*—enjoins (by means of the passage, ‘thinking that thereby they make the breath dressed’) a new mental resolve with regard to the water used for rinsing purposes, viz. that that water should act as a means for clothing the *prāṇa*. The statement about the clothing of the *prāṇa* cannot (as suggested by the *pūrvapakshin*) be taken as a glorification of the act of rinsing the mouth; for in the first place the act of rinsing is not enjoined in the Vedic passage¹, and in the second place we apprehend that the passage itself conveys an injunction, viz. of the mental

¹ A glorifying *arthavāda*-passage would be in its place only if it were preceded by some injunction; for the glorification of certain acts is meant to induce men to comply with the injunctions concerning those acts.

resolve to provide clothing for the *prāṇa*. Nor must the objection be raised that in that case two purposes are admitted for the one act of rinsing the mouth, viz. the purpose of purification and the purpose of providing the *prāṇa* with clothing. For we have actually to do not with one action, but with two separate actions. For one action is the rinsing of the mouth which serves the purpose of purifying man, and another action is the mental resolve that that water should serve the purpose of clothing the *prāṇa*. Similarly the preceding passage, 'Whatever there is, even unto dogs, &c., that is thy food,' does not enjoin the promiscuous use of food of all kinds—for that would be contrary to scripture and impossible in itself—but merely enjoins the meditation on all food as food of the *prāṇa*. We therefore conclude that also the passage, 'Water is thy dress,' which forms the immediate continuation of the passage last quoted does not enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth but merely the act of meditating on the rinsing-water as constituting the dress of the *prāṇa*.

Moreover the mere present-form, 'they rinse the mouth with water,' has no enjoining force.—But also in the passage, 'They think that thereby they make the breath dressed,' we have a mere present-form without injunctive power (and yet you maintain that that passage conveys an injunction)!—True; but as necessarily one of the two must be enjoined¹, we assume, on the ground of what the text says about the making of a dress, that what is enjoined is the meditation on water being the dress of *prāṇa*; for this is something 'new,' i.e. not established by other means of knowledge². The rinsing of the mouth with water, on the other hand, is already established by other means (i.e. *Smṛiti*), and therefore need not be enjoined again.—The argument founded

¹ Because otherwise we should have only *arthavādas*. But *arthavādas* have a meaning only in so far as connected with an injunction.

² The above argumentation avails itself of the *Sūtra*, putting a new construction on it.—*Tarhi dvayor avidheyatvam ity āraṅkyānuvādamātrasyā kiṃkīrtakatvād anyataravidher āvāsyakatve samkalpanam eva vidheyam iti vidhāntarena sūtram yogayati.* Ān. Gi.

by the pūrvapakshin on the circumstance that, in the *Bṛi. Up.*, the verb 'to rinse' is found in the injunctive form ('therefore a man, &c., is to rinse'), is already refuted by our showing that the act of rinsing the mouth is not a new one (and therefore requires no Vedic injunction).

For the very reason that the text does not aim at enjoining the rinsing of the mouth, the Kāṇvas (in their recension of the *Bṛi. Up.*) conclude the chapter with the clause, 'They think,' &c., and do not add the concluding clause of the Mādhyandinas, 'Therefore a man,' &c. From this we have to conclude that what is enjoined in the text of the Mādhyandinas also is 'the knowledge of that,' i.e. the knowledge of the water being the dress of the previously mentioned *prāṇa*.—Nor finally can it be maintained that in one place (i.e. the Mādhyandina-sākhā) the rinsing of the mouth is enjoined, and in other places the knowledge of water as the dress of *prāṇa*; for the introductory passage, 'Water is the dress,' is the same everywhere.—We are therefore entitled to conclude that what is enjoined in all Sākhās is the cognition of water being the dress of the *prāṇa*.

19. In the same (Sākhā also) it is thus (i.e. there is unity of *vidyā*), on account of the non-difference (of the object of meditation).

In the Agnirahasya forming part of the Vāgasaneyi-sākhā there is a *vidyā* called the *Sāṇḍilya-vidyā*, in which we meet with the following statement of particulars, 'Let him meditate on the Self which consists of mind, which has the *prāṇa* for its body and light for its form,' &c.—In the *Bṛihad-āraṇyaka* again, which belongs to the same Sākhā, we read (V, 10, 6), 'That person consisting of mind, whose being is light, is within the heart, small like a grain of rice or barley. He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all—he rules all this whatsoever exists.'—A doubt here presents itself whether these two passages are to be taken as one *vidyā* in which the particulars mentioned in either text are to be combined or not.

The pūrvapakshin maintains that we have to do with two separate *vidyās* whose particulars cannot be combined. For

otherwise, he argues, the text could not be cleared from the reproach of useless repetition. As long as we have to do with texts belonging to different Sākhās we can rebut the charge of useless repetition by pointing to the fact that the texts are read and known by separate classes of men ; we can then ascertain the unity of the vidyās and combine the particulars mentioned in one text only with those mentioned in the others ; so e.g. in the colloquy of the prāṇas. On the other hand, texts belonging to one and the same Sākhā cannot be freed from the reproach of tautology as the same persons study and know them, and passages occurring in different places cannot therefore be combined into one vidyā. Nor can we make out a separate position for each of the texts of the latter kind by saying that it is the task of one text to enjoin the vidyā and that of the other to enjoin the particulars of the vidyā. For in that case each of the two passages would mention only such particulars as are not mentioned in the other one ; while as a matter of fact particulars common to both as well as not common to both are mentioned in each. Hence the particulars of the one passage are not to be combined with those of the other.

To this we make the following reply. Just as passages met with in different Sākhās form one vidyā in which the different particulars are to be combined, so the two passages under discussion also, although belonging to one and the same Sākhā, constitute one vidyā only, since the object of meditation is the same in both. For as such we recognise Brahman possessing certain qualities such as consisting of mind and so on. Now we know that the object constitutes the character of a meditation ; as long as there is no difference of character we cannot determine difference of vidyā ; and if there is no difference of vidyā the particulars mentioned in different places cannot be held apart.—But has it not been demonstrated above that the vidyās have to be held apart, as otherwise tautology would arise ?—Tautology does not result, we reply, because the two passages may be understood to have each its particular meaning, one of them enjoining the vidyā, and the other the particulars of the vidyā.—But in that case the *Bṛihad-Āraṇyaka* ought to

mention only those points which are not mentioned in the Agnirahasya, as e.g. 'he is the Lord of all;' while it ought not to mention what is already mentioned in the Agnirahasya, as e.g. the Self's consisting of mind!—Not so, we reply. Only the repetition, in one passage, of what is already mentioned in the other passage enables us to recognise the vidyâ. The *Bṛihad-âraṇyaka*-passage, by mentioning some common qualities, first enables us to recognise the *Sândilya*-vidyâ, and then teaches certain particulars with reference to the latter; how otherwise should we know that the *Bṛi*-passage is meant to enjoin particulars for the *Sândilya*-vidyâ? Moreover, as in a passage which has a purpose of its own in so far as it teaches something not yet established, a reference to something already established is justified on the ground of its being a (so-called) *nityānuvâda*, we cannot overlook the recognition (of the identity of the passage with another one) which is rendered possible through that *anuvâda*. Hence, although the two passages belong to one and the same *Sâkhâ*, they yet constitute one vidyâ only, and their particulars have to be combined into one whole.

20. Thus in other cases also, on account of the connexion (of particulars with one and the same vidyâ).

We read in the *Bṛihad-âraṇyaka* (V, 5), 'The true is Brahman,' and, further on, 'Now what is the true, that is the Âditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye.' Having thus declared the different abodes of that true Brahman with reference to the gods and with reference to the body, and having, in what follows, identified its body with the sacred syllables (*bhûh*, &c.), the text teaches its two secret names (*upanishad*), 'Its secret name is *ahar*' with reference to the gods; and 'its secret name is *aham*' with reference to the body.—A doubt here arises whether these two secret names are both to be applied to the deva-abode of Brahman as well as to its bodily abode, or only one name to each.

The above Sûtra maintains the *pûrvapaksha* view. Just as certain particulars though recorded elsewhere are yet

to be combined with the *Sāṇḍilya-vidyā*, so we have to proceed in other cases also, as e.g. the one under discussion, because the particulars mentioned are all connected with one *vidyā*. The *vidyā* of the True with its double reference to the Devas and to the body is one only, as we infer from the fact of its having one exordium only ('The true is Brahman'), and from the way in which the text interconnects *Āditya* and the person in the eye. Why then should an attribute belonging to one of the latter not belong to the other also? For, to quote an analogous case, certain rules of life which are prescribed for a teacher—as e.g. having a following of pupils—remain equally valid whether the teacher be in a village or in a wood. For these reasons both secret names equally belong to the *Āditya* as well as to the person within the eye. This view the next *Sūtra* refutes.

21. Or this is not so, on account of the difference (of place).

The two secret names do not apply quite equally to the two persons mentioned, because they are connected with different places in the *vidyā*. For the clause, 'Its secret name is *ahar*,' the text exhibits in connexion with the person in the solar orb, while the clause, 'Its secret name is *aham*,' occurs in connexion with the person in the eye. Now the pronoun 'its' always refers to something mentioned close by; we therefore conclude that the text teaches each secret name as belonging to one special abode of Brahman only. How then can both names be valid for both?—But, an objection is raised, the person within the orb of the sun and the person within the eye are one only; for the text teaches them both to be abodes of the one true Brahman!—True, we reply; but as each secret name is taught only with reference to the one Brahman as conditioned by a particular state, the name applies to Brahman only in so far as it is in that state. We on our part also illustrate the case by a comparison. The teacher always remains the teacher; yet those kinds of services which the pupil has to do to the teacher when sitting have not to be

done when he stands ; and vice versâ.—The comparison, on the other hand, instituted by the pūrvapakshin is ill chosen, since the duties of the disciple towards his teacher depend on the latter's character as teacher, and that is not changed by his being either in the village or the forest.—Hence the two secret names have to be held apart.

22. (Scripture) also declares that.

Scripture moreover contains a distinct intimation that the attributes under discussion are to be held apart. We read, *Kh. Up. I, 8, 5*, 'The form of that person is the same as the form of the other person, the joints of the one are the joints of the other, the name of the one is the name of the other.'—But how does this passage convey the desired intimation?—By expressly transferring the attributes of the person within the sun to the person within the eye ; for this express transfer shows that the text looks upon the attributes of the two as separated by the difference of abode and therefore not to be combined (unless specially enjoined to be so combined).—The conclusion therefore is that the two secret names are to be held apart.

23. And for the same reason the holding together and the pervading the sky (attributed to Brahman in the *Rânâyanīya-khila*) (are not to be inserted in other *vidyās*).

In the *khilas* (supplementary writings) of the *Rânâyanīyas* we meet with a passage, 'Held together are the powers among which Brahman is the best ; the best Brahman in the beginning stretched out the sky¹, which mentions certain energies of Brahman, such as holding together its powers, entering into the sky, &c. And in the

¹ *Vīryā vīryāni parākramabhedāḥ, anye hi purushāḥ saḥāyān apekshya vikramān bibhrati tena tatparākramānām na ta eva niyat-
apūrvatvarūpakāraṇatvena gyesh/hā bhavanti kim tu tatsahakāriṇo
-pi, brahmavīryānām tu brahmaiva gyesh/ham brahma gyesh/ham
yeshām tāni tathā brahma khalv ananyāpeksham gagagganmādi
karoti. Kim kānyeshām parākramānām balavadbhir madhye
bhaṅgaḥ sambhavati tena te svavīryāni na bibhrati, brahmavīryāni
tu brahmanā sambhṛitāni avighnena sambhṛitāni ity arthaḥ. Ān. Gi.*

Upanishad of the same (i. e. the Rânâyanaîyas) we meet with vidyâs of Brahman among which the *Sândilya*-vidyâ is the first.—The question then arises whether the energies of Brahman just mentioned are to be inserted in those *Brahma*-vidyâs or not. To the *pûrvapaksha* view that they are to be so inserted because they are connected with Brahman, the *Sûtrakâra* replies that the holding together and pervading the sky are not to be inserted in the *Sândilya*-vidyâ and other vidyâs, for the same reason, i. e. on account of their being connected with different abodes. In the *Sândilya*-vidyâ, Brahman is said to have its abode in the heart, ‘He is the Self within the heart’ (*Kh. Up.* III, 14, 3); the same statement is made in the *dahara*-vidyâ, ‘There is the palace, the small lotus (of the heart), and in it that small ether’ (VIII, 1, 1). In the *Upakosala*-vidyâ again, Brahman is said to reside within the eye, ‘That person that is seen in the eye’ (IV, 15, 1). In all these vidyâs Brahman is described as residing within the body; it is therefore impossible to insert into them the energies of Brahman which the *khila* of the Rânâyanaîyas mentions, and which are connected with the *Devas* (i. e. external nature).—But the vidyâs of the *Khândogya* likewise mention such powers of Brahman as are connected with the *Devas*; cp. e. g. III, 14, 3, ‘He is greater than the heaven, greater than these worlds;’ IV, 15, 4, ‘He is also *Bhâmanî*, for he shines in all worlds;’ VIII, 1, 3, ‘As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it.’ And again there are other vidyâs of Brahman, such as the one which represents Brahman as comprising sixteen parts, in which not any special abode is mentioned.—True; but there is a special reason why the attributes stated in the Rânâyanaîya-*khila* cannot be introduced into the other vidyâs. Particulars mentioned in one place can indeed be inserted in vidyâs met with in another place if the latter are suggested to the mind by containing some reference to agreeing particulars; the qualities of holding together, however, on one side and those mentioned in the *Sândilya*-vidyâ, &c., on the other side are of such a nature as to exclude each

other, and therefore do not mutually suggest each other. The mere circumstance of all the particulars being connected with Brahman does not suffice to suggest vidyās occurring in other places; for even in vidyās which are avowedly separate, all the particulars may be connected with Brahman. And it is an established fact that Brahman, although one only, is, owing to the plurality of its powers, meditated upon in more than one way, as shown under Sūtra 7.—The conclusion therefore is that the attributes of holding together its powers and so on are not to be inserted in the *Sāṇḍilya* and similar vidyās.

24. And as the record of others (viz. the *Taittirīyaka*) is not such as in the *purusha-vidyā* (of the *Khândogya*), (the two *purusha-vidyās* are not to be combined).

In the *Rahasya-brāhmaṇa* of the *Tāṇḍins* and the *Paīṅins* (the *Khândogya*) there is a *vidyā* treating of man, in which man is fancifully identified with the sacrifice, the three periods of his life with the three libations, his hunger and so on, with the *dikshā*, &c. And other particulars also are mentioned there, such as formulas of prayer, use of mantras and so on.—A similar fanciful assimilation of the sacrifice and man the *Taittirīyakas* exhibit, 'For him who knows thus the Self of the sacrifice is the sacrificer, Faith is the wife of the sacrificer,' and so on (*Taitt. Ār. X, 64*).—The doubt here arises whether the particulars of the man-sacrifice given in the *Khândogya* are to be inserted in the *Taittirīyaka* or not.

Against the view of the *pūrvapakshin* that they are so to be inserted because in both places we have a *purusha-yagñā*, we maintain that they are not to be inserted because the characteristics of the *purusha-yagñā* of the *Khândogya* are not recognised in the *Taittirīya*-text. This the *Sūtra-kāra* expresses by saying, 'As (the record of the followers of some *Sākhās*, viz. the *Tāṇḍins* and *Paīṅins*, is) in the *purusha-vidyā*, not such is the record of others,' viz. the *Taittirīyakas*. For the latter exhibit an identification of man with the sacrifice, in which the wife, the sacrificer, the

Veda, the vedi, the sacrificial grass, the post, the butter, the sacrificial animal, the priest, &c., are mentioned in succession; none of which particulars are mentioned in the *Khândogya*. The use also to which the *Taittirīyaka* turns the three libations is different from the *Khândogya*. And the few points in which the two texts agree, such as the identification of the *Avabr̥tha*-ceremony with death, lose their significance side by side with the greater number of dissimilarities, and are therefore not able to effect the recognition of the *vidyā*.—Moreover the *Taittirīyaka* does not represent man as the sacrifice (as the *Khândogya* does); for the two genitives ('of him who thus knows' and 'of the sacrifice') are not co-ordinate, and the passage therefore cannot be construed to mean, 'The knowing one who is the sacrifice, of him the Self is,' &c. For it cannot be said that man is the sacrifice, in the literal sense of the word¹. The two genitives are rather to be taken in that way, that one qualifies the other, 'The sacrifice of him who thus knows, of that sacrifice,' &c. For the connexion of the sacrifice with man (which is expressed by the genitive, 'the sacrifice of him') is really and literally true; and to take a passage in its literal meaning, if possible at all, is always preferable to having recourse to a secondary metaphorical meaning². Moreover the words next following in the *Taittirīyaka*-passage, 'the Self is the sacrificer,' declare that man (man's Self) is the sacrificer, and this again shows that man's relation to the sacrifice is not that of co-ordination³. Moreover as the section beginning with 'Of him who thus knows' forms an *anuvāda* of something previously established (and as such forms one *vākya* to which one sense only must be ascribed), we must not bring about 'a split of the sentence' by interpreting it as

¹ And therefore we are not warranted in taking the two genitives as co-ordinate, as otherwise they might be taken.

² Which latter would be the case if we should take the two genitives as co-ordinate and therefore expressing an imaginative identification of the man and the sacrifice.

³ If man is the sacrificer he cannot be identified with the sacrifice; he is rather the Lord of the sacrifice.

teaching in the first place that man is the sacrifice, and in the second place that the Self and the other beings enumerated are the sacrificer and so on. And as we see that the passage, 'Of him who thus knows,' &c., follows upon some instruction about the knowledge of the Self coupled with *saṁnyāsa*, we apprehend that the Taittirīyaka-chapter is not an independent vidyā but merely supplementary to the instruction previously given. In agreement with this conclusion we observe that the Taittirīyaka promises only one result for both chapters, viz. the one stated in the passage, 'He obtains the greatness of Brahman.'—On the other hand the text embodying the puruṣa-vidyā in the *Khândogya* is an independent text; for we see that an independent result is attached to it, viz. an increase of length of life, 'He who knows this lives on to a hundred and sixteen years.'—Hence the particulars mentioned in the puruṣa-vidyā of another *Sākhā*, such as formulas of prayer, mantras and so on, are not to be combined with the Taittirīya-text of the vidyā.

25. Because the matter (of certain mantras) such as piercing and so on is different (from the matter of the approximate vidyās) (the former have not to be combined with the latter).

At the beginning of an Upanishad of the *Ātharvanikas* the following mantra is recorded, 'Pierce him (the enemy) whole, pierce his heart: crush his veins, crush his head; thrice crushed,' &c. At the beginning of the Upanishad of the *Tāndins* we have the mantra, 'O God Savitar, produce the sacrifice.' At the beginning of that of the *Sātyāyanins*, 'Thou hast a white horse and art green as grass,' &c.; at the beginning of that of the *Kaṭhas* and the *Taittirīyakas*, 'May Mitra be propitious to us and Varuṇa,' &c. At the beginning of the Upanishad of the *Vāgasaneyins* we have a *Brāhmaṇa*-passage about the pravargya-ceremony, 'The gods indeed sat down to a sattra;' and at the beginning of that of the *Kaushītakins* there is a *Brāhmaṇa*-passage about the agnishṭoma, 'Brahman indeed is the Agnishṭoma, Brahman is that day; through Brahman they pass into

Brahman, immortality those reach who observe that day.'—The point to be inquired into with reference to all these mantras and the sacrifices referred to in the *Brâhmaṇa*-passages is whether they are to be combined with the *vidyâs* (contained in the *Upanishads*) or not.

The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that they are so to be combined, because the text exhibits them in proximity to the *Upanishad*-portions of the *Brâhmaṇas* whose chief contents are formed by the *vidyâs*.—But we do not observe those mantras and sacrifices to be actually enjoined as subordinate members of the *vidyâs*!—True, but in spite of this we, on the ground of proximity, infer them to be connected with the *vidyâs*. For we have no right to set aside the fact of proximity as irrelevant as long as an inference can be established on it.—But we are unable to see that the mantras have anything to do with the *vidyâs*, and how can it be assumed that ceremonies, such as the *pravargya* which scripture enjoins with reference to other occasions, sacrifices, and so on, stand in any relation to the *vidyâs*!—Never mind, the *pûrvapakshin* replies. In the case of mantras we can always imagine some meaning which connects them with the *vidyâs*; the first mantra quoted, e.g. may be viewed as glorifying the heart. For the heart and other parts of the body are often represented, in the *vidyâs*, as abodes of meditation, and hence mantras glorifying the heart, &c., may appropriately form subordinate members of those *vidyâs*. Some mantras, moreover, we clearly see to be enjoined with reference to *vidyâs*, so, e.g. the mantra, 'I turn to *Bhûh* with such and such' (*Kh. Up. III, 15, 3*). Sacrificial acts again may indeed be enjoined in connexion with other occasions; yet there is no reason why they should not also be applied to the *vidyâs*, just as the offering called *Brîhaspatisava* is a subordinate part of the *Vâgapeya*-sacrifice¹.

To this we make the following reply. The mantras and

¹ The *Brîhaspatisava*, although enjoined with special reference to him who is desirous of *Brahmavarṇas*, is yet at the same time a subordinate part of the *Vâgapeya*-sacrifice. Cp. *Pû. Mî. Sû. IV, 3, 29*.

ceremonies mentioned cannot be drawn into connexion with the vidyās, 'because their matter, such as piercing the heart, &c., is different (from the matter of the vidyās),' and therefore cannot be connected with the latter.—But has it not been said above that the mantras may be connected with the meditations enjoined in the vidyās, on the ground of their coming of use in meditations on the heart, &c. ?—The mantras, we reply, might be so employed, if their entire contents were glorification of the heart, and the like ; but this is by no means the case. The mantra first quoted, e.g. clearly expresses hostility to somebody, and is therefore to be connected, not with the vidyās of the Upanishads, but with some ceremony meant to hurt an enemy. The mantra of the Tāṇḍins again, 'O God Savitar, produce the sacrifice,' indicates by its very words that it is connected with some sacrifice ; with what particular sacrifice it is connected has to be established by other means of proof. Similarly other mantras also—which, either by 'indication' (līṅga), or 'syntactical connexion' (vākya), or some other means of proof, are shown to be subordinate to certain sacrificial actions—cannot, because they occur in the Upanishads also, be connected with the vidyās on the ground of mere proximity. For that 'proximity,' as a means of proof regarding the connexion of subordinate matters with principal matters, is weaker than direct enunciation (Śruti), and so on, is demonstrated in the former science (i.e. in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā) under III, 3, 14. Of sacrificial works also, such as the pravargya, which are primarily enjoined with reference to other occasions, it cannot be demonstrated that they are supplementary to vidyās with which they have nothing in common. The case of the Bṛhaspatisava, quoted by the pūrvapakshin, is of an altogether different kind, as there we have an injunction clearly showing that that oblation is a subordinate member of the Vāgapeya, viz. 'Having offered the Vāgapeya he offers the Bṛhaspatisava.' And, moreover, if the one pravargya-ceremony has once been enjoined for a definite purpose by a means of proof of superior strength, we must not, on the strength of an inferior means of proof, assume

it to be enjoined for some different purpose. A proceeding of that kind would be possible only if the difference of the means of proof were not apprehended; but in our case this latter possibility is excluded since the relative strength and weakness of the various means of proof is fully apprehended (on the ground of the conclusions arrived at in the *Pûrva Mīmāṃsā*).—For these reasons the mentioned mantras and acts are not, on the ground of mere textual collocation, to be viewed as supplementary to the vidyās of the Upanishads. To account for the fact of their textual collocation with the latter we must keep in view that the mantras, &c. as well as the vidyās have to be studied, &c. in the woods.

26. Where the getting rid (of good and evil) is mentioned (the obtaining of this good and evil by others has to be added) because the statement about the obtaining is supplementary (to the statement about the getting rid of), as in the case of the *kuśās*, the metres, the praise and the singing. This (i.e. the reason for this) has been stated (in the *Pûrva Mīmāṃsā*).

In the text of the *Tāṇḍins* we meet with the following passage: 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair, and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from the mouth of *Rāhu*, I obtain self made and satisfied the uncreated world of Brahman' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 13). Again, in the text of the *Ātharvāṇikas*, we read, 'Then knowing, shaking off good and evil he reaches the highest oneness, free from passion' (*Mu. Up.* III. 1, 3). The *Sātyāyanins* read, 'His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he has done.' And the *Kaushītākins*, 'He shakes off his good and his evil deeds. His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil he has done' (*Kau. Up.* I, 4).—Of these texts two state that the man who has reached true knowledge rids himself of his good and evil deeds; one, that his friends and enemies obtain his good and evil deeds respectively; and one finally declares that both things take place.

This latter text calls for no remark ; nor again that one which refers only to his friends and enemies obtaining his good and evil deeds ; for in order that they may obtain those he must necessarily first have got rid of them, and the act of getting rid of them has therefore to be supplied in the text. Those passages, however, which merely mention a man's shaking off his deeds, give rise to a discussion whether those deeds, when shaken off, are obtained by his friends and enemies, or not. Here the *pūrvapakshin* maintains that the latter circumstance is not to be supplied in the two passages mentioned—firstly because the text does not state it ; secondly because what other *Sākhās* say about it falls within the sphere of a different *vidyā* ; and thirdly because the getting rid of the evil and good deeds is something done by the man himself, while the obtaining of them is the work of others. As thus there is no necessary connexion between the two, we have no right to supply the latter on the basis of the former.

To this we make the following reply. Although the text mentions only the getting rid of the deeds, yet the obtaining of them by others must necessarily be added, because the statement concerning the latter is merely supplementary to the statement about the former, as appears from the text of the *Kaushītakins*.—In reply to the arguments brought forward by the *pūrvapakshin* we offer the following remarks.

The separation of the different passages would indeed have to be insisted upon, if anybody intended to introduce an injunction about something to be done, which is contained in one text only, into some other text also. But in the passages under discussion the act of getting rid of—and the act of obtaining—the good and evil deeds are not mentioned as something to be performed, but merely as implying a glorification of knowledge ; the intended sense being, 'Glorious indeed is that knowledge through whose power the good and evil deeds, the causes of the *samsāra*, are shaken off by him who knows, and are transferred to his friends and enemies.' The passage thus being glorificatory only, the teacher is of opinion that,

to the end of strengthening the glorification, the obtaining of the good and evil deeds by the friends and enemies—which in some passages is represented as the consequence of their being shaken off by the man who knows—must be supplied in those passages also which mention only the shaking off. That one arthavāda-passage often depends on another arthavāda-passage is a well-known fact; the following passage, e.g. ‘The twenty-first indeed from this world is that sun,’ would be unintelligible if no regard were paid to the other passage, ‘Twelve are the months, five the seasons, three these worlds; that sun is the twenty-first.’ Similarly the passage, ‘The two Trishubh verses are for strengthening,’ necessarily requires to be taken in connexion with the other passage, ‘Strength of the senses indeed is Trishubh.’ And as the statement about the obtaining of the good and evil deeds has only the purpose of glorifying knowledge (and is not made on its own account), we need not insist too much on the question how the results of actions done by one man can be obtained by others. That the obtaining of the deeds by others is connected with their being got rid of by the man who knows, merely for the purpose of glorifying knowledge, the Sûtrakāra moreover indicates by making use of the expression, ‘because the statement about obtaining is supplementary to,’ &c.; for if he wished to intimate that the actual circumstance of other persons obtaining a man’s good and evil deeds is to be inserted in those vidyās where it is not mentioned he would say, ‘because the fact of obtaining,’ &c. The Sûtra therefore, availing itself of the opportunity offered by the discussion of the combination of particular qualities, shows how mere glorificatory passages have to be inserted in texts where they are wanting.

The remaining part of the Sûtra, ‘Like the kusās, the metres, the praise and the singing,’ introduces some analogous instances.—The case under discussion is analogous to the case of the kusās¹. Those, a mantra of the Bhāl-

¹ I.e. according to the commentators, small wooden rods used by the Udgâtrîs in counting the stotras.

lavins ('You *kuśās* are the children of the tree, do you protect me!') represents as coming from trees in general, without any specification. The corresponding mantra of the *Sātyāyanins* on the other hand is, 'You *kuśās* are the children of the *Udumbara-tree*;' a particularizing statement which must be considered as valid for the *kuśās* in general.—Another analogous case is that of the metres. In some places no special statement is made about their order of succession; but the text of the *Pañḍins*, 'The metres of the *Devas* come first,' determines the general priority of the metres of the *Devas* to those of the *Asuras*¹.—Similarly the time of the *stotra* accompanying the performance of the *Shoḍaśin-rite* which in some texts is left undefined is settled by the text of the *Rig-vedins* (*ārkhāh*), 'when the Sun has half risen.'—And similarly a particularizing text of the *Bhāllavins* defines what priests have to join in the singing; a point left unsettled in other *Srutis*².—As in these parallel cases, so we have to proceed in the case under discussion also. For if we refused to define a general text by another more particular one, we should be driven to assume optional procedure (*vikalpa*), and that the latter is if possible to be avoided is a well-known principle. This is stated in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* X, 8, 15.

The passages about the shaking (off) can be viewed as giving rise to a different discussion also, and the *Sūtra* can accordingly be explained in a different manner. The question can be raised whether the 'shaking' means the getting rid of one's good and evil deeds or something else.—The *pūrvapaksha* will in that case have to be established in the following manner. Shaking (*dhû*) here does not mean 'getting rid of,' since the root '*dhû*' according to grammar means shaking in an intransitive sense or trembling; of flags streaming in the wind we say, for

¹ Metres of less than ten syllables belong to the *Asuras*, those of ten and more to the *Devas*.

² The general text is, according to the commentators, 'The priests join in the singing;' the defining text of the *Bhāllavins*, 'The *adhvaryu* does not join in the singing.'

instance, 'the flags are shaking' (dodhûyante). We therefore take the word in the same sense in the passages under discussion and understand by the 'trembling' of the good and evil deeds the fact of their not meeting, for a certain time, with their results.

To this pûrvapaksha we make the following reply. The word 'shaking' has to be taken in the sense of 'getting rid of,' because it is supplemented by the statement of others obtaining the good and evil deeds. For those deeds cannot be obtained by others unless they are got rid of by their former owner. Hence although it is not easily imaginable that the deeds got rid of by one man should be obtained by others, we yet, on the ground of its being mentioned, may determine accordingly that 'shaking' means 'getting rid of.' And although only in some passages the statement about the obtaining is actually found in proximity to the statement about the shaking, it yet has, on the ground of the latter, to be supplied everywhere and thus becomes a general reason of decision (viz. that 'shaking' means 'getting rid of'). Against the pûrvapakshin's view we further remark that good and evil deeds cannot be said to 'tremble' in the literal sense of the word, like flags in the wind, since they are not of substantial nature.—(Nor must it be said that of the horse which exemplifies the shaking, the text only says that it shakes its hair, not that it casts anything off, for) the horse when shaking itself shakes off dust and also old hairs. And with that shaking (which at the same time is a shaking off) the text expressly compares the shaking (off) of evil.—Nor do we when assigning different meanings to one and the same root enter thereby into conflict with *Smṛiti* (grammar). The clause 'this has been stated' we have already explained.

27. At the (moment of) departing (he frees himself from his works), there being nothing to be reached (by him, on the way to Brahman, through those works); for thus others (declare, in their sacred texts).

The Kaushîtakins record in the paryaṅka-vidyâ how the man (who possesses true knowledge) when approaching Brahman seated on the couch frees himself on the way from his good and evil deeds, 'He having reached the path of the gods comes to the world of Agni,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3), and later on (I, 4), 'He comes to the river Vigarâ and crosses it by the mind alone and there shakes off his good and evil deeds.'—The question here arises whether in strict agreement with the text we have to understand that the deceased man frees himself from his good and evil deeds on the way to Brahman, or rather that he does so at the outset when he departs from his body.

The letter of the text favouring the former alternative, the Sûtrakâra rebuts it by declaring 'at the going,' i.e. at the time of departing from the body the man frees himself, through the strength of his knowledge, from his good and evil deeds. The reason for this averment is assigned in the words, 'On account of the absence of anything to be reached.' For when the man possessing true knowledge has departed from the body and is, through his knowledge, about to reach Brahman, there exists nothing to be reached by him on the way through his good and evil works, and we therefore have no reason to assume the latter to remain uneffaced during a certain number of moments. We rather have to conclude that as the results of his good and evil works are contrary to the result of knowledge, they are destroyed by the power of the latter; and that hence the moment of their destruction is that moment in which he sets out toward the fruit of his knowledge (i.e. the world of Brahman).—The conclusion thus is that the deliverance of the man from his works takes place early, and is only mentioned later on in the text of the Kaushîtakins.—Thus other Sâkhâs also, as that of the Tâṇḍins and Sâtyâyânins, declare that he frees himself from his deeds at an earlier stage; cp. the passages, 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair,' and 'His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he has done.'

28. And because (on the above interpretation)

there is no contradiction to both (i.e. man's making an effort to free himself from his deeds and actually freeing himself) according to his liking.

Moreover if we assumed that the man frees himself from his good and evil deeds on the way—after having departed from the body and having entered on the path of the gods—we should implicate ourselves in impossibilities; for after the body has been left behind, man can no longer accomplish, according to his liking, that effort which consists in self-restraint and pursuit of knowledge, and which is the cause of the obliteration of all his good and evil deeds, and consequently that obliteration also cannot take place. We therefore must assume that the requisite effort is made—and its result takes place—at an earlier moment, viz. in the state in which man is able to effect it, and that in consequence thereof man rids himself of his good and evil deeds.

Nothing then stands in the way of the conditioning and the conditioned events taking place, and the assumption moreover agrees with the statements of the Tândîns and Sâtyâyanins.

29. A purpose has to be attributed to the going (on the path of the gods) in a twofold manner; otherwise there would be contradiction of scripture.

In some scriptural texts the (dead man's) going on the path of the gods is mentioned in connexion with his freeing himself from good and evil; in other texts it is not mentioned. The doubt then arises whether the two things go together in all cases or only in certain cases.—The pûrva-pakshin maintains that the two are to be connected in all cases, just as the man's freeing himself from his good and evil deeds is always followed by their passing over to his friends and enemies.

To this we make the following reply. That a man's going on the path of the gods has a purpose is to be admitted in a twofold manner, i.e. with a distinction only. His going on that path has a sense in certain cases, in others not. For otherwise, i.e. if we admitted that men,

in all cases, proceed on that path, we should have to assume that even the passage, Mu. Up. III, 1, 3, 'Shaking off good and evil, free from passions, he reaches the highest unity,' refers to actual going through which another place is reached, and that would clearly be contrary to reason. For a person free from all desire and therefore non-moving does not go to another place, and the highest unity is not to be reached by a man transporting himself to another locality.

30. (The twofold view taken above) is justified because we observe a purpose characterised thereby (i.e. a purpose of the going); as in ordinary life.

Our view of the matter, viz. that a man's proceeding on the path of the gods has a meaning in certain cases but not in others, is justified by the following consideration. In meditations on the qualified Brahman such as the paryaṅka-vidyā we see a reason for the man's proceeding on the path of the gods; for the text mentions certain results which can be reached only by the man going to different places, such as his mounting a couch, his holding a colloquy with Brahman seated on the couch, his perceiving various odours and so on. On the other hand we do not see that going on the path of the gods has anything to do with perfect knowledge. For those who have risen to the intuition of the Self's unity, whose every wish is fulfilled, in whom the potentiality of all suffering is already destroyed here below, have nothing further to look for but the dissolution of the abode of activity and enjoyment of former deeds, i.e. the body; in their case therefore to proceed on the road of the gods would be purposeless.—The distinction is analogous to what is observed in ordinary life. If we want to reach some village we have to proceed on a path leading there; but no moving on a path is required when we wish to attain freedom from sickness.—The distinction made here will be established more carefully in the fourth adhyāya.

31. There is no restriction (as to the going on the path of the gods) for any vidyā; nor any contra-

diction (of the general subject-matter), according to scripture and inference (i.e. *Smṛiti*).

We have shown that the going on the path of the gods is valid only for the vidyās of the qualified Brahman, not for the knowledge of the highest Brahman which is destitute of all qualities.—Now we observe that the going on the path of the gods is mentioned only in some of the qualified vidyās, such as the paryāṅka-vidyā, the pañkāgni-vidyā, the upakośala-vidyā, the dahara-vidyā; while it is not mentioned in others, such as the madhu-vidyā, the śāṇḍilya-vidyā, the shoḍaśakala-vidyā, the vaisvānara-vidyā.—The doubt then arises whether the going on the path of the gods is to be connected with those vidyās only in which it is actually mentioned or generally with all vidyās of that kind.

The pūrvapakshin maintains the former view; for, he says, the limitative force of the general subject-matter of each particular section compels us to connect the going on the path of the gods with those vidyās only which actually mention it. If we transferred it to other vidyās also, the authoritativeness of scripture would suffer; for then anything might be the sense of anything. Moreover, the details about the path of the gods beginning with light and so on are given equally in the upakośala-vidyā and the pañkāgni-vidyā, which would be a useless repetition if as a matter of course the going on the path of the gods were connected with all vidyās.

To this we make the following reply. The going on the path of the gods is not to be restricted but to be connected equally with all those qualified vidyās which have exaltation (*abhyudaya*) for their result. The objection above raised by the pūrvapakshin that thereby we contradict the general subject-matter, we refute by appealing to scripture and *Smṛiti*. Scripture in the first place declares that not only those 'who know this,' i.e. the pañkāgni-vidyā (*Kh. Up. V, 10, 1*), proceed on the path of the gods, but also those who understand other vidyās, 'and also those who in the forest follow faith and austerities.'—But how do we know that the latter passage refers to those who are conversant with other

vidyās? The text certainly speaks of those only who are intent on faith and austerities!—Not by faith and austerities alone, we reply, unaided by knowledge, can that path be attained; for another scriptural passage says, ‘Through knowledge they mount to that place from which all wishes have passed away; those who are skilled in works only do not go there, nor penitents devoid of knowledge’ (Sat. Brā. X, 5, 4, 16). We therefore conclude that faith and austerities denote at the same time other vidyās.—The Vāgasaneyins again read in the *Pañkâgni-vidyâ*, ‘Those who thus know this and those who in the forest worship faith and the True.’ The latter part of this passage we must explain to mean, ‘Those who in the forest with faith worship the True, i.e. Brahman;’ the term ‘the True’ being often employed to denote Brahman. And as those who know the *pañkâgni-vidyâ* are in the above passage referred to as ‘those who thus know this,’ we must understand the clause, ‘and those who in the forest,’ &c., as referring to men in the possession of other vidyās. And, moreover, also the passage, ‘Those, however, who know neither of these two paths become worms, birds, and creeping things’ (VI, 2, 16), which teaches that those who miss the two paths have to go downwards, intimates that those who possess other vidyās have to proceed either on the path of the gods or that of the fathers, and as their vidyās are as such not different from the *pañkâgni-vidyâ*, we conclude that they proceed on the path of the gods (not on that of the fathers)¹.

In the second place *Smṛiti* also confirms the same doctrine, ‘These two, the white and the black path, are known as the eternal paths of the world; on the one man goes not to return, on the other he again returns’ (Bha. Gī. VIII, 26).

With regard, finally, to the circumstance that the details about the path of the gods are given in the *Upakosala-*

¹ Itas *ka* vidyântarasīlinām gatir iti līngadarsanam samukhīnoti atheti, etān iti vidyāntaraparā *grīhyante*, tathāpi katham devayānayogas teshām ity āraṅkya yogyatayety āha tatrāpīti. Ān. Gī.

vidyâ as well as the *Pañikâgni-vidyâ*, we remark that the repetition is meant to assist reflection.

For all these reasons the going on the path of the gods is not limited to those vidyâs in which it is actually mentioned.

32. Of those who have a certain office there is subsistence (of the body) as long as the office lasts.

The question here is whether for him who has reached true knowledge a new body originates after he has parted with the old one or not.—But, an objection is here raised at the outset, there is really no occasion for inquiring whether knowledge when reaching its perfection brings about its due effect, viz. complete isolation of the Self from all bodies or not ; not any more than there is room for an inquiry whether there is cooked rice or not, after the process of cooking has reached its due termination ; or, for an inquiry whether a man is satisfied by eating or not.—Not so, we reply. There is indeed room for the inquiry proposed, as we know from *itihâsa* and *purâna* that some persons although knowing Brahman yet obtained new bodies. Tradition informs us, e.g. that *Apântaratamas*, an ancient *rishi* and teacher of the Vedas, was, by the order of Vishnu, born on this earth as *Krishna Dvaipâyana* at the time when the *Dvâparayuga* was succeeded by the *Kaliyuga*. Similarly *Vasishtha*, the son of Brahman's mind, having parted from his former body in consequence of the curse of Nimi, was, on the order of Brahman, again procreated by *Mitra* and *Varuna*. *Smṛiti* further relates that *Bhrigu* and other sons of Brahman's mind were again born at the sacrifice of *Varuna*. *Sanatkumâra* also, who likewise was a son of Brahman's mind, was, in consequence of a boon being granted to *Rudra*, born again as *Skanda*. And there are similar tales about *Daksha*, *Nârada*, and others having, for various reasons, assumed new bodies. Stories of the same kind are met with in the mantras and *arthavâdas* of *Sruti*. Of some of the persons mentioned it is said that they assumed a new body after the old body had perished ; of others that they assumed, through their

supernatural powers, various new bodies, while the old body remained intact all the while. And all of them are known to have completely mastered the contents of the Vedas.

On the ground of all this the pûrvapakshin maintains that the knowledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either be or not be the cause of final release.

This we deny, for the reason that the continuance of the bodily existence of Aparântamas and others—who are entrusted with offices conducive to the subsistence of the worlds, such as the promulgation of the Vedas and the like—depends on those their offices. As Savitar (the sun), who after having for thousands of yugas performed the office of watching over these worlds, at the end of that period enjoys the condition of release in which he neither rises nor sets, according to *Kh. Up. III, 11, 1*, ‘When from thence he has risen upwards, he neither rises nor sets. He is alone, standing in the centre;’ and as the present knowers of Brahman reach the state of isolation after the enjoyment of those results of action, which have begun to operate, has come to an end, according to *Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2*, ‘For him there is only delay so long as he is not delivered from the body;’ so Aparântamas and other Lords to whom the highest Lord has entrusted certain offices, last—although they possess complete knowledge, the cause of release—as long as their office lasts, their works not yet being exhausted, and obtain release only when their office comes to an end. For gradually exhausting the aggregate of works the consequences of which have once begun, so as to enable them to discharge their offices; passing according to their free will from one body into another, as if from one house into another, in order to accomplish the duties of their offices; preserving all the time the memory of their identity; they create for themselves through their power over the material of the body and the sense organs new bodies, and occupy them either all at once or in succession. Nor can it be said that when passing into new bodies they remember only the fact of their former existence (not their individuality); for it is known that they preserve the sense

of their individuality¹. *Smṛiti* tells us, e.g. that Sulabhā, a woman conversant with Brahman, wishing to dispute with Ganaka, left her own body, entered into that of Ganaka, carried on a discussion with him, and again returned into her own body. If in addition to the works the consequences of which are already in operation, other works manifested themselves, constituting the cause of further embodiments, the result would be that in the same way further works also, whose potentiality would in that case not be destroyed, would take place, and then it might be suspected that the knowledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either be or not be the cause of final release. But such a suspicion is inadmissible since it is known from *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* that knowledge completely destroys the potentiality of action. For *Sruti* says, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld who is high and low' (*Mu. Up. II, 2, 8*); and, 'When the memory remains firm, then all the ties are loosened' (*Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2*). And *Smṛiti* similarly says, 'As a fire well kindled, O Arguna, reduces fuel to ashes, so the fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes;' and, 'As seeds burned by fire do not sprout again, so the Self is not again touched by the afflictions which knowledge has burned.' Nor is it possible that when the afflictions such as ignorance and the like are burned, the aggregate of works which is the seed of affliction should be partly burned, but partly keep the power of again springing up; not any more than the seed of the *Sāli*, when burned, preserves the power of sprouting again with some part. The aggregate of works, however, whose fruits have once begun to develop themselves comes to rest through effecting a delay which terminates with the death of the body, just as an arrow discharged stops in the end owing to the gradual cessation of its impetus; this in agreement with *Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2*, 'For him there is only delay,' &c. We have thus shown that persons to whom an office is

¹ *Utpadyamānānām aparimushitasmaratve-pi gâtismaratvam eva na vasish/hādinānatvam ity āsaṅkyāha na kēti. Ān. Gi.*

entrusted last as long as their office lasts, and that nevertheless there is absolutely only one result of true knowledge.—In accordance with this, scripture declares that the result of knowledge on the part of all beings is equally final release, cp. ‘So whatever Deva was awakened he indeed became that, and the same with *Rīshis* and men’ (*Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 10*). Moreover¹ it may be the case that (some) great *rīshis* had attached their minds to other cognitions whose result is lordly power and the like, and that later on only when they became aware of the transitory nature of those results they turned from them and fixed their minds on the highest Self, whereby they obtained final release. As *Smṛiti* says, ‘When the mahāpralaya has arrived and the highest (i.e. *Hiranyagarbha*) himself comes to an end, then they all, with well-prepared minds, reach together with Brahman the highest place.’—Another reason precluding the suspicion that true knowledge may be destitute of its result is that that result is the object of immediate intuition. In the case of such results of action as the heavenly world and the like which are not present to intuitional knowledge, there may be a doubt; but not so in the case of the fruit of true knowledge, with regard to which scripture says, ‘The Brahman which is present to intuition, not hidden’ (*Bṛi. Up. III, 4, 1*), and which in the passage, ‘That art thou,’ is referred to as something already accomplished. This latter passage cannot be interpreted to mean, ‘Thou wilt be that after thou hast died;’ for another Vedic passage declares that the fruit of complete knowledge, viz. union with the universal Self, springs up at the moment when complete knowledge is attained, ‘The *Rīshi Vāmadeva* saw and understood it, singing, “I was Manu, I was the sun.”’

For all these reasons we maintain that those who possess true knowledge reach in all cases final release.

33. But the (denials of) conceptions concerning the

¹ *Api ka nādhikāravatām sarveshām rīshīnām āmatattvagñānam tenāvyāpakoऽpy ayam pūrvapaksha ity āha gñānāntareshu kēti. Bhā.*

akshara are to be comprehended (in all meditations on the akshara), on account of the equality and of the object being the same, as in the case of the upasad; this has been explained (in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ).

We read in the Vâgasaneyaka, 'O Gârî, the Brâhmanas call this the Akshara. It is neither coarse, nor fine, nor short, nor long,' &c. (*Bri. Up.* III, 8, 8). Similarly the Âtharvâna says, 'The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized, which has no family and no caste,' &c. (*Mu. Up.* I, 1, 5; 6). In other places also the highest Brahman, under the name of Akshara, is described as that of which all qualities are to be denied. Now in some places qualities are denied of Brahman which are not denied in other places, and hence a doubt arises whether the mental conception of these particular denials is to form part of all those passages or not.

To the assertion of the pûrvapakshin that each denial is valid only for that passage in which the text actually exhibits it, we make the following reply.—The conceptions of the akshara, i.e. the conceptions of the particular denials concerning the akshara, are to be included in all those passages, 'on account of the equality and on account of the same object being referred to.' The equality consists therein that all the texts alluded to convey an idea of Brahman in the same way, viz. by denying of it all attributes; and we recognise in all of them the same object of instruction, viz. the one undivided Brahman. Why then should the conceptions stated in one passage not be valid for all others also? To the present case the same argumentation applies which had been made use of under III, 3, 11. There positive attributes were discussed; here we are concerned with negative ones. The division of the discussion into two (instead of disposing of positive and negative attributes in one *adhikarâna*) is due to the wish of explaining the differences in detail.—The clause, 'as in the case of the upasads,' introduces a parallel case. For

the *Gāmadagnya*-ahina-sacrifice¹ the text enjoins that the upasad offerings are to consist of *puroḍāśas*. Now although the mantras accompanying the offering of the *puroḍāśas* are originally enjoined in the Veda of the *Udgātrīs* (*Tāndya Brā.* XXI, 10, 11, 'Agni, promote the hotra,' &c.), yet they are to be enounced by the *adhvaryu*; for the offering of the *puroḍāśas* is the work of the *adhvaryu*, and subordinate matters (i.e. here, the mantras) are governed by the principal matter (i.e. the offering of the *puroḍāśa*). Similarly, in the case under discussion, the attributes of the *akshara* have, because they are subordinate to the *akshara* itself, to be connected with the latter everywhere, in whatever places the text may originally state them.—The principle of decision employed is explained in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* III, 3, 9.

34. On account of (the same) number being recorded.

The *Ātharvanikas* exhibit, with reference to the Self, the following mantra, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (*Mu. Up.* III, 1, 1). The same mantra is found in the text of the *Svetāsvatara* (IV, 6). The *Kaṭhas* again read, 'There are the two drinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and light, likewise those householders who perform the *Trināṭiketa*-sacrifice.'—The doubt here arises whether the two sections introduced by these mantras constitute one *vidyā* or two *vidyās*. Here the *pūrvapakshin* maintains that we have to do with two separate *vidyās*, because the texts exhibit certain differences. For the mantra of the *Mundaka* and *Svetāsvatara* Upanishads represents one bird as enjoying and the other as not enjoying; while in the mantra of the *Kaṭhas*

¹ I.e. a sacrifice lasting four days, called *Gāmadagnya*, because first offered by *Gamadagni*. Cp. *Taitt. Samh.* VII, 1, 9.

both are said to enjoy.—As thus the objects of knowledge differ in character, the vidyâs themselves must be looked upon as separate.

To this we make the following reply. The vidyâ is one only because both mantras exhibit the character of the objects of knowledge as one and the same, viz. as defined by the number two.—But has not the pûrvapakshin shown that there exists a certain difference of character?—By no means, we reply. Both texts intimate one and the same matter, viz. the Lord together with the individual soul. In the *Mundaka*-text the clause, 'The other looks on without eating,' intimates the highest Self which is raised above all desire; the same highest Self forms also the subject of the complementary passage, 'But when he sees the other Lord contented.' And the *Kaṭha*-text intimates the same highest Self which is raised above all desire; only, as it is mentioned together with the enjoying individual soul, it is itself metaphorically spoken of as enjoying; just as we speak of the 'men with the umbrella,' although only one out of several carries an umbrella. For that in the *Kaṭha*-text also the highest Self forms the general subject-matter we have to conclude from the preceding passage, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that' (I, 2, 14), and from the complementary passage referring to the same Self, 'Which is a bridge for sacrificers, which is the highest imperishable Brahman' (I, 3, 2). All this has been explained at length under I, 2, 11. As therefore there is one object of knowledge only, the vidyâ also is one.—Moreover, if we carefully examine the context of the three mantras quoted, we observe that they are concerned merely with the knowledge of the highest Self, and that they mention the individual soul not as a new object of instruction but merely to show its identity with the highest Self. And that, as far as the knowledge of the highest Self is concerned, the question as to the oneness or separateness of vidyâs cannot be even raised, we have already shown above. The present Sûtra therefore merely aims at a fuller discussion of the matter, the practical outcome of which is that any particulars stated in one of the texts only have to be supplied in the others also.

35. As the Self is within all, as in the case of the aggregate of the elements, (there is oneness of vidyâ).

The Vāgasaneyins record, in the questions asked by Ushasta and by Kahola, the same passage twice in succession, 'Tell me the Brahman which is present to intuition, not hidden ; the Self who is within all' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 4, 1 ; 5, 1*).—The question here presents itself whether the two sections introduced by the questions constitute one vidyâ only or two separate vidyâs.

Two separate vidyâs, the pūrvapakshin maintains ; owing to the force of repetition. For if the second passage added nothing to—or took nothing away from—the contents of the first, the repetition would be altogether meaningless. We therefore conclude that the repetition intimates the separateness of the two vidyâs, just as in the Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā repetition shows two sacrificial actions to be separate.

To this we make the following reply. As both texts equally declare the Self to be within all, they must be taken as constituting one vidyâ only. In both passages question and answer equally refer to a Self which is within everything. For in one body there cannot be two Selves, each of which is inside everything else. One Self indeed may without difficulty be within everything, but of a second one this could not be predicated, not any more than of the aggregate of the elements ; i.e. the case of that second Self is analogous to that of the aggregate of the five elements, i.e. the body. In the body the element of water is indeed within the element of earth, and the element of fire within the element of water ; but each of these elements is 'within all' in a relative sense only, not in the literal sense of the phrase.—Or else the 'like the aggregate of the elements (or beings)' of the Sūtra has to be taken as pointing to another scriptural passage, viz. *Sve. Up. VI, 11*, 'He is the one god, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings.' As this mantra records that one Self lives within the aggregate of all beings,

the same holds good with regard to the two Brāhmaṇa-passages. And the object of knowledge being one, the vidyā also is one only.

36. If it be said that otherwise the separation (of the statements) cannot be accounted for; we reply that it is (here) as in the case of other instructions.

We yet have to refute the remark made by the pūrva-pakshin that, unless the separateness of the two vidyās be admitted, the separation of the two statements cannot be accounted for. We do this by pointing to analogous cases. In the sixth prapāṭhaka of the upanishad of the Tāndins the instruction conveyed in the words, 'That is the Self, thou art that, O Svetaketu,' is repeated nine times, and yet the one vidyā is not thereby split into many. Similarly in our case.—But how do you know that the vidyā remains one and the same in spite of the ninefold repetition?—Because, we reply, the introductory and concluding clauses show that all those passages have the same sense. For the repeated request on the part of Svetaketu, 'Please, Sir, inform me still more,' shows that one and the same matter is again and again proposed for further discussion, and further instruction regarding it is repeatedly given by means of new doubts being removed. Similarly, in the case under discussion, the sameness of form of the two introductory questions and the equality of the concluding clauses, 'Everything else is of evil,' show that both sections refer to one and the same matter.—Moreover, in the second question the text adds the word 'just' (eva), 'Tell me just that Brahman,' &c., which shows that the second question refers to the same matter as the first one. That the matter of the two sections is really the same, we establish by pointing out that the former section declares the existence of the highest Self which is neither cause nor effect, while the latter qualifies it as that which transcends all the attributes of the Samsāra state, such as hunger, thirst, and so on.—The two sections, therefore, form one vidyā only.

37. There is exchange (of meditation), for the texts distinguish (two meditations); as in other cases.

The Aitareyins declare with reference to the person in the sun, 'What I am, that is he; what he is, that am I' (Ait. Âr. II, 2, 4, 6). And the Gābālas say, 'I am thou indeed, O reverend divinity, and thou art I indeed.'—The doubt here arises whether the reflection founded upon this text is to be a double one 'by means of exchange' (i.e. whether the soul is to be meditated upon as āditya and āditya as the soul), or a simple one (the soul only being meditated upon as āditya).

The pūrvapakshin maintains the latter view; for, he says, the text cannot possibly propose as matter of meditation anything but the oneness of the individual soul with the Lord. For if we assumed that two different forms of meditation are intended, viz. firstly the soul's being the Self of the Lord, and, secondly, the Lord's being the Self of the soul, the soul indeed would be exalted by the former meditation, but the Lord, at the same time, be lowered by the latter one. We therefore conclude that the meditation is to be of one kind only, and that the double form, in which the text exhibits it, merely aims at confirming the oneness of the Self.

To this we make the following reply. 'Exchange' is expressly recorded in the text for the purposes of meditation, just as other qualities (of the Self), such as its being the Self of all, &c., are recorded for the same purpose. For both texts make the distinctive double enunciation, 'I am thou,' and 'Thou art I.' Now this double enunciation has a sense only if a twofold meditation is to be based upon it; otherwise it would be devoid of meaning, since one statement would be all that is required.—But has not the pūrvapakshin urged above that this your explanation involves a lowering of the Lord, who is thereby represented as having the transmigrating soul for his Self?—Never mind, we reply; even in that way only the unity of the Self is meditated upon.—But does your explanation

then not come to that of the *pûrvapakshin*, viz. that the double statement is merely meant to confirm the oneness of the Self?—We do not, our reply is, deny that the text confirms the oneness of the Self; we only want to prove that, on the ground of the text as it stands, a twofold meditation has to be admitted, not a simple one. That this virtually confirms the unity of the Self we admit; just as the instruction about (the Lord's) possessing such qualities as having only true wishes, and so on—which instruction is given for the purpose of meditation—at the same time proves the existence of a Lord endowed with such qualities.—Hence the double relation enounced in the text has to be meditated upon, and is to be transferred to other *vidyâs* also which treat of the same subject.

38. For the True and so on are one and the same (*vidyâ*).

The text of the *Vâgasaneyaka*, after having enjoined the knowledge of the True, together with a meditation on the syllables of its name ('Whosoever knows this great glorious first-born as the true Brahman,' &c., *Bri. Up.* V, 4, 1), continues, 'Now what is the True, that is the *Âditya*, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye' (V, 5, 2).—The doubt here arises whether the text enjoins two *vidyâs* of the True or one only.

Two, the *pûrvapakshin* maintains. For the text declares two different results, one in the earlier passage, 'He conquers these worlds' (V, 4, 1); the other one later on, 'He destroys evil and leaves it' (V, 5, 3). And what our opponent may call a reference to the subject-matter under discussion¹, is merely due to the circumstance of the object of meditation being the same (in the two *vidyâs*).

To this we make the following reply.—There is only one *vidyâ* of the True, because the clause, 'That which is the True,' &c., refers back to that True which is treated

¹ Viz. the clause in V, 5, 2, 'That which is the true,' which apparently—or really—connects the *vidyâ* of V, 5 with that of V, 4.

of in V, 4.—But has not the pûrvapakshin shown that the clause alluded to can be accounted for even on the supposition of there being two vidyâs?—The reasoning of the pûrvapakshin, we reply, would be admissible only if the separateness of the two vidyâs were established by some other clear and undoubted reason; in our case, however, there is a general possibility of both (viz. of the vidyâs being separate or not), and the very circumstance that the mentioned clause contains a back reference to the True spoken of in V, 4, determines us to conclude that there is only one vidyâ of the True.—To the remark that there must be two vidyâs because the text states two different results, we reply that the statement of a second result merely has the purpose of glorifying the new instruction given about the True, viz. that its secret names are ahar and aham. Moreover, as in the case under discussion, the fruit of the vidyâ has really to be supplied from its arthavâda part¹, and as there is unity of vidyâ, all those fruits which the text states in connexion with the single parts of the vidyâ are to be combined and put in connexion with the vidyâ taken as a whole.—The conclusion therefore is that the text records only one vidyâ of the True, distinguished by such and such details, and that hence all the qualities mentioned, such as Truth and so on, are to be comprehended in one act of meditation.

Some commentators are of opinion that the above Sûtra refers (not to the question whether *Brî.* Up. V, 4 and V, 5 constitute one vidyâ but) to the question whether the Vâgasaneyaka-passages about the persons in the sun and in the eye, and the similar *Khândogya*-passage (I, 6, 6, 'Now that golden person who is seen within the sun,' &c.) form one vidyâ or not. They conclude that they do so, and that hence truth and the other qualities mentioned in

¹ For the vidyâ contains no explicit statement that a man desirous of such and such a fruit is to meditate on the True in such and such a way.—That in cases where the fruit is not stated in a vidhi-passages it must be supplied from the arthavâda-passages, is taught in the Pû. Mî. Sû. IV, 3, eighth adhikaraṇa.

the Vâgasaneyaka are to be combined with the *Khândogya*-text also.—But this interpretation of the Sûtra appears objectionable. For the *Khândogya*-vidyâ refers to the udgîtha and is thus connected with sacrificial acts, marks of which connexion are exhibited in the beginning, the middle, and the end of the vidyâ. Thus we read at the beginning, 'The *Rik* is the earth, the *Sâman* is fire;' in the middle, '*Rik* and *Sâman* are his joints and therefore he is udgîtha;' and in the end, 'He who knowing this sings a *Sâman*' (*Kh. Up.* I, 6, 1; 8; I, 7, 7). In the Vâgasaneyaka, on the other hand, there is nothing to connect the vidyâ with sacrificial acts. As therefore the subject-matter is different, the vidyâs are separate and the details of the two are to be held apart.

39. (Having true) wishes and other (qualities) (have to be combined) there and here, on account of the abode and so on.

In the chapter of the *Khândogya* which begins with the passage, 'There is this city of Brahman and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether' (VIII, 1, 1), we read, 'That is the Self free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose imaginations are true.' A similar passage is found in the text of the Vâgasaneyins, 'He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by the *Prâṇas*, the ether within the heart. In it there reposes the ruler of all' (*Bṛi. Up.* IV, 4, 22).

A doubt here arises whether these two passages constitute one vidyâ, and whether the particulars stated in one text are to be comprehended within the other text also.

There is oneness of vidyâ¹.—Here (the Sûtrakâra) says, 'Wishes and so on,' i. e. 'The quality of having true wishes and so on' (the word *kâma* standing for *satyakâma*, just

¹ This clause must apparently be taken as stating the *siddhânta*-view, although later on it is said that the two vidyâs are distinct (that, however, in spite of their distinctness, their details have to be combined).

as people occasionally say Datta for Devadatta and Bhāmā for Satyabhāmā). This quality and the other qualities, which the *Khândogya* attributes to the ether within the heart, have to be combined with the *Vâgasaneyaka*-passage, and vice versâ the qualities stated in the *Vâgasaneyaka*, such as being the ruler of all, have also to be ascribed to the Self free from sin, proclaimed in the *Khândogya*. The reason for this is that the two passages display a number of common features. Common to both is the heart viewed as abode, common again is the Lord as object of knowledge, common also is the Lord being viewed as a bank preventing these worlds from being confounded; and several other points.—But, an objection is raised, there are also differences. In the *Khândogya* the qualities are attributed to the ether within the heart, while in the *Vâgasaneyaka* they are ascribed to Brahman abiding in that ether.—This objection, we reply, is unfounded, for we have shown under I, 3, 14 that the term ‘ether’ in the *Khândogya* designates Brahman.

There is, however, the following difference between the two passages. The *Khândogya*-vidyâ has for its object the qualified Brahman, as we see from the passage VIII, 1, 6, ‘But those who depart from hence after having discovered the Self and those true desires,’ in which certain desires are represented as objects of knowledge equally as the Self. In the *Vâgasaneyaka*, on the other hand, the highest Brahman devoid of all qualities forms the object of instruction, as we conclude from the consideration of the request made by Ganaka, ‘Speak on for the sake of emancipation,’ and the reply given by Yâgñavalkya, ‘For that person is not attached to anything’ (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 14; 15). That the text ascribes to the Self such qualities as being the Lord of all and the like is (not for the purpose of teaching that the Self really possesses those qualities, but is) merely meant to glorify the Self. Later on also (IV, 5, 15) the chapter winds up with a passage clearly referring to the Self devoid of all qualities, ‘That Self is to be described by No, no!’ But as the qualified Brahman is (fundamentally) one (with the unqualified Brahman), we

must conclude that the Sūtra teaches the combination of the qualities to the end of setting forth the glory of Brahman, not for the purpose of devout meditation.

40. On account of (the passage showing) respect, there is non-omission (of the *prāṇāgnihotra*) (even when the eating of food is omitted).

We read in the *Khândogya* under the heading of the *Vaisvânara-vidyâ*, 'Therefore the first food which comes is in the place of Homa. And he who offers that first oblation should offer it to *Prâṇa*, saying *Svâhâ*' (*Kh. Up. V, 19, 1*). The text thereupon enjoins five oblations, and later on applies to them the term '*Agnihotra*;' 'He who thus knowing this offers the *agnihotra*,' and 'As hungry children here on earth sit round their mother, so do all beings sit round the *agnihotra*' (*V, 24, 2 ; 4*).

Here the doubt arises whether the *agnihotra* offered to the *prâṇas* is to be omitted when the eating itself is omitted or not.—As, according to the clause, 'The first food which comes,' &c., the oblation is connected with the coming of food, and as the coming of food subserves the eating, the *agnihotra* offered to the *prâṇas* is omitted when the eating is omitted.—Against this conclusion the Sūtra (embodying the *pûrvapaksha*) declares, 'It is not omitted.'—Why?—'On account of the respect.' This means: In their version of the *Vaisvânara-vidyâ* the *Gâbâlas* read as follows: 'He (i.e. the host) is to eat before his guests; for (if he would make them eat first) it would be as if he without having himself offered the *agnihotra* offered that of another person.' This passage, which objects to the priority of the eating on the part of the guests and establishes priority on the part of the host, thereby intimates respect for the *agnihotra* offered to the *prâṇas*. For as it does not allow the omission of priority it will allow all the less the omission of that which is characterised by priority, viz. the *agnihotra* offered to the *prâṇas*.—But (as mentioned above) the connexion—established by the *Khândogya*-passage—of the oblation with the coming of food—which subserves the eating—establishes the omission of the ob-

lation in the case of the eating being omitted!—Not so, the pûrvapakshin replies. The purpose of that passage is to enjoin some particular material (to be offered). For the fundamental agnihotra certain materials, such as milk and so on, are exclusively prescribed. Now, as through the term ‘agnihotra’ (which the text applies to the offering to the prâṇas) all the particulars belonging to the fundamental agnihotra are already established for the secondary agnihotra also (viz. the oblation made to the prâṇas), just as in the case of the ayana of the *Kundapâyins*¹; the clause, ‘the first food which comes,’ &c., is meant to enjoin, for the prâṇagnihotra, some particular secondary matter, viz. the circumstance of food constituting the material of the oblation². Hence, considering the *Mīmāṃsā* principle that the omission of a secondary matter does not involve the omission of the principal matter, we conclude that even in the case of the omission of eating, the agnihotra offered to the prâṇas has to be performed by means of water or some other not altogether unsuitable material, according to the *Mīmāṃsā* principle that in the absence of the prescribed material some other suitable material may be substituted.

To this pûrvapaksha the next Sûtra replies.

41. When (eating) is taking place, (the prâṇagnihotra has to be performed) from that (i.e. the food first eaten); on the ground of the passage declaring this.

When eating is actually taking place, ‘from that,’ i.e. with that material of food which first presents itself, the agnihotra offered to the prâṇas is to be effected.—On what

¹ For one of the great sacrifices lasting a whole year—called the ayana of the *Kundapâyins*—the texts enjoin the offering of the ‘agnihotra’ during a full month (cp. e.g. *Tândya Mahâbrâhmana* XXV, 4). Now from the term ‘agnihotra’ we conclude that all the details of the ordinary agnihotra are valid for the agnihotra of the ayana also.

² Whereby the materials offered in the ordinary agnihotra are superseded.

ground?—‘On the ground of the passage declaring this.’ For the clause, ‘The first food which a man may take is in the place of a homa,’ enjoins the circumstance of the oblations to the *prâṇas* being effected by means of a material (primarily) subserving another purpose (viz. eating), as appears from its referring to the presentation of food as something accomplished (i. e. accomplished independently of the oblations; not tending to accomplish the oblations). How then should these oblations—which are characterised as not having any motive power with regard to the employment of the food—be capable of causing us to substitute, in the absence of eating, some other material (than food)?—Nor is it true that there are already established, for the *prâṇagnihotra*, all the details belonging to the fundamental *agnihotra*. In the case of the *ayana* of the *Kundapâyins*, the term ‘*agnihotra*’ forms part of the injunctive passage, ‘They offer the *agnihotra* during a month,’ and therefore may have the force of enjoining a general character of the sacrifice identical with that of the fundamental *agnihotra*; and it is therefore appropriate to consider the details of the latter as valid for the *agnihotra* of the *Kundapâyins* also. In the case of the so-called *prâṇagnihotra*, on the other hand, the term ‘*agnihotra*’ occurs in an *arthavâda*-passage only, and does not therefore possess an analogous injunctive force. If, again, we admitted that the details of the fundamental *agnihotra* are valid for the *prâṇagnihotra* also, such details as the transference of the fire (from the *gârhapatya* fire to the two other fires) would be likewise valid. But this is impossible, as the transference of the fire is made for the purpose of establishing a fire-place in which the oblations are made; in our case, on the other hand, the oblations are not made in the fire at all—because that would interfere with their being used as food, and because they are connected with a material procured for the purpose of eating,—but are made in the mouth (of the eater). Thus the text of the *Gâbâlas* also, ‘He is to eat before the guests,’ shows that the accomplishment of the oblation has the mouth for its abode. For the same reason (i. e. because the details of the fundamental *agnihotra* are

not valid for the *prâṇāgni*hotra) the text declares the subordinate members of the *agni*hotra to be present here (i.e. in the *prâṇāgni*hotra) in the way of fanciful combination only, 'the chest is the *vedi*, the hairs the sacrificial grass, the heart the *Gârhapatya* fire, the mind the *Anvâhârya-pakana* fire, the mouth the *Âhavaniya* fire.' By the *vedi* mentioned in this passage we have to understand a levelled spot, as in the fundamental *agni*hotra there is no *vedi*, and as the intention of the passage is to effect a fanciful combination of the members of the fundamental *agni*hotra (with members of the *prâṇāgni*hotra).—And as the *prâṇāgni*hotra is connected with eating which has its definite times, it is also not possible that it should be restricted to the time enjoined for the fundamental *agni*hotra. In the same way other particulars also of the fundamental *agni*hotra, such as the so-called *upasthâna*, cannot be reconciled with the requirements of the *prâṇāgni*hotra. From all this it follows that the five oblations, as connected with their respective mantras, materials, and divinities, have to be performed only in the case of food being eaten.—With reference to the passage showing 'respect,' we remark that it is meant to intimate priority (of the host), in the case of food being actually eaten. But the passage has no power to declare that the offering of the *prâṇāgni*hotra is of permanent obligation.—It therefore is a settled conclusion that the *prâṇāgni*hotra is omitted when the eating of food is omitted.

42. There is non-restriction of the assertions concerning them (i.e. the assertions made concerning certain sacrificial acts are not permanently connected with those acts), because this is seen (in scripture); for a separate fruit, viz. non-obstruction (of the success of the sacrifice), (belongs to them).

We meet in the Vedânta-texts with certain *vidyâs* which are founded on matters subordinate to sacrificial acts. To this class belongs, e.g. the first *vidyâ* of the *Khândogya* Upanishad, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable *Om* as *udgîtha*.'—We now enter on an inquiry whether those

vidyās are permanently connected with the acts in the same way as the circumstance of being made of *parṇa*-wood is permanently connected with all sacrifices in which the *guhû* (the sacrificial ladle) is used; or if they are non-permanent like the vessel called *godohana*¹. The *pûrva-pakshin* maintains that the meditations are permanently connected with the sacrificial acts, because they also are comprised within the scriptural enouncements concerning performances. For they also do not stand under some special heading², and as they are connected with the sacrifice through the *udgîtha* and so on, they combine themselves, like other subordinate members, with the scriptural statements as to the performance of the sacrifice.

If against the doctrine of the meditations forming permanent parts of the sacrificial performances it should be urged, that in the chapters containing them special results are mentioned (which seem to constitute the meditations into independent acts), as e.g. in the passage, 'he indeed becomes a fulfiller of desires' (*Kh. Up. I, 1, 7*); we reply that those statements of results being given in the text in the present form only (not in an injunctive form), are mere

¹ The question is raised whether the meditations, enjoined in the Upanishads, on certain parts or elements of sacrificial acts, are permanently connected with the latter, i.e. are to be undertaken whenever the sacrificial act is performed, or not.—In the former case they would stand to the sacrifice in the same relation as the *parṇamayîta*, i.e. the quality of being made of *parṇa*-wood, does. Just as the latter is connected with the sacrifice by means of the *guhû*—the sacrificial ladle,—so the meditation on the syllable *Om*, e.g. would be connected with the sacrifice by means of that syllable.—In the latter case, i.e. in the case of being connected with the sacrifice on certain occasions only, the *upâsana* is analogous to the *godohana*-vessel which is used in the *darsapûrṇamâsa*-sacrifice instead of the usual *āmāsa*, only if the sacrificer specially wishes for cattle.—See *Pû. Mî. Sû. III, 6, 1*; *IV, 1, 2*.

² Like the statement about the *parṇamayîta* of the *guhû* which the sacred text does not exhibit under some particular *prakaraṇa*, but *ex abrupto* as it were; on which account it is to be connected with the sacrifice in general.

arthavāda-passages—like the statement about him whose guhû is made of parna-wood hearing no evil sound—and thus do not aim at enjoining certain results.—Hence, just as the statement about being made of parna-wood—which does not occur under a definite prakaraṇa—connects itself, by means of the sacrificial ladle, with the sacrifice, and thus forms a permanent element of the latter no less than if it were actually made under the heading of the sacrifice ; so the meditations on the udgîtha, &c., also form permanent parts of the sacrifices.

To this we make the following reply. 'There is non-restriction of the assertions concerning them.' That means : the assertions which the text makes concerning the nature of certain subordinate members of sacrificial acts such as the udgîtha and so on—as e. g. that the udgîtha is the best of all essences (*Kh. Up. I, 1, 3*), the fulfiller of desires (*I, 1, 7*), a gratifier of desires (*I, 1, 8*), the chief prâṇa (*I, 2, 7*), Âditya (*I, 3, 1*)—cannot be permanently connected with the sacrificial acts in the same way as other permanent members are, 'because that is seen,' i. e. because scripture shows that they are not so permanently connected. For scripture allows also such as are not acquainted with the details mentioned above to perform the sacrificial actions (cp. the passage *I, 1, 10*, 'Therefore both he who knows this, and he who does not, perform the sacrifice'), and declares that even those priests, Prastotri and so on, who are devoid of the knowledge of the divinities of the prastâva and the like, do perform the sacrifices 'Prastotri, if you without knowing the deity which belongs to the prastâva are going to sing it,' &c. (*I, 10, 9* and ff.).—The sacred text moreover declares that the vidyâs founded on certain elements of sacrificial acts have results of their own, apart from those acts, viz. 'non-obstruction' in the accomplishment of the fruit of the sacrifice, i. e. a certain additional success of the sacrifice, cp. the passage *I, 1, 10*, 'Therefore he who knows this and he who does not perform the sacrifice. But knowledge and ignorance are separate. The sacrifice which a man performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad is more powerful.' The declaration made in this passage

that the performances of him who knows and of him who does not know are separate, and the employment of the comparative form ('more powerful') show that even the sacrifice destitute of the vidyā is powerful. But how would that be possible if the vidyā formed a permanent necessary part of the sacrifice? In the latter case a sacrifice devoid of that vidyā could never be admitted to be powerful; for it is an established principle that only those sacrifices are effective which comprise all subordinate members. Thus the text also teaches definite results for each meditation, in the section treating of the meditation on the Sāman as the worlds and others: 'The worlds in an ascending and in a descending line belong to him,' &c. (*Kh. Up. II, 2, 3*).—Nor must we understand those declarations of results to be mere arthavādas; for in that case they would have to be taken as stating a secondary matter only, while if understood to teach certain results they may be taken in their principal (i. e. direct, literal) sense¹. The case of the results which scripture declares to be connected with the prayāgas e.g. is of a different nature. For the prayāgas are enjoined with reference to a sacrifice (viz. the darsapūrṇamāsa) which requires certain definite modes of procedure (such as the offering of the prayāgas and the like), and hence subserve that sacrifice; so that the passage stating a fruit for the prayāgas has to be considered as a mere arthavāda-passage². In the case again of the quality of consisting of parṇa-wood—which quality is stated ex abrupto, not under a definite heading—no special result can be assumed; for as a quality is not an act it cannot be connected with any result unless it be joined to something to abide in. The use of the godohana indeed may have its own injunction of

¹ The statement as to the result of an action is a 'statement of a principal matter' if it is really meant to inform us that a certain result will attend a certain action. It is a statement of a 'secondary matter' if it is only meant to glorify the action.

² Not as a passage enjoining a special result for the prayāgas; for the latter merely help to bring about the general result of the darsapūrṇamāsa and have no special result of their own.

result, for it does possess such an abode—viz. the act of water being carried (in it)—with reference to which it is enjoined. So again a special fruit may be enjoined for the case of the sacrificial post being made of bilva-wood; for this latter quality likewise has an abode, viz. the sacrificial post with reference to which it is enjoined. But in the case of the quality of consisting of parṇa-wood there is no such established abode under the heading of which that quality is enjoined; and if we assumed that the sentence ('He whose guhû is made of parṇa-wood hears no evil sound') after intimating that the quality of consisting of parṇa-wood resides in the guhû is also meant to enjoin the fruit thereof, we should impute to the text the imperfection called 'split of the sentence.'—The meditations on the other hand are themselves acts, and as such capable of a special injunction; hence there is no reason why a special result should not be enjoined for those meditations which are based on sacrificial acts. The conclusion therefore is that the meditations on the udgîtha, &c., although based on sacrifices, are yet not necessary members of the latter, because they have results of their own like the use of the godohana-vessel. For this reason the authors of the Kalpa-sûtras have not represented such meditations as belonging to the sacrificial performances.

43. As in the case of the offerings, (Vāyu and Prāṇa must be held apart). This has been explained (in the Pûrva Mîmāṃsâ-sûtra).

The section of the Vâgasaneyaka which begins, 'Voice held, I shall speak' (Bṛi. Up. I, 5, 21), determines Prāṇa to be the best among the organs of the body, viz. speech and so on, and Vāyu to be the best among the Devas, viz. Agni and so on.—Similarly in the Kṛhândogya, Vāyu is affirmed to be the general absorber of the Devas, 'Vāyu indeed is the absorber' (IV, 3, 1), while Prāṇa is said to be the general absorber of the organs of the body, 'Breath indeed is the absorber' (IV, 3, 3).—The doubt here arises whether Vāyu and Prāṇa are to be conceived as separate or not.

As non-separate, the pûrvapakshin maintains; because in

their true nature they do not differ. And as their true nature does not differ they must not be meditated upon separately. Another scriptural passage also declares that the organs of the body and the divinities are non-different in their true nature, 'Agni having become speech entered the mouth,' &c. (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 2, 4). Moreover, the passage *Bri. Up. I, 5, 13*, 'These are all alike, all endless,' declares that the powers of the Devas constitute the Self of the organs of the body. And various other passages also testify to the fundamental non-difference of the two. In some places we have even a direct identification of the two, 'What *Prâna* is, that is *Vâyu*.' And in the sloka concluding the *Vâgasaneyaka*-chapter to which the passage under discussion belongs, the text refers to *prâna* only ('He verily rises from the breath and sets in the breath'), and thus shows the breath to be one with the previously mentioned *Vâyu*. This conclusion is moreover confirmed by the fact that the observance enjoined in the end refers to *prâna* only, 'Therefore let a man perform one observance only, let him breathe up and let him breathe down' (*Bri. Up. I, 5, 23*). Similarly, the *Khândogya*-passage, IV, 3, 6, 'One god swallowed the four great ones,' intimates that there is one absorber only, and does not say that one god is the absorber of the one set of four, and another the absorber of the other set of four.—From all this it follows that *Vâyu* and *Prâna* are to be conceived as one.

To this we make the following reply. *Vâyu* and *Prâna* are to be conceived separately, because the text teaches them in separation. The separate instruction given by the text with reference to the organs and the Devas for the purposes of meditation would be meaningless if the meditations were not held apart.—But the *pûrvapakshin* maintains that owing to the essential non-difference of *Vâyu* and *Prâna* the meditations are not to be separated!—Although, we reply, there may be non-difference of true nature, yet there may be difference of condition giving rise to difference of instruction, and, through the latter, to difference of meditation. And although the introduction of the concluding sloka may be accounted for on the ground of its

showing the fundamental non-difference of the two, it yet has no power to sublimate the previously declared difference of the objects of meditation. Moreover, the text institutes a comparison between Vāyu and Prāṇa, which again shows that the two are different, 'And as it was with the central breath among the breaths, so it was with Vāyu, the wind among those deities' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 5, 22*).—This explains also the mention made of the observance (*I, 5, 23*). The word 'only' (in 'Let a man perform one observance only') has the purpose of establishing the observance with regard to Prāṇa, by sublimating the observances with regard to speech and so on, regarding which the text had remarked previously that they were disturbed by Death ('Death having become weariness took them'), and does not by any means aim at sublimating the observance with regard to Vāyu; for the section beginning 'Next follows the consideration of the observances' distinctly asserts that the observances of Vāyu and Prāṇa were equally unbroken.—Moreover, the text, after having said, 'Let a man perform one observance only,' declares in the end that the fruit of that observance is the obtaining of (union with) Vāyu ('Then he obtains through it union and oneness with that deity'), and thus shows that the observance with regard to Vāyu is not to be considered as sublimated. That by that 'deity' we have to understand Vāyu, we conclude from the circumstance that what the worshipper wishes to obtain is non-limitation of his Self¹, and that previously the term 'deity' had been applied to Vāyu, 'Vāyu is the deity that never sets.'—Analogously in the *Khândogya*-passage the text represents Vāyu and Prāṇa as different, 'These are the two absorbers, Vāyu among the Devas, Prāṇa among the prāṇas,' and in the concluding paragraph also (*IV, 3, 8*) refers to them as distinct, 'These five and the other five make ten, and that is the *Kṛita*.'—For these reasons Vāyu and Prāṇa are to be conceived as different.

The Sūtra compares the case under discussion to a

¹ Agnyādīn apekshyānavakṣhino devo vāyus te tu tenaivāvakṣhinnā iti samvargaguno vāyur anavakṣhinnā devatā. Ān. Gi.

parallel one from the karmakāṇḍa, by means of the clause, 'as in the case of the offerings.' With regard to the ishṛī comprising three sacrificial cakes, which is enjoined in the passage, Taitt. Samh. II, 3, 6, 'A puroḍāsa on eleven potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the over-ruler, to Indra the self-ruler,' it might be supposed that the three cakes are to be offered together because they are offered to one and the same Indra, and because the concluding sentence says, 'conveying to all (gods) he cuts off to preclude purposelessness.' But as the attributes (viz. 'ruler' and so on) differ, and as scripture enjoins that the yāgyā and anuvākyāmantras are to exchange places with regard to the different cakes¹, the divinity is each time a different one according to the address, and from this it follows that the three offerings also are separate.—Thus, in the case under discussion, Vāyu and Prāṇa, although fundamentally non-different, are to be held apart as objects of meditation, and we have therefore to do with two separate meditations.—This is explained in the Saṅkarsha-kāṇḍa, 'The divinities are separate on account of their being cognized thus.'

But while in the case of the three puroḍāsas the difference of material and divinity involves a difference on the part of the oblations, we have in the case under discussion to do with one vidyā only; for that the text enjoins one vidyā only we conclude from the introductory and concluding statements. There is contained, however, in this one vidyā a double meditative activity with regard to the bodily organs and the divinities, just as the agnihotra which is offered in the morning as well as in the evening requires a double activity. In this sense the Sūtra says, 'as in the case of the offerings.'

44. On account of the majority of indicatory marks (the fire-altars built of mind, &c. do not form elements of any act); for this (i. e. the indicatory

¹ The yāgyā-mantra of the first offering being used as anuvākyā in the second one and so on.

mark) is stronger (than the general subject-matter) ; this also (has been explained in the Pū. Mī. Sūtras).

In the Agnirahasya of the Vāgasaneyins, in the Brāhmaṇa beginning 'for in the beginning indeed this was not existent,' we read with reference to mind (manas), 'It saw thirty-six thousand shining fire-altars, belonging to itself, made of mind, built of mind.' And, further on, the text makes similar statements about other fanciful fire-altars built of speech, built of breath, built of sight, built of hearing, built of work, built of fire.—A doubt here arises whether these fire-altars built of mind and so on are connected with the act (i.e. the construction of the fire-altar made of bricks), and supplementary to it, or whether they are independent, constituting a mere vidyā.

Against the primâ facie view that those agnis are connected with the sacrificial act under whose heading the text records them, the Sūtra maintains their independence, 'on account of the majority of indicatory marks.' For we meet in that Brāhmaṇa with a number of indicatory marks confirming that those agnis constitute a mere vidyā ; cp. e.g. the following passages : 'Whatever these beings conceive in their minds, that is a means for those fire-altars,' and 'All beings always pile up those fire-altars for him who thus knows, even when he sleeps,' and so on¹.—And that indicatory marks (līṅga) are of greater force than the leading subject-matter (prakaraṇa) has been explained in the Pūrva Mimāṃsā (III, 3, 14).

45. (The agni built of mind, &c.) is a particular form of the preceding one (i.e. the agni built of bricks), on account of the leading subject-matter ; it is (part of) the act ; as in the case of the mānasa cup.

Your supposition, the pūrvapakshin objects, as to those fire-altars being not supplementary to the sacrificial act,

¹ For something which forms part of an act cannot be brought about by something so indefinite as 'whatever these beings conceive in their minds,' nor can it be accomplished indifferently at any time by any beings.

but altogether independent of it, is untenable. The influence of the leading subject-matter rather compels us to conclude that the instruction given by the text about the agni made of mind and so on, enjoins some particular mode of the same agni which the preceding sections describe as the outcome of a real act¹.—But are not indicatory marks stronger than the leading subject-matter?—True in general; but indicatory marks such as those contained in the passages quoted above are by no means stronger than the general subject-matter. For as those passages are of the nature of glorifications of the fanciful fire-altars, the *līngas* (have no proving power in themselves but) merely illustrate some other matter (*viz.* the injunction to which those passages are *arthavādas*); and as they are of that nature they may, there being no other proof, be taken as mere *gunavādas*, and as such are not able to sublate the influence of the *prakaraṇa*. On the ground of the latter, therefore, all those fanciful agnis must be viewed as forming parts of the sacrificial action.

The case is analogous to that of the 'mental' (cup). On the tenth day of the Soma sacrifices occupying twelve days—which day is termed *avivākya*—a soma cup is offered mentally, the earth being viewed as the cup, the sea as the Soma and *Pragāpati* as the divinity to which the offering is made. All rites connected with that cup, *viz.* taking it up, putting it down in its place, offering the liquid in it, taking up the remaining liquid, the priests inviting one another to drink the remainder, and the drinking, all these rites the text declares to be mental only, *i.e.* to be done in thought only². Yet this mental quasi-cup, as standing under the heading of a sacrificial act, forms part of that act.—The same then holds good with regard to the quasi-agnis made of mind and so on.

46. And on account of the transfer (of particulars).

That those agnis enter into the sacrificial action follows

¹ *I.e.* of the agni made of bricks which is the outcome of the *agnikāyana*.—*Ān. Gi.* explains *vikalpavishesha* by *prakārabhedha*.

² *Cp. Tāndya Brāh. IV, 9; Taitt. Samh. VII, 3, 1.*

moreover from the fact that the text extends to them (the injunctions given about the agni made of bricks). Compare the passage, 'Thirty-six thousand shining Agnis; each one of them is as large as the previously mentioned Agni.' Such extension of injunctions is possible only where there is general equality. The text therefore by extending the determinations relative to the previous agni, i.e. the agni built of bricks, which forms a constituent element of the sacrificial action, to the fanciful agnis, intimates thereby that they also form part of the sacrificial performance.

47. But (the agnis rather constitute) a vidyâ, on account of the assertion (made by the text).

The word 'but' sets aside the pûrvapaksha.—The agnis built of mind and so on are to be viewed not as complementary to a sacrificial action, but as independent and constituting a vidyâ of their own. For the text expressly asserts that 'they are built of knowledge (vidyâ) only,' and that 'by knowledge they are built for him who thus knows.'

48. And because (indicatory marks of that) are seen (in the text).

And that there are to be observed indicatory marks leading to the same conclusion, has already been declared in Sûtra 44.—But, under Sûtra 45, it was shown that indicatory marks unaided by other reasons cannot be admitted as proving anything, and it was consequently determined that, owing to the influence of the leading subject-matter, the Agnis form part of the sacrificial action!—To this objection the next Sûtra replies.

49. (The view that the agnis constitute an independent vidyâ) cannot be refuted, owing to the greater force of direct enunciation and so on.

Our opponent has no right to determine, on the ground of prakaraṇa, that the agnis are subordinate to the sacrificial action, and so to set aside our view according to which they are independent. For we know from the Pûrvâ Mīmāṃsâ that direct enunciation (Sruti), indicatory mark

(liṅga), and syntactical connexion (vākya) are of greater force than leading subject-matter (prakaraṇa), and all those three means of proof are seen to confirm our view of the agnis being independent. In the first place we have the direct enunciation, 'These agnis are indeed knowledge-piled only.' In the second place we have the indicatory mark supplied by the passage, 'All beings ever pile for him sleeping,' &c. And in the third place we have the sentence, 'By knowledge indeed those (agnis) are piled for him who thus knows.'

In the first of these passages the emphatical expression, 'built by knowledge only,' would be contradicted if we admitted that the agnis form part of the sacrificial action.—But may this emphatical phrase not merely have the purpose of indicating that those agnis are not to be accomplished by external means?—No, we reply, for if that were intended, it would be sufficient to glorify the fact of knowledge constituting the character of the agnis by means of the word 'knowledge-piled,' and the emphatical assertion (implied in the addition of the word 'only') would be useless. For it is the nature of such agnis to be accomplished without any external means. But, although the agnis are clearly to be accomplished without external means, yet it might be supposed that, like the mental cup, they form part of the sacrificial action, and the object of the emphatical assertion implied in 'only' is to discard that suspicion.—So likewise (to pass over to liṅga) the continuity of action implied in the passage, 'For him who thus knows whether sleeping or waking all beings always pile these agnis,' is possible only on the supposition of those agnis being independent. The case is analogous to that of the imaginary agnihotra consisting of speech and breath, with reference to which the text says at first, 'He offers his breath in his speech, he offers his speech in his breath,' and then adds, 'These two endless and immortal oblations he offers always whether waking or sleeping' (Kau. Up. II, 6).—If, on the other hand, the imaginary agnis were parts of the sacrificial action it would be impossible for them to be accomplished continually, since

the accomplishment of the sacrificial action itself occupies only a short time.—Nor may we suppose the passage (which contains the *līṅga*) to be a mere *arthavāda*-passage (in which case, as the *pūrvapakshin* avers, the *līṅga* would be unable to refute *prakaraṇa*). For in those cases where we meet with an unmistakeable injunctory passage—marked out as such by the use of the optative or imperative form—there indeed we may assume a glorificatory passage (met with in connexion with that injunctory passage) to be an *arthavāda*. In the present case, however, we observe no clear injunctory passage, and should therefore be obliged to construct one enjoining the knowledge of the various fanciful agnis, merely on the basis of the *arthavāda*-passage. But in that case the injunction can be framed only in accordance with the *arthavāda*, and as the *arthavāda* speaks of the continual building of the agnis, the latter item would have to appear in the injunction also. But, if so, it follows (as shown above) that the mental construction of those agnis constitutes an independent *vidyā* (and does not form part of the actual *agnikāyana*).—The same argumentation applies to the second *līṅga*-passage quoted above, ‘Whatever those beings conceive in their minds,’ &c.—And the sentence finally shows, by means of the clause, ‘For him who thus knows,’ that those agnis are connected with a special class of men (*viz.* those who thus know), and are therefore not to be connected with the sacrificial action.—For all these reasons the view of those agnis constituting an independent *vidyā* is preferable.

50. On account of the connexion and so on (the agnis built of mind, &c. are independent); in the same way as other cognitions are separate. And there is seen (another case of something having to be withdrawn from the leading subject-matter); this has been explained (in the *Pūva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*).

Independence has, against the general subject-matter, to be assumed for the fire-altars built of mind and so on, for that reason also that the text connects the constituent

members of the sacrificial action with activities of the mind, &c.; viz. in the passage, 'With mind only they are established, with mind only they are piled, with mind only the cups were taken, with mind the udgâtrîs praised, with mind the hotrîs recited; whatever work is done at the sacrifice, whatever sacrificial work, was done as consisting of mind, by mind only, at those fire-altars made of mind, piled by mind,' &c. For that connexion has for its result an imaginative combination (of certain mental energies with the parts of the sacrifice), and the obtainment of the parts of the sacrifice which are objects of actual perception cannot be made dependent on such imaginative combination¹. Nor must it be supposed that, because here also, as in the case of the meditation on the udgîtha, the vidyâ is connected with members of the sacrificial action, it enters into that action as a constituent part; for the statements of the text differ in the two cases. For in our case scripture does not say that we are to take some member of a sacrificial action and then to superimpose upon it such and such a name; but rather takes six and thirty thousand different energies of the mind and identifies them with the fire-altars, the cups, and so on, just as in some other place it teaches a meditation on man viewed as the sacrifice. The number given by the text is originally observed as belonging to the days of a man's life, and is then transferred to the mental energies connected therewith.—From the connexion (referred to in the Sûtra) it therefore follows that the agnis piled of mind, &c. are independent.—The clause 'and so on' (met with in the Sûtra) must be explained as comprehending 'transference' and the like as far as possible. For if the text says, 'Each of those Agnis is as great as that prior one,' it transfers the glory of the fire-altar consisting of the work (i.e. the real altar piled of bricks) to the altars consisting of knowledge and so on, and thereby

¹ Kimartham idam anubandhakaraṇam tad āha, sampad iti, upāstyartha hy anubandhas tathāpi manasā dādānām akriyāṅgatve kim āyātam tad āha, na kēti, teshām kriyāṅgatve sākshād evādhānā diprasiddher anarthikā sampad ity arthaḥ. Ân. Gi.

expresses want of regard for the work. Nor can it be said that if there is connexion (of all the agnis) with the sacrificial action, the later ones (i.e. those made of mind) may optionally be used instead of the original agnis made of bricks (as was asserted by the *pūrvapakshin* in Sūtra 45). For the later agnis are incapable of assisting the sacrificial action by means of those energies with which the original agni assists it, viz. by bearing the *āhavanīya* fire and so on.—The assertion, again, made by the *pūrvapakshin* (Sūtra 46) that 'transference' strengthens his view in so far as transference is possible only where there is equality, is already refuted by the remark that also on our view transference is possible, since the fanciful fire-altars are equal to the real fire-altar in so far as both are fire-altars.—And that direct enunciation and so on favour our conclusion has been shown.—From connexion and so on it therefore follows that the agnis piled of mind, &c. are independent.—'As in the case of the separateness of other cognitions.' As other cognitions, such as e. g. the *Sāṇḍilya-vidyā*, which have each their own particular connexion, separate themselves from works and other cognitions and are independent ; so it is in our case also.—Moreover 'there is seen' an analogous case of independence from the leading subject-matter. The offering called *aveshṭi* which is mentioned in the sacred texts under the heading of the *rāgasūya*-sacrifice, is to be taken out from that heading because it is connected with the three higher castes, while the *rāgasūya* can be offered by a member of the warrior caste only. This has been explained in the first section (i.e. in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*).

51. Not also on account of its resembling (the *mānasa* cup) (can the fires constitute parts of an action); for it is observed (on the ground of *Sruti*, &c., that they are independent); as in the case of death; for the world does not become (a fire) (because it resembles a fire in some points).

Against the allegation made by the *pūrvapakshin* that the present case is analogous to that of the *mānasa* cup, we

remark that the fire-altars made of mind and so on cannot be assumed to supplement a sacrificial action although they may resemble the *mānasa* cup, since on the ground of direct enunciation &c. they are seen to subserve the purpose of man only (not the purpose of some sacrificial action). Anything indeed may resemble anything in some point or other; but in spite of that there remains the individual dissimilarity of each thing from all other things. The case is analogous to that of death. In the passages, 'The man in that orb is death indeed' (Sat. Brā. X, 5, 2, 3), and 'Agni indeed is death' (Taitt. Samh. V, 1, 10, 3), the term 'death' is applied equally to Agni and the man in the sun; all the same the two are by no means absolutely equal. And if the text says in another place, 'This world is a fire indeed, O Gotama; the sun is its fuel,' &c. (*Kh. Up.* V, 4, 1), it does not follow from the similarity of fuel and so on that the world really is a fire. Thus also in our case.

52. And from the subsequent (*Brāhmaṇa*) it follows that being of that kind (i.e. injunction of a mere *vidyā*) (is the aim) of the text. The connexion (of the fanciful agnis with the real one) is due to the plurality (of details of the real agni which are imaginatively connected with the *vidyā*).

With regard to a subsequent *Brāhmaṇa* also, viz. the one beginning, 'That piled agni is this world indeed,' we apprehend that what is the purpose of the text is 'being of that kind,' i.e. injunction of a mere *vidyā*, not injunction of the member of a mere action. For we meet there with the following sloka, 'By knowledge they ascend there where all wishes are attained. Those skilled in works do not go there, nor those who destitute of knowledge do penance.' This verse blames mere works and praises knowledge. A former *Brāhmaṇa* also, viz. the one beginning, 'What that orb leads' (Sat. Brā. X, 5, 2, 23), concludes with a statement of the fruit of knowledge ('Immortal becomes he whose Self is death'), and thereby indicates that works are not the chief thing.—The text connects the *vidyā* (of the agnis built of

mind) with the real agni built of bricks, not because those agnis are members of the act of building the real agni, but because many of the elements of the real agni are imaginatively combined with the vidyâ.

All this establishes the conclusion that the fire-altars built of mind and so on constitute a mere vidyâ.

53. Some (maintain the non-existence) of a (separate) Self, on account of the existence (of the Self) where a body is (only).

At present we will prove the existence of a Self different from the body in order to establish thereby the qualification (of the Self) for bondage and release. For if there were no Self different from the body, there would be no room for injunctions that have the other world for their result ; nor could it be taught of anybody that Brahman is his Self.—But, an objection is raised, already in the first pâda which stands at the head of this Sâstra (i. e. the first pâda of the Pûrva Mīmāṃsâ-sûtras) there has been declared the existence of a Self which is different from the body and hence capable of enjoying the fruits taught by the Sâstra.—True, this has been declared there by the author of the bhâshya, but there is in that place no Sûtra about the existence of the Self. Here, on the other hand, the Sûtrakâra himself establishes the existence of the Self after having disposed of a preliminary objection. And from hence the teacher Sabara Svâmin has taken the matter for his discussion of the point in the chapter treating of the means of right knowledge. For the same reason the reverend Upavarsha remarks in the first tantra—where an opportunity offers itself for the discussion of the existence of the Self—‘ We will discuss this in the Sârîraka,’ and allows the matter to rest there. Here, where we are engaged in an inquiry into the pious meditations which are matter of injunction, a discussion of the existence of the Self is introduced in order to show that the whole Sâstra depends thereon.

Moreover, in the preceding adhikarana we have shown that passages may be exempted from the influence of the leading subject-matter, and that for that reason the fire-

altars built of mind and so on subserve the purpose of man (not of the sacrifice). In consequence thereof there naturally arises the question who that man is whose purposes the different fire-altars subserve, and in reply to it the existence of a Self which is separate from the body is affirmed.—The first Sûtra embodies an objection against that doctrine; according to the principle that a final refutation of objections stated in the beginning effects a stronger conviction of the truth of the doctrine whose establishment is aimed at.

Here now some materialists (*lokâyatika*), who see the Self in the body only, are of opinion that a Self separate from the body does not exist; assume that consciousness (*kāitanya*), although not observed in earth and the other external elements—either single or combined—may yet appear in them when transformed into the shape of a body, so that consciousness springs from them; and thus maintain that knowledge is analogous to intoxicating quality (which arises when certain materials are mixed in certain proportions), and that man is only a body qualified by consciousness. There is thus, according to them, no Self separate from the body and capable of going to the heavenly world or obtaining release, through which consciousness is in the body; but the body alone is what is conscious, is the Self. For this assertion they allege the reason stated in the Sûtra, 'On account of its existence where a body is.' For wherever something exists if some other thing exists, and does not exist if that other thing does not exist, we determine the former thing to be a mere quality of the latter; light and heat, e. g. we determine to be qualities of fire. And as life, movement, consciousness, remembrance and so on—which by the upholders of an independent Self are considered qualities of that Self—are observed only within bodies and not outside bodies, and as an abode of those qualities, different from the body, cannot be proved, it follows that they must be qualities of the body only. The Self therefore is not different from the body.—To this conclusion the next Sûtra replies.

54. There is separation (of the Self from the

body) because its existence does not depend on the existence of that (viz. the body), but there is not (non-separation); as in the case of perceptive consciousness.

The assertion that the Self is not separate from the body cannot be maintained. The Self rather must be something separate from the body, 'because the existence (of the Self) does not depend on the existence of that (i.e. the body).' For if from the circumstance that they are where the body is you conclude that the qualities of the Self are qualities of the body, you also must conclude from the fact that they are not where the body is that they are not qualities of the body, because thereby they show themselves to be different in character from the qualities of the body. Now the (real) qualities of the body, such as form and so on, may be viewed as existing as long as the body exists; life, movement, &c., on the other hand, do not exist even when the body exists, viz. in the state of death. The qualities of the body, again, such as form and so on, are perceived by others; not so the qualities of the Self, such as consciousness, remembrance, and so on. Moreover, we can indeed ascertain the presence of those latter qualities as long as the body exists in the state of life, but we cannot ascertain their non-existence when the body does not exist; for it is possible that even after this body has died the qualities of the Self should continue to exist by passing over into another body. The opposite opinion is thus precluded also for the reason of its being a mere hypothesis.—We further must question our opponent as to the nature of that consciousness which he assumes to spring from the elements; for the materialists do not admit the existence of anything but the four elements. Should he say that consciousness is the perception of the elements and what springs from the elements, we remark that in that case the elements and their products are objects of consciousness and that hence the latter cannot be a quality of them, as it is contradictory that anything should act on itself. Fire is hot indeed but does not burn itself, and the acrobat, well

trained as he may be, cannot mount on his own shoulders. As little could consciousness, if it were a mere quality of the elements and their products, render them objects of itself. For form and other (undoubted) qualities do not make their own colour or the colour of something else their objects; the elements and their products, on the other hand, whether external or belonging to the Self (the organism) are rendered objects by consciousness. Hence in the same way as we admit the existence of that perceptive consciousness which has the material elements and their products for its objects, we also must admit the separateness of that consciousness from the elements. And as consciousness constitutes the character of our Self, the Self must be distinct from the body. That consciousness is permanent, follows from the uniformity of its character (and we therefore may conclude that the conscious Self is permanent also; as also follows) from the fact that the Self, although connected with a different state, recognises itself as the conscious agent—a recognition expressed in judgments such as ‘I saw this,’—and from the fact of remembrance and so on being possible¹.

The argumentation that consciousness is an attribute of the body because it is where a body is, is already refuted by the reasons stated above. Moreover, perceptive consciousness takes place where there are certain auxiliaries such as lamps and the like, and does not take place where those are absent, without its following therefrom that perception is an attribute of the lamp or the like. Analogously

¹ The ‘nityatvam ka’ of the text might perhaps be connected directly with ‘âtmano.’ Ânanda Giri on the entire passage: Bhavatu tarhi bhûtebhyo • tiriktâ svâtantryopalabdhis tathâpi katham âtmasiddhis tatrâha upalabdhitî, ksharikatvât tasyâ nityâtmarûpatvam ayuktam ity âraṅkyâgânatas tadbhedâbhâvâd vishayoparâgât tadbhânâd asâv eva nityopalabdhir ity âha nityatvam keti, kim ka sthûladehâbhimânâhînasya svapne pratyabhigñânâd atiriktâtma-siddhir ity âha aham iti, svapne sthûladehântarasyaivopalabdhritvam ity âraṅkyâha smṛityâditi, upalabdhri-smartor bhedo saty anyopalabdhe • nyasya smṛtir ikkâdayas ka neti na tayoṛ anyatety arthaḥ.

the fact that perception takes place where there is a body, and does not take place where there is none, does not imply that it is an attribute of the body ; for like lamps and so on the body may be used (by the Self) as a mere auxiliary. Nor is it even true that the body is absolutely required as an auxiliary of perception ; for in the state of dream we have manifold perceptions while the body lies motionless.—The view of the Self being something separate from the body is therefore free from all objections.

55. But the (meditations) connected with members (of sacrificial acts are) not (restricted) to (particular) Sākhās, according to the Veda (to which they belong).

The above occasional discussion being terminated, we return to the discussion of the matter in hand.—We meet in the different Sākhās of each Veda with injunctions of vidyās connected with certain members of sacrificial acts, such as the udgītha and the like. Cp. e.g. ‘Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgītha’ (*Kṛ. Up. I, 1, 1*) ; ‘Let a man meditate on the fivefold Sāman as the five worlds’ (*Kṛ. Up. II, 2, 1*) ; ‘People say : “Hymns, hymns !” the hymn is truly this earth’ (*Ait. Ār. II, 1, 2, 1*) ; ‘The piled up fire-altar truly is this world’ (*Sat. Brā. X, 5, 4. 1*). A doubt here arises whether the vidyās are enjoined with reference to the udgītha and so on as belonging to a certain Sākhā only or as belonging to all Sākhās. The doubt is raised on the supposition that the udgītha and so on differ in the different Sākhās because the accents, &c. differ.

Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that the vidyās are enjoined only with reference to the udgītha and so on which belong to the particular Sākhā (to which the vidyā belongs).—Why?—On account of proximity. For as such general injunctions as ‘Let a man meditate on the udgītha’ are in need of a specification, and as this need is satisfied by the specifications given in the same Sākhā which stand in immediate proximity, there is no reason for passing over that Sākhā and having recourse to specifications enjoined

in other Sâkhâs. Hence the vidyâs are to be held apart, according to the Sâkhâs to which they belong.

To this the Sûtra replies 'but those connected with members,' &c.—The word 'but' discards the *primâ facie* view. The meditations are not restricted to their own Sâkhâs according to the Veda to which they belong, but are valid for all Sâkhâs.—Why?—Because the direct statements of the texts about the udgîtha and so on enounce no specification. For to such general injunctions as 'Let a man meditate on the udgîtha'—which say nothing about specifications—violence would be done, if on the ground of proximity we restricted them to something special belonging to its own Sâkhâ, and that would be objectionable because direct statement has greater weight than proximity. There is, on the other hand, no reason why the vidyâ should not be of general reference. We therefore conclude that, although the Sâkhâs differ as to accents and the like, the vidyâs mentioned refer to the udgîtha and so on belonging to all Sâkhâs, because the text speaks only of the udgîtha and so on in general.

56. Or else there is no contradiction (implied in our opinion) ; as in the case of mantras and the like.

Or else we may put the matter as follows. There is no reason whatever to suspect a contradiction if we declare certain vidyâs enjoined in one Sâkhâ to be valid for the udgîtha and so on belonging to other Sâkhâs also ; for there is no more room for contradiction than in the case of mantras. We observe that mantras, acts, and qualities of acts which are enjoined in one Sâkhâ are taken over by other Sâkhâs also. So e.g. the members of certain Yagur-veda Sâkhâs do not exhibit in their text the mantra, 'Thou art the kuṣaru¹,' which accompanies the taking of the stone (with which the rice-grains are ground) ; all the same we meet in their text with the following injunction of application, 'Thou art the cock, with this mantra he takes the stone ; or else with the mantra, Thou art the kuṣaru.'

¹ Maitrâyaṇīya Saṃhitâ I, 1, 6.

Again, the text of some Sākhā does not contain a direct injunction of the five offerings called prayāgas which are made to the fuel and so on, but it contains the injunction of secondary matters connected with the prayāgas, viz. in the passage, 'the seasons indeed are the prayāgas; they are to be offered in one and the same spot¹.'—Again, the text of some Sākhā does not contain an injunction as to the species of the animal to be sacrificed to Agnīshomau—such as would be 'a he-goat is sacrificed to Agnīshomau²;'—but in the same Sākhā we meet with a mantra which contains the required specification, 'Hotri, recite the anuvākyā, for the fat of the omentum of the he-goat³.' Similarly mantras enjoined in one Veda only, such as 'O Agni, promote the hautra, promote the sacrifice,' are seen to be taken over into other Vedas also. Another example (of the transference of mantras) is supplied by the hymn, 'He who as soon as born showed himself intelligent,' &c. (*Rik. Samh.* II, 12), which although read in the text of the Bahvrikas is employed in the Taittirīya Veda also, according to Taitt. Samh. VII, 5, 5, 2, 'The Sāganiya hymn is to be recited.'—Just as, therefore, the members of sacrificial actions on which certain vidyās rest are valid everywhere, so the vidyās themselves also which rest on those members are valid for all Sākhās and Vedas.

57. There is pre-eminence of the (meditation on) plenitude (i.e. Agni Vaisvānara in his aggregate form), as in the case of sacrifices; for thus scripture shows.

In the legend beginning 'Prākīnasāla Aupamanyava,' the text speaks of meditations on Vaisvānara in his dis-

¹ As this passage states the number of the prayāgas (viz. five, which is the number of the seasons) and other secondary points, we conclude that the injunction of the offering of the prayāgas, which is given in other Sākhās, is valid also for the Sākhā referred to in the text (the Maitrāyaṇīyas, according to the commentators).

² But only says 'they offer an animal to Agnīshomau.'

³ Wherefrom we infer that not any animal may be offered to Agnīshomau, but only a he-goat.

tributed as well as his aggregate condition. References to him in his distributed state are made in the passage, 'Aupamanyava, whom do you meditate on as the Self? He replied : Heaven only, venerable king. He said : The Self which you meditate on is the Vaisvânara Self called Sutegas ;' and in the following passages (*Kh. Up. V, 12-17*). A meditation on him in his aggregate state, on the other hand, is referred to in the passage (*V, 18*), 'Of that Vaisvânara Self the head is Sutegas, the eye Visvarûpa, the breath *Prithagvartman*, the trunk *Bahula*, the bladder *Rayi*, the feet the earth,' &c.—A doubt here arises whether the text intimates a meditation on Vaisvânara in both his forms or only in his aggregate form.

The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that we have to do with meditations on Vaisvânara in his distributed form, firstly, because the text exhibits a special verb, viz. 'you meditate on,' with reference to each of the limbs, Sutegas and so on ; and secondly because the text states special fruits (connected with each special meditation) in the passage, 'Therefore every kind of Soma libation is seen in your house,' and the later similar passages.

To this we make the following reply. We must suppose that the entire section aims at intimating 'the pre-eminence,' i. e. at intimating as its pre-eminent subject, a meditation on 'plenitude,' i. e. on Vaisvânara in his aggregate state, who comprises within himself a plurality of things ; not a number of special meditations on the limbs of Vaisvânara. 'As in the case of sacrifices.' In the same way as the Vedic texts referring to sacrifices such as the *darsapûrnamâsa* aim at enjoining the performance of the entire sacrifice only, i. e. of the chief sacrificial action together with its members—and not in addition the performance of single subordinate members such as the *prayâgas*, nor again the performance of the chief action together with some of its subordinate members ; so it is here also.—But whence do you know that 'plenitude' is the pre-eminent topic of the passage?—It is shown by scripture, we reply, since we apprehend that the entire section forms a connected whole. For on examining the connexion of

the parts we find that the entire section has for its subject the knowledge of Vaisvānara. The text at first informs us that six *Rīshis*—*Prāñinasāla*, &c., up to *Uddālaka*—being unable to reach a firm foundation in the knowledge of Vaisvānara, went to the king *Asvapati Kaikeya*; goes on to mention the object of each *Rīshi*'s meditation, viz. the sky and so on; determines that the sky and so on are only the head and so on of Vaisvānara—in the passage 'he said: that is but the head of the Self,' and the later similar passages;—and thereupon rejects all meditations on Vaisvānara in his distributed form, in the passage, 'Your head would have fallen if you had not come to me,' and so on. Finally having discarded all distributed meditation it turns to the meditation on the aggregate Vaisvānara and declares that all results rest on him only, 'he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selves.'—That the text mentions special fruits for the special meditations on *Sutegas* and so on we have, in accordance with our view, to explain as meaning that the results of the subordinate meditations are to be connected in their aggregate with the principal meditation. And that the text exhibits a special verb—'you do meditate'—in connexion with each member is not meant to enjoin special meditations on those members, but merely to make additional remarks about something which has another purpose (i. e. about the meditation on the aggregate Vaisvānara).—For all these reasons the view according to which the text enjoins a meditation on the aggregate Vaisvānara only is preferable.

Some commentators here establish the conclusion that the meditation on the aggregate Vaisvānara is the preferable alternative, but assume, on the ground of the *Sūtra* employing the term 'pre-eminence' only, that the *Sūtra-kāra* allows also the alternative of distributed meditation. But this is inadmissible, since it is improper to assume a 'split of the sentence' (i. e. to ascribe to a passage a double meaning), as long as the passage may be understood as having one meaning only. Their interpretation, moreover, contradicts those passages which expressly blame distributed meditations; such as 'Thy head would have

fallen.' And as the conclusion of the section clearly intimates a meditation on the aggregate Vaisvānara, the negation of such meditation could not be maintained as pūrvapaksha¹. The term 'pre-eminence' which the Sūtra employs may moreover be explained as meaning (not mere preferability, but exclusive) authoritativeness.

58. (The vidyās are) separate, on account of the difference of words and the like.

In the preceding adhikaraṇa we have arrived at the conclusion that a meditation on Vaisvānara as a whole is the pre-eminent meaning of the text, although special results are stated for meditations on Sutejas and so on. On the ground of this it may be presumed that other meditations also which are enjoined by separate scriptural texts have to be combined into more general meditations. Moreover, we cannot acknowledge a separation of vidyās (acts of cognition; meditations) as long as the object of cognition is the same; for the object constitutes the character of a cognition in the same way as the material offered and the divinity to which the offering is made constitute the character of a sacrifice. Now we understand that the Lord forms the only object of cognition in a number of scriptural passages, although the latter are separate in enunciation; cp. e.g. 'He consisting of mind, whose body is prāṇa' (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 2*); 'Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha' (*Kh. Up. IV, 10, 5*); 'He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 3*). Analogously one and the same Prāṇa is referred to in different texts; cp. 'Prāṇa indeed is the end of all' (*Kh. Up. IV, 3, 3*); 'Prāṇa indeed is the oldest and the best' (*Kh. Up. V, 1, 1*); 'Prāṇa is father, Prāṇa is mother' (*Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1*). And from the unity of the object of cognition there follows unity of cognition. Nor

¹ Yadobhayatropāstisiddhāntas tadā vyastopāstir evātra samastopāstir eva vā pūrvapakshaḥ syān nādyā ity āha, spashṇe kēti, dvitīyas ka tatrāyukto vākyopakramasthavyastopāstidhivirodhāt. Ān. Gi.

can it be said that, on this view, the separateness of the different scriptural statements would be purposeless, since each text serves to set forth other qualities (of the one *pradhāna* which is their common subject). Hence the different qualities which are enjoined in one's own and in other *Sākhās*, and which all belong to one object of knowledge, must be combined so that a totality of cognition may be effected.

To this conclusion we reply, 'Separate,' &c. Although the object of cognition is one, such cognitions must be considered as separate 'on account of the difference of words and the like.'—For the text exhibits a difference of words such as 'he knows,' 'let him meditate,' 'let him form the idea' (cp. *Kh. Up.* III, 14, 1). And difference of terms is acknowledged as a reason of difference of acts, according to *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* II, 2, 1.—The clause 'and the like' in the *Sūtra* intimates that also qualities and so on may be employed, according to circumstances, as reasons for the separateness of acts.—But, an objection is raised, from passages such as 'he knows' and so on we indeed apprehend a difference of words, but not a difference of sense such as we apprehend when meeting with such clauses as 'he sacrifices' and the like (*yagate, guhoti, dadāti*). For all these words (*viz. veda, upāsīta, &c.*) denote one thing only, *viz.* a certain activity of the mind, and another meaning is not possible in their case¹. How then does difference of *vidyā* follow from difference of words?—This objection is without force, we reply; for although all those words equally denote a certain activity of the mind only, yet a difference of *vidyā* may result from a difference of connexion. The Lord indeed is the only object of meditation in the passages quoted, but according to its general purport each passage teaches different qualities of the Lord; and similarly, although one and the same *Prāṇa* is the object of meditation in the other series

¹ *Vedopāśitetyādisabdānām kvāṅig gñānam kvāṅid dhyānam ity arthabhedam āśaṅkya gñānasyāvidheyatvād vidhīyamānam upāśanam evety āha arthāntareti. Ān. Gi.*

of passages, yet one of his qualities has to be meditated upon in one place and another in another place. From difference of connexion there thus follows difference of injunction, and from the latter we apprehend the separateness of the vidyās. Nor can it be maintained (as the pūrvapakshin did) that one of those injunctions is the injunction of the vidyā itself, while the others enjoin mere qualities; for there is no determining reason (as to which is the vidyā-vidhi and which the guṇavidhis), and as in each passage more than one quality are mentioned it is impossible that those passages should enjoin qualities with reference to a vidyā established elsewhere¹. Nor should, in the case of the pūrvapakshin's view being the true one, the qualities which are common to several passages, such as 'having true wishes,' be repeated more than once. Nor can the different sections be combined into one syntactical whole, because in each one a certain kind of meditation is enjoined on those who have a certain wish, whence we understand that the passage is complete in itself². Nor is there in the present case an additional injunction of a meditation on something whole—such as there is in the case of the cognition of the Vaisvānara—owing to the force of which the meditations on the single parts which are contained in each section would combine themselves into a whole. And if on the ground of the object of cognition being one we should admit unity of vidyā without any restriction, we should thereby admit an altogether impossible combination of all qualities (mentioned anywhere in the Upanishads). The Sūtra therefore rightly declares the separateness of the vidyās.—The present adhikāraṇa being thus settled, the first Sūtra of the pāda has now to be considered³.

¹ For to enjoin in one passage several qualities—none of which is established already—would involve an objectionable vākyabheda.

² A sentence is to be combined with another one into a larger whole only if the sentences are not complete in themselves but evince an ākaṅkshā, a desire of complementation.

³ I.e. the present adhikāraṇa ought in reality to head the entire pāda.

59. There is (restriction to) option (between the vidyās), on account of their having non-differing results.

The difference of the vidyās having been determined, we now enter on an inquiry whether, according to one's liking, there should be cumulation of the different vidyās or option between them; or else restriction to an optional proceeding (to the exclusion of cumulation). For restriction to cumulation (which might be mentioned as a third alternative) there is no reason, because the separation of the vidyās has been established.—But we observe that in the case of the sacrifices, agnihotra, darsapûrnamâsa and so on, there is restriction to cumulation (i. e. that those sacrifices have all of them to be performed, not optionally one or the other) although they are different from each other.—True; but the reason for the obligatory cumulation of those sacrifices lies therein that scripture teaches them to be of absolute obligation. No scriptural passage, on the other hand, teaches the absolute obligatoriness of the vidyās, and it cannot therefore be a rule that they must be cumulated.—Nor can it be a rule that there must be option between them, because a person entitled to one vidyâ cannot be excluded from another vidyâ. It therefore only remains to conclude that one may proceed as one likes.—But—an objection is raised—we must rather conclude that option between them is the rule, because their fruits are non-different. For vidyās such as 'He who consists of mind, whose body is prâṇa;' 'Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha;' 'He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true,' have all of them equally the obtaining of the Lord for their fruit.—This does not affect our conclusion; for we see that it is allowed to proceed as one likes also with regard to certain sacrificial acts which are the means of obtaining the heavenly world, and thus have all of them the same result. It therefore remains a settled conclusion that in the case of vidyās one may proceed as one likes.

To this we reply as follows. There must be option between the vidyās, not cumulation, because they have the

same fruit. For the fruit of all of them is the intuition of the object meditated upon, and when this object, e.g. the Lord, has once been intuited through one meditation a second meditation would be purposeless. It would, moreover, be impossible even to effect an intuition through the cumulation of several meditations, since that would cause distraction of attention. And that the fruit of a vidyâ is to be effected through intuition various scriptural passages declare; cp. *Kh. Up.* III, 14, 4, 'He who has this faith and no doubt;' *Bri. Up.* IV, 1, 3, 'Having become a god he goes to the gods,' and others. Also *Smṛiti*-passages such as *Bha. Gîtâ* VIII, 6, and others.—One therefore has to select one of those vidyâs the fruit of which is the same, and to remain intent on it until, through the intuition of the object to be meditated upon, the fruit of the vidyâ is obtained.

60. But (vidyâs) connected with wishes may, according to one's liking, be cumulated or not; on account of the absence of the former reason.

The above Sûtra supplies a counter-instance to the preceding Sûtra.—We have, on the other hand, vidyâs connected with definite wishes; as e.g. *Kh. Up.* III, 15, 2, 'He who knows that the wind is the child of the regions never weeps for his sons;' *Kh. Up.* VII, 1, 5, 'He who meditates on name as Brahman, walks at will as far as name reaches.' In these vidyâs which, like actions, effect their own special results by means of their 'unseen' Self, there is no reference to any intuition, and one therefore may, according to one's liking, either cumulate them or not cumulate them; 'on account of the absence of the former reason,' i.e. because there is not the reason for option which was stated in the preceding Sûtra.

61. With the (meditations on) members (of sacrificial acts) it is as with their abodes.

Are those meditations—enjoined in the three Vedas—which rest on members of sacrificial actions such as the

udgītha to be superadded to each other, or may we proceed with regard to them as we like?—To this doubt the Sūtra replies, 'it is according to the abodes.' As the abiding-places of those meditations, viz. the Stotra and so on, are combined (for the performance of the sacrifice), so those meditations also. For a meditation is subject to what it rests on.

62. And on account of the teaching.

As the Stotra and the other members of the sacrifice on which the meditations under discussion rest are taught in the three Vedas, so also the meditations resting on them. The meaning of this remark is that also as far as the mode of information is concerned there is no difference between the members of a sacrificial act and the meditations referring to them.

63. On account of the rectification.

The passage, 'From the seat of the Hotri he sets right any mistake committed in the udgītha' (*Kh. Up. I, 5, 5*), declares that, owing to the might of the meditation on the unity of *praṇava* and udgītha, the Hotri sets right any mistake he may commit in his work, by means of the work of the Hotri.

Now, as a meditation mentioned in one Veda is connected (with what is mentioned in another Veda) in the same way as a thing mentioned in another Veda, the above passage suggests the conclusion that all meditations on members of sacrificial acts—in whatever Veda they may be mentioned—have to be combined¹.

64. And because the text states a quality (of the vidyā) to be common (to the three Vedas).

The text states that the syllable Om which is a quality,

¹ A 'thing' belonging to the *Rig-veda*, viz. the *praṇava*, is, according to the *Khândogya*-passage, connected with the *Sâma-veda* meditation on the udgītha. Hence meditations also which belong to different Vedas may be combined; for there is no difference between them and things as far as connexion is concerned.

i.e. the abode of a meditation, is common to the three Vedas, 'By that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds. With Om the Adhvaryu gives orders, with Om the Hotṛi recites, with Om the Udgâṭṛi sings.' This suggests that, as the abode of the vidyâ (viz. the *Omkâra*) is common, the vidyâs which abide in it are common also.—Or else the Sûtra may be explained as follows. If the udgîtha and so on, which are matters qualifying the sacrificial action, were not all of them common to all sacrificial performances, the vidyâs resting on them would not go together. But the scriptural passages which teach the sacrificial performances and extend over all subordinate matters, state that the udgîtha and so on are common to all performances. As thus the abodes of the vidyâs go together, the vidyâs abiding in them go together likewise.

65. (The meditations on members of sacrificial actions are) rather not (to be combined), as the text does not state their going together.

The words 'rather not' discard the pûrvapaksha. The meditations resting on members of actions are not to be treated like what they rest on, because scripture does not state their going together. Scripture actually states the going together of the Stotras and other subordinate members of sacrificial action which are enjoined in the three Vedas; cp. passages such as 'After the taking of the graha or the raising of the *kamasa* he performs the Stotra;' 'After the Stotra he recites;' 'Prastotṛi sing the Sâman;' 'Hotṛi recite the Yâgyâ for this;' and so on. But, on the other hand, there are no analogous texts expressly teaching the going together of the meditations.—But the going together of the meditations is established by those texts which intimate the successive performance of the different constituent members of a sacrifice!—By no means, we reply. The meditations subserve the end of man, while the texts referred to by you establish only the going together of the udgîtha and the like which subserve the purpose of the sacrifice. That the meditations on the udgîtha and so on—although resting on

members of sacrificial acts—yet subserve the end of man only in the same way as the godohana vessel does, we have already explained under III, 3, 42.—And this very difference between members of sacrificial action and the meditations resting on them, viz. that the former subserve the purpose of the sacrifice while the latter subserve the end of man, is founded on the express teaching of scripture¹.—And the further two indicatory marks (pointed out by the pûrvapakshin in Sûtras 63 and 64) supply no reason for the going together of the meditations, because no direct scriptural statement may be constructed from them. Nor² does the fact that in each sacrificial performance all foundations of meditations are comprised, enable us to conclude that the meditations founded on them are to be combined also; for the meditations are not caused by what they rest on. The meditations, as resting on their foundations, would, it may be admitted, not exist if those foundations did not exist. But therefrom it does not follow that the going together of the foundations implies a necessary going together of the meditations; for as to this we have no direct scriptural statement.—From all this it results that the meditations may be performed according to one's liking.

66. And because (scripture) shows it.

Scripture moreover shows that the meditations do not go together, viz. in the following passage, 'A Brahman priest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the priests' (*Kh. Up. IV, 17, 10*). For if all meditations were to be combined, all priests would know them all, and the text could not specially announce that the Brahman priest possessing a certain knowledge thereby saves the others.—The meditations may therefore, according to one's liking, be either combined or optionally employed.

¹ A remark refuting the averment made in Sûtra 62.

² And this is meant to refute the second interpretation given of Sûtra 64.

FOURTH PĀDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF !

1. The purpose of man (is effected) thence (i. e. through the mere knowledge of Brahman), thus Bādarāyaṇa opines.

The Sūtrakāra at present enters on an inquiry whether the knowledge of the Self which is derived from the Upanishads, is connected with works through him who is entitled to perform the works¹, or is an independent means to accomplish the purpose of man. He begins by stating the final view in the above Sūtra, 'Thence' &c. The teacher Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that thence, i. e. through the independent knowledge of Brahman enjoined in the Vedānta-texts, the purpose of man is effected.—Whence is this known?—'From scripture,' which exhibits passages such as the following: 'He who knows the Self overcomes grief' (*Kh. Up.* III, 4, 1); 'He who knows that highest Brahman becomes even Brahman' (*Mu. Up.* III, 2, 9); 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest' (*Taitt. Up.* II, 1); 'For him who has a teacher there is delay only so long as he is not delivered; then he will be perfect' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 14, 2); 'He who has searched out and understands the Self which is free from sin, &c. &c., obtains all worlds and all desires' (*Kh. Up.* VII, 7, 1); 'The Self is to be seen' &c. up to 'Thus far goes immortality' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 5, 6–15). These and similar texts declare that mere knowledge effects the purpose of man.—Against this the opponent raises his voice as follows.

2. On account of (the Self) standing in a supplementary relation (to action), (the statements as to

¹ The pūrvapakshin (see next Sūtra) maintains that the knowledge of the Self is subordinate to (sacrificial) action through the mediation of the agent, i. e. in so far as it imparts to the agent a certain qualification.

the fruits of the knowledge of the Self) are arthavādas, as in other cases, thus Gaimini opines.

As the Self, in consequence of its being the agent, stands in a supplementary relation to action, the knowledge of the Self also is connected with action through the mediation of its object, analogously to the case of the sprinkling of the rice-grains with water; hence as the purpose of the knowledge of the Self is understood thereby, the statements of the text about the fruits of that knowledge are mere arthavādas. Such is the opinion of the teacher Gaimini¹. The case is analogous to that of other textual statements as to the fruits of certain materials, *samskāras* and works; which statements have likewise to be understood as arthavādas. Cp. the passage, 'He whose sacrificial ladle is made of *parṇa*-wood hears no evil sound;' 'By anointing his eye he wards off the eye of the enemy;' 'By making the *prayāga* and *anuyāga*-oblations he makes an armour for the sacrifice, an armour for the sacrificer so that he overcomes his enemies².'—But how can it be supposed that

¹ The contention of the *pūrvapakshin*—Gaimini—is that the knowledge of the Self has no independent fruit of its own, because it stands in a subordinate relation to sacrificial action. This relation is mediated by the Self—the object of knowledge—which is the agent in all action, and therefore itself stands in a subordinate relation to action. By learning that his Self will outlive the body the agent becomes qualified for actions, the fruit of which will only appear after death. The qualification the Self thus acquires is analogous to that which the rice-grains acquire by being sprinkled with water; for only through this latter act of ceremonial modification (or purification, *samskāra*) they become fit to be used in the sacrifice.—As the knowledge of the Self thus has no independent position, it cannot have an independent fruit of its own, and consequently the passages which state such fruits cannot be taken as 'injunctions of fruits,' but merely as arthavādas, making some additional statement about the fruit of the sacrificial actions to which the knowledge of the Self is auxiliary.

² The material, i. e. the ladle made of *parṇa*-wood, is auxiliary to the sacrifice, and the fruit which the text ascribes to it (*viz.* hearing no evil sound) therefore has to be viewed as a fruit of

the knowledge of the Self which the text does not exhibit under any special heading can enter into sacrificial action as a subordinate member, without the presence of any of the means of proof—general subject-matter and so on—which determine such subordinate relation?—The *pūrvapakshin* may reply that the knowledge of the Self enters into sacrificial action through the mediation of the agent, on the ground of the means of proof called *vākya* (sentence; syntactical unity)¹. But this we deny because in the present case 'sentence' has no force to teach the application (of the knowledge of the Self to the sacrifices, as a subordinate member of the latter). Things which the text states under no particular heading may indeed be connected with the sacrifice on the ground of 'sentence,' through some intermediate link which is not of too wide an application²; but the agent is an intermediate link of too wide an application, since it is common to all action whether worldly or based on the Veda. The agent cannot therefore be used as a mediating link to establish the connexion of the knowledge of the Self with the sacrifice.—Your objection is not valid, the *pūrvapakshin* replies, since the knowledge of a Self different from the body is of no use anywhere but in works based on the Veda. For such knowledge is of no use in worldly works, in all of which the activity may be shown to be guided by visible purposes; with reference to Vedic works, on the other hand, whose fruits manifest themselves only after the death of this body no activity would be possible

the entire sacrifice. Analogously in the case of the *samskāra*—the anointing—which fits the sacrificer for performing the sacrifice, and in the case of the *prayāgas* and *anuyāgas* which are merely subordinate members of the *darsapūṇamāsa*.

¹ The entire Veda constituting an extended syntactical whole, in which the agent is the same.

² Thus the quality of being made of *parṇa*-wood is connected with the sacrifices on the ground of the *vākya* implied in '*yasya parṇamayī guhūr bhavati*,' because here we have as an intermediate link the *guhū*, i. e. a special implement which is used at sacrifices only, and therefore is not of too wide an application.

were it not for the knowledge of a Self separate from the body, and such knowledge therefore has its uses there.—But, another objection is raised, from attributes given to the Self, such as ‘free from sin,’ and the like, it appears that the doctrine of the Upanishads refers to that Self which stands outside the *samsāra* and cannot therefore be subordinate to activity.—This objection too is without force; for what the Upanishads teach as the object of cognition is just the transmigrating Self, which is clearly referred to in such terms as ‘dear’ (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 5*). Attributes such as being free from sin, on the other hand, may be viewed as aiming merely at the glorification of that Self.—But in more than one place Brahman, the cause of the world, which is additional to the transmigrating Self and itself not subject to transmigration has been established, and the Upanishads teach that this very Brahman constitutes the real nature of the transmigrating Self!—True, that has been established; but in order to confirm that doctrine, objections and their refutation are again set forth with reference to the question as to the fruit (of the knowledge of the Self).

3. On account of scripture showing (certain lines of) conduct.

‘Ganaka the king of the Videhas sacrificed with a sacrifice at which many presents were given to the priests’ (*Bṛi. Up. III, 1, 1*); ‘Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice’ (*Kh. Up. V, 11, 5*); these and similar passages—which occur in sections that have another purport—show that those who know Brahman are connected with sacrificial action also. And similarly we apprehend from the fact that according to scripture Uddālaka and others taught their sons and so on, that they were connected with the condition of life of householders. If mere knowledge could effect the purpose of man, why should the persons mentioned have performed works troublesome in many respects? ‘If a man would find honey in the Arka tree why should he go to the forest?’

4. Because scripture directly states that.

'What a man does with knowledge, faith and the Upanishad is more powerful' (*Kh. Up.* I, 1, 10); this passage directly states that knowledge is subordinate to work¹, and from this it follows that mere knowledge cannot effect the purpose of man.

5. On account of the taking hold together.

'Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of him' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 2); as this passage shows that knowledge and work begin together to manifest their fruits, it follows that knowledge is not independent.

6. And because scripture enjoins (works) for such (only as understand the purport of the Veda).

'He who has learnt (lit. "read") the Veda from a family of teachers, according to the sacred injunction, in the leisure time left from the duties to be performed for the Guru ; who after having received his discharge has settled in his own house, studying his sacred texts in some sacred spot' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 15); such passages also show that those who know the purport of the whole Veda are qualified for sacrificial action, and that hence knowledge does not independently bring about a result.—But the expression 'who has read' directly states only that the Veda is read, not that its purport is understood!—Not so, we reply. The reading of the Veda extends up to the comprehension of its purport, as thus the reading has a visible purpose².

7. And on account of definite rules.

'Performing works here (i. e. in this life) let a man wish to live a hundred years ; thus work will not cling to thee, man ; there is no other way than that' (*Īśa. Up.* 2); 'The

¹ For the instrumental case 'vidyayâ' directly represents knowledge as a means of work.

² According to the *Mîmâmsâ* principle that, wherever possible, actions enjoined must be understood to have a visible purpose (a supersensuous result being admitted only where no visible result can be made out).

Agnihotra is a sattra lasting up to old age and death ; for through old age one is freed from it or through death' (Sat. Brā. XII, 4, 1, 1); from such definite rules also it follows that knowledge is merely supplementary to works.

Against all these objections the Sūtrakāra upholds his view in the following Sūtra.

8. But on account of (scripture teaching) the additional one (i.e. the Lord), (the view) of Bādarāyana (is valid) ; as that is seen thus (in scriptural passages).

The word 'but' discards the pūrvapaksha.—The assertion made in Sūtra 2 cannot be maintained 'on account of the text teaching the additional one.' If the Vedānta-texts taught that the transmigrating embodied Self which is an agent and enjoyer is something different from the mere body, the statements as to the fruit of the knowledge of the Self would, for the reasons indicated above, be mere arthavādas. But what the Vedānta-texts really teach as the object of knowledge is something different from the embodied Self, viz. the non-transmigrating Lord who is free from all attributes of transmigratory existence such as agency and the like and distinguished by freedom from sin and so on, the highest Self. And the knowledge of that Self does not only not promote action but rather cuts all action short, as will be declared in Sūtra 16. Hence the view of the reverend Bādarāyana which was stated in Sūtra 1 remains valid and cannot be shaken by fallacious reasoning about the subordination of knowledge to action and the like. That the Lord who is superior to the embodied Self is the Self many scriptural texts declare; compare 'He who perceives all and knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun rises' (Taitt. Up. II, 8); 'It is a great terror, a raised thunderbolt' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 2); 'By the command of that imperishable one, O Gārgi' (Bṛi. Up. III, 8, 9); 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire' (Kā. Up. VI, 2, 3). There are indeed passages in

which the transmigrating Self—hinted at by such terms as ‘dear’—is referred to as the object of knowledge, such as ‘But for the love of the Self everything is dear. Verily the Self is to be seen’ (*Bri. Up.* II, 4, 5); ‘He who breathes in the up-breathing he is thy Self and within all’ (*Bri. Up.* III, 4, 1); ‘The person that is seen in the eye that is thy Self,’ up to ‘But I shall explain him further to you’ (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 7 ff.). But as there are at the same time complementary passages connected with the passages quoted above—viz. ‘There has been breathed forth from this great Being the *Rîg-veda*, *Yagur-veda*,’ &c. (*Bri. Up.* II, 4, 10); ‘He who overcomes hunger and thirst, sorrow, passion, old age and death’ (*Bri. Up.* III, 5, 1); ‘Having approached the highest light he appears in his own form. That is the highest person’ (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 12, 3)—which aim at giving instruction about the superior Self; it follows that the two sets of passages do not mean to teach an absolute difference of the two Selves and that thus contradiction is avoided. For the Self of the highest Lord is the real nature of the embodied Self, while the state of being embodied is due to the limiting adjuncts, as appears from scriptural passages such as ‘Thou art that;’ ‘There is no other seer but he.’ All which has been demonstrated by us at length in the earlier parts of this commentary in more than one place.

9. But the declarations (of scripture) are equal (on the other side).

In reply to the averment made in Sûtra 3, we point out that there are declarations of scripture, of equal weight, in favour of the view that knowledge is not complementary to action. For there are scriptural passages such as, ‘Knowing this the *rîshis* descended from Kavasha said: For what purpose should we study the Veda? for what purpose should we sacrifice? Knowing this indeed the Ancient ones did not offer the Agnihotra;’ and ‘When Brâhmaṇas know that Self and have risen above the desire for sons, wealth, and worlds, they wander about as mendicants’ (*Bri. Up.* III, 5). Scripture moreover shows that

Yāgñavalkya and others who knew Brahman did not take their stand on works. 'Thus far goes immortality. Having said so Yāgñavalkya went away into the forest' (*Bṛi. Up.* IV, 5, 15). With reference to the indicatory sign (as to the dependence of knowledge to work) which is implied in the passage, 'Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice,' we remark that it belongs to a section which treats of Vaisvānara. Now, the text may declare that a vidyā of Brahman as limited by adjuncts is accompanied by works; but all the same the vidyā does not stand in a subordinate relation to works since 'leading subject-matter' and the other means of proof are absent.

We now reply to the averment made in Sūtra 4.

10. (The direct statement is) non-comprehensive.

The direct scriptural statement implied in 'What a man does with knowledge' &c. does not refer to all knowledge, as it is connected with the knowledge forming the subject-matter of the section. And the latter is the knowledge of the udgītha only, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgītha.'

11. There is distribution (of the work and knowledge) as in the case of the hundred.

In reply to the averment (Sūtra 5) that the passage, 'Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of him,' indicates the non-independence of knowledge, we point out that the passage must be understood in a distributed sense, knowledge taking hold of one man and work of another. The case is analogous to that of the 'hundred.' When it is said, 'Let a hundred be given to these two men,' the hundred are divided in that way that fifty are given to one man and fifty to the other.—Moreover what the text says about the laying hold does not refer to him who is about to obtain final release; for the concluding passage, 'So much for the man who desires,' indicates that the whole section refers to the soul implicated in the *samsāra*, and a new beginning is made for him who is about to be released, in the clause, 'But as to the man who does not

desire.' The clause about the laying hold thus comprises all knowledge which falls within the sphere of the transmigrating soul whether it be enjoined or prohibited¹, since there is no reason for distinction, and to all action whether enjoined or prohibited, the clause embodying a reference to knowledge and work as established elsewhere. And on this interpretation there is room for the clause even without our having recourse to the distribution of knowledge and work.

The next Sûtra replies to the averment made in Sûtra 6.

12. Of him who has merely read the Veda (there is qualification for works).

As the clause, 'Having learnt (read) the Veda from a family of teachers,' speaks only of the reading, we determine that acts are there enjoined for him who has only read the Veda.—But from this it would follow that on account of being destitute of knowledge such a person would not be qualified for works!—Never mind; we do not mean to deny that the understanding of sacrificial acts which springs from the reading of the texts is the cause of qualification for their performance; we only wish to establish that the knowledge of the Self derived from the Upanishads is seen to have an independent purpose of its own and therefore does not supply a reason of qualification for acts. Analogously a person who is qualified for one act does not require the knowledge of another act.

Against the reasoning of Sûtra 7 we make the following remark.

13. There being no specification (the rule does) not (specially apply to him who knows).

In passages such as 'Performing works here let a man live' &c., which state definite rules, there is no specification

¹ Pratishiddhâ ka ragnastrîdarsanâdirûpâ. Ân. Gi. — Pratishiddhâ ka yathâsaktîhâstrâdhigamanalaksharâ (not 'yathâ saktîhâstra' as in the Biblioth. Indica edition). Bhâmatî.

of him who knows, since the definite rule is enjoined without any such specification.

14. Or else the permission (of works) is for the glorification (of knowledge).

The passage 'Performing works here' may be treated in another way also. Even if, owing to the influence of the general subject-matter, only he who knows is to be viewed as he who performs works, yet the permission to perform works must be viewed as aiming at the glorification of knowledge; as appears from the subsequent clause, 'no work clings to the man.' The meaning of the entire passage thus is: To a man who knows no work will cling, should he perform works during his whole life even, owing to the power of knowledge. And this clearly glorifies knowledge.

15. Some also by proceeding according to their liking (evince their disregard of anything but knowledge).

Moreover some who know, having obtained the intuition of the fruit of knowledge, express, in reliance thereon, the purposelessness of the means of all other results, viz. by proceeding according to their liking (and abandoning those means). A scriptural text of the Vāgasaneyins runs as follows: 'Knowing this the people of old did not wish for offspring. What shall we do with offspring, they said, we who have this Self and this world' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22*). And that the fruit of knowledge, being present to intuition, does not manifest itself at a later time only as the fruits of actions do, we have explained more than once. From this also it follows that knowledge is not subordinate to action, and that the scriptural statements as to the fruit of knowledge cannot be taken in any but their true sense.

16. And (scripture teaches) the destruction (of the qualification for works, by knowledge).

Moreover scripture teaches that this whole apparent world—which springs from Nescience, is characterised by

actions, agents and results of actions and is the cause of all qualification for works—is essentially destroyed by the power of knowledge. Compare such passages as ‘But when all has become the Self of him, wherewith should he see another, wherewith should he smell another?’ (*Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15*). For him now who should teach that the qualification for works has for its necessary antecedent the knowledge of the Self which the Vedânta-texts teach, it would follow that the qualification for works is cut short altogether. From this also it follows that knowledge is independent.

17. And (knowledge belongs) to those who are bound to chastity; for in scripture (that condition of life is mentioned).

Scripture shows that knowledge is valid also for those stages of life for which chastity is prescribed. Now in their case knowledge cannot be subordinate to work because work is absent; for the works prescribed by the Veda such as the Agnihotra are no longer performed by men who have reached those stages.—But, an objection is raised, those stages of life are not even mentioned in the Veda!—This is not so, we reply. Certain Vedic passages clearly intimate them; so e.g. ‘There are three branches of the law’ (*Kh. Up. II, 23, 1*); ‘Those who in the forest practise faith and austerity’ (*Kh. Up. V, 10, 1*); ‘Those who practise penance and faith in the forest’ (*Mu. Up. I, 10, 11*); ‘Wishing for that world only mendicants wander forth’ (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22*); ‘Let him wander forth at once from the state of studentship.’—That the stages requiring chastity are open to men whether they have reached householdership or not, and whether they have paid the debts (of procreating a son, &c.) or not, is known from scripture and *Smṛiti*. Herefrom also follows the independence of knowledge.

18. Gaimini (considers that scriptural passages mentioning those stages of life in which chastity is obligatory, contain) a reference (only to those stages);

they are not injunctions ; for (other scriptural passages) forbid (those stages).

The Vedic texts which have been quoted to the end of showing the existence of the stages of life on which chastity is binding—such as ‘ There are three branches of the law ’ and so on—have no power to establish those stages. For the teacher Gaimini is of opinion that those passages contain only a reference to the other stages of life, not an injunction (of them).—Why?—Because they contain no words expressive of injunction such as imperative verbal forms, and because each of them is seen to have some other purport. In the passage, ‘ There are three ’ &c., the text at first refers to three stages of life (‘ Sacrifice, study, and charity are the first ’ &c. &c.), thereupon declares them not to have unbounded results (‘ All these obtain the world of the blessed ’), and finally glorifies ‘ the state of being grounded on Brahman ’ as having unbounded results (‘ the Brahmasamstha obtains immortality ’).—But is not a mere reference even sufficient to intimate the existence of those stages of life?—True ; but they are established (enjoined) not by direct scriptural statements, but only by *Smṛiti* and custom, and therefore when contradicted by direct scriptural statement¹ are either to be disregarded or else to be viewed as concerning those who (for some reason or other) are disqualified (for active worship, sacrifices and the like).—But together with the stages demanding chastity the text refers to the condition of the householder also². (‘ Sacrifice, study, and charity are the first. ’)—True ; but the existence of the state of the householder is established (not by that passage but) by other scriptural passages, viz. those which enjoin on the householder certain works such as the *Agnihotra*. Hence the reference in the passage under discussion aims at glorification only, not at injunction.

¹ Such as that concerning the permanent obligation of the *Agnihotra* and so on.

² And we therefore may conclude that those stages are as valid as the—notoriously valid—state of householdership.

Moreover, direct scriptural enunciations forbid other stages of life ; cp. 'A murderer of the gods is he who removes the fire ;' 'After having brought to thy teacher his proper reward do not cut off the line of children' (Taitt. Up. I, 11, 1) ; 'To him who is without a son the world does not belong ; all beasts even know that.'—Similarly the passages, 'Those who in the forest practise faith and austerity' (*Kh.* Up. V, 10, 1), and the analogous passage (from the *Mundaka*), contain instruction not about the other stages of life but about the going on the path of the gods. And of clauses such as 'austerity is the second' it is doubtful whether they speak of a stage of life at all. And a passage like 'Wishing for that world only mendicants wander forth,' does not enjoin the wandering forth but merely glorifies that world.—But there is at any rate one scriptural text which directly and unambiguously enjoins the condition of life of the wandering mendicant, viz. the one of the *Gâbâlas*, 'Let him wander forth at once from the state of studentship.'—True, but our discussion is carried on without reference to that passage.

19. (The other stage of life) is to be accomplished, (according to) *Bâdarâyana* ; on account of the scriptural statement of equality.

The teacher *Bâdarâyana* is of opinion that that other stage of life is something to be accomplished. The view that there is a contradiction because the other stage of life is stated in the *Veda* and, on the other hand, works such as the *Agnihotra* must necessarily be performed, and that, in order to remove this contradiction, that other stage of life must be entered upon by those only who are not qualified for active worship, he rejects ; being of opinion that that other stage is to be entered upon, in the same way as the state of the householder, even by him who does not wish to do so.—On what ground ?—'On account of the scriptural statement of equality.' For we have a passage (viz. 'There are three branches of the law,' &c.) which refers equally to that other stage as to the state of the householder. As the state of the householder which

is enjoined in other passages only is here referred to, so also that other stage of life. The case is analogous to the reference made to the wearing of the sacrificial thread round the neck or on the right shoulder—which two modes are established in other scriptural passages—in a passage the purpose of which it is to enjoin the wearing of the thread on the left shoulder. The other stage must therefore be entered upon in the same way as the state of the householder.—Analogously in the passage, ‘Wishing for that world only mendicants leave their homes,’ the last stage of life is mentioned together with the study of the Veda, sacrifice and so on, and in the passage, ‘Those who in the forest,’ &c., with the knowledge of the five fires.—The remark, made above by the pûrvapakshin, that in such passages as ‘austerity is the second’ there is unambiguous reference to a further stage of life, is without force, since there is a reason enabling us to determine what is meant. The text proclaims in the beginning that there are three subdivisions (‘There are three branches of the law’). Now the sacrifice and the other duties (which the text enumerates subsequently to the introductory clause) can, because they are more than three, and rest on separate originaive injunctions, be comprised within the three branches only if they are connected with one of the stages of life. Now the terms ‘sacrifice’ and so on indicate that the stage of householdership constitutes one branch of the law, and the term ‘Brahmakârin’ clearly denotes another stage; what then remains but to assume that the term ‘austerity’ also denotes a stage of life, viz. the one in which austerity is the chief thing? Analogously the reference to the forest—in the passage, ‘Those who in the forest,’—indicates that by the austerity and faith mentioned there we have to understand that stage of life in which austerity and faith are the chief thing.—From all this it follows that the further stage of life has to be gone through, even if the passage under discussion should do nothing but refer to it.

20. Or (the passage rather is) an injunction, as in the case of the carrying (of the firewood).

Or the passage is rather to be understood as containing an injunction, not a mere reference.—But, an objection is raised, if we assume it to be an injunction we thereby oppose the conception of the entire passage as a coherent whole, while yet the passage has clearly to be conceived as constituting such a whole, viz. as meaning that while the three branches of the law have for their result the world of the blessed, the condition of being grounded in Brahman has immortality for its result.—True, but all the same we must set aside the conception of the passage as a whole—well founded as it is—and assume it to be an injunction. For it is a new injunction because no other injunction is observed, and as the conception of the other stage of life clearly arises from the passage it is impossible to interpret it as a coherent whole by means of the assumption that it is a mere *gunavāda* ¹.

The case is analogous to that of the ‘carrying.’ There is a scriptural text (relating to the Agnihotra which forms part of the *mahāpitṛiyagñā*), ‘Let him approach carrying the firewood below (the ladle holding the offering); for above he carries it for the gods.’ Now this passage may be conceived as an unbroken whole if we view it as referring to the carrying below only; nevertheless we determine that it enjoins the carrying above because that

¹ In the clause ‘*vidhyantarādarsanāt*’ I can see nothing more than an explanation of—or reason for—the ‘*apūrvatvāt*.’ If we viewed the passage as glorifying the *brahmasamsthātā* compared to the three branches of the law through the statement of its super-sensuous results (so that it would constitute an *arthavāda* of the kind called *gunavāda*), we should indeed preserve the unity of the passage—which is destroyed if we view it as enjoining the different stages of life. But all the same the latter explanation is the true one; for a glorificatory passage presupposes an injunctive one, and as no such injunctive passage is met with elsewhere, it is simpler to assume that the present passage is itself injunctive than to construe (on the basis of it if viewed as a *gunavāda*) another injunctive passage. (In Ānanda Giri’s gloss on this passage—*Biblioth. Indica* edition—read ‘*vihitatvopagamaprasaktyā*’ and ‘*stutilakṣaṇayaika*’.)

is not enjoined anywhere else¹. This is explained in the chapter treating of 'complement,' in the Sūtra, 'But it is an injunction,' &c. (Pū. Mīm. Sū.). In the same way we assume that our passage referring to the different āśramas is an injunctory passage only.

Even if (to state an alternative conclusion) the passage contains references only to the other āśramas, it must be viewed as enjoining at any rate the condition of being grounded in Brahman, owing to the glorification of that condition. The question here arises whether that state belongs to any one comprised within the four āśramas, or only to the wandering mendicant. If now a reference to the mendicant also is contained within the references to the āśramas up to the Brahma-kārin (i.e. the three āśramas the text refers to before the passage about the brahmasaṁstha); then, as all four āśramas are referred to equally and as somebody not belonging to any āśrama could not possibly be called brahmasaṁstha, it follows that the term 'brahmasaṁstha' denotes any one standing within one of the four āśramas. If, on the other hand, the mendicant is not comprised within the references to the three āśramas, he alone remains, and this establishes the conclusion that the brahmasaṁstha is the mendicant only. (We therefore have to inquire which of the two alternatives stated has to be adopted.)—Here some maintain that the term 'austerity' which denotes the hermit in the woods implies a reference to the mendicant also. But this is wrong. For as long as any other explanation is possible, we must not assume that a term which expresses a distinctive attribute of the hermits living in the forest comprises the wandering mendicants also. Both the Brahma-kārin and the householder are

¹ The ekavākyatā is preserved if we take the clause from 'above' as an arthavāda meant to give the reason why in sacrifices offered to the Fathers the firewood has to be carried below. Nevertheless the clause must be taken as a vidhi enjoining the carrying above in all sacrifices offered to the gods, because this particular is not enjoined elsewhere.

referred to by distinctive terms applying to them only, and we therefore expect that the mendicant and the hermit also should be referred to by analogous terms. Now 'austerity' is a distinctive attribute of the hermits living in the woods; for the principal conventional meaning of the word 'austerity' is mortification of the body. The distinctive attribute of the mendicant, on the other hand, viz. restraint of the senses and so on, cannot be denoted by the term 'austerity.' Moreover it would be an illegitimate assumption that the âśramas which are known to be four should here be referred to as three. And further the text notifies a distinction, viz. by saying that those three reach the world of the blessed, while one enjoys immortality. Now there is room for such a distinction if the hermits and the mendicants are separate; for we do not say 'Devadatta and Yagñadatta are stupid, but one of them is clever,' but we say 'Devadatta and Yagñadatta are stupid, but Vishnumitra is clever.' The passage therefore has to be understood in that sense, that those belonging to the three former âśramas obtain the world of the blessed, while the remaining one, i. e. the wandering mendicant, enjoys immortality.—But how can the term 'brahmasamsthā,' which according to its etymological meaning may be applied to members of all âśramas, be restricted to the mendicant? and, if we agree to take it in its conventional meaning, it follows that immortality may be reached by merely belonging to an âśrama, and hence that knowledge is useless!—To these objections we make the following reply. The term 'brahmasamsthā' denotes fulfilment in Brahman, a state of being grounded in Brahman to the exclusion of all other activity. Now such a state is impossible for persons belonging to the three former âśramas, as scripture declares that they suffer loss through the non-performance of the works enjoined on their âśrama. The mendicant, on the other hand, who has discarded all works can suffer no loss owing to non-performance. Such duties as are incumbent on him, viz. restraint of the senses and the like, are not opposed to the state of being grounded in Brahman, but rather helpful

to it. For the only work enjoined on him by his āsrama is the state of being firmly grounded in Brahman, wherein he is strengthened by restraint of the senses and so on—just as sacrifices and the like are prescribed for the other āśramas—and loss he incurs only by neglecting that work. In agreement herewith texts from scripture and *Smṛiti* declare that for him who is grounded in Brahman there are no works. Compare ‘Renunciation is Brahman; for Brahman is the highest; for the highest is Brahman; above those lower penances, indeed, there rises renunciation;’ ‘Those anchorites who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of the Vedānta and have purified their nature by the Yoga of renunciation’ (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6); and similar scriptural passages. And *Smṛiti*-texts to the same effect, such as ‘They whose minds are fixed on him, who have their Self in him, their stand on him, their end in him’ (Bha. Gītā V, 17). All these passages teach that for him who is founded on Brahman there are no works. From this there also follows the non-validity of the second objection raised above, viz. that the mendicant’s reaching immortality through the mere stage of life in which he stands would imply the uselessness of knowledge.—In this way we understand that, although there is a reference to the other stages of life, that which is indicated by the quality of being grounded in Brahman is the state of the wandering mendicant.

This whole discussion has been carried on by the teacher without taking into account the text of the *Gābālas*, which enjoins the other stage of life. But there exists that text which directly enjoins the other stage, ‘Having completed his studentship he is to become a householder; having been a householder he is to become a dweller in the forest; having been a dweller in the forest he is to wander forth; or else he may wander forth from the student’s state; or from the house; or from the forest.’ Nor can this text be interpreted as referring to those who are not qualified for works; for it states no difference, and there is a separate injunction (of the *pārivrāgya*-state) for those who are not qualified, viz. in the passage, ‘May he have

taken vows upon himself or not, may he be a snātaka or not, may he be one whose fire has gone out or one who has no fire,' &c. That the text does not refer to such only as are not qualified for works, further follows from the fact that the state of the mendicant is meant to subserve the development of the knowledge of Brahman¹, as scripture declares, 'The wandering mendicant, with colourless dress, shaven, wifeless, pure, guileless, living on alms, qualifies himself for the intuition of Brahman.'—From all this it follows that the stages of life for which chastity is obligatory are established by scripture, and that knowledge—because enjoined on persons who have entered on those stages—is independent of works.

21. If it be said that (texts such as the one about the udgītha are) mere glorification, on account of their reference (to parts of sacrifices); we deny that, on account of the newness (of what they teach, if viewed as injunctions).

'That udgītha is the best of all essences, the highest, holding the highest place, the eighth' (*Kh. Up. I, 1, 3*); 'This earth is the *Rik*, the fire is *Sāman*' (*Kh. Up. I, 6, 1*); 'This world in truth is that piled-up fire-altar' (*Sat. Brā. X, 1, 2, 2*); 'That hymn is truly that earth' (*Ait. Ār. II, 1, 2, 1*); with reference to these and other similar passages a doubt arises whether they are meant to glorify the udgītha and so on, or to enjoin devout meditations.

The pūrvapakshin maintains that their aim is glorification, because the text exhibits them with reference to subordinate members of sacrificial actions, such as the udgītha and so on. They are, he says, analogous to passages such as 'This earth is the ladle;' 'the sun is the tortoise;' 'the heavenly world is the *Āhavanīya*,' whose

¹ Which has to be acquired in the regular prescribed way of Brahmanical studentship.

aim it is to glorify the ladle and so on. To this the Sūtra-kāra replies as follows. We have no right to consider the purpose of those passages to be mere glorification, on account of the newness. If they aim at injunction, a new matter is enjoined by them; if, on the other hand, they aimed at glorification they would be devoid of meaning. For, as explained in the Pū. Mīm. Sū., glorificatory passages are of use in so far as entering into a complementary relation to injunctive passages; but the passages under discussion are incapable of entering into such a relation to the udgītha and so on which are enjoined in altogether different places of the Veda, and would therefore be purposeless as far as glorification is concerned. Passages such as 'This earth is the ladle' are not analogous because they stand in proximity to injunctive passages.—Therefore texts such as those under discussion have an injunctive purpose.

22. And on account of the words expressive of becoming.

Moreover the text exhibits words of clearly injunctive meaning, in connexion with the passages quoted above, viz. 'Let him meditate on the udgītha' (*Kh. Up. I, 1, 1*); 'Let him meditate on the Sāman' (*Kh. Up. II, 2, 1*); 'Let him think: I am the hymn' (*Ait. Ār. II, 1, 6*). Now these injunctive forms would be rendered futile by the assumption of the texts under discussion aiming at glorification only. Compare the following saying of those who know Nyāya, 'Let him do, let it be done, it is to be done, let it become, let it be; these forms are in all Vedas the settled signs of injunction.' What they mean thereby is that injunction is the sense of all potential, imperative, &c., verbal forms.—Moreover in each of the sections to which the passages under discussion belong the text states special fruits, 'He becomes indeed a fulfiller of desires' (*Kh. Up. I, 1, 7*); 'He is able to obtain wishes through his song' (*Kh. Up. I, 7, 9*); 'The worlds in an ascending and a descending line belong to him' (*Kh. Up. II, 2, 3*). For this reason also the texts

about the udgîtha and so on are meant to enjoin devout meditations.

23. (The stories told in the Upanishads) are for the purpose of the pâriplava; we deny this on account of (certain stories only) being specified.

‘Yâgñavalkya had two wives, Maitreyî and Kâtyâyanî’ (*Bri. Up.* IV, 5, 1); ‘Pratardana, forsooth, the son of Divodâsa came to the beloved abode of Indra’ (*Kau. Up.* III, 1); ‘There lived once upon a time Gânasruti Pautrâyana, who was a pious giver, giving much and keeping open house’ (*Kh. Up.* IV, 1, 1); with regard to these and similar stories met with in the Vedânta portions of scripture there arises a doubt whether they are meant to subserve the performance of the pâriplava¹, or to introduce the vidyâs standing in proximity to them.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that those scriptural stories subserve the pâriplava because they are stories like others, and because the telling of stories is enjoined for the pâriplava. And from this it follows that the Vedânta-texts do not chiefly aim at knowledge, because like mantras they stand in a complementary relation to sacrificial performances.

This conclusion we deny ‘on account of the specification.’ Under the heading ‘he is to recite the pâriplava,’ scripture specifies certain definite stories such as that of ‘Manu Vivasvat’s son the king.’ If, now, for the reason that all tales as such are alike, all tales were admitted for the pâriplava, the mentioned specification would be devoid of meaning. We therefore conclude that those scriptural stories are not meant to be told at the pâriplava.

24. This follows also from the connexion (of the stories with the vidyâs) in one coherent whole.

And as thus the stories do not subserve the pâriplava it

¹ I. e. have to be recited at stated intervals during the year occupied by the arvamedha sacrifice.

is appropriate to assume that they are meant to bring nearer to our understanding the approximate vidyās with which they are seen to form connected wholes; for they serve to render the latter more acceptable and facilitate their comprehension.

In the Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa we see that the story forms a whole with the vidyā beginning, 'The Self indeed is to be seen,' &c.; in the account of Pratardana with the vidyā, 'I am prāṇa, the conscious Self;' in the legend of Gāṇasruti with the vidyā, 'Air indeed is the end of all.' The case of all these stories is analogous to that of stories met with in scriptural texts referring to works, whose purpose is the glorification of injunctions standing in proximity; as e.g. 'He cut out his own omentum.'—The stories under discussion therefore do not subserve the pāriplava.

25. For this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire and so on.

The expression 'For this very same reason' must be viewed as taking up Sūtra III, 4, 1, because thus a satisfactory sense is established. For this very same reason, i.e. because knowledge subserves the purpose of man, the lighting of the sacrificial fire and similar works which are enjoined on the different āśramas are not to be observed, since man's purpose is effected through knowledge.

The Sūtrakāra thus sums up the result of the first adhikaraṇa, intending to make some further remarks.

26. And there is need of all (works), on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like; as in the case of the horse.

We now consider whether knowledge has absolutely no need of the works enjoined on the different āśramas, or whether it has some need of them. Under the preceding Sūtra we have arrived at the conclusion that as knowledge effects its own end the works enjoined on the āśramas are absolutely not required. With reference to this point the present Sūtra now remarks that knowledge has regard

for all works enjoined on the âśramas, and that there is not absolute non-regard.—But do not the two Sûtras thus contradict each other?—By no means, we reply. Knowledge having once sprung up requires no help towards the accomplishment of its fruit, but it does stand in need of something else with a view to its own origination.—Why so?—On account of the scriptural statements of sacrifices and so on. For the passage, ‘Him Brâhmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting’ (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22*), declares that sacrifices and so on are means of knowledge, and as the text connects them with the ‘seeking to know,’ we conclude that they are, more especially, means of the origination of knowledge. Similarly the passage, ‘What people call sacrifice that is really brahma-kārya’ (*Kh. Up. VIII, 5, 1*), by connecting sacrifices and so on with brahma-kārya which is a means of knowledge, intimates that sacrifices &c. also are means of knowledge. Again the passage, ‘That word which all the Vedas record, which all penances proclaim, desiring which men live as religious students, that word I tell thee briefly, it is Om’ (*Ka. Up. I, 2, 15*), likewise intimates that the works enjoined on the âśramas are means of knowledge. Similarly *Smṛiti* says, ‘Works are the washing away of uncleanness, but knowledge is the highest way. When the impurity has been removed, then knowledge begins to act.’

The phrase, ‘as in the case of the horse,’ supplies an illustration on the ground of suitability. As the horse, owing to its specific suitability, is not employed for dragging ploughs but is harnessed to chariots; so the works enjoined on the âśramas are not required by knowledge for bringing about its results, but with a view to its own origination.

27. But all the same he (who is desirous of knowledge) must be possessed of calmness, subjection of the senses, &c., since those (states) are enjoined as auxiliaries to that (*viz.* knowledge), and must (on that account) necessarily be accomplished.

Perhaps somebody might think that we have no right to look upon sacrifices and the like as means of knowledge because there is no injunction to that effect. For a passage like 'By sacrifice they seek to know' is of the nature of an anuvāda, and therefore does not aim at enjoining sacrifices but rather at glorifying knowledge, 'so glorious is knowledge that they seek to obtain it through sacrifices and the like.'

But even should this be so the seeker for knowledge must possess calmness of mind, must subdue his senses and so on ; for all this is enjoined as a means of knowledge in the following scriptural passage, 'Therefore he who knows this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, sees self in Self' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 23*). And what is enjoined must necessarily be carried out.—But in the above passage also we observe only a statement as to something actually going on—'Having become calm, &c., he sees,' not an injunction!—Not so, we reply. The introductory word 'therefore' which expresses praise of the subject under discussion makes us understand that the passage has an injunctive character¹.

Moreover the text of the Mādhyandinas directly reads 'let him see' (not 'he sees'). Hence calmness of mind and so on are required even if sacrifices, &c., should not be required.—Sacrifices and so on, however, are required likewise, because (as said in Sūtra 26) scripture teaches them.—But it has been said that in the passage, 'Him they seek to know by sacrifices,' no injunction is observed!—True ; but nevertheless we must assume the passage to be an injunction, because the connexion of the search for knowledge with sacrifices and so on is something new ; i.e. is not established by another text, and therefore the

¹ For if there were no injunction, the praise would be without meaning. The 'therefore' connects the passage with the preceding clause, 'he is not sullied by any evil deed.' The sense then is, 'Because he who knows the Self as described before is not sullied by any evil deed, therefore let him, after having become calm, &c., see the Self, and so on.'

passage under discussion cannot be an anuvāda referring to it. The case is analogous to that of passages such as 'therefore Pūshan¹ receives a well-crushed share of food, for he is toothless.' There also no injunction is directly stated ; but as the matter of the passage is new we assume an injunction and understand that the grains for Pūshan are to be crushed at all vikṛitis of the darsapūṛṇamāsa ; as was explained in the Pūṛva Mīmāṃsā.

An analogous conclusion was arrived at under Sūtra 20.—Smṛitis also such as the Bhagavadgītā explain that sacrifices and the like if undertaken without a view to their special results become for him who is desirous of final release a means of knowledge. Hence sacrifices and the like, on the one hand, and calmness of mind and so on, on the other hand, according to the āśramas, i.e. all works enjoined on the āśramas must be had regard to with a view to the springing up of knowledge. Calmness of mind, &c., are, on account of the expression 'he who knows this' connecting them with knowledge, to be viewed as approximate—direct—means of knowledge, while sacrifices and so on which scripture connects with the search of knowledge are to be looked upon as remote—indirect—means.

28. And there is permission of all food, (only) in the case of danger of life ; on account of this being shown (by scripture).

In the colloquy of the prānas the *Kṛh*andogas record, 'To him who knows this there is nothing which is not food' (*Kṛh. Up. V, 1, 2*) ; and the *Vāgasaneyins*, 'By him nothing is eaten that is not food, nothing is received that is not food' (*Bṛi. Up. VI, 1, 14*). The sense of the two passages is that anything may be eaten by him.—A doubt here arises whether the texts enjoin the permission of eating anything

¹ The passage quoted occurs in the Veda under the heading of the darsapūṛṇamāsa. But as Pūshan has no share in the fundamental form of that sacrifice, we conclude that the injunction implied in the passage is valid for those vikṛitis of the darsapūṛṇamāsa in which offerings are made to Pūshan.

as an auxiliary to knowledge—as calmness of mind, &c., are—or mention them for the purpose of glorification.—The pûrvapakshin maintains that the passages are injunctions because thus we gain an instruction which causes a special kind of activity. What, therefore, the text teaches is the non-operation of a definite rule, in so far as auxiliary to the knowledge of the prâṇas in proximity to which it is taught.—But this interpretation implies the sublation of the scriptural rules as to the distinction of lawful and unlawful food!—Such sublation, we reply, is possible, because the present case is one of general rule and special exception. The prohibition of doing harm to any living creature is sublated by the injunction of the killing of the sacrificial animal; the general rule which distinguishes between such women as may be approached and such as may not, is sublated by the text prescribing, with reference to the knowledge of the Vâmadevya, that no woman is to be avoided ('Let him avoid no woman, that is the vow,' *Kh. Up. II, 13, 2*); analogously the passage which enjoins, with reference to the knowledge of the prâṇas, the eating of all food may sublate the general rule as to the distinction of lawful and unlawful food.

To this we reply as follows. The permission to eat any food whatever is not enjoined, since the passages do not contain any word of injunctive power; for the clause, 'To him who knows this there is nothing,' &c., expresses only something actually going on. And where the conception of an injunction does not naturally arise we may not assume one from the mere wish of something causing a special line of activity. Moreover the text says that 'for him who knows this there is nothing that is not food,' only after having said that everything even unto dogs and the like is food for the Prâṇa. Now food such as dogs and the like cannot be enjoyed by the human body; but all this can be thought of as food of the Prâṇa. From this it follows that the passage is an arthavâda meant to glorify the knowledge of the food of the Prâṇa, not an injunction of the permission of all food.—This the Sûtra indicates in the words, 'and there is permission of all food

in danger of life.' That means: Only in danger of life, in cases of highest need, food of any kind is permitted to be eaten. 'On account of scripture showing this.' For scripture shows that the *rishi Kâkrâyana* when in evil plight proceeded to eat unlawful food. In the *brâhmaṇa* beginning, 'when the Kurus had been destroyed by hail-stones,' it is told how the *rishi Kâkrâyana* having fallen into great wretchedness ate the beans half eaten by a chief, but refused to drink what had been offered on the ground of its being a mere leaving; and explained his proceeding as follows: 'I should not have lived if I had not eaten them; but water I can drink wherever I like.' And again on the following day he ate the stale beans left by himself and another person. Scripture, in thus showing how the stale leaving of a leaving was eaten, intimates as its principle that in order to preserve one's life when in danger one may eat even unlawful food. That, on the other hand, in normal circumstances not even a man possessing knowledge must do this, appears from *Kâkrâyana's* refusing to drink.—From this it follows that the passage, 'For to him who knows this,' &c., is an *arthavâda*.

29. And on account of the non-sublation.

And thus those scriptural passages which distinguish lawful and unlawful food,—such as *Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2*, 'When the food is pure the whole nature becomes pure,'—are non-sublated.

30. And this is said in *Smṛiti* also.

That in cases of need both he who knows and he who does not know may eat any food *Smṛiti* also states; compare e.g. 'He who being in danger of his life eats food from anywhere is stained by sin no more than the lotus leaf by water.'—On the other hand, many passages teach that unlawful food is to be avoided. 'Intoxicating liquor the *Brâhmaṇa* must permanently forego;' 'Let them pour boiling spirits down the throat of the *Brâhmaṇa* who drinks spirits;' 'Spirit-drinking worms grow in the

mouth of the spirit-drinking man, because he enjoys what is unlawful.'

31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to non-proceeding according to liking.

There is also a scriptural passage prohibiting unlawful food, the purpose of which it is to stop procedure therein according to one's liking, viz. in the *Samhitā* of the *Kaṭhas*, 'Therefore a Brāhmaṇa is not to drink spirits.' This text also is more appropriate if we take the passage, 'To him who knows this,' as an arthavāda.—Hence passages of that kind are arthavādas, not injunctions.

32. The works of the āśramas (are incumbent on him) also (who does not desire release); because they are enjoined.

Under Sūtra 26 it has been proved that the works enjoined on the āśramas are means of knowledge. Now we will consider whether those works have to be performed also by him who does not desire final release and therefore takes his stand on his āśrama merely without wishing for knowledge.—Here the pūrvapakshin maintains that as the works incumbent on the āśramas are enjoined as means of knowledge by the passage, 'Him the Brāhmaṇas seek to know by the study of the Veda' &c., the works of permanent obligation are not to be performed by him who, not desirous of knowledge, wishes for some other fruit. Or else they are to be performed by him also; but then they cannot be means of knowledge, since it would be contradictory to attribute to them a permanent and a non-permanent connexion¹.

Against this conclusion the Sūtrakāra remarks that the works of permanent obligation are to be performed by

¹ I. e. we must not think that because they enjoy the 'nityatā' of certain works, other passages may not enjoy the same works as mere means of knowledge.

him only who, not desirous of release, takes his stand on the âśramas merely, because they are enjoined by texts such 'as long as his life lasts he is to offer the agnihotra.' For to such texts no excessive weight must be ascribed.—The next Sûtra replies to the objection raised above in the words, 'but then they cannot be means of knowledge.'

33. And through the co-operativeness (of the works towards the origination of knowledge).

Those works are also co-operative with knowledge just because they are enjoined as such, viz. in passages such as 'Him the Brâhmaṇas seek to know by the study of the Veda,' &c. This has been explained under Sûtra 26. Nor must you think that the texts stating the co-operation of the works of the âśramas towards knowledge refer to the fruit of knowledge, as e.g. the offerings called prayâgas co-operate towards the fruit of the darsapûṇamâsa of which they are auxiliary members; for knowledge is not characterised by injunction, and the fruit of knowledge is not to be effected by means. Means characterised by injunctions such as the darsapûṇamâsa-sacrifice which aim at bringing about certain fruits such as the heavenly world require other (subordinate) means co-operating towards the fruit (such as the prayâgas). But not so knowledge. Compare on this point Sûtra 25. Therefore texts stating the co-operation of works (with knowledge) have to be interpreted as stating that works are means for the origination of knowledge.—Nor need we fear that thus there arises a contradiction of permanent and non-permanent connexion. For there may be difference of connexion even where there is no difference of work. One connexion is permanent, resting on the texts about the life-long performance of the agnihotra and so on; of this knowledge is not the result. The other connexion is non-permanent, resting on texts such as 'Him the Brâhmaṇas seek to know,' &c.; of this knowledge is the result. The case is analogous to that of the one khadira, which through a permanent connexion serves the purpose of the sacrifice, and through a non-permanent connexion the purpose of man.

34. In any case the same (duties have to be performed) on account of the twofold indicatory marks.

In any case, i. e. whether viewed as duties incumbent on the āsramas or as co-operating with knowledge, the very same agnihotra and other duties have to be performed.—What, it may be asked, does the teacher wish to preclude by the emphatic expression ‘the very same?’—The suspicion, we reply, that those works might be separate works¹. In the ayana of the *Kundapâyins* indeed the injunctive statement, ‘They offer the agnihotra for a month²,’ enjoins a sacrifice different from the permanent (ordinary) agnihotra ; but in our present case there is no analogous separation of works.—Why?—On account of the twofold indicatory mark ; i. e. on account of both scripture and *Smṛiti* supplying indicatory marks. In the first place, the scriptural passage, ‘Him the Brāhmaṇas seek to know through the study of the Veda,’ &c., directs that sacrifices and the like—as things already established and the form of which is already in existence (viz. through previous injunctions)—are to be employed as means in the search for knowledge ; and does not originate a new form of those works, while the passage quoted above, ‘They offer the agnihotra for a month,’ does originate a new separate sacrifice.—In the second place the *Smṛiti*-passage, ‘He who performs the work to be done without aiming at the fruit of the work,’ shows that the very same work which is already known as something to be performed subserves the origination of knowledge. Moreover the *Smṛiti*-passage, ‘He who is qualified by those forty-eight purifications,’ &c., refers to the purifications required for Vedic works, with a view to the origination of knowledge in him who has undergone those purifications.—The *Sūtrakāra* therefore rightly emphasizes the non-difference of the works.

¹ That the works referred to in the Upanishads as means of knowledge, might be works altogether different from those enjoined in the *karmakāṇḍa* as means of bringing about certain special results such as the heavenly world.

² See above, p. 250.

35. And scripture also declares that (those performing works) are not overpowered (by passion and the like).

This Sûtra points out a further indicatory mark fortifying the conclusion that works co-operate towards knowledge. Scripture also shows that he who is furnished with such means as Brahma-karya, &c., is not overpowered by such afflictions as passion and the like. Compare the passage, 'That Self does not perish which they find out by Brahma-karya' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 5, 3*).—It is thus a settled conclusion that sacrifices and so on are works incumbent on the âśramas as well as co-operative towards knowledge.

36. But also (persons standing) between (are qualified for knowledge); for that is seen (in scripture).

A doubt arises whether persons in want who do not possess means, &c., and therefore are not able to enter one or the other of the âśramas, standing between as it were, are qualified for knowledge or not.—They are not qualified, the pûrvapakshin maintains. For we have ascertained that the works incumbent on the âśramas are the cause of knowledge, and those persons have no opportunity to perform those works.—To this the Sûtrakâra replies, 'But also between.' Even a person who because he does not belong to an âśrama stands between, as it were, is qualified for knowledge. 'For that is seen.' For we meet with scriptural passages declaring that persons of that class—such as Raikva and the daughter of Vâknu—possessed the knowledge of Brahman (*Kh. Up. IV, 1; Bri. Up. III, 6, 8*).

37. This is stated in Smṛiti also.

It is recorded in itihâsas also how Samvarta and others who paid no regard to the duties incumbent on the âśramas, in going naked and so on, became great Yogins all the same.—But the instances quoted from scripture and Smṛiti furnish merely indicatory marks; what then is

the final conclusion?—That conclusion is stated in the next Sūtra.

38. And the promotion (of knowledge is bestowed on them) through special acts.

Also for widowers, &c., the favour of knowledge is possible through special acts of duty, such as praying, fasting, propitiation of divinities, &c., which are not opposed to their āsrama-less condition and may be performed by any man as such. Thus *Smṛiti* says, 'By mere prayer no doubt the Brāhmaṇa perfects himself. May he perform other works or not, the kindhearted one is called Brāhmaṇa' (*Manu Samh.* II, 87), which passage shows that where the works of the āsramas are not possible prayer qualifies for knowledge. Moreover knowledge may be promoted by āsrama works performed in previous births. Thus *Smṛiti* also declares, 'Perfectured by many births he finally goes the highest way' (*Bha. Gītā* VI, 45); which passage shows that the aggregate of the different purificatory ceremonies performed in former births promotes knowledge.—Moreover knowledge—as having a seen result (*viz.* the removal of ignorance)—qualifies any one who is desirous of it for learning and so on, through the mere absence of obstacles¹. Hence there is no contradiction in admitting qualification for knowledge on the part of widowers and the like.

39. Better than this is the other (state of belonging to an āsrama), on account of the indicatory marks.

'Than this,' i.e. 'than standing between,' a better means of knowledge it is to stand within one of the āsramas, since this is confirmed by *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*. For scripture supplies an indicatory mark in the passage, 'On that path goes whoever knows Brahman and who has done holy

¹ I.e. any one who wishes to learn may do so, if only there is no obstacle in the way. No special injunction is wanted.

works (as prescribed for the āśramas) and obtained splendour' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 9*); and *Smṛiti* in the passage, 'Let a Brāhmaṇa stay not one day even outside the āśrama; having stayed outside for a year he goes to utter ruin.'

40. But of him who has become that (i.e. entered on a higher āśrama) there is no becoming not that (i.e. descending to a lower one), according to *Gai-minī* also, on account of restrictive rule, absence of such like (i.e. statements of descent), and non-existence (of good custom).

It has been established that there are stages of life for which chastity is obligatory. A doubt here arises whether one who has entered them may for some reason or other fall from them or not.—The *pūrvapakṣhin* maintains that as there is no difference a person may descend to a lower stage, either from the wish of well performing the duties of that stage, or influenced by passion and the like.—To this we reply as follows, 'Of him who has become that,' i.e. of him who has reached the stages for which chastity is obligatory, there is no 'becoming not that,' i.e. descending thence.—Why?—'On account of restrictive rule, absence of such like, and non-existence.' That means: there are, in the first place, restrictive rules declaring that a descent may not take place. Compare 'for life mortifying the body in the house of a tutor' (*Kṛ. Up. II, 23, 2*); 'He is to go into the forest, that is he is not to return thence, that is the Upanishad'; 'Having been dismissed by the teacher he is to follow one of the four āśramas, according to rule, up to release from the body.'—In the second place there are texts teaching the ascent to higher āśramas ('Having completed the Brahma-kārya state he is to become a householder; he may wander forth from the Brahma-kārya state'); but there are none teaching the descent to lower āśramas.—And in the third place there exists no good custom of that kind.—The descent to a lower āśrama can in no way be based on the wish of well performing the duties of that āśrama; for

Smṛiti says, 'One's own duty, however badly performed, is better than another duty well carried out' (Bha. Gītā III, 35). And the principle is that whatever is enjoined on a certain person constitutes his duty, not what a person is able to perform well; for all duty is characterised by injunction. Nor is a descent allowed owing to the influence of passion, &c.; for restrictive rules are weightier than passion.—By the word 'also' the *Sūtrakāra* indicates the consensus of *Gaimini* and *Bādarāyaṇa* on this point, in order to confirm thereby the view adopted.

41. And not also (can the expiation take place) prescribed in the chapter treating of qualification, because on account of the inference of his lapse from *Smṛiti* he (the *Naishṭhika*) is not capable of it.

If a *Brahmakārin* for life breaks from inattention the vow of chastity, is he to perform the expiatory sacrifice enjoined by the text, 'A student who has broken the vow of chastity shall sacrifice an ass to *Nirṛiti*¹' or not?—He is not, the *pūrvapakshin* says. For although in the chapter which treats of qualification (*Pū. Mīm. Sū. VI, 8, 22*) that expiatory ceremony has been settled (for *Brahmakārins* in general), it does not yet hold good for the professed *Brahmakārin*. For *Smṛiti* declares that such sins cannot be expiated by him any more than a head once cut off can again be healed on to the body, 'He who having once entered on the duties of a *Naishṭhika* again lapses from them, for him—a slayer of the Self—I see no expiation which might make him clean again.' The *Upakurvāna* (i. e. he who is a *Brahmakārin* for a certain time only, not for life) on the other hand, about whose sin *Smṛiti* makes no similar declaration, may purify himself by the ceremony mentioned.

42. But some (consider the sin) a minor one, (and

¹ Cp. e. g. *Āpastamba Dharma-sūtra I, 9, 26, 8*. The passage quoted in the text is, however, a scriptural one.

hence claim) the existence (of expiation for the Naishṭhika also); as in the case of the eating (of unlawful food). This has been explained (in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ).

Some teachers, however, are of opinion that the transgression of the vow of chastity, even on the part of a professed Brahmaçârî, is a minor sin, not a mortal one, excepting cases where the wife of the teacher and so on are concerned. For they plead that that sin is not anywhere enumerated among the deadly ones such as violating a teacher's bed and so on. Accordingly they claim the expiatory ceremony to be valid for the Naishṭhika as well as the Upakurvâṇa; both being alike Brahmaçârîs and having committed the same offence. The case is analogous to that of eating. Just as Brahmaçârîs (in general) who have broken their vow by eating honey, flesh, and the like may again purify themselves by a ceremony, so here also.—The reason for this decision is that for those who assume the absence of all expiation on the part of the Naishṭhikas no scriptural passage supporting their view is met with; while those who admit expiation can base their view on the passage quoted above ('A student who has broken the vow' &c.), which makes no distinction between Upakurvâṇas and Naishṭhikas. It therefore is more appropriate to assume the validity of the ceremony for Naishṭhikas also. The principle guiding the decision has been explained in the chapter treating of the means of right knowledge (Pû. Mî. Sû. I, 3, 8).—On this view the Smṛiti-passage which declares that there is no expiation for the Naishṭhika must be explained as aiming at the origination of weighty effort on the Naishṭhika's part.—Similarly in the case of the mendicant and the hermit. The hermit, when he has broken his vows, undergoes the Krikkhra penance for twelve nights and then cultivates a place rich in plants. The mendicant proceeds like the hermit, with the exception of cultivating the Soma-plant, and undergoes the purifications prescribed for his state. The rules given by Smṛiti for those cases have to be followed.

43. But (they are to be kept outside) in either case, on account of *Smṛiti* and custom.

But whether lapses from the duties of one's order, committed by those who are bound to chastity, be mortal sins or minor sins, in either case such persons are to be excluded by honourable men (*śiṣṭas*). For *Smṛiti* refers to them in terms of the highest reproach; cp. passages such as the one quoted under Sūtra 41; and the following one, 'He who touches a Brāhmaṇa that has broken his vow and fallen from his order, or a hanged man or one gnawed by worms must undergo the *Kāṇḍāyana* penance.' And good custom also condemns them; for good men do not sacrifice, study, or attend weddings with such persons.

44. To the lord (of the sacrifice) only (the agent-ship in meditations belongs), because scripture declares a fruit; this is the view of Ātreya.

With regard to meditations on subordinate members of sacrificial actions there arises a doubt whether they are to be carried out by the sacrificer (i.e. him for whom the sacrifice is performed) or by the officiating priests.—By the sacrificer, the *pūrvapakṣin* maintains, because scripture declares fruits. For a fruit is declared in such texts as the following one, 'There is rain for him, and he brings rain for others who thus knowing meditates on the fivefold *Sāman* as rain' (*Kh. Up.* II, 3, 2); and we must conclude that that fruit goes to the Lord of the sacrifice, because it is he who is entitled to the sacrificial performance together with its subordinate members, and because such meditations fall within the sphere of that to which he is entitled. And that the fruit belongs to him who carries out the meditations scripture states when saying, 'There is rain for him who meditates.'—But scripture declares a fruit for the priest also, viz. in the passage, 'Whatever desire he may desire either for himself or for the sacrificer he obtains by his singing.'—That passage, we reply, is of no force because it expressly declares the fruit (as belonging to the priest in a special case only). Hence the lord of the sacrifice only

is the agent in those meditations which have a fruit ; this is the opinion of the teacher Âtreya.

45. (They are) the work of the priest, this is the view of Audulomi ; since for that (i.e. the entire sacrificial work) he is feed.

The assertion that the meditations on subordinate members of the sacrifice are the work of the sacrificer is unfounded. They rather are the work of the priest, as the teacher Audulomi thinks. For the priest is rewarded for the work together with its subordinate members ; and the meditations on the udgîtha and so on fall within the performance of the work since they belong to the sphere of that to which the person entitled (viz. the lord of the sacrifice) is entitled. Hence they are to be carried out by the priests only, the case being analogous to that of the restrictive rule as to the work to be performed by means of the godohana vessel. In agreement herewith scripture declares the udgâtri to be the agent in knowledge, in the following passage, 'Him Vaka Dâlbhya knew. He was the udgâtri of the Naimishîya-sacrificers' (*Kh. Up. I, 2, 13*). With reference to the circumstance noted by the pûrvapakshin that scripture states the fruit to belong to the agent, we remark that this makes no difference ; for with the exception of cases expressly stated the priest cannot be connected with the sacrifice since he subserves the purposes (acts for) another (viz. the lord of the sacrifice).

46. And on account of scriptural statement.

'Whatever blessing the priests pray for at the sacrifice, they pray for the good of the sacrificer ; thus he said' (*Sat. Brâ. I, 3, 1, 26*) ; 'Therefore an udgâtri who knows this may say : what wish shall I obtain for you by my singing?' (*Kh. Up. I, 7, 8*). These scriptural passages also declare that the fruit of meditations in which the priest is the agent goes to the sacrificer.—All this establishes the conclusion that the meditations on subordinate parts of the sacrifice are the work of the priest.

47. There is the injunction of something else co-operating (towards knowledge) (which is) a third thing (with regard to *bālya* and *pāṇḍitya*), (which injunction is given) for the case (of perfect knowledge not yet having arisen) to him who is such (i. e. the *Samnyâsin* possessing knowledge); as in the case of injunctions and the like.

‘Therefore let a *Brâhmana* after he has done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state; and after he has done with the childlike state and learning (he is, or, may be) a *Muni*; and after he has done with what constitutes *Muniship* and non-*Muniship* (he is, or, may be) a *Brâhmana*’ (*Bṛi. Up. III, 5*). With reference to this passage a doubt arises whether it enjoins the state of a *Muni* or not.—The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that it does not enjoin it, since the injunction is completed with the clause, ‘Let him wish to stand by a childlike state.’ The following clause ‘then a *Muni*’ contains no verbal form of injunctive force and therefore must be viewed as a mere *anuvâda* (making a remark concerning the state of a *Muni* which is already established). Should it be asked how this conclusion is reached, we reply that *Muniship* is established by the clause ‘having done with learning’ (which forms part of the injunctive portion of the passage), as ‘*Muni*’ and ‘learned man’ both denote knowledge¹. It is, moreover, clear also that the last clause, ‘and after he has done with what constitutes *Muniship* and non-*Muniship* (he is) a *Brâhmana*,’ does not enjoin the condition of a *Brâhmana*, as that state is previously established (independently of that clause); but the words ‘then a *Brâhmana*’ are a mere glorificatory *anuvâda*. Now as the words ‘then a *Muni*’ show an analogous form of enunciation (to the clause ‘then a *Brâhmana*’), they also can embody a glorificatory *anuvâda* only.

¹ The state of a *Muni* is already enjoined by the clause ‘*pāṇḍi-tyam nirvidya*,’ the clause ‘*atha muniḥ*,’ therefore, may be viewed as an *anuvâda* (as which it could not be viewed, if there were no previous injunction of *mauna*).

To all this we reply as follows. 'There is an injunction of something else which co-operates.' The passage must be understood as enjoining the state of a Muni—which co-operates towards knowledge—in the same way as it enjoins learning and a childlike state, because that state is something new (not enjoined before).—But it has been said above that the word 'learning' already intimates Muniship!—This, we reply, does not invalidate our case since the word 'muni' denotes (not only knowledge as the term 'learned man' does, but) pre-eminence of knowledge, on the ground as well of its etymology from 'manana,' i.e. thinking, as of common use, shown in such phrases as 'I am the Vyāsa of Munis also.'—But the term 'Muni' is also seen to denote the last order of life; cp. passages such as 'Householdership, studentship, the order of Munis, the order of hermits in the woods.'—Yes, but it has not that meaning exclusively, as we see that it does not apply to phrases such as 'Valmīki is the foremost among Munis.' In the passage quoted (about the four orders) the last order is referred to, by the term 'Muni,' because there it stands in proximity to the other orders of life, and, as the state of the Ascetic is the only one which remains (after we have assigned the three other terms to the stages of life clearly denoted by them), the last order may be denoted 'mauna' because knowledge is its principal requirement.—We therefore conclude that in the passage under discussion the state of the Muni—whose characteristic mark is pre-eminence of knowledge—is enjoined as something third—with regard to the childlike state and learning.—Against the objection that the injunction terminates with the childlike state, we remark that all the same we must view the Muniship also as something enjoined, as it is something new, so that we have to supplement the clause as follows: 'then *he is to be* a Muni.' That the state of a Muni is something to be enjoined, in the same way as the childlike state and learning, also follows from its being referred to as something to be done with (like *bālya* and *pāṇḍitya*). It is enjoined 'on him who is such,' i.e. on the *Samnyāsin* possessing knowledge.—How do we know this latter point?—Because

the *Samnyāsin* who possesses knowledge forms the topic, as we see from the preceding passage, 'Having cognized the Self and risen above the desire for sons, &c., they wander about as mendicants.'—But if the *Samnyāsin* possesses knowledge, pre-eminence of knowledge is already established thereby; what then is the use of the injunction of Muniship?—To this the *Sūtra* replies 'in the case of.' That means: in the case of pre-eminence of knowledge not being established owing to the prevailing force of the (erroneous) idea of multiplicity; for that case the injunction (of Muniship, i.e. of pre-eminence of knowledge) is given. 'As in the case of injunctions and the like.' With reference to sacrifices such as are enjoined in the passage, 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to offer the *darsapūrṇamāsa*-sacrifice,' the aggregate of subordinate members, such as the establishment of the sacred fires, is enjoined as something helpful; similarly in this text whose topic is knowledge and which therefore does not chiefly aim at injunction, Muniship is enjoined as something helpful to knowledge.

As thus the order of the ascetic, as distinguished by a childlike state and so on, is actually established by scripture, for what reason does the *Khândogya* Upanishad wind up with the householder, viz. in the passage, 'After having received his discharge from his teacher he settles in his own house,' &c.? For by concluding with the householder, scripture manifests special regard for him.—To this doubt the next *Sūtra* replies.

48. On account of his being all, however, there is winding up with the householder.

The word 'however' is meant to lay stress on the householder's being everything. For the performance of many works belonging to his own *āśrama*, such as sacrifices and the like, which involve not a little trouble, is enjoined on him by scripture; and at the same time the duties of the other *āśramas*—such as tenderness for all living creatures, restraint of the senses and so on—are incumbent on him also as far as circumstances allow. There is therefore nothing con-

tradictory in the *Khândogya* winding up with the householder.

49. On account of there being injunction of the others also, in the same way as of the state of a Muni.

As the state of the Muni (*Samnyāsin*) and the state of the householder are enjoined in scripture, so also the two other orders, viz. that of the hermit and that of the student. For we have already pointed above to passages such as 'Austerity is the second, and to dwell as a student in the house of a teacher is the third.' As thus the four āśramas are equally taught by scripture, they are to be gone through equally, either in the way of option (between them) or in the way of comprehension (of all of them).—That the *Sūtra* uses a plural form (of 'the others') when speaking of two orders only, is due to its having regard either to the different sub-classes of those two, or to their different duties.

50. (The passage enjoining *bālya* means that the ascetic is to live) not manifesting himself; on account of the connexion (thus gained for the passage).

The passage, 'Therefore let a *Brāhmaṇa* after he has done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state,' speaks of the childlike state as something to be undertaken. Now by the 'childlike state' we have to understand either the nature or the actions of a child. Childhood in so far as it means a period of life cannot be brought about at will, and we therefore must take the 'childlike state' to mean either the behaviour of a child—such as attending to the calls of nature without any respect of place, &c.—or inward purity, i. e. absence of cunning, arrogance, force of the sensual passions, and so on¹.—With regard to the

¹ I am doubtful as to the true reading in this place. The 'va' of the Calcutta edition (p. 1039, last line) has certainly to be struck

doubt thus arising the pûrvapakshin maintains that by 'childlike being' people more commonly understand behaving, talking, and eating according to one's liking, freely attending to the calls of nature and so on, and that therefore the word is to be understood here also in that sense.—But such free conduct is improper, because sinfulness and so on would follow from it!—Not so, the pûrvapakshin replies; for the *Samnyâsin* possessing knowledge is, through express scriptural statements, free from all sinfulness thus incurred; just as the sacrificer is declared to be free from the sin he might incur in slaying the sacrificial animal.

To this we reply that it is not so because the statement of the text may be understood in a different sense. For as long as another rational interpretation of the word 'bâlya' is possible we have no right to adopt an interpretation which involves the assumption of another injunction being rendered futile. Moreover subordinate matters are enjoined with a view to the furtherance of the principal matter, and what here is the principal matter is the endeavour after knowledge which ascetics have to take upon themselves. Now if we accepted the entire conduct of a child as what is enjoined here we could in no way show that the endeavour of knowledge is furthered thereby. We therefore understand by 'bâlya' the special inward state of a child, i. e. absence of strong sensual passions and the like. This the Sûtra expresses by saying 'Not manifesting.' The meaning of the clause under discussion thus is: Let him be free from guile, pride, and so on, not manifesting himself by a display of knowledge, learning, and virtuousness, just as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed themselves does not strive to make a display of himself before others. For thus the passage gains a connexion with the entire chapter on the ground of co-operating towards the principal matter. In agreement herewith *Smṛiti*-writers have said, 'He whom nobody knows either

out. Some good MSS. read:—*bâla*taritam antargatâ bhâvavirud-dhir aprarûdhendriyatvam dambhâdirahitatvam vâ.—The 'antar-gatâ' seems to mean the same as the 'ântaraḥ,' p. 1041, ll. 1-2.

as noble or ignoble, as ignorant or learned, as well-conducted or ill-conducted, he is a Brāhmaṇa. Quietly devoted to his duty, let the wise man pass through life unknown; let him step on this earth as if he were blind, unconscious, deaf.' Another similar passage is, 'With hidden nature, hidden conduct,' and so on.

51. In this life also (the origination of knowledge takes place) if there is no obstruction of what is ready at hand; on account of this being seen (in scripture).

Beginning from Sūtra 26 of the present pāda we have discussed the various means of knowledge. We are now to consider whether knowledge—the fruit of those means—when accomplishing itself accomplishes itself only here in this life, or sometimes in the next life only.—The pūrva-pakṣin maintains that it accomplishes itself here in this life only. For, he argues, knowledge has for its antecedent the learning of scripture and so on, and nobody applies himself to learning, &c., with the intention that knowledge should result therefrom in the next life only; we rather observe that men begin to learn with a view to knowledge already springing up in this life. And also sacrifices and the like produce knowledge only mediately through learning and so on; for knowledge can be produced (directly) through the means of right knowledge only¹. Hence the origination of knowledge takes place in this life only.—To this we reply, 'The origination of knowledge takes place in this life if there is no obstruction of that which is ready at hand.' That means: When the means of knowledge which is operative is not obstructed by some other work the results of which are just then reaching maturity, knowledge already reaches maturity in this life.

¹ Of which study is one.—Sacrifices indeed may bear their special fruits in the next life only; but in so far as they co-operate towards knowledge they are effective in this life. For their only action in that line is to purify the mind and thus to render it fitter to receive knowledge.

But when such an obstruction takes place, then in the next life. And a work's reaching maturity depends on place, time, and operative cause presenting themselves. Nor is there any binding rule according to which the same time, place, and operative cause which ripen one work should ripen another work also; for there are works the fruits of which are opposed to each other. And scripture also goes only so far as to teach what the fruit of each work is, without teaching the special conditions of place, time, and operative cause. And owing to the specific strength of the means employed the supersensuous power of one work manifests itself (i. e. the fruit of that work realizes itself), while that of another is obstructed thereby and comes to a standstill.

Nor is there any reason why a man should not form, with regard to knowledge, an unspecified intention¹; for we may freely form the intention that knowledge should spring up from us either in this life or in some subsequent life. And knowledge although springing up through the mediation of learning and so on, springs up only in so far as learning destroys the obstacles in the way of knowledge. Thus scripture also declares the difficulty of knowing the Self, 'He of whom many are not even able to hear, whom many even when they hear of him do not comprehend; wonderful is a man when found who is able to teach him; wonderful is he who comprehends him when taught by an able teacher' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 7).—Moreover scripture relates that Vāmadeva already became Brahman in his mother's womb, and thus shows that knowledge may spring up in a later form of existence through means procured in a former one; for a child in the womb cannot possibly procure such means in its present state.

The same is shown by Smṛiti. Vāsudeva being asked by Arguna, 'What will be the fate of him, O *Kṛishṇa*, who has not reached perfection?' replies, 'None who performs good works undergoes an evil fate;' declares thereupon

¹ I. e. there is no reason for the assertion made by the pūrva-pakshin that men form a specified intention only, viz. that knowledge should spring up in this life only.

that such a man reaches the world of the blessed and is, later on, born again in a good family; and finally states just what we at present maintain in the passage beginning, 'There he obtains that knowledge which corresponds to his former bodily existence,' and closing, 'Perfected by many states of existence he then goes the highest way.'—It therefore is an established conclusion that knowledge originates, either in the present or in a future life, in dependence on the evanescence of obstacles.

52. No such definite rule (exists) as to the fruit which is release, on account of the assertions as to that condition, on account of the assertions as to that condition.

We have seen that in the case of persons desirous of release who rely upon the means of knowledge there exists a definite difference of result, in so far as the knowledge resulting springs up either in this life or a future life according to the degree of strength of the means employed. It might now be supposed that there exists a similar definite difference with regard to the fruit characterised as final release, owing to the superior or inferior qualification of the persons knowing.

With reference to this possible doubt the Sûtra now says, 'No such definite rule as to that fruit which is release.' That means: We must not suppose that in the case of that fruit which is release there exists an analogous definite rule of difference.—Why?—'On account of the assertions (by scripture) about that condition.' For all Vedânta-texts assert the state of final release to be of one kind only. The state of final release is nothing but Brahman, and Brahman cannot be connected with different forms since many scriptural passages assert it to have one nature only. Compare e.g. 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (*Bri. Up.* III, 8, 8); 'That Self is to be described by No, no' (*Bri. Up.* III, 9, 26); 'Where one sees nothing else' (*Kh. Up.* VII, 24, 1); 'That immortal Brahman is before' (*Mu. Up.* II, 2, 11); 'This everything is that Self' (*Bri. Up.* II, 4, 6);

'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 25*); 'When the Self only is all this how should he see another?' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 5, 15*).—Moreover the means of knowledge might perhaps, according to their individual strength, impart a higher (or lower) degree to their result, viz. knowledge, but not to the result of knowledge, viz. release; for, as we have explained more than once, release is not something which is to be brought about, but something whose nature is permanently established, and is reached through knowledge. Nor does, in reality, knowledge admit of lower or higher degree; for it is, in its own nature, high only, and would not be knowledge at all if it were low. Although therefore knowledge may differ in so far as it originates after a long or short time, it is impossible that release should be distinguished by a higher or lower degree. And from the absence of difference of knowledge also there follows absence of definite distinction on the part of the result of knowledge (viz. release). The whole case is analogous to that of the results of works. In that knowledge which is the means of release there is no difference as there is between works. In those cognitions, on the other hand, which have the qualified Brahman for its object—such as 'he who consists of mind, whose body is *prāṇa*'—a difference is possible according to the addition or omission of qualities, and hence there may be a definite distinction of results, just as there is between the results of actions. This is also indicated by the passage, 'according as they meditate on him they become.' But in meditations on Brahman devoid of qualities it is otherwise. Thus *Smṛiti* also says, 'No higher road is possible for any one; for they speak of inequality only where there are qualities.'—The repetition of the clause 'on account of the assertions as to that condition' indicates the termination of the *adhyāya*.

FOURTH ADHYĀYA.

FIRST PĀDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. Repetition (of the mental functions of knowing, meditating, &c., is required) on account of the text giving instruction more than once.

The third adhyāya was taken up chiefly with a discussion of the means of knowledge as related to the higher and lower vidyās. In the fourth adhyāya we shall now discuss the fruits of knowledge, and as occasion suggests some other topics also.—In the beginning, however, we shall carry on, in a few *adhikaraṇas*, a special discussion connected with the means of knowledge. ‘Verily the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on’ (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 5*); ‘Let a wise Brāhmaṇa after he has discovered him practise wisdom’ (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 21*); ‘That it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand’ (*Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1*).

Concerning these and similar passages a doubt arises whether the mental action referred to in them is to be performed once only or repeatedly.—Once only, the *pūrva* *vapakshin* says; as in the case of the *prayāga*-offerings and the like. For thereby the purpose of scripture is accomplished; while to practise repetitions not demanded by scripture would be to accomplish what is not the purpose of scripture.—But passages have been quoted which teach repetition ‘it is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on,’ &c. !—Let us then repeat exactly as scripture says, i. e. let us hear the Self once, let us think it once, let us reflect on it once, and nothing more. But where scripture teaches something once only—viz. in such passages as ‘He knows,’ ‘Let him meditate,’ &c.—no repetition has to be practised.—To this we reply as

follows. Repetition is to be performed because scripture gives repeated instruction. For the repeated instruction contained in passages such as 'He is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on' intimates the repetition of the required mental acts.—But the pûrvapakshin has said above that the repetition is to extend exactly to what scripture says and not to go further!—This is wrong, we reply, because all those mental activities have for their end intuition. For hearing and so on when repeated terminate in intuition, and thus subserve a seen purpose, just as the action of beating, &c., terminates in freeing the rice grains from their husks. Moreover also such terms as 'meditating,' 'being devoted to,' and 'reflecting' denote actions in which repetition is implied as a quality. Thus we say in ordinary life that a person 'is devoted' to a teacher or a king if he follows him with a mind steadily set on him; and of a wife whose husband has gone on a journey we say that she thinks of him, only if she steadily remembers him with longing. And (that also 'knowing' implies repetition, follows from the fact that) in the Vedānta-texts the terms 'knowing' and 'meditating' are seen to be used one in the place of the other. In some passages the term 'knowing' is used in the beginning and the term 'meditating' in the end; thus e.g. 'He who knows what he knows is thus spoken of by me,' and 'Teach me, sir, the deity which you meditate on' (*Kh. Up. IV, 1, 4; 2, 2*). In other places the text at first speaks of 'meditating' and later on of 'knowing;' thus e.g. 'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,' and 'He who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance' (*Kh. Up. III, 18, 1; 6*).—From this it follows that repetition has to be practised there also, where the text gives instruction once only. Where, again, the text gives repeated instruction, repeated performance of the mental acts is directly intimated.

2. And on account of an indicatory mark.

An indicatory mark also gives to understand that repetition is required. For, in the section treating of meditation

on the udgîtha, the text rejects the meditation on the udgîtha viewed as the sun, because its result is one sun only, and (in the clause 'Do thou resolve his rays,' &c.) enjoins a meditation on his manifold rays as leading to the possession of many suns (*Kh. Up. I, 5, 1; 2*); which shows that the repetition of meditations is something well known. Now as other meditations are meditations no less than the one referred to, it follows that repetition holds good for all of them.

Here the following objection may be raised. With regard to those meditations whose fruit is something to be effected repetition may hold good, because thereby superior strength may be imparted to them. But of what use can repetition be with regard to the meditations having for their object the highest Brahman, which present to us Brahman as the universal Self characterised by eternal purity, thought, and freedom? Should it be said that repetition has to be allowed because the knowledge of Brahman being the Self cannot spring up on hearing a text once only, we reply that in that case it will not spring up even when it is heard repeatedly. For if a text such as 'Thou art that' does not originate the true notion of Brahman if heard once, what hope is there that the desired effect should be produced by its repetition?—Perhaps it will be said that a sentence alone is not able to lead to the intuition of a thing; but that a sentence assisted by reasoning may enable us to intuit Brahman as the universal Self. But even in that case repetition would be useless; for the reasoning will lead to the desired intuition even if gone through once only.—Again it will perhaps be said that the sentence and reasoning together effect only a cognition of the generic nature of the object known, not of its specific individual character. When, to exemplify this, a man says that he feels a pain in his heart another person can infer from this statement—and certain accompanying symptoms such as trembling of the limbs—only that there exists a pain in general but is unable to intuit its specific character; all he knows is 'This man suffers a pain.' But what removes ignorance is (not

a general knowledge but) the intuitive knowledge of the specific character of something. And repetition serves to produce such knowledge.—This also is not so. For if so much only is done repeatedly even, no specific knowledge can spring up. When a specific character is not cognized through scripture and reasoning being applied once, it will not be cognized through them if applied a hundred times even. Hence whether scripture and reasoning produce specific knowledge or general knowledge, in either case they will do so even if acting once only; and repetition therefore is of no use. Nor can it be laid down as a binding rule that scripture and reasoning, applied once, in no case produce intuitive knowledge; for their effect will after all depend on the various degrees of intelligence of those who wish to learn. Moreover a certain use of repetition may be admitted in the case of worldly things which consist of several parts and possess generic character as well as individual difference; for there the student may grasp by one act of attention one part of the object, and by another act another part; so e.g. in the case of long chapters to be studied. But in order to reach a true knowledge of Brahman whose Self is mere intelligence and which therefore is destitute of generic character as well as specific difference there clearly is no need of repetition.

To this we make the following reply. Repetition would indeed be useless for him who is able to cognize the true nature of Brahman even if enounced once only in the sentence 'Thou art that.' But he who is not able to do that, for him repetition is of use. For this reason the teacher in the *Khândogya*, having given instruction in the sentence 'Thou art that, O Svetaketu,' and being again and again asked by his pupil—'Please, sir, inform me still more'—removes his pupil's reasons for doubt, and again and again repeats the instruction 'Thou art that.' We have already given an analogous explanation of the passage 'The Self is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected upon.'—But has not the *pûrvapakshin* declared that if the first enunciation of the sentence 'Thou art that' is not able to effect an intuition of its sense, repetition will like-

wise fail of the desired effect?—This objection, we reply, is without force, because the alleged impossibility is not confirmed by observation. For we observe that men by again and again repeating a sentence which they, on the first hearing, had understood imperfectly only, gradually rid themselves of all misconceptions and arrive at a full understanding of the true sense.—Moreover the sentence ‘Thou art that’ teaches that what is denoted by the term ‘thou’ is identical with what is denoted by ‘that.’ Now the latter term denotes the subject of the entire section, viz. the thinking Brahman which is the cause of the origin and so on of the world; which is known from other passages such as ‘Brahman which is true knowledge, infinite’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); ‘Brahman that is knowledge and bliss’ (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28); ‘That Brahman is unseen, but seeing; unknown, but knowing’ (Bri. Up. III, 8, 11); ‘not produced’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); ‘not subject to old age, not subject to death’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25); ‘not coarse, not fine; not short, not long’ (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8). In these passages terms such as ‘not produced’ deny the different phases of existence such as origination; such terms as ‘not coarse’ deny of it the qualities of substances such as coarseness; and such terms as ‘knowledge’ declare that the luminousness of intelligence constitutes its nature. The entity thus described—which is free from all the qualities of transmigratory existence, has consciousness for its Self and is called Brahman—is known, by all students of the Vedânta, as what is denoted by the term ‘that.’ They likewise know that what is denoted by the term ‘thou’ is the inward Self (pratyagâtman); which is the agent in seeing and hearing, is (successively) apprehended as the inward Self of all the outward involucra beginning with the gross body (cp. Taitt. Up.), and finally ascertained as of the nature of intelligence. Now in the case of those persons for whom the meaning of these two terms is obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, the sentence ‘Thou art that’ cannot produce a right knowledge of its sense, since the knowledge of the sense of a sentence presupposes the knowledge of the sense of the words; for them therefore the repetition of the scriptural

text and of reasoning must be assumed to have a purpose, viz. the discernment of the true sense of the words.—And although the object to be known, viz. the Self, does not consist of parts, yet men wrongly superimpose upon it the attribute of being made up of many parts, such as the body, the senses, the manas, the buddhi, the objects of the senses, the sensations, and so on. Now by one act of attention we may discard one of these parts, and by another act of attention another part; so that a successively progressing cognition may very well take place. This however is merely an antecedent of the (true) knowledge of the Self (in which there can be no successive stages).

Those quick-witted persons, on the other hand, in whose mind the sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, are able to intuit the sense of the sentence 'Thou art that' on its first enunciation even, and for them therefore repetition is not required. For the knowledge of the Self having once sprung up discards all ignorance; so that in this case no progressive process of cognition can be acknowledged.—All this might be so—an objection is raised—if cognition did spring up in any mind in the way described. (But this is not the case); for the cognition of the Self being subject to pain and so on has such strength that nobody ever reaches the cognition of all absence of pain and so on.—This objection, we reply, is without force; for it can be shown that the conceit of the Self being subject to pain, &c., is a wrong conceit, no less than the conceit of the body being the Self. For we clearly observe that when the body is cut or burned a wrong notion springs up, 'I am being cut,' 'I am being burned;' and similarly we observe that when sons, friends, &c.—who are even more external to the Self than one's own body—suffer affliction, that affliction is wrongly attributed to the Self. Analogous to these cases is the conceit of the Self being subject to pain, &c.; for like the body and so on, the condition of being subject to pain is observed as something external to intelligence. This moreover follows from its not being continued in such states as dreamless sleep and the like; while scripture expressly declares that in deep

sleep intelligence suffers no interruption, 'And when there he does not see, yet he is seeing,' &c. (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 22). Hence the intuition of the Self consists in the knowledge, 'My Self is pure intelligence free from all pain.' For him who possesses that knowledge there remains no other work. Thus scripture says, 'What shall we do with offspring, we who have this Self and this world' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 22). And *Smṛiti* also says, 'But that man who loves the Self, is satisfied by the Self and has all his longings stilled by the Self only, for him there is no further work' (*Bha. Gîtâ* III, 12).—For him, on the other hand, who does not reach that intuition all at once, we admit repetition, in order that the desired intuition may be brought about. He also, however, must not be moved towards repetition in such a way as to make him lose the true sense of the teaching, 'Thou art that.' In the mind of one on whom repetition is enjoined as a duty, there arise infallibly notions opposed to the true notion of Brahman, such as 'I have a claim on this (knowledge of the Self) as an agent; this is to be done by me¹.' But if a learner, naturally slow-minded, is about altogether to dismiss from his mind the purport of the sentence, because it does not reveal itself to him, it is permissible to fortify him in the understanding of that sense by means of reasoning on the texts relative to repetition and so on.—All this establishes the conclusion that, also in the case of cognitions of the highest Brahman, the instruction leading to such cognition may be repeated.

3. But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us comprehend (the Lord).

The *Sûtrakâra* now considers the question whether the highest Self whose characteristics scripture declares is

¹ Care must be taken not to engender in the mind of such a learner the notion that the repeated acts of reflection are incumbent on him as a duty; for such notions would only obstruct the end aimed at, i. e. the intuition that the Self of the meditating man is identical with Brahman's Self, to which no notions of duty or action apply.

to be understood as the 'I' or as different from me.—But how can a doubt arise, considering that scripture exhibits the term 'Self' whose sphere is the inward Self?—This term 'Self'—a reply may be given—may be taken in its primary sense, provided it be possible to view the individual soul and the Lord as non-different; but in the other case the term has to be taken in a secondary (metaphorical) sense only¹.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the term 'Self' is not to be taken as meaning the 'I.' For that which possesses the qualities of being free from all evil, &c., cannot be understood as possessing qualities of a contrary nature, nor can that which possesses those contrary qualities be understood as being free from all evil and so on. But the highest Lord possesses the qualities of being free from all evil, &c., and the embodied Self is characterised by qualities of a contrary nature.—Moreover, if the transmigrating soul constituted the Self of the Lord, it would follow that he is no Lord, and thus scripture would lose its meaning; while, if the Lord constituted the Self of the individual soul, the latter would not be entitled (to works and knowledge), and scripture would thus also lose its meaning. The latter assumption would moreover run counter to perception and the other means of proof.—Should it be said that, although the Lord and the soul are different, they yet must be contemplated as identical, on the basis of scripture, just as Vishṇu and other divinities are contemplated in images and so on; the answer is that this contemplation may take place, but that therefrom we must not conclude that the Lord is the real Self of the transmigrating soul.

To all this we make the following reply. The highest Lord must be understood as the Self. For in a chapter treating of the highest Lord the Gābālas acknowledge him to be the Self, 'Thou indeed I am, O holy divinity; I indeed thou art, O divinity!'—In the same light other

¹ And in that case the identity of the highest Self and the 'I' would not follow from the term 'Self.'

texts have to be viewed, which also acknowledge the Lord as the Self, such as 'I am Brahman' (*Bri. Up. I, 4, 10*). Moreover certain Vedânta-texts make us comprehend the Lord as the Self, 'Thy Self is this which is within all' (*Bri. Up. III, 4, 1*); 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (*Bri. Up. III, 7, 3*); 'That is the True, that is the Self, thou art that' (*Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7*).—Nor can we admit the truth of the assertion, made by the pûrvapakshin, that all these passages teach merely a contemplation (of the Lord) in certain symbols, analogous to the contemplation of Vishnu in an image. For that would firstly involve that the texts have not to be understood in their primary sense¹; and in the second place there is a difference of syntactical form. For where scripture intends the contemplation of something in a symbol, it conveys its meaning through a single enunciation such as 'Brahman is Mind' (*Kh. Up. III, 18, 1*), or 'Brahman is Âditya' (*Kh. Up. III, 19, 1*). But in the passage quoted above, scripture says, 'I am Thou and thou art I.' As here the form of expression differs from that of texts teaching the contemplation of symbols, the passage must be understood as teaching non-difference. This moreover follows from the express prohibition of the view of difference which a number of scriptural texts convey. Compare e.g. 'Now if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know' (*Bri. Up. I, 4, 10*); 'From death to death goes he who here perceives any diversity' (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19*); 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (*Bri. Up. II, 4, 6*).—Nor is there any force in the objection that things with contrary qualities cannot be identical; for this opposition of qualities can be shown to be false.—Nor is it true that from our doctrine it would follow that the Lord is not a Lord. For in these matters scripture alone is authoritative, and we, moreover, do not at all admit that scripture teaches the Lord to be the Self of the transmi-

¹ And this is objectionable as long as it has not been demonstrated that the primary meaning is altogether inadmissible.

grating soul, but maintain that by denying the transmigrating character of the soul it aims at teaching that the soul is the Self of the Lord. From this it follows that the non-dual Lord is free from all evil qualities, and that to ascribe to him contrary qualities is an error.—Nor is it true that the doctrine of identity would imply that nobody is entitled to works, &c., and is contrary to perception and so on. For we admit that before true knowledge springs up, the soul is implicated in the transmigratory state, and that this state constitutes the sphere of the operation of perception and so on. On the other hand texts such as ‘But when the Self only has become all this, how should he see another?’ &c., teach that as soon as true knowledge springs up, perception, &c., are no longer valid.—Nor do we mind your objecting that if perception, &c., cease to be valid, scripture itself ceases to be so; for this conclusion is just what we assume. For on the ground of the text, ‘Then a father is not a father’ up to ‘Then the Vedas are not Vedas’ (*Bri. Up. IV, 3, 22*), we ourselves assume that when knowledge springs up scripture ceases to be valid.—And should you ask who then is characterised by the absence of true knowledge, we reply: You yourself who ask this question!—And if you retort, ‘But I am the Lord as declared by scripture,’ we reply, ‘Very well, if you have arrived at that knowledge, then there is nobody who does not possess such knowledge.’—This also disposes of the objection, urged by some, that a system of non-duality cannot be established because the Self is affected with duality by Nescience.

Hence we must fix our minds on the Lord as being the Self.

4. Not in the symbol (is the Self to be contemplated); for he (the meditating person) (may) not (view symbols as being the Self).

‘Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman; this is said with reference to the body. Let a man meditate on ether as Brahman; this is said with reference to the Devas’ (*Kh. Up. III, 18, 1*); ‘Āditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine’

(*Kk. Up.* III, 19, 1); 'He who meditates on name as Brahman' (*Kk. Up.* VII, 1, 5). With regard to these and similar meditations on symbols a doubt arises whether the Self is to be apprehended in them also, or not.

The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that it is right to apprehend the Self in them also because Brahman is known from scriptural passages as the (universal) Self. For those symbols also are of the nature of Brahman in so far as they are effects of it, and therefore are of the nature of the Self as well.

We must not, our reply runs, attach to symbols the idea of Brahman. For he, i.e. the meditating person, cannot comprehend the heterogeneous symbols as being of the nature of the Self.—Nor is it true that the symbols are of the nature of the Self, because as being effects of Brahman they are of the nature of Brahman; for (from their being of the nature of Brahman) there results the non-existence of (them as) symbols. For the aggregate of names and so on can be viewed as of the nature of Brahman only in so far as the individual character of those effects of Brahman is sublated; and when that character is sublated how then can they be viewed as symbols, and how can the Self be apprehended in them? Nor does it follow from the fact of Brahman being the Self that a contemplation of the Self can be established on the ground of texts teaching a contemplation on Brahman (in certain symbols), since a contemplation of the latter kind does not do away with agentship and the like. For the instruction that Brahman is the Self depends on the doing away with agentship and all other characteristics of transmigratory existence; the injunction of meditations, on the other hand, depends on the non-removal of those characteristics. Hence we cannot establish the apprehension of the Self (in the symbols) on the ground of the meditating person being the same as the symbols. For golden ornaments and figures made of gold are not identical with each other, but only in so far as gold constitutes the Self of both. And that from that oneness (of symbol and meditating person) which depends on Brahman being the Self of all there results non-existence of the symbols (and hence impossibility of the meditations

enjoined), we have explained above.—For these reasons the Self is not contemplated in symbols.

5. A contemplation of Brahman (is to be superinduced on symbols of Brahman), on account of the exaltation (thereby bestowed on the symbols).

With regard to the texts quoted above there arises another doubt, viz. whether the contemplation of Āditya and so on is to be superimposed on Brahman, or the contemplation of Brahman on Āditya and so on¹.—But whence does this doubt arise?—From the absence of a decisive reason, owing to the grammatical co-ordination. For we observe in the sentences quoted a co-ordination of the term 'Brahman' with the terms 'Āditya,' &c. 'Āditya is Brahman,' 'Prāṇa is Brahman,' 'Lightning is Brahman ;' the text exhibiting the two members of each clause in the same case. And here there is no obvious occasion for co-ordination because the words 'Brahman' on the one hand, and 'Āditya' and so on on the other hand, denote different things; not any more than there exists a relation of co-ordination which could be expressed by the sentence 'The ox is a horse.'—But cannot Brahman and Āditya and so on be viewed as co-ordinated on the basis of the relation connecting a causal substance and its effects, analogously to the case of clay and earthen vessels?—By no means, we reply. For in that case dissolution of the effect would result from its co-ordination with the causal substance, and that—as we have already explained—would imply non-existence of the symbol. Moreover, the scriptural passages would then be statements about the highest Self, and thereby the qualification for meditations would be sublated²; and further the mention of a limited effect would be purposeless³. It follows herefrom that we have

¹ I. e. whether Brahman is to be meditated upon as Āditya, or Āditya as Brahman.

² While, as a matter of fact, scripture enjoins the meditations.

³ It would serve no purpose to refer to limited things, such as

to do here with the superimposition of the contemplation of one thing on another thing—just as in the case of the text, ‘The Brâhmana is Agni Vaisvânara,’—and the doubt therefore arises the contemplation of which of the two things is to be superimposed on the other.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that there exists no fixed rule for this case, because we have no scriptural text establishing such a rule.—Or else, he says, contemplations on Âditya and so on are exclusively to be superimposed on Brahman. For in this way Brahman is meditated upon by means of contemplations on Âditya, and scripture decides that meditations on Brahman are what is productive of fruits. Hence contemplations on Brahman are not to be superimposed on Âditya and so on.

To this we make the following reply. The contemplation on Brahman is exclusively to be superimposed on Âditya and so on.—Why?—‘On account of exaltation.’ For thus Âditya and so on are viewed in an exalted way, the contemplation of something higher than they being superimposed on them. Thereby we also comply with a secular rule, viz. the one enjoining that the idea of something higher is to be superimposed upon something lower, as when we view—and speak of—the king’s charioteer as a king. This rule must be observed in worldly matters, because to act contrary to it would be disadvantageous; for should we view a king as a charioteer, we should thereby lower him, and that would be no ways beneficial.—But, an objection is raised, as the whole matter rests on scriptural authority, the suspicion of any disadvantage cannot arise; and it is, further, not appropriate to define contemplations based on scripture by secular rules!—That might be so, we reply, if the sense of scripture were fully ascertained; but as it is liable to doubt, there is no objection to our having recourse to a secular rule whereby to ascertain it. And as by means of that rule we decide that what scripture means

the sun and so on, as being resolved into their causal substance, i.e. Brahman. True knowledge is concerned only with the resolution of the entire world of effects into Brahman.

is the superimposition of a higher contemplation on something lower, we should incur loss by superimposing a lower contemplation upon something higher.—As moreover in the passages under discussion the words 'Āditya' and so on stand first, they must, this being not contradictory, be taken in their primary sense. But, as our thought is thus defined by these words taken in their true literal sense, the word 'Brahman,' which supervenes later on, cannot be co-ordinated with them if it also be taken in its true literal sense, and from this it follows that the purport of the passages can only be to enjoin contemplations on Brahman (superinduced on Āditya and so on).—The same sense follows from the circumstance that the word 'Brahman' is, in all the passages under discussion, followed by the word 'iti,' 'thus¹.' 'He is to meditate (on Āditya, &c.) as Brahman.' The words 'Āditya' and so on, on the other hand, the text exhibits without any such addition. The passages therefore are clearly analogous to such sentences as 'He views the mother o' pearl as silver,' in which the word 'mother o' pearl' denotes mother o' pearl pure and simple, while the word 'silver' denotes, by implication, the idea of silver; for the person in question merely thinks 'this is silver' while there is no real silver. Thus our passages also mean, 'He is to view Āditya and so on as Brahman.'—The complementary clauses, moreover, which belong to the passages under discussion ('He who knowing this meditates (upon) Āditya as Brahman;,' 'Who meditates (on) speech as Brahman;,' 'Who meditates (on) will as Brahman'), exhibit the words 'Āditya' and so on in the accusative case, and thereby show them to be the direct objects of the action of meditation².—Against the remark that in all the mentioned cases Brahman only has to be meditated upon in order that a fruit may result from the meditation, we point out that from the mode of proof used

¹ Which in the translations given above of the texts under discussion is mostly rendered by 'as' before the words concerned.

² While the word 'Brahman' does not stand in the accusative case.

above we infer that (not Brahman but) only Âditya and so on have to be meditated upon. But as in the case of hospitality shown to guests, Brahman, that is the supreme ruler of all, will give the fruit of meditations on Âditya and so on as well. This we have already shown under III, 2, 28. And, after all, Brahman also is meditated upon (in the cases under discussion) in so far as a contemplation on Brahman is superinduced on its symbols, analogously as a contemplation on Vishnu is superinduced on his images.

6. And the ideas of Âditya and so on (are to be superimposed) on the members (of the sacrificial action); owing to the effectuation (of the result of the sacrifice).

‘He who burns up these, let a man meditate upon him as udgîtha’ (*Kh. Up. I, 3, 1*); ‘Let a man meditate on the fivefold Sâman in the worlds’ (*Kh. Up. II, 2, 1*); ‘Let a man meditate on the sevenfold Sâman in speech’ (*Kh. Up. II, 8, 1*); ‘This earth is the *Rik*, fire is Sâman’ (*Kh. Up. I, 6, 1*).—With regard to these and similar meditations limited to members of sacrificial action, there arises a doubt whether the text enjoins contemplations on the udgîtha and so on superinduced on Âditya and so on, or else contemplations on Âditya, &c., superinduced on the udgîtha and so on.

No definite rule can here be established, the pûrvapakshin maintains, since there is no basis for such a rule. For in the present case we are unable to ascertain any special pre-eminence, while we were able to do so in the case of Brahman. Of Brahman, which is the cause of the whole world and free from all evil and so on, we can assert definitively that it is superior to Âditya and so on; the udgîtha and so on, on the other hand, are equally mere effects, and we cannot therefore with certainty ascribe to any of them any pre-eminence.—Or else we may decide that the ideas of the udgîtha and so on are to be superinduced exclusively on Âditya and so on. For the udgîtha and so on are of the nature of sacrificial work, and as it is known that the fruit is attained through the work, Âditya

and so on if meditated upon as udgītha and so on will themselves become of the nature of work and thereby be causes of fruit.—Moreover, the text, ‘This earth is the *Rik*, the fire is the *Sāman*,’ is followed by the complementary passage, ‘this *Sāman* is placed upon this *Rik*,’ where the word ‘*Rik*’ denotes the earth and the word ‘*Sāman*’ the fire. Now this (viz. this calling the earth ‘*Rik*’ and calling the fire ‘*Sāman*’) is possible only if the meaning of the passage is that the earth and the fire have to be viewed as *Rik* and *Sāman*; not if the *Rik* and the *Sāman* were to be contemplated as earth and fire. For the term ‘king’ is metaphorically applied to the charioteer—and not the term ‘charioteer’ to the king—the reason being that the charioteer may be viewed as a king.—Again in the text, ‘Let a man meditate upon the fivefold *Sāman* in the worlds,’ the use of the locative case ‘in the worlds’ intimates that the meditation on the *Sāman* is to be superimposed on the worlds as its locus. This is also proved by the analogous passage, ‘This *Gāyatra Sāman* is woven on the vital airs’ (*Kh. Up.* II, 11, 1).—Moreover (as proved before), in passages such as ‘*Āditya* is Brahman, this is the instruction,’ Brahman, which is mentioned last, is superimposed on *Āditya*, which is mentioned first. In the same way the earth, &c., are mentioned first, and the *hīnkāra*, &c., mentioned last in passages such as ‘The earth is the *hīnkāra*’ (*Kh. Up.* II, 2, 1).—For all these reasons the idea of members of sacrificial action has to be transferred to *Āditya* and so on, which are not such members.

To this we make the following reply. The ideas of *Āditya* and so on are exclusively to be transferred to members of sacrificial action, such as the udgītha and so on. For what reason?—‘On account of effectuation’—that means: Because thus, through their connexion with the supersensuous result (of the sacrificial work under discussion), when the udgītha and so on are ceremonially qualified by being viewed as *Āditya* and so on, the sacrificial work is successful¹. A scriptural passage—viz. *Kh.*

¹ Certain constituent members of the sacrificial action—such as

Up. I, 1, 10, 'Whatever one performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad is more powerful'—moreover expressly declares that knowledge causes the success of sacrificial work.—Well then, an objection is raised, let this be admitted with regard to those meditations which have for their result the success of certain works; but how is it with meditations that have independent fruits of their own? Of this latter nature is e.g. the meditation referred to in *Kh. Up.* II, 2, 3, 'He who knowing this meditates on the fivefold Sâman in the worlds (to him belong the worlds in an ascending and a descending scale).—In those cases also, we reply, the meditation falls within the sphere of a person entitled to the performance of a certain work, and therefore it is proper to assume that it has a fruit only through its connexion with the supersensuous result of the work under the heading of which it is mentioned; the case being analogous to that of the godohana-vessel¹.—And as Âditya and so on are of the nature of fruits of action, they may be viewed as superior to the udgîtha and so on which are of the nature of action only. Scriptural texts expressly teach that the reaching of Âditya (the sun) and so on constitutes the fruit of certain works.—Moreover the initial passages, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as the udgîtha,' and 'Of this syllable the full account is this' (*Kh. Up.* I, 1, 1), represent the udgîtha only as the object of meditation, and only after that the

the udgîtha—undergo a certain ceremonial purification (*sam-skâra*) by being meditated upon as Âditya and so on. The meditations therefore contribute, through the mediation of the constituent members, towards the apûrva, the supersensuous result of the entire sacrifice.

¹ The sacred text promises a special fruit for the employment of the milking-pail (instead of the ordinary *kamasa*), viz. the obtainment of cattle; nevertheless that fruit is obtained only in so far as the godohana subserves the accomplishment of the apûrva of the sacrifice. Analogously those meditations on members of sacrificial works for which the text promises a separate fruit obtain that fruit only in so far as they effect a mysterious *sam-skâra* in those members, and thereby subserve the apûrva of the sacrifice.

text enjoins the contemplations on Āditya and so on.—Nor can we accept the remark that Āditya and so on being meditated upon as udgītha, &c., assume thereby the nature of work and thus will be productive of fruit. For pious meditation is in itself of the nature of work, and thus capable of producing a result. And if the udgītha and so on are meditated upon as Āditya, &c., they do not therefore cease to be of the nature of work.—In the passage, ‘This Sâman is placed upon this *Rik*,’ the words ‘*Rik*’ and ‘Sâman’ are employed to denote the earth and Agni by means of implication (*lakṣhaṇā*), and implication may be based, according to opportunity, either on a less or more remote connexion of sense. Although, therefore, the intention of the passage is to enjoin the contemplation of the *Rik* and the Sâman as earth and Agni, yet—as the *Rik* and the Sâman are mentioned separately and as the earth and Agni are mentioned close by—we decide that, on the ground of their connexion with the *Rik* and Sâman, the words ‘*Rik*’ and ‘Sâman’ are employed to denote them (i. e. earth and Agni) only. For we also cannot altogether deny that the word ‘charioteer’ may, for some reason or other, metaphorically denote a king.—Moreover the position of the words in the clause, ‘Just this (earth) is *Rik*,’ declares that the *Rik* is of the nature of earth; while if the text wanted to declare that the earth is of the nature of *Rik*, the words would be arranged as follows, ‘this earth is just *Rik*.’—Moreover the concluding clause, ‘He who knowing this sings the Sâman,’ refers only to a cognition based on a subordinate member (of sacrificial action), not to one based on the earth and so on.—Analogously in the passage, ‘Let a man meditate (on) the fivefold Sâman in the worlds,’ the worlds—although enounced in the locative case—have to be superimposed on the Sâman, as the circumstance of the ‘Sâman’ being exhibited in the objective case indicates it to be the object of meditation. For if the worlds are superimposed on the Sâman, the Sâman is meditated upon as the Self of the worlds; while in the opposite case the worlds would be meditated upon as the Self of the Sâman.—The same remark applies to the passage, ‘This Gâyatra

Sâman is woven on the *prâṇas*' (*Kh. Up. II, 11, 1*).—Where again both members of the sentence are equally exhibited in the objective case, viz. in the passage, 'Let a man meditate on the sevenfold Sâman (as) the sun' (*Kh. Up. II, 9, 1*), we observe that the introductory passages—viz. 'Meditation on the whole Sâman is good;' 'Thus for the fivefold Sâman;' 'Next for the sevenfold Sâman' (*Kh. Up. II, 1, 1*; *7, 2*; *8, 1*)—represent the Sâman only as the object of meditation, and therefrom conclude that Âditya has to be superinduced on it, and not the reverse.—From this very circumstance of the Sâman being the object of meditation, it follows that even in cases where the two members of the sentence have a reverse position—such as 'The earth (is) the *hîṅkāra*,' &c.—the *hîṅkāra*, &c., have to be viewed as earth and so on; and not the reverse.—From all this it follows that reflections based on things not forming constituent members of the sacrifice, such as Âditya and so on, are to be superimposed on the *udgîtha* and the like which are such constituent members.

7. Sitting (a man is to meditate), on account of the possibility.

As meditations connected with members of sacrificial action depend on action, we need not raise the question whether they are to be carried on in a sitting, or any other posture. The same holds good in the case of perfect intuition, since knowledge depends on its object only. With regard to all other meditations, on the other hand, the author of the *Sûtras* raises the question whether they may be undertaken indifferently by a person standing, sitting, or lying down; or only by a person sitting.

The *pûrvapakshin* here maintains that as meditation is something mental there can be no restriction as to the attitude of the body.—No, the author of the *Sûtras* rejoins; 'Sitting' only a man is to meditate.—Why?—'On account of the possibility.' By meditation we understand the lengthened carrying on of an identical train of thought; and of this a man is capable neither when going nor when running, since the act of going and so on tends to distract the mind.

The mind of a standing man, again, is directed on maintaining the body in an erect position, and therefore incapable of reflection on any subtle matter. A man lying down, finally, is unawares overcome by slumber. A sitting person, on the other hand, may easily avoid these several untoward occurrences, and is therefore in a position to carry on meditations.

8. And on account of thoughtfulness.

Moreover also the word 'thoughtfulness' denotes a lengthened carrying on of the same train of ideas. Now 'thoughtfulness' we ascribe to those whose mind is concentrated on one and the same object, while their look is fixed and their limbs move only very slightly. We say e.g. that the crane is thoughtful, or that a wife whose husband has gone on a journey is thoughtful. Now such thoughtfulness is easy for those who sit; and we therefore conclude herefrom also that meditation is the occupation of a sitting person.

9. And with reference to immobility (scripture ascribes thought to the earth, &c.).

Moreover, in the passage 'The earth thinks as it were' scripture ascribes thought to the earth, with regard to its immobility. This also helps us to infer that meditation is the occupation of one who is sitting.

10. And Smṛiti-passages say the same.

Authoritative authors also teach in their Smṛitis that a sitting posture subserves the act of meditation: cp. e.g. Bha. Gītā VI, 11, 'Having made a firm seat for one's self on a pure spot.' For the same reason the Yogasāstra teaches different sitting postures, viz. the so-called lotus position and so on.

11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), there (meditation may be carried on), on account of there being no difference.

A doubt here arises with regard to direction, place, and

time, viz. whether any restrictive rules exist or not.—Against the view of those who maintain that such rules exist because we have analogous rules concerning the locality, &c., of Vedic works, the Sâtrakâra remarks that all rules concerning direction, place, and time depend on the aim merely ; that is to say : Let a man meditate at whatever time, in whatever place and facing whatever region, he may with ease manage to concentrate his mind. For while scripture prescribes an easterly direction, the time of forenoon, and a spot sloping towards the east for certain sacrifices, no such specific rules are recorded for meditation, since the requisite concentration may be managed indifferently anywhere.—But, an objection is raised, some passages record such specific rules, as e.g. the following one, ‘Let a man apply himself (to meditation) in a level and clean place, free from pebbles, fire and dust, noises, standing water, and the like, favourable to the mind, not infested by what hurts the eyes, full of caves and shelters’ (Svet. Up. II, 10).—Such particular rules are met with indeed ; but the teacher being friendly-minded says that there is no binding rule as to the particulars mentioned therein. The clause ‘favourable to the mind’ moreover shows that meditation may be carried on wherever concentration of the mind may be attained.

12. Up to death (meditations have to be repeated); for then also it is thus seen in scripture.

The first *adhikarâṇa* (of the present *adhyâya*) has established that repetition is to be observed with regard to all meditations. But now a distinction is made. Those meditations which aim at complete knowledge, terminate—in the same way as the beating of the rice grains is terminated by the husks becoming detached from the grains—with their effect being accomplished ; for as soon as the effect, i.e. perfect knowledge, has been obtained, no further effort can be commanded, since scriptural instruction does not apply to him who knows that Brahman—which is not the object of injunction—constitutes his Self. On the other hand a doubt arises whether the devotee is to repeat those meditations which aim at certain forms of

exaltation for a certain time only and then may stop ; or whether he is to repeat them again and again as long as he lives.

Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that such meditations are to be carried on for some time only and then to be given up, since this satisfies the demands of those scriptural passages which teach meditations distinguished by repetition.

To this we make the following reply. The devotee is to reiterate those meditations up to his death, since the supersensuous result (of such meditations) is reached by means of the extreme meditation. For such works also as originate a fruit to be enjoyed in a future state of existence presuppose, at the time of death, a creative cognition analogous to the fruit to be produced ; as appears from such passages as, ' Endowed with knowledge (i.e. the conception of the fruit to be obtained) he (i.e. the individual soul) goes after that (viz. the fruit) which is connected with that knowledge' (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2*) ; ' Whatever his thought (at the time of death), with that he goes into Prâna, and the Prâna united with light, together with the individual Self, leads on to the world as conceived (at the moment of death)' (*Pr. Up. IV, 2, 10*). This also follows from the comparison to the caterpillar (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 3*). But the meditations under discussion do not, at the time of death, require any other creative cognition but a repetition of themselves. Such meditations therefore as consist in the creative conception of a fruit to be obtained must be repeated up to the moment of death. Analogously the scriptural text, *Sat. Brâ. X, 6, 3, 1*—' With whatever thought he passes away from this world'—declares that the meditation extends up to the time of death. Similarly *Smṛiti* says, ' Remembering whatever form of being he in the end leaves this body, into that same form he ever passes, assimilated to its being' (*Bha. Gîtâ VIII, 6*) ; and ' At the time of death with unmoved mind' (*Bha. Gîtâ VIII, 10*). And that at the moment of death also there remains something to be done, the scriptural passage (*Kh. Up. III, 17, 6*) also proves, ' Let a man, at the time of death, take refuge with this triad.'

13. On the attainment of this (viz. Brahman) (there take place) the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared (by scripture).

The supplement to the third adhyāya is finished herewith, and an inquiry now begins concerning the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman.—The doubt here presents itself whether, on the attainment of Brahman, sins the results of which are opposed in nature to such attainment are extinguished or not. They cannot possibly be extinguished, the *pūrvapakshin* maintains, before they have given their results, because the purpose of all works is their result. For we understand from scripture that work possesses the power of producing results; if, therefore, the work would perish without the enjoyment of its result, scripture would thereby be rendered nugatory. *Smṛiti* also declares that 'works do not perish.'—But from this it would follow that all scriptural instruction regarding expiatory ceremonies is meaningless!—This objection is without force, we reply, because expiatory ceremonies may be viewed as merely due to certain special occurrences; as is the case with the offering enjoined on the occasion of the house (of one who has established the sacred fire-place) being burned¹.—Let us moreover admit that expiatory ceremonies, because enjoined on account of a person being afflicted by some mischief, may be meant to extinguish that mischief. But there is no analogous injunction of the knowledge of Brahman.—But if we do not admit that the works of him who knows Brahman are extinguished, it follows that he must necessarily enjoy the fruits of his works and thus cannot obtain release!—This follows by no means; but in the same way as the results of works, release will take place in due dependence on place, time, and special causes.—For these reasons the obtainment of Brahman does not imply the cessation of (the consequences of) misdeeds.

¹ Scripture enjoins the *ishā* in question merely on the occasion of the house being burned, not as annulling the mischief done.

To this we make the following reply. On the obtainment of Brahman there take place the non-clinging (to the agent) of the posterior sins and the annihilation of anterior ones.—‘On account of this being declared.’ For in a chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman scripture expressly declares that future sins which might be presumed to cling to the agent do not cling to him who knows: ‘As water does not cling to a lotus-leaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this’ (*Kh. Up.* IV, 14, 3). Similarly scripture declares the destruction of previously accumulated evil deeds: ‘As the fibres of the Ishikā reed when thrown into the fire are burned, thus all his sins are burned’ (*Kh. Up.* V, 24, 3). The extinction of works the following passage also declares, ‘The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, extinguished are all his works when He has been beheld who is high and low’ (*Mu. Up.* II, 2, 8).—Nor is there any force in the averment that the assumption of works being extinguished without their fruits having been enjoyed would render scripture futile. For we by no means deny the fruit-producing power of works; this power actually exists; but we maintain that it is counteracted by other causes such as knowledge. Scripture is concerned only with the existence of this power in general, not with its obstruction and non-obstruction. Thus also the *Smṛiti* passage, ‘For work is not extinguished,’ expresses the general rule; for as fruition of the result is the purpose of work, work is not extinguished without such fruition. But it is assumed that evil deeds are extinguished through expiatory ceremonies and the like, on account of scriptural and *Smṛiti* passages such as ‘All sins transcends he, the murder of a Brāhmaṇa transcends he who offers the asvamedha-sacrifice and who knows it thus’ (*Tai. Samh.* V, 3, 12, 1).—Nor is there any truth in the assertion that expiatory ceremonies are due to certain special occurrences (without possessing the power of extinguishing the evil inherent in such occurrences). For as these expiatory acts are enjoined in connexion with evil events, we may assume that they have for their fruit the destruction of such evil,

and are therefore not entitled to assume any other fruit. —Against the objection that knowledge is not actually enjoined with reference to the destruction of evil while expiatory acts are so enjoined, we make the following remark. In the case of the meditations on the qualified Brahman there exists such injunction, and the corresponding complementary passages declare that he who possesses such knowledge obtains lordly power and cessation of all sin. Now there is no reason why the passages should not expressly aim at declaring these two things¹, and we therefore conclude that the fruit of those vidyâs is the acquisition of lordly power, preceded by the annulment of all sin. In the case of vidyâs referring to Brahman devoid of qualities we indeed have no corresponding injunction; nevertheless the destruction of all works follows from the cognition that our true Self is not an agent. (With relation to these vidyâs about Brahman as devoid of qualities) the term 'non-clinging' shows that, as far as future works are concerned, he who knows Brahman does not enter at all into the state of agency. And as to works past, although he has entered as it were into that state owing to wrong knowledge, yet those works also are dissolved when, through the power of knowledge, wrong cognition comes to an end; this is conveyed by the term 'destruction.' 'That Brahman whose nature it is to be at all times neither agent nor enjoyer, and which is thus opposed in being to the (soul's) previously established state of agency and enjoyment, that Brahman am I; hence I neither was an agent nor an enjoyer at any previous time, nor am I such at the present time, nor shall I be such at any future time;' this is the cognition of the man who knows Brahman. And in this way only final release is possible; for otherwise, i.e. if the chain of works which have been running on from eternity could not be cut short, release

¹ I. e. there is no reason to assume that those passages mention the acquisition of lordly power and the cessation of sin merely for the purpose of glorifying the injunction, and not for the purpose of stating the result of our compliance with the injunction.

could never take place.—Nor can final release be dependent on locality, time, and special causes, as the fruit of works is; for therefrom it would follow that the fruit of knowledge is non-permanent and cannot be.

It therefore is an established conclusion that on attaining Brahman there results the extinction of all sin.

14. Of the other (i. e. good works) also there is, in the same way, non-clinging; but at death.

In the preceding *adhyakṣaṇa* it has been shown that, according to scriptural statements, all natural sin—which is the cause of the soul's bondage—does, owing to the power of knowledge, either not cling to the soul or undergo destruction. One might now think that works of religious duty which are enjoined by scripture are not opposed to knowledge also founded on scripture. In order to dispel this notion the reasoning of the last *adhyakṣaṇa* is formally extended to the case under discussion. For him who knows there is 'in the same way,' i. e. as in the case of sin, 'non-clinging' and destruction 'of the other also,' i. e. of good works also; because such works also, as productive of their own results, would be apt to obstruct thereby the result of knowledge. Scripture also—in passages such as 'He overcomes both' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22*)—declares that good works are extinguished no less than evil ones, and the extinction of works which depends on the cognition of the Self not being an agent is the same in the case of good and of evil works, and moreover there is a passage making a general statement without any distinction, viz. 'And his works are extinguished' (*Mu. Up. II, 2, 8*). And even there where the text mentions evil works only, we must consider good works also to be implied therein, because the results of the latter also are inferior to the result of knowledge. Moreover scripture directly applies the term 'evil works' to good works also, viz. in the passage, *Kṛ. Up. VIII, 4, 1*, 'Day and night do not pass that bank,' where good works are mentioned together with evil works, and finally the term 'evil' is without any distinction applied to all things mentioned before, 'All evil things

turn back from it.'—'But at death.' The word 'but' is meant for emphatical assertion. As it is established that good as well as evil works—which are both causes of bondage—do, owing to the strength of knowledge, on the one hand not cling and on the other hand undergo destruction, there necessarily results final release of him who knows as soon as death takes place.

15. But only those former (works) whose effects have not yet begun (are destroyed by knowledge); because (scripture states) that (i. e. the death of the body) to be the term.

In the two preceding *adhikaraṇas* it has been proved that good as well as evil works are annihilated through knowledge. We now have to consider the question whether this annihilation extends, without distinction, to those works whose effects have already begun to operate as well as to those whose effects have not yet begun; or only to works of the latter kind.

Here the *pûrvapakshin* maintains that on the ground of scriptural passages such as 'He thereby overcomes both,' which refer to all works without any distinction, all works whatever must be considered to undergo destruction.

To this we reply, 'But only those whose effects have not begun.' Former works, i. e. works, whether good or evil, which have been accumulated in previous forms of existence as well as in the current form of existence before the origination of knowledge, are destroyed by the attainment of knowledge only if their fruit has not yet begun to operate. Those works, on the other hand, whose effects have begun and whose results have been half enjoyed—i. e. those very works to which there is due the present state of existence in which the knowledge of Brahman arises—are not destroyed by that knowledge. This opinion is founded on the scriptural passage, 'For him there is delay only as long as he is not delivered (from the body)' (*Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2*), which fixes the death of the body as the term of the attainment of final release. Were it otherwise,

i.e. were all works whatever extinguished by knowledge, there would be no reason for the continuance of the current form of existence, and the rise of knowledge would therefore be immediately followed by the state of final release ; in which case scripture would not teach that one has to wait for the death of the body.—But, an objection is raised, the knowledge of the Self being essentially non-active does by its intrinsic power destroy (all) works ; how then should it destroy some only and leave others unaffected ? We certainly have no right to assume that when fire and seeds come into contact the germinative power of some seeds only is destroyed while that of others remains unimpaired !—The origination of knowledge, we reply, cannot take place without dependence on an aggregate of works whose effects have already begun to operate, and when this dependence has once been entered into, we must—as in the case of the potter's wheel—wait until the motion of that which once has begun to move comes to an end, there being nothing to obstruct it in the interim. The knowledge of our Self being essentially non-active destroys all works by means of refuting wrong knowledge ; but wrong knowledge—comparable to the appearance of a double moon—lasts for some time even after it has been refuted, owing to the impression it has made.—Moreover it is not a matter for dispute at all whether the body of him who knows Brahman continues to exist for some time or not. For how can one man contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman—vouched for by his heart's conviction—and at the same time continuing to enjoy bodily existence ? This same point is explained in scripture and *Smṛiti*, where they describe him who stands firm in the highest knowledge.—The final decision therefore is that knowledge effects the destruction of those works only—whether good or evil—whose effects have not yet begun to operate.

16. But the Agnihotra and the like (tend) towards the same effect ; scripture showing this.

The reasoning as to evil deeds has been extended to the

non-clinging and destruction of good deeds also. Against a notion which now might present itself, viz. that this extension comprehends all good works alike, the Sûtrakâra remarks, 'But the Agnihotra and so on.'—The word 'but' is meant to set that notion aside. Works of permanent obligation enjoined by the Veda, such as the Agnihotra, tend 'towards the same effect,' i. e. have the same effect as knowledge. For this is declared by texts such as the following one, 'Brâhmanas seek to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, by gifts' (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22*).—But, an objection is raised, as knowledge and works have different effects, it is impossible that they should have one and the same effect!—It is observed, we reply, that sour milk and poison whose ordinary effects are fever and death have for their effects satisfaction and a flourishing state of the body, if the sour milk is mixed with sugar and the poison taken while certain mantras are recited; in the same way works if joined with knowledge may effect final release.—But final release is something not to be effected at all; how then can you declare it to be the effect of works?—Works, we reply, may subserve final release mediately. For in so far as furthering knowledge, work may be spoken of as an indirect cause of final release. For the same reason the equality of effect spoken of above extends only to works past (at the time when knowledge springs up). Because for him who knows Brahman no future Agnihotras and the like are possible, since the attainment of the Self of Brahman—which Brahman is not subject to injunction—lies outside the sphere of sacred precept. In those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to the qualified Brahman, the Self does not cease to be an agent, and consequently future Agnihotras and the like are not excluded. Such works also—because they have no other effect if undertaken without a view to reward—may be brought into connexion with knowledge.

To what works then, it may be asked, does the statement refer made above about the non-clinging and the destruction, and to what works the following statement made in some Sâkhâ about the application of works, 'His sons enter upon

his inheritance, his friends on his good works, his enemies upon his evil works?'—To this question the next Sūtra replies.

17. For (there is) also (a class of good works) other than this, according to some. (There is agreement) of both (teachers) (as to the fate of those works.)

'For also one other than this,' i. e. there is also a class of good works different from works of permanent obligation, viz. those good works which are performed with a view to a fruit. Of those latter works the passage quoted above from some Sākhā ('His friends enter on his good works') teaches the application. And first of those works Sūtra 14 teaches that, in the same way as evil deeds, they do not cling to the doer or else are destroyed. Both teachers, Gaimini as well as Bādarāyaṇa, are agreed that such works, undertaken for the fulfilment of some special wish, do not contribute towards the origination of true knowledge.

18. For (the text) 'whatever he does with knowledge' (intimates that).

In the preceding *adhikaraṇa* the following conclusion has been established:—Works of permanent obligation such as the Agnihotra, if performed by a person desirous of release with a view to release, lead to the extinction of evil deeds committed, thus become a means of the purification of the mind, and thereby cause the attainment of Brahman, which leads to final release; they therefore operate towards the same effect as the knowledge of Brahman. Now the Agnihotra and similar works are either connected with a special knowledge based on the constituent members of the sacrificial work, or absolute (non-connected with such knowledge). This appears from scriptural texts such as 'He who knowing this sacrifices; he who knowing this makes an offering; he who knowing this recites; he who knowing this sings; therefore let a man make him who knows this his Brahman-priest

(*Kh. Up.* IV, 17, 1); therefore both perform the work, he who knows this and he who does not know it' (*Kh. Up.* I, 1, 10).—We have now to consider the question whether only such Agnihotras and so on as are connected with knowledge cause knowledge on the part of him who desires release and thus operate towards the same effect as knowledge; or whether both kinds of works—those connected with knowledge and those not so connected—equally act in that way. The doubt concerning this point arises on the one hand from scriptural passages such as 'That Self they seek to know by sacrifice' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 22), which represent sacrifices and the like, without difference, as auxiliary to the knowledge of the Self; and on the other hand from our observing that a superiority is conceded to Agnihotras, &c., if connected with knowledge.

Here the *pûrvapakshin* maintains that only such sacrificial works as are connected with knowledge are helpful towards the cognition of the Self, since we understand from various scriptural and *Smṛiti* passages that works connected with knowledge are superior to those destitute of knowledge; cp. e. g. 'On the very day on which he sacrifices on that day he overcomes death again, he who knows this' (*Bri. Up.* I, 5, 2); and 'Possessor of this knowledge thou wilt cast off the bonds of action;' 'Action is far inferior to concentration of mind' (*Bha. Gitā* II, 39; 49).

To this the *Sûtrakâra* replies, 'For what with knowledge only.' It is true that works such as the Agnihotra if joined with knowledge are superior to works destitute of knowledge, in the same way as a *Brâhmaṇa* possessed of knowledge is superior to one devoid of knowledge. Nevertheless works such as the Agnihotra even if not connected with knowledge are not altogether ineffective; for certain scriptural texts declare that such works are, all of them without any difference, causes of knowledge; so e. g. the passage, 'That Self they seek to know through sacrifices.'—But, as we understand from scripture that works connected with knowledge are superior to those destitute of knowledge, we must suppose that the Agnihotra and the like if unaccompanied by knowledge are inoperative towards the

cognition of the Self!—By no means, we reply. The proper assumption is that the Agnihotra and so on, if accompanied by knowledge, possess a greater capability of originating knowledge and therefore are of superior causal efficiency with regard to the cognition of the Self; while the same works if devoid of knowledge possess no such superiority. We cannot, however, admit that the Agnihotra and similar works which scripture, without making any distinction, declares to subserve knowledge (cp. 'they seek to know through sacrifices') should not subserve it. With this our conclusion agrees the scriptural text, 'Whatever he performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad that is more powerful' (*Kh. Up. I, 1, 10*); for this text—in speaking of the greater power of work joined with knowledge and thus proclaiming the superiority of such work with regard to its effect—intimates thereby that work destitute of knowledge possesses some power towards the same effect. By the 'power' of work we understand its capacity of effecting its purpose. We therefore accept as settled the following conclusion: All works of permanent obligation, such as the Agnihotra—whether joined with or devoid of knowledge—which have been performed before the rise of true knowledge, either in the present state of existence or a former one, by a person desirous of release with a view to release; all such works act, according to their several capacities, as means of the extinction of evil desert which obstructs the attainment of Brahman, and thus become causes of such attainment, subserving the more immediate causes such as the hearing of and reflecting on the sacred texts, faith, meditation, devotion, &c. They therefore operate towards the same effect as the knowledge of Brahman.

19. But having destroyed by fruition the two other (sets of work) he becomes one with Brahman.

It has been shown that all good and evil deeds whose effects have not yet begun are extinguished by the power of knowledge. 'The two others,' on the other hand, i. e. those good and evil works whose effects have begun, a man

has at first to exhaust by the fruition of their consequences, and then he becomes one with Brahman. This appears from scriptural passages such as 'For him there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become one with Brahman' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 14, 2); and 'Being Brahman he goes to Brahman' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 6).—But, an objection is raised, even when perfect intuition has risen the practical intuition of multiplicity may continue after the death of the body, just as it continued before death; analogously to the visual appearance of a double moon (which may continue even after it has been cognized as false).—Not so, we reply. After the death of the body there no longer exists any cause for such continuance; while up to death there is such a cause, viz. the extinction of the remainder of works to be enjoyed.—But a new aggregate of works will originate a new fruition!—Not so, we reply; since the seed of all such fruition is destroyed. What, on the death of the body, could originate a new period of fruition, is only a new set of works, and works depend on false knowledge; but such false knowledge is completely destroyed by perfect intuition. When therefore the works whose effects have begun are destroyed, the man who knows necessarily enters into the state of perfect isolation.

SECOND PĀDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. Speech (is merged) in mind, on account of this being seen, and of the scriptural statement.

Being about to describe the path of the gods which leads those who possess the lower kind of knowledge towards the attainment of their reward, the Sūtrakāra begins by explaining, on the basis of scriptural statements, the successive steps by which the soul passes out of the body; for, as will be stated later on, the departure of the soul is the same in the case of him who possesses the (lower) knowledge and of him who is devoid of all knowledge.

About the process of dying we have the following passage, 'When a man departs from hence his speech merges in his mind, his mind in his breath, his breath in fire, fire in the highest deity' (*Kh. Up. VI, 6, 1*). A doubt here arises whether the passage means to say that speech itself, together with its function, is merged in the mind, or only the function of speech.

The pūrvapakshin maintains that speech itself is merged in the mind. For this explanation only is in agreement with the direct statement of the sacred text, while the other alternative compels us to have recourse to an implied meaning; now wherever direct enunciation and implied meaning are in conflict the preference has to be given to the former, and we therefore maintain that speech itself is merged in the mind.

To this we reply that only the function of speech is merged in the mind.—But how can this interpretation be maintained, considering that the teacher (in the Sūtra) expressly says 'Speech in the mind?'—True, we reply; but later on he says 'There is non-division, according to scriptural statement' (Sūtra 16), and we therefrom conclude that what is meant in the present Sūtra is merely cessation of the function of speech. For if the intention were to

express absorption of the thing (i.e. the organ of speech) itself, there would be 'non-division' in all cases, and for what reason then should 'non-division' be specially stated in another case (i.e. in the case of which Sûtra 16 treats)? The meaning therefore is that the different functions are retracted, and that while the function of the mind continues to go on the function of speech is retracted first.—Why so?—'Because this is seen.' It is a matter of observation that while the mind continues to act the function of speech comes to an end; nobody, on the other hand, is able to see that the organ of speech itself, together with its function, is merged in the mind.—But are we not justified in assuming such a merging of speech in the mind, on the ground of scriptural statement?—This is impossible, we reply, since mind is not the causal substance of speech. We are entitled to assume only that a thing is merged in what is its causal substance; a pot e.g. (when destroyed) is merged in clay. But there is no proof whatever for speech originating from mind. On the other hand we observe that functions originate and are retracted even where they do not inhere in causal substances. The function of fire, e.g. which is of the nature of heat, springs from fuel which is of the nature of earth, and it is extinguished in water.—But how do you, on this interpretation, account for the scriptural statement that 'speech is merged in the mind?'—'And on account of the scriptural statement,' the Sûtrakâra replies. The scriptural statement also may be reconciled with our interpretation, in so far as the function and the thing to which the function belongs are viewed as non-different.

2. And for the same reason all (sense-organs) (follow) after (mind).

'Therefore he whose light has gone out comes to a new birth with his senses merged in the mind' (Pr. Up. III, 9); this passage states that all senses without difference are merged in the mind. 'For the same reason,' i.e. because there also as in the case of speech, it is observed that the eye and so on discontinue their functions, while the mind together with its functions persists, and because the organs

themselves cannot be absorbed, and because the text admits of that interpretation ; we conclude that the different organs follow after, i. e. are merged in, the mind only as far as their functions are concerned.—As all organs¹ without difference are merged in the mind, the special mention made of speech (in Sūtra 1) must be viewed as made in agreement with the special example referred to by scripture, 'Speech is merged in mind.'

3. That mind (is merged) in breath, owing to the subsequent clause.

It has been shown that the passage, 'Speech is merged in mind,' means a merging of the function only.—A doubt here arises whether the subsequent clause, 'mind in breath,' also means to intimate a merging of the function only or of that to which the function belongs.—The *pūrvapakshin* maintains the latter alternative. For that, he says, agrees with scripture, and moreover breath may be viewed as the causal substance of mind. For scripture—'Mind is made of earth, breath of water' (*Kh. Up. VI, 6, 5*)—states that mind comes from earth and breath from water, and scripture further states that 'Water sent forth earth' (*Kh. Up. VI, 2, 4*). When mind therefore is merged in breath, it is the same as earth being merged in water ; for mind is earth and breath is water, causal substance and effect being non-different.

To this we reply as follows. 'The subsequent clause' intimates that the mind, after having absorbed within itself the functions of the outer senses, is merged in breath only in the way of its function being so merged. For we observe in the case of persons lying in deep sleep or about to die that, while the function of breath persists, the functions of the mind are stopped. Nor is the mind capable of being itself merged in breath, since breath does not constitute its causal substance.—But it has been shown above that breath is the causal substance of mind !—This is not valid,

¹ I. e. the functions of all organs.

we reply. For the relation of causality, made out in such an indirect way, does not suffice to show that mind is really merged in breath. Were it so, then mind would also be merged in earth, earth in water, breath in water. Nor is there, on the alternative contemplated, any proof of mind having originated from that water which had passed over into breath.—Mind cannot therefore, in itself, be merged in breath. And that the scriptural statement is satisfied by a mere merging of the function—the function and that to which the function belongs being viewed as identical—has been shown already under the preceding Sûtra.

4. That (viz. breath) (is merged) in the ruler (i. e. the individual soul), on account of the (statements as to the *prâṇas*) coming to it and so on.

We have ascertained that a thing which has not originated from another is not itself merged in the latter, but only through its functions. A doubt now arises whether, according to the word of scripture, the function of breath is merged in heat, or in the individual soul which is the ruler of the body and senses.—According to the *pûrvapakshin* we must conclude that the breath is merged in heat only, since the scriptural statement allows no room for doubt and we are not entitled to assume something not declared by scripture. The breath under discussion persists 'in the ruler,' i. e. the intelligent Self (the individual soul) which possesses nescience, work, and former knowledge as limiting adjuncts; i. e. the function of breath has that soul for its substratum.—Why so?—'On account of (the *prâṇas*) going towards him,' &c.—Another scriptural passage declares that all *prâṇas* without any difference go to the soul, 'All the *prâṇas* go to the Self at the time of death when a man is thus going to expire' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 38*). Another passage again specially declares that the *prâṇa* with its five functions follows the individual soul, 'After him thus departing the *prâṇa* departs,' and that the other *prâṇas* follow that *prâṇa*, 'And after the *prâṇa* thus departing all the other *prâṇas* depart' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 2*). And the text, 'He is furnished with intelligence' (*ibid.*), by declaring the individual soul to

be of intimately intelligent nature, suggests that in it, viz. the soul, the *prāṇa*—into which the different organs of knowledge have been merged—has taken its abode.—But scripture also says, ‘The *prāṇa* (is merged) in heat;’ why then make the addition implied in the doctrine—that breath is merged in the individual soul?—We must make that addition, we reply, because in the process of departure &c. the soul is the chief agent, and because we must pay regard to specifications contained in other scriptural passages also.—How then do you explain the statement, ‘Breath is merged in heat?’—To this question the next *Sūtra* replies.

5. To the elements (the soul, with *prāṇa*, goes), on account of the subsequent scriptural clause.

The soul joined by the *prāṇa* takes up its abode within the subtle elements which accompany heat and form the seed of the (gross) body. This we conclude from the clause, ‘Breath in heat.’—But this passage declares, not that the soul together with the *prāṇa* takes up its abode in heat, but only that the *prāṇa* takes up its abode!—No matter, we reply; since the preceding *Sūtra* intercalates the soul in the interval (between *prāṇa* and *tejas*). Of a man who first travels from *Srughna* to *Mathurā* and then from *Mathurā* to *Pāṭaliputra*, we may say shortly that he travels from *Srughna* to *Pāṭaliputra*. The passage under discussion therefore means that the soul together with the *prāṇa* abides in the elements associated with heat.—But how are you entitled to draw in the other elements also, while the text only speaks of heat?—To this question the next *Sūtra* replies.

6. Not to one (element) (the soul goes); for both (i. e. scripture and *Smṛiti*) declare this.

At the time of passing over into another body the individual soul does not abide in the one element of heat only; for we see that the new body consists of various elements. This matter is declared in the question and answer about the waters called *man* (*Kh. Up. V, 3, 3*); as explained by us in III, 1, 2.—Scripture and *Smṛiti* alike

teach this doctrine; compare e.g. 'Consisting of earth, water, wind, ether, heat' (*Bṛi.* Up. IV, 4, 5); and 'The subtle perishable parts of the five (elements) from them all this is produced in due succession' (*Manu* I, 27).—But is there not another scriptural text—beginning 'Where then is that person?'—which teaches that at the time of the soul attaining a new body, after speech and the other organs have been withdrawn within the soul, work constitutes the soul's abode, 'What those two said, as work they said it; what they praised, as work they praised it' (*Bṛi.* Up. III, 2, 13)?—That passage, we reply, describes the operation of bondage consisting of the senses and their objects—there called *grahas* and *atigrahas*—and therefore work is spoken of as the abode; here on the other hand the elements are said to be the abode because we have to do with the origination of a new body out of the matter of the elements. The expression 'they prayed' moreover intimates only that work occupies the chief place in the process, and does not exclude another abode. The two passages therefore do not contradict each other.

7. And common (to him who knows and him who does not know) (is the departure) up to the beginning of the way; and the immortality (of him who knows) (is relative only) without having burned (nescience and so on).

The question here arises whether the departure of the soul, as described hitherto, is the same in the case of him who knows and him who is destitute of knowledge; or whether there is any difference.—There is a difference, the *pūrvapakshin* maintains. For the departure as described has for its abode the elements, and this abiding in the elements is for the purpose of a new birth. But he who possesses true knowledge cannot be born again, since scripture declares that 'He who knows reaches immortality.' Hence only he who is devoid of knowledge departs in the way described.—But as that departure is described in chapters treating of knowledge it can belong only to him

who knows!—Not so, the *pūrvapakshin* replies. In the same way as sleep and the like, the departure of the soul is only referred to in the texts as something established elsewhere (not as something to be taught as part of true knowledge). Passages such as ‘When a man sleeps,—is hungry,—is thirsty’ (*Kh. Up. VI, 8*), although forming part of chapters concerned with true knowledge, mention sleep and so on which are common to all living beings, because they assist the comprehension of the matter to be taught, but do not aim at enjoining them specially for those who know. Analogously the texts about the soul’s departure refer to that departure only in order to teach that ‘that highest deity in which the heat of the dying man is merged, that is the Self, that art thou.’ Now that departure is (in other scriptural passages) specially denied of him who knows; it therefore belongs to him only who does not know.

To this we make the following reply. That departure which is described in the passage, ‘speech is merged in mind,’ &c., must be ‘common’ to him who knows and him who does not know ‘up to the beginning of the way;’ because scripture records no distinction. The soul destitute of true knowledge having taken its abode in the subtle elements which constitute the seed of the body and being impelled by its works, migrates into a new body; while the soul of him who knows passes into the vein, revealed by true knowledge, which is the door of release. In this sense the *Sūtra* says ‘up to the beginning of the way.’—But he who knows reaches immortality, and immortality does not depend on a change of place; why then should the soul take its abode in the elements or set out on a journey?—That immortality, we reply, is ‘without having burned,’ i. e. for him who, without having altogether burned nescience and the other afflictions, is about to obtain, through the power of the lower knowledge, a relative immortality only, there take place the entering on the way and the abiding in the elements. For without a substratum the *prāṇas* could not move. There is thus no difficulty.

8. This (aggregate of the elements) (continues to exist) up to the (final absolute) union (with Brahman); on account of the declarations of the *samsâra* state (made by scripture).

With regard to the final clause, 'Heat in the highest deity,' the force of its connexion with what precedes shows that the meaning is 'the heat of the dying man is—together with the individual soul, the *prâna*, the aggregate of the organs and the other elements—merged in Brahman.'—We now have to consider of what kind that merging is.—The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that it is an absolute absorption of the things merged, since it is proved that those things have the highest deity for their causal matter. For it has been established that the deity is the causal substance of all things that have an origin. Hence that passing into the state of non-separation is an absolute one.

To this we reply as follows. Those subtle elements—heat and so on—which constitute the abode of hearing and the other organs persist up to the 'union,' i. e. up to final release from the *samsâra*, which is caused by perfect knowledge. 'On account of the declarations of the *samsâra* state' made in passages such as 'Some enter the womb, for embodied existence as organic beings; others go into inorganic matter, according to their work and according to their knowledge' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 7). Otherwise the limiting adjuncts of every soul would, at the time of death, be absorbed and the soul would enter into absolute union with Brahman; which would render all scriptural injunction and scriptural doctrine equally purportless. Moreover bondage, which is due to wrong knowledge, cannot be dissolved but through perfect knowledge. Hence, although Brahman is the causal substance of those elements, they are at the time of death—as in the case of deep sleep and a *pralaya* of the world—merged in it only in such a way as to continue to exist in a seminal condition.

9. And (heat is) subtle in measure; as this is thus observed.

The elementary matter of heat and the other elements

B b 2

which form the substratum for the soul when passing out of this body, must be subtle in its nature and extent. This follows from the scriptural passages, which declare that it passes out by the veins and so on. Their thinness renders them capable of passing out, and their transparency (permeability) is the cause of their not being stopped by any gross substance. For these reasons they, when passing out of the body, are not perceived by bystanders.

10. For this reason (it is) not (destroyed) by the destruction (of the gross body).

On account of this very subtlety the subtle body is not destroyed by what destroys the gross body, viz. burning and the like.

11. And to that same (subtle body) that warmth (belongs), on account of the proof (which observation furnishes).

To that same subtle body belongs the warmth which we perceive in the living body by means of touch. That warmth is not felt in the body after death, while such qualities as form, colour and so on continue to be perceived; it is, on the other hand, observed as long as there is life. From this it follows that the warmth resides in something different from the body as ordinarily known. Scripture also says, 'He is warm if going to live, cold if going to die.'

12. Should you say that on account of the denial (made by scripture) (the soul of him who knows Brahman does not depart); we deny this, (because scripture means to say that the *prāṇas* do not depart) from the embodied soul.

From the distinction conveyed by the clause, 'and (relative) immortality without having burned' (Sūtra 7), it follows that in the case of absolute immortality being reached there is no going and no departure of the soul from the body.—The idea that for some reason or other

a departure of the soul might take place in this latter case also, is precluded by the following scriptural passage, 'But as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, of him the vital spirits do not depart,—being Brahman, he goes to Brahman' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 6*). From this express denial—forming part of the higher knowledge—it follows that the *prâṇas* do not pass out of the body of him who knows Brahman.

This conclusion the *pûrvapakshin* denies. For, he says, the passage quoted does not deny the departure of the *prâṇas* from the body, but from the embodied (individual) soul.—How is this known?—From the fact that in another *Sâkhâ* we have (not the sixth, genitive, case 'of him,' but) the fifth, ablative, case 'from him'—'From him the vital spirits do not depart' (*Mâdhyandina Sâkhâ*). For the sixth case which expresses only relation in general is determined towards some special relation by the fifth case met with in another *Sâkhâ*. And as the embodied soul which has a claim on exaltation and bliss is the chief topic of the chapter, we construe the words 'from him' to mean not the body but the embodied soul. The sense therefore is 'from that soul when about to depart the *prâṇas* do not depart, but remain with it.' The soul of him who dies therefore passes out of the body, together with the *prâṇas*. This view the next *Sûtra* refutes.

13. For (in the text) of some (the denial of the soul's departure) is clear.

The assertion that also the soul of him who knows Brahman departs from the body, because the denial states the soul (not the body) to be the point of departure, cannot be upheld. For we observe that in the sacred text of some there is a clear denial of a departure, the starting-point of which is the body.—The text meant at first records the question asked by *Ârtabhâga*, 'When this man dies, do the vital spirits depart from him or not?' then embraces the alternative of non-departure, in the words, No, replied *Yâgñavalkya*; thereupon—anticipating the objection that

a man cannot be dead as long as his vital spirits have not departed—teaches the resolution of the *prāṇas* in the body 'in that very same place they are merged;' and finally, in confirmation thereof, remarks, 'he swells, he is inflated, inflated the dead man lies.' This last clause states that swelling, &c., affect the subject under discussion, viz. that from which the departure takes place (the 'tasmât' of the former clause), which subject is, in this last clause, referred to by means of the word 'He.' Now swelling and so on can belong to the body only, not to the embodied soul. And owing to its equality thereto¹ also the passages, 'from him the vital spirits do not depart;' 'in that very same place they are resolved,' have to be taken as denying a departure starting from the body, although the chief subject of the passage is the embodied soul. This may be done by the embodied soul and the body being viewed as non-different². In this way we have to explain the passage if read with the fifth case.—If again the passage is read with the sixth case ('of him the vital spirits do not depart'), it must be understood as denying the departure of him who knows, as its purport manifestly is to deny a departure established elsewhere. But what it denies can only be a departure from the body; for what is established (viz. for ordinary men not possessing the highest knowledge) is only the departure (of the soul, &c.) from the body, not the departure (of the *prāṇas*, &c.) from the embodied soul.—Moreover, after the passage, 'Either through the eye or through the skull or through other places of the body, him thus departing the *prāṇa* departs after, and after the departing *prāṇa* all *prāṇas* depart,' &c., has at length described the departure and transmigration of the soul as belonging to him who does not know, and after the account of him

¹ I. e. its belonging to the same chapter and treating of the same subject.

² The two being viewed as non-different, the pronoun (tasmât), which properly denotes the soul, the person, may be used to denote the body.—*Abhedopakāreṇa dehadehinor dehiparāmarśinā sarva-nāmnā deha eva parāmrśita iti. Bhā.*

who does not know has been concluded with the words, 'So much for the man who has desires,' the text designates him who knows as 'he who has no desires;' a designation which would be altogether inappropriate if the text wanted to establish departure, &c., for that person also. The passage therefore has to be explained as denying of him who knows the going and departing which are established for him who does not know. For thus only the designation employed by the text has a sense.—And for him who knowing Brahman has become the Self of that omnipresent Brahman, and in whom all desires and works have become extinct, departing and going are not even possible, as there is not any occasion for them. And such texts as 'there he reaches Brahman' (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7*) indicate the absence of all going and departing.

14. And Smṛiti also says that.

In the Mahābhārata also it is said that those who know do not go or depart, 'He who has become the Self of all beings and has a complete intuition of all, at his way the gods themselves are perplexed, seeking for the path of him who has no path.'—But, an objection is raised, other passages speak of men knowing Brahman as going, so e.g. 'Suka the son of Vyāsa being desirous of release travelled to the sphere of the sun; being called by his father who had followed him, he gave an answering shout.'—That passage, we reply, describes (not the effects of the highest knowledge but only) how an embodied person, through the power of Yoga (which is of the nature of the lower knowledge), reached some special place and freed himself from the body. This appears from it being mentioned that he was seen by all beings; for the beings could not see a person moving without a body. The conclusion of the story makes all this clear, 'Suka having moved through the air more rapidly than wind, and having shown his power, was known by all beings.'—It thus follows that he who knows Brahman neither moves nor departs. To what sphere the scriptural texts about going and so on refer we shall explain later on.

15. Those (elements, &c.) (are merged) in the highest Brahman; for thus (scripture) says.

Those, i. e. the sense organs—denoted by the term ‘*prāṇa*’—and the elements of him who knows the highest Brahman, are merged in that same highest Brahman.—Why?—Because scripture declares that ‘Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the person, when they have reached the person, sink into him’ (Pr. Up. VI, 5).—But another text which refers to him who knows teaches that the parts also are merged in something different from the highest Self, ‘The fifteen parts enter into their elements’ (Mu. Up. III, 2, 7).—No, we reply. This latter passage is concerned with the ordinary view of the matter, according to which the parts of the body which consist of earth and so on are merged in their causal substances, earth and so on. The former passage, on the other hand, expresses the view of him who knows; according to which the whole aggregate of the parts of him who knows the highest Brahman is merged in Brahman only.—There is thus no contradiction.

16. (There is absolute) non-division (from Brahman, of the parts merged in it); according to scriptural declaration.

When the parts of him who knows are merged in Brahman, is there a remainder (which is not so merged), as in the case of other men; or is there no such remainder? As the merging of him also who knows falls under the general heading of merging, it might be assumed that of him also there remains a potential body, and the Sūtra-kāra therefore teaches expressly that the elements, &c., of him who knows enter into the relation of (absolute) non-division from Brahman.—On what ground?—Because scripture declares this. For after having taught the dissolution of the parts, the text continues, ‘Their name and form are broken, and people speak of the person only; and he becomes without parts and immortal’ (Pr. Up. VI, 5). And when parts that are due to nescience are dissolved

through knowledge it is not possible that a remainder should be left. The parts therefore enter into absolute non-division from Brahman.

17. (There takes place) a lighting up of the point of its (the soul's) abode (viz. the heart); the door (of its egress) being illuminated thereby; owing to the power of knowledge and the application of meditation to the way which is part of that (knowledge); (the soul) favoured by him in the heart (viz. Brahman) (passes upwards) by the one that exceeds a hundred (i. e. by the hundred and first vein).

Having absolved the inquiry into a point of the higher knowledge into which we were led by a special occasion, we now continue the discussion connected with the lower knowledge.—It has been stated that up to the beginning of the way the departure of him who knows and him who does not know is the same. The present Sûtra now describes the soul's entering on the way. The abode of the soul, when—having taken within itself speech and the other powers—it is about to depart, is the heart, according to the text, 'He taking with him those elements of light descends into the heart' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 1). Of the heart the point becomes lighted up, and subsequent to that is the departure of the soul, starting from the eye or some other place, according to the passage, 'The point of his heart becomes lighted up, and by that light the Self departs, either through the eye or through the skull or through other places of the body' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 2). The question here arises whether that departure is the same for him who knows and him who does not know, or if there is a special limitation in the case of the former; and the *primâ facie* view might be upheld that there is no such limitation since scripture records no difference. Against this the teacher states that although, equally for him who does know and him who does not know, the point of the heart becomes shining and the door of egress thereby

is lighted up, yet he who knows departs through the skull only, while the others depart from other places.—Why so? —‘On account of the power of knowledge.’ If also he who knows departed, like all others, from any place of the body, he would be unable to reach an exalted sphere; and then all knowledge would be purportless. ‘And on account of the application of meditation on the way forming a part of that.’ That means: in different vidyās there is enjoined meditation on the soul’s travelling on the way connected with the vein that passes through the skull;—which way forms a part of those vidyās. Now it is proper to conclude that he who meditates on that way should after death proceed on it¹. Hence he who knows, being favoured by Brahman abiding in the heart on which he had meditated, and thus becoming like it in nature departs by the vein which passes through the skull and ‘exceeds the hundred,’ i. e. is the hundred and first. The souls of other men pass out by other veins. For thus scripture says, in a chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman dwelling in the heart, ‘There are a hundred and one veins of the heart; one of them penetrates the crown of the head; by that moving upwards a man reaches immortality; the others serve for departing in different directions’ (*Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5*).

18. (The soul after having passed forth from the body) follows the rays.

There is the vidyā of him within the heart, which begins, ‘There is this city of Brahman and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether’ (*Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 1*). A subsequent section of that chapter—beginning with the words, ‘Now these veins of the heart’—describes at length the connexion of the veins and the rays, and the text then continues, ‘When he departs from this body, he departs upwards by those very rays,’ and further on, ‘By that

¹ For otherwise the meditation enjoined would be ‘*adrishārtha*’ only; an alternative not to be admitted anywhere as long as a ‘seen’ purpose can be demonstrated.

moving upwards he reaches immortality.' From this we understand that the soul passing out by the hundred and first vein follows the rays.—A doubt here arises as to whether the soul of him who dies by night as well as of him who dies by day follows the rays, or the soul of the latter only.—Since scripture mentions no difference, the Sûtra teaches that the souls follow the rays in both cases.

19. (Should it be said that the soul does) not (follow the rays) by night; (we reply) not so, because the connexion (of veins and rays) exists as long as the body; and (scripture) also declares this.

It might perhaps be said that the veins and rays are connected during the day, so that the soul of a person who dies during the day may follow those rays; but not the soul of one who dies by night when the connexion of the veins and rays is broken.—But this is a mistaken assumption, because the connexion of rays and veins lasts as long as the body exists. This scripture also declares, 'They (the rays) stretch out from yonder sun and slip into these veins; they stretch from these veins and slip into yonder sun' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 2*). We moreover observe that the rays of the sun continue to exist in the nights of the summer season; for we feel their warmth and other effects. During the nights of the other seasons they are difficult to perceive because then few only continue to exist; just as during the cloudy days of the cold season.—This the following scriptural passage also shows, 'Day he makes in the night.'—If, moreover, he who dies at night mounted upwards without following the rays, the following of the rays would be generally meaningless. For the text gives no special direction to the effect that he who dies by day mounts upwards by means of the rays, while he who dies by night mounts without them.—Should, on the other hand, even he who knows be prevented from mounting upwards, by the mere mischance of dying by night, knowledge would in that case produce its fruit eventually only, and the consequence would be that—as the time of death is not

fixed—nobody would apply himself to knowledge.—If, again, a man dying at night should wait for the dawn (to mount upwards), it might happen that, owing to the action of the funeral fire, &c., his body would, at the time of daybreak, not be capable of entering into connexion with the rays. Scripture moreover expressly says that he does not wait, 'As quickly as he sends off the mind he goes to the sun' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5*).—For all these reasons the soul follows the rays by night as well as by day.

20. And for the same reason (the departed soul follows the rays) also during the southern progress of the sun.

For the same reason, viz. because waiting is impossible, and because the fruit of knowledge is not a merely eventual one, and because the time of death is not fixed, also that possessor of true knowledge who dies during the southern progress of the sun obtains the fruit of his knowledge. Because dying during the northern progress of the sun is more excellent, and because Bhīṣma is known to have waited for that period, and because scripture says, 'From the light half of the month (they go) to the six months when the sun goes to the north,' it might be thought that the northern progress of the sun is needful for dying. This notion the Sūtra refutes. The greater excellence of the sun's northern progress applies to those only who do not possess the highest knowledge.—Bhīṣma's waiting for the sun's northern progress was due to his wish of upholding good customs and of showing that by the favour of his father he could choose the time of his death.—And the sense of the scriptural passage quoted will be explained under IV, 3, 4.—But we have the following *Smṛiti*-text, 'At what times the Yogins depart either not to return or to return, those times I will declare to thee' (*Bha. Gītā VIII, 23*), which determines specially that to die by day and so on causes the soul not to return. How then can he who dies by night or during the sun's southern progress depart not to return? Concerning this point the next Sūtra remarks :

21. (These details) are recorded by *Smṛiti* with reference to the Yogins; and both (*Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*) are *Smṛiti* (only).

The rules as to dying by day and so on in order not to return are given by *Smṛiti* for the Yogins only. And those two, viz. *Yoga* and *Sāṅkhya* are mere *Smṛiti*, not of scriptural character. As thus it has a different sphere of application and is based on a special kind of authority, the *Smṛiti* rule as to the time of dying has no influence on knowledge based on scripture.—But, an objection is raised, we have such passages as the following one, ‘Fire, light, the day, the light half of the month, the six months of the northern progress; smoke, night, the dark half of the month, the six months of the southern progress’ (*Bhā. Gītā* VIII, 24; 25); in which though belonging to *Smṛiti* we recognise the path of the gods and the path of the fathers just as determined by scripture!—Our refutation, we reply, of the claims of *Smṛiti* applies only to the contradiction which may arise from the teaching of *Smṛiti* regarding the legitimate time of dying. ‘I will tell you the time,’ &c. In so far as *Smṛiti* also mentions *Agni* and the other divinities which lead on the departed soul, there is no contradiction whatever.

THIRD PĀDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF !

1. On the road beginning with light (the departed soul proceeds), on account of that being widely known.

It has been explained that up to the beginning of the way, the departure is the same. About the way itself, however, different texts make different declarations. One passage describes it as constituted by the junction of the veins and rays, 'Then he mounts upwards by just those rays' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 6, 5). Another passage describes it as beginning with light, 'They go to the light, from light to day' (*Kh. Up.* V, 10, 1). Another way is described, *Kau. Up.* I, 3, 'Having reached the path of the gods, he comes to the world of Agni.' Another, *Bṛi. Up.* V, 10, 1, 'When the person goes away from this world, he comes to the wind.' Another again, *Mu. Up.* I, 2, 11, 'Free from passions they depart through the gate of the sun.' A doubt here arises whether these ways are different from each other, or whether there is only one road of which the different texts mention different particulars.—The *pūrvapakshin* embraces the former alternative, for the reason that those roads are referred to in different chapters and form parts of different meditations. If, moreover, we regarded the statements about light and so on, the emphatical assertion¹ made in the first of the passages quoted above would be contradicted; and the statement about the quickness of mounting, 'As quickly as he sends off the mind he goes to the sun,' would also be interfered with. We therefore conclude that the roads described are different roads. To this we reply, 'On the road beginning with light;'

¹ The emphasis lies in the word 'eva,' i.e. 'just' or 'only,' which seems to exclude any stages of the way but those rays.

i.e. we maintain that every one who desires to reach Brahman moves on the road beginning with light.—Why so?—‘On account of its being widely known.’ That road is known to all who possess knowledge. Thus the chapter of the vidyâ of the five fires (‘And those also who in the forest meditate on the True as faith,’ &c., *Bri. Up.* VI, 2, 15) expressly states that the road beginning with the light belongs to those also who practise other meditations.—That road, an objection is raised, may present itself to the mind in the case of those meditations which do not mention any road of their own; but why should it be accepted for such meditations as mention different roads of their own?—This objection would be valid, we reply, if the various roads mentioned were entirely different; but as a matter of fact there is only one road leading to the world of Brahman and possessing different attributes; and this road is designated in one place by one attribute and in another place by another attribute. For this relation of attributes and what possesses attributes is established by the circumstance that we recognise, in all the passages quoted, some part of the road¹. And if the chapters which mention the roads are different, we, as long as the meditation is one, have to combine the different attributes of the road (mentioned separately in the different chapters), in the same way as (in general) the different particulars of one meditation (which are stated in different chapters) have to be combined. And even if the meditations (in which the particulars of the road are mentioned) are different, the road must be viewed as one and the same, because we recognise everywhere some part of the road and because the goal is everywhere the same. For all the following passages declare one and the same result, viz. the obtainment of the world of Brahman: ‘In these worlds of Brahman they dwell for ever and ever’ (*Bri. Up.* VI, 2, 15); ‘There he dwells eternal years’ (*Bri.*

¹ Each passage mentions at least one of the stages of the road leading to the world of Brahman, and we thus conclude that the same road—of which the stations are the attributes—is meant everywhere.

Up. V, 10, 1); 'Whatever victory, whatever greatness belongs to Brahman, that victory he gives, that greatness he reaches' (Kau. Up. I, 2); 'Those who find the world of Brahman by Brahmaṭarya' (*Kh.* Up. VIII, 4, 3).—To the remark that the emphatical assertion (made in the passage, 'Just by those rays,' &c.) would be contradicted by our admitting light and so on as stages of the road, we reply that no such difficulty exists, because that passage aims only at establishing the rays (as part of the road). For the one word 'just' cannot at the same time establish the rays and discard light and so on. The passage therefore must be understood as only emphasising the connexion with the rays.—Nor does the regard paid by us to the statements about light and so on being stages of the way contradict what one passage says about speed; for that passage means to say that one goes (to the world of Brahman) more quickly than anywhere else, so that its sense is, 'In the twinkling of an eye one goes there¹.'—Moreover the passage, 'On neither of these two ways' (*Kh.* Up. V, 10, 8)—in teaching that there is a third inferior road for those who have missed the other two roads—shows that besides the road of the fathers there is only one further road, viz. the road of the gods, of which light and so on are stages. The text about light and so on mentioning a greater number of stages while other texts mention a smaller number, it stands to reason that the less numerous should be explained in conformity with the more numerous. For this reason also the Sūtra says, 'On the road beginning with light, on account of its being widely known.'

2. From the year to Vāyu; on account of the absence and presence of specification.

But by what special combination can we establish between

¹ Read in the text—*tvarāvaṭanam tv arkirādyapekshāyām api gantavyāntarāpekshayā kshaipryārtha°*.—Ānandagiri comments—*tvareti, arkirādimārgasyaikye=pi kutasid anyato gantavyād anenopāyena satyalokam gaḥ iti gaḥḥantīti gantavyabhedāpekshayā vaṭanam yuktam ity arthaḥ*.

the different attributes of the road the relation of what is determined by attributes and of determining attributes? The teacher out of kindness to us connects them as follows.—The Kaushîtakins describe the road of the gods as follows, ‘Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the world of Agni, to the world of Vāyu, to the world of Varuṇa, to the world of Indra, to the world of Pragâpati, to the world of Brahman’ (Kau. Up. I, 3). Now the world of Agni means the same as light, since both terms denote burning, and we therefore need not, with regard to them, search for the order in which they are to be combined. Vāyu, on the other hand, is not mentioned in the road beginning with light; in what place then is he to be inserted?—We read, *Kh. Up. V, 10, 1*, ‘They go to the light, from light to day, from day to the waxing half of the moon, from the waxing half of the moon to the six months when the sun goes to the north, from those months to the year, from the year to Âditya.’ Here they reach Vāyu after the year and before Âditya.—Why so?—‘On account of the absence and presence of specification.’ About Vāyu—concerning whom the passage, ‘He goes to the world of Vāyu,’ contains no specification—another passage does state such a specification, viz. *Bṛi. Up. V, 10, 1*, ‘When the person goes away from this world he comes to Vāyu. Then Vāyu makes room for him like the hole of a wheel, and through it he mounts higher, he comes to Âditya.’ On account of this specification which shows Vāyu to come before Âditya, Vāyu must be inserted between the year and Âditya.—But as there is a specification showing that Vāyu comes after Agni, why is he not inserted after the light?—There is no such specification, we reply.—But a scriptural passage has been quoted which runs as follows, ‘Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the world of Agni, to the world of Vāyu.’—In that passage, we reply, we have only two clauses, of which the text exhibits one before the other, but there is no word expressing order of succession. We have there only a simple statement of facts, ‘He goes to this and to that.’ But in the other text we perceive a regular order of succession;

for it intimates that after having mounted on high through an opening as large as the wheel of a chariot, granted by Vāyu, he approaches the sun. The Sūtra therefore rightly says, 'On account of the absence and presence of specification.'—The Vāgasaneyins in their text record that he proceeds 'from the months to the world of the gods, from the world of the gods to the sun' (*Bṛi. Up. VI, 2, 15*). Here, in order to maintain the immediate succession of Vāyu and Āditya, we must suppose the souls to go from the world of the gods to Vāyu. What the Sūtra says about the soul going to Vāyu from the year has reference to the text of the *Khândogya*. As between the Vāgasaneyaka and the *Khândogya*, the world of the gods is absent from one, the year from the other. As both texts are authoritative, both stages have to be inserted in each, and the distinction has to be made that, owing to its connexion with the months, the year has the first place (i.e. after the months and before the world of the gods), and the world of the gods the second place.

3. Beyond lightning (there is) Varuṇa, on account of the connexion (of the two).

The *Khândogya* continues, 'From Āditya to the moon, from the moon to lightning.' Here Varuṇa (mentioned in the *Kaushîtaki-upan.*) has to be brought in so that above that lightning he goes to the world of Varuṇa. For there is a connexion between lightning and Varuṇa; the broad lightnings dance forth from the womb of the clouds with the sound of deep thunder, and then water falls down. And a Brâhmaṇa also says, 'It lightens, it thunders, it will rain' (*Kh. Up. VII, 11, 1*). But the lord of all water is Varuṇa, as known from *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*.—And above Varuṇa there come Indra and Pragâpati, as there is no other place for them, and according to the force of the text, as it stands. Varuṇa and so on should be inserted at the end, for that reason also that they are merely additional, no particular place being assigned to them. And lightning is the end of the road beginning with light¹.

¹ So that Varuṇa and so on are to be placed after lightning.

4. (They are) conductors, this being indicated.

With regard to those beginning with light a doubt arises whether they are marks of the road, or places of enjoyment, or leaders of the travelling souls.—The first possible view of the question is that light and so on are marks of the road, because the instruction has that character. For as in ordinary life a man wishing to go to a village or a town is told, 'Go from here to that hill, from there to a fig-tree, from that to a river, from that to a village; after that you will reach the town;' so here the text also says, 'from light to day, from day to the waxing half of the month,' &c.—Or else light and so on may be viewed as places of enjoyment. For the text connects Agni and so on with the word 'world'; 'He comes to the world of Agni,' &c. Now the term 'world' is used to denote places of enjoyment of living beings, as when we say, 'The world of men; the world of the Fathers; the world of the gods.' A Brâhmaṇa passage also says, 'They remain attached to the worlds which consist of day and night' (Sat. Brâ. X, 2, 6, 8). Therefore light and the rest are not conductors. Moreover, they cannot be conductors because they are without intelligence. For in ordinary life intelligent men only are appointed by the king to conduct travellers over difficult roads.

To all this we reply as follows. They must be conductors, because the text indicates this. For we read, 'From the moon to the lightning; there a person that is not a man leads them to Brahman;' which shows their conductorship to be something settled. Should it be objected that this last sentence exhausts itself in conveying its own purport¹; we say No; for the attribute ('that is not a man') has only the meaning of excluding his previously established humanity. Only if in the case of the light and the rest personal conductors are settled, and those of human nature, it is appropriate to use the attribute

¹ And has not the additional power of indicating, i.e. enabling us to infer that also the beings previously mentioned are 'leaders' of the soul.

‘amānava,’ to the end of excluding this (previously established) humanity¹.

But mere indication has no force, as there is nothing to prove (that there must be such personal conductors).—To this objection the next Sūtra replies.

5. (There are personal conductors) because that is established on the ground of both (i. e. road and travellers) being bewildered (i. e. unconscious).

As, owing to their separation from a body, the organs of those who go on the road beginning with light are wrapped up, they are incapable of ruling themselves ; and the light &c., as they are without intelligence, are equally incapable. Hence it follows that the particular intelligent deities who represent light and the rest are appointed to the conductorship. For in ordinary life also drunken or senseless people whose sense-organs are wrapped up follow a road as commanded by others.—Again light and the rest cannot be taken for marks of the road because they are not always present. A man who dies in the night cannot come to day in its true (physical) nature ; and he cannot wait (for the break of day), as we have already explained above (IV, 2, 19). But this objection does not apply to gods who are permanent. And gods may be called light and so on, because they represent light and so on. Nor is the expression, ‘From light to day,’ &c. objectionable, even if we adopt the sense of conductorship ; for it means, through the light as cause they come to the day ; through the day as cause, to the waxing half of the moon. And such instruction is seen also in the case of conductors known in ordinary life, for they say, Go hence to Balavarman, thence (i. e. Balavarman conducting you) to Gayasimha, thence to

¹ Why should it be specially stated that this last ‘conducting person’ is amānava? Only, because it is a settled matter that the previously mentioned beings are also ‘conducting persons,’ and at the same time ‘mānava.’ The last clause therefore does not only directly teach that a person conducts the souls to Brahman, but at the same time ‘indicates’ that the beings mentioned before in connexion with the road are also ‘personal conductors.’

Kṛishṇagupta. Moreover, in the beginning where the text says that they go to the light, a relation in general only is expressed, not a special relation ; at the end, however, where it is said he leads them to Brahman, a special relation is expressed, viz. that between conductor and conductor. Therefore this is accepted for the beginning also.—And as the organs of the wandering souls are wrapped up together there is no possibility of their enjoying anything. Although, however, the wanderers do not enjoy anything, the word ‘world’ may be explained on the ground that those worlds are places of enjoyment for other beings dwelling there.—The conclusion therefore is that he who has reached the world of Agni is led on by Agni, and he who has reached the world ruled by Vāyu, by Vāyu.

But how, if we adopt the view of conductorship, can this apply to Varuṇa and the rest? Varuṇa and the rest were inserted above the lightning ; but scripture states that after the lightning until Brahman is reached a person leads who is not a man.—To this doubt the next Sūtra replies.

6. From thence (the souls are led) by him only who belongs to the lightning ; the sacred text stating that.

From thence, i. e. after they have come to the lightning they go to the world of Brahman, being led through the worlds of Varuṇa and the rest by the person, not a man, who follows immediately after the lightning. For that that person leads them is stated in the following passage, ‘When they have reached the place of lightning a person, not a man, leads them to the world of Brahman’ (*Bṛi. Up. VI, 2, 15*). Varuṇa and the rest, we must understand, favour them either by not hindering or somehow assisting them.—Therefore it is well said that light and so on are the gods who act as conductors.

7. To the effected (Brahman) (the souls are led) ; (thus opines) Bādari ; because going to him is possible.

With regard to the passage, ‘He leads them to Brahman,’

the doubt arises whether that person leads the souls to the effected, lower, Brahman, or to the highest, non-modified, chief Brahman.—Whence the doubt?—Because the (ambiguous) word Brahman is used, and because scripture speaks of going.—The opinion of the teacher Bādari is that the person, who is not a man, leads them to the lower, qualified, effected Brahman; because it is possible to go to that. For the effected Brahman which occupies a definite place can be the goal of a journey. With the highest Brahman, on the other hand, we cannot connect the ideas of one who goes, or object of going, or act of going; for that Brahman is present everywhere and is the inner Self of all.

8. And on account of (the Brahman to which the souls are led) being qualified (in another passage).

That the soul's going has for its object the effected Brahman, we conclude from another scriptural passage also which qualifies Brahman in a certain way, 'He leads them to the worlds of Brahman; in these worlds of Brahman they live for ever and ever' (*Bṛi. Up. VI, 2, 15*). For it would be impossible to qualify the highest Brahman by means of the plural number ('worlds'); while the plural number may be applied to the lower Brahman which may abide in different conditions.—The term 'world' also can directly denote only some place of enjoyment falling within the sphere of effects and possessing the quality of being entered into, while it must be understood in a metaphorical sense in passages¹ such as 'Brahman is that world' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 23*).—And also what the text says concerning an abode and some one abiding within it ('in these worlds of Brahman,' &c.), cannot be directly understood of the highest Brahman.—For all these reasons the leading of the souls has the lower Brahman for its goal.

But even on this interpretation the word 'Brahman' is inappropriate, as it has been proved that Brahman is the

¹ Where the term 'world' is applied to the highest Brahman.

cause of the origination and so on of the entire world.—To this objection the next Sûtra replies.

9. But on account of its proximity (to the higher Brahman) there is designation (of the lower Brahman) as that.

The word 'but' indicates the setting aside of the doubt.—As the lower Brahman is in proximity to the higher one, there is nothing unreasonable in the word 'Brahman' being applied to the former also. For when the higher Brahman is, for the purposes of pious meditation, described as possessing certain effected qualities—such as consisting of mind and the rest—which qualities depend on its connexion with certain pure limiting adjuncts; then it is what we call the lower Brahman.—But with the assumption of the lower Brahman there does not agree what scripture says about the souls not returning; for there is no permanence anywhere apart from the highest Brahman. And scripture declares that those who have set out on the road of the gods do not return, 'They who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man' (*Kh. Up.* IV, 15, 6); 'For them there is no return here' (*Bri. Up.* VI, 2, 15); 'Moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 6, 5).

To this objection we make the following reply.

10. On the passing away of the effected (world of Brahman) (the souls go) together with the ruler of that (world) to what is higher than that; on account of scriptural declaration.

When the reabsorption of the effected Brahman world draws near, the souls in which meanwhile perfect knowledge has sprung up proceed, together with Hiranyagarbha the ruler of that world, to 'what is higher than that,' i.e. to the pure highest place of Vishnu. This is the release by successive steps which we have to accept on the basis of the scriptural declarations about the non-return of the souls. For we have shown that the Highest cannot be directly reached by the act of going.

11. And on account of *Smṛiti*.

Smṛiti also agrees with this view; cp. the following passage, 'When the pralaya has come and the end of the highest (i.e. *Hiraṇyagarbha*), then they all, together with Brahman, with purified minds enter the highest place.'—The final conclusion (*siddhānta*) therefore is that the going of the souls, of which scripture speaks, has for its goal the effected Brahman.—But what is the *primā facie* view, with regard to which this final conclusion has been established in *Sūtras* 7-11?—This required *primā facie* view is now set forth in the following *Sūtras*.

12. To the highest (Brahman) (the souls are led); *Gaimini* (opines); owing to this being the principal sense (of the word 'Brahman').

The teacher *Gaimini* is of opinion that the passage, 'He leads them to Brahman,' refers to the highest Brahman. For the highest Brahman constitutes the principal, primary sense, of the word 'Brahman,' which denotes the lower Brahman only in a secondary, metaphorical way. And where both senses are possible, the primary sense has to be preferred.

13. And because scripture declares that.

The text, 'Going upwards by that he reaches immortality,' declares that immortality is reached by going. But immortality is possible only in the highest Brahman, not in the effected one, because the latter is transitory. So scripture says, 'Where one sees something else, that is little, that is mortal' (*Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1*). According to the text of the *Kaṭha-upanishad* also the going of the soul is towards the highest Brahman; for after the highest Brahman has been introduced there as general subject-matter—in the passage, 'That which thou seest,' &c., I, 2, 14, no other kind of knowledge is taken up later on.

14. And the intention of entering (can) not (be referred) to the effected (Brahman).

Moreover the intention of entering into which is expressed

in the passage, 'I enter the hall of Pragâpati, the house' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 14, 1), cannot have the lower Brahman for its object. For the immediately preceding passage, 'That within which these forms and names are contained is the Brahman,' shows that the highest Brahman, different in nature from the effected one, is the general subject-matter; and the subsequent passage, 'I am the glory of the Brâhmans,' represents the soul as the Self of all; it being known from another scriptural passage that 'Glory' is a name of the highest Brahman, 'There is no likeness of him whose name is great glory' (*Vâg. Samh.* XXXII, 3). And in the vidyâ of Brahman within the heart it is said of this same entering the house that it is preceded by going¹, 'There is the city of Brahman Aparâgitâ, and the golden hall built by Prabhu' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 5, 3). And that the performing of a journey is intended follows also from the use of the verb 'pad,' which denotes going (prapadye, I enter).—The other (*primâ facie*) view therefore is that all the passages about the soul's going refer to the highest Brahman.

These two views have been embodied by the teacher in the Sûtras; one in the Sûtras 7-11, the other in the Sûtras 12-14. Now the arguments contained in the former set are capable of proving the fallaciousness of the arguments in the latter set, but not vice versâ; from which it follows that the former set states the final view and the latter set the *primâ facie* view only.—For nobody can compel us to accept the primary sense of a word (such as Brahman) even where it is impossible to do so.—And although met with in a chapter that treats of the highest knowledge, the reference to the going to Brahman—which belongs to another kind of knowledge—may be explained as aiming merely at the glorification of the highest knowledge (not at teaching that the going to Brahman is the result of higher

¹ I am not quite sure which passage in the daharavidyâ is supposed to prove that the entering of Brahman's house is preceded by going. Probably VIII, 6, 5, 'He departs upwards; he is going to the sun.'

knowledge).—And with reference to the passage, ‘I enter the hall of Pragâpati, the house,’ there is no reason why we should not separate that passage from what precedes and refer the intention of entering to the effected Brahman. And the qualified Brahman also may be spoken of as being the Self of all, as shown by other passages such as ‘He to whom all works, all desires belong,’ &c. (*Kh. Up.* III, 14, 2). The texts about the going therefore all belong to the lower knowledge.—Others again, in accordance with the general principle that the earlier Sûtras set forth the primâ facie view, while the later ones contain the siddhânta view, maintain that the passages about the soul’s going fall within the sphere of the higher knowledge. But this is impossible, because nothing may go to the highest Brahman. ‘Omnipresent and eternal like the ether;’ ‘The Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self that is within all’ (*Bri. Up.* III, 4, 1); ‘Self only is all this’ (*Kh. Up.* VII, 25, 2); ‘Brahman only is all this, it is the best’ (*Mu. Up.* II, 2, 11): from all these passages we ascertain that the highest Brahman is present everywhere, within everything, the Self of everything, and of such a Brahman it is altogether impossible that it ever should be the goal of going. For we do not go to what is already reached; ordinary experience rather tells us that a person goes to something different from him.—But we observe in ordinary experience also that something already reached may become an object of going, in so far as qualified by a different place; a man living on the earth, e.g. goes to the earth, in so far as he goes to another place on the earth. In the same way we see that a child reaches the adult state which in reality belongs to the child’s identical Self, but is qualified by a difference of time. Analogously Brahman also may be an object of going in so far as it is possessed of all kinds of powers.—This may not be, we reply, because scripture expressly negatives Brahman’s possessing any distinctive qualities.—‘Without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint’ (*Svet. Up.* VI, 19); ‘Neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long’ (*Bri. Up.* III, 8, 8); ‘He who is without and within, unproduced’ (*Mu. Up.* II, 1, 2);

'This great, unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 25); 'He is to be described by No, no!' (*Bri. Up.* III, 9, 26); from all these scriptural texts, as well as from *Smṛiti* and reasoning, it follows that the highest Self cannot be assumed to possess any differences depending on time or space or anything else, and cannot therefore become the object of going. The cases of places on the earth and of the different ages of man are by no means analogous; for they are affected by differences of locality and so on, and therefore can be gone to or reached.—Nor will it avail our opponent to say that Brahman possesses manifold powers, because scripture declares it to be the cause of the world's origination, sustentation, and final retraction; for those passages which deny difference have no other sense (but just the absolute denial of all difference).—But in the same way also those passages which state the origination and so on of the world have no other sense! (i.e. cannot be understood to teach anything but just the origination and so on of the world).—This is not so, we reply; for what they aim at teaching is the absolute oneness of Brahman. For texts which by means of the simile of the lump of clay, &c., teach that only that which is, viz. Brahman, is true, while everything effected is untrue, cannot aim at teaching the origination, &c. of the world.—But why should the passages about the origination, &c. of the world be subordinate to those which deny all difference, and not vice versa?—Because, we reply, the texts which negative all difference effect the cessation of all desire. For when the absolute oneness, permanence, and purity of the Self have once been apprehended, we cognize that the highest aim of man has been attained, and therefore conceive no further desires. Compare the following texts: 'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who beholds that unity?' (*Īśa-up.* 7); 'Thou hast reached fearlessness, O *Ganaka*' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 2, 4); 'He who knows does not fear anything; he does not distress himself with the thought, Why did I not do what is good? Why did I do what is bad?' (*Taitt. Up.* II, 9.) This also follows from our observing that those who know realise

contentment of mind ; and from the fact that scripture blames the false notion of (the reality of) effects, 'From death to death goes he who sees here any difference' (Ka. Up. II, 4, 10). The texts negating all difference cannot therefore be understood as subordinate to other texts. Those texts, on the other hand, which speak of the origination of the world and so on have no similar power of conveying a sense which effects cessation of all desire. At the same time it is manifest that they have another (than their literal) meaning. For the text, after having said at first, 'Of this shoot sprung up know that it cannot be without a root' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 3), declares in the end that Being which is the root of the world is the only object of cognition. Similarly Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'That from which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, seek to know that ; that is Brahman.' As thus the passages about origination and so on aim at teaching the unity of the Self, Brahman cannot be viewed as possessing manifold powers, and cannot therefore be the object of the action of going.—And, as already explained under IV, 2, 13, also the text Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6 ('Of him the *prāṇas* do not depart ; being Brahman he goes to Brahman'), denies any going to the highest Brahman.

Moreover, on the hypothesis of going, that which goes, i.e. the individual soul, must be either a part of Brahman to which it goes, or an effect of Brahman, or different from Brahman ; for if the two were absolutely identical no going could take place.—Well, what then ?—We reply as follows. If, in the first place, the soul is a part of Brahman, it cannot go to it, since the whole is permanently reached by the part. Besides, the hypothesis of whole and parts cannot be applied to Brahman, which is acknowledged to be without parts.—The same objection lies against the hypothesis of the soul being an effect of Brahman ; for also that which passes over into an effect is permanently reached by the effect. A jar made of clay does not exist apart from the clay which constitutes its Self ; were it so apart it would cease to be. And on both hypotheses, as that to

which the parts or the effects would belong, i. e. Brahman is altogether unchanging, its entering into the *Samsâra* state could not be accounted for.—Let then, in the third place, the soul be different from Brahman. In that case it must be either of atomic size, or infinite, or of some intervening extent. If it is omnipresent, it cannot go anywhere. If it is of some middling extent, it cannot be permanent. If it is of atomic size, the fact of sensation extending over the whole body cannot be accounted for. The two hypotheses of atomic and middling extent have moreover been refuted at length in a former part of this work (II, 3, 19 ff.). And from the soul's being different from the highest Brahman it also would follow that such texts as 'Thou art that' are futile. This latter objection also lies against the theories of the soul being a part or an effect of Brahman. Nor can the difficulty be got over by it being pleaded that a part and an effect are not different from the whole and the causal substance; for that kind of oneness is not oneness in the true literal sense.—From all those three theories it moreover equally follows that the soul cannot obtain final release, because its *Samsâra* condition could never come to an end. Or else, if that condition should come to an end, it would follow that the very essence of the soul perishes; for those theories do not admit that the (imperishable) Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul.

Here now some come forward with the following contention. Works of permanent obligation and works to be performed on special occasions are undertaken to the end that harm may not spring up; such works as are due to special desires, and such as are forbidden, are eschewed, in order that neither the heavenly world nor hell may be obtained, and those works whose fruits are to be enjoyed in the current bodily existence are exhausted by just that fruition. Hence, as after the death of the present body, there is no cause for the origination of a new body, that blessed isolation which consists in the soul's abiding within its own nature will accomplish itself for a man acting in the way described above, even without the cognition of his

Self being identical with Brahman's Self.—All this is inadmissible, we reply, because there is no proof of it. For scripture nowhere teaches that he who desires release should conduct himself in the way described. To say that because the *Samsāra* state depends on works, it will cease when works are absent, is an altogether arbitrary style of reasoning. And (whether arbitrary or not) this reasoning falls to the ground, because the absence of the cause is something that cannot be ascertained. It may be supposed that each living being has, in its former states of existence, accumulated many works which have part of them pleasant, part of them unpleasant results. As these works are such as to lead to contrary results, which cannot be enjoyed all of them at the same time, some works whose opportunity has come, build up the present state of existence; others sit inactive waiting for a place, a time, and operative causes (favourable to them). As these latter works cannot thus be exhausted in the present state of existence, we cannot definitely assert, even in the case of a man who conducts himself as described above, that at the end of his present bodily existence all cause for a new bodily existence will be absent. The existence of a remainder of works is, moreover, established by scriptural and *Smṛiti* passages, such as, 'Those whose conduct has been good' (*Kh. Up.* V, 10, 7); 'Then with the remainder.'—But may not, an objection is raised, those remaining works be wiped out (even in the present existence) by the performance of works of permanent obligation and such works as are due to special occasions?—This may not be, we reply, because the two sets of works are not of contrary nature. Where there is contrariety of nature, one thing may be wiped out by another; but good deeds performed in previous states of existence, and works of permanent obligation and so on (performed in the present life), are both of them equally pure and therefore not of opposite nature. Bad works indeed, as being of impure nature, are opposed to works of permanent obligation, &c., and therefore may be extinguished by the latter. But even from this admission it does not follow that the causes for a new embodied existence

are altogether absent; for those causes may be supplied by good deeds, and we do not know that the evil works have been extinguished without a remainder. Nor is there anything to prove that the performance of works of permanent obligation, &c., leads only to the non-origination of harm, and not at the same time to the origination of new results (to be extinguished in future states of existence); for it may happen that such new results spring up collaterally. Thus Âpastamba says, 'When a mango tree is planted for the sake of its fruits, it in addition gives shade and fragrance; thus additional advantages spring from the performance of religious duty.'—Nor can anybody who has not reached perfect knowledge promise to refrain altogether, from birth to death, from all actions either forbidden or aiming at the fulfilment of special wishes; for we observe that even the most perfect men commit faults, however minute. This may be a matter of doubt; all the same it remains true that the absence of causes for a new existence cannot be known with certainty.—If, further, the soul's unity with Brahman's Self—which is to be realised through knowledge—is not acknowledged, the soul whose essential nature it is to be an agent and enjoyer cannot even desire the state of blissful isolation; for a being cannot divorce itself from its true essence, not any more than fire can cease to be hot.—But, an objection is raised, what is of disadvantage to the soul is the state of agentship and fruition in so far as actually produced, not its mere potentiality. Release of the soul may, therefore, take place if only that actual condition is avoided while its potentiality remains.—This also, we reply, is not true; for as long as the potentiality exists it will inevitably produce the actuality.—But, our opponent resumes, potentiality alone, without other co-operative causes, does not produce its effect; as long therefore as it is alone it cannot, though continuing to exist, do any harm!—This also, we reply, is not valid; for the co-operative causes also are, potentially, permanently connected (with the acting and enjoying soul). If, therefore, the soul whose essence is acting and enjoying is not considered to possess fundamental identity with Brahman

—an identity to be realised by knowledge—there is not any chance of its obtaining final release. Scripture, moreover (in the passage, ‘There is no other way to go,’ *Svet. Up. III, 8*), denies that there is any other way to release but knowledge.—But if the soul is non-different from the highest Brahman, all practical existence comes to an end, because then perception and the other means of right knowledge no longer act!—Not so, we reply. Practical life will hold its place even then, just as dreamlife holds its place up to the moment of waking. Scripture, after having said that perception and the rest are operative in the sphere of those who have not reached true knowledge (‘For where there is duality, as it were, there one sees the other,’ &c.; *Bṛi. Up. IV, 5, 15*), goes on to show that those means of knowledge do not exist for those who possess that knowledge (‘But when the whole of him has become the Self, whereby should he see another,’ &c.). As thus for him who knows the highest Brahman all cognition of something to be gone to, &c. is sublated, his going cannot in any way be shown to be possible.

To what sphere then belong the scriptural texts about the soul’s going?—To the sphere of qualified knowledge, we reply. Accordingly the soul’s going is mentioned in the chapter treating of the knowledge of the five fires, in the chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman’s couch, in the chapter treating of the knowledge of Agni Vaisvânara (*Kh. Up. V, 3-10*; *Kau. Up. I*; *Kh. Up. V, 11-24*). And where the soul’s going is spoken of in a chapter treating of Brahman—(as e.g. in the passages, ‘He leads them to Brahman,’ &c., *Kh. Up. IV, 15, 6*, in a chapter treating of Brahman, as shown by ‘Breath is Brahman,’ &c., *IV, 10, 5*; and ‘He departs upward,’ &c., *Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5*, in the chapter beginning ‘There is this city of Brahman,’ *VIII, 1, 1*)—such attributes as ‘vāmanî,’ i.e. Leader of blessings (*Kh. Up. IV, 15, 3*), and ‘satyakâma,’ i.e. having true wishes, show that there the qualified Brahman has to be meditated upon, and to that Brahman the soul can go. No passage, on the other hand, speaks of the soul’s going to the highest Brahman; while such going is specially

denied in the passage, 'Of him the *prâṇas* do not depart.' In passages, again, such as 'He who knows Brahman obtains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), we indeed meet with the verb 'to reach,' which has the sense of going; but because, as explained before, the reaching of another place is out of question, 'reaching' there denotes only the obtainment (realisation) of one's own nature, in so far as (through true knowledge) the expanse of names and forms which Nescience superimposes (on Brahman) is dissolved. Such passages are to be understood analogously to the text, 'Being Brahman he enters into Brahman' (*Bṛi.* Up. IV, 4, 6).—Besides, if the going were understood as connected with the highest Brahman, it could only subserve the purpose either of satisfying (the mind of him who knows) or of reflection. Now, a statement of the soul's going cannot produce any satisfaction in him who knows Brahman, since satisfaction is already fully accomplished through his perfect condition, bestowed on him by knowledge, of which he is immediately conscious. Nor, on the other hand, can it be shown that reflection on the soul's going in any way subserves knowledge, which is conscious of eternally perfect blessedness, and has not for its fruit something to be accomplished.—For all these reasons the soul's going falls within the sphere of the lower knowledge. And only in consequence of the distinction of the higher and lower Brahman not being ascertained, statements about the soul's going which apply to the lower Brahman are wrongly put in connexion with the higher Brahman.

But are there really two Brahman, a higher one and a lower one?—Certainly there are two! For scripture declares this, as e.g. in the passage, 'O Satyakâma, the syllable Om is the higher and also the lower Brahman' (*Pr.* Up. V, 2).—What then is the higher Brahman, and what the lower?—Listen! Where the texts, negating all distinctions founded on name, form, and the like, designate Brahman by such terms as that which is not coarse and so on, the higher Brahman is spoken of. Where, again, for the purpose of pious meditation, the texts teach Brahman as qualified by some distinction depending on name, form, and so on, using terms such as

‘He who consists of mind, whose body is *prāṇa*, whose shape is light’ (*Kṛ. Up. III, 14, 2*), that is the lower Brahman.—But is there not room here for the objection that this distinction of a higher and a lower Brahman stultifies the scriptural texts asserting aduality?—Not so, we reply. That objection is removed by the consideration that name and form, the adjuncts (of the one real Brahman), are due to Nescience. Passages such as ‘If he desires the world of the fathers’ (*Kṛ. Up. VIII, 2, 1*), which the text exhibits in proximity to a meditation on the lower Brahman, show that the fruit of such meditation is lordship over the worlds; a fruit falling within the sphere of the *Samsāra*, Nescience having not as yet been discarded. And as that fruit is bound to a special locality, there is nothing contradictory in the soul’s going there in order to reach it. That the soul, although all-pervading, is viewed as going because it enters into connexion with the *buddhi* and the rest of its adjuncts, just as general space enters into connexion with jars and the like, we have explained under II, 3, 29.

For all these reasons the view of Bādari as set forth in Sūtra 7 is the final one; while Sūtra 12, which states Gaimini’s opinion, merely sets forth another view, to the end of the illumination of the learner’s understanding.

15. Those who do not take their stand on symbols he leads, thus Bādarāyaṇa (opines); there being no fault in the twofold relation (resulting from this opinion); and the meditation on that (i.e. Brahman) (is the reason of this twofold relation).

It is a settled conclusion that all going has reference to the effected Brahman, not to the highest Brahman. Another doubt now arises here. Does that person who is not a man lead to the world of Brahman all those who take their stand on the effected Brahman, without any difference; or only some of them?

The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that all those who possess knowledge—provided that knowledge be not of the highest Brahman—go to the world of Brahman. For in Sūtra III,

3, 31 that going was put in connexion with all the different vidyās (of the qualified Brahmans), without any distinction.

To this the Sūtrakāra replies, 'Those who do not take their stand on symbols.' That means: Excepting those who take their stand on symbols (i. e. who meditate on certain things as symbolically representing Brahman), that person who is not a man leads all others who take their stand (i. e. who meditate) on the effected Brahman, to the world of Brahman; this is the opinion of the teacher Bādarāyaṇa. For in acknowledging in this way a twofold relation there is no fault; since the argumentation as to the non-restriction of going (Sūtra III, 3, 31) may be understood as referring to all meditations with the exception of those on symbols. The words, 'and the meditation on that,' state the reason for this twofold relation. For he whose meditation is fixed on Brahman reaches lordship like that of Brahman, according to the scriptural relation, 'In whatever form they meditate on him, that they become themselves.' In the case of symbols, on the other hand, the meditation is not fixed on Brahman, the symbol being the chief element in the meditation.—But scripture says also that persons whose mind is not fixed on Brahman go to it; so in the knowledge of the five fires, 'He leads them to Brahman' (*Kh. Up. V, 10, 2*).—This may be so where we observe a direct scriptural declaration. We only mean to say that where there is no such declaration the general rule is that those only whose purpose is Brahman go to it, not any others.

16. And scripture declares a difference (in the case of meditations on symbols).

With reference to the meditations on symbols, such as name and so on, scripture declares that each following meditation has a different result from the preceding one, 'As far as name reaches he is lord and master;—speech is greater than name;—as far as speech reaches he is lord and master;—mind is greater than speech' (*Kh. Up. VII, 1, f.*).

Now this distinction of rewards is possible because the meditations depend on symbols, while there could be no such distinction if they depended on the one non-different Brahman.—Hence those who take their stand on symbols cannot have the same reward as others.

FOURTH PÂDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. (On the soul's) having entered (into the highest light), there is manifestation (of its own nature); (as we infer) from the word 'own.'

'Thus does that serene being, having risen out of this body and entered into the highest light, manifest itself by its own nature' (*Kh. Up. VII, 12, 3*). Regarding this text a doubt arises whether the Self¹ manifests itself through some adventitious distinction—as the Self (of him who possesses the lower knowledge only) does in the world of the gods and other abodes of enjoyment—or only through its own Self.—The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that, as in other places, here also the manifestation takes place through some adventitious characteristic; because release also is a fruit (like other fruits, e.g. *svarga*), and because 'manifestation' means as much as origination. If the manifestation took place only through the Self's own nature, it would already appear in the Self's former states; for a thing's own nature is never absent from it. The Self therefore manifests itself by means of some adventitious distinction.

To this we make the following reply. It manifests itself through its Self only, not through any other attribute.—Why so?—On account of the word 'own' in the clause 'by its own nature.' For on the other view the qualification conveyed by 'own' would be unmeaning.—But may not the term 'own' merely indicate that that form belongs to that which manifests itself?—Not so, we reply. This is a point which would not require to be stated. For as in

¹ *Samprati katurthe pâde paravidyâphalaikadeso brahmabhâvâvirbhâvaḥ, sagunavidyâphalam ka sarvesvaratulyabhogatvam avadhârayishyate, tatrâparavidyâprâpyam uktvâ paravidyâprâpyam âha sampadyeti. Ân. Gi.*

whatever form a thing manifests itself that form necessarily belongs to it, the qualification 'own' would be devoid of purport. It has a meaning, on the other hand, if it denotes the Self, the sense conveyed then being that the manifestation takes place only through the nature of the Self, not through any other, adventitious, nature.—But, as a thing cannot be without its own nature, what difference is there between the Self's former states and its present state (after the manifestation)?—To this question the next Sūtra replies.

2. (The Self whose true nature has manifested itself is) released ; according to the promise (made by scripture).

That soul, of which the text says that it manifests itself, is released from its former bondage and abides in its own pure Self ; while previously its Self was stained by the three states (i. e. the state of waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep), according to *Kṛ. Up. VIII, 9-11*, 'It is blind ;' —'it weeps as it were ;'—'it goes to utter annihilation.' This is the difference.—But how is it known that in its present condition the soul is released?—'On account of the promise,' the Sūtra says. For after the teacher has promised to give further instruction about the Self as free from the imperfections of the three states ('I shall explain him further to you,' *Kṛ. Up. VIII, 11, 3*), he introduces the topic (of the released Self) in the words, 'Him being free from the body neither pleasure nor pain touches,' and concludes, 'By his own nature he manifests himself ; that is the highest Person.' The words at the beginning of the tale also, 'The Self which is free from sin' (*VIII, 7, 1*), make a promise regarding the released Self. And release is a fruit in so far only as it is a cessation of all bondage, not as implying the accession of something new. And with reference to the assertion that manifestation is the origination of something new we remark that it is so only with regard to a former condition (which ceases to be), as when we say of a convalescent person that he now manifests

himself free from sickness. Hence there is no room for objections.

3. (The light into which the soul enters is) the Self; owing to the subject-matter of the chapter.

But how can the soul be called 'released,' considering that the clause 'having entered into the highest light' speaks of it as within the sphere of what is a mere effect? For the word 'light,' according to general usage, denotes physical light. And none who has not passed beyond the sphere of what is effected can be released, it being known that whatever is an effect is tainted with evil.—This objection is without force, we reply; because in the passage referred to the word 'light' denotes the Self, in accordance with the subject-matter of the chapter. For as such the highest Self is introduced in the words, 'The Self which is free from sin, old age, death,' &c., and we therefore may not all at once pass over to physical light; incurring thereby the fault of abandoning the topic under discussion and introducing a new one. Besides, the word 'light' sometimes denotes the Self, as e.g. in the passage, 'That the gods meditate on as the light of lights' (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 16*). We have discussed this at length under I, 3, 40.

4. (The released soul abides) in non-division (from the highest Self); because that is seen from scripture.

A doubt here arises whether that soul of which the text says, 'Having entered the highest light it manifests itself by its true nature,' remains separate from the highest Self, or abides in the state of non-division from it.—Somebody might be inclined to think that—because in the passage, 'He moves about there,' a distinction is made between the abode and him who abides; and because the clause, 'Having entered the highest light,' mentions an agent and an object (of the agent's activity)—the soul remains distinct from the highest Self.—This view the Sûtra sets aside. The released soul is non-separate from the highest Self.—Why so?—Because

that is seen from scripture.] For passages such as 'Thou art that' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman' (*Bri. Up.* I, 4, 10); 'Where he sees nothing else' (*Kh. Up.* VII, 24, 1); 'But there is then nothing second, nothing else different that he could see' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 23), show that the highest Self abides in the state of non-division. And the fruit must be assumed to correspond to the cognition, according to what was explained under IV, 3, 15. And also such passages as 'Just as pure water poured into pure water remains the same, thus, O Gautama, is the Self of a thinker who knows' (*Ka. Up.* II, 4, 15), whose object it is to describe the nature of the released soul, declare that there is non-separation only. The same follows from the comparisons (of the soul entering Brahman) to rivers falling into the sea. Passages where separation (of abode and abiding thing, &c.) is expressed, may be explained as, in a secondary sense, expressing non-separation; so e.g. *Kh. Up.* VII, 24, 1, 'In what does the Infinite rest?—In its own greatness;' and *Kh. Up.* VII, 25, 2, 'Loving the Self, playing with the Self.'

5. By (a nature) like that of Brahman (the soul manifests itself); (thus) Gaimini (opines); on account of reference and the rest.

It has been concluded that the clause, 'by its own nature,' means that the soul manifests itself by its own Self only, not by some other adventitious character. What has now to be inquired into is the specific qualities of that nature. Here the Sūtra at first states the opinion of the teacher Gaimini. According to him the soul's own nature is 'like that of Brahman,' i.e. it comprises all the qualities beginning with freeness from sin and concluding with truthfulness of conception (i.e. the qualities enumerated in *Kh. Up.* VIII, 7, 1), and also omniscience and omnipotence; and in this nature the soul manifests itself.—Why so?—Because this is known from reference¹ and the rest. For the reference

¹ The commentators say that the 'and the rest' of the Sūtra comprises vidhi and vyapadera, and give the following definitions.

to certain qualities made in VIII, 7, 1, teaches that the Selfhood of the Self is such (i.e. such as made up of those qualities).—Again, the passage, ‘He there moves about eating, playing, rejoicing,’ shows that the Self possesses lordly power; so also the passage, ‘For him there is free movement in all worlds’ (*Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 6*).—And thus also there is justification for such designations as ‘All-knowing; all-powerful.’

6. By the sole nature of intelligence (the soul manifests itself), as that is its Self; thus *Auḍulomi* (opines).

Although the text enumerates different qualities, such as freeness from sin, &c., these qualities rest only on fanciful conceptions due to difference of words; for what the text intimates is only absence in general of all qualities such as sin and the rest. Intelligence alone constitutes the nature of the Self, and hence it is proper to conclude that it manifests itself in a nature consisting of that only. This conclusion will also agree with other scriptural texts, such as *Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13*, ‘Thus this Self has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge.’—Qualities, on the other hand, such as having true wishes, are indeed mentioned by the text as real (positive) attributes, the meaning being that his wishes are true, i.e. truly existent; but all the same they, as depending on the connexion with limiting adjuncts, cannot constitute the true nature of the

Upanyâsa is the reference to something known (established elsewhere), which reference is made with a view to a *vidhi*, i.e. the establishing of something not yet known (*upanyâso nâmoddeśaḥ sa kâṇyatra gñâtasyâṇyavidhânâyânuvâdaḥ*). Thus here the qualities—freeness from sin—are referred to as known, for the purpose of establishing the *vidhi*, ‘That it is which we must search out.’—The passage, ‘He there wanders about,’ &c., is a *vidhi*; for it teaches what is not already known from elsewhere.—The mentioning of such qualities as omniscience and omnipotence is *vyapadeśa*, i.e. simple expression of something known without reference to a *vidhi*.

Self, as intelligence does. For all manifoldness of character has to be denied of Brahman, as we have shown under III, 2, 11. For the same reason the mention made of eating and so on, means only the absence of all pain in general, and aims at glorification, just as the passage about 'loving the Self' (*Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2*). For love, play, and the like cannot in their literal sense be ascribed to the action of the Self, because they presuppose something second (beyond the Self). Hence the soul manifests itself in the nature of pure intelligence, free from all manifoldness, calm, not capable of being expressed by any terms. This is the view of the teacher Auḍulomi.

7. Thus also, on account of the existence of the former (qualities), (admitted) owing to reference and so on, there is absence of contradiction, (as) Bādarāyana (thinks).

Thus also, i. e. although it be admitted that intelligence only constitutes the true nature of the Self, also the former nature, i. e. lordly power like that of Brahman, which is intimated by reference and the rest, is—with a view to the world of appearances—not rejected; and hence there is no contradiction. This is the opinion of the teacher Bādarāyana.

8. But by mere will (the released effect their purposes); because scripture states that.

In the meditation on Brāhman within the heart we read as follows: 'If he desires the world of the fathers, by his mere will the fathers rise,' &c. (*Kh. Up. VIII, 2, 1*).—A doubt here presents itself whether the will alone is the cause of the rising of the fathers, or the will joined with some other operative cause.—The pūrvapakshin maintains that although scripture says 'by his mere will,' some other cause must be supposed to co-operate, as in ordinary life. For as in our ordinary experience the meeting with one's father is caused by one's will, and, in addition, by the act of going and so on, so it will be in the case of the released soul also; and

thus we do not assume something contrary to observation. When the text says 'by his mere will,' it implies, as in the case of a king, the whole apparatus of other easily procurable instrumental causes by which the desired object is obtained. Besides, if the fathers and so on rose owing to a mere wish, they would be of unstable nature, like the imaginary representation of some desired object, and thus not be able to procure any solid enjoyment.—To this we reply that the rising of the fathers and so on is due to the will only.—Why so?—Because scripture declares this. If any other cause were required, the direct scriptural statement 'by his will only' would thereby be contradicted. And even if we admit some other cause accompanying the act of will, it cannot be a cause to be realised by an effort; for therefrom it would follow that before the realisation of that cause the will would be barren. Nor can the analogies of ordinary experience be applied to something to be learned from scripture. For as the will of the released differs in nature from the will of ordinary men, it may have the power of effecting something that possesses as much stability as the special purpose requires.

9. And for this very same reason (the released soul is) without another lord.

For this very same reason, i.e. owing to the fact of the will of the released person not being barren, he who knows has no other lord over himself. For not even an ordinary person when forming wishes will, if he can help it, wish himself to be subject to another master. And scripture also declares this when saying, 'Those who depart from hence, after having discovered the Self and those true desires, for them there is freedom in all worlds' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 6*).

10. The absence (of a body and sense-organs, on the part of the released) Bâdari (asserts); for thus scripture says.

The passage, 'By his mere wish the fathers rise,' shows that the released possesses a mind (internal organ, *manas*) whereby he wills. A question however arises whether he

who knows, after having reached lordly power, possesses a body and senses, or not. Here the teacher Bādari is of opinion that the glorified possessor of knowledge is without body and sense-organs.—Why so?—Because scripture declares this, ‘With the mind seeing those wishes he rejoices’ (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 12, 5). If he rejoiced with the mind, the body, and the senses, scripture would not specially say ‘with the mind.’ Hence there are neither body nor sense-organs in the state of release.

11. The presence (of a body and senses) Gaimini (asserts); because the text records option (of the released person multiplying himself).

The teacher Gaimini is of opinion that the released person possesses a body and sense-organs as well as a mind. For passages like ‘He is onefold, he is threefold’ (*Kh. Up.* VII, 26, 2) declare that the Self has the option of manifold existence which cannot be brought about without manifoldness of body.—The capability of optionally multiplying one’s self is, indeed, mentioned in the knowledge of plenitude (*bhūman*) which refers to Brahman as devoid of qualities, but this lordly power which is valid only for the qualified state is there mentioned only in order to glorify the knowledge of the (unqualified) plenitude; and it therefore presents itself as constituting the fruit of qualified knowledge¹.

12. For this reason Bādarāyana (opines that the released person is) of both kinds; as in the case of the twelve days’ sacrifice.

The teacher Bādarāyana, again, thinks that for this reason, i.e. because scripture contains indications of both kinds, the proper conclusion is that the released person exists in both

¹ Manifoldness of the Self is mentioned in a *vidyā* referring to the highest Brahman; but its introduction there is not due to the wish of teaching something about that state, but merely of, rhetorically, glorifying it. We, therefore, are entitled to view that passage as teaching something about him who possesses the lower knowledge.

conditions. When he wishes to have a body, he appears with one; when he wishes to be disembodied, he is without one. For he has various wishes, and all his wishes are realised.—‘As in the case of the twelve days’ sacrifice.’ As the soma sacrifice extending over twelve days may be viewed either as a *sattra* or as an *ahîna* sacrifice, because both alternatives are indicated by scriptural passages¹; so it is here also.

13. When there is no body, (the process) may take place as in the dreaming state.

When there is no body and no sense-organs, the process in the state of release may be viewed as analogous to that in the state of dream, when objects wished, such as a father and so on, have a perceptual existence only while body, senses, and objects do not really exist.

14. When there is (a body), (it may be) as in the waking state.

When, on the other hand, the released person has a body, then the objects of his wishes—fathers and so on—may have real existence, as in the waking state.

15. The entering (of one soul into several bodies) is like (the multiplication of) the flame of a lamp; for thus scripture declares.

Under Sûtra 11 it has been shown that the released person is embodied. The question now arises whether the bodies which the released create for themselves when rendering themselves threefold and so on are soulless like wooden figures, or animated by souls like the bodies of us men.—The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that as neither the soul nor the *manas* can be divided they are joined with one body only, while the other bodies are soulless.—To this the *Sûtrakâra* replies, ‘Like the flame of a lamp is their entering,’ i. e. just as the one flame of a lamp can pass over into several flames (lighted at the original flame), because it possesses

¹ See *Pûrva Mîmâṃsâ-sûtras* II, 3, 5th *adhikarana*.

the power of modifying itself, thus the soul of him who knows, although one only, multiplying itself through its lordly power, enters into all those bodies. For scripture declares that in this way one may become many, 'He is onefold, he is threefold, fivefold, sevenfold' (*Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2*). And this is not possible, if we should accept the simile of the wooden puppets, or the entering of other souls into those additional bodies¹. Nor again can there be any motion on the part of bodies destitute of souls.—Nor is there any force in the objection that, because the Self and the Manas cannot be divided, they cannot be in connexion with more than one body. For the Self, because possessing the quality of having true wishes (i. e. wishes which become real), may be supposed to create other bodies with internal organs, conformable to the original one organ; and, the Self dividing itself through the division of its limiting adjuncts, it may be possible to give a soul to each created body. This is the topic which the books on Yoga treat, in the chapters explaining the connexion of one soul with several bodies.—But how can lordly power, enabling the released soul to enter into several bodies, be admitted, if we consider that different scriptural texts declare that the soul in that state has not any specific cognition? so e.g. 'Whereby should he know another?' 'For there is then no second, nothing else different from him that he could know;' 'An ocean is that one seer, without any duality' (*Bri. Up. II, 4, 14; IV, 3, 30; 32*).

To this objection the next Sūtra replies.

16. (What scripture says about absence of all specific cognition) refers either to deep sleep or union (release); for this is manifested (by the texts).

By 'entering into one's own Self' is meant dreamless

¹ I. e. the scriptural statement about one Self rendering itself manifold can neither be reconciled with the hypothesis of the other bodies being moved by the one soul as puppets are moved by one person through strings, nor with the hypothesis of a new separate soul entering each new body.

sleep ; according to the text, 'He is gone to his own Self, he sleeps they say' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 1). 'Union' means blissful isolation (final release), according to the text, 'Being Brahman he goes to Brahman' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 6). What the texts say about absence of specific cognition is said with reference to either of those two states, dreamless sleep or final release.—How do we know this?—Because this is 'manifest,' owing to the fact that those two states form the topic there (where absence of all cognition is mentioned). Compare the passages, 'Having risen from out of these elements it perishes again after them. Having departed there is no more knowledge;' 'But where the Self only is all this;' 'Where when asleep he desires no more desires, and dreams no more dreams' (*Bri. Up.* II, 4, 12 ; IV, 5, 15 ; IV, 3, 19).—Those passages, on the other hand, which describe lordly power refer to an altogether different condition, which—like the heavenly world and so on—is an abode where qualified knowledge produces its results.—Thus there is no contradiction.

17. With the exception of world-business (the released possess all lordly power), (the Lord) being the topic (where world-business is referred to), and (the souls) not being near (to such business).

The following doubt here presents itself. Do those who through meditations on the qualified Brahman enter, together with their manas, into a condition of equality with the Lord, possess unlimited lordly power, or power limited to some extent?—The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that their power must be unlimited, because we meet with texts such as 'He obtains Self-lordship' (*Taitt. Samh.* I, 6, 2); 'All the gods bring an offering for him' (*Taitt. Samh.* I, 5, 3); 'For them there is freedom in all worlds' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 1, 6).—To this the *Sûtra* replies, 'Excepting the world-business.' With the exception of the origination and so on of the world all other lordly powers, as e. g. rendering one's self of atomic size, must belong to the released. The world-business, on the other hand, can belong to the everlastingly

perfect Lord only.—Why so?—Because there (where the origination and so on of the world are referred to) the Lord forms the general topic, and because the other (souls) do not stand near (to the world-business). The highest Lord only is appointed to do all work referring to the entire world; for the world's origination and so on are taught only where he constitutes the general subject-matter, and moreover he (only) is eternal, and described in scripture (as the creator, &c. of the world)¹. The lordly power of the other souls, on the contrary, scripture shows to have a beginning, because it depends on their searching for and striving to know the Lord. They are therefore remote from all world-business. And just because they have minds, they might be of different minds, and one might have the intention of preserving the world while another might wish to destroy it. Such conflicts can only be avoided by assuming that the wishes of one should conform to those of another, and from this it follows that all other souls (but the Lord) depend on the highest Lord.

18. (Should it be said that the souls must possess unlimited power) on account of manifest teaching; we reply No, because scripture states him who, entrusted with office, abides in the spheres (of the sun and so on), (to be that one on whom the soul's obtaining lordly power depends).

It remains to refute the remark, made by the pûrvapakshin, that absolute power on the part of those who know must be inferred from texts directly asserting such power, as e.g. 'He obtains self-lordship.'—This refutation the above Sûtra undertakes. Scripture declares that the obtaining of rulership on the soul's part, depends on the

¹ *Kim ka paraisyaiva nityatvena svahetvanapekshanasya klipta-saktitvâg gagatsarganam prati kalpyasâmarthyâk ka vidushâm isvara-vishayaiva gagatsrîshîr eshtavyâ, kim ka paurvâparyâlokanâyâm isvarasyaiva gagatsargañ sabdâd gamyate ganmâdisûtram ârabhya kaitad upapâditam. Ân. Gi.*

highest Lord who, as entrusted with definite offices, abides in certain definite abodes, such as the sphere of the sun, &c. This is shown by the text going on to say (after the clause quoted above), 'He obtains the lord of Mind.' For that means that he obtains the lord known to be the lord of all minds. In accordance herewith the text later on says that he becomes lord of speech, lord of the eye, lord of the ear, lord of understanding.—Similarly in other passages also the lordly power of the other souls has to be viewed, according to circumstances, as depending on the eternally perfect Lord.

19. And (there is also a form of the highest Lord) not abiding in effected things ; for thus scripture declares his abiding.

Moreover, according to scripture, there is also an eternal form of the highest Lord which does not abide in effects ; he is not only the ruling soul of the spheres of the sun and so on which lie within the sphere of what is effected. For the text declares his abiding in a twofold form, as follows : ' Such is the greatness of it ; greater than it is the Person. One foot of him are all beings ; three feet of him is what is immortal in heaven ' (*Kh. Up. III, 12, 6*). And it cannot be maintained that that form of him which is divorced from all effects is reached by those who put their trust on his other form ; for their minds are not set on the former. Hence as he who does not reach that form of the double-natured highest Lord which is divorced from all qualities stops at that form which is distinguished by qualities, so also, unable to reach unlimited power within the latter form, he stops at limited lordly power.

20. And thus perception and inference show.

Scripture and *Smṛiti* both declare that the highest light does not abide within effected things, 'The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, and much less this fire' (*Mu. Up. II, 2, 10*). 'The sun does not illumine it, nor the moon, nor fire' (*Bha. Gîtâ XV, 6*).—The *Sûtra* is meant to show that the non-abiding of the

highest light within effected things is a well-known circumstance.

21. And on account of the indications of equality of enjoyment only.

The lordly power of those who take their stand on the effected Brahman is not absolute, for that reason also that scripture teaches that their enjoyment only is equal to that of the eternally perfect Lord. For scripture contains statements and indications of the difference (of the Lord and the released soul); compare 'To him he says, Water indeed is enjoyed¹ (by me); that world (is to be enjoyed by thee also)' (Kau. Up. I, 7); 'As all beings honour that deity, so do all beings honour him who knows that' (Bṛi. Up. I, 5, 20); 'He obtains through it equality (in body) and sameness of abode with that deity' (Bṛi. Up. I, 5, 23). But from the circumstance of the lordly power of the released souls not being absolute it follows that it comes to an end, and then they will have to return from the world of Brahman!—To this objection the reverend Bādarāyaṇa replies in the following Sūtra.

22. (Of them) there is non-return, according to scripture; non-return, according to scripture.

Those who, in following the road of the gods, to which the vein and the ray are leading, and on which light is the first stage, reach the world of Brahman as described by scripture—where 'there are the two lakes Ara and Nya in the world of Brahman, in the third heaven from hence,' and where 'there is the lake Airammadiya and the Asvattha tree showering down Soma, and the city of Brahman Aparāgitā and the golden hall built by Prabhu' (Kā. Up. VIII, 5, 3)—and set forth at length in mantras,

¹ All the commentators explain the reading 'mīyante.'—Ān. Gi. says—*taṁ brahmalokagatam upāsakam hiraṇyagarbhaḥ svasamīpam upāgatam sânunayam âha mayâ khalv âpa evâmṛitamayyo mīyante drīsyante bhugyante tavāpy asāv amṛitarūpodakalakshano loko bhogyo yathāsukham bhugyatām.*

arthavâdas, and so on; those, we say, who reach that world do not return from there after having finished the enjoyment of their deeds; as those do who have gone to the world of the moon and other places.—Why so?—Because scriptural passages teach that they do not so return. Compare 'Moving upwards by it he reaches the immortal' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 6*); 'For them there is no return' (*Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15*); 'Those who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man' (*Kh. Up. IV, 15, 6*); 'He reaches the world of Brahman and does not return' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 15, 1*). That the finality of their lordly power does not imply their return to the life of man, we have shown under IV, 3, 10. It is a settled matter that those who through perfect knowledge have dispelled all mental darkness and are devoted to the eternally perfect Nirvâṇa do not return. And as those also who rely on the knowledge of the qualified Brahman in the end have recourse to that (Nirvâṇa), it follows that they also do not return¹—The repetition of the words, 'Non-return, according to scripture,' indicates the conclusion of this body of doctrine.

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 pañtāpūli, one bundle made of five bundles, i, 259.
 pañtāgnividya, knowledge of the five fires, i, pp. lxxxiii, cviii; ii, 187.
 pad, to go, ii, 393.
 para, higher, highest, i, 173.
 paramārthadr̥śhi, intuition, ii, 37 n.
 param brahma, higher Brahman, i, pp. xxx, xxxiii n.
 parāgrūpatva, externality, i, 130.
 parā vidyā, highest knowledge, i, pp. lxxxiii, cix, cx, cxvi.
 parināma, change, modification, i, pp. xxix, xl, xcv, cxviii, 393 n.
 parināmavāda, i, p. xcv.
 parizāminitya, eternal, although changing, i, 28.
 parimandala, spherical, i, 382 n.
 parivedana, lament, i, 405 n.
 parnamayitva, the quality of being made of parna-wood, ii, 253 n.
 pāṇḍitya, learning, i, p. lxxvi; ii, 322, 323.
 pāramārthika, real, i, p. lxxiii; ii, 133.
 pāriplava, recitation of certain stories at stated intervals during the year occupied by the aśvamedha sacrifice, ii, 305 seq., 305 n.
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 prīthagbhūta, separate, i, p. lxxxiv.
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 prakāra, mode, i, pp. xxviii, liii, lxiv.
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- prakāya, accumulation, i, 384 n.
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 — beings, moving and non-moving things, ii, 63.
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mahat, great, i, 252.

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¹ Arranged in the following order:—(1) names, definitions, and symbols of B.; (2) nature, qualities, powers, forms, parts, abodes of B.; (3) higher and lower B.; (4) unity of, and oneness with B.; (5) B. is everything; (6) B. and the world; (7) B. and the soul; (8) B. and Scripture; (9) knowledge of B.; (10) meditation on B.; (11) B. and final release; (12) world of B.

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 - release is taught of him who takes his stand on it, i, 55-57.
 - pradhâna is not denoted by the term, i, 57-60.
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 - Brahman is S., and the world is S., i, 332.
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- Satyaloka, the world of the lower Brahman is called S., i, 181.
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 - its authoritativeness denied by the Bauddhas, i, 412.
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- are conscious) is Brahman, i, 14, 377; ii, 208 seq.
- Self, different opinions about it, i, 14 seq.
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 - divine, one and the same d. S. may assume several forms at the same time, i, 200.
 - the intelligent, is the highest Lord, i, 234, 235.
 - the great, may denote the intellect of the first-born Hiraṇyagarbha, i, 240.
 - is higher than the intellect, i, 240.
 - i. e. the individual soul, or the fundamental intellect, i, 241.
 - is the intelligent soul of the Sāṅkhyas, i, 259.
 - husband, wife, riches, and other objects of enjoyment in this world are dear on account of the, i, 274.
 - is not destroyed, i, 281.
 - but by means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the mātṛās, i, 281.
 - makes itself; which is possible owing to modification, i, 287.
 - the witnessing S. is self-proved, i, 424.
 - is one and permanent, i, 424.
 - there results from the Gaiṇa doctrine non-universality of the, i, 431 seq.
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 - — the S. spoken of in the account of the creation given in Ait. Ār. II, 4 is not a lower form of the S., but the h. S., i, p. lxix; ii, 205-211.
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 - — its true nature is nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided, i, 36.
 - — the golden person in the disc of the sun is the, i, 63.
 - — although eternally unchanging and uniform, it reveals itself in a graduated series of beings, i, 63.
 - — is ānandamaya, i, 66-68.
 - — only is entirely free from sin, i, 79.
 - — is Rīk, Sāman, Uktha, Yagus, Brahman, i, 79 seq.

- Self, the highest, the knowledge of the, is most beneficial for man, i, 98, 167, 250.
- — — subsequently to it all works and their effects entirely cease, i, 98.
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 - — — is self-established, ii, 14.
 - — — souls devoid of it are objects of enjoyment for the gods, ii, 111.
 - — — is it connected with works, or is it an independent means to accomplish the purpose of man? ii, 285-306.
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 - — — the eater is the h. S. since what is movable and what is immovable is mentioned as his food, i, 116-118.
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 - — — universal rulership an appropriate attribute of it, i, 131 seq.
 - — — immortal, unseen, unheard, i, 132.
 - — — organs of action may be ascribed to it, i, 132.
 - — — may be represented as the Gârhapatya-fire, i, 150.
 - — — as the mere witness, i. e., the pure Self, non-related to the limiting conditions, i, 150.
 - — — is the abode of heaven, earth, &c., i, 161.
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 - — — the qualities of being the True, of resting in its own greatness, of being omnipresent, and of being the Self of everything, can belong to the h. S. only, i, 169.
 - — — meditation on the, i, 171-174.
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- — — that after which sun, moon, &c., are said to shine is the, i, 192-194.
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 - — — the one general cause, i, 274.
 - — — is the centre of the whole world with the objects, the senses, and the mind, it has neither inside nor outside, it is altogether a mass of knowledge, i, 276.
 - — — is the operative as well as material cause of the world, i, 286.
 - — — is not affected by the world-illusion, i, 312.
 - — — the one unchanging witness of the three states, the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world, i, 312.
 - — — though devoid of motion, may yet move other things, i, 369.
 - — — the relation of object and subject cannot exist in it, i, 378 seq.
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 - — — the passage 'Being only this was in the beginning' refers to it, ii, 209 seq.
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 — the golden person is in the, i, 112.
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 — has the qualities of Selfhood and intelligence, but not those of omniscience and similar qualities, i, 158, 268.

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 — is not produced, but it is eternal, according to Scripture, ii, 29-33.
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 — words like āditya, &c., convey the idea of certain divine, i, 219.
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- Selves, there is no distinction of different S., such a distinction being due to limiting adjuncts only, ii, 172.
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- Sense-organs, the elements and the s. the product of Nescience, i, 281.
- ten, ii, 65 n.
 - are the cause of the perception of the sense-objects, ii, 95.
 - the word *prāṇa* is secondarily applied to the, ii, 96.
 - accompany the soul when leaving its body, ii, 102.
 - all s., i.e. their functions, are merged in mind on the departure of the soul, ii, 365 seq.
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- Senses, the objects are beyond the, i, 239, 244.
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 - 'the abode of the six,' in Bauddha terminology, i, 404, 405 n.
 - though the soul is intelligent, the s. are not useless, ii, 34.
 - seven, ii, 82 seq.
 - called *grahas*, i.e. seizers, because they are bonds by which the soul is tied, ii, 83.
 - the vital airs are the eleven, ii, 93 seq.
- Servara-sāṅkhyas admit the existence of a highest Lord, but postulate a *pradhāna* besides, i, p. xl.
- Shodasakala-vidyā, ii, 233.
- Shodas-in-cup at the *atirātra*-sacrifice, either to be offered or not to be offered, i, 262 seq.; ii, 188.
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- he who possesses knowledge obtains lordly power and cessation of all, ii, 355.
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- Skanda, Sanatkumâra was born again as, ii, 235.
- Skandhas (groups), the five, of the realists, i, 402 seq.
- the atoms and s. cannot be assumed to enter on activity on their own account, i, 403.
- Sleep, the activity of the sense-organs interrupted during, i, 85, 86.
- a kind of dissolution and origination takes place in the sleeping and the waking states, i, 212.
 - the undeveloped principle or the causal potentiality is a universal s., in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of their individual character, i, 243.
 - the soul wanders about in the state of, ii, 49 seq.
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 - what Scripture says about absence of all specific cognition, refers either to d. s. or final release, i, p. lxxxv; ii, 145, 414 seq.
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- Sleep, deep, the case of the re-absorption of the world compared with that of, i, 312.
- the absence of intelligence in it is only due to the absence of objects, but the soul remains intelligent even in, ii, 33, 34 seq., 47 seq., 336 seq.
 - the rising from it is due to the existence of potential avidyā, ii, 48.
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 - the state of swoon is half coincident with, ii, 151 seq.
 - in it the elements are merged in Brahman in such a way as to continue to exist in a seminal condition, ii, 371.
- Sleeping man, the doctrine about the soul, conveyed by the waking of the, i, 269, 273, 274.
- Smṛiti, 'that which the S. assumes,' viz. the pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas, i, 132 seq.
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 - Sāṅkhya and Yoga are S. only, without scriptural authority, ii, 381.
- Smṛitis such as the Manu-smṛiti opposed to the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti, i, p. xlvii, 290-296.
- if the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world be accepted, is there any room for S.? i, 290-299.
 - like the Kāpila S. were composed with reference to perfect knowledge as the means of final release, i, 291.
 - men who are unable to ascertain the true sense of Śruti, rely on them, i, 292.
- Smṛitis which follow Śruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others are to be disregarded, i, 293, 294.
- Soma sacrifice, on the tenth day of a S. a soma cup is offered mentally, ii, 260 seq.
- extending over twelve days, may be viewed either as a sattra or as an ahīna sacrifice, ii, 413.
- Soul¹, individual or personal, or gīva, i, p. xxv.
- Sāṅkarshaṇa identical with it, i, p. xxiii, 440.
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 - it is nowhere the purpose of Scripture to make statements regarding it, i, 160.
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 - Sāṅkhya views about it, i, 238, 259, 298, 370, 372-374, 379 n., 436-438; ii, 33.
 - Nāṭiketas' question and Yama's answer as to it, i, 248.
 - as it is the support of prāṇa, it may itself be called prāṇa, i, 270.
 - Āmarathya's opinion about it, i, 276 seq.
 - according to the Vaiśeṣikas intelligence is not essential to it, i, 388 n.
 - conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the s., and the internal organ, i, 398.
 - its conjunction with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, i, 398 n.
 - its conjunction with manas cannot be the cause of cognition, i, 398 n.

¹ Arranged in the following order:—(1) different designations and notions of different schools about it; (2) its nature and characteristics; (3) its size; (4) s. and body; (5) s. and Brahman, the Lord, the highest Self; (6) its states of dream, sleep, swoon; (7) its fate after death; (8) the released s.

- Soul, denied by the Bauddhas, i, 403, 406.
- and non-soul of the Gainas, i, 428, 428 n.
 - Paṇḍita taught the five categories to the end of breaking the bonds of the animal, i.e. the s., i, 435.
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 - — is non-intelligent, according to the followers of Kaṇāda, ii, 33.
 - the non-enlightened s. unable to look through Mâyâ, i, p. xxvi.
 - identifies itself with its adjuncts, i, p. xxvi.
 - in reality pure intelligence, non-active, infinite, it becomes limited, i, p. xxvi, 139 seq., 171; ii, 140.
 - individual, discussion on the nature of it, i, p. liii; ii, 28-73.
 - — is permanent, eternal, not produced from Brahman at the time of creation, i, p. liii; ii, 29-33.
 - — is *gṇā*, i, p. liv; ii, 33-35.
 - is all-pervading, not *anu*, i, p. liv seqq.; ii, 35-49.
 - intelligent, i, pp. lv, lvi, xcvi, 53, 103, 133, 134; ii, 33-35, 39-42, 43, 45-48, 367 seq.
 - is it an agent? i, pp. lvii, xcvi; ii, 49-58.
 - is imperishable, i, 37, 133, 438; ii, 28 seq.
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 - rules and employs the different organs of action, i, 102, 133.
 - is the charioteer driving on through transmigratory existence and final release, i, 121, 241.
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 - is the knower, Brahman the object of knowledge, i, 159.
 - eating, i.e. fruition of the results of works, is characteristic of it, i, 159 seq., 269.
 - cannot be denoted by akshara, i, 171.
 - the mind constitutes its limiting adjunct, i, 175.
- Soul, individual, carries on the course of its practical existence by means of the activities of seeing, hearing, cognising; otherwise no practical existence at all would be possible, i, 186, 322.
- its nature before the rise of discriminative knowledge, i, 186 seq., 189.
 - as such is real, i, 189 seq.
 - depending on the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience, i, 241, 244.
 - name and form abide in it, i, 277 seq.; cannot abide in it, i, 279.
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 - is its suffering real or not? i, 379 seq.
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 - is not divided, but only appears divided, ii, 30, 32.
 - dwells within the heart, ii, 38 seq., 45, 175.
 - and intelligence represented as separate, viz. as the agent and the instrument of action, ii, 42.
 - tied by the senses (*grahas*), ii, 83.
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 - the vital airs are connected with it, which is the Lord of the aggregate of instruments of action, ii, 92 seq.
 - compared to a caterpillar, ii, 103.
 - is self-luminous, ii, 141.
 - is it to be meditated upon as the sun, and the sun as the s., or is it only to be meditated upon as the sun? ii, 244.
 - possesses Nescience, work, and former knowledge as limiting adjuncts, ii, 367.
 - its size minute (*anu*), says Rāmānuja, i, pp. liv, xcvi.
 - — atomic, ii, 35-45, 397.
 - — that of an awl's point, i, 113.
 - — compared to the point of a goad, i, 175.

- Soul, individual, its size, the Gainas believe that it is the same as that of the body, i, 431-434.
- requires a body in order that knowledge may arise, i, 51.
 - is in the body only, i, 111 seq.; ii, 93.
 - is the body the sufferer of pain, or the s.? i, 379; ii, 64, 65.
 - the Sāṅkhya cannot admit a real connexion of it and the body, i, 379.
 - endeavour (which is required for action) originates when it is connected with the internal organ which abides in the body, i, 387.
 - although abiding in one point of the body only, may be the cause of perception extending over the entire body, ii, 38-42.
 - that its knowledge and lordship are hidden, is due to its connexion with the body, ii, 139 seq.
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 - and body viewed as non-different, ii, 374.
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 - according to the Upanishads, i, p. cxxi seq.
 - has to be viewed like that of the snake to its coils, ii, 173 seq.
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 - a part of Brahman, i, pp. xxv, xcvi seq.; ii, 61-63, 396 seq.
 - its fundamental identity with the highest Brahman, i, pp. xxvii, xxx, xxxiv seq., 51, 104, 116, 161, 185, 190 n., 198, 233, 251, 277 seq., 278-283, 322; ii, 30, 31, 33, 34, 42 seqq., 65 seq., 138, 140, 146, 244 seq., 396 seq., 399 seq.
 - becomes manifest by strenuous meditations only; for from the Lord are the s.'s bondage and release, ii, 138 seq.
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 - in its activity is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions, i, p. lvii; ii, 58-61.
 - do the imperfections clinging to it affect also the highest Lord who abides within it? i, pp. lxii-lxiv.
 - and the Self consisting of bliss different, i, 69-71; to be joined, i, 71-77.
 - the 'two entered into the cave' are the i. s. and the highest Self, i, 118-123.
 - called 'the lord of the city of Brahman,' i, 175.
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 - — difficulty of knowing it, i, 241.
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- — is the bhūman the? i, 162-168.
 - — represented as the Self of everything, i, 164.
 - — is immortality, i, 164.
 - — may be called 'higher' with reference to the body, i, 172.
 - — is the maker of all the persons, the person in the sun, the person in the moon, &c., i, 269.

Vital air, the chief, (*mukhya prāṇa*), is produced from Brahman, is distinct from air in general and from the other vital airs, and is minute, i, p. lix; ii, 84-91, 94-96.

— — — called 'the best,' ii, 84 seq.
— — — 'the oldest and the best,' ii, 85.

— — — is neither air nor function, ii, 85-87.

— — — according to the Sāṅkhya, the combined function of all organs, ii, 86.

— — — is nothing but air, according to a *Sruti*, ii, 86, 87.

— — — various powers ascribed to it in scriptural passages, ii, 87.

— — — is independent in the body, like the individual soul, ii, 87.

— — — is subordinate to the soul, ii, 88.

— — — is not an instrument, ii, 88 seq.

— — — the body and all the senses subsist by means of it, ii, 89, 95.

— — — is designated as having five functions like mind, ii, 89 seq.

— — — is not a sense-organ, ii, 93 seq.

— — — accompanies the soul when leaving its body, ii, 102.

— — — the two passages on the *Udgītha-vidyā* in the *Bṛh. Up.* and in the *Kbānd. Up.* both glorify it, and are injunctions of a meditation on it, ii, 192 seq.

— — — represented as *Udgātri*, as well as *udgītha*, ii, 195.

— — — see also *Breath*, and *Prāṇa*.

Vital airs (*prāṇas*) spring from Brahman, are eleven in number, and are of minute size, i, p. lix; ii, 74-84.

— — — are superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the chief vital air, i, p. lix; ii, 91-96.

— — — do not depart from the body, i, p. cxii.

— — — the instance of the v. a. illustrating the identity of cause and effect, i, 342 seq.

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— discussion of Vedic passages on the origination of the, ii, 74-79.

— — the statement that they existed before the creation refers to a subordinate causal substance, ii, 76 seq.

— — different Vedic statements as to their number, ii, 79-84.

— — called *graha*, seizers, ii, 79, 83.

— — although guided by divinities, are yet connected with the individual soul, ii, 92 seq.

— — are senses, with the exception of the chief vital air, ii, 93 seq.

— — are not functions of the chief vital air, ii, 94.

— — when a new body is obtained, they also go from the old body to the new one, ii, 105.

— — at the time of death, go to *Agni* and the other gods, ii, 105 seq.

— — *Agnihotra* offered to them, ii, 249-252.

— — all come to the individual soul, ii, 367 seq.

— — do not depart from the embodied soul of him who knows Brahman, ii, 372 seq.

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— from it sprang earth, ii, 23 seq.

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— earth is dissolved into, ii, 26.

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— designated by *śraddhā*, ii, 106-108.

— the soul assumes a body of w. in the moon, ii, 127.

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 - enjoined for such only as understand the purport of the Veda, ii, 289.
 - for him who has merely read the Veda, ii, 293.
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- Works, those performing w. are not overpowered by passion and the like, ii, 315.
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 - — — are superior to w. destitute of knowledge, ii, 361.
 - of public utility, less meritorious than sacrifices, lead through smoke &c. to the southern path of the sun, i, 27.
 - — — lead to the road of the fathers, ii, 124.
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CORRIGENDA.

VOLUME XXXIV.

- Page lxi, line 25, *read* (10) *for* (9)
„ lxiv, „ 32, *read* prakṛitaitāvattva
„ cxvi, „ 3, *read* I, 1, 4 *for* I, 4
„ 34, „ 20, *read* I, 3, 4 *for* III, 1, 4
„ 172, „ 6 from below, *read* or *for* on
„ 191, „ 22, *read* nād'is *for* nad'is
„ 246, last line, *read* Ka. Up. I, 3, 15
„ 282, line 23, *read* IV, 4, 24 *for* IV, 24
„ 402, „ 13, and line 8 from below, *read* saṃgṛhā° *for* saṃgṛhā°
„ 440, „ 26, *read* igyā *for* igrā

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- Page 154, line 12, *read* Vairvānara *for* °svanara
„ 182, „ 4 from below, *read* Bādarāyana *for* Bādārayana
„ 190, last line, *read* Up. II, 6, 2
„ 221, line 7, *read* Avabhrītha- *for* Avabrītha-
„ 236, „ 9 } *read* Aparāntaratamas *for* Aparāntamas
„ „ 23 }
„ 287, „ 2 from below, *read* guhū *for* guhū
„ 295, „ 11 „ „ *read* 2, 11 *for* 10, 11
„ 319, „ 6 „ „ *read* Krikkhṛa *for* Krikkhṛa
„ 330, „ 13 „ „ *read* their *for* its
„ 352, „ 18 „ „ *read* Pr. Up. III, 10 *for* Pr. Up. IV, 2, 10

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pahlavi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.	
	I Class.	II Class.									III Class.
Gutturales.											
1 Tenuis	k	.	.	क	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	k	
2 " aspirata	kh	.	.	ख	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	kh	
3 Media	g	.	.	ग	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	.	
4 " aspirata	gh	.	.	घ	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	.	
5 Gutturo-labialis	q	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
6 Nasalis	h (ng)	.	.	ङ	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	.	
7 Spiritus asper	h	.	.	ह	𐬚	𐬚	𐬚	𐬚	𐬚	h, hs	
8 " lenis	,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
9 " asper faucalis	'h	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
10 " lenis faucalis	'h	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
11 " asper fricatus	.	'h	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
12 " lenis fricatus	.	'h	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)											
13 Tenuis	.	k	.	च	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	k	
14 " aspirata	.	kh	.	छ	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	kh	
15 Media	.	g	.	ज	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	.	
16 " aspirata	.	gh	.	झ	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	.	
17 " Nasalis	.	ḡ	.	ञ	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	.	

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y	...	...	य	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	ي	י	y
19 Spiritus asper	...	(y')	...	...	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	...
20 " lenis	...	(y)	...	...	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	...
21 " asper assibilatus	...	s	...	श	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	...
22 " lenis assibilatus	...	s	...	...	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	...
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t	...	...	त	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	ت	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th	...	...	थ	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	th
25 " assibilata	...	...	TH	...	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	...
26 Media	d	...	...	द	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	د	ד	...
27 " aspirata	dh	...	...	ध	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	...
28 " assibilata	...	...	DH	...	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	...
29 Nasalis	n	...	...	न	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	ن	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l	...	...	ल	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	ل	ל	l
31 " mollis 1	...	l	...	...	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	...
32 " mollis 2	...	...	L	...	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	...
33 Spiritus asper 1	s	...	...	स	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	س	ס	s
34 " asper 2	...	...	s (s)	...	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	...
35 " lenis	z	...	...	...	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	ز	ז	z
36 " asperimus 1	...	...	z (z)	...	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	...
37 " asperimus 2	...	...	z (z)	...	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	...	...	...

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.		III Class.							
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	0			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ě			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
3 " labialis	ö			...	...	fin.	...	...	...	...
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			अ	...	...	...	...	...	...
5 " longa	ā	(a)		आ	...	...	...	...	...	...
6 Palatalis brevis	i			इ	...	...	...	...	...	...
7 " longa	ī	(i)		ई	...	...	...	...	...	...
8 Dentalis brevis	u			उ	...	...	...	...	...	...
9 " longa	ū			ऊ	...	...	...	...	...	...
10 Lingualis brevis	ri			रि	...	...	...	...	...	...
11 " longa	ri			रि	...	...	...	...	...	...
12 Labialis brevis	u			उ	...	...	...	...	...	...
13 " longa	ū	(u)		ऊ	...	...	...	...	...	...
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	o			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 " longa	ô (ai)	(e)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi	(ai)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
17 " " " " " "	ei (ēi)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
18 " " " " " "	oi (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20 " longa	ô (au)	(o)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu	(au)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
22 " " " " " "	eu (ēu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
23 " " " " " "	ou (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
24 Gutturalis fracta	ä			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Labialis fracta	ü			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ö			...	...	...	...	...	...	...

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PREFACE.

IN the Preface to the third volume of these 'Sacred Books of the East' (1879), I stated that I proposed giving in due course, in order to exhibit the System of Tâoism, translations of the Tâo Teh King by Lâo-ȳze (sixth century B.C.), the Writings of Kwang-ȳze (between the middle of the fourth and third centuries B.C.), and the Treatise of 'Actions and their Retributions' (of our eleventh century); and perhaps also of one or more of the other characteristic Productions of the System.

The two volumes now submitted to the reader are a fulfilment of the promise made so long ago. They contain versions of the Three Works which were specified, and, in addition, as Appendixes, four other shorter Treatises of Tâoism; Analyses of several of the Books of Kwang-ȳze by Lin Hsi-ȳung; a list of the stories which form so important a part of those Books; two Essays by two of the greatest Scholars of China, written the one in A.D. 586 and illustrating the Tâoistic beliefs of that age, and the other in A.D. 1078 and dealing with the four Books of Kwang-ȳze, whose genuineness is frequently called in question. The concluding Index is confined very much to Proper Names. For Subjects the reader is referred to the Tables of Contents, the Introduction to the Books of Kwang-ȳze (vol. xxxix, pp. 127-163), and the Introductory Notes to the various Appendixes.

The Treatise of Actions and their Retributions exhibits to us the Tâoism of the eleventh century in its moral or ethical aspects; in the two earlier Works we see it rather as a philosophical speculation than as a religion in the ordinary sense of that term. It was not till after the introduction of Buddhism into China in our first century that Tâoism began to organise itself as a

Religion, having its monasteries and nunneries, its images and rituals. While it did so, it maintained the superstitions peculiar to itself:—some, like the cultivation of the Táo as a rule of life favourable to longevity, come down from the earliest times, and others which grew up during the decay of the *Káu* dynasty, and subsequently blossomed;—now in Mystical Speculation; now in the pursuits of Alchemy; now in the search for the pills of Immortality and the Elixir vitae; now in Astrological fancies; now in visions of Spirits and in Magical arts to control them; and finally in the terrors of its Purgatory and everlasting Hell. Its phases have been continually changing, and at present it attracts our notice more as a degraded adjunct of Buddhism than as a development of the speculations of *Lão-ze* and *Kwang-ze*. Up to its contact with Buddhism, it subsisted as an opposition to the Confucian system, which, while admitting the existence and rule of the Supreme Being, bases its teachings on the study of man's nature and the enforcement of the duties binding on all men from the moral and social principles of their constitution.

It is only during the present century that the Texts of Táoism have begun to receive the attention which they deserve. Christianity was introduced into China by Nestorian missionaries in the seventh century; and from the *Hsî-an* monument, which was erected by their successors in 781, nearly 150 years after their first entrance, we perceive that they were as familiar with the books of *Lão-ze* and *Kwang-ze* as with the Confucian literature of the empire, but that monument is the only memorial of them that remains. In the thirteenth century the Roman Catholic Church sent its earliest missionaries to China, but we hardly know anything of their literary labours.

The great Romish missions which continue to the present day began towards the end of the sixteenth century; and there exists now in the India Office a translation of the *Táo Teh King* in Latin, which was brought to England

by a Mr. Matthew Raper, and presented by him to the Royal Society, of which he was a Fellow, on January 10th, 1788. The manuscript is in excellent preservation, but we do not know by whom the version was made. It was presented, as stated in the Introduction, p. 12, to Mr. Raper by P. de Grammont, 'Missionarius Apostolicus, ex-Jesuita.' The chief object of the translator or translators was to show that 'the Mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnate God were anciently known to the Chinese nation.' The version as a whole is of little value. The reader will find, on pp. 115, 116, its explanation of L  o's seventy-second chapter;—the first morsel of it that has appeared in print.

Protestant missions to China commenced in 1807; but it was not till 1868 that the Rev. Dr. Chalmers, a member of one of them, published his 'Speculations on Metaphysics, Polity, and Morality of "The Old Philosopher," Lao-Tsze.' Meanwhile, Abel R  musat had aroused the curiosity of scholars throughout Europe, in 1823, by his 'Memoir on the Life and Opinions of L  o-Tseu, a Chinese Philosopher of the sixth century before our era, who professed the opinions commonly attributed to Pythagoras, to Plato, and to their disciples.' R  musat was followed by one who had received from him his first lessons in Chinese, and had become a truly great Chinese scholar,—the late Stanislas Julien. He published in 1842 'a complete translation for the first time of this memorable Work, which is regarded with reason as the most profound, the most abstract, and the most difficult of all Chinese Literature.' Dr. Chalmers's translation was also complete, but his comments, whether original or from Chinese sources, were much fewer than those supplied by Julien. Two years later, two German versions of the Treatise were published at Leipzig;—by Reinhold von Pl  nckner and Victor von Strauss, differing much from each other, but both marked by originality and ability.

I undertook myself, as stated above, in 1879 to translate for 'The Sacred Books of the East' the Texts of T  oism

which appear in these volumes; and, as I could find time from my labours on 'The Texts of Confucianism,' I had written out more than one version of L  o's work by the end of 1880. Though not satisfied with the result, I felt justified in exhibiting my general views of it in an article in the *British Quarterly Review* of July, 1883.

In 1884 Mr. F. H. Balfour published at Shanghai a version of 'Taoist Texts, Ethical, Political, and Speculative.' His Texts were ten in all, the *T  o Teh King* being the first and longest of them. His version of this differed in many points from all previous versions; and Mr. H. A. Giles, of H. M.'s Consular Service in China, vehemently assailed it and also Dr. Chalmers's translation, in the *China Review* for March and April, 1886. Mr. Giles, indeed, occasionally launched a shaft also at Julien and myself; but his main object in his article was to discredit the genuineness and authenticity of the *T  o Teh King* itself. 'The work,' he says, 'is undoubtedly a forgery. It contains, indeed, much that L  o Tz   did say, but more that he did not.' I replied, so far as was necessary, to Mr. Giles in the same *Review* for January and February, 1888; and a brief summary of my reply is given in the second chapter of the Introduction in this volume. My confidence has never been shaken for a moment in the *T  o Teh King* as a genuine relic of L  o-  ze, one of the most original minds of the Chinese race.

In preparing the version now published, I have used:—

First, 'The Complete Works of the Ten Philosophers;'—a *S  -   u* reprint in 1804 of the best editions of the Philosophers, nearly all belonging more or less to the T  oist school, included in it. It is a fine specimen of Chinese printing, clear and accurate. The Treatise of L  o-  ze of course occupies the first place, as edited by Kwei Y  -kwang (better known as Kwei K  n-shan) of the M  ng dynasty. The Text and Commentary are those of Ho-shang Kung (Intro., p. 7), along with the division of the whole into Parts and eighty-one chapters, and the titles of the several chapters, all attributed to him. Along the top of the page,

there is a large collection of notes from celebrated commentators and writers down to the editor himself.

Second, the Text and Commentary of Wang Pi (called also Fû-sze), who died A.D. 249, at the early age of twenty-four. See Introduction, p. 8.

Third, 'Helps (lit. Wings) to Lâo-îze;' by Jião Hung (called also Zâo-hâu), and prefaced by him in 1587. This is what Julien calls 'the most extensive and most important contribution to the understanding of Lâo-îze, which we yet possess.' Its contents are selected from the ablest writings on the Treatise from Han Fei (Introd., p. 5) downwards, closing in many chapters with the notes made by the compiler himself in the course of his studies. Altogether the book sets before us the substance of the views of sixty-four writers on our short *K'ing*. Julien took the trouble to analyse the list of them, and found it composed of three emperors, twenty professed Tâoists, seven Buddhists, and thirty-four Confucianists or members of the Literati. He says, 'These last constantly explain Lâo-îze according to the ideas peculiar to the School of Confucius, at the risk of misrepresenting him, and with the express intention of throttling his system;' then adding, 'The commentaries written in such a spirit have no interest for persons who wish to enter fully into the thought of Lâo-îze, and obtain a just idea of his doctrine. I have thought it useless, therefore, to specify the names of such commentaries and their authors.'

I have quoted these sentences of Julien, because of a charge brought by Mr. Balfour, in a prefatory note to his own version of the Tâo Teh *K'ing*, against him and other translators. 'One prime defect,' he says, though with some hesitation, 'lies at the root of every translation that has been published hitherto; and this is, that not one seems to have been based solely and entirely on commentaries furnished by members of the Tâoist school. The Confucian element enters largely into all; and here, I think, an injustice has been done to Lâo-îze. To a Confucianist the Tâoist system is in every sense of the word a heresy, and

a commentator holding this opinion is surely not the best expositor. It is as a Grammarian rather than as a Philosopher that a member of the Jû Chiá deals with the *Táo Teh King*; he gives the sense of a passage according to the syntactical construction rather than according to the genius of the philosophy itself; and in attempting to explain the text by his own canons, instead of by the canons of Taoism, he mistakes the superficial and apparently obvious meaning for the hidden and esoteric interpretation.'

Mr. Balfour will hardly repeat his charge of imperfect or erroneous interpretation against Julien; and I believe that it is equally undeserved by most, if not all, of the other translators against whom it is directed. He himself adopted as his guide the 'Explanations of the *Táo Teh King*,' current as the work of Lü Yen (called also Lü 3ü, Lü Tung-pin, and Lü K'ün-yang), a Taoist of the eighth century. Through Mr. Balfour's kindness I have had an opportunity of examining this edition of *Lão's Treatise*; and I am compelled to agree with the very unfavourable judgment on it pronounced by Mr. Giles as both 'spurious' and 'ridiculous.' All that we are told of Lü Yen is very suspicious; much of it evidently false. The editions of our little book ascribed to him are many. I have for more than twenty years possessed one with the title of 'The Meaning of the *Táo Teh King* Explained by the TRUE Man of *K'ün-yang*,' being a reprint of 1690, and as different as possible from the work patronised by Mr. Balfour.

Fourth, the *Thái Shang Hwun Hsüan Táo Teh K'ăn King*,—a work of the present dynasty, published at Shanghai, but when produced I do not know. It is certainly of the Lü 3ü type, and is worth purchasing as one of the finest specimens of block-printing. It professes to be the production of 'The Immortals of the Eight Grottoes,' each of whom is styled 'a Divine Ruler (Tí K'ün).' The eighty-one chapters are equally divided for commentary among them, excepting that 'the Divine Ruler, the Universal Refiner,' has the last eleven assigned to him. The Text is everywhere broken up into short clauses, which are explained in

a very few characters by 'God, the True Helper,' the same, I suppose, who is also styled, 'The Divine Ruler, the True Helper,' and comments at length on chapters 31 to 40. I mention these particulars as an illustration of how the ancient Tâoism has become polytheistic and absurd. The name 'God, the True Helper,' is a title, I imagine, given to Lü 3û. With all this nonsense, the composite commentary is a good one, the work, evidently, of one hand. One of several recommendatory Prefaces is ascribed to Wân *Khang*, the god of Literature; and he specially praises the work, as 'explaining the meaning by examination of the Text.'

Fifth, a 'Collection of the Most Important Treatises of the Tâoist Fathers (Tâo 3û *Kăn Kwan Kî Yáo*).' This was reprinted in 1877 at *Khang-kâu* in *Kiang-sû*; beginning with the Tâo Teh King, and ending with the Kan Ying Phien. Between these there are fourteen other Treatises, mostly short, five of them being among Mr. Balfour's 'Tâoist Texts.' The Collection was edited by a Lü Yü; and the Commentary selected by him, in all but the last Treatise, was by a Lî Hsî-yüeh, who appears to have been a recluse in a monastery on a mountain in the department of Pào-ning, *Sze-khwan*, if, indeed, what is said of him be not entirely fabulous.

Sixth, the Commentary on the Tâo Teh King, by Wû *Khăng* (A.D. 1249-1333) of Lin *Khwan*. This has been of the highest service to me. Wû *Khăng* was the greatest of the Yüan scholars. He is one of the Literati quoted from occasionally by 3iáo Hung in his 'Wings;' but by no means so extensively as Julien supposes (*Observations Détachées*, p. xli). My own copy of his work is in the 12th Section of the large Collection of the 'Yüeh-yâ Hall,' published in 1853. Writing of Wû *Khăng* in 1865 (*Proleg. to the Shû*, p. 36), I said that he was 'a bold thinker and a daring critic, handling his text with a freedom which I had not seen in any other Chinese scholar.' The subsequent study of his writings has confirmed me in this opinion of him. Perhaps he might be characterised as an independent, rather than as a bold, thinker, and the daring

of his criticism must not be supposed to be without caution. (See *Intro.*, p. 9.)

The Writings of *Kwang-ze* have been studied by foreigners still less than the *Treatise of Láo-ze*. When I undertook in 1879 to translate them, no version of them had been published. In 1881, however, there appeared at Shanghai Mr. Balfour's 'The Divine Classic of Nan-hua (*Intro.*, pp. 11, 12), being the Works of Chuang Tszé, Táoist Philosopher.' It was a 'bold' undertaking in Mr. Balfour thus to commence his translations of Chinese Books with one of the most difficult of them. I fancy that he was himself convinced of this, and that his undertaking had been 'too bold,' by the criticism to which his work was subjected in the *China Review* by Mr. Giles. Nevertheless, it was no small achievement to be the first to endeavour to lift up the veil from *Kwang-ze*. Even a first translation, though imperfect, is not without benefit to others who come after, and are able to do better. In preparing the draft of my own version, which draft was finished in April, 1887, I made frequent reference to the volume of Mr. Balfour.

Having exposed the errors of Mr. Balfour, Mr. Giles proceeded to make a version of his own, which was published last year in London, with the title of 'CHUANG Tzŭ, Mystic, Moralist, and Social Reformer.' It was not, however, till I was well through with the revision of my draft version, that I supplied myself with a copy of his volume. I did not doubt that Mr. Giles's translation would be well and tersely done, and I preferred to do my own work independently and without the help which he would have afforded me. In carrying my sheets through the press, I have often paused over my rendering of a passage to compare it with his; and I have pleasure in acknowledging the merits of his version. The careful and competent reader will see and form his own judgment on passages and points where we differ.

Before describing the editions of *Kwang-ze* which I

have consulted, I must not omit to mention Professor Gabelentz's 'Treatise on the Speech or Style of *Kwang-ze*,' as 'a Contribution to Chinese Grammar,' published at Leipzig in 1888. It has been a satisfaction to me to find myself on almost every point of usage in agreement with the views of so able a Chinese scholar.

The works which I employed in preparing my version have been:—

First, 'The True *K'ing* of Nan-hwâ,' in 'The Complete Works of the Ten Philosophers,' which has been described above. The Commentary which it supplies is that of Kwo Hsiang (Introd., pp. 9, 10), with 'The Sounds and Meanings of the Characters' from Lû Teh Ming's 'Explanations of the Terms and Phrases of the Classics,' of our seventh century. As in the case of the Táo Teh *K'ing*, the Ming editor has introduced at the top of his pages a selection of comments and notes from a great variety of scholars down to his own time.

Second, 'Helps (Wings) to *Kwang-ze* by Jiáo Hung,'—a kindred work to the one with a similar title on *Lão-ze*; by the same author, and prefaced by him in 1588. The two works are constructed on the same lines. Jiáo draws his materials from forty-eight authorities, from Kwo Hsiang to himself. He divides the several Books also into paragraphs, more or fewer according to their length, and the variety of subjects in them; and my version follows him in this lead with little or no change. He has two concluding Books; the one containing a collation of various readings, and the other a collection of articles on the history and genius of *Kwang-ze*, and different passages of his Text.

Third, the *Kwang-ze* Hsüeh or '*Kwang-ze* made like Snow,' equivalent to our '*Kwang-ze* Elucidated,' by a Lû Shû-kih of Canton province, written in 1796. The different Books are preceded by a short summary of their subject-matter. The work goes far to fulfil the promise of its title.

Fourth, *Kwang-ze* Yin, meaning 'The Train of

Thought in *Kwang-ze* Traced in its Phraseology.' My copy is a reprint, in 1880, of the Commentary of Lin Hsi-kung, who lived from the Ming into the present dynasty, under the editorship of a Lû K'û-wang of Kiang-sû province. The style is clear and elegant, but rather more concise than that of the preceding work. It leaves out the four disputed Books (XXVIII to XXXI); but all the others are followed by an elaborate discussion of their scope and plan.

Fifth, 'The Nan-hwâ Classic of *Kwang-ze* Explained,' published in 1621, by a Hsüan Ying or Jung (宣穎, 宣穎; the name is printed throughout the book, now in one of these ways, now in the other), called also Mâu-kung. The commentary is carefully executed and ingenious; but my copy of the book is so incorrectly printed that it can only be used with caution. Mr. Balfour appears to have made his version mainly from the same edition of the work; and some of his grossest errors pointed out by Mr. Giles arose from his accepting without question the misprints of his authority.

Sixth, 'Independent Views of *Kwang-ze* (莊子獨見);'—by Hû Wăn-ying, published in 1751. Occasionally, the writer pauses over a passage, which, he thinks, has defied all preceding students, and suggests the right explanation of it, or leaves it as inexplicable.

It only remains for me to refer to the Repertories of 'Elegant Extracts,' called by the Chinese K'û Wăn, which abound in their literature, and where the masterpieces of composition are elucidated with more or less of critical detail and paraphrase. I have consulted nearly a dozen of these collections, and would mention my indebtedness especially to that called Mèi K'wan, which discusses passages from twelve of *Kwang-ze*'s books.

When consulting the editions of Lin Hsi-kung and Lû Shû-kih, the reader is surprised by the frequency with which they refer to the 'old explanations' as 'incomplete and unsatisfactory,' often as 'absurd,' or 'ridiculous,' and he

finds on examination that they do not so express themselves without reason. He is soon convinced that the translation of *Kwang-ze* calls for the exercise of one's individual judgment, and the employment of every method akin to the critical processes by which the meaning in the books of other languages is determined. It was the perception of this which made me prepare in the first place a draft version to familiarise myself with the peculiar style and eccentric thought of the author.

From *Kwang-ze* to the Tractate of 'Actions and their Retributions' the transition is great. Translation in the latter case is as easy as it is difficult in the former. It was Rémusat who in 1816 called attention to the *Kan Ying Phien* in Europe, as he did to the *Tão Teh King* seven years later, and he translated the Text of it with a few Notes and Illustrative Anecdotes. In 1828 Klaproth published a translation of it from the *Man-châu* version; and in 1830 a translation in English appeared in the *Canton Register*, a newspaper published at Macao. In 1828 Julien published what has since been the standard version of it; with an immense amount of additional matter under the title—'Le Livre Des Récompenses et Des Peines, en Chinois et en Français; Accompagné de quatre cent Légendes, Anecdotes et Histoires, qui font connaître les Doctrines, les Croyances et les Mœurs de la Secte des Tão-ssé.'

In writing out my own version I have had before me:—

First, 'The *Thâi Shang Kan Ying Phien*, with Plates and the Description of them;' a popular edition, as profusely furnished with anecdotes and stories as Julien's original, and all pictorially illustrated. The notes, comments, and corresponding sentences from the Confucian Classics are also abundant.

Second, 'The *Thâi Shang Kan Ying Phien*, with explanations collected from the Classics and Histories;'—a Cantonese reprint of an edition prepared in the *Khien-lung* reign by a Hsiâ Kiû-hsiâ.

Third, the edition in the Collection of Tàoiist Texts described above on p. xvii; by Hsü Hsiù-teh. It is decidedly Tàoiistic; but without stories or pictures.

Fourth, 'The Thái Shang Kan Ying Phien Kû;' by Hui Tung, of the present dynasty. The Work follows the Commentary of Wù K'ăng on the Tào Teh King in the Collection of the Yüeh-yâ Hall. The preface of the author is dated in 1749. The Commentary, he tells us, was written in consequence of a vow, when his mother was ill, and he was praying for her recovery. It contains many extracts from Ko Hung (Introduction, p. 5, note), to whom he always refers by his nom de plume of Pao-phoh 3ze, or 'Maintainer of Simplicity.' He considers indeed this Tractate to have originated from him.

I have thus set forth all that is necessary to be said here by way of preface. For various information about the Treatises comprised in the Appendixes, the reader is referred to the preliminary notes, which precede the translation of most of them. I have often sorely missed the presence of a competent native scholar who would have assisted me in the quest of references, and in talking over difficult passages. Such a helper would have saved me much time; but the result, I think, would scarcely have appeared in any great alteration of my versions.

J. L.

OXFORD,

December 20, 1890.

THE TEXTS OF TÂOISM.

THE TEXTS OF TÂOISM.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

WAS TÂOISM OLDER THAN LÂO-3ZE?

1. In writing the preface to the third volume of these Sacred Books of the East in 1879, I referred to Lâo-3ze as 'the acknowledged founder' of the system of Tâoism. Prolonged study and research, however, have brought me to the conclusion that there was a Tâoism earlier than his; and that before he wrote his *Tâo Teh King*, the principles taught in it had been promulgated, and the ordering of human conduct and government flowing from them inculcated.

For more than a thousand years 'the Three Religions' has been a stereotyped phrase in China, meaning what we call Confucianism, Tâoism, and Buddhism. The phrase itself simply means 'the Three Teachings,' or systems of instruction, leaving the subject-matter of each 'Teaching' to be learned by inquiry. Of the three, Buddhism is of course the most recent, having been introduced into China only in the first century of our Christian era. Both the others were indigenous to the country, and are traceable to a much greater antiquity, so that it is a question to which the earlier origin should be assigned. The years of Confucius's life lay between B.C. 551 and 478; but his own acknowledgment that he was 'a transmitter and not a maker,' and the testimony of his grandson, that 'he handed down the doctrines of Yâo and Shun (B.C. 2300), and elegantly displayed the regulations

of Wân and Wû (B.C. 1200), taking them as his model,' are well known.

2. Láo-¿ze's birth is said, in the most likely account of it, to have taken place in the third year of king Ting of the Káu dynasty, (B.C.) 604. He was thus rather more than fifty years older than Confucius. The two men seem to have met more than once, and I am inclined to think that the name of Láo-¿ze, as the designation of the other, arose from Confucius's styling him to his disciples 'The Old Philosopher.' They met as Heads of different schools or schemes of thought; but did not touch, so far as we know, on the comparative antiquity of their views. It is a peculiarity of the Táo Teh K'ing that any historical element in

it is of the vaguest nature possible, and in all its chapters there is not a single proper name. Peculiarity of the Táo Teh K'ing.

Yet there are some references to earlier sages whose words the author was copying out, and to 'sentence-makers' whose maxims he was introducing to illustrate his own sentiments¹. In the most distant antiquity he saw a happy society in which his highest ideas of the Táo were realised, and in the seventeenth chapter he tells us that in the earliest times the people did not know that there were their rulers, and when those rulers were most successful in dealing with them, simply said, 'We are what we are of ourselves.' Evidently, men existed to Láo-¿ze at first in a condition of happy innocence,—in what we must call a paradisiacal state, according to his idea of what such a state was likely to be.

When we turn from the treatise of Láo-¿ze to the writings of K'wang-¿ze, the greatest of his followers, we are

¹ The sixth chapter of Láo's treatise, that about 'the Spirit of the Valley,' is referred to in Lich-¿ze (I, 1^b), as being from Hwang Tí, from which the commentator Tú Táo-¿ien (about A.D. 1300) takes occasion to say: 'From which we know that Láo-¿ze was accustomed to quote in his treatise passages from earlier records,—as when he refers to the remarks of "some sage," of "some ancient," of "the sentence-makers," and of "some writer on war." In all these cases he is clearly introducing the words of earlier wise men. The case is like that of Confucius when he said, "I am a transmitter and not a maker," &c.' Found in Biáo Hung, in loc.

not left in doubt as to his belief in an early state of paradisiacal Tâoism. Hwang Tî, the first year of whose reign is placed in B.C. 2697, is often introduced as a seeker of the Tâo, and is occasionally condemned as having been one of the first to disturb its rule in men's minds and break up 'the State of Perfect Unity.' He mentions several sovereigns of whom we can hardly find a trace in the records of history as having ruled in the primeval period, and gives us more than one description of the condition of the world during that happy time ¹.

I do not think that *Kwang-ze* had any historical evidence for the statements which he makes about those early days, the men who flourished in them, and their ways. His narratives are for the most part fictions, in which the names and incidents are of his own devising. They are no more true as matters of fact than the accounts of the characters in Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* are true, with reference to any particular individuals; but as these last are grandly true of myriads of minds in different ages, so may we read in *Kwang-ze's* stories the thoughts of Tâoistic men beyond the restrictions of place and time. He believed that those thoughts were as old as the men to whom he attributed them. I find in his belief a ground for believing myself that to Tâoism, as well as to Confucianism, we ought to attribute a much earlier origin than the famous men whose names they bear. Perhaps they did not differ so much at first as they came afterwards to do in the hands of Confucius and Lâo-ze, both great thinkers, the one more of a moralist, and the other more of a metaphysician. When and how, if they were ever more akin than they came to be, their divergence took place, are difficult questions on which it may be well to make some remarks after we have tried to set forth the most important principles of Tâoism.

Those principles have to be learned from the treatise of Lâo-ze and the writings of *Kwang-ze*. We can hardly

¹ See in Books IX, X, and XII.

say that the Táoism taught in them is the Táoism now current in China, or that has been current in it for many centuries; but in an inquiry into the nature and origin of religions these are the authorities that must be consulted for Táoism, and whose evidence must be accepted. The treatise, 'Actions and the Responses to them,' will show one of the phases of it at a much later period.

CHAPTER II.

THE TEXTS OF THE TÁO TEH KING AND K'WANG-JZE SHÛ, AS REGARDS THEIR AUTHENTICITY AND GENUINENESS, AND THE ARRANGEMENT OF THEM.

I. 1. I will now state briefly, first, the grounds on which I accept the Táo Teh King as a genuine production of the age to which it has been assigned, and the truth of its authorship by Láo-jze to whom it has been ascribed. It would not have been necessary a few years ago to write as if these points could be called in question, but in 1886 Mr. Herbert A. Giles, of Her Majesty's Consular Service in China, and one of the ablest Chinese scholars living, vehemently called them in question in an article in the China Review for the months of March and April. His strictures have been replied to, and I am not going to revive here the controversy which they produced, but only to state a portion of the evidence which satisfies my own mind on the two points just mentioned.

2. It has been said above that the year B. C. 604 was, probably, that of Láo-jze's birth. The year of his death is not recorded. Sze-mâ K'ien, the first great Chinese historian, who died in about B. C. 85, commences ^{The evidence of} his 'Biographies' with a short account of Láo-jze. ^{Sze-mâ K'ien, the historian.} He tells us that the philosopher had been a curator of the Royal Library of K'áu, and that, mourning over the decadence of the dynasty, he wished to withdraw from the world, and proceeded to the pass or defile of Hsien-ku ¹,

¹ In the present district of Ling-páo, Shan K'áu, province of Ho-nan.

leading from China to the west. There he was recognised by the warden of the pass, Yin Hsî (often called Kwan Yin), himself a well-known Tâoist, who insisted on his leaving him a writing before he went into seclusion. Lâo-ze then wrote his views on 'The Tâo and its Characteristics,' in two parts or sections, containing more than 5000 characters, gave the manuscript to the warden, and went his way¹; 'nor is it known where he died.' This account is strange enough, and we need not wonder that it was by and by embellished with many marvels. It contains, however, the definite statements that Lâo-ze wrote the Tâo Teh K'ing in two parts, and consisting of more than 5000 characters. And that K'ien was himself well acquainted with the treatise is apparent from his quotations from it, with, in almost every case, the specification of the author. He thus adduces part of the first chapter, and a large portion of the last chapter but one. His brief references also to Lâo-ze and his writings are numerous.

3. But between Lâo-ze and Sze-mâ K'ien there were many Tâoist writers whose works remain. I may specify of them Lieh-ze (assuming that his chapters, though not composed in their present form by him, may yet be accepted as fair specimens of his teaching); Kwang-ze (of the fourth century B.C. We find him refusing to accept high office from king Wei of K'û, B.C. 339-299); Han Fei, a voluminous author, who died by his own hand in B.C. 230; and Liû An, a scion of the Imperial House of Han, king of Hwâi-nan, and better known to us as Hwâi-nan Ze, who also died by his own hand in B.C. 122. In the books of all these men we find quotations of many passages that are in our treatise. They are expressly said to be, many of them, quotations from Lâo-ze; Han Fei several times all but

Lieh-ze, Han
Fei-ze, and
other Tâoist
authors.

¹ In an ordinary Student's Manual I find a note with reference to this incident to which it may be worth while to give a place here:—The warden, it is said, set before Lâo-ze a dish of tea; and this was the origin of the custom of tea-drinking between host and guest (see the 幼學故事尋源, ch. 7, on Food and Drink).

shows the book beneath his eyes. To show how numerous the quotations by Han Fei and Liû An are, let it be borne in mind that the Tâo Teh King has come down to us as divided into eighty-one short chapters; and that the whole of it is shorter than the shortest of our Gospels. Of the eighty-one chapters, either the whole or portions of seventy-one are found in those two writers. There are other authors not so decidedly Tâoistic, in whom we find quotations from the little book. These quotations are in general wonderfully correct. Various readings indeed there are; but if we were sure that the writers did trust to memory, their differences would only prove that copies of the text had been multiplied from the very first.

In passing on from quotations to the complete text, I will Evidence of Pan Kû. clinch the assertion that *K'ien* was well acquainted with our treatise, by a passage from the History of the Former Han Dynasty (B.C. 206–A.D. 24), which was begun to be compiled by Pan Kû, who died however in 92, and left a portion to be completed by his sister, the famous Pan K'áo. The thirty-second chapter of his Biographies is devoted to Sze-mâ *K'ien*, and towards the end it is said that 'on the subject of the Great Tâo he preferred Hwang and Láo to the six King.' 'Hwang and Láo' must there be the writings of Hwang-Tî and Láo-ze. The association of the two names also illustrates the anti-quity claimed for Tâoism, and the subject of note 1, p. 2.

4. We go on from quotations to complete texts, and turn, first, to the catalogue of the Imperial Library of Han, as compiled by Liû Hsin, not later than the commencement of our Christian era. There are entered in it Tâoist works by thirty-seven different authors, containing in all Catalogue of the Imperial Library of Han. 993 chapters or sections (*phien*). Í Yin, the premier of *K'hang* Thang (B.C. 1766), heads the list with fifty-one sections. There are in it four editions of Láo-ze's work with commentaries:—by a Mr. Lin, in four sections; a Mr. Fû, in thirty-seven sections; a Mr. Hsü, in six sections; and by Liû Hsiang, Hsin's own father, in four sections. All these four works have since perished, but there they were in the Imperial Library before

our era began. *Kwang-ze* is in the same list in fifty-two books or sections, the greater part of which have happily escaped the devouring tooth of time.

We turn now to the twentieth chapter of *K'ien's* Biographies, in which he gives an account of *Yo Í*, the scion of a distinguished family, and who himself played a famous part, both as a politician and military leader, and became prince of *Wang-kú* under the kingdom of *Káo* in B.C. 279. Among his descendants was a *Yo K'ăn*, who learned in *K'hi* 'the words,' that is, the Táoistic writings 'of *Hwang-Ti* and *Láo-ze* from an old man who lived on the Ho-side.' The origin of this old man was not known, but *Yo K'ăn* taught what he learned from him to a Mr. Ko, who again became preceptor to *Zhào Zhan*, the chief minister of *K'hi*, and afterwards of the new dynasty of Han, dying in B.C. 190.

5. Referring now to the catalogue of the Imperial Library of the dynasty of Sui (A.D. 589-618), we find that

The catalogue it contained many editions of *Láo's* treatise of the Sui dynasty. with commentaries. The first mentioned is 'The *Táo Teh King*,' with the commentary of the old man of the Ho-side, in the time of the emperor *Wăn* of Han (B.C. 179-142). It is added in a note that the dynasty of *Liang* (A.D. 502-556) had possessed the edition of 'the old man of the Ho-side, of the time of the Warring States; but that with some other texts and commentaries it had disappeared.' I find it difficult to believe that there had been two old men of the Ho-side¹, both teachers of Táoism and commentators on our *King*, but I am willing to content myself with the more recent work, and accept the copy that has been current—say from B.C. 150, when *Sze-mâ K'ien* could have been little more than a boy. Táoism was a favourite study with many of the Han emperors and their ladies. *Hwái-nan Ze*, of whose many quotations from

¹ The earlier old man of the Ho-side is styled in Chinese 河上丈人; the other 河上公; but the designations have the same meaning. Some critical objections to the genuineness of the latter's commentary on the ground of the style are without foundation.

the text of *Lão I* have spoken, was an uncle of the emperor *Wăn*. To the emperor *King* (B.C. 156-143), the son of *Wăn*, there is attributed the designation of *Lão's* treatise as a *King*, a work of standard authority. At the beginning of his reign, we are told, some one was commending to him four works, among which were those of *Lão-jze* and *Kwang-jze*. Deeming that the work of *Hwang-jze* and *Lão-jze* was of a deeper character than the others, he ordered that it should be called a *King*, established a board for the study of *Táoism*, and issued an edict that the book should be learned and recited at court, and throughout the country¹. Thenceforth it was so styled. We find *Hwang-fû Mî* (A.D. 215-282) referring to it as the *Táo Teh King*.

The second place in the *Sui* catalogue is given to the text and commentary of *Wang Pi* or *Wang Fû-sze*, an

The work of Wang Pi. extraordinary scholar who died in A.D. 249, at the early age of twenty-four. This work has always been much prized. It was its text which *Lû Teh-ming* used in his 'Explanation of the Terms and Phrases of the Classics,' in the seventh century. Among the editions of it which I possess is that printed in 1794 with the imperial moveable metal types.

I need not speak of editions or commentaries subsequent to *Wang Pi's*. They soon begin to be many, and are only not so numerous as those of the *Confucian Classics*.

6. All the editions of the book are divided into two parts, the former called *Táo*, and the latter *Teh*, meaning the Qualities or Characteristics of the *Táo*, but this distinction of subjects is by no means uniformly adhered to.

Divisions into parts, chapters; and number of characters in the text.

I referred already to the division of the whole into eighty-one short chapters (37 + 44), which is by common tradition attributed to *Ho-shang Kung*, or 'The old man of the *Ho-side*.' Another very early commentator, called *Yen Jun* or *Yen Kün-phing*, made a division into seventy-two chapters (40 + 32), under the influence, no doubt, of some

¹ See *Sião Hung's Wings or Helps*, ch. v, p. 11^a.

mystical considerations. His predecessor, perhaps, had no better reason for his eighty-one; but the names of his chapters were, for the most part, happily chosen, and have been preserved. Wû *Khǎng* arranged the two parts in sixty-seven chapters (31 + 36). It is a mistake, however, to suppose, as even Mr. Wylie with all his general accuracy did¹, that Wû 'curtails the ordinary text to some extent.' He does not curtail, but only re-arranges according to his fashion, uniting some of Ho-shang Kung's chapters in one, and sometimes altering the order of their clauses.

Sze-mâ *Khien* tells us that, as the treatise came from Láo-ze, it contained more than 5000 characters; that is, as one critic says, 'more than 5000 and fewer than 6000.' Ho-shang Kung's text has 5350, and one copy 5590; Wang P's, 5683, and one copy 5610. Two other early texts have been counted, giving 5720 and 5635 characters respectively. The brevity arises from the terse conciseness of the style, owing mainly to the absence of the embellishment of particles, which forms so striking a peculiarity in the composition of Mencius and *Kwang-ze*.

In passing on to speak, secondly and more briefly, of the far more voluminous writings of *Kwang-ze*, I may say that I do not know of any other book of so ancient a date as the *Táo Teh King*, of which the authenticity of the origin and genuineness of the text can claim to be so well substantiated.

II. 7. In the catalogue of the Han Library we have the entry of '*Kwang-ze* in fifty-two books or sections.' By

The Books of the time of the Sui dynasty, the editions of *Kwang-ze*. his work amounted to nearly a score. The earliest commentary that has come down to us goes by the name of Kwo Hsiang's. He was an officer and scholar of the Jin dynasty, who died about the year 312. Another officer, also of Jin, called Hsiang Hsiù, of rather an earlier date, had undertaken the same task, but left it incomplete; and his manuscripts coming (not, as it appears, by

¹ Notes on Chinese Literature, p. 173.

any fraud) into Kwo's hands, he altered and completed them as suited his own views, and then gave them to the public. In the short account of Kwo, given in the twentieth chapter of the Biographies of the 3in history, it is said that several tens of commentators had laboured unsatisfactorily on Kwang's writings before Hsiang Hsiû took them in hand. As the joint result of the labours of the two men, however, we have only thirty-three of the fifty-two sections mentioned in the Han catalogue. It is in vain that I have tried to discover how and when the other nineteen sections were lost. In one of the earliest commentaries on the Tào Teh King, that by Yen 3un, we have several quotations from Kwang-3ze which bear evidently the stamp of his handiwork, and are not in the current Books; but they would not altogether make up a single section. We have only to be thankful that so large a proportion of the original work has been preserved. Sû Shih (3ze-kan, and Tung-pho), it is well known, called in question the genuineness of Books 28 to 31¹. Books 15 and 16 have also been challenged, and a paragraph here and there in one or other of the Books. The various readings, according to a collation given by 3iào Hung, are few.

8. There can be no doubt that the Books of Kwang-3ze were hailed by all the friends of Taoism. It has been mentioned above that the names 'Hwang-Ti' and 'Lão-3ze' were associated together as denoting the masters of Taoism, and the phrase, 'the words of Hwang-Ti and Lão-3ze,' came to be no more than a name for the Tào Teh King. Gradually the two names were contracted into 'Hwang Lão,' as in the passage quoted on p. 6 from Pan Kû. After the Han dynasty, the name Hwang gave place to Kwang, and the names Lão Kwang, and, sometimes inverted, Kwang Lão, were employed to denote the system or the texts of Taoism. In the account, for instance, of Kî

Importance to
Taoism of the
Books of
Kwang-3ze.

¹ A brother of Shih, Sû Kêh (3ze-yû and Ying-pin), wrote a remarkable commentary on the Tào Teh King; but it was Shih who first discredited those four Books, in his Inscription for the temple of Kwang-3ze, prepared in 1078.

Khang, in the nineteenth chapter of the Biographies of Jin, we have a typical Tâoist brought before us. When grown up, 'he loved Lâo and K'wang;' and a visitor, to produce the most favourable impression on him, says, 'Lâo-ze and K'wang K'âu are my masters.'

9. The thirty-three Books of K'wang-ze are divided into three Parts, called Nêi, or 'the Inner;' Wâi, or 'the Outer;' and Jâ, 'the Miscellaneous.' The first Part comprises seven Books; the second, fifteen; and the third, eleven. 'Inner' may be understood as equivalent to esoteric or More Im-

portant. The titles of the several Books are significant, and each expresses the subject or theme of its Book. They are believed to have been prefixed by K'wang-ze himself, and that no alteration could be made in the composition but for the worse. 'Outer' is understood in the sense of supplementary or subsidiary. The fifteen Books so called are 'Wings' to the previous seven. Their titles were not given by the author, and are not significant of the Tâoistic truth which all the paragraphs unite, or should unite, in illustrating; they are merely some name or phrase taken from the commencement of the first paragraph in each Book,—like the names of the Books of the Confucian Analects, or of the Hebrew Pentateuch. The fixing them originally is generally supposed to have been the work of Kwo Hsiang. The eleven Miscellaneous Books are also supplementary to those of the first Part, and it is not easy to see why a difference was made between them and the fifteen that precede.

10. K'wang-ze's writings have long been current under the name of Nan Hwa K'ân King. He was a native of the duchy of Sung, born in what was then called the district of Măng, and belonged to the state or kingdom of Liang or Wei. As he grew up, he filled some official post in the city of Zhî-yüan,—the site of which it is not easy to determine with certainty. In A.D. 742, the name of his birth-place was changed (but only for a time) to Nan-hwa, and an imperial order was issued that K'wang-ze should thence-

The general title of K'wang-ze's works.

forth be styled 'The True Man of Nan-hwa,' and his Book, 'The True Book of Nan-hwa'.¹ To be 'a True Man' is the highest Tâoistic achievement of a man, and our author thus canonised communicates his glory to his Book.

CHAPTER III.

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NAME TÂO? AND THE CHIEF POINTS OF BELIEF IN TÂOISM.

1. The first translation of the *Tâo Teh King* into a Western language was executed in Latin by some of the Roman Catholic missionaries, and a copy of Meaning of the name Tâo. it was brought to England by a Mr. Matthew Raper, F.R.S., and presented by him to the Society at a meeting on the 10th January, 1788,—being the gift to him of P. Jos. de Grammont, 'Missionarius Apostolicus, ex-Jesuita.' In this version Tâo is taken in the sense of Ratio, or the Supreme Reason of the Divine Being, the Creator and Governor.

M. Abel Rémusat, the first Professor of Chinese in Paris, does not seem to have been aware of the existence of the above version in London, but his attention was attracted to Lâo's treatise about 1820, and, in 1823, he wrote of the character Tâo, 'Ce mot me semble ne pas pouvoir être bien traduit, si ce n'est par le mot λόγος dans le triple sens de souverain Être, de raison, et de parole.'

Rémusat's successor in the chair of Chinese, the late Stanislas Julien, published in 1842 a translation of the whole treatise. Having concluded from an examination of it, and the earliest Tâoist writers, such as Kwang-ze, Ho-kwan Ze, and Ho-shang Kung, that the Tâo was devoid of action, of thought, of judgment, and of intelligence, he concluded that it was impossible to understand by it 'the Primordial Reason, or the Sublime Intelligence which created, and which governs the world,' and to

¹ See the Khang-hsî Thesaurus (佩文韻府), under 華.

this he subjoined the following note:—‘*Quelque étrange que puisse paraître cette idée de Lâo-ze, elle n’est pas sans exemple dans l’histoire de la philosophie. Le mot nature n’a-t-il pas été employé par certains philosophes, que la religion et la raison condamnent, pour désigner une cause première, également dépourvue de pensée et d’intelligence?*’ Julien himself did not doubt that Lâo’s idea of the character was that it primarily and properly meant ‘a way,’ and hence he translated the title *Tâo Teh King* by ‘*Le Livre de la Voie et de la Vertu,*’ transferring at the same time the name *Tâo* to the text of his version.

The first English writer who endeavoured to give a distinct account of *Tâoism* was the late Archdeacon Hardwick, while he held the office of Christian Advocate in the University of Cambridge. In his ‘*Christ and other Masters*’ (vol. ii, p. 67), when treating of the religions of China, he says, ‘I feel disposed to argue that the centre of the system founded by Lâo-ze had been awarded to some energy or power resembling the “Nature” of modern speculators. The indefinite expression *Tâo* was adopted to denominate an abstract cause, or the initial principle of life and order, to which worshippers were able to assign the attributes of immateriality, eternity, immensity, invisibility.’

It was, probably, Julien’s reference in his note to the use of the term *nature*, which suggested to Hardwick his analogy between Lâo-ze’s *Tâo*, and ‘the Nature of modern speculation.’ Canon Farrar has said, ‘We have long personified under the name of Nature the sum total of God’s laws as observed in the physical world; and now the notion of Nature as a distinct, living, independent entity seems to be ineradicable alike from our literature and our systems of philosophy¹.’ But it seems to me that this metaphorical or mythological use of the word *nature* for the Cause and Ruler of it, implies the previous notion of Him, that is, of God, in the mind. Does not this clearly appear in the words of Seneca?—‘*Vis illum (h.e. Jovem Deum) naturam*

¹ *Language and Languages*, pp. 184, 185.

vocare, non peccabis:—hic est ex quo nata sunt omnia, cujus spiritu vivimus¹.

In his translation of the Works of *Kwang-ze* in 1881, Mr. Balfour adopted Nature as the ordinary rendering of the Chinese Tâo. He says, 'When the word is translated Way, it means the Way of Nature,—her processes, her methods, and her laws; when translated Reason, it is the same as li,—the power that works in all created things, producing, preserving, and life-giving,—the intelligent principle of the world; when translated Doctrine, it refers to the True doctrine respecting the laws and mysteries of Nature.' He calls attention also to the point that 'he uses NATURE in the sense of *Natura naturans*, while the Chinese expression *wan wû* (= all things) denotes *Natura naturata*.' But this really comes to the metaphorical use of nature which has been touched upon above. It can claim as its patrons great names like those of Aquinas, Giordano Bruno, and Spinoza, but I have never been able to see that its barbarous phraseology makes it more than a figure of speech².

The term Nature, however, is so handy, and often fits so appropriately into a version, that if Tâo had ever such a signification I should not hesitate to employ it as freely as Mr. Balfour has done; but as it has not that signification, to try to put a non-natural meaning into it, only perplexes the mind, and obscures the idea of Lâo-ze.

Mr. Balfour himself says (p. xviii), 'The primary signification of Tâo is simply "road."' Beyond question this meaning underlies the use of it by the great master of Tâoism and by *Kwang-ze*³. Let the reader refer to the version of the twenty-fifth chapter of Lâo's treatise, and to

¹ Natur. Quaest. lib. II, cap. xlv.

² Martineau's 'Types of Ethical Theory,' I, p. 286, and his whole 'Conjectural History of Spinoza's Thought.'

³ 道 is equivalent to the Greek *ἡ ὁδός*, the way. Where this name for the Christian system occurs in our Revised Version of the New Testament in the Acts of the Apostles, the literal rendering is adhered to, Way being printed with a capital W. See Acts ix. 2; xix. 9, 23; xxii. 4; xxiv. 14, 22.

the notes subjoined to it. There Tâo appears as the spontaneously operating cause of all movement in the phenomena of the universe; and the nearest the writer can come to a name for it is 'the Great Tâo.' Having established this name, he subsequently uses it repeatedly; see chh. xxxiv and liii. In the third paragraph of his twentieth chapter, K'wang-ze uses a synonymous phrase instead of Lâo's 'Great Tâo,' calling it the 'Great Thû,' about which there can be no dispute, as meaning 'the Great Path,' 'Way,' or 'Course¹.' In the last paragraph of his twenty-fifth Book, K'wang-ze again sets forth the metaphorical origin of the name Tâo. 'Tâo,' he says, 'cannot be regarded as having a positive existence; existences cannot be regarded as non-existent. The name Tâo is a metaphor used for the purpose of description. To say that it exercises some causation, or that it does nothing, is speaking of it from the phase of a thing;—how can such language serve as a designation of it in its greatness? If words were sufficient for the purpose, we might in a day's time exhaust the subject of the Tâo. Words not being sufficient, we may talk about it the whole day, and the subject of discourse will only have been a thing. Tâo is the extreme to which things conduct us. Neither speech nor silence is sufficient to convey the notion of it. When we neither speak nor refrain from speech, our speculations about it reach their highest point.'

The Tâo therefore is a phenomenon; not a positive being, but a mode of being. Lâo's idea of it may become plainer as we proceed to other points of his system. In the meantime, the best way of dealing with it in translating is to transfer it to the version, instead of trying to introduce an English equivalent for it.

2. Next in importance to Tâo is the name Thien, meaning at first the vaulted sky or the open firmament of heaven. In the Confucian Classics, and in the speech of the Chinese

¹ 大塗. The Khang-hsi dictionary defines thû by lû, road or way. Medhurst gives 'road.' Unfortunately, both Morrison and Williams overlooked this definition of the character. Giles has also a note in loc., showing how this synonym settles the original meaning of Tâo in the sense of 'road.'

people, this name is used metaphorically as it is by ourselves for the Supreme Being, with reference especially to His will and rule. So it was that the idea of God arose among the Chinese fathers; so it was that they proceeded to fashion a name for God, calling Him Tî, and Shang Tî, 'the Ruler,' and 'the Supreme Ruler.' The Táoist fathers found this among their people; but in their idea of the Táo they had already a Supreme Concept which superseded the necessity of any other. The name Tî for God only occurs once in the Táo Teh King; in the well-known passage of the fourth chapter, where, speaking of the Táo, Láo-¿ze says, 'I do not know whose Son it is; it might seem to be before God.'

Nor is the name Thien very common. We have the phrase, 'Heaven and Earth,' used for the two great constituents of the kosmos, owing their origin to the Táo, and also for a sort of binomial power, acting in harmony with the Táo, covering, protecting, nurturing, and maturing all things. Never once is Thien used in the sense of God, the Supreme Being. In its peculiarly Táoistic employment, it is more an adjective than a noun. 'The Táo of Heaven' means the Táo that is Heavenly, the course that is quiet and undemonstrative, that is free from motive and effort, such as is seen in the processes of nature, grandly proceeding and successful without any striving or crying. The Táo of man, not dominated by this Táo, is contrary to it, and shows will, purpose, and effort, till, submitting to it, it becomes 'the Táo or Way of the Sages,' which in all its action has no striving.

The characteristics both of Heaven and man are dealt with more fully by Kwang than by Láo. In the conclusion of his eleventh Book, for instance, he says:—'What do we mean by Táo? There is the Táo (or Way) of Heaven, and there is the Táo of man. Acting without action, and yet attracting all honour, is the Way of Heaven. Doing and being embarrassed thereby is the Way of man. The Way of Heaven should play the part of lord; the Way of man, the part of minister. The two are far apart, and should be distinguished from each other.'

In his next Book (par. 2), *Kwang-ze* tells us what he intends by 'Heaven:—'Acting without action,—this is what is called Heaven.' Heaven thus takes its law from the Táo. 'The oldest sages and sovereigns attained to do the same,'—it was for all men to aim at the same achievement. As they were successful, 'vacancy, stillness, placidity, tastelessness, quietude, silence, and non-action' would be found to be their characteristics, and they would go on to the perfection of the Táo¹.

The employment of Thien by the Confucianists, as of Heaven by ourselves, must be distinguished therefore from the Táoistic use of the name to denote the quiet but mighty influence of the impersonal Táo; and to translate it by 'God' only obscures the meaning of the Táoist writers. This has been done by Mr. Giles in his version of *Kwang-ze*, which is otherwise for the most part so good. Everywhere on his pages there appears the great name 'God';—a blot on his translation more painful to my eyes and ears than the use of 'Nature' for Táo by Mr. Balfour. I know that Mr. Giles's plan in translating is to use strictly English equivalents for all kinds of Chinese terms². The plan is good where there are in the two languages such strict equivalents; but in the case before us there is no ground for its application. The exact English equivalent for the Chinese thien is our heaven. The Confucianists often used thien metaphorically for the personal Being whom they denominated Tî (God) and Shang Tî (the Supreme God), and a translator may occasionally, in working on books of Confucian literature, employ our name God for it. But neither Láo nor *Kwang* ever attached anything like our idea of God to it; and when one, in working on books of early Táoist literature, translates thien by God, such a rendering must fail to produce in an English reader a correct apprehension of the meaning.

There is also in *Kwang-ze* a peculiar usage of the name Thien. He applies it to the Beings whom he introduces as

¹ The Táo Teh King, ch. 25, and *Kwang-ze*, XIII, par. 1.

² See 'Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio,' vol. i, p. 1, note 2.

Peculiar usage
of Thien in
Kwang-ze. Masters of the Tâo, generally with mystical appellations in order to set forth his own views. Two instances from Book XI will suffice in illustration of this. In par. 4, Hwang-Ti does reverence to his instructor Kwang *Khăng-ze*¹, saying, 'In Kwang *Khăng-ze* we have an example of what is called Heaven,' which Mr. Giles renders 'Kwang *Khăng Ze* is surely God.' In par. 5, again, the mystical Yün-kiang is made to say to the equally fabulous and mystical Hung-mung, 'O Heaven, have you forgotten me?' and, farther on, 'O Heaven, you have conferred on me (the knowledge of) your operation, and revealed to me the mystery of it;' in both which passages Mr. Giles renders thien by 'your Holiness.'

But Mr. Giles seems to agree with me that the old Tâoists had no idea of a personal God, when they wrote of Thien or Heaven. On his sixty-eighth page, near the beginning of Book VI, we meet with the following sentence, having every appearance of being translated from the Chinese text:—'God is a principle which exists by virtue of its own intrinsicity, and operates without self-manifestation.' By an inadvertence he has introduced his own definition of 'God' as if it were *Kwang-ze*'s; and though I can find no characters in the text of which I can suppose that he intends it to be the translation, it is valuable as helping us to understand the meaning to be attached to the Great Name in his volume.

I have referred above (p. 16) to the only passage in Lâo's treatise, where he uses the name Tî or God in its highest sense, saying that 'the Tâo might seem to have been before Him.' He might well say so, for in his first chapter he describes the Tâo, '(conceived of as) having no name, as the Originator of heaven and

¹ Kwang *Khăng-ze* heads the list of characters in Ko Hung's 'History of Spirit-like Immortals (神仙傳),' written in our fourth century. 'He was,' it is said, 'an Immortal of old, who lives on the hill of M'ung-thung in a grotto of rocks.'

earth, and (conceived of as) having a name, as the Mother of all things.' The reader will also find the same predicates of the Tão at greater length in his fifty-first chapter.

The character Tî is also of rare occurrence in *Kwang-ze*, excepting as applied to the five ancient Tîs. In Bk. III, par. 4, and in one other place, we find it indicating the Supreme Being, but the usage is ascribed to the ancients. In Bk. XV, par. 3, in a description of the human SPIRIT, its name is said to be 'Thung Tî,' which Mr. Giles renders 'Of God;' Mr. Balfour, 'One with God;' while my own version is 'The Divinity in Man.' In Bk. XII, par. 6, we have the expression 'the place of God;' in Mr. Giles, 'the kingdom of God;' in Mr. Balfour, 'the home of God.' In this and the former instance, the character seems to be used with the ancient meaning which had entered into the folklore of the people. But in Bk. VI, par. 7, there is a passage which shows clearly the relative position of Tão and Tî in the Tãoistic system; and having called attention to it, I will go on to other points. Let the reader mark well the following predicates of the Tão:—'Before there were heaven and earth, from of old, there It was, securely existing. From It came the mysterious existence of spirits; from It the mysterious existence of Tî (God). It produced heaven, It produced earth¹.' This says more than the utterance of Lâu,—that 'the Tão seemed to be before God;'—does it not say that Tão was before God, and that He was what He is by virtue of Its operation?

3. Among the various personal names given to the Tão are those of 3ão Hwâ, 'Maker and Transformer,' and 3ão Wû Kê, 'Maker of things.' Instances of both these names are found in Bk. VI, parr. 9, 10. 'Creator' and 'God' have both been employed for them; but there is no idea of Creation in Tãoism.

Again and again *Kwang-ze* entertains the question of

¹ For this sentence we find in Mr. Balfour:—'Spirits of the dead, receiving It, become divine; the very gods themselves owe their divinity to its influence; and by it both Heaven and Earth were produced.' The version of it by Mr. Giles is too condensed:—'Spiritual beings drew their spirituality therefrom, while the universe became what we see it now.'

how it was at the first beginning of things. Different views are stated. In Bk. II, par. 4, he says:—‘Among the men of old their knowledge reached the extreme point. What was that extreme point?’

‘Some held that at first there was not anything. This is the extreme point,—the utmost limit to which nothing can be added.

‘A second class held that there was something, but without any responsive recognition of it (on the part of man).

‘A third class held that there was such recognition, but there had not begun to be any expression of different opinions about it. It was through the definite expression of different opinions about it that there ensued injury to the (doctrine of the) Tâo¹.’

The first of these three views was that which *Kwang-ze* himself preferred. The most condensed expression of it is given in Bk. XII, par. 8:—‘In the Grand Beginning of all things there was nothing in all the vacancy of space; there was nothing that could be named². It was in this state that there arose the first existence; the first existence, but still without bodily shape. From this things could be produced, (receiving) what we call their several characters. That which had no bodily shape was divided, and then without intermission there was what we call the process of conferring. (The two processes) continued to operate, and things were produced. As they were completed, there appeared the distinguishing lines of each, which we call the bodily shape. That shape was the body preserving in it the spirit, and each had its peculiar manifestation which we call its nature.’

Such was the genesis of things; the formation of heaven

¹ Compare also Bk. XXII, parr. 7, 8, and XXIII, par. 10.

² Mr. Balfour had given for this sentence:—‘In the beginning of all things there was not even nothing. There were no names; these arose afterwards.’ In his critique on Mr. Balfour’s version in 1882, Mr. Giles proposed:—‘At the beginning of all things there was nothing; but this nothing had no name.’ He now in his own version gives for it, ‘At the beginning of the beginning, even nothing did not exist. Then came the period of the nameless;’—an improvement, certainly, on the other; but which can hardly be accepted as the correct version of the text.

and earth and all that in them is, under the guidance of the Táo. It was an evolution and not a creation. How the Táo itself came,—I do not say into existence, but into operation,—neither Láo nor Kwang ever thought of saying anything about. We have seen that it is nothing material¹. It acted spontaneously of itself. Its sudden appearance in the field of non-existence, Producer, Transformer, Beautifier, surpasses my comprehension. To Láo it seemed to be before God. I am compelled to accept the existence of God, as the ultimate Fact, bowing before it with reverence, and not attempting to explain it, the one mystery, the sole mystery of the universe.

4. 'The bodily shape was the body preserving in it the spirit, and each had its peculiar manifestation which we call its nature.' So it is said in the passage quoted above from Kwang-ze's twelfth Book, and the language shows

Man is composed
of body and
spirit.

how Táoism, in a loose and indefinite way, considered man to be composed of body and spirit, associated together, yet not necessarily dependent on each other. Little is found bearing on this tenet in the Táo Teh King. The concluding sentence of ch. 33, 'He who dies and yet does not perish, has longevity,' is of doubtful acceptance. More pertinent is the description of life as 'a coming forth,' and of death as 'an entering²;' but Kwang-ze expounds more fully, though after all unsatisfactorily, the teaching of their system on the subject.

At the conclusion of his third Book, writing of the death of Láo-ze, he says, 'When the master came, it was at the proper time; when he went away, it was the simple sequence (of his coming). Quiet acquiescence in what happens at its proper time, and quietly submitting (to its sequence), afford no occasion for grief or for joy. The ancients described (death) as the loosening of the cord on which God suspended (the life). What we can point to are the faggots that have been consumed; but the fire is transmitted elsewhere, and we know not that it is over and ended.'

¹ The Táo Teh King, ch. 14; et al.

² Ch. 50.

It is, however, in connexion with the death of his own wife, as related in the eighteenth Book, that his views most fully—I do not say ‘clearly’—appear. We are told that when that event took place, his friend Hui-ze went to condole with him, and found him squatted on the ground, drumming on the vessel (of ice), and singing. His friend said to him, ‘When a wife has lived with her husband, brought up children, and then dies in her old age, not to wail for her is enough. When you go on to drum on the vessel and sing, is it not an excessive (and strange) demonstration?’ Kwang-ze replied, ‘It is not so. When she first died, was it possible for me to be singular, and not affected by the event? But I reflected on the commencement of her being, when she had not yet been born to life. Not only had she no life, but she had no bodily form. Not only had she no bodily form, but she had no breath. Suddenly in this chaotic condition there ensued a change, and there was breath; another change, and there was the bodily form; a further change, and she was born to life; a change now again, and she is dead. The relation between those changes is like the procession of the four seasons,—spring, autumn, winter, and summer. There she lies with her face up, sleeping in the Great Chamber¹; and if I were to fall sobbing and going on to wail for her, I should think I did not understand what was appointed for all. I therefore restrained myself.’

The next paragraph of the same Book contains another story about two ancient men, both deformed, who, when looking at the graves on Kwān-lun, begin to feel in their own frames the symptoms of approaching dissolution. One says to the other, ‘Do you dread it?’ and gets the reply, ‘No. Why should I dread it? Life is a borrowed thing. The living frame thus borrowed is but so much dust. Life and death are like day and night.’

In every birth, it would thus appear, there is, somehow, a repetition of what it is said, as we have seen, took place at ‘the Grand Beginning of all things,’ when out of the

¹ That is, between heaven and earth.

primal nothingness, the T'ao somehow appeared, and there was developed through its operation the world of things,—material things and the material body of man, which enshrines or enshrouds an immaterial spirit. This returns to the T'ao that gave it, and may be regarded indeed as that T'ao operating in the body during the time of life, and in due time receives a new embodiment.

In these notions of T'aoism there was a preparation for the appreciation by its followers of the Buddhistic system when it came to be introduced into the country, and which forms a close connexion between the two at the present day, T'aoism itself constantly becoming less definite and influential on the minds of the Chinese people. The Book which tells us of the death of *K'wang-ze's* wife concludes with a narrative about *Lieh-ze* and an old bleached skull¹, and to this is appended a passage about the metamorphoses of things, ending with the statement that 'the panther produces the horse, and the horse the man, who then again enters into the great machinery (of evolution), from which all things come forth (at birth) and into which they re-enter (at death).' Such representations need not be characterised.

5. K'ü Hsi, 'the prince of Literature,' described the main object of T'aoism to be 'the preservation of the breath of life;' and Liü Mî, probably of our thirteenth century², in his 'Dispassionate Comparison of the Three Religions,' declares that 'its chief achievement is the prolongation of longevity.' Such is the account of T'aoism ordinarily given by Confucian and Buddhist writers, but our authorities, L'ao and K'wang, hardly bear out this representation of it as true of their time. There are chapters of the T'ao Teh King which

¹ Quoted in the Amplification of the Sixteen Precepts or Maxims of the second emperor of the present dynasty by his son. The words are from Dr. Milne's version of 'the Sacred Edict,' p. 137.

² In his Index to the Tripitaka, Mr. Bunyio Nanjio (p. 359) assigns Liü Mî and his work to the Yüan dynasty. In a copy of the work in my possession they are assigned to that of Sung. The author, no doubt, lived under both dynasties,—from the Sung into the Yüan.

presuppose a peculiar management of the breath, but the treatise is singularly free from anything to justify what Mr. Balfour well calls 'the antics of the Kung-fû, or system of mystic and recondite calisthenics¹.' Láo insists, however, on the Táo as conducive to long life, and in *Kwang-ze* we have references to it as a discipline of longevity, though even he mentions rather with disapproval 'those who kept blowing and breathing with open mouth, inhaling and exhaling the breath, expelling the old and taking in new; passing their time like the (dormant) bear, and stretching and twisting (their necks) like birds.' He says that 'all this simply shows their desire for longevity, and is what the scholars who manage the breath, and men who nourish the body and wish to live as long as Phăng-ü, are fond of doing².' My own opinion is that the methods of the Táo were first cultivated for the sake of the longevity which they were thought to promote, and that Láo, discountenancing such a use of them, endeavoured to give the doctrine a higher character; and this view is favoured by passages in *Kwang-ze*. In the seventh paragraph, for instance, of his Book VI, speaking of parties who had obtained the Táo, he begins with a prehistoric sovereign, who 'got it and by it adjusted heaven and earth.' Among his other instances is Phăng-ü, who got it in the time of Shun, and lived on to the time of the five leading princes of Kâu, —a longevity of more than 1800 years, greater than that ascribed to Methuselah! In the paragraph that follows there appears a Nü Yü, who is addressed by another famous Táoist in the words, 'You are old, Sir, while your complexion is like that of a child;—how is it so?' and the reply is, 'I became acquainted with the Táo.'

I will adduce only one more passage of *Kwang*. In his eleventh Book, and the fourth paragraph, he tells us of interviews between Hwang-Ti, in the nineteenth year of his reign, which would be B. C. 2679, and his instructor Kwang Khăng-ze. The Táoist sage is not readily prevailed on

¹ See note on p. 187 of his *Kwang-ze*.

² See Bk. XV, par. 1.

to unfold the treasures of his knowledge to the sovereign, but at last his reluctance is overcome, and he says to him, 'Come, and I will tell you about the Perfect Táo. Its essence is surrounded with the deepest obscurity; its highest reach is in darkness and silence. There is nothing to be seen, nothing to be heard. When it holds the spirit in its arms in stillness, then the bodily form will of itself become correct. You must be still, you must be pure; not subjecting your body to toil, not agitating your vital force:—then you may live for long. When your eyes see nothing, your ears hear nothing, and your mind knows nothing, your spirit will keep your body, and the body will live long. Watch over what is within you; shut up the avenues that connect you with what is external;—much knowledge is pernicious. I will proceed with you to the summit of the Grand Brilliance, where we come to the bright and expanding (element); I will enter with you the gate of the dark and depressing element. There heaven and earth have their Controllers; there the Yin and Yang have their Repositories. Watch over and keep your body, and all things will of themselves give it vigour. I maintain the (original) unity (of these elements). In this way I have cultivated myself for 1200 years, and my bodily form knows no decay.' Add 1200 to 2679, and we obtain 3879 as the year B.C. of Kwang K'ang-ze's birth!

6. Láo-ze describes some other and kindred results of cultivating the Táo in terms which are sufficiently startling, and which it is difficult to accept. In his Startling results of the Táo. fiftieth chapter he says, 'He who is skilful in managing his life travels on land without having to shun rhinoceros or tiger, and enters a host without having to avoid buff coat or sharp weapon. The rhinoceros finds no place in him into which to thrust its horn, nor the tiger a place in which to fix its claws, nor the weapon a place to admit its point. And for what reason? Because there is in him no place of death.' To the same effect he says in his fifty-fifth chapter, 'He who has in himself abundantly the attributes (of the Táo) is like an infant. Poisonous

insects will not sting him ; fierce beasts will not seize him ; birds of prey will not strike him.'

Such assertions startle us by their contrariety to our observation and experience, but so does most of the teaching of Tâoism. What can seem more absurd than the declaration that 'the Tâo does nothing, and so there is nothing that it does not do?' And yet this is one of the fundamental axioms of the system. The thirty-seventh chapter, which enunciates it, goes on to say, 'If princes and kings were able to maintain (the Tâo), all things would of themselves be transformed by them.' This principle, if we can call it so, is generalised in the fortieth, one of the shortest chapters, and partly in rhyme :—

'The movement of the Tâo
By contraries proceeds ;
And weakness marks the course
Of Tâo's mighty deeds.

All things under heaven sprang from it as existing (and named) ; that existence sprang from it as non-existent (and not named).'

Ho-shang Kung, or whoever gave their names to the chapters of the Tâo Teh K'ing, styles this fortieth chapter 'Dispensing with the use (of means).' If the wish to use means arise in the mind, the nature of the Tâo as 'the Nameless Simplicity' has been vitiated ; and this nature is celebrated in lines like those just quoted :—

'Simplicity without a name
Is free from all external aim.
With no desire, at rest and still,
All things go right, as of their will.'

I do not cull any passages from *Kwang-ze* to illustrate these points. In his eleventh Book his subject is Government by 'Let-a-be and the exercise of Forbearance.'

7. This Tâo ruled men at first, and then the world was in a paradisiacal state. Neither of our authorities tells us how long this condition lasted, but as Lâo observes in his eighteenth chapter, 'the Tâo ceased to be observed.' *Kwang-ze*, however, gives us

more than one description of what he considered the paradisiacal state was. He calls it 'the age of Perfect Virtue.' In the thirteenth paragraph of his twelfth Book he says, 'In this age, they attached no value to wisdom, nor employed men of ability. Superiors were (but) as the higher branches of a tree; and the people were like the deer of the wild. They were upright and correct, without knowing that to be so was Righteousness; they loved one another, without knowing that to do so was Benevolence; they were honest and leal-hearted, without knowing that it was Loyalty; they fulfilled their engagements, without knowing that to do so was Good Faith; in their movements they employed the services of one another, without thinking that they were conferring or receiving any gift. Therefore their actions left no trace, and there was no record of their affairs.'

Again, in the fourth paragraph of his tenth Book, addressing an imaginary interlocutor, he says, 'Are you, Sir, unacquainted with the age of Perfect Virtue?' He then gives the names of twelve sovereigns who ruled in it, of the greater number of whom we have no other means of knowing anything, and goes on:—'In their times the people used knotted cords in carrying on their business. They thought their (simple) food pleasant, and their (plain) clothing beautiful. They were happy in their (simple) manners, and felt at rest in their (poor) dwellings. (The people of) neighbouring states might be able to descry one another; the voices of their cocks and dogs might be heard from one to the other; they might not die till they were old; and yet all their life they would have no communication together. In those times perfect good order prevailed.'

One other description of the primeval state is still more interesting. It is in the second paragraph of Bk. IX:—'The people had their regular and constant nature:—they wove and made themselves clothes; they tilled the ground and got food. This was their common faculty. They were all one in this, and did not form themselves into separate classes; so were they constituted and left to their natural tendencies. Therefore in the age of Perfect Virtue men walked along with slow and grave step, and with their

looks steadily directed forwards. On the hills there were no footpaths nor excavated passages; on the lakes there were no boats nor dams. All creatures lived in companies, and their places of settlement were made near to one another. Birds and beasts multiplied to flocks and herds; the grass and trees grew luxuriant and long. The birds and beasts might be led about without feeling the constraint; the nest of the magpie might be climbed to, and peeped into. Yes, in the age of Perfect Virtue, men lived in common with birds and beasts, and were on terms of equality with all creatures, as forming one family;—how could they know among themselves the distinctions of superior men and small men? Equally without knowledge, they did not leave the path of their natural virtue; equally free from desires, they were in the state of pure simplicity. In that pure simplicity, their nature was what it ought to be.'

Such were the earliest Chinese of whom *K'wang-ze* could venture to give any account. If ever their ancestors had been in a ruder or savage condition, it must have been at a much antecedent time. These had long passed out of such a state; they were tillers of the ground, and acquainted with the use of the loom. They lived in happy relations with one another, and in kindly harmony with the tribes of inferior creatures. But there is not the slightest allusion to any sentiment of piety as animating them individually, or to any ceremony of religion as observed by them in common. This surely is a remarkable feature in their condition. I call attention to it, but I do not dwell upon it.

8. But by the time of *Lão* and *K'wang* the cultivation of the *Tão* had fallen into disuse. The simplicity of life which it demanded, with its freedom from all disturbing speculation and action, was no longer to be found in individuals or in government. It was the general decay of manners and of social order which unsettled the mind of *Lão*, made him resign his position as a curator of the Royal Library, and determine to withdraw from China and hide himself

The decay of the
Tão before the
growth of
knowledge.

among the rude peoples beyond it. The cause of the deterioration of the Táo and of all the evils of the nation was attributed to the ever-growing pursuit of knowledge, and of what we call the arts of culture. It had commenced very long before;—in the time of Hwang-Ti, *Kwang* says in one place¹; and in another he carries it still higher to Sui-zăn and Fu-hsî². There had been indeed, all along the line of history, a groping for the rules of life, as indicated by the constitution of man's nature. The results were embodied in the ancient literature which was the life-long study of Confucius. He had gathered up that literature; he recognised the nature of man as the gift of Heaven or God. The monitions of God as given in the convictions of man's mind supplied him with a Táo or Path of duty very different from the Táo or Mysterious Way of Láo. All this was gall and wormwood to the dreaming librarian or brooding recluse, and made him say, 'If we could renounce our sageness and discard our wisdom, it would be better for the people a hundredfold. If we could renounce our benevolence and discard our righteousness, the people would again become filial and kindly. If we could renounce our artful contrivances and discard our (scheming for) gain, there would be no thieves nor robbers³.'

We can laugh at this. Táoism was wrong in its opposition to the increase of knowledge. Man exists under a law of progress. In pursuing it there are demanded discretion and justice. Moral ends must rule over material ends, and advance in virtue be ranked higher than advance in science. So have good and evil, truth and error, to fight out the battle on the field of the world, and in all the range of time; but there is no standing still for the individual or for society. Even Confucius taught his countrymen to set too high a value on the examples of antiquity. The school of Láo-ze fixing themselves in an unknown region beyond antiquity,—a prehistoric time between 'the Grand Beginning of all things' out of nothing, and the unknown commencement of societies of men,—has made no advance

¹ Bk. XI, par. 5.

² Bk. XVI, par. 2.

³ Táo Teh K'ing, ch. 19.

but rather retrograded, and is represented by the still more degenerate Tâoism of the present day.

There is a short parabolic story of *Kwang-ze*, intended to represent the antagonism between Tâoism and knowledge, which has always struck me as curious. The last paragraph of his seventh Book is this:—‘The Ruler (or god Tî) of the Southern Ocean was Shû (that is, Heedless); the Ruler of the Northern Ocean was Hû (that is, Hasty); and the Ruler of the Centre was Hwun-tun (that is, Chaos). Shû and Hû were continually meeting in the land of Hwun-tun, who treated them very well. They consulted together how they might repay his kindness, and said, “Men have all seven orifices for the purposes of seeing, hearing, eating, and breathing, while this (poor) Ruler alone has not one. Let us try and make them for him.” Accordingly they dug one orifice in him every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died.’

So it was that Chaos passed away before Light. So did the nameless Simplicity of the Tâo disappear before Knowledge. But it was better that the Chaos should give place to the Kosmos. ‘Heedless’ and ‘Hasty’ did a good deed.

9. I have thus set forth eight characteristics of the Tâoistic system, having respect mostly to what is peculiar and mystical in it. I will now conclude my exhibition of it by

The practical
lessons of
Lâo-ze.

bringing together under one head the practical lessons of its author for men individually, and for the administration of government.

The praise of whatever excellence these possess belongs to Lâo himself: *Kwang-ze* devotes himself mainly to the illustration of the abstruse and difficult points.

First, it does not surprise us that in his rules for individual man, Lâo should place Humility in the foremost place. A favourite illustration with him of the Tâo is water. In his

Humility.

eighth chapter he says:—‘The highest excellence is like that of water. The excellence of water appears in its benefiting all things, and in its occupying, without striving to the contrary, the low ground which all men dislike. Hence (its way) is near to that of the Tâo.’ To the same effect in the seventy-eighth

chapter:—‘There is nothing in the world more soft and weak than water, and yet for attacking things that are firm and strong there is nothing that can take precedence of it. Every one in the world knows that the soft overcomes the hard, and the weak the strong; but no one is able to carry it out in practice.’

In his sixty-seventh chapter L  o associates with Humility two other virtues, and calls them his three Precious Things or

L  o’s three Jewels. They are Gentleness, Economy, and Jewels. Shrinking from taking precedence of others.

‘With that Gentleness,’ he says, ‘I can be bold; with that Economy I can be liberal; Shrinking from taking precedence of others, I can become a vessel of the highest honour.’

And in his sixty-third chapter, he rises to a still loftier height of morality. He says, ‘(It is the way of the T  o) to act without (thinking of) acting, to conduct affairs without (feeling) the trouble of them; to taste without discern-

ing any flavour, to consider the small as great, and the few as many, and to recompense injury with kindness.’

Rendering good
for evil.

Here is the grand Christian precept, ‘Render to no man evil for evil. If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink. Be not overcome with evil, but overcome evil with good.’ We know that the maxim made some noise in its author’s lifetime; that the disciples of Confucius consulted him about it, and that he was unable to receive it¹. It comes in with less important matters by virtue of the T  oistic ‘rule of contraries.’ I have been surprised to find what little reference to it I have met with in the course of my Chinese reading. I do not think that Kwang-  ze takes notice of it to illustrate it after his fashion. There, however, it is in the T  o Teh King. The fruit of it has yet to be developed.

Second, L  o laid down the same rule for the policy of the state as for the life of the individual. He says in his sixty-first chapter, ‘What makes a state great is its being like a low-lying, down-flowing stream;—it becomes the

¹ Confucian Analects, XIV, 36.

centre to which tend all (the small states) under heaven.' He then uses an illustration which will produce a smile :— 'Take the case of all females. The female always overcomes the male by her stillness. Stillness may be considered (a sort of) abasement.' Resuming his subject, he adds, 'Thus it is that a great state, by condescending to small states, gains them for itself; and that small states, by abasing themselves to a great state, win it over to them. In the one case the abasement tends to gaining adherents; in the other case, to procuring favour. The great state only wishes to unite men together and nourish them; a small state only wishes to be received by, and to serve, the other. Each gets what it desires, but the great state must learn to abase itself.'

'All very well in theory,' some one will exclaim, 'but, the world has not seen it yet reduced to practice.' So it is. The fact is deplorable. No one saw the misery arising from it, and exposed its unreasonableness more unsparingly, than *K'wang-ze*. But it was all in vain in his time, as it has been in all the centuries that have since rolled their course. Philosophy, philanthropy, and religion have still to toil on, 'faint, yet pursuing,' believing that the time will yet come when humility and love shall secure the reign of peace and good will among the nations of men.

While enjoining humility, *Lão* protested against war. In his thirty-first chapter he says, 'Arms, however beautiful, are instruments of evil omen; hateful, it may be said, to all creatures. They who have the *Táo* do not like to employ them.' Perhaps in his sixty-ninth chapter he allows defensive war, but he adds, 'There is no calamity greater than that of lightly engaging in war. To do that is near losing the gentleness which is so precious. Thus it is that when weapons are (actually) crossed, he who deplors the (situation) conquers.'

There are some other points in the practical lessons of *Táoism* to which I should like to call the attention of the reader, but I must refer him for them to the chapters of the *Táo Teh King*, and the Books of *K'wang-ze*. Its salient features have been set forth somewhat fully. Not-

withstanding the scorn poured so freely on Confucius by Kwang-ze and other Tâoist writers, he proved in the course of time too strong for Lâo as the teacher of their people. The entrance of Buddhism, moreover, into the country in our first century, was very injurious to Tâoism, which still exists, but is only the shadow of its former self. It is tolerated by the government, but not patronised as it was when emperors and empresses seemed to think more of it than of Confucianism. It is by the spread of knowledge, which it has always opposed, that its overthrow and disappearance will be brought about ere long.

CHAPTER IV.

ACCOUNTS OF LÂO-3ZE AND KWANG-3ZE GIVEN BY SZE-MÂ KHIEN.

It seems desirable, before passing from Lâo and Kwang in this Introduction, to give a place in it to what is said about them by Sze-mâ K'ien. I have said that not a single proper name occurs in the Tâo Teh King. There is hardly an historical allusion in it. Only one chapter, the twentieth, has somewhat of an autobiographical character. It tells us, however, of no incidents of his life. He appears alone in the world through his cultivation of the Tâo, melancholy and misunderstood, yet binding that Tâo more closely to his bosom.

The Books of Kwang-ze are of a different nature, abounding in pictures of Tâoist life, in anecdotes and narratives, graphic, argumentative, often satirical. But they are not historical. Confucius and many of his disciples, Lâo and members of his school, heroes and sages of antiquity, and men of his own day, move across his pages; but the incidents in connexion with which they are introduced are probably fictitious, and devised by him 'to point his moral or adorn his tale.' His names of individuals and places are often like those of Bunyan in his Pilgrim's Progress or his Holy War, emblematic of their characters and the doctrines which he employs

them to illustrate. He often comes on the stage himself, and there is an air of verisimilitude in his descriptions, possibly also a certain amount of fact about them; but we cannot appeal to them as historical testimony. It is only to Sze-má *K'ien* that we can go for this; he always writes in the spirit of an historian; but what he has to tell us of the two men is not much.

And first, as to his account of Láo-ze. When he wrote, about the beginning of the first century B.C., the Taoist master was already known as Láo-ze. *K'ien*, however, tells us that his surname was Lî, and his name *R*, meaning 'Ear,' which gave place after his death to Tan, meaning 'Long-eared,' from which we may conclude that he was named from some peculiarity in the form of his ears. He was a native of the state of *K'û*, which had then extended far beyond its original limits, and his birth-place was in the present province of Ho-nan or of An-hui. He was a curator in the Royal Library; and when Confucius visited the capital in the year B.C. 517, the two men met. *K'ien* says that Confucius's visit to Lo-yang was that he might question Láo on the subject of ceremonies. He might have other objects in mind as well; but however that was, the two met. Lî said to Khung, 'The men about whom you talk are dead, and their bones are mouldered to dust; only their words are left. Moreover, when the superior man gets his opportunity, he mounts aloft; but when the time is against him, he is carried along by the force of circumstances¹. I have heard that a good merchant, though he have rich treasures safely stored, appears as if he were poor; and that the superior man, though his virtue be complete, is yet to outward seeming stupid. Put away your proud air and many desires, your insinuating habit and wild will. They are of no advantage to you;—this is all I have to tell you.' Confucius is made to say to his disciples after the interview: 'I know how

¹ Julien translates this by 'il erre à l'aventure.' In 1861 I rendered it, 'He moves as if his feet were entangled.' To one critic it suggests the idea of a bundle or wisp of brushwood rolled about over the ground by the wind.

birds can fly, fishes swim, and animals run. But the runner may be snared, the swimmer hooked, and the flyer shot by the arrow. But there is the dragon:—I cannot tell how he mounts on the wind through the clouds, and rises to heaven. To-day I have seen Láo-ze, and can only compare him to the dragon.'

In this speech of Confucius we have, I believe, the origin of the name Láo-ze, as applied to the master of Táoism. Its meaning is 'The Old Philosopher,' or 'The Old Gentleman'¹. Confucius might well so style Lî R. At the time of this interview he was himself in his thirty-fifth year, and the other was in his eighty-eighth. K'ien adds, 'Láo-ze cultivated the Táo and its attributes, the chief aim of his studies being how to keep himself concealed and remain unknown. He continued to reside at (the capital of) Káu, but after a long time, seeing the decay of the dynasty, he left it and went away to the barrier-gate, leading out of the kingdom on the north-west. Yin Hsí, the warden of the gate, said to him, "You are about to withdraw yourself out of sight. Let me insist on your (first) composing for me a book." On this, Láo-ze wrote a book in two parts, setting forth his views on the Táo and its attributes, in more than 5000 characters. He then went away, and it is not known where he died. He was a superior man, who liked to keep himself unknown.'

K'ien finally traces Láo's descendants down to the first century B.C., and concludes by saying, 'Those who attach themselves to the doctrine of Láo-ze condemn that of the Literati, and the Literati on their part condemn Láo-ze, verifying the saying, "Parties whose principles are different cannot take counsel together." Lî R taught that by doing nothing others are as a matter of course trans-

¹ The characters may mean 'the old boy,' and so understood have given rise to various fabulous legends; that his mother had carried him in her womb for seventy-two years (some say, for eighty-one), and that when born the child had the white hair of an old man. Julien has translated the fabulous legend of Ko Hung of our fourth century about him. By that time the legends of Buddhism about Sâkyamuni had become current in China, and were copied and applied to Láo-ze by his followers. Looking at the meaning of the two names, I am surprised no one has characterized Láo-ze as the Chinese Seneca.

formed, and that rectification in the same way ensues from being pure and still.'

This morsel is all that we have of historical narrative about Láo-ze. The account of the writing of the *Táo Teh King* at the request of the warden of the barrier-gate has a doubtful and legendary appearance. Otherwise, the record is free from anything to raise suspicion about it. It says nothing about previous existences of Láo, and nothing of his travelling to the west, and learning there the doctrines which are embodied in his work. He goes through the pass out of the domain of *Káu*, and died no one knowing where.

It is difficult, however, to reconcile this last statement with a narrative in the end of *Kwang-ze's* third Book. There we see Láo-ze dead, and a crowd of mourners wailing round the corpse, and giving extraordinary demonstrations of grief, which offend a disciple of a higher order, who has gone to the house to offer his condolences on the occasion. But for the peculiar nature of most of *Kwang's* narratives, we should say, in opposition to *K'ien*, that the place and time of Láo's death were well known. Possibly, however, *Kwang-ze* may have invented the whole story, to give him the opportunity of setting forth what, according to his ideal of it, the life of a Taoist master should be, and how even Láo-ze himself fell short of it.

Second, *K'ien's* account of *Kwang-ze* is still more brief. He was a native, he tells us, of the territory of *Mǎng*, which belonged to the kingdom of *Liang* or *Wei*, and held an office, he does not say what, in the city of *K'hi-yüan*. *Kwang* was thus of the same part of China as Láo-ze, and probably grew up familiar with all his speculations and lessons. He lived during the reigns of the kings *Hui* of *Liang*, *Hsüan* of *K'hi*, and *Wei* of *K'ü*. We cannot be wrong therefore in assigning his period to the latter half of the third, and earlier part of the fourth century B.C. He was thus a contemporary of *Mencius*. They visited at the same courts, and yet neither ever mentions the other. They were the two ablest debaters of their day, and fond of exposing what they deemed heresy. But it would only be

a matter of useless speculation to try to account for their never having come into argumentative collision.

K'ien says: 'Kwang had made himself well acquainted with all the literature of his time, but preferred the views of Lâo-ze, and ranked himself among his followers, so that of the more than ten myriads of characters contained in his published writings the greater part are occupied with metaphorical illustrations of Lâo's doctrines. He made "The Old Fisherman," "The Robber *Kih*," and "The Cutting open Satchels," to satirize and expose the disciples of Confucius, and clearly exhibit the sentiments of Lâo. Such names and characters as "Wei-lêi Hsü" and "Khang-sang Ze" are fictitious, and the pieces where they occur are not to be understood as narratives of real events¹.

'But Kwang was an admirable writer and skilful composer, and by his instances and truthful descriptions hit and exposed the Mohists and Literati. The ablest scholars of his day could not escape his satire nor reply to it, while he allowed and enjoyed himself with his sparkling, dashing style; and thus it was that the greatest men, even kings and princes, could not use him for their purposes.

'King Wei of *K'û*, having heard of the ability of Kwang *K'û*, sent messengers with large gifts to bring him to his court, and promising also that he would make him his chief minister. Kwang-ze, however, only laughed and said to them, "A thousand ounces of silver are a great gain to me, and to be a high noble and minister is a most honourable position. But have you not seen the victim-ox for the border sacrifice? It is carefully fed for several years, and robed with rich embroidery that it may be fit to enter the Grand Temple. When the time comes for it to do so, it would prefer to be a little pig, but it cannot get to be so. Go away quickly, and do not soil me with your presence.

¹ Khang-sang Ze is evidently the Käng-sang *K'û* of Kwang's Book XXIII. Wei-lêi Hsü is supposed by Sze-mâ K'ang of the Tang dynasty, who called himself the Lesser Sze-mâ, to be the name of a Book; one, in that case, of the lost books of Kwang. But as we find the 'Hill of Wei-lêi' mentioned in Bk. XXIII as the scene of Käng-sang *K'û*'s Tâoistic labours and success, I suppose that *K'ien*'s reference is to that. The names are quoted by him from memory, or might be insisted on as instances of different readings.

I had rather amuse and enjoy myself in the midst of a filthy ditch than be subject to the rules and restrictions in the court of a sovereign. I have determined never to take office, but prefer the enjoyment of my own free will.”

K'hen concludes his account of *K'wang-ze* with the above story, condensed by him, probably, from two of *K'wang's* own narratives, in par. 11 of Bk. XVII, and 13 of XXXII, to the injury of them both. Paragraph 14 of XXXII brings before us one of the last scenes of *K'wang-ze's* life, and we may doubt whether it should be received as from his own pencil. It is interesting in itself, however, and I introduce it here: ‘When *K'wang-ze* was about to die, his disciples signified their wish to give him a grand burial. “I shall have heaven and earth,” he said, “for my coffin and its shell; the sun and moon for my two round symbols of jade; the stars and constellations for my pearls and jewels;—will not the provisions for my interment be complete? What would you add to them?” The disciples replied, “We are afraid that the crows and kites will eat our master.” *K'wang-ze* rejoined, “Above, the crows and kites will eat me; below, the mole-cricket and ants will eat me; to take from those and give to these would only show your partiality.”’

Such were among the last words of *K'wang-ze*. His end was not so impressive as that of Confucius; but it was in keeping with the general magniloquence and strong assertion of independence that marked all his course.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE TRACTATE OF ACTIONS AND THEIR RETRIBUTIONS.

1. The contrast is great between the style of the *Tao Teh King* and the Books of *K'wang-ze* and that of the *Kan Ying Phien*, a translation of which is now submitted as a specimen of the Texts of Taoism. The works of *Lao* and *K'wang* stand alone in the literature of the system. What

Peculiar style
and nature of
the *Kan Ying
Phien*.

it was before Láo cannot be ascertained, and in his chapters it comes before us not as a religion, but as a subject of philosophical speculation, together with some practical applications of it insisted on by Láo himself. The brilliant pages of *K'wang-ze* contain little more than his ingenious defence of his master's speculations, and an aggregate of illustrative narratives sparkling with the charms of his composition, but in themselves for the most part unbelievable, often grotesque and absurd. This treatise, on the other hand, is more of what we understand by a sermon or popular tract. It eschews all difficult discussion, and sets forth a variety of traits of character and actions which are good, and a still greater variety of others which are bad, exhorting to the cultivation and performance of the former, and warning against the latter. It describes at the outset the machinery to secure the record of men's doings, and the infliction of the certain retribution, and concludes with insisting on the wisdom of repentance and reformation. At the same time it does not carry its idea of retribution beyond death, but declares that if the reward or punishment is not completed in the present life, the remainder will be received by the posterity of the good-doer and of the offender.

A place is given to the treatise among the Texts of Táoism in 'The Sacred Books of the East,' because of its popularity in China. 'The various editions of it,' as observed by Mr. Wylie, 'are innumerable; it has appeared from time to time in almost every conceivable size, shape, and style of execution. Many commentaries have been written upon it, and it is frequently published with a collection of several hundred anecdotes, along with pictorial illustrations, to illustrate every paragraph seriatim. It is deemed a great act of merit to aid by voluntary contribution towards the gratuitous distribution of this work¹.'

2. The author of the treatise is not known, but, as Mr. Wylie also observes, it appears to have been written during the Sung dynasty. The earliest mention of it which I have met with is in the continua-

The origin of
the treatise.

¹ Notes on Chinese Literature, p. 179.

tion of Ma-twan Lin's encyclopedic work by Wang *K'hi*, first published in 1586, the fourteenth year of the fourteenth emperor of the Ming dynasty. In Wang's supplement to his predecessor's account of Taoist works, the sixth notice is of 'a commentary on the *Thâi Shang Kan Ying Phien* by a *Lî K'hang-ling*,' and immediately before it is a commentary on the short but well-known *Yin Fû King* by a *Lû Tien*, who lived 1042-1102. Immediately after it other works of the eleventh century are mentioned. To that same century therefore we may reasonably refer the origin of the *Kan Ying Phien*.

As to the meaning of the title, the only difficulty is with the two commencing characters *Thâi Shang*. Julien left them untranslated, with the note, however, ^{The meaning of the title.} that they were 'l'abréviation de *Thâi Shang Lâo K'ün*, expression honorifique par laquelle les Tâo-sze désignent Lâo-ze, le fondateur de leur secte¹.' This is the interpretation commonly given of the phrase, and it is hardly worth while to indicate any doubt of its correctness; but if the characters were taken, as I believe they were, from the beginning of the seventeenth chapter of the *Tâo Teh King*, I should prefer to understand them of the highest and oldest form of the Taoistic teaching².

3. I quoted on page 13 the view of Hardwick, the Christian Advocate of Cambridge, that 'the indefinite expression

¹ See 'Le Livre des Récompense et des Peines en Chinois et en François' (London, 1835).

² The designation of Lâo-ze as *Thâi Shang Lâo K'ün* originated probably in the Tang dynasty. It is on record that in 666 K'ao Tsung, the third emperor, went to Lâo-ze's temple at Po K'âu (the place of Lâo's birth, and still called by the same name, in the department of F'ang-yang in An-hui), and conferred on him the title of *Thâi Shang Yüan Yüan Hwang Tî*, 'The Great God, the Mysterious Originator, the Most High.' 'Then,' says Mayers, *Manual*, p. 113, 'for the first time he was ranked among the gods as "Great Supreme, the Emperor (or Imperial God) of the Dark First Cause."' The whole entry is 至亳州尊老君爲太上元(或玄)元皇帝. Later on, in 1014, we find K'ao Tsung, the fourth Sung emperor, also visiting Po K'âu, and in Lâo's temple, which has by this time become 'the Palace of Grand Purity,' enlarging his title to *Thâi Shang Lâo K'ün Hwun Yüan Shang Teh Hwang Tî*, 'The Most High, the Ruler Lâo, the Great God of Grand Virtue at the Chaotic Origin.' But such titles are not easily translated.

Tão was adopted to denominate an abstract Cause, or the initial principle of life and order, to ^{Was the old} ~~Tãoism~~ a religion? which worshippers were able to assign the attributes of immateriality, eternity, immensity, invisibility.' His selection of the term worshippers in this passage was unfortunate. Neither Lâu nor Kwang says anything about the worship of the Tão, about priests or monks, about temples or rituals. How could they do so, seeing that Tão was not to them the name of a personal Being, nor 'Heaven' a metaphorical term equivalent to the Confucian Tî, 'Ruler,' or Shang Tî, 'Supreme Ruler.' With this agnosticism as to God, and their belief that by a certain management and discipline of the breath life might be prolonged indefinitely, I do not see how anything of an organised religion was possible for the old Tãoists.

The Tãoist proclivities of the founder of the *K'in* dynasty are well known. If his life had been prolonged, and the dynasty become consolidated, there might have arisen such a religion in connexion with Tãoism, for we have a record that he, as head of the Empire, had eight spirits¹ to which he offered sacrifices. *K'in*, however, soon passed away; what remained in permanency from it was only the abolition of the feudal kingdom.

4. We cannot here attempt to relate in detail the rise and growth of the *K'ang* family in which the headship of Tãoism has been hereditary since our first Christian century, with the exception of one not very long interruption.

The family of *K'ang*. One of the earliest members of it, *K'ang* Liang, must have been born not long after the death of *Kwang-ze*, for he joined the party of *Liú*

¹ The eight spirits were:—1. The Lord of Heaven; 2. The Lord of Earth; 3. The Lord of War; 4. The Lord of the Yang operation; 5. The Lord of the Yin operation; 6. The Lord of the Moon; 7. The Lord of the Sun; and 8. The Lord of the Four Seasons. See Mayers's *C. R. Manual*, pp. 327, 328. His authority is the sixth of Sze-mâ *K'ien*'s monographs. *K'ien* seems to say that the worship of these spirits could be traced to *Thâi Kung*, one of the principal ministers of kings *Wân* and *Wû* at the rise of the *K'âu* dynasty in the twelfth century B. C., and to whom in the list of Tãoist writings in the Imperial Library of Han, no fewer than 237 *chien* are ascribed.

Pang, the founder of the dynasty of Han, in B. C. 208, and by his wisdom and bravery contributed greatly to his success over the adherents of *K'in*, and other contenders for the sovereignty of the empire. Abandoning then a political career, he spent the latter years of his life in a vain quest for the elixir of life.

Among Liang's descendants in our first century was a *Kang Tào-ling*, who, eschewing a career in the service of the state, devoted himself to the pursuits of alchemy, and at last succeeded in compounding the grand elixir or pill, and at the age of 123 was released from the trammels of the mortal body, and entered on the enjoyment of immortality, leaving to his descendants his books, talismans and charms, his sword, mighty against spirits, and his seal. *Tào-ling* stands out, in *Tâoist* accounts, as the first patriarch of the system, with the title of *Thien Shih*, 'Master or Preceptor of Heaven.' *Hsüan Jung* of the *Thang* dynasty in 748, confirmed the dignity and title in the family; and in 1016 the *Sung* emperor *K'ân Jung* invested its representative with large tracts of land near the *Lung-hû* mountain in *K'iang-hsi*. The present patriarch—for I suppose the same man is still alive—made a journey from his residence not many years ago, and was interviewed by several foreigners in Shanghai. The succession is said to be perpetuated by the transmigration of the soul of *Kang Tào-ling* into some infant or youthful member of the family; whose heirship is supernaturally revealed as soon as the miracle is effected¹.

This superstitious notion shows the influence of Buddhism on *Tâoism*. It has been seen from the eighteenth of the *Books of Kwang-ze* what affinities there were between *Tâoism* and the Indian system; and there can be no doubt that the introduction of the latter into China did more than anything else to affect the development of the *Tâoistic* system. As early as the time of Confucius there were recluses in the country, men who had withdrawn from the world, disgusted with its

Influence of
Buddhism on
Tâoism.

¹ See Mayers's *C. R. Manual*, Part I, article 35.

vanities and in despair from its disorders. Lâu would appear to have himself contemplated this course. When their representatives of our early centuries saw the Buddhists among them with their images, monasteries, and nunneries, their ritual and discipline, they proceeded to organise themselves after a similar fashion. They built monasteries and nunneries, framed images, composed liturgies, and adopted a peculiar mode of tying up their hair. The 'Three Precious Ones' of Buddhism, emblematic to the initiated of Intelligence personified in Buddha, the Law, and the Community or Church, but to the mass of the worshippers merely three great idols, styled by them Buddha Past, Present, and To Come: these appeared in Tâoism as the 'Three Pure Ones,' also represented by three great images, each of which receives the title of 'His Celestial Eminence,' and is styled the 'Most High God (Shang Tî).' The first of them is a deification of Chaos, the second, of Lâu-ze, and the third of I know not whom or what; perhaps of the Tâo.

But those Three Pure Ones have been very much cast into the shade, as the objects of popular worship and veneration, by Yü Hwang Tî or Yü Hwang Shang Tî. This personage appears to have been a member of the Kang clan, held to be a magician and venerated from the time of the Thang dynasty, but deified in 1116 by the Sung emperor Hui Jung at the instigation of a charlatan Lin Ling-sû, a renegade Buddhist monk. He is the god in the court of heaven to whom the spirits of the body and of the hearth in our treatise proceed at stated times to report for approval or condemnation the conduct of men.

Since the first publication of the Kan Ying Phien, the tenets of Buddhism have been still further adopted by the teachers of Tâoism, and shaped to suit the nature of their own system. I have observed that the idea of retribution in our treatise does not go beyond the present life; but the manifestoes of Tâoism of more recent times are much occupied with descriptions of the courts of purgatory and threatenings of the everlasting misery of hell to those whom their sufferings in those courts

fail to wean from their wickedness. Those manifestoes are published by the mercy of Yü Hwang Shang Tî that men and women may be led to repent of their faults and make atonement for their crimes. They emanate from the temples of the tutelary deities¹ which are found throughout the empire, and especially in the walled cities, and are under the charge of Tâoist monks. A visitor to one of the larger of these temples may not only see the pictures of the purgatorial courts and other forms of the modern superstitions, but he will find also astrologers, diviners, geomancers, physiognomists, et id genus omne, plying their trades or waiting to be asked to do so, and he will wonder how it has been possible to affiliate such things with the teachings of Lâo-ze.

Other manifestoes of a milder form, and more like our tractate, are also continually being issued as from one or other of what are called the state gods, whose temples are all in the charge of the same monks. In the approximation which has thus been going on of Tâoism to Buddhism, the requirement of celibacy was long resisted by the professors of the former; but recent editions of the Penal Code² contain sundry regulations framed to enforce celibacy, to bind the monks and nuns of both systems to the observance of the Confucian maxims concerning filial piety, and the sacrificial worship of the dead; and also to restrict the multiplication of monasteries and nunneries. Neither Lâo nor Kwang was a celibate or recommended celibacy. The present patriarch, as a married man, would seem to be able still to resist the law.

¹ Called *K'zăng Hwang Miào*, 'Wall and Moat Temples,' Palladia of the city.

² See Dr. Eitel's third edition of his 'Three Lectures on Buddhism,' pp. 36-45 (Hongkong: Lane, Crawford & Co., 1884). The edition of the Penal Code to which he refers is of 1879.

THE TÂO TEH KING,

OR

THE TÂO

AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS.

THE WRITINGS OF KWANG-3ZE.

INTRODUCTION.

BRIEF NOTICES OF THE DIFFERENT BOOKS.

BOOK I. HSIÄO-YÄO YÛ.

The three characters which form the title of this Book have all of them the ideagram 𢀿 (*Ko*), which gives the idea, as the Shwo Wăn explains it, of 'now walking, now halting.' We might render the title by 'Sauntering or Rambling at Ease;' but it is the untroubled enjoyment of the mind which the author has in view. And this enjoyment is secured by the *Tâo*, though that character does not once occur in the Book. *Kwang-3ze* illustrates his thesis first by the cases of creatures, the largest and the smallest, showing that however different they may be in size, they should not pass judgment on one another, but may equally find their happiness in the *Tâo*. From this he advances to men, and from the cases of *Yung-3ze* and *Lieh-3ze* proceeds to that of one who finds his enjoyment in himself, independent of every other being or instrumentality; and we have the three important definitions of the accomplished *Tâoist*, as 'the Perfect Man,' 'the Spirit-like Man,' and 'the Sagely Man.' Those definitions are then illustrated;—the third in *Yáo* and *Hsü Yû*, and the second in the conversation between *K'ien Wû* and *Lien Shû*. The description given in this conversation of the spirit-like man is very startling, and contains statements that are true only of Him who is a 'Spirit,' 'the Blessed and only Potentate,' 'Who covereth Himself with light as with a garment, Who stretcheth out the heavens as a curtain,

Who layeth the beams of His chambers in the waters, Who maketh the clouds His chariot, Who walketh on the wings of the wind,' 'Who rideth on a cherub,' 'Who inhabiteth eternity.' The most imaginative and metaphorical expressions in the *Táo Teh King* about the power of the possessor of the *Táo* are tame, compared with the language of our author. I call attention to it here, as he often uses the same extravagant style. There follows an illustration of 'the Perfect Man,' which is comparatively feeble, and part of it, so far as I can see, inappropriate, though Lin Hsí-kung says that all other interpretations of the sentences are ridiculous.

In the seventh and last paragraph we have two illustrations that nothing is really useless, if only used *Táo-istically*; 'to the same effect,' says 3iao Hung, 'as Confucius in the *Analects*, XVII, ii.' They hang loosely, however, from what precedes.

An old view of the Book was that *Kwang-ze* intended himself by the great phăng, 'which,' says Lû Shû-ñih, 'is wide of the mark.'

BOOK II. *KHÎ WŪ LUN*.

Mr. Balfour has translated this title by 'Essay on the Uniformity of All Things;' and, the subject of the Book being thus misconceived, his translation of it could not fail to be very incorrect. The Chinese critics, I may say without exception, construe the title as I have done. The second and third characters, *WŪ Lun*, are taken together, and mean 'Discussions about Things,' equivalent to our 'Controversies.' They are under the government of the first character *Khî*, used as a verb, with the signification of 'Harmonising,' or 'Adjusting.' Let me illustrate this by condensing a passage from the 'Supplementary Commentary of a Mr. Kang, a sub-secretary of the Imperial Chancery,' of the Ming dynasty (張學士補註). He says, 'What *Kwang-ze* calls "Discussions about Things" has reference to the various branches of the numerous schools, each of which has its own views, conflicting with

the views of the others.' He goes on to show that if they would only adopt the method pointed out by *K'wang-ze*, 'their controversies would be adjusted (物論齊)' now using the first *K'î* in the passive voice.

This then was the theme of our author in this Book. It must be left for the reader to discover from the translation how he pursues it. I pointed out a peculiarity in the former Book, that though the idea of the *Táo* underlies it all, the term itself is never allowed to appear. Not only does the same idea underlie this Book, but the name is frequently employed. The *Táo* is the panacea for the evils of controversy, the solvent through the use of which the different views of men may be made to disappear.

That the *Táo* is not a Personal name in the conception of *K'wang-ze* is seen in several passages. We have not to go beyond the phenomena of nature to discover the reason of their being what they are; nor have we to go beyond the bigoted egoism and vaingloriousness of controversialists to find the explanation of their discussions, various as these are, and confounding like the sounds of the wind among the trees of a forest. To man, neither in nature nor in the sphere of knowledge, is there any other 'Heaven' but what belongs to his own mind. That is his only 'True Ruler.' If there be any other, we do not see His form, nor any traces of His acting. Things come about in their proper course. We cannot advance any proof of Creation. Whether we assume that there was something 'in the beginning' or nothing, we are equally landed in contradiction and absurdity. Let us stop at the limit of what we know, and not try to advance a step beyond it.

Towards the end of the Book our author's agnosticism seems to reach its farthest point. All human experience is spoken of as a dream or as 'illusion.' He who calls another a dreamer does not know that he is not dreaming himself. One and another commentator discover in such utterances something very like the Buddhist doctrine that all life is but so much illusion (象). This notion has its consummation in the story with which the Book concludes.

Kwang-ze had dreamt that he was a butterfly. When he awoke, and was himself again, he did not know whether he, *Kwang Kâu*, had been dreaming that he was a butterfly, or was now a butterfly dreaming that it was *Kwang Kâu*. And yet he adds that there must be a difference between *Kâu* and a butterfly, but he does not say what that difference is. But had he ever dreamt that he was a butterfly, so as to lose the consciousness of his personal identity as *Kwang Kâu*? I do not think so. One may, perhaps, lose that consciousness in the state of insanity; but the language of Young is not sufficiently guarded when he writes of

‘Dreams, where thought, in fancy’s maze, runs mad.’

When dreaming, our thoughts are not conditioned by the categories of time and space; but the conviction of our identity is never lost.

BOOK III. YANG SHANG K’Ü.

‘The Lord of Life’ is the *Tão*. It is to this that we are indebted for the origin of life and for the preservation of it. Though not a Personal Being, it is here spoken of as if it were,—‘the Lord of Life;’ just as in the preceding Book it is made to appear as ‘a True Governor,’ and ‘a True Ruler.’ But how can we nourish the *Tão*? The reply is, By avoiding all striving to do so; by a passionless, unstraining performance of what we have to do in our position in life; simply allowing the *Tão* to guide and nourish us, without doing anything to please ourselves or to counteract the tendency of our being to decay and death.

Par. 1 exhibits the injury arising from not thus nourishing the life, and sets forth the rule we are to pursue.

Par. 2 illustrates the observance of the rule by the perfect skill with which the cook of the ruler *Wăn-hui* of Wei cut up the oxen for his employer without trouble to himself, or injury to his knife.

Par. 3 illustrates the result of a neglect of one of the cautions in par. 1 to a certain master of the Left, who had brought on himself dismemberment in the loss of one of his feet.

Par. 4 shows how even Láo-ze had failed in nourishing 'the Lord of Life' by neglecting the other caution, and allowing in his good-doing an admixture of human feeling, which produced in his disciples a regard for him that was inconsistent with the nature of the Táo, and made them wail for him excessively on his death. This is the most remarkable portion of the Book, and it is followed by a sentence which implies that the existence of man's spirit continues after death has taken place. His body is intended by the 'faggots' that are consumed by the fire. That fire represents the spirit which may be transferred elsewhere.

Some commentators dwell on the analogy between this and the Buddhistic transrotation of births; which latter teaching, however, they do not seem to understand. Others say that 'the nourishment of the Lord of Life' is simply acting as Yü did when he conveyed away the flooded waters 'by doing that which gave him no trouble;'—see Mencius, IV, ii, 26.

In *Kwang-ze* there are various other stories of the same character as that about king Wán-hui's cook,—e.g. XIX, 3 and XXII, 9. They are instances of the dexterity acquired by habit, and should hardly be pressed into the service of the doctrine of the Táo.

BOOK IV. ZÂN KIEN SHIH.

A man has his place among other men in the world; he is a member, while he lives, of the body of humanity. And as he has his place in society, so also he has his special duties to discharge, according to his position, and his relation to others. Táoist writers refer to this Book as a proof of the practical character of the writings of *Kwang-ze*.

They are right to a certain extent in doing so; but the cases of relationship which are exhibited and prescribed for are of so peculiar a character, that the Book is of little value as a directory of human conduct and duty. In the first two paragraphs we have the case of Yen Hui, who wishes to go to Wei, and try to reform the character and government of its oppressive ruler; in the third and fourth, that of the duke of Sheh, who has been entrusted by the king of *K'û* with a difficult mission to the court of *K'û*, which is occasioning him much anxiety and apprehension; and in the fifth, that of a Yen Ho, who is about to undertake the office of teacher to the son of duke Ling of Wei, a young man with a very bad natural disposition. The other four paragraphs do not seem to come in naturally after these three cases, being occupied with two immense and wonderful trees, the case of a poor deformed cripple, and the lecture for the benefit of Confucius by 'the madman of *K'û*.' In all these last paragraphs, the theme is the usefulness, to the party himself at least, of being of no use.

Confucius is the principal speaker in the first four paragraphs. In what he says to Yen Hui and the duke of Sheh there is much that is shrewd and good; but we prefer the practical style of his teachings, as related by his own disciples in the Confucian Analects. Possibly, it was the object of *Kwang-ze* to exhibit his teaching, as containing, without his being aware of it, much of the mystical character of the Tâoistic system. His conversation with the duke of Sheh, however, is less obnoxious to this charge than what he is made to say to Yen Hui. The adviser of Yen Ho is a *K'ü Po-yü*, a disciple of Confucius, who still has a place in the sage's temples.

In the conclusion, the Tâoism of our author comes out in contrast with the methods of Confucius. His object in the whole treatise, perhaps, was to show how 'the doing nothing, and yet thereby doing everything,' was the method to be pursued in all the intercourses of society.

BOOK V. TEH KHUNG FŪ.

The fū (符) consisted in the earliest times of two slips of bamboo made with certain marks, so as to fit to each other exactly, and held by the two parties to any agreement or covenant. By the production and comparison of the slips, the parties verified their mutual relation; and the claim of the one and the obligation of the other were sufficiently established. 'Seal' seems the best translation of the character in this title.

By 'virtue' (德) we must understand the characteristics of the Tào. Where those existed in their full proportions in any individual, there was sure to be the evidence or proof of them in the influence which he exerted in all his intercourse with other men; and the illustration of this is the subject of this Book, in all its five paragraphs. That influence is the 'Seal' set on him, proving him to be a true child of the Tào.

The heroes, as I may call them, of the first three paragraphs are all men who had lost their feet, having been reduced to that condition as a punishment, just or unjust, of certain offences; and those of the last two are distinguished by their extraordinary ugliness or disgusting deformity. But neither the loss of their feet nor their deformities trouble the serenity of their own minds, or interfere with the effects of their teaching and character upon others; so superior is their virtue to the deficiencies in their outward appearance.

Various brief descriptions of the Tào are interspersed in the Book. The most remarkable of them are those in par. 1, where it appears as 'that in which there is no element of falsehood,' and as 'the author of all the Changes or Transformations' in the world. The sentences where these occur are thus translated by Mr. Balfour:—'He seeks to know Him in whom is nothing false. He would not be affected by the instability of creation; even if his life were involved in the general destruction, he would yet hold firmly to his faith (in God).' And he observes in a

note, that the first short sentence 'is explained by the commentators as referring to *Kăn 3âi* (眞宰), the term used by the Tâoist school for God.' But we met with that name and synonyms of it in Book II, par. 2, as appellations of the Tâo, coupled with the denial of its personality. *Kăn 3âi*, 'the True Governor or Lord,' may be used as a designation for god or God, but the Tâoist school denies the existence of a Personal Being, to whom we are accustomed to apply that name.

Hui-ze, the sophist and friend of *Kwang-ze*, is introduced in the conclusion as disputing with him the propriety of his representing the Master of the Tâo as being still 'a man;' and is beaten down by him with a repetition of his assertions, and a reference to some of Hui-ze's well-known peculiarities. What would *Kwang-ze* have said, if his opponent had affirmed that his instances were all imaginary, and that no man had ever appeared who could appeal to his possession of such a 'seal' to his virtues and influence as he described?

Lû Fang-wǎng compares with the tenor of this Book what we find in Mencius, VII, i, 21, about the nature of the superior man. The analogy between them, however, is very faint and incomplete.

BOOK VI. TÂ 3UNG SHIH.

So I translate the title of this Book, taking 3ung as a verb, and 3ung Shih as = 'The Master who is Honoured.' Some critics take 3ung in the sense of 'Originator,' in which it is employed in the Tâo Teh King, lxx, 2. Whichever rendering be adopted, there is no doubt that the title is intended to be a designation of the Tâo; and no one of our author's Books is more important for the understanding of his system of thought.

The key to it is found in the first of its fifteen paragraphs. There are in man two elements;—the Heavenly or Tâoistic, and the human. The disciple of the Tâo, recognising them both, cultivates what he knows as a man

so as to become entirely conformed to the action of the Tâo, and submissive in all the most painful experiences in his lot, which is entirely ordered by it. A seal will be set on the wisdom of this course hereafter, when he has completed the period of his existence on earth, and returns to the state of non-existence, from which the Tâo called him to be born as a man. In the meantime he may attain to be the True man possessing the True knowledge.

Our author then proceeds to give his readers in five paragraphs his idea of the True Man. Mr. Balfour says that this name is to be understood 'in the esoteric sense, the partaking of the essence of divinity,' and he translates it by 'the Divine Man.' But we have no right to introduce here the terms 'divine' and 'divinity.' Nan-hwâi (VII, 5 b) gives a short definition of the name which is more to the point:—'What we call "the True Man" is one whose nature is in agreement with the Tâo (所謂真人者性合于道也;)' and the commentator adds in a note, 'Such men as Fû-hsî, Hwang-Ti, and Lâo Tan.' The Khang-hsî dictionary commences its account of the character 眞 or 'True' by a definition of the True Man taken from the Shwo Wăn as a 仙人, 'a recluse of the mountain, whose bodily form has been changed, and who ascends to heaven;' but when that earliest dictionary was made, Tâoism had entered into a new phase, different from what it had in the time of our author. The most prominent characteristic of the True Man is that he is free from all exercise of thought and purpose, a being entirely passive in the hands of the Tâo. In par. 3 seven men are mentioned, good and worthy men, but inferior to the True.

Having said what he had to say of the True Man, Kwang-ze comes in the seventh paragraph to speak directly of the Tâo itself, and describes it with many wonderful predicates which exalt it above our idea of God;—a concept and not a personality. He concludes by mentioning a number of ancient personages who had got the Tâo, and by it wrought wonders, beginning with a Shih-wei, who preceded Fû-hsî, and ending with Fû Yüeh, the minister of

Wù-ting, in the fourteenth century B.C., and who finally became a star in the eastern portion of the zodiac. Phăng 3û is also mentioned as living, through his possession of the Táo, from the twenty-third century B.C. to the seventh or later. The sun and moon and the constellation of the Great Bear are also mentioned as its possessors, and the fabulous Being called the Mother of the Western King. The whole passage is perplexing to the reader to the last degree.

The remaining paragraphs are mostly occupied with instances of learning the Táo, and of its effects in making men superior to the infirmities of age and the most terrible deformities of person and calamities of penury; as 'Tranquillity' under all that might seem most calculated to disturb it. Very strange is the attempt at the conclusion of par. 8 apparently to trace the genesis of the knowledge of the Táo. Confucius is introduced repeatedly as the expounder of Táoism, and made to praise it as the *ne plus ultra* of human attainment.

BOOK VII. YING TÎ WANG.

The first of the three characters in this title renders the translation of it somewhat perplexing. Ying has different meanings according as it is read in the first tone or in the third. In the first tone it is the symbol of what is right, or should be; in the third tone of answering or responding to. I prefer to take it here in the first tone. As Kwo Hsiang says, 'One who is free from mind or purpose of his own, and loves men to become transformed of themselves, is fit to be a Ruler or a King,' and as 3hui K'wan, another early commentator, says, 'He whose teaching is that which is without words, and makes men in the world act as if they were oxen or horses, is fit to be a Ruler or a King.' This then is the object of the Book—to describe that government which exhibits the Táo equally in the rulers and the ruled, the world of men all happy and good without purpose or effort.

It consists of seven paragraphs. The first shows us the model ruler in him of the line of Thái, whom I have not

succeeded in identifying. The second shows us men under such a rule, uncontrolled and safe like the bird that flies high beyond the reach of the archer, and the mouse secure in its deep hole from its pursuers. The teacher in this portion is *K'ieh-yü*, known in the Confucian school as 'the madman of *K'ü*,' and he delivers his lesson in opposition to the heresy of a *Z'äh-kung Shih*, or 'Noon Beginning.' In the third paragraph the speakers are 'a nameless man,' and a *Thien Kän*, or 'Heaven Root.' In the fourth paragraph *Lão-ze* himself appears upon the stage, and lectures a *Yang Ze-kü*, the *Yang K'ü* of Mencius. He concludes by saying that 'where the intelligent kings took their stand could not be fathomed, and they found their enjoyment in (the realm of) nonentity.'

The fifth paragraph is longer, and tells us of the defeat of a wizard, a physiognomist in *K'äng*, by *Hü-ze*, the master of the philosopher *Lieh-ze*, who is thereby delivered from the glamour which the cheat was throwing round him. I confess to not being able to understand the various processes by which *Hü-ze* foils the wizard and makes him run away. The whole story is told, and at greater length, in the second book of the collection ascribed to *Lieh-ze*, and the curious student may like to look at the translation of that work by Mr. Ernst Faber (*Der Naturalismus bei den alten Chinesen sowohl nach der Seite des Pantheismus als des Sensualismus, oder die Sämmtlichen Werke des Philosophen Licius, 1877*). The effect of the wizard's defeat on *Lieh-ze* was great. He returned in great humility to his house, and did not go out of it for three years. He did the cooking for his wife, and fed the pigs as if he were feeding men. He returned to pure simplicity, and therein continued to the end of his life. But I do not see the connexion between this narrative and the government of the Rulers and Kings.

The sixth paragraph is a homily by our author himself on 'non-action.' It contains a good simile, comparing the mind of the perfect man to a mirror, which reflects faithfully what comes before it, but does not retain any image of it, when the mind is gone.

The last paragraph is an ingenious and interesting allegory relating how the gods of the southern and northern seas brought Chaos to an end by boring holes in him. Thereby they destroyed the primal simplicity, and according to Tâoism did Chaos an injury! On the whole I do not think that this Book, with which the more finished essays of *Kwang-ze* come to an end, is so successful as those that precede it.

BOOK VIII. PHÏEN MÂU.

This Book brings us to the Second Part of the writings of our author, embracing in all fifteen Books. Of the most important difference between the Books of the First and the other Parts some account has been given in the Introductory Chapter. We have here to do only with the different character of their titles. Those of the seven preceding Books are so many theses, and are believed to have been prefixed to them by *Kwang-ze* himself; those of this Book and the others that follow are believed to have been prefixed by *Kwo Hsiang*, and consist of two or three characters taken from the beginning, or near the beginning of the several Books, after the fashion of the names of the Books in the Confucian Analects, in the works of Mencius, and in our Hebrew Scriptures. Books VIII to XIII are considered to be supplementary to VII by *Aû-yang Hsiû*.

The title of this eighth Book, *Phien Mâu*, has been rendered by Mr. Balfour, after Dr. Williams, 'Double Thumbs.' But the *Mâu*, which may mean either the Thumb or the Great Toe, must be taken in the latter sense, being distinguished in this paragraph and elsewhere from *Kih*, 'a finger,' and expressly specified also as belonging to the foot. The character *phien*, as used here, is defined in the *Khang-hsi* dictionary as 'anything additional growing out as an appendage or excrescence, a growing out at the side.' This would seem to justify the translation of it by 'double.' But in paragraph 3, while the extra finger increases the number of the fingers, this growth on the foot is represented as diminishing the number of the toes. I must consider

the *phien* therefore as descriptive of an appendage by which the great toe was united to one or all of the other toes, and can think of no better rendering of the title than what I have given. It is told in the 30 *Kwan* (twenty-third year of duke Hsî) that the famous duke Wăn of 3in had *phien hsieh*, that is, that his ribs presented the appearance of forming one bone. So much for the title.

The subject-matter of the Book seems strange to us;—that, according to the *Tâo*, benevolence and righteousness are not natural growths of humanity, but excrescences on it, like the extra finger on the hand, and the membranous web of the toes. The weakness of the *Tâoistic* system begins to appear. *Kwang-ze's* arguments in support of his position must be pronounced very feeble. The ancient Shun is introduced as the first who called in the two great virtues to distort and vex the world, keeping society for more than a thousand years in a state of uneasy excitement. Of course he assumes that prior to Shun, he does not say for how long a time (and in other places he makes decay to have begun earlier), the world had been in a state of paradisiacal innocence and simplicity, under the guidance of the *Tâo*, untroubled by any consideration of what was right and what was wrong, men passively allowing their nature to have its quiet development, and happy in that condition. All culture of art or music is wrong, and so it is wrong and injurious to be striving to manifest benevolence and to maintain righteousness.

He especially singles out two men, one of the twelfth century B.C., the famous Po-î, who died of hunger rather than acknowledge the dynasty of *Kâu*; and one of a more recent age, the robber Shih, a great leader of brigands, who brought himself by his deeds to an untimely end; and he sees nothing to choose between them. We must give our judgment for the teaching of Confucianism in preference to that of *Tâoism*, if our author can be regarded as a fair expositor of the latter. He is ingenious in his statements and illustrations, but he was, like his master *Lão-ze*, only a dreamer.

BOOK IX. MÂ THÎ.

‘Horses’ and ‘Hoofs’ are the first two characters of the Text, standing there in the relation of regent and regimen. The account of the teaching of the Book given by Lin Hsî-kung is so concise that I will avail myself of it. He says:—

‘Governing men is like governing horses. They may be governed in such a way as shall be injurious to them, just as Po-lão governed the horse;—contrary to its true nature. His method was not different from that of the (first) potter and carpenter in dealing with clay and wood;—contrary to the nature of those substances. Notwithstanding this, one age after another has celebrated the skill of those parties;—not knowing what it is that constitutes the good and skilful government of men. Such government simply requires that men be made to fulfil their regular constant nature,—the qualities which they all possess in common, with which they are constituted by Heaven, and then be left to themselves. It was this which constituted the age of perfect virtue; but when the sages insisted on the practice of benevolence, righteousness, ceremonies, and music, then the people began to be without that perfect virtue. Not that they were in themselves different from what they had been, but those practices do not really belong to their regular nature; they arose from their neglecting the characteristics of the Tâo, and abandoning their natural constitution;—it was the case of the skilful artisan cutting and hacking his raw materials in order to form vessels from them. There is no ground for doubting that Po-lão’s management of horses gave them that knowledge with which they went on to play the part of thieves, or that it was the sages’ government of the people which made them devote themselves to the pursuit of gain;—it is impossible to deny the error of those sages.

‘There is but one idea in the Book from the beginning to the end;—it is an amplification of the expression in the preceding Book that “all men have their regular and con-

stant constitution," and is the most easily construed of all *Kwang-ze's* compositions. In consequence, however, of the wonderful touches of his pencil in describing the sympathy between men and other creatures in their primal state, some have imagined that there is a waste and embellishment of language, and doubted whether the Book is really his own, but thought it was written by some one in imitation of his style. I apprehend that no other hand would easily have attained to such a mastery of that style.'

There is no possibility of adjudicating definitely on the suspicion of the genuineness of the Book thus expressed in *Hsi-kung's* concluding remarks. The same suspicion arose in my own mind in the process of translation. My surprise continues that our author did not perceive the absurdity of his notions of the primal state of men, and of his condemnation of the sages.

BOOK X. *KHÜ KHIEH.*

It is observed by the commentator *Kwei Kăn-khüan* that one idea runs through this Book:—that the most sage and wise men have ministered to theft and robbery, and that, if there were an end of sageness and wisdom, the world would be at rest. Between it and the previous Book there is a general agreement in argument and object, but in this the author expresses himself with greater vehemence, and almost goes to excess in his denunciation of the institutions of the sages.

The reader will agree with these accounts of the Book. *Kwang-ze* at times becomes weak in his attempts to establish his points. To my mind the most interesting portions of this Book and the last one are the full statements which we have in them of the happy state of men when the *Tão* maintained its undisputed sway in the world, and the names of many of the early *Tãoistic* sovereigns. How can we suppose that anything would be gained by a return to the condition of primitive innocence and simplicity? The antagonism between *Tãoism* and *Confucianism* comes out in this Book very decidedly.

The title of the Book is taken from two characters in the first clause of the first paragraph.

BOOK XI. 3ÂI YÛ.

The two characters of the title are taken from the first sentence of the Text, but they express the subject of the Book more fully than the other titles in this Part do, and almost entitle it to a place in Part I. It is not easy to translate them, and Mr. Balfour renders them by 'Leniency towards Faults,' probably construing 3Âi as equivalent to our preposition 'in,' which it often is. But Kwang-ze uses both 3Âi and YÛ as verbs, or blends them together, the chief force of the binomial compound being derived from the significance of the 3Âi. 3Âi is defined by 3hun (存), which gives the idea of 'preserving' or 'keeping intact,' and YÛ by Khwan (寬), 'being indulgent' or 'forbearing.' The two characters are afterwards exchanged for other two, wû wei (無爲), 'doing nothing,' 'inaction,' a grand characteristic of the Táo.

The following summary of the Book is taken from Hsüan Ying's explanations of our author:—'The two characters 3Âi YÛ express the subject-matter of the Book, and "governing" points out the opposite error as the disease into which men are prone to fall. Let men be, and the tendencies of their nature will be at rest, and there will be no necessity for governing the world. Try to govern it, and the world will be full of trouble; and men will not be able to rest in the tendencies of their nature. These are the subjects of the first two paragraphs.

'In the third paragraph we have the erroneous view of 3hui K'ü that by government it was possible to make men's minds good. He did not know that governing was a disturbing meddling with the minds of men; and how Láo-ze set forth the evil of such government, going on till it be irretrievable. This long paragraph vigorously attacks the injury done by governing.

'In the fourth paragraph, when Hwang-Ti questions

Kwang *K'ăng-jze*, the latter sets aside his inquiry about the government of the world, and tells him about the government of himself; and in the fifth, when Yün *Kiang* asks Hung Mung about governing men, the latter tells him about the nourishing of the heart. These two great paragraphs set forth clearly the subtlest points in the policy of Let-a-be. Truly it is not an empty name.

'In the two last paragraphs, Kwang in his own words and way sets forth, now by affirmation, and now by negation, the meaning of all that precedes.'

This summary of the Book will assist the reader in understanding it. For other remarks that will be helpful, I must refer him to the notes appended to the Text. The Book is not easy to understand or to translate; and a remark found in the *K'ia-k'ing* edition of 'the Ten Philosophers,' by Lû Hsiû-fû, who died in 1279, was welcome to me, 'If you cannot understand one or two sentences of Kwang-jze, it does not matter.'

BOOK XII. THIEN Tĭ.

The first two characters of the Book are adopted as its name;—Thien Tĭ, 'Heaven and Earth.' These are employed, not so much as the two greatest material forms in the universe, but as the Great Powers whose influences extend to all below and upon them. Silently and effectively, with entire spontaneity, their influence goes forth, and a rule and pattern is thus given to those on whom the business of the government of the world devolves. The one character 'Heaven' is employed throughout the Book as the denomination of this purposeless spontaneity which yet is so powerful.

Lû Shû-*zh* says:—'This Book also sets forth clearly how the rulers of the world ought simply to act in accordance with the spontaneity of the virtue of Heaven; abjuring sageness and putting away knowledge; and doing nothing:—in this way the Táo or proper Method of Government will be attained to. As to the coercive methods of Mo Tĭ

and Hui-ze, they only serve to distress those who follow them.'

This object of the Book appears, more or less distinctly, in most of the illustrative paragraphs; though, as has been pointed out in the notes upon it, several of them must be considered to be spurious. Paragraphs 6, 7, and 11 are thus called in question, and, as most readers will feel, with reason. From 13 to the end, the paragraphs are held to be one long paragraph where *Kwang-ze* introduces his own reflections in an unusual style; but the genuineness of the whole, so far as I have observed, has not been called in question.

BOOK XIII. THIEN TÂO.

'Thien Tâo,' the first two characters of the first paragraph, and prefixed to the Book as the name of it, are best translated by 'The Way of Heaven,' meaning the noiseless spontaneity, which characterises all the operations of nature, proceeding silently, yet 'perfecting all things.' As the rulers of the world attain to this same way in their government, and the sages among men attain to it in their teachings, both government and doctrine arrive at a corresponding perfection. 'The joy of Heaven' and 'the joy of Men' are both realised. There ought to be no purpose or will in the universe. 'Vacancy, stillness, placidity, tastelessness, quietude, silence, and non-action; this is the perfection of the Tâo and its characteristics.'

Our author dwells especially on doing-nothing or non-action as the subject-matter of the Book. But as the world is full of doing, he endeavours to make a distinction between the Ruling Powers and those subordinate to and employed by them, to whom doing or action and purpose, though still without the thought of self, are necessary; and by this distinction he seems to me to give up the peculiarity of his system, so that some of the critics, especially *Aû-yang Hsiû*, are obliged to confess that these portions of the Book are unlike the writing of *Kwang-ze*. Still the antagonism of Tâoism to Confucianism is very apparent

throughout. Of the illustrative paragraphs, the seventh, relating the churlish behaviour of Láo-ze to Confucius, and the way in which he subsequently argues with him and snubs him, is very amusing. The eighth paragraph, relating the interview between Láo and Shih-kháng K'hi, is very strange. The allusions in it to certain incidents and peculiarities in Láo's domestic life make us wish that we had fuller accounts of his history; and the way in which he rates his disciple shows him as a master of the language of abuse.

The concluding paragraph about duke Hwan of K'hi is interesting, but I can only dimly perceive its bearing on the argument of the Book.

BOOK XIV. THIEN YÜN.

The contrast between the movement of the heavens (天運), and the resting of the earth (地處), requires the translation of the characters of the title by 'The Revolution of Heaven.' But that idea does not enter largely into the subject-matter of the Book. 'The whole,' says Hsüan Ying, 'consists of eight paragraphs, the first three of which show that under the sky there is nothing which is not dominated by the Táo, with which the Tis and the Kings have only to act in accordance; while the last five set forth how the Táo is not to be found in the material forms and changes of things, but in a spirit-like energy working imperceptibly, developing and controlling all phenomena.'

I have endeavoured in the notes on the former three paragraphs to make their meaning less obscure and unconnected than it is on a first perusal. The five illustrative paragraphs are, we may assume, all of them factitious, and can hardly be received as genuine productions of K'wang-ze. In the sixth paragraph, or at least a part of it, Lin Hsi-zung acknowledges the hand of the forger, and not less unworthy of credence are in my opinion the rest of it and much of the other four paragraphs. If they may be

taken as from the hand of our author himself, he was too much devoted to his own system to hold the balance of judgment evenly between Láo and Khung.

BOOK XV. KHO Í.

I can think of no better translation for 刻意, the two first characters of the Book, and which appear as its title, than our 'Ingrained Ideas;' notions, that is, held as firmly as if they were cut into the substance of the mind. They do not belong to the whole Book, however, but only to the first member of the first paragraph. That paragraph describes six classes of men, only the last of which are the right followers of the Táo;—the Sages, from the Táoistic point of view, who again are in the last sentence of the last paragraph identified with 'the True Men' described at length in the sixth Book. The fifth member of this first paragraph is interesting as showing how there was a class of Táoists who cultivated the system with a view to obtain longevity by their practices in the management of the breath; yet our author does not accord to them his full approbation, while at the same time the higher Táoism appears in the last paragraph, as promoting longevity without the management of the breath. *K'û* Po-hsiû, in his commentary on *K'wang-ze*, which was published in 1210, gives Po-í and Shû-*k'hi* as instances of the first class spoken of here; Confucius and Mencius, of the second; Í Yin and Fù Yüeh, of the third; *K'áo* Fù and Hsü Yü, as instances of the fourth. Of the fifth class he gives no example, but that of Phăng 3û mentioned in it.

That which distinguishes the genuine sage, the True Man of Táoism, is his pure simplicity in pursuing the Way, as it is seen in the operation of Heaven and Earth, and nourishing his spirit accordingly, till there ensues an ethereal amalgamation between his Way and the orderly operation of Heaven. This subject is pursued to the end of the Book. The most remarkable predicate of the spirit so trained is that in the third paragraph,—that 'Its name is the

same as Tî or God ;' on which none of the critics has been able to throw any satisfactory light. Balfour's version is:—'Its name is called "One with God ;"' Giles's, 'Its name is then "Of God,"' the 'then' being in consequence of his view that the subject is 'man's spiritual existence before he is born into the world of mortals.' My own view of the meaning appears in my version.

Lin Hsi-kung, however, calls the genuineness of the whole Book into question, and thinks it may have proceeded from the same hand as Book XIII. They have certainly one peculiarity in common ;—many references to sayings which cannot be traced, but are introduced by the formula of quotation, 'Therefore, it is said.'

BOOK XVI. SHAN HSING.

'Rectifying or Correcting the Nature' is the meaning of the title, and expresses sufficiently well the subject-matter of the Book. It was written to expose the 'vulgar' learning of the time as contrary to the principles of the true Tâoism, that learning being, according to Lû Shû-kih, 'the teachings of Hui-ze and Kung-sun Lung.' It is to be wished that we had fuller accounts of these. But see in Book XXXIII.

Many of the critics are fond of comparing the Book with the 21st chapter of the 7th Book of Mencius, part I,—where that philosopher sets forth 'Man's own nature as the most important thing to him, and the source of his true enjoyment,' which no one can read without admiration. But we have more sympathy with Mencius's fundamental views about our human nature, than with those of Kwang-ze and his Tâoism. Lin Hsi-kung is rather inclined to doubt the genuineness of the Book. Though he admires its composition, and admits the close and compact sequence of its sentences, there is yet something about it that does not smack of Kwang-ze's style. Rather there seems to me to underlie it the antagonism of Lâo and Kwang to the learning of the Confucian school. The only characteristic

of our author which I miss, is the illustrative stories of which he is generally so profuse. In this the Book agrees with the preceding.

BOOK XVII. *K'hiû Shui.*

K'hiû Shui, or 'Autumn Waters,' the first two characters of the first paragraph of this Book, are adopted as its title. Its subject, in that paragraph, however, is not so much the waters of autumn, as the greatness of the Tâo in its spontaneity, when it has obtained complete dominion over man. No illustration of the Tâo is so great a favourite with Lâo-ze as water, but he loved to set it forth in its quiet, onward movement, always seeking the lowest place, and always exercising a beneficent influence. But water is here before *Kwang-ze* in its mightiest volume,—the inundated Ho and the all but boundless magnitude of the ocean ; and as he takes occasion from those phenomena to deliver his lessons, I translate the title by 'The Floods of Autumn.'

To adopt the account of the Book given by Lû Shû-kih :—'This Book,' he says, 'shows how its spontaneity is the greatest characteristic of the Tâo, and the chief thing inculcated in it is that we must not allow the human element to extinguish in our constitution the Heavenly.'

'First, using the illustrations of the Ho and the Sea, our author gives us to see the Five Tîs and the Kings of the Three dynasties as only exhibiting the Tâo in a small degree, while its great development is not to be found in outward form and appliances so that it cannot be described in words, and it is difficult to find its point of commencement, which indeed appears to be impracticable, while still by doing nothing the human may be united with the Heavenly, and men may bring back their True condition. By means of the conversations between the guardian spirit of the Ho and Zo (the god) of the Sea this subject is exhaustively treated.

'Next (in paragraph 8), the *khwei*, the millepede, and other subjects illustrate how the mind is spirit-like in its spontaneity and doing nothing. The case of Confucius (in par. 9) shows the same spontaneity, transforming violence.

Kung-sun Lung (in par. 10), refusing to comply with that spontaneity, and seeking victory by his sophistical reasonings, shows his wisdom to be only like the folly of the frog in the well. The remaining three paragraphs bring before us *Kwang-ze* by the spontaneity of his *Tâo*, now superior to the allurements of rank; then, like the phoenix flying aloft, as enjoying himself in perfect ease; and finally, as like the fishes, in the happiness of his self-possession.' Such is a brief outline of this interesting chapter. Many of the critics would expunge the ninth and tenth paragraphs as unworthy of *Kwang-ze*, the former as misrepresenting Confucius, the latter as extolling himself. I think they may both be allowed to stand as from his pencil.

BOOK XVIII. *KIH LO*.

The title of this Book, *Kih Lo*, or 'Perfect Enjoyment,' may also be received as describing the subject-matter of it. But the author does not tell us distinctly what he means by 'Perfect Enjoyment.' It seems to involve two elements,—freedom from trouble and distress, and freedom from the fear of death. What men seek for as their chief good would only be to him burdens. He does not indeed altogether condemn them, but his own quest is the better and more excellent way. His own enjoyment is to be obtained by means of doing nothing; that is, by the *Tâo*; of which passionless and purposeless action is a chief characteristic; and is at the same time the most effective action, as is illustrated in the operation of heaven and earth.

Such is the substance of the first paragraph. The second is interesting as showing how his principle controlled *Kwang-ze* on the death of his wife. Paragraph 3 shows us two professors of *Tâoism* delivered by it from the fear of their own death. Paragraph 4 brings our author before us talking to a skull, and then the skull's appearance to him in a dream and telling him of the happiness of the state after death. Paragraph 5 is occupied with Confucius and his favourite disciple Yen Hui. It stands by itself, unconnected with the rest of the Book, and its

genuineness is denied by some commentators. The last paragraph, found in an enlarged form in the Books ascribed to Lieh-ze, has as little to do as the fifth with the general theme of the Book, and is a strange anticipation in China of the transrotation or transformation system of Buddhism.

Indeed, after reading this Book, we cease to wonder that Táoism and Buddhism should in many practices come so near each other.

BOOK XIX. TÂ SHĀNG.

I have been inclined to translate the title of this Book by 'The Fuller Understanding of Life,' with reference to what is said in the second Book on 'The Nourishment of the Lord of Life.' There the Life before the mind of the writer is that of the Body; here he extends his view also to the Life of the Spirit. The one subject is not kept, however, with sufficient distinctness apart from the other, and the profusion of illustrations, taken, most of them, from the works of Lieh-ze, is perplexing.

To use the words of Lû Shû-kih:—'This Book shows how he who would skilfully nourish his life, must maintain his spirit complete, and become one with Heaven. These two ideas preside in it throughout. In par. 2, the words of the Warden Yin show that the spirit kept complete is beyond the reach of harm. In 3, the illustration of the hunchback shows how the will must be maintained free from all confusion. In 4, that of the ferryman shows that to the completeness of the spirit there is required the disregard of life or death. In 5 and 6, the words of Thien Khâi-kih convey a warning against injuring the life by the indulgence of sensual desires. In 7, the sight of a sprite by duke Hwan unsettles his spirit. In 8, the gamecock is trained so as to preserve the spirit unagitated. In 9, we see the man in the water of the cataract resting calmly in his appointed lot. In 10, we have the maker of the bell-stand completing his work as he did in accordance with the mind of Heaven. All these instances show how the

spirit is nourished. The reckless charioteering of Tung Yê in par. 11, not stopping when the strength of his horses was exhausted, and the false pretext of Sun Hsiû, clear as at noon-day, are instances of a different kind; while in the skilful Shui, hardly needing the application of his mind, and fully enjoying himself in all things, his movements testify of his harmony with Heaven, and his spiritual completeness.'

BOOK XX. SHAN MÛ.

It requires a little effort to perceive that Shan Mû, the title of this Book, does not belong to it as a whole, but only to the first of its nine paragraphs. That speaks of a large tree which our author once saw on a mountain. The other paragraphs have nothing to do with mountain trees, large or small. As the last Book might be considered to be supplementary to 'the Nourishment of Life,' discussed in Book III, so this is taken as having the same relation to Book IV, which treats of 'Man in the World, associated with other men.' It shows by its various narratives, some of which are full of interest, how by a strict observance of the principles and lessons of the Táo a man may preserve his life and be happy, may do the right thing and enjoy himself and obtain the approbation of others in the various circumstances in which he may be placed. The themes both of Books I and IV blend together in it. Paragraph 8 has more the character of an apologue than most of Kwang-ze's stories.

BOOK XXI. THIEN 3ZE-FANG.

Thien 3ze-fang is merely the name of one of the men who appear in the first paragraph. That he was a historical character is learned from the 'Plans of the Warring States,' XIV, art. 6, where we find him at the court of the marquis Wăn of Wei (B. C. 424-387), acting as counsellor to that ruler. Thien was his surname; 3ze-fang his designa-

tion, and Wû-k'ai his name. He has nothing to do with any of the paragraphs but the first.

It is not easy to reduce all the narratives or stories in the Book to one category. The fifth, seventh, and eighth, indeed, are generally rejected as spurious, or unworthy of our author; and the sixth and ninth are trivial, though the ninth bears all the marks of his graphic style. Paragraphs 3 and 4 are both long and important. A common idea in them and in 1, 2, and 10 seems to be that the presence and power of the Tâo cannot be communicated by words, and are independent of outward condition and circumstances.

BOOK XXII. KIH PEI YÜ.

With this Book the Second Part of *Kwang-ze's* Essays or Treatises ends. 'All the Books in it,' says Lû Shû-k'ih, 'show the opposition of Tâoism to the pursuit of knowledge as enjoined in the Confucian and other schools; and this Book may be regarded as the deepest, most vehement, and clearest of them all.' The concluding sentences of the last paragraph and Lâo-ze's advice to Confucius in par. 5, to 'sternly repress his knowledge,' may be referred to as illustrating the correctness of Lû's remark.

Book seventeenth is commonly considered to be the most eloquent of *Kwang-ze's* Treatises, but this twenty-second Book is not inferior to it in eloquence, and it is more characteristic of his method of argument. The way in which he runs riot in the names with which he personifies the attributes of the Tâo, is a remarkable instance of the subtle manner in which he often brings out his ideas; and in no other Book does he set forth more emphatically what his own idea of the Tâo was, though the student often fails to be certain that he has exactly caught the meaning.

The title, let it be observed, belongs only to the first paragraph. The *Kih* in it must be taken in the sense of 'knowledge,' and not of 'wisdom.'

BOOK XXIII. KǎNG-SANG KĤŪ.

It is not at all certain that there ever was such a personage as Kǎng-sang KĤŪ, who gives its name to the Book. In his brief memoir of Kwang-ze, Sze-mâ KĤien spells, as we should say, the first character of the surname differently, and for the Kǎng (庚), employs Khang (亢), adding his own opinion, that there was nothing in reality corresponding to the account given of the characters in this and some other Books. They would be therefore the inventions of Kwang-ze, devised by him to serve his purpose in setting forth the teaching of Láo-ze. It may have been so, but the value of the Book would hardly be thereby affected.

Lû Shû-kih gives the following very brief account of the contents. Borrowing the language of Mencius concerning Yen Hui and two other disciples of Confucius as compared with the sage, he says, 'Kǎng-sang KĤŪ had all the members of Láo-ze, but in small proportions. To outward appearance he was above such as abjure sagehood and put knowledge away, but still he was unable to transform Nan-yung KĤŪ, whom therefore he sent to Láo-ze; and he announced to him the doctrine of the Tâo that everything was done by doing nothing.'

The reader will see that this is a very incomplete summary of the contents of the Book. We find in it the Tâoistic ideal of the 'Perfect Man,' and the discipline both of body and mind through the depths of the system by means of which it is possible for a disciple to become such.

BOOK XXIV. HSÜ WŪ-KWEI.

This Book is named from the first three characters in it, the surname and name of Hsü WŪ-kwei, who plays the most important part in the first two paragraphs, and does not further appear. He comes before us as a well-known recluse of Wei, who visits the court to offer his counsels to the marquis of the state. But whether there ever was such

a man, or whether he was only a creation of *K'wang-ze*, we cannot, so far as I know, tell.

Scattered throughout the Book are the lessons so common with our author against sagehood and knowledge, and on the quality of doing nothing and thereby securing the doing of everything. The concluding chapter is one of the finest descriptions in the whole Work of the Táo and of the Táoistic idea of Heaven. 'There are in the Book,' says Lû Fang, 'many dark and mysterious expressions. It is not to be read hastily; but the more it is studied, the more flavour will there be found in it.'

BOOK XXV. 3EH-YANG.

This Book is named from the first two characters in it,— '3eh-yang,' which again are the designation of a gentleman of Lû, called Phǎng Yang, who comes before us in *K'û*, seeking for an introduction to the king of that state, with the view, we may suppose, of giving him good counsel. Whether he ever got the introduction which he desired we do not know. The mention of him only serves to bring in three other individuals, all belonging to *K'û*, and the characters of two of them; but we hear no more of 3eh-yang. The second and third paragraphs are, probably, sequels to the first, but his name does not appear.

The paragraphs from 4 to 9 have more or less interest in themselves; but it is not easy to trace in them any sequence of thought. The tenth and eleventh are more important. The former deals with 'the Talk of the Hamlets and Villages,' the common sentiments of men, which, correct and just in themselves, are not to be accepted as a sufficient expression of the Táo; the latter sets forth how the name Táo itself is only a metaphorical term, used for the purpose of description; as if the Táo were a thing, and not capable, therefore, from its material derivation of giving adequate expression to our highest notion of what it is.

'The Book,' says Lû Shû-kih, 'illustrates how the Great Táo cannot be described by any name; that men ought to

stop where they do not really know, and not try to find it in any phenomenon, or in any event or thing. They must forget both speech and silence, and then they may approximate to the idea of the Great Tâo.'

BOOK XXVI. WÂI WÛ.

The first two characters of the first paragraph are again adopted as the title of the Book,—Wâi Wû, 'External Things;' and the lesson supposed to be taught in it is that expressed in the first sentence, that the influence of external things on character and condition cannot be determined beforehand. It may be good, it may be evil. Mr. Balfour has translated the two characters by 'External Advantages.' Hû Wăn-ying interprets them of 'External Disadvantages.' The things may in fact be either of these. What seems useless may be productive of the greatest services; and what men deem most advantageous may turn out to be most hurtful to them.

What really belongs to man is the Tâo. That is his own, sufficient for his happiness, and cannot be taken from him, if he prize it and cultivate it. But if he neglect it, and yield to external influences unfavourable to it, he may become bad, and suffer all that is most hateful to him and injurious.

Readers must judge for themselves of the way in which the subject is illustrated in the various paragraphs. Some of the stories are pertinent enough; others are wide of the mark. The second, third, and fourth paragraphs are generally held to be spurious, 'poor in composition, and not at all to the point.' If my note on the 'six faculties of perception' in par. 9 be correct, we must admit in it a Buddhistic hand, modifying the conceptions of Kwang-ze after he had passed away.

BOOK XXVII. YÜ YEN.

Yü Yen, 'Metaphorical Words,' stand at the commencement of the Book, and have been adopted as its name.

They might be employed to denote its first paragraph, but are not applicable to the Book as a whole. Nor let the reader expect to find even here any disquisition on the nature of the metaphor as a figure of speech. Translated literally, 'Yü Yen' are 'Lodged Words,' that is, Ideas that receive their meaning or character from their environment, the narrative or description in which they are deposited.

Kwang-ze wished, I suppose, to give some description of the style in which he himself wrote:—now metaphorical, now abounding in quotations, and throughout moulded by his Taoistic views. This last seems to be the meaning of his *Kih Yen*,—literally, 'Cup, or Goblet, Words,' that is, words, common as the water constantly supplied in the cup, but all moulded by the Taoist principle, the element of and from Heaven blended in man's constitution and that should direct and guide his conduct. The best help in the interpretation of the paragraph is derived from a study of the difficult second Book, as suggested in the notes.

Of the five paragraphs that follow the first, the second relates to the change of views, which, it is said, took place in Confucius; the third, to the change of feeling in *Žǎng-ze* in his poverty and prosperity; the fourth, to changes of character produced in his disciple by the teachings of Tung-kwo *Žze-khi*; the fifth, to the changes in the appearance of the shadow produced by the ever-changing substance; and the sixth, to the change of spirit and manner produced in Yang *Kü* by the stern lesson of *Lão-ze*.

Various other lessons, more or less appropriate and important, are interspersed.

Some critics argue that this Book must have originally been one with the thirty-second, which was made into two by the insertion between its Parts of the four spurious intervening Books, but this is uncertain and unlikely.

BOOK XXVIII. ZANG WANG.

Zang Wang, explaining the characters as I have done,

fairly indicates the subject-matter of the Book. Not that we have a king in every illustration, but the personages adduced are always men of worth, who decline the throne, or gift, or distinction of whatever nature, proffered to them, and feel that they have something better to live for.

A persuasion, however, is widely spread, that this Book and the three that follow are all spurious. The first critic of note to challenge their genuineness was Sû Shih (better known as Sû Tung-pho, A.D. 1036-1101); and now, some of the best editors, such as Lin Hsî-kung, do not admit them into their texts, while others who are not bold enough to exclude them altogether, do not think it worth their while to discuss them seriously. Hû Wăn-ying, for instance, says, 'Their style is poor and mean, and they are, without doubt, forgeries. I will not therefore trouble myself with comments of praise or blame upon them. The reader may accept or reject them at his pleasure.'

But something may be said for them. Sze-mâ *K'ien* seems to have been acquainted with them all. In his short biographical notice of *K'wang-ze*, he says, 'He made the Old Fisherman, the Robber *Kih*, and the Cutting Open Satchels, to defame and calumniate the disciples of Confucius.' *K'ien* does not indeed mention our present Book along with XXX and XXXI, but it is less open to objection on the ground he mentions than they are. I think if it had stood alone, it would not have been condemned.

BOOK XXIX. T'AO *K'ih*.

It has been seen above that Sze-mâ *K'ien* expressly ascribes the Book called 'the Robber *Kih*' to *K'wang-ze*. *K'ien* refers also in another place to *Kih*, adducing the facts of his history in contrast with those about Confucius' favourite disciple Yen Hui as inexplicable on the supposition of a just and wise Providence. We must conclude therefore that the Book existed in *K'ien*'s time, and that he had read it. On the other hand it has been shown that Confucius could not have been on terms

of friendship with Liû-hsiâ Kî, and all that is related of his brother the robber wants substantiation. That such a man ever existed appears to me very doubtful. Are we to put down the whole of the first paragraph then as a *jeu d'esprit* on the part of Kwang-ze, intended to throw ridicule on Confucius and what our author considered his pedantic ways? It certainly does so, and we are amused to hear the sage outcrowded by the robber.

In the other two paragraphs we have good instances of Kwang-ze's 'metaphorical expressions,' his coinage of names for his personages, more or less ingeniously indicating their characters; but in such cases the element of time or chronology does not enter; and it is the anachronism of the first paragraph which constitutes its chief difficulty.

The name of 'Robber Kih' may be said to be a coinage; and that a famous robber was popularly indicated by the name appears from its use by Mencius (III, ii, ch. 10, 3), to explain which the commentators have invented the story of a robber so-called in the time of Hwang-Ti, in the twenty-seventh century B.C.! Was there really such a legend? and did Kwang-ze take advantage of it to apply the name to a notorious and disreputable brother of Liû-hsiâ Kî? Still there remain the anachronisms in the paragraph which have been pointed out. On the whole we must come to a conclusion rather unfavourable to the genuineness of the Book. But it must have been forged at a very early time, and we have no idea by whom.

BOOK XXX. YÜEH KIEN.

We need not suppose that anything ever occurred in Kwang-ze's experience such as is described here. The whole narrative is metaphorical; and that he himself is made to play the part in it which he describes, only shows how the style of writing in which he indulged was ingrained into the texture of his mind. We do not know that there ever was a ruler of Kào who indulged in the love of the

sword-fight, and kept about him a crowd of vulgar bravoës such as the story describes. We may be assured that our author never wore the bravo's dress or girt on him the bravo's sword. The whole is a metaphorical representation of the way in which a besotted ruler might be brought to a feeling of his degradation, and recalled to a sense of his duty and the way in which he might fulfil it. The narrative is full of interest and force. I do not feel any great difficulty in accepting it as the genuine composition of *Kwang-ze*. Who but himself could have composed it? Was it a good-humoured caricature of him by an able Confucian writer to repay him for the ridicule he was fond of casting on the sage?

BOOK XXXI. YÜ-FŪ.

'The Old Fisherman' is the fourth of the Books in the collection of the writings of *Kwang-ze* to which, since the time of Sû Shih, the epithet of 'spurious' has been attached by many. My own opinion, however, has been already intimated that the suspicions of the genuineness of those Books have been entertained on insufficient grounds; and so far as 'the Old Fisherman' is concerned, I am glad that it has come down to us, spurious or genuine. There may be a certain coarseness in 'the Robber Kih,' which makes us despise Confucius or laugh at him; but the satire in this Book is delicate, and we do not like the sage the less when he walks up the bank from the stream where he has been lectured by the fisherman. The pictures of him and his disciples in the forest, reading and singing on the Apricot Terrace, and of the old man slowly impelling his skiff to the land and then as quietly impelling it away till it is lost among the reeds, are delicious; there is nothing finer of its kind in the volume. What hand but that of *Kwang-ze*, so light in its touch and yet so strong, both incisive and decisive, could have delineated them?

BOOK XXXII. LIEH YÜ-KHÂU.

Lieh Yü-khâu, the surname and name of Lieh-ze, with which the first paragraph commences, have become current as the name of the Book, though they have nothing to do with any but that one paragraph, which is found also in the second Book of the writings ascribed to Lieh-ze. There are some variations in the two Texts, but they are so slight that we cannot look on them as proofs that the two passages are narratives of independent origin.

Various difficulties surround the questions of the existence of Lieh-ze, and of the work which bears his name. They will be found distinctly and dispassionately stated and discussed in the 146th chapter of the Catalogue of the *K'ien-lung* Imperial Library. The writers seem to me to make it out that there was such a man, but they do not make it clear when he lived, or how his writings assumed their present form. There is a statement of Liú Hsiang that he lived in the time of duke Mû of *K'ang* (B.C. 627-606); but in that case he must have been earlier than Láo-ze himself, whom he very frequently quotes. The writers think that Liú's 'Mû of *K'ang*' should be Mû of Lú (B.C. 409-377), which would make him not much anterior to Mencius and *K'wang-ze*; but this is merely an ingenious conjecture. As to the composition of his chapters, they are evidently not at first hand from Lieh, but by some one of his disciples; whether they were current in *K'wang-ze*'s days, and he made use of various passages from them, or those passages were *K'wang-ze*'s originally, and taken from him by the followers of Lieh-ze and added to what fragments they had of their master's teaching;—these are points which must be left undetermined.

Whether the narrative about Lieh be from *K'wang-ze* or not, its bearing on his character is not readily apprehended; but, as we study it, we seem to understand that his master Wû-šan condemned him as not having fully attained to the Táo, but owing his influence with others

mainly to the manifestation of his merely human qualities. And this is the lesson which our author keeps before him, more or less distinctly, in all his paragraphs. As Lû Shû-kih says:—

‘This Book also sets forth Doing Nothing as the essential condition of the Tâo. Lieh-ze, frightened at the respect shown to him by the soup-vendors, and yet by his human doings drawing men to him, disowns the rule of the heavenly; Hwan of K’ang, thinking himself different from other men, does not know that Heaven recompenses men according to their employment of the heavenly in them; the resting of the sages in their proper rest shows how the ancients pursued the heavenly and not the human; the one who learned to slay the Dragon, but afterwards did not exercise his skill, begins with the human, but afterwards goes on to the heavenly; in those who do not rest in the heavenly, and perish by the inward war, we see how the small men do not know the secret of the Great Repose; Zhao Shang, glorying in the carriages which he had acquired, is still farther removed from the heavenly; when Yen Ho shows that the sage, in imparting his instructions, did not follow the example of Heaven in diffusing its benefits, we learn that it is only the Doing Nothing of the True Man which is in agreement with Heaven; the difficulty of knowing the mind of man, and the various methods required to test it, show the readiness with which, when not under the rule of Heaven, it seems to go after what is right, and the greater readiness with which it again revolts from it; in Khao-fû, the Correct, we have one indifferent to the distinctions of rank, and from him we advance to the man who understands the great condition appointed for him, and is a follower of Heaven; then comes he who plays the thief under the chin of the Black Dragon, running the greatest risks on a mere peradventure of success, a resolute opponent of Heaven; and finally we have Kwang-ze despising the ornaments of the sacrificial ox, looking in the same way at the worms beneath and the kites overhead, and regarding himself as quite independent

of them, thus giving us an example of the embodiment of the spiritual, and of harmony with Heaven.'

So does this ingenious commentator endeavour to exhibit the one idea in the Book, and show the unity of its different paragraphs.

BOOK XXXIII. THIEN HSIÂ.

The Thien Hsiâ with which this Book commences is in regimen, and cannot be translated, so as to give an adequate idea of the scope of the Book, or even of the first paragraph to which it belongs. The phrase itself means literally 'under heaven or the sky,' and is used as a denomination of 'the kingdom,' and, even more widely, of 'the world' or 'all men.' 'Historical Phases of Tâoist Teaching' would be nearly descriptive of the subject-matter of the Book; but may be objected to on two grounds:—first, that a chronological method is not observed, and next, that the concluding paragraph can hardly be said to relate to Tâoism at all, but to the sophistical teachers, which abounded in the age of *Kwang-ze*.

Par. 1 sketches with a light hand the nature of Tâoism and the forms which it assumed from the earliest times to the era of Confucius, as imperfectly represented by him and his school.

Par. 2 introduces us to the system of Mo Ti and his school as an erroneous form of Tâoism, and departing, as it continued, farther and farther from the old model.

Par. 3 deals with a modification of Mohism, advocated by scholars who are hardly heard of elsewhere.

Par. 4 treats of a further modification of this modified Mohism, held by scholars 'whose Tâo was not the true Tâo, and whose "right" was really "wrong."'

Par. 5 goes back to the era of *Lão-ze*, and mentions him and Kwan Yin, as the men who gave to the system of Tâo a grand development.

Par. 6 sets forth *Kwang-ze* as following in their steps and going beyond them, the brightest luminary of the system.

Par. 7 leaves Táoism, and brings up Hui Shih and other sophists.

Whether the Book should be received as from *K'wang-ze* himself or from some early editor of his writings is 'a vexed question.' If it did come from his pencil, he certainly had a good opinion of himself. It is hard for a foreign student at this distant time to be called on for an opinion on the one side or the other.

THE WRITINGS OF KWANG-3ZE.

BOOK I.

PART I. SECTION I.

Hsião-yâo Yû, or 'Enjoyment in Untroubled Ease¹.'

1. In the Northern Ocean there is a fish, the name of which is Khwăn²,—I do not know how many lî in size. It changes into a bird with the name of Phăng, the back of which is (also)—I do not know how many lî in extent. When this bird rouses itself and flies, its wings are like clouds all round the sky. When the sea is moved (so as to bear it along), it prepares to remove to the Southern Ocean. The Southern Ocean is the Pool of Heaven.

¹ See notice on pp. 127, 128, on the Title and Subject-matter of the Book.

² The khwăn and the phăng are both fabulous creatures, far transcending in size the dimensions ascribed by the wildest fancy of the West to the kraken and the roc. Kwang-ze represents them as so huge by way of contrast to the small creatures which he is intending to introduce ;—to show that size has nothing to do with the Tâo, and the perfect enjoyment which the possession of it affords. The passage is a good specimen of the Yü Yen (寓言), metaphorical or parabolical narratives or stories, which are the chief characteristic of our author's writings ; but the reader must keep in mind that the idea or lesson in its 'lodging' is generally of a Tâoistic nature.

There is the (book called) *K'hi Hsieh*¹,—a record of marvels. We have in it these words:—‘When the phăng is removing to the Southern Ocean it flaps (its wings) on the water for 3000 li. Then it ascends on a whirlwind 90,000 li, and it rests only at the end of six months.’ (But similar to this is the movement of the breezes which we call) the horses of the fields, of the dust (which quivers in the sunbeams), and of living things as they are blown against one another by the air². Is its azure the proper colour of the sky? Or is it occasioned by its distance and illimitable extent? If one were looking down (from above), the very same appearance would just meet his view.

2. And moreover, (to speak of) the accumulation of water;—if it be not great, it will not have strength to support a large boat. Upset a cup of water in a cavity, and a straw will float on it as if it were a boat. Place a cup in it, and it will stick fast;—the water is shallow and the boat is large. (So it is with) the accumulation of wind; if it be not great, it will not have strength to support great wings. Therefore (the phăng ascended to) the height of 90,000 li, and there was such a mass of wind beneath it; thenceforth the accumulation of wind was sufficient. As it seemed to bear the blue sky on its back, and there was nothing to obstruct or arrest its course, it could pursue its way to the South.

¹ There may have been a book with this title, to which *Kwang-3ze* appeals, as if feeling that what he had said needed to be substantiated.

² This seems to be interjected as an afterthought, suggesting to the reader that the phăng, soaring along at such a height, was only an exaggerated form of the common phenomena with which he was familiar.

A cicada and a little dove laughed at it, saying, 'We make an effort and fly towards an elm or sapanwood tree; and sometimes before we reach it, we can do no more but drop to the ground. Of what use is it for this (creature) to rise 90,000 lî, and make for the South?' He who goes to the grassy suburbs¹, returning to the third meal (of the day), will have his belly as full as when he set out; he who goes to a distance of 100 lî will have to pound his grain where he stops for the night; he who goes a thousand lî, will have to carry with him provisions for three months. What should these two small creatures know about the matter? The knowledge of that which is small does not reach to that which is great; (the experience of) a few years does not reach to that of many. How do we know that it is so? The mushroom of a morning does not know (what takes place between) the beginning and end of a month; the short-lived cicada does not know (what takes place between) the spring and autumn. These are instances of a short term of life. In the south of *K'û*² there is the (tree) called Ming-ling³, whose spring is 500 years, and its autumn the same; in high antiquity there was that called *Tâ-k'ûn*⁴,

¹ In Chinese, Mang 3hang; but this is not the name of any particular place. The phrase denotes the grassy suburbs (from their green colour), not far from any city or town.

² The great state of the South, having its capital Ying in the present Hû-pei, and afterwards the chief competitor with *K'ûn* for the sovereignty of the kingdom.

³ Taken by some as the name of a tortoise.

⁴ This and the Ming-ling tree, as well as the mushroom mentioned above, together with the *khwăn* and *phăng*, are all mentioned in the fifth Book of the writings of Lieh-3ze, referred to in the next paragraph.

whose spring was 8000 years, and its autumn the same. And Phăng 3û¹ is the one man renowned to the present day for his length of life :—if all men were (to wish) to match him, would they not be miserable ?

3. In the questions put by Thang² to Kî we have similar statements :—‘ In the bare and barren north there is the dark and vast ocean,—the Pool of Heaven. In it there is a fish, several thousand li in breadth, while no one knows its length. Its name is the khwăn. There is (also) a bird named the phăng; its back is like the Thái mountain, while its wings are like clouds all round the sky. On a whirlwind it mounts upwards as on the whorls of a goat’s horn for 90,000 li, till, far removed from the cloudy vapours, it bears on its back the blue sky, and then it shapes its course for the South, and proceeds to the ocean there.’ A quail by the side of a marsh laughed at it, and said, ‘ Where is it going to ? I spring up with a bound, and come down again when I have reached but a few fathoms, and then fly about among the brushwood and bushes; and

¹ Or ‘ the patriarch Phăng.’ Confucius compared himself to him (*Analects*, VII, 1);—‘ our old Phăng;’ and Kû Hsî thinks he was a worthy officer of the Shang dynasty. Whoever he was, the legends about him are a mass of Táoistic fables. At the end of the Shang dynasty (B.C. 1123) he was more than 767 years old, and still in unabated vigour. We read of his losing 49 wives and 54 sons; and that he still left two sons, Wû and Î, who died in Fû-kien, and gave their names to the Wû-î, or Bû-î hills, from which we get our Bohea tea! See Mayers’ ‘ Chinese Reader’s Manual,’ p. 175.

² The founder of the Shang dynasty (B.C. 1766–1754). In Lieh-ze his interlocutor is called Hsiâ Ko, and 3ze-kî.

this is the perfection of flying. Where is that creature going to?' This shows the difference between the small and the great.

Thus it is that men, whose wisdom is sufficient for the duties of some one office, or whose conduct will secure harmony in some one district, or whose virtue is befitting a ruler so that they could efficiently govern some one state, are sure to look on themselves in this manner (like the quail), and yet Yung-ze¹ of Sung¹ would have smiled and laughed at them. (This Yung-ze), though the whole world should have praised him, would not for that have stimulated himself to greater endeavour, and though the whole world should have condemned him, would not have exercised any more repression of his course; so fixed was he in the difference between the internal (judgment of himself) and the external (judgment of others), so distinctly had he marked out the bounding limit of glory and disgrace. Here, however, he stopped. His place in the world indeed had become indifferent to him, but still he had not planted himself firmly (in the right position).

There was Lieh-ze², who rode on the wind and pursued his way, with an admirable indifference (to

¹ We can hardly tell who this Yung-ze was. Sung was a duchy, comprehending portions of the present provinces of Honan, An-hui, and Kiang-sû.

² See note on the title of Book XXXII. Whether there ever was a personage called Lieh-ze or Lieh Yü-khâu, and what is the real character of the writings that go under his name, are questions that cannot be more than thus alluded to in a note. He is often introduced by Kwang-ze, and many narratives are common to their books. Here he comes before us, not as a thinker and writer, but as a semi-supernatural being, who has only not yet attained to the highest consummations of the Tâo.

all external things), returning, however, after fifteen days, (to his place). In regard to the things that (are supposed to) contribute to happiness, he was free from all endeavours to obtain them; but though he had not to walk, there was still something for which he had to wait. But suppose one who mounts on (the ether of) heaven and earth in its normal operation, and drives along the six elemental energies of the changing (seasons), thus enjoying himself in the illimitable,—what has he to wait for¹? Therefore it is said, 'The Perfect man has no (thought of) self; the Spirit-like man, none of merit; the Sagely-minded man, none of fame¹.'

4. Yâo², proposing to resign the throne to Hsü Yü³, said, 'When the sun and moon have come forth, if the torches have not been put out, would it not be difficult for them to give light? When the seasonal rains are coming down, if we still keep watering the ground, will not our toil be labour lost for all the good it will do? Do you, Master, stand forth (as sovereign), and the kingdom will (at once) be well governed. If I still (continue to) preside over it, I must look on myself as vainly occupying the place;—I beg to resign the throne to you.' Hsü

¹ The description of a master of the Tâo, exalted by it, unless the predicates about him be nothing but the ravings of a wild extravagance, above mere mortal man. In the conclusion, however, he is presented under three different phrases, which the reader will do well to keep in mind.

² The great sovereign with whom the documents of the Shü K'ing commence:—B. C. 2357–2257.

³ A counsellor of Yâo, who is once mentioned by Sze-mâ K'ien in his account of Po-î,—in the first Book of his Biographies (列傳). Hsü Yü is here the instance of 'the Sagely man,' with whom the desire of a name or fame has no influence.

Yü said, 'You, Sir, govern the kingdom, and the kingdom is well governed. If I in these circumstances take your place, shall I not be doing so for the sake of the name? But the name is but the guest of the reality;—shall I be playing the part of the guest? The tailor-bird makes its nest in the deep forest, but only uses a single branch; the mole¹ drinks from the Ho, but only takes what fills its belly. Return and rest in being ruler,—I will have nothing to do with the throne. Though the cook were not attending to his kitchen, the representative of the dead and the officer of prayer would not leave their cups and stands to take his place.'

5. *K'ien Wû*² asked *Lien Shû*³, saying, 'I heard *K'ieh-yü*³ talking words which were great, but had nothing corresponding to them (in reality);—once gone, they could not be brought back. I was frightened by them;—they were like the Milky Way⁴ which cannot be traced to its beginning or end. They had no connexion with one another, and were not akin to the experiences of men.' 'What were his words?' asked *Lien Shû*, and the other replied, (He said) that 'Far away on the hill of *Kû-shih*⁵ there dwelt a Spirit-like man whose flesh and skin

¹ Some say the tapir.

² Known to us only through *K'wang-ze*.

³ 'The madman of *K'û*' of the *Analects*, XVIII, 5, who eschews intercourse with Confucius. See *Hwang-fû Mi*'s account of him, under the surname and name of *Lû Thung*, in his *Notices of Eminent Tâoists*, I, 25.

⁴ Literally, 'the Ho and the Han;,' but the name of those rivers combined was used to denote 'the Milky Way.'

⁵ See the *Khang-hsi* Thesaurus under the character 射. All which is said about the hill is that it was 'in the North Sea.'

were (smooth) as ice and (white) as snow; that his manner was elegant and delicate as that of a virgin; that he did not eat any of the five grains, but inhaled the wind and drank the dew; that he mounted on the clouds, drove along the flying dragons, rambling and enjoying himself beyond the four seas; that by the concentration of his spirit-like powers he could save men from disease and pestilence, and secure every year a plentiful harvest.' These words appeared to me wild and incoherent and I did not believe them. 'So it is,' said Lien Shû. 'The blind have no perception of the beauty of elegant figures, nor the deaf of the sound of bells and drums. But is it only the bodily senses of which deafness and blindness can be predicated? There is also a similar defect in the intelligence; and of this your words supply an illustration in yourself. That man, with those attributes, though all things were one mass of confusion, and he heard in that condition the whole world crying out to him to be rectified, would not have to address himself laboriously to the task, as if it were his business to rectify the world. Nothing could hurt that man; the greatest floods, reaching to the sky, could not drown him, nor would he feel the fervour of the greatest heats melting metals and stones till they flowed, and scorching all the ground and hills. From the dust and chaff of himself, he could still mould and fashion Yâos and Shuns¹;—how should he be willing to occupy himself with things²?'

¹ Shun was the successor of Yâo in the ancient kingdom.

² All this description is to give us an idea of the 'Spirit-like man.' We have in it the results of the Tâo in its fullest embodiment.

6. A man of Sung, who dealt in the ceremonial caps (of Yin)¹, went with them to Yüeh², the people of which cut off their hair and tattooed their bodies, so that they had no use for them. Yáo ruled the people of the kingdom, and maintained a perfect government within the four seas. Having gone to see the four (Perfect) Ones³ on the distant hill of Kû-shih, when (he returned to his capital) on the south of the Făn water⁴, his throne appeared no more to his deep-sunk oblivious eyes⁵.

7. Hui-ze⁶ told K'wang-ze, saying, 'The king of Wei⁷ sent me some seeds of a large calabash, which I sowed. The fruit, when fully grown, could contain five piculs (of anything). I used it to contain water,

¹ See the Lî K'î, IX, iii, 3.

² A state, part of the present province of K'ieh-kiang.

³ Said to have been Hsü Yü mentioned above, with Nieh K'üeh, Wang Í, and Phí-î, who will by and by come before us.

⁴ A river in Shan-hsí, on which was the capital of Yáo ;—a tributary of the Ho.

⁵ This paragraph is intended to give us an idea of 'the Perfect man,' who has no thought of himself. The description, however, is brief and tame, compared with the accounts of Hsü Yü and of 'the Spirit-like man.'

⁶ Or Hui Shih, the chief minister of 'king Hui of Liang (or Wei), (B. C. 370-333),' with an interview between whom and Mencius the works of that philosopher commence. He was a friend of K'wang-ze, and an eccentric thinker; and in Book XXXIII there is a long account of several of his views. I do not think that the conversations about 'the great calabash' and 'the great tree' really took place; K'wang-ze probably invented them, to illustrate his point that size had nothing to do with the Táo, and that things which seemed useless were not really so when rightly used.

⁷ Called also Liang from the name of its capital. Wei was one of the three states (subsequently kingdoms), into which the great fief of Jin was divided about B. C. 400.

but it was so heavy that I could not lift it by myself. I cut it in two to make the parts into drinking vessels; but the dried shells were too wide and unstable and would not hold (the liquor); nothing but large useless things! Because of their uselessness I knocked them to pieces.' Kwang-ze replied, 'You were indeed stupid, my master, in the use of what was large. There was a man of Sung who was skilful at making a salve which kept the hands from getting chapped; and (his family) for generations had made the bleaching of cocoon-silk their business. A stranger heard of it, and proposed to buy the art of the preparation for a hundred ounces of silver. The kindred all came together, and considered the proposal. "We have," said they, "been bleaching cocoon-silk for generations, and have only gained a little money. Now in one morning we can sell to this man our art for a hundred ounces;—let him have it." The stranger accordingly got it and went away with it to give counsel to the king of Wû¹, who was then engaged in hostilities with Yüeh. The king gave him the command of his fleet, and in the winter he had an engagement with that of Yüeh, on which he inflicted a great defeat², and was invested with a portion of territory taken from Yüeh. The keeping the hands from getting chapped was the same in both cases; but in the one case it led to the investiture (of the possessor of the salve), and

¹ A great and ancient state on the sea-board, north of Yüeh. The name remains in the district of Wû-kiang in the prefecture of Sû-kâu.

² The salve gave the troops of Wû a great advantage in a war on the Kiang, especially in winter.

in the other it had only enabled its owners to continue their bleaching. The difference of result was owing to the different use made of the art. Now you, Sir, had calabashes large enough to hold five piculs;—why did you not think of making large bottle-gourds of them, by means of which you could have floated over rivers and lakes, instead of giving yourself the sorrow of finding that they were useless for holding anything. Your mind, my master, would seem to have been closed against all intelligence !'

Hui-ze said to Kwang-ze, 'I have a large tree, which men call the *Ailantus*¹. Its trunk swells out to a large size, but is not fit for a carpenter to apply his line to it; its smaller branches are knotted and crooked, so that the disk and square cannot be used on them. Though planted on the wayside, a builder would not turn his head to look at it. Now your words, Sir, are great, but of no use;—all unite in putting them away from them.' Kwang-ze replied, 'Have you never seen a wild cat or a weasel? There it lies, crouching and low, till the wanderer approaches; east and west it leaps about, avoiding neither what is high nor what is low, till it is caught in a trap, or dies in a net. Again there is the Yak², so large that it is like a cloud hanging in the sky. It is large indeed, but it cannot catch mice. You, Sir, have a large tree and are troubled because it is of no use;—why do you not plant it in a tract where there is nothing else, or in a wide and barren wild?

¹ The *Ailantus glandulosa*, common in the north of China, called 'the fetid tree,' from the odour of its leaves.

² The *bos grunniens* of Thibet, the long tail of which is in great demand for making standards and chowries.

There you might saunter idly by its side, or in the enjoyment of untroubled ease sleep beneath it. Neither bill nor axe would shorten its existence; there would be nothing to injure it. What is there in its uselessness to cause you distress ?'

BOOK II.

PART I. SECTION II.

Khî Wû Lun, or 'The Adjustment of Controversies¹.'

1. Nan-kwo *ʒze-khî*² was seated, leaning forward on his stool. He was looking up to heaven and breathed gently, seeming to be in a trance, and to have lost all consciousness of any companion. (His disciple), Yen *Khǎng ʒze-yû*³, who was in attendance and standing before him, said, 'What is this? Can the body be made to become thus like a withered tree, and the mind to become like slaked lime? His appearance as he leans forward on the stool to-day is such as I never saw him have before in the same position.' *ʒze-khî* said, 'Yen, you do well to ask such a question, I had just now lost myself⁴; but how should you understand it? You

¹ See pp. 128-130.

² Nan-kwo, 'the southern suburb,' had probably been the quarter where *ʒze-khî* had resided, and is used as his surname. He is introduced several times by *Kwang-ʒze* in his writings:—Books IV, 7; XXVII, 4, and perhaps elsewhere.

³ We have the surname of this disciple, Yen (顏); his name, Yen (偃); his honorary or posthumous epithet (*Khǎng*); and his ordinary appellation, *ʒze-yû*. The use of the epithet shows that he and his master had lived before our author.

⁴ 'He had lost himself;' that is, he had become unconscious of all around him, and even of himself, as if he were about to enter

may have heard the notes¹ of Man, but have not heard those of Earth; you may have heard the notes of Earth, but have not heard those of Heaven.'

3ze-yû said, 'I venture to ask from you a description of all these.' The reply was, 'When the breath of the Great Mass (of nature) comes strongly, it is called Wind. Sometimes it does not come so; but when it does, then from a myriad apertures there issues its excited noise;—have you not heard it in a prolonged gale? Take the projecting bluff of a mountain forest;—in the great trees, a hundred spans round, the apertures and cavities are like the nostrils, or the mouth, or the ears; now square, now round like a cup or a mortar; here like a wet footprint, and there like a large puddle. (The sounds issuing from them are like) those of fretted water, of the arrowy whizz, of the stern command, of the inhaling of the breath, of the shout, of the gruff note, of the deep wail, of the sad and piping note. The first notes are slight, and those that follow deeper, but in harmony with them. Gentle winds produce a small response; violent winds a great one. When the fierce gusts have passed away, all the apertures

into the state of 'an Immortal,' a mild form of the Buddhistic samâdhi. But his attitude and appearance were intended by Kwang-3ze to indicate what should be the mental condition in reference to the inquiry pursued in the Book;—a condition, it appears to me, of agnosticism. See the account of Lâu-3ze in a similar trance in Book XXI, par. 4.

¹ The Chinese term here (lâi) denotes a reed or pipe, with three holes, by a combination of which there was formed the rudimentary or reed organ. Our author uses it for the sounds or notes heard in nature, various as the various opinions of men in their discussions about things.

are empty (and still);—have you not seen this in the bending and quivering of the branches and leaves ?’

3ze-yû said, ‘The notes of Earth then are simply those which come from its myriad apertures; and the notes of Man may just be compared to those which (are brought from the tubes of) bamboo;—allow me to ask about the notes of Heaven¹.’ 3ze-khi replied, ‘When (the wind) blows, (the sounds from) the myriad apertures are different, and (its cessation) makes them stop of themselves. Both of these things arise from (the wind and the apertures) themselves:—should there be any other agency that excites them?’

2. Great knowledge is wide and comprehensive; small knowledge is partial and restricted. Great speech is exact and complete; small speech is (merely) so much talk². When we sleep, the soul communicates with (what is external to us); when we awake, the body is set free. Our intercourse with others then leads to various activity, and daily there is the striving of mind with mind. There are hesitations; deep difficulties; reservations; small apprehensions causing restless distress, and great

¹ The sounds of Earth have been described fully and graphically. Of the sounds of Man very little is said, but they form the subject of the next paragraph. Nothing is said in answer to the disciple’s inquiry about the notes of Heaven. It is intimated, however, that there is no necessity to introduce any foreign Influence or Power like Heaven in connexion with the notes of Earth. The term Heaven, indeed, is about to pass with our author into a mere synonym of Tâo, the natural ‘course’ of the phenomena of men and things.

² Words are the ‘sounds’ of Man; and knowledge is the ‘wind’ by which they are excited.

apprehensions producing endless fears. Where their utterances are like arrows from a bow, we have those who feel it their charge to pronounce what is right and what is wrong ; where they are given out like the conditions of a covenant, we have those who maintain their views, determined to overcome. (The weakness of their arguments), like the decay (of things) in autumn and winter, shows the failing (of the minds of some) from day to day ; or it is like their water which, once voided, cannot be gathered up again. Then their ideas seem as if fast bound with cords, showing that the mind is become like an old and dry moat, and that it is nigh to death, and cannot be restored to vigour and brightness.

Joy and anger, sadness and pleasure, anticipation and regret, fickleness and fixedness, vehemence and indolence, eagerness and tardiness ;—(all these moods), like music from an empty tube, or mushrooms from the warm moisture, day and night succeed to one another and come before us, and we do not know whence they sprout. Let us stop ! Let us stop ! Can we expect to find out suddenly how they are produced ?

If there were not (the views of) another, I should not have mine ; if there were not I (with my views), his would be uncalled for :—this is nearly a true statement of the case, but we do not know what it is that makes it be so. It might seem as if there would be a true Governor¹ concerned in it, but we do not find

¹ 'A true Governor' would be a good enough translation for 'the true God.' But Kwang-3ze did not admit any supernatural Power or Being as working in man. His true Governor was the Táo ; and this will be increasingly evident as we proceed with the study of his Books.

any trace (of his presence and acting). That such an One could act so I believe; but we do not see His form. He has affections, but He has no form.

Given the body, with its hundred parts, its nine openings, and its six viscera, all complete in their places, which do I love the most? Do you love them all equally? or do you love some more than others? Is it not the case that they all perform the part of your servants and waiting women? All of them being such, are they not incompetent to rule one another? or do they take it in turns to be now ruler and now servants? There must be a true Ruler (among them)¹ whether by searching you can find out His character or not, there is neither advantage nor hurt, so far as the truth of His operation is concerned. When once we have received the bodily form complete, its parts do not fail to perform their functions till the end comes. In conflict with things or in harmony with them, they pursue their course to the end, with the speed of a galloping horse which cannot be stopped;—is it not sad? To be constantly toiling all one's lifetime, without seeing the fruit of one's labour, and to be weary and worn out with his labour, without knowing where he is going to:—is it not a deplorable case? Men may say, 'But it is not death;' yet of what advantage is this? When the body is decomposed, the mind will be the same along with it:—must not the case be pronounced very deplorable²? Is the life

¹ The name 'Ruler' is different from 'Governor' above; but they both indicate the same concept in the author's mind.

² The proper reply to this would be that the mind is not dissolved with the body; and K'wang-ze's real opinion, as we shall find, was that life and death were but phases in the phenomenal

of man indeed enveloped in such darkness? Is it I alone to whom it appears so? And does it not appear to be so to other men?

3. If we were to follow the judgments of the pre-determined mind, who would be left alone and without a teacher¹? Not only would it be so with those who know the sequences (of knowledge and feeling) and make their own selection among them, but it would be so as well with the stupid and unthinking. For one who has not this determined mind, to have his affirmations and negations is like the case described in the saying, 'He went to Yüeh to-day, and arrived at it yesterday².' It would be making what was not a fact to be a fact. But even the spirit-like Yü³ could not have known how to do this, and how should one like me be able to do it?

But speech is not like the blowing (of the wind); the speaker has (a meaning in) his words. If, however, what he says, be indeterminate (as from a mind not made up), does he then really speak or not? He thinks that his words are different from the chirpings of fledgelings; but is there any distinction between them or not? But how can the Táo be so obscured, that there should be 'a True' and 'a False' in it? How can speech be so obscured that there should be 'the Right' and 'the Wrong' about them? Where shall the Táo go to that it will not

development. But the course of his argument suggests to us the question here, 'Is life worth living?'

¹ This 'teacher' is 'the Táo.'

² Expressing the absurdity of the case. This is one of the sayings of Hui-ze;—see Book XXXIII, par. 7.

³ The successor and counsellor of Shun, who coped with and remedied the flood of Yáo.

be found? Where shall speech be found that it will be inappropriate? Táo becomes obscured through the small comprehension (of the mind), and speech comes to be obscure through the vain-gloriousness (of the speaker). So it is that we have the contentions between the Literati¹ and the Mohists², the one side affirming what the other denies, and vice versâ. If we would decide on their several affirmations and denials, no plan is like bringing the (proper) light (of the mind)³ to bear on them.

All subjects may be looked at from (two points of view),—from that and from this. If I look at a thing from another's point of view, I do not see it; only as I know it myself, do I know it. Hence it is said, 'That view comes from this; and this view is a consequence of that: '—which is the theory that that view and this—(the opposite views)—produce each the other⁴. Although it be so, there is affirmed now life and now death; now death and now life; now the admissibility of a thing and now its inadmissibility; now its inadmissibility and now its admissibility. (The disputants) now affirm and now deny; now deny and now affirm. Therefore the sagely man does not pursue this method, but views things in the light of (his) Heaven⁵ (-ly nature), and hence forms his judgment of what is right.

¹ The followers of Confucius.

² The disciples of Mih-ze, or Mih Tî, the heresiarch, whom Mencius attacked so fiercely;—see Mencius, V, 1, 5, et al. His era must be assigned between Confucius and Mencius.

³ That is, the perfect mind, the principle of the Táo.

⁴ As taught by Hui-ze;—see XXXIII, 7; but it is doubtful if the quotation from Hui's teaching be complete.

⁵ Equivalent to the Táo. See on the use in Láo-ze and Kwang-ze of the term 'Heaven,' in the Introduction, pp. 16-18.

This view is the same as that, and that view is the same as this. But that view involves both a right and a wrong; and this view involves also a right and a wrong:—are there indeed, or are there not the two views, that and this? They have not found their point of correspondency which is called the pivot of the Tâo. As soon as one finds this pivot, he stands in the centre of the ring (of thought), where he can respond without end to the changing views;—without end to those affirming, and without end to those denying. Therefore I said, ‘There is nothing like the proper light (of the mind).’

4. By means of a finger (of my own) to illustrate that the finger (of another) is not a finger is not so good a plan as to illustrate that it is not so by means of what is (acknowledged to be) not a finger; and by means of (what I call) a horse to illustrate that (what another calls) a horse is not so, is not so good a plan as to illustrate that it is not a horse, by means of what is (acknowledged to be) not a horse¹. (All things in) heaven and earth may be (dealt with as) a finger; (each of) their myriads may be (dealt with as) a horse. Does a thing seem so to me? (I say that) it is so. Does it seem not so to me? (I say that) it is not so. A path is formed by (constant)

¹ The language of our author here is understood to have reference to the views of Kung-sun Lung, a contemporary of Hui-ze, and a sophist like him. One of his treatises or arguments had the title of ‘The White Horse,’ and another that of ‘Pointing to Things.’ If these had been preserved, we might have seen more clearly the appropriateness of the text here. But the illustration of the monkeys and their actions shows us the scope of the whole paragraph to be that controversialists, whose views are substantially the same, may yet differ, and that with heat, in words.

treading on the ground. A thing is called by its name through the (constant) application of the name to it. How is it so? It is so because it is so. How is it not so? It is not so, because it is not so. Everything has its inherent character and its proper capability. There is nothing which has not these. Therefore, this being so, if we take a stalk of grain¹ and a (large) pillar, a loathsome (leper) and (a beauty like) Hsî Shih², things large and things insecure, things crafty and things strange;—they may in the light of the Táo all be reduced to the same category (of opinion about them).

It was separation that led to completion; from completion ensued dissolution. But all things, without regard to their completion and dissolution, may again be comprehended in their unity;—it is only the far reaching in thought who know how to comprehend them in this unity. This being so, let us give up our devotion to our own views, and occupy ourselves with the ordinary views. These ordinary views are grounded on the use of things. (The study of that) use leads to the comprehensive judgment, and that judgment secures the success (of the inquiry). That success gained, we are near (to the object of our search), and there we stop. When we stop, and yet we do not know how it is so, we have what is called the Táo.

When we toil our spirits and intelligence, obstin-

¹ The character in the text means both 'a stalk of grain' and 'a horizontal beam.' Each meaning has its advocates here.

² A famous beauty, a courtesan presented by the king of Yüeh to his enemy, the king of Wû, and who hastened on his progress to ruin and death, she herself perishing at the same time.

ately determined (to establish our own view), and do not know the agreement (which underlies it and the views of others), we have what is called 'In the morning three.' What is meant by that 'In the morning three?' A keeper of monkeys, in giving them out their acorns, (once) said, 'In the morning I will give you three (measures) and in the evening four.' This made them all angry, and he said, 'Very well. In the morning I will give you four and in the evening three.' His two proposals were substantially the same, but the result of the one was to make the creatures angry, and of the other to make them pleased:—an illustration of the point I am insisting on. Therefore the sagely man brings together a dispute in its affirmations and denials, and rests in the equal fashioning of Heaven¹. Both sides of the question are admissible.

5. Among the men of old their knowledge reached the extreme point. What was that extreme point? Some held that at first there was not anything. This is the extreme point, the utmost point to which nothing can be added². A second class held that there was something, but without any responsive recognition³ of it (on the part of men).

A third class held that there was such recognition, but there had not begun to be any expression of different opinions about it.

¹ Literally, 'the Heaven-Mould or Moulder,'—another name for the T'ao, by which all things are fashioned.

² See the same passage in Book XXIII, par. 10:

³ The ordinary reading here is fǎng (封), 'a boundary' or 'distinctive limit.' Lin Hsî-kung adopts the reading 對, 'a response,' and I have followed him.

It was through the definite expression of different opinions about it that there ensued injury to (the doctrine of) the Táo. It was this injury to the (doctrine of the) Táo which led to the formation of (partial) preferences. Was it indeed after such preferences were formed that the injury came? or did the injury precede the rise of such preferences? If the injury arose after their formation, *K'áo's* method of playing on the lute was natural. If the injury arose before their formation, there would have been no such playing on the lute as *K'áo's*¹.

K'áo Wăn's playing on the lute, *Shih Kwang's* indicating time with his staff, and *Hui-ze's* (giving his views), while leaning against a dryandra tree (were all extraordinary). The knowledge of the three men (in their several arts) was nearly perfect, and therefore they practised them to the end of their lives. They loved them because they were different from those of others. They loved them and wished to make them known to others. But as they could not be made clear, though they tried to make them so, they ended with the obscure (discussions) about 'the hard' and 'the white.' And their sons², moreover, with all the threads of their fathers' compositions, yet to the end of their lives accomplished nothing. If they, proceeding in this way, could be said to have succeeded, then am I also successful;

¹ *K'áo Wăn* and *Shih Kwang* were both musicians of the state of *Šin*. *Shih*, which appears as *Kwang's* surname, was his denomination as 'music-master.' It is difficult to understand the reason why *Kwang-ze* introduces these men and their ways, or how it helps his argument.

² Perhaps we should read here 'son,' with special reference to the son of *Hui-ze*.

if they cannot be pronounced successful, neither I nor any other can succeed.

Therefore the scintillations of light from the midst of confusion and perplexity are indeed valued by the sagely man ; but not to use one's own views and to take his position on the ordinary views is what is called using the (proper) light.

6. But here now are some other sayings¹ :—I do not know whether they are of the same character as those which I have already given, or of a different character. Whether they be of the same character or not when looked at along with them, they have a character of their own, which cannot be distinguished from the others. But though this be the case, let me try to explain myself.

There was a beginning. There was a beginning before that beginning². There was a beginning previous to that beginning before there was the beginning.

There was existence ; there had been no existence. There was no existence before the beginning of that no existence². There was no existence previous to the no existence before there was the beginning of the no existence. If suddenly there was non-existence, we do not know whether it was really anything existing, or really not existing. Now I have said what I have said, but I do not know whether what I have said be really anything to the point or not.

¹ Referring, I think, to those below commencing 'There was a beginning.'

² That is, looking at things from the standpoint of an original non-existence, and discarding all considerations of space and time.

Under heaven there is nothing greater than the tip of an autumn down, and the Thâi mountain is small. There is no one more long-lived than a child which dies prematurely, and Phăng 3û did not live out his time. Heaven, Earth, and I were produced together, and all things and I are one. Since they are one, can there be speech about them? But since they are spoken of as one, must there not be room for speech? One and Speech are two; two and one are three. Going on from this (in our enumeration), the most skilful reckoner cannot reach (the end of the necessary numbers), and how much less can ordinary people do so! Therefore from non-existence we proceed to existence till we arrive at three; proceeding from existence to existence, to how many should we reach? Let us abjure such procedure, and simply rest here¹.

7. The Tâo at first met with no responsive recognition. Speech at first had no constant forms of expression. Because of this there came the demarcations (of different views). Let me describe those demarcations :—they are the Left and the Right²; the Relations and their Obligations³; Classifications⁴

¹ On this concluding clause, 3iâu Hung says :—‘ Avoiding such procedure, there will be no affirmations and denials (no contraries). The phrase 因是已 occurs in the Book several times, and interpreters have missed its meaning from not observing that 是已 serve merely as a final particle, and often have the 因 added to them, without affecting its meaning.’ See also Wang Yin on the usages of 因 in the 皇清經解, ch. 1208, art. 6.

² That is, direct opposites.

³ Literally, ‘ righteousneses; ’ the proper way of dealing with the relations.

⁴ Literally, ‘ separations.’

and their Distinctions ; Emulations and Contentions. These are what are called 'the Eight Qualities.' Outside the limits of the world of men¹, the sage occupies his thoughts, but does not discuss about anything; inside those limits he occupies his thoughts, but does not pass any judgments. In the *Khun K'hiu*², which embraces the history of the former kings, the sage indicates his judgments, but does not argue (in vindication of them). Thus it is that he separates his characters from one another without appearing to do so, and argues without the form of argument. How does he do so? The sage cherishes his views in his own breast, while men generally state theirs argumentatively, to show them to others. Hence we have the saying, 'Disputation is a proof of not seeing clearly.'

The Great T'ao³ does not admit of being praised. The Great Argument does not require words. Great Benevolence is not (officiously) benevolent. Great Disinterestedness does not vaunt its humility. Great Courage is not seen in stubborn bravery.

The T'ao that is displayed is not the T'ao. Words that are argumentative do not reach the point. Benevolence that is constantly exercised does not accomplish its object. Disinterestedness that vaunts its purity is not genuine. Courage that is most stub-

¹ Literally, 'the six conjunctions,' meaning the four cardinal points of space, with the zenith and nadir; sometimes a name for the universe of space. Here we must restrict the meaning as I have done.

² 'The Spring and Autumn;—Confucius's Annals of Lû, here complimented by *Kwang-3ze*. See in Mencius, IV, ii, 21.

³ Compare the T'ao Teh K'ing, ch. 25, et al.

born is ineffectual. These five seem to be round (and complete), but they tend to become square (and immovable)¹. Therefore the knowledge that stops at what it does not know is the greatest. Who knows the argument that needs no words, and the Way that is not to be trodden²?

He who is able to know this has what is called 'The Heavenly Treasure-house'³. He may pour into it without its being filled; he may pour from it without its being exhausted; and all the while he does not know whence (the supply) comes. This is what is called 'The Store of Light'³.

Therefore of old Yáo asked Shun, saying, 'I wish to smite (the rulers of) Jung, Kwei, and Hsü-áo⁴. Even when standing in my court, I cannot get them out of my mind. How is it so?' Shun replied, 'Those three rulers live (in their little states) as if they were among the mugwort and other brushwood;—how is it that you cannot get them out of your mind? Formerly, ten suns came out together, and all things were illuminated by them;—how much should (your) virtue exceed (all) suns!'

8. Nieh K'üeh⁵ asked Wang Í⁵, saying, 'Do you know, Sir, what all creatures agree in approving and

¹ Compare the use of 方 in the Shû K'ing, I, iii, 11.

² The classic of Láo, in chaps. 1, 2.

³ Names for the Táo.

⁴ Three small states. Is Yáo's wish to smite an instance of the 'quality' of 'emulation' or jealousy?

⁵ Both Taoistic worthies of the time of Yáo, supposed to have been two of the Perfect Ones whom Yáo visited on the distant hill of K'ü-shih (I, par. 6). According to Hwang Mí, Wang Í was the teacher of Nieh K'üeh, and he again of Hsü Yü.

affirming?' 'How should I know it?' was the reply. 'Do you know what it is that you do not know?' asked the other again, and he got the same reply. He asked a third time,—'Then are all creatures thus without knowledge?' and Wang Í answered as before, (adding however), 'Notwithstanding, I will try and explain my meaning. How do you know that when I say "I know it," I really (am showing that) I do not know it, and that when I say "I do not know it," I really am showing that I do know it¹.' And let me ask you some questions:—'If a man sleep in a damp place, he will have a pain in his loins, and half his body will be as if it were dead; but will it be so with an eel? If he be living in a tree, he will be frightened and all in a tremble; but will it be so with a monkey? And does any one of the three know his right place? Men eat animals that have been fed on grain and grass; deer feed on the thick-set grass; centipedes enjoy small snakes; owls and crows delight in mice; but does any one of the four know the right taste? The dog-headed monkey finds its mate in the female gibbon; the elk and the axis deer cohabit; and the eel enjoys itself with other fishes. Máo 3hiang² and Lì Kî² were accounted by men to be most beautiful, but when fishes saw them, they dived deep in the water from them; when birds, they flew from them aloft; and

¹ Compare par. 1 of Book XXII.

² Two famous beauties;—the former, a contemporary of Hsî Shih (par. 4, note 2), and like her also, of the state of Yüeh; the latter, the daughter of a barbarian chief among the Western Jung. She was captured by duke Hsien of 3in, in B. C. 672. He subsequently made her his wife,—to the great injury of his family and state.

when deer saw them, they separated and fled away¹. But did any of these four know which in the world is the right female attraction? As I look at the matter, the first principles of benevolence and righteousness and the paths of approval and disapproval are inextricably mixed and confused together:—how is it possible that I should know how to discriminate among them?’

Nieh *Khüeh* said (further), ‘Since you, Sir, do not know what is advantageous and what is hurtful, is the Perfect man also in the same way without the knowledge of them?’ Wang *Î* replied, ‘The Perfect man is spirit-like. Great lakes might be boiling about him, and he would not feel their heat; the Ho and the Han might be frozen up, and he would not feel the cold; the hurrying thunderbolts might split the mountains, and the wind shake the ocean, without being able to make him afraid. Being such, he mounts on the clouds of the air, rides on the sun and moon, and rambles at ease beyond the four seas. Neither death nor life makes any change in him, and how much less should the considerations of advantage and injury do so²!’

9. *Khü* *ÿhiào-ÿze*³ asked *Khang-wû* *ÿze*³, saying,

¹ Not thinking them beautiful, as men did, but frightened and repelled by them.

² Compare Book I, pars. 3 and 5.

³ We know nothing of the former of these men, but what is mentioned here; the other appears also in Book XXV, 6, q. v. If ‘the master’ that immediately follows be Confucius they must have been contemporary with him. The *Khü* in *Khang-wû*’s reply would seem to make it certain ‘the master’ was Confucius, but the oldest critics, and some modern ones as well, think that *Khang-wû*’s name was also *Khü*. But this view is attended with more

‘I heard the Master (speaking of such language as the following):—“The sagely man does not occupy himself with worldly affairs. He does not put himself in the way of what is profitable, nor try to avoid what is hurtful; he has no pleasure in seeking (for anything from any one); he does not care to be found in (any established) Way; he speaks without speaking; he does not speak when he speaks; thus finding his enjoyment outside the dust and dirt (of the world).” The Master considered all this to be a shoreless flow of mere words, and I consider it to describe the course of the Mysterious Way.—What do you, Sir, think of it?’ *Khang-wû 3ze* replied, ‘The hearing of such words would have perplexed even Hwang-Tî, and how should *K’hiû* be competent to understand them? And you, moreover, are too hasty in forming your estimate (of their meaning). You see the egg, and (immediately) look out for the cock (that is to be hatched from it); you see the bow, and (immediately) look out for the dove (that is to be brought down by it) being roasted. I will try to explain the thing to you in a rough way; do you in the same way listen to me.

‘How could any one stand by the side of the sun and moon, and hold under his arm all space and all time? (Such language only means that the sagely man) keeps his mouth shut, and puts aside questions that are uncertain and dark; making his inferior capacities unite with him in honouring (the One Lord). Men in general bustle about and toil; the

difficulties than the other. By the clause interjected in the translation after the first ‘Master,’ I have avoided the incongruity of ascribing the long description of Tâoism to Confucius.

sagely man seems stupid and to know nothing¹. He blends ten thousand years together in the one (conception of time); the myriad things all pursue their spontaneous course, and they are all before him as doing so.

‘How do I know that the love of life is not a delusion? and that the dislike of death is not like a young person’s losing his way, and not knowing that he is (really) going home? *Lî Kî*² was a daughter of the border Warden of *Âi*. When (the ruler of) the state of *Ûin* first got possession of her, she wept till the tears wetted all the front of her dress. But when she came to the place of the king³, shared with him his luxurious couch, and ate his grain-and-grass-fed meat, then she regretted that she had wept. How do I know that the dead do not repent of their former craving for life?

‘Those who dream of (the pleasures of) drinking may in the morning wail and weep; those who dream of wailing and weeping may in the morning be going out to hunt. When they were dreaming they did not know it was a dream; in their dream they may even have tried to interpret it⁴; but when they awoke they knew that it was a dream. And

¹ Compare *Lão-ze*’s account of himself in his *Work*, ch. 20.

² See note 2 on page 191. The lady is there said to have been the daughter of a barbarian chief; here she appears as the child of the border Warden of *Âi*. But her maiden surname of *Kî* (姬) shows her father must have been a scion of the royal family of *Kâu*. Had he forsaken his wardenship, and joined one of the *Tî* tribes, which had adopted him as its chief?

³ *Ûin* was only a marquise. How does *Kwang-ze* speak of its ruler as ‘a king?’

⁴ This could not be; a man does not come to himself in his dream, and in that state try to interpret it.

there is the great awaking, after which we shall know that this life was a great dream¹. All the while, the stupid think they are awake, and with nice discrimination insist on their knowledge; now playing the part of rulers, and now of grooms. Bigoted was that *K'hiû*! He and you are both dreaming. I who say that you are dreaming am dreaming myself. These words seem very strange; but if after ten thousand ages we once meet with a great sage who knows how to explain them, it will be as if we met him (unexpectedly) some morning or evening.

10. 'Since you made me enter into this discussion with you, if you have got the better of me and not I of you, are you indeed right, and I indeed wrong? If I have got the better of you and not you of me, am I indeed right and you indeed wrong? Is the one of us right and the other wrong? are we both right or both wrong? Since we cannot come to a mutual and common understanding, men will certainly continue in darkness on the subject.

'Whom shall I employ to adjudicate in the matter? If I employ one who agrees with you, how can he, agreeing with you, do so correctly? And the same may be said, if I employ one who agrees with me. It will be the same if I employ one who differs from us both or one who agrees with us both. In this way I and you and those others would all not be able to come to a mutual understanding; and shall we then wait for that (great sage)? (We need not do so.) To wait on others to learn how conflicting opinions are changed is simply like not so

¹ Compare XVIII, par. 4.

waiting at all. The harmonising of them is to be found in the invisible operation of Heaven, and by following this on into the unlimited past. It is by this method that we can complete our years (without our minds being disturbed)¹.

‘What is meant by harmonising (conflicting opinions) in the invisible operation of Heaven? There is the affirmation and the denial of it; and there is the assertion of an opinion and the rejection of it. If the affirmation be according to the reality of the fact, it is certainly different from the denial of it:—there can be no dispute about that. If the assertion of an opinion be correct, it is certainly different from its rejection:—neither can there be any dispute about that. Let us forget the lapse of time; let us forget the conflict of opinions. Let us make our appeal to the Infinite, and take up our position there².’

II. The Penumbra asked the Shadow³, saying, ‘Formerly you were walking on, and now you have stopped; formerly you were sitting, and now you have risen up:—how is it that you are so without stability?’ The Shadow replied, ‘I wait for the movements of something else to do what I do, and that something else on which I wait waits further

¹ See this passage again in Book XXVII, par. 1, where the phrase which I have called here ‘the invisible operation of Heaven,’ is said to be the same as ‘the Heavenly Mould or Moulder,’ that is, the Heavenly Fashioner, one of the Taoistic names for the T’ao.

² That is, all things being traced up to the unity of the T’ao, we have found the pivot to which all conflicting opinions, all affirmations, all denials, all positions and negatives converge, and bring to bear on them the proper light of the mind. Compare paragraph 3.

³ A story to the same effect as this here, with some textual variations, occurs in Book XXVII, immediately after par. 1 referred to above.

on another to do as it does¹. My waiting,—is it for the scales of a snake, or the wings of a cicada²? How should I know why I do one thing, or do not do another³?

‘Formerly, I, *Kwang Kâu*, dreamt that I was a butterfly, a butterfly flying about, feeling that it was enjoying itself. I did not know that it was *Kâu*. Suddenly I awoke, and was myself again, the veritable *Kâu*. I did not know whether it had formerly been *Kâu* dreaming that he was a butterfly, or it was now a butterfly dreaming that it was *Kâu*. But between *Kâu* and a butterfly there must be a difference⁴. This is a case of what is called the Transformation of Things⁴.’

¹ The mind cannot rest in second causes, and the first cause, if there be one, is inscrutable.

² Even these must wait for the will of the creature; but the case of the shadow is still more remarkable.

³ I have put this interrogatively, as being more graphic, and because of the particle 耶, which is generally, though not necessarily, interrogative.

⁴ Hsüan Ying, in his remarks on these two sentences, brings out the force of the story very successfully:—‘Looking at them in their ordinary appearance, there was necessarily a difference between them, but in the delusion of the dream each of them appeared the other, and they could not distinguish themselves! *Kâu* could be a butterfly, and the butterfly could be *Kâu*;—we may see that in the world all traces of that and this may pass away, as they come under the influence of transformations.’ For the phrase, ‘the transformation of things,’ see in Book XI, par. 5, et al. But the Tâoism here can hardly be distinguished from the Buddhism that holds that all human experience is merely so much *mâya* or illusion.

BOOK III.

PART I. SECTION III.

Yang Shang K'ü, or 'Nourishing the Lord of Life'.¹

1. There is a limit to our life, but to knowledge there is no limit. With what is limited to pursue after what is unlimited is a perilous thing; and when, knowing this, we still seek the increase of our knowledge, the peril cannot be averted². There should not be the practice of what is good with any thought of the fame (which it will bring), nor of what is evil with any approximation to the punishment (which it will incur)³:—an accordance with the Central Element (of our nature)⁴ is the regular way to preserve the body, to maintain the life, to nourish our parents, and to complete our term of years.

2. His cook⁵ was cutting up an ox for the ruler Wăn-hui⁵. Whenever he applied his hand, leaned forward with his shoulder, planted his foot, and em-

¹ See pp. 130, 131.

² Under what is said about knowledge here there lies the objection of Tâoists to the Confucian pursuit of knowledge as the means for the right conduct of life, instead of the quiet simplicity and self-suppression of their own system.

³ This is the key to the three paragraphs that follow. But the text of it is not easily construed. The 'doing good' and the 'doing evil' are to be lightly understood.

⁴ A name for the Tâo.

⁵ 'The ruler Wăn-hui' is understood to be 'king Hui of Liang (or Wei),' with the account of an interview between whom and Mencius the works of that philosopher commence.

ployed the pressure of his knee, in the audible ripping off of the skin, and slicing operation of the knife, the sounds were all in regular cadence. Movements and sounds proceeded as in the dance of 'the Mulberry Forest'¹ and the blended notes of 'the King Shâu'. The ruler said, 'Ah! Admirable! That your art should have become so perfect!' (Having finished his operation), the cook laid down his knife, and replied to the remark, 'What your servant loves is the method of the Tào, something in advance of any art. When I first began to cut up an ox, I saw nothing but the (entire) carcass. After three years I ceased to see it as a whole. Now I deal with it in a spirit-like manner, and do not look at it with my eyes. The use of my senses is discarded, and my spirit acts as it wills. Observing the natural lines, (my knife) slips through the great crevices and slides through the great cavities, taking advantage of the facilities thus presented. My art avoids the membranous ligatures, and much more the great bones.

'A good cook changes his knife every year;—(it may have been injured) in cutting; an ordinary cook changes his every month;—(it may have been) broken. Now my knife has been in use for nineteen years; it has cut up several thousand oxen, and yet its edge is as sharp as if it had newly come from the whetstone. There are the interstices of the joints, and the edge of the knife has no (appreciable) thickness; when that which is so thin enters where the interstice is, how easily it moves along! The

¹ Two pieces of music, ascribed to K'äng Thang and Hwang-Ti.

blade has more than room enough. Nevertheless, whenever I come to a complicated joint, and see that there will be some difficulty, I proceed anxiously and with caution, not allowing my eyes to wander from the place, and moving my hand slowly. Then by a very slight movement of the knife, the part is quickly separated, and drops like (a clod of) earth to the ground. Then standing up with the knife in my hand, I look all round, and in a leisurely manner, with an air of satisfaction, wipe it clean, and put it in its sheath.' The ruler Wăn-hui said, 'Excellent! I have heard the words of my cook, and learned from them the nourishment of (our) life.'

3. When Kung-wăn Hsien¹ saw the Master of the Left, he was startled, and said, 'What sort of man is this? How is it he has but one foot? Is it from Heaven? or from Man?' Then he added², 'It must be from Heaven, and not from Man. Heaven's making of this man caused him to have but one foot. In the person of man, each foot has its marrow. By this I know that his peculiarity is from Heaven, and not from Man. A pheasant of the marshes has to take ten steps to pick up a mouthful of food, and thirty steps to get a drink, but it does not seek to be nourished in a coop. Though its spirit would (there) enjoy a royal abundance, it does not think (such confinement) good.'

¹ There was a family in Wei with the double surname Kung-wăn. This would be a scion of it.

² This is Hsien still speaking. We have to understand his reasoning *ad sensum* and not *ad verbum*. The master of the Left had done 'evil,' so as to incur the punishment from which he suffered; and had shown himself less wise than a pheasant.

4. When Láo Tan died¹, *K'hin Shih*² went to condole (with his son), but after crying out three times, he came out. The disciples³ said to him, 'Were you not a friend of the Master?' 'I was,' he replied, and they said, 'Is it proper then to offer your condolences merely as you have done?' He said, 'It is. At first I thought he was the man of men, and now I do not think so. When I entered a little ago and expressed my condolences, there were the old men wailing as if they had lost a son, and the young men wailing as if they had lost their mother. In his attracting and uniting them to himself in such a way there must have been that which made them involuntarily express their words (of condolence), and involuntarily wail, as they were doing. And this was a hiding from himself of his Heaven (-nature), and an excessive indulgence of his (human) feelings;—a forgetting of what he had received (in being born); what the ancients called the punishment due to neglecting the Heaven (-nature)⁴. When the Master came⁵, it was at the proper time; when he went away, it was the simple sequence (of his coming). Quiet acquiescence in what happens at its proper time, and quietly submitting (to its ceasing) afford no occasion for grief or for joy⁶. The ancients described (death) as the loosening of the

¹ Then the account that Láo-3ze went westwards, and that nothing is known as to where he died, must be without foundation.

² Nothing more is known of this person.

³ Probably the disciples of Láo-3ze.

⁴ Láo had gone to an excess in his 'doing good,' as if he were seeking reputation.

⁵ Into the world.

⁶ See *Kwang-3ze's* remarks and demeanour on the death of his wife, in Book XVIII.

cord on which God suspended (the life)¹. What we can point to are the faggots that have been consumed; but the fire is transmitted (elsewhere), and we know not that it is over and ended².

¹ This short sentence is remarkable by the use of the character Tî (帝), 'God,' in it, a usage here ascribed to the ancients.

² The concluding sentence might stand as a short paragraph by itself. The 'faggots' are understood to represent the body, and the 'fire' the animating spirit. The body perishes at death as the faggots are consumed by the fire. But the fire may be transmitted to other faggots, and so the spirit may migrate, and be existing elsewhere.

BOOK IV.

PART I. SECTION IV.

Zăn Kien Shih, or 'Man in the World, Associated with other Men¹.'

1. Yen Hui² went to see *Kung-nî*³, and asked leave to take his departure. 'Where are you going to?' asked the Master. 'I will go to Wei⁴' was the reply. 'And with what object?' 'I have heard that the ruler of Wei⁵ is in the vigour of his years, and consults none but himself as to his course. He deals with his state as if it were a light matter, and has no perception of his errors. He thinks lightly of his people's dying; the dead are lying all over the country as if no smaller space could contain them; on the plains⁶ and about the marshes, they are as thick as heaps of fuel. The people know not where to turn to. I have heard you, Master, say, "Leave the state that is well

¹ See pp. 131, 132.

² The favourite disciple of Confucius, styled also *Ze-yüan*.

³ Of course, Confucius;—his designation or married name.

⁴ A feudal state, embracing portions of the present provinces of Ho-nan, Kih-lî, and Shan-tung. There was another state, which we must also call Wei in English, though the Chinese characters of them are different;—one of the fragments of the great state of Jin, more to the west.

⁵ At this time the marquis Yüan, known to us by his posthumous title of duke Ling;—see Book XXV, 9.

⁶ Adopting Lin's reading of 平 instead of the common 平.

governed; go to the state where disorder prevails¹." At the door of a physician there are many who are ill. I wish through what I have heard (from you) to think out some methods (of dealing with Wei), if peradventure the evils of the state may be cured.'

Kung-ni said, 'Alas! The risk is that you will go only to suffer in the punishment (of yourself)! The right method (in such a case) will not admit of any admixture. With such admixture, the one method will become many methods. Their multiplication will embarrass you. That embarrassment will make you anxious. However anxious you may be, you will not save (yourself). The perfect men of old first had (what they wanted to do) in themselves, and afterwards they found (the response to it) in others. If what they wanted in themselves was not fixed, what leisure had they to go and interfere with the proceedings of any tyrannous man?

'Moreover, do you know how virtue is liable to be dissipated, and how wisdom proceeds to display itself? Virtue is dissipated in (the pursuit of) the name for it, and wisdom seeks to display itself in the striving with others. In the pursuit of the name men overthrow one another; wisdom becomes a weapon of contention. Both these things are instruments of evil, and should not be allowed to have free course in one's conduct. Supposing one's virtue to be great and his sincerity firm, if he do not comprehend the spirit of those (whom he wishes to influence); and supposing he is free from the

¹ Compare in the Analects, VIII, xiii, 2, where a different lesson is given; but Confucius may at another time have spoken as Hui says.

disposition to strive for reputation, if he do not comprehend their minds;—when in such a case he forcibly insists on benevolence and righteousness, setting them forth in the strongest and most direct language, before the tyrant, then he, hating (his reprover's) possession of those excellences, will put him down as doing him injury. He who injures others is sure to be injured by them in return. You indeed will hardly escape being injured by the man (to whom you go)!

‘Further, if perchance he takes pleasure in men of worth and hates those of an opposite character, what is the use of your seeking to make yourself out to be different (from such men about him)? Before you have begun to announce (your views), he, as king and ruler, will take advantage of you, and immediately contend with you for victory. Your eyes will be dazed and full of perplexity; you will try to look pleased with him; you will frame your words with care; your demeanour will be conformed to his; you will confirm him in his views. In this way you will be adding fire to fire, and water to water, increasing, as we may express it, the evils (which you deplore). To these signs of deferring to him at the first there will be no end. You will be in danger, seeing he does not believe you, of making your words more strong; and you are sure to die at the hands of such a tyrant.

‘And formerly *Kieh*¹ killed *Kwan Lung-fang*², and *Kâu*³ killed the prince *Pi-kan*⁴. Both of

¹ The tyrant with whom the dynasty of Hsiâ ended.

² A worthy minister of *Kieh*.

³ The tyrant with whom the dynasty of Shang or Yin ended.

⁴ A half-brother of *Kâu*, the tyrant of the Yin dynasty.

these cultivated their persons, bending down in sympathy with the lower people to comfort them suffering (as they did) from their oppressors, and on their account opposing their superiors. On this account, because they so ordered their conduct, their rulers compassed their destruction:—such regard had they for their own fame. (Again), Yáo anciently attacked (the states of) ʒhung-kih¹ and Hsü-áo¹, and Yü attacked the ruler of Hû¹. Those states were left empty, and with no one to continue their population, the people being exterminated. They had engaged in war without ceasing; their craving for whatever they could get was insatiable. And this (ruler of Wei) is, like them, one who craves after fame and greater substance;—have you not heard it? Those sages were not able to overcome the thirst for fame and substance;—how much less will you be able to do so! Nevertheless you must have some ground (for the course which you wish to take); pray try and tell it to me.’

Yen Hui said, ‘May I go, doing so in uprightness and humility, using also every endeavour to be uniform (in my plans of operation)?’ ‘No, indeed!’ was the reply. ‘How can you do so? This man makes a display² of being filled to overflowing (with virtue), and has great self-conceit. His feelings are not to be determined from his countenance. Ordinary men do not (venture to) oppose him, and he proceeds from the way in which he affects them

¹ See in par. 7, Book II, where Hsü-áo is mentioned, though not ʒhung-kih. See the Shû, III, ii.

² I take 陽 here as = 佯;—a meaning given in the Khang-hsi dictionary.

to seek still more the satisfaction of his own mind. He may be described as unaffected by the (small lessons of) virtue brought to bear on him from day to day; and how much less will he be so by your great lessons? He will be obstinate, and refuse to be converted. He may outwardly agree with you, but inwardly there will be no self-condemnation;—how can you (go to him in this way and be successful)?

(Yen Hui) rejoined, 'Well then; while inwardly maintaining my straightforward intention, I will outwardly seem to bend to him. I will deliver (my lessons), and substantiate them by appealing to antiquity. Inwardly maintaining my straightforward intention, I shall be a co-worker with Heaven. When I thus speak of being a co-worker with Heaven, it is because I know that (the sovereign, whom we style) the son of Heaven, and myself, are equally regarded by Heaven as Its sons. And should I then, as if my words were only my own, be seeking to find whether men approved of them, or disapproved of them? In this way men will pronounce me a (sincere and simple¹) boy. This is what is called being a co-worker with Heaven.

'Outwardly bending (to the ruler), I shall be a co-worker with other men. To carry (the memorandum tablet to court)², to kneel, and to bend the body reverentially:—these are the observances of ministers. They all employ them, and should I presume not to do so? Doing what other men do, they would have no occasion to blame me. This

¹ Entirely unsophisticated, governed by the Tâo.

² See the *Lî K'î*, XI, ii, 16, 17.

is what is called being a fellow-worker with other men.

‘Fully declaring my sentiments and substantiating them by appealing to antiquity, I shall be a co-worker with the ancients. Although the words in which I convey my lessons may really be condemnatory (of the ruler), they will be those of antiquity, and not my own. In this way, though straightforward, I shall be free from blame. This is what is called being a co-worker with antiquity. May I go to Wei in this way, and be successful?’ ‘No indeed!’ said *Kung-ni*. ‘How can you do so? You have too many plans of proceeding, and have not spied out (the ruler’s character). Though you firmly adhere to your plans, you may be held free from transgression, but this will be all the result. How can you (in this way) produce the transformation (which you desire)? All this only shows (in you) the mind of a teacher!’

2. Yen Hui said, ‘I can go no farther; I venture to ask the method from you.’ *Kung-ni* replied, ‘It is fasting¹, (as) I will tell you. (But) when you have the method, will you find it easy to practise it? He who thinks it easy will be disapproved of by the bright Heaven.’ Hui said, ‘My family is poor. For months together we have no spirituous drink, nor do we taste the proscribed food or any strong-smelling vegetables²;—can this be regarded as fasting?’ The reply was, ‘It is the fasting appropriate to sacrificing, but it is not the fasting

¹ The term is emphatic, as Confucius goes on to explain.

² Such as onions and garlic, with horse, dog, cow, goose, and pigeon.

of the mind.' 'I venture to ask what that fasting of the mind is,' said Hui, and *K'ung-ni* answered, 'Maintain a perfect unity in every movement of your will. You will not wait for the hearing of your ears about it, but for the hearing of your mind. You will not wait even for the hearing of your mind, but for the hearing of the spirit¹. Let the hearing (of the ears) rest with the ears. Let the mind rest in the verification (of the rightness of what is in the will). But the spirit is free from all pre-occupation and so waits for (the appearance of) things. Where the (proper) course is², there is freedom from all pre-occupation;—such freedom is the fasting of the mind.' Hui said³, 'Before it was possible for me to employ (this method), there I was, the Hui that I am; now, that I can employ it, the Hui that I was has passed away. Can I be said to have obtained this freedom from pre-occupation?' The Master replied, 'Entirely. I tell you that you can enter and be at ease in the enclosure (where he is), and not come into collision with the reputation (which belongs to him). If he listen to your counsels, let him hear your notes; if he will not listen, be silent. Open no (other) door; employ no other medicine; dwell with him (as with a friend) in the same apartment, and as if you had no other option, and you will not be far from success in your object. Not to move a step is easy; to walk without treading on the ground is difficult. In acting after the manner of men, it is easy to fall

¹ The character in the text for 'spirit' here is 氣, 'the breath.'

² The Táo.

³ 'Said;' probably, after having made trial of this fasting.

into hypocrisy; in acting after the manner of Heaven, it is difficult to play the hypocrite. I have heard of flying with wings; I have not heard of flying without them. I have heard of the knowledge of the wise; I have not heard of the knowledge of the unwise. Look at that aperture (left in the wall);—the empty apartment is filled with light through it. Felicitous influences rest (in the mind thus emblemed), as in their proper resting place. Even when they do not so rest, we have what is called (the body) seated and (the mind) galloping abroad. The information that comes through the ears and eyes is comprehended internally, and the knowledge of the mind becomes something external:—(when this is the case), the spiritual intelligences will come, and take up their dwelling with us, and how much more will other men do so! All things thus undergo a transforming influence. This was the hinge on which Yü and Shun moved; it was this which Fû-hsî¹ and Kî-khü² practised all their lives: how much more should other men follow the same rule!’

3. 3ze-káo³, duke of Sheh, being about to proceed on a mission to K’hi, asked Kung-nî, saying, ‘The king is sending me, Kû-liang³, on a mission which

¹ Often spoken of as Fo-hî, the founder of the Chinese kingdom. His place in chronology should be assigned to him more than b.c. 3000 rather than under that date.

² A predecessor of Fû-hsî, a sovereign of the ancient paradisiacal time.

³ The name of Sheh remains in Sheh-hsien, a district of the department Nan-yang, Ho-nan. Its governor, who is the subject of this narrative, was a Shǎn Kû-liang, styled 3ze-káo. He was

is very important. *K'hi* will probably treat me as his commissioner with great respect, but it will not be in a hurry (to attend to the business). Even an ordinary man cannot be readily moved (to action), and how much less the prince of a state! I am very full of apprehension. You, Sir, once said to me that of all things, great or small, there were few which, if not conducted in the proper way¹, could be brought to a happy conclusion; that, if the thing were not successful, there was sure to be the evil of being dealt with after the manner of men²; that, if it were successful, there was sure to be the evil of constant anxiety³; and that, whether it succeeded or not, it was only the virtuous man who could secure its not being followed by evil. In my diet I take what is coarse, and do not seek delicacies,—a man whose cookery does not require him to be using cooling drinks. This morning I received my charge, and in the evening I am drinking iced water;—am I not feeling the internal heat (and discomfort)? Such is my state before I have actually engaged in the affair;—I am already suffering from conflicting anxieties. And if the thing do not succeed, (the king) is sure to deal with me after the manner of men. The evil is twofold; as a minister, I am not able to bear the burden (of the mission). Can

not a duke, but as the counts of *K'hi* had usurped the name of king, they gave high-sounding names to all their ministers and officers.

¹ Or, 'according to the Tâo.'

² As a criminal; punished by his sovereign.

³ Anxiety 'night and day,' or 'cold and hot' fits of trouble;—a peculiar usage of Yin Yang.

you, Sir, tell me something (to help me in the case)?'

Kung-nî replied, 'In all things under heaven there are two great cautionary considerations:—the one is the requirement implanted (in the nature)¹; the other is the conviction of what is right. The love of a son for his parents is the implanted requirement, and can never be separated from his heart; the service of his ruler by a minister is what is right, and from its obligation there is no escaping anywhere between heaven and earth. These are what are called the great cautionary considerations. Therefore a son finds his rest in serving his parents without reference to or choice of place; and this is the height of filial duty. In the same way a subject finds his rest in serving his ruler, without reference to or choice of the business; and this is the fullest discharge of loyalty. When men are simply obeying (the dictates of) their hearts, the considerations of grief and joy are not readily set before them. They know that there is no alternative to their acting as they do, and rest in it as what is appointed; and this is the highest achievement of virtue. He who is in the position of a minister or of a son has indeed to do what he cannot but do. Occupied with the details of the business (in hand), and forgetful of his own person, what leisure has he to think of his pleasure in living or his dislike of death? You, my master, may well proceed on your mission.

'But let me repeat to you what I have heard :—In

¹ The Ming of the text here is that in the first sentence of the *Kung Yung*.

all intercourse (between states), if they are near to each other, there should be mutual friendliness, verified by deeds; if they are far apart, there must be sincere adherence to truth in their messages. Those messages will be transmitted by internuncios. But to convey messages which express the complacency or the dissatisfaction of the two parties is the most difficult thing in the world. If they be those of mutual complacency, there is sure to be an overflow of expressions of satisfaction; if of mutual dissatisfaction, an overflow of expressions of dislike. But all extravagance leads to reckless language, and such language fails to command belief. When this distrust arises, woe to the internuncio! Hence the Rules for Speech¹ say, "Transmit the message exactly as it stands; do not transmit it with any overflow of language; so is (the internuncio) likely to keep himself whole."

4. 'Moreover, skilful wrestlers begin with open trials of strength, but always end with masked attempts (to gain the victory); as their excitement grows excessive, they display much wonderful dexterity. Parties drinking according to the rules at first observe good order, but always end with disorder; as their excitement grows excessive, their fun becomes uproarious². In all things it is so. People are at first sincere, but always end with becoming rude; at the commencement things are treated as trivial,

¹ Probably a Collection of Directions current at the time; and which led to the name of Yang Hsiung's Treatise with the same name in our first century.

² See the Shih, II, vii, 6.

but as the end draws near, they assume great proportions. Words are (like) the waves acted on by the wind; the real point of the matters (discussed by them) is lost. The wind and waves are easily set in motion; the success of the matter of which the real point is lost is easily put in peril. Hence quarrels are occasioned by nothing so much as by artful words and one-sided speeches. The breath comes angrily, as when a beast, driven to death, wildly bellows forth its rage. On this animosities arise on both sides. Hasty examination (of the case) eagerly proceeds, and revengeful thoughts arise in their minds;—they do not know how. Since they do not know how such thoughts arise, who knows how they will end? Hence the Rules for Speech¹ say, “Let not an internuncius depart from his instructions. Let him not urge on a settlement. If he go beyond the regular rules, he will complicate matters. Departing from his instructions and urging on a settlement imperils negotiations. A good settlement is proved by its lasting long, and a bad settlement cannot be altered;—ought he not to be careful?”

‘Further still, let your mind find its enjoyment in the circumstances of your position; nourish the central course which you pursue, by a reference to your unavoidable obligations. This is the highest object for you to pursue; what else can you do to fulfil the charge (of your father and ruler)². The best thing you can do is to be prepared to sacrifice your life; and this is the most difficult thing to do.’

¹ See above, on preceding page.

² Not meaning the king of *K'û*; but the *T'ao*, whose will was to be found in his nature and the conditions of his lot.

5. Yen Ho¹, being about to undertake the office of Teacher of the eldest son of duke Ling of Wei, consulted *K'ü Po-yü*². 'Here,' said he, 'is this (young) man, whose natural disposition is as bad as it could be. If I allow him to proceed in a bad way, it will be at the peril of our state; if I insist on his proceeding in a right way, it will be at the peril of my own person. His wisdom is just sufficient to know the errors of other men, but he does not know how he errs himself. What am I to do in such a case?' *K'ü Po-yü* replied, 'Good indeed is your question! Be on your guard; be careful; see that you keep yourself correct! Your best plan will be, with your person to seek association with him, and with your mind to try to be in harmony with him; and yet there are dangers connected with both of these things. While seeking to keep near to him, do not enter into his pursuits; while cultivating a harmony of mind with him, do not show how superior you are to him. If in your personal association you enter into his pursuits, you will fall with him and be ruined, you will tumble down with a crash. If in maintaining a harmony with his mind, you show how different you are from him, he will think you do so for the reputation and the name, and regard you as a creature of evil omen³. If you find him to be a mere boy, be you with him as another boy; if you find him one of those who will not have their ground marked out in the ordinary way, do you humour

¹ A member of the Yen family of Lû. We shall meet with him again in Books XIX, XXVIII, and XXXII.

² A minister of Wei; a friend and favourite of Confucius.

³ Compare in the *K'ung Yung*, ii, ch. 24.

him in this characteristic¹; if you find him to be free from lofty airs, show yourself to be the same;—(ever) leading him on so as to keep him free from faults.

‘Do you not know (the fate of) the praying mantis? It angrily stretches out its arms, to arrest the progress of the carriage, unconscious of its inability for such a task, but showing how much it thinks of its own powers. Be on your guard; be careful. If you cherish a boastful confidence in your own excellence, and place yourself in collision with him, you are likely to incur the fate (of the mantis).

‘Do you not know how those who keep tigers proceed? They do not dare to supply them with living creatures, because of the rage which their killing of them will excite. They do not (even) dare to give them their food whole, because of the rage which their rending of it will excite. They watch till their hunger is appeased, (dealing with them) from their knowledge of their natural ferocity. Tigers are different from men, but they fawn on those who feed them, and do so in accordance with their nature. When any of these are killed by them, it is because they have gone against that nature.

‘Those again who are fond of horses preserve their dung in baskets, and their urine in jars. If mosquitoes and gadflies light on them, and the grooms brush them suddenly away, the horses break their bits, injure (the ornaments on) their heads, and smash those on their breasts. The more care that is taken of them, the more does their fond-

¹ Equivalent to ‘Do not cross him in his peculiarities.’

ness (for their attendants) disappear. Ought not caution to be exercised (in the management of them)?'

6. A (master) mechanic, called Shih, on his way to *K'hi*, came to *K'hi-yüan*¹, where he saw an oak-tree, which was used as the altar for the spirits of the land. It was so large that an ox standing behind it could not be seen. It measured a hundred spans round, and rose up eighty cubits on the hill before it threw out any branches, after which there were ten or so, from each of which a boat could be hollowed out. People came to see it in crowds as in a market place, but the mechanic did not look round at it, but held on his way without stopping. One of his workmen, however, looked long and admiringly at it, and then ran on to his master, and said to him, 'Since I followed you with my axe and bill, I have never seen such a beautiful mass of timber as this. Why would you, Sir, not look round at it, but went on without stopping?' 'Have done,' said Mr. Shih, 'and do not speak about it. It is quite useless. A boat made from its wood would sink; a coffin or shell would quickly rot; an article of furniture would soon go to pieces; a door would be covered with the exuding sap; a pillar would be riddled by insects; the material of it is good for nothing, and hence it is that it has attained to so great an age².'

¹ The name of a place; of a road; of a bend in the road; of a hill. All these accounts of the name are found in different editions of our author, showing that the locality had not been identified.

² No one has thought it worth cutting down.

When Mr. Shih was returning, the altar-oak appeared to him in a dream, and said, 'What other tree will you compare with me? Will you compare me to one of your ornamental trees? There are hawthorns, pear-trees, orange-trees, pummelo-trees, gourds and other low fruit-bearing plants. When their fruits are ripe, they are knocked down from them, and thrown among the dirt¹. The large branches are broken, and the smaller are torn away. So it is that their productive ability makes their lives bitter to them; they do not complete their natural term of existence, but come to a premature end in the middle of their time, bringing on themselves the destructive treatment which they ordinarily receive. It is so with all things. I have sought to discover how it was that I was so useless;—I had long done so, till (the effort) nearly caused my death; and now I have learned it:—it has been of the greatest use to me. Suppose that I had possessed useful properties, should I have become of the great size that I am? And moreover you and I are both things;—how should one thing thus pass its judgment on another? how is it that you a useless man know all this about me a useless tree?' When Mr. Shih awoke, he kept thinking about his dream, but the workman said, 'Being so taken with its uselessness, how is it that it yet acts here as the altar for the spirits of the land?' 'Be still,' was the master's reply, 'and do not say a word. It simply happened to grow here; and thus those who do not know it do not speak ill of it as an evil thing. If it were not used as the altar, would it be in danger of

¹ This is the indignity intended.

being cut down? Moreover, the reason of its being preserved is different from that of the preservation of things generally; is not your explaining it from the sentiment which you have expressed wide of the mark?’

7. Nan-po 3ze-*khi*¹ in rambling about the Heights of Shang², saw a large and extraordinary tree. The teams of a thousand chariots might be sheltered under it, and its shade would cover them all! 3ze-*khi* said, ‘What a tree is this! It must contain an extraordinary amount of timber! When he looked up, however, at its smaller branches, they were so twisted and crooked that they could not be made into rafters and beams; when he looked down to its root, its stem was divided into so many rounded portions that neither coffin nor shell could be made from them. He licked one of its leaves, and his mouth felt torn and wounded. The smell of it would make a man frantic, as if intoxicated, for more than three whole days together. ‘This, indeed,’ said he, ‘is a tree good for nothing, and it is thus that it has attained to such a size. Ah! and spirit-like men acknowledge this worthlessness (and its result)³.’

In Sung there is the district of *King-shih*⁴, in which catalpae, cypresses, and mulberry trees grow well. Those of them which are a span or two or rather more in circumference⁵ are cut down by persons who want to make posts to which to tie their

¹ Probably the Nan-kwo 3ze-*khi* at the beginning of the second Book.

² In the present department of Kwei-teh, Ho-nan.

³ A difficult sentence to construe.

⁴ In what part of the duchy we do not know.

⁵ See Mencius, VI, i, 13.

monkeys; those which are three or four spans round are cut down by persons who want beams for their lofty and famous houses; and those of seven or eight spans are cut down by noblemen and rich merchants who want single planks for the sides of their coffins. The trees in consequence do not complete their natural term of life, and come to a premature end in the middle of their growth under the axe and bill;—this is the evil that befalls them from their supplying good timber.

In the same way the *K'ieh*¹ (book) specifies oxen that have white foreheads, pigs that have turned-up snouts, and men that are suffering from piles, and forbids their being sacrificed to the Ho. The wizards know them by these peculiarities and consider them to be inauspicious, but spirit-like men consider them on this account to be very fortunate.

8. There was the deformed object Shû². His chin seemed to hide his navel; his shoulders were higher than the crown of his head; the knot of his hair pointed to the sky; his five viscera were all compressed into the upper part of his body, and his two thigh bones were like ribs. By sharpening needles and washing clothes he was able to make a living. By sifting rice and cleaning it, he was able to support ten individuals. When the government was calling out soldiers, this poor Shû would bare his arms among the others; when it had any great service to be undertaken, because of his constant ailments, none of the work was assigned to him; when it was

¹ Probably the name of an old work on sacrifices. But was there ever a time in China when human sacrifices were offered to the Ho, or on any altar?

² One of *Kwang-ze's* creations.

giving out grain to the sick, he received three *kung*, and ten bundles of firewood. If this poor man, so deformed in body, was still able to support himself, and complete his term of life, how much more may they do so, whose deformity is that of their faculties¹!

9. When Confucius went to *K'û*², *K'ieh-yû*, the madman of *K'û*³, as he was wandering about, passed by his door, and said, 'O Phoenix, O Phoenix, how is your virtue degenerated! The future is not to be waited for; the past is not to be sought again! When good order prevails in the world, the sage tries to accomplish all his service; when disorder prevails, he may preserve his life; at the present time, it is enough if he simply escape being punished. Happiness is lighter than a feather, but no one knows how to support it; calamity is heavier than the earth, and yet no one knows how to avoid it. Give over! give over approaching men with the lessons of your virtue! You are in peril! you are in peril, hurrying on where you have marked out the ground against your advance! I avoid publicity, I avoid publicity, that my path may not be injured. I pursue my course, now going backwards, now crookedly, that my feet may not be hurt⁴.

¹ The deficiency of their faculties—here mental faculties—would assimilate them to the useless trees in the last two paragraphs, whose uselessness only proved useful to them.

² The great state of the south, having its capital in the present Hû-peï.

³ See the Analects, XVIII, v.

⁴ The madman would seem to contrast his own course with that of Confucius; but the meaning is very uncertain, and the text cannot be discussed fully in these short notes. There is a jingle

‘The mountain by its trees weakens itself¹. The grease which ministers to the fire fries itself. The cinnamon tree can be eaten, and therefore it is cut down. The varnish tree is useful, and therefore incisions are made in it. All men know the advantage of being useful, but no one knows the advantage of being useless.’

of rhyme also in the sentence, and some critics find something like this in them :

‘Ye ferns, ye thorny ferns, O injure not my way!
To save my feet, I backward turn, or winding stray!’

¹ Literally, ‘robs itself;’—exhausts its moisture or productive strength.

BOOK V.

PART I. SECTION V.

Teh *Khung Fû*, or 'The Seal of Virtue Complete¹.'

1. In *Lû*² there was a Wang *Thâi*³ who had lost both his feet⁴; while his disciples who followed and went about with him were as numerous as those of *Kung-nî*. *Khang Kî*⁵ asked *Kung-nî* about him, saying, 'Though Wang *Thâi* is a cripple, the disciples who follow him about divide *Lû* equally with you, Master. When he stands, he does not teach them; when he sits, he does not discourse to them. But they go to him empty, and come back full. Is there indeed such a thing as instruction without words⁶? and while the body is imperfect, may the mind be complete? What sort of man is he?'

Kung-nî replied, 'This master is a sage. I have

¹ See pp. 133, 134.

² The native state of Confucius, part of the present Shan-tung.

³ A *Tâoist* of complete virtue; but probably there was not really such a person. Our author fabricates him according to his fashion.

⁴ The character *uh* (兀) does not say that he had lost both his feet, but I suppose that such is the meaning, because of what is said of *Toeless* below that 'he walked on his heels to see Confucius.' The feet must have been amputated, or mutilated rather (justly or unjustly), as a punishment; but *Kwang-ze* wished to say nothing on that point.

⁵ Perhaps a disciple of Confucius;—not elsewhere mentioned as such.

⁶ See the *Tâu Teh King*, ch. 2.

only been too late in going to him. I will make him my teacher; and how much more should those do so who are not equal to me! Why should only the state of Lû follow him? I will lead on all under heaven with me to do so.' *Khang Kî* rejoined, 'He is a man who has lost his feet, and yet he is known as the venerable Wang¹;—he must be very different from ordinary men. What is the peculiar way in which he employs his mind?' The reply was, 'Death and life are great considerations, but they could work no change in him. Though heaven and earth were to be overturned and fall, they would occasion him no loss. His judgment is fixed regarding that in which there is no element of falsehood²; and, while other things change, he changes not. The transformations of things are to him the developments prescribed for them, and he keeps fast hold of the author of them².'

Khang Kî said, 'What do you mean?' 'When we look at things,' said *Kung-nî*, 'as they differ, we see them to be different, (as for instance) the liver and the gall, or *Khû* and *Yüeh*; when we look at them, as they agree, we see them all to be a unity. So it is with this (Wang Thâi). He takes no knowledge of the things for which his ears and eyes are the appropriate organs, but his mind delights itself in the harmony of (all excellent) qualities. He looks at the unity which belongs to things, and does not perceive where they have suffered loss. He looks

¹ Literally, 'the Senior;' often rendered 'Teacher.'

² 'That in which there is no element of falsehood' is the *Táo*, which also is the 'Author' of all the changes that take place in time and space. See the Introductory Note on the title and subject of the Book.

on the loss of his feet as only the loss of so much earth.'

Khang Kî said, 'He is entirely occupied with his (proper) self¹. By his knowledge he has discovered (the nature of) his mind, and to that he holds as what is unchangeable¹; but how is it that men make so much of him?' The reply was, 'Men do not look into running water as a mirror, but into still water;—it is only the still water that can arrest them all, and keep them (in the contemplation of their real selves). Of things which are what they are by the influence of the earth, it is only the pine and cypress which are the best instances;—in winter as in summer brightly green². Of those which were what they were by the influence of Heaven³, the most correct examples were Yáo and Shun; fortunate in (thus) maintaining their own life correct, and so as to correct the lives of others.

'As a verification of the (power of) the original endowment, when it has been preserved, take the result of fearlessness,—how the heroic spirit of a single brave soldier has been thrown into an army of nine hosts⁴. If a man only seeking for fame and able in this way to secure it can produce such an effect, how much more (may we look for a greater

¹ Wang Thái saw all things in the Táo, and the Táo in all things. Comp. Book XI, par. 7, et al.

² Notwithstanding his being a cripple. He forgets that circumstance himself, and all others forget it, constrained and won by his embodiment of the Táo. What follows is an illustration of this, exaggerated indeed, but not so extravagantly as in many other passages.

³ In the Táoistic meaning of the term.

⁴ The royal army consisted of six hosts; that of a great feudal prince of three. 'Nine hosts'=a very great army.

result) from one whose rule is over heaven and earth, and holds all things in his treasury, who simply has his lodging in the six members¹ of his body, whom his ears and eyes serve but as conveying emblematic images of things, who comprehends all his knowledge in a unity, and whose mind never dies! If such a man were to choose a day on which he would ascend far on high, men would (seek to) follow him there. But how should he be willing to occupy himself with other men?'

2. Shăn-thû *Kiá*² was (another) man who had lost his feet. Along with *3ze-khân*³ of *K'ang*³ he studied under the master Po-hwăn *Wû-zăn*⁴. *3ze-khân* said to him (one day), 'If I go out first, do you remain behind; and if you go out first, I will remain behind.' Next day they were again sitting together on the same mat in the hall, when *3ze-khân* spoke the same words to him, adding, 'Now I am about to go out; will you stay behind or not? Moreover, when you see one of official rank (like myself), you do not try to get out of his way;—do you consider yourself equal to one of official rank?' Shăn-thû *Kiá* replied, 'In our Master's school is there indeed such recognition required of official rank? You are one, Sir, whose pleasure is in your official rank, and would therefore take precedence of other men. I

¹ The arms, legs, head, and trunk.

² Another cripple introduced by our author to serve his purpose.

³ Kung-sun *K'hião*; a good and able minister of *K'ang*, an earldom forming part of the present Ho-nan. He was a contemporary of Confucius, who wept when he heard of his death in B.C. 522. He was a scion of the ruling house, which again was a branch of the royal family of *K'âu*.

⁴ A Taoist teacher. See XXI, par. 9; XXXII, par. 1.

have heard that when a mirror is bright, the dust does not rest on it; when dust rests on it the mirror is not bright. When one dwells long with a man of ability and virtue, he comes to be without error. There now is our teacher whom you have chosen to make you greater than you are; and when you still talk in this way, are you not in error?' 3ze-khân rejoined, 'A (shattered) object as you are, you would still strive to make yourself out as good as Yáo! If I may form an estimate of your virtue, might it not be sufficient to lead you to the examination of yourself?' The other said, 'Most criminals, in describing their offences, would make it out that they ought not to have lost (their feet) for them; few would describe them so as to make it appear that they should not have preserved their feet. They are only the virtuous who know that such a calamity was unavoidable, and therefore rest in it as what was appointed for them. When men stand before (an archer like) Í¹ with his bent bow, if they are in the middle of his field, that is the place where they should be hit; and if they be not hit, that also was appointed. There are many with their feet entire who laugh at me because I have lost my feet, which makes me feel vexed and angry. But when I go to our teacher, I throw off that feeling, and return (to a better mood);—he has washed, without my knowing it, the other from me by (his instructions in) what is good. I have attended him now for nineteen years, and have not known that I am without my feet. Now, you, Sir, and I have for the object of our study the

¹ A famous archer of antiquity in the twenty-second century B.C., or perhaps earlier.

(virtue) which is internal, and not an adjunct of the body, and yet you are continually directing your attention to my external body;—are you not wrong in this?’ *3ze-khân* felt uneasy, altered his manner and looks, and said, ‘You need not, Sir, say anything more about it.’

3. In *Lû* there was a cripple, called *Shû-shan* the Toeless¹, who came on his heels to see *Kung-nî*. *Kung-nî* said to him, ‘By your want of circumspection in the past, Sir, you have incurred such a calamity;—of what use is your coming to me now?’ Toeless said, ‘Through my ignorance of my proper business and taking too little care of my body, I came to lose my feet. But now I am come to you, still possessing what is more honourable than my feet, and which therefore I am anxious to preserve entire. There is nothing which Heaven does not cover, and nothing which Earth does not sustain; you, Master, were regarded by me as doing the part of Heaven and Earth;—how could I know that you would receive me in such a way?’ Confucius rejoined, ‘I am but a poor creature. But why, my master, do you not come inside, where I will try to tell you what I have learned?’ When Toeless had gone out, Confucius said, ‘Be stimulated to effort, my disciples. This toeless cripple is still anxious to learn to make up for the evil of his former conduct;—how much more should those be so whose conduct has been unchallenged!’

Mr. Toeless, however, told *Lão Tan* (of the inter-

¹ ‘Toeless’ is a sort of nickname. *Shû-shan* or *Shû hill* was, probably, where he dwelt:—‘Toeless of *Shû hill*.’

view), saying, 'Khung *K'hiû*, I apprehend, has not yet attained to be a Perfect man. What has he to do with keeping a crowd of disciples around him? He is seeking to have the reputation of being an extraordinary and marvellous man, and does not know that the Perfect man considers this to be as handcuffs and fetters to him.' Lâu Tan said, 'Why did you not simply lead him to see the unity of life and death, and that the admissible and inadmissible belong to one category, so freeing him from his fetters? Would this be possible?' Toeless said, 'It is the punishment inflicted on him by Heaven ¹. How can he be freed from it?'

4. Duke Âi of Lû² asked *Kung-nî*, saying, 'There was an ugly man in Wei, called Âi-thâi Tho³. His father-in-law, who lived with him, thought so much of him that he could not be away from him. His wife, when she saw him (ugly as he was), represented to her parents, saying, "I had more than ten times rather be his concubine than the wife of any other man⁴." He was never heard to take the lead in discussion, but always seemed to be of the same opinion with others. He had not the position of a ruler, so as to be able to save men from death. He had no revenues, so as to be able to satisfy men's craving for food. He was ugly enough, moreover, to scare

¹ 'Heaven' here is a synonym of *Tâo*. Perhaps the meaning is 'unavoidable'; it is so in the *Tâoistic* order of things.

² It was in the sixteenth year of duke Âi that Confucius died. Âi was marquis of Lû from B.C. 494 to 468.

³ The account of Âi-thâi Tho is of course *Kwang-ze's* own fabrication. Âi-thâi is understood to be descriptive of his ugliness, and Tho to be his name.

⁴ Perhaps this was spoken by his wife before their marriage.

the whole world. He agreed with men instead of trying to lead them to adopt his views; his knowledge did not go beyond his immediate neighbourhood¹. And yet his father-in-law and his wife were of one mind about him in his presence (as I have said);—he must have been different from other men. I called him, and saw him. Certainly he was ugly enough to scare the whole world. He had not lived with me, however, for many months, when I was drawn to the man; and before he had been with me a full year, I had confidence in him. The state being without a chief minister, I (was minded) to commit the government to him. He responded to my proposal sorrowfully, and looked undecided as if he would fain have declined it. I was ashamed of myself (as inferior to him), but finally gave the government into his hands. In a little time, however, he left me and went away. I was sorry and felt that I had sustained a loss, and as if there were no other to share the pleasures of the kingdom with me. What sort of man was he?’

Kung-ni said, ‘Once when I was sent on a mission to *Khû*, I saw some pigs sucking at their dead mother. After a little they looked with rapid glances, when they all left her, and ran away. They felt that she did not see them, and that she was no longer like themselves. What they had loved in their mother was not her bodily figure, but what had given animation to her figure. When a man dies in battle, they do not at his interment employ the usual appendages

¹ One sees dimly the applicability of this illustration to the case in hand. What made *Âi-thâi Tho* so much esteemed was his mental power, quite independent of his ugly person.

of plumes¹: as to supplying shoes to one who has lost his feet, there is no reason why he should care for them;—in neither case is there the proper reason for their use¹. The members of the royal harem do not pare their nails nor pierce their ears²; when a man is newly married, he remains (for a time) absent from his official duties, and unoccupied with them². That their bodies might be perfect was sufficient to make them thus dealt with;—how much greater results should be expected from men whose mental gifts are perfect! This Âi-thâi Tho was believed by men, though he did not speak a word; and was loved by them, though he did no special service for them. He made men appoint him to the government of their states, afraid only that he would not accept the appointment. He must have been a man whose powers³ were perfect, though his realisation of them³ was not manifested in his person.'

Duke Âi said, 'What is meant by saying that his powers were complete?' Kung-nî replied, 'Death and life, preservation and ruin, failure and success, poverty and wealth, superiority and inferiority, blame and praise, hunger and thirst, cold and heat;—these are the changes of circumstances, the operation of our appointed lot. Day and night they succeed to one another before us, but there is no wisdom

¹ See the *Lî Kî*, VIII, i, 7; but the applicability of these two illustrations is not so clear.

² These two have force as in 'reasoning from the less to the greater.' With the latter of the two compare the mosaical provision in Deuteronomy xxiv. 5.

³ 'Powers' are the capacities of the nature,—the gift of the Táo. 'Virtue' is the realisation or carrying out of those capacities.

able to discover to what they owe their origination. They are not sufficient therefore to disturb the harmony (of the nature), and are not allowed to enter into the treasury of intelligence. To cause this harmony and satisfaction ever to be diffused, while the feeling of pleasure is not lost from the mind; to allow no break to arise in this state day or night, so that it is always spring-time¹ in his relations with external things; in all his experiences to realise in his mind what is appropriate to each season (of the year)²:—these are the characteristics of him whose powers are perfect.'

'And what do you mean by the realisation of these powers not being manifested in the person?' (pursued further the duke). The reply was, 'There is nothing so level as the surface of a pool of still water. It may serve as an example of what I mean. All within its circuit is preserved (in peace), and there comes to it no agitation from without. The virtuous efficacy is the perfect cultivation of the harmony (of the nature). Though the realisation of this be not manifested in the person, things cannot separate themselves (from its influence).'

Some days afterwards duke Âi told this conversation to Min-ze³, saying, 'Formerly it seemed to me the work of the sovereign to stand in court with his face to the south, to rule the kingdom, and to pay good heed to the accounts of the people concerned, lest any should come to a (miserable) death;—this

¹ Specially the season of complacent enjoyment.

² So, in Lin Hsi-kung; but the meaning has to be forced out of the text.

³ The disciple Min Sun or Min Ze-khien.

I considered to be the sum (of his duty). Now that I have heard that description of the Perfect man, I fear that my idea is not the real one, and that, by employing myself too lightly, I may cause the ruin of my state. I and Khung *K'hiu* are not on the footing of ruler and subject, but on that of a virtuous friendship.'

5. A person who had no lips, whose legs were bent so that he could only walk on his toes, and who was (otherwise) deformed ¹, addressed his counsels to duke Ling of Wei, who was so pleased with him, that he looked on a perfectly formed man as having a lean and small neck in comparison with him. Another who had a large goitre like an earthenware jar ¹ addressed his counsels to duke Hwan of *K'hi* ², who was so pleased with him that he looked on a perfectly formed man as having a neck lean and small in comparison with him ³. So it is that when one's virtue is extraordinary, (any deficiency in) his bodily form may be forgotten. When men do not forget what is (easily) forgotten, and forget what is not (easily) forgotten, we have a case of real oblivion. Therefore the sagely man has that in which his mind finds its enjoyment, and (looks on) wisdom as (but) the shoots from an old stump; agreements with others are to him but so much glue; kindnesses are

¹ These two men are undoubtedly inventions of *K'wang-3ze*. They are brought before us, not by surnames and names, but by their several deformities.

² The first of the five presiding chiefs; marquis of *K'hi* from B.C. 685 to 643.

³ Lin Hsi-kung wonders whether the story of the man who was so taken with the charms of a one-eyed courtesan, that he thought other women all had an eye too many, was taken from this!

(but the arts of) intercourse; and great skill is (but as) merchants' wares. The sagely man lays no plans;—of what use would wisdom be to him? He has no cutting and hacking to do;—of what use would glue be to him? He has lost nothing;—of what use would arts of intercourse be to him? He has no goods to dispose of;—what need has he to play the merchant? (The want of) these four things are the nourishment of (his) Heavenly (nature); that nourishment is its Heavenly food. Since he receives this food from Heaven, what need has he for anything of man's (devising)? He has the bodily form of man, but not the passions and desires of (other) men. He has the form of man, and therefore he is a man. Being without the passions and desires of men, their approvings and disapprovings are not to be found in him. How insignificant and small is (the body) by which he belongs to humanity! How grand and great is he in the unique perfection of his Heavenly (nature)!

Hui-ze said to Kwang-ze, 'Can a man indeed be without desires and passions?' The reply was, 'He can.' 'But on what grounds do you call him a man, who is thus without passions and desires?' Kwang-ze said, 'The T'ao¹ gives him his personal appearance (and powers); Heaven² gives him his bodily form; how should we not call him a man?' Hui-ze rejoined, 'Since you call him a man, how

¹ Lû Shû-ñih maintains here that 'the T'ao' and 'Heaven' have the same meaning; nor does he make any distinction between mào (貌), 'the personal appearance,' and hsing (形), 'the figure,' or 'bodily form.'

² Compare in the T'ao Teh King expressions in li, 2, and lv, 5.

can he be without passions and desires?' The reply was, 'You are misunderstanding what I mean by passions and desires. What I mean when I say that he is without these is, that this man does not by his likings and dislikings do any inward harm to his body;—he always pursues his course without effort, and does not (try to) increase his (store of) life.' Hui-3ze rejoined, 'If there were not that increasing of (the amount) of life, how would he get his body¹?' Kwang-3ze said, 'The T'ao gives him his personal appearance (and powers); Heaven gives him his bodily form; and he does not by his likings and dislikings do any internal harm to his body. But now you, Sir, deal with your spirit as if it were something external to you, and subject your vital powers to toil. You sing (your ditties), leaning against a tree; you go to sleep, grasping the stump of a rotten dryandra tree. Heaven selected for you the bodily form (of a man), and you babble about what is strong and what is white².'

¹ Apparently a gross meaning attached by Hui-3ze to Kwang-3ze's words.

² Kwang-3ze beats down his opponent, and contemptuously refers to some of his well-known peculiarities;—as in II, par. 5, XXXIII, par. 7, and elsewhere.

BOOK VI.

PART I. SECTION VI.

Tâ Jung Shih, or 'The Great and Most
Honoured Master¹.'

1. He who knows the part which the Heavenly² (in him) plays, and knows (also) that which the Human² (in him ought to) play, has reached the perfection (of knowledge). He who knows the part which the Heavenly plays (knows) that it is naturally born with him; he who knows the part which the Human ought to play (proceeds) with the knowledge which he possesses to nourish it in the direction of what he does not (yet) know³:—to complete one's natural term of years and not come to an untimely end in the middle of his course is the fulness of knowledge. Although it be so, there is an evil (attending this condition). Such knowledge still awaits the confirmation of it as correct; it does so because it is not yet determined⁴. How do we know that what

¹ See pp. 134-136.

² Both 'Heaven' and 'Man' here are used in the Tâoistic sense;—the meaning which the terms commonly have both with Lâo and Kwang.

³ The middle member of this sentence is said to be the practical outcome of all that is said in the Book; conducting the student of the Tâo to an unquestioning submission to the experiences in his lot, which are beyond his comprehension, and approaching nearly to what we understand by the Christian virtue of Faith.

⁴ That is, there may be the conflict, to the end of life, between

we call the Heavenly (in us) is not the Human? and that what we call the Human is not the Heavenly? There must be the True man¹, and then there is the True knowledge.

2. What is meant by 'the True Man²?' The True men of old did not reject (the views of) the few; they did not seek to accomplish (their ends) like heroes (before others); they did not lay plans to attain those ends³. Being such, though they might make mistakes, they had no occasion for repentance; though they might succeed, they had no self-complacency. Being such, they could ascend the loftiest heights without fear; they could pass through water without being made wet by it; they could go into fire without being burnt; so it was

faith and fact, so graphically exhibited in the Book of Job, and compendiously described in the seventy-third Psalm.

¹ Here we meet with the True Man, a Master of the T'ao. He is the same as the Perfect Man, the Spirit-like Man, and the Sagely Man (see pp. 127, 128), and the designation is sometimes interchanged in the five paragraphs that follow with 'the Sagely Man.' Mr. Balfour says here that this name 'is used in the esoteric sense,—“partaking of the essence of divinity;”' and he accordingly translates 真人 by 'the divine man.' But he might as well translate any one of the other three names in the same way. The Shwo Wăn dictionary defines the name by 仙人, 'a recluse of the mountain, whose bodily form has been changed, and who ascends to heaven;' but when this account was made, T'aoism had entered into a new phase, different from what it had in the time of our author.

² In this description of 'the True Man,' and in what follows, there is what is grotesque and what is exaggerated (see note on the title of the first Book, p. 127). The most prominent characteristic of him was his perfect comprehension of the T'ao and participation of it.

³ 士 has here the sense of 事.

that by their knowledge they ascended to and reached the Tâo¹.

The True men of old did not dream when they slept, had no anxiety when they awoke, and did not care that their food should be pleasant. Their breathing came deep and silently. The breathing of the true man comes (even) from his heels, while men generally breathe (only) from their throats. When men are defeated in argument, their words come from their gullets as if they were vomiting. Where lusts and desires are deep, the springs of the Heavenly are shallow.

The True men of old knew nothing of the love of life or of the hatred of death. Entrance into life occasioned them no joy; the exit from it awakened no resistance. Composedly they went and came. They did not forget what their beginning had been, and they did not inquire into what their end would be. They accepted (their life) and rejoiced in it; they forgot (all fear of death), and returned (to their state before life)¹. Thus there was in them what is called the want of any mind to resist the Tâo, and of all attempts by means of the Human to assist the Heavenly. Such were they who are called the True men.

3. Being such, their minds were free from all thought²; their demeanour was still and unmoved;

¹ Was not this the state of non-existence? We cannot say of Pantâoism. However we may describe that, the Tâo operates in nature, but is not identical with it.

² 心忘 appears in the common editions as 心志, which must have got into the text at a very early time. 'The mind forgetting,' or 'free from all thought and purpose,' appears every-

their foreheads beamed simplicity. Whatever coldness came from them was like that of autumn; whatever warmth came from them was like that of spring. Their joy and anger assimilated to what we see in the four seasons. They did in regard to all things what was suitable, and no one could know how far their action would go. Therefore the sagely man might, in his conduct of war, destroy a state without losing the hearts of the people¹; his benefits and favours might extend to a myriad generations without his being a lover of men. Hence he who tries to share his joys with others is not a sagely man; he who manifests affection is not benevolent; he who observes times and seasons (to regulate his conduct) is not a man of wisdom; he to whom profit and injury are not the same is not a superior man; he who acts for the sake of the name of doing so, and loses his (proper) self is not the (right) scholar; and he who throws away his person in a way which is not the true (way) cannot command the service of others. Such men as Hû Pû-*k'ieh*, Wû Kwang, Po-*i*, Shû-*k'hi*, the count of K'î, Hsü-yü, K'î Thâ, and Shân-thû Tî, all did service for other men, and sought to secure for them what they desired, not seeking their own pleasure².

where in the Book as a characteristic of the True Man. Not a few critics contend that it was this, and not the Tâo of which it is a quality, that Kwang-3ze intended by the 'Master' in the title.

¹ Such antithetic statements are startling, but they are common with both Lâo-3ze and our author.

² The seven men mentioned here are all adduced, I must suppose, as instances of good and worthy men, but still inferior to the True Man. Of Hû Pû-*k'ieh* all that we are told is that he was 'an ancient worthy.' One account of Wû Kwang is that he was of the time of Hwang-Tî, with ears seven inches long; another, that he

4. The True men of old presented the aspect of judging others aright, but without being partisans; of feeling their own insufficiency, but being without flattery or cringing. Their peculiarities were natural to them, but they were not obstinately attached to them; their humility was evident, but there was nothing of unreality or display about it. Their placidity and satisfaction had the appearance of joy; their every movement seemed to be a necessity to them. Their accumulated attractiveness drew men's looks to them; their blandness fixed men's attachment to their virtue. They seemed to accommodate themselves to the (manners of their age), but with a certain severity; their haughty indifference was beyond its control. Unceasing seemed their endeavours to keep (their mouths) shut; when they looked down, they had forgotten what they wished to say.

They considered punishments to be the substance (of government, and they never incurred it); ceremonies to be its supporting wings (and they always observed them); wisdom (to indicate) the time (for action, and they always selected it); and virtue to be accordance (with others), and they were all-accordant. Considering punishments to be the substance (of government), yet their generosity appeared in the (manner of their) infliction of death. Considering ceremonies to be its supporting wings, they pursued

was of the time of Thang, of the Shang dynasty. Po-î and Shû-khî are known to us from the Analects; and also the count of K'hi, whose name, it is said, was Hsü-yü. I can find nothing about K'î Thâ;—his name in *Sião Hung's* text is 紀他沱. Shân-thû Tî was of the Yin dynasty, a contemporary of Thang. He drowned himself in the Ho. Most of these are referred to in other places.

by means of them their course in the world. Considering wisdom to indicate the time (for action), they felt it necessary to employ it in (the direction of) affairs. Considering virtue to be accordance (with others), they sought to ascend its height along with all who had feet (to climb it). (Such were they), and yet men really thought that they did what they did by earnest effort¹.

5. In this way they were one and the same in all their likings and dislikings. Where they liked, they were the same; where they did not like, they were the same. In the former case where they liked, they were fellow-workers with the Heavenly (in them); in the latter where they disliked, they were co-workers with the Human in them. The one of these elements (in their nature) did not overcome the other. Such were those who are called the True men.

Death and life are ordained, just as we have the constant succession of night and day;—in both cases from Heaven. Men have no power to do anything in reference to them;—such is the constitution of things². There are those who specially regard Heaven³ as their father, and they still love It (distant as It is)³;—how much more should they love

¹ All this paragraph is taken as illustrative of the True man's freedom from thought or purpose in his course.

² See note 3 on par. 1, p. 236.

³ Love is due to a parent, and so such persons should love Heaven. There is in the text here, I think, an unconscious reference to the earliest time, before the views of the earliest Chinese diverged to Theism and Tâoism. We cannot translate the 身 here.

That which stands out (Superior and Alone)¹! Some specially regard their ruler as superior to themselves, and will give their bodies to die for him;—how much more should they do so for That which is their true (Ruler)¹! When the springs are dried up, the fishes collect together on the land. Than that they should moisten one another there by the damp about them, and keep one another wet by their slime, it would be better for them to forget one another in the rivers and lakes². And when men praise Yáo and condemn Kieh, it would be better to forget them both, and seek the renovation of the Táo.

6. There is the great Mass (of nature);—I find the support of my body on it; my life is spent in toil on it; my old age seeks ease on it; at death I find rest in it;—what makes my life a good makes my death also a good³. If you hide away a boat in the ravine of a hill, and hide away the hill in a lake, you will say that (the boat) is secure; but at midnight there shall come a strong man and carry it off on his back, while you in the dark know nothing about it. You may hide away anything, whether small or great, in the most suitable place, and yet it shall disappear from it. But if you could hide the world in the world⁴, so that there was nowhere to which it could be removed, this would be the grand reality of the

¹ The great and most honoured Master,—the Táo.

² This sentence contrasts the cramping effect on the mind of Confucianism with the freedom given by the doctrine of the Táo.

³ The Táo does this. The whole paragraph is an amplification of the view given in the preceding note.

⁴ The Táo cannot be taken away. It is with its possessor, an 'ever-during thing.'

ever-during Thing¹. When the body of man comes from its special mould², there is even then occasion for joy; but this body undergoes a myriad transformations, and does not immediately reach its perfection;—does it not thus afford occasion for joys incalculable? Therefore the sagely man enjoys himself in that from which there is no possibility of separation, and by which all things are preserved. He considers early death or old age, his beginning and his ending, all to be good, and in this other men imitate him;—how much more will they do so in regard to That Itself on which all things depend, and from which every transformation arises!

7. This is the Táo;—there is in It emotion and sincerity, but It does nothing and has no bodily form³. It may be handed down (by the teacher), but may not be received (by his scholars). It may be apprehended (by the mind), but It cannot be seen. It has Its root and ground (of existence) in Itself. Before there were heaven and earth, from of old, there It was, securely existing. From It came the mysterious existences of spirits, from It the mysterious existence of God⁴. It produced heaven; It produced earth. It was before the Thâi-kî⁵, and

¹ See p. 242, note 4.

² Adopting the reading of 範 for 犯, supplied by Hwâi-nan Sze.

³ Our author has done with 'the True Man,' and now brings in the Táo itself as his subject. Compare the predicates of It here with Bk. II, par. 2. But there are other, and perhaps higher, things said of it here.

⁴ Men at a very early time came to believe in the existence of their spirits after death, and in the existence of a Supreme Ruler or God. It was to the Táo that those concepts were owing.

⁵ The primal ether out of which all things were fashioned by the interaction of the Yin and Yang. This was something like the

yet could not be considered high¹; It was below all space, and yet could not be considered deep¹. It was produced before heaven and earth, and yet could not be considered to have existed long¹; It was older than the highest antiquity, and yet could not be considered old¹.

Shih-wei got It², and by It adjusted heaven and earth. Fû-hsi got It, and by It penetrated to the mystery of the maternity of the primary matter. The Wei-tâu³ got It, and from all antiquity has made no eccentric movement. The Sun and Moon got It, and from all antiquity have not intermitted (their bright shining). Khan-pei got It, and by It became lord of Khwân-lun⁴. Făng-t⁵ got It, and by It enjoyed himself in the Great River. K'ien Wû⁶ got It, and by It dwelt on mount Thâi. Hwang-Ti⁷ got It, and by It ascended the cloudy sky. Kwan-hsü⁸

current idea of protoplasm; but while protoplasm lies down in the lower parts of the earth, the Thâi-k'î was imagined to be in the higher regions of space.

¹ The T'ao is independent both of space and time.

² A prehistoric sovereign.

³ A name for the constellation of the Great Bear.

⁴ Name of the spirit of the Khwân-lun mountains in Thibet, the fairy-land of T'aoist writers, very much in T'aoism what mount Sumêru is in Buddhism.

⁵ The spirit presiding over the Yellow River;—see Mayers's Manual, pp. 54, 55.

⁶ Appears here as the spirit of mount Thâi, the great eastern mountain; we met with him in I, 5, but simply as one of Kwang-ze's fictitious personages.

⁷ Appears before in Bk. II; the first of Sze-mâ K'ien's 'Five T'is;,' no doubt a very early sovereign, to whom many important discoveries and inventions are ascribed; is placed by many at the head of T'aoism itself.

⁸ The second of the 'Five T'is;,' a grandson of Hwang-Ti. I do not know what to say of his 'Dark Palace.'

got It, and by It dwelt in the Dark Palace. Yü-khiang¹ got It, and by It was set on the North Pole. Hsi Wang-mû² got It, and by It had her seat in (the palace of) Shão-kwang. No one knows Its beginning; no one knows Its end. Phăng 3û got It, and lived on from the time of the lord of Yü to that of the Five Chiefs³. Fû Yüeh⁴ got It, and by It became chief minister to Wû-ting⁴, (who thus) in a trice became master of the kingdom. (After his death), Fû Yüeh mounted to the eastern portion of the Milky Way, where, riding on Sagittarius and Scorpio, he took his place among the stars.

8. Nan-po 3ze-khwei⁵ asked Nü Yü⁶, saying, 'You are old, Sir, while your complexion is like that of a child;—how is it so?' The reply was, 'I have become acquainted with the Táo.' The other said, 'Can I learn the Táo?' Nü Yü said, 'No. How can you? You, Sir, are not the man to do so. There was Pû-liang Í⁷ who had the abilities of a sagely man, but not the Táo, while I had the Táo, but not the abilities. I wished, however, to teach him, if, peradventure, he might

¹ The Spirit of the Northern regions, with a man's face, and a bird's body, &c.

² A queen of the Genii on mount Khwăn-lun. See Mayers's Manual, pp. 178, 179.

³ Phăng 3û has been before us in Bk. I. Shun is intended by 'the Lord of Yü.' The five Chiefs;—see Mencius, VI, ii, 7.

⁴ See the Shû, IV, viii; but we have nothing there of course about the Milky Way and the stars.—This passage certainly lessens our confidence in Kwang-3ze's statements.

⁵ Perhaps the same as Nan-po 3ze-khi in Bk. IV, par. 7.

⁶ Must have been a great Táoist. Nothing more can be said of him or her.

⁷ Only mentioned here.

become the sagely man indeed. If he should not do so, it was easy (I thought) for one possessing the Tâo of the sagely man to communicate it to another possessing his abilities. Accordingly, I proceeded to do so, but with deliberation¹. After three days, he was able to banish from his mind all worldly (matters). This accomplished, I continued my intercourse with him in the same way; and in seven days he was able to banish from his mind all thought of men and things. This accomplished, and my instructions continued, after nine days, he was able to count his life as foreign to himself. This accomplished, his mind was afterwards clear as the morning; and after this he was able to see his own individuality². That individuality perceived, he was able to banish all thought of Past or Present. Freed from this, he was able to penetrate to (the truth that there is no difference between) life and death;—(how) the destruction of life is not dying, and the communication of other life is not living. (The Tâo) is a thing which accompanies all other things and meets them, which is present when they are overthrown and when they obtain their completion. Its name is Tranquillity amid all Disturbances, meaning that such Disturbances lead to Its Perfection³.

‘And how did you, being alone (without any teacher), learn all this?’ ‘I learned it,’ was the reply, ‘from the son of Fû-mo⁴; he learned it from

¹ So the 守 is explained.

² Standing by himself, as it were face to face with the Tâo.

³ Amid all changes, in life and death, the possessor of the Tâo has peace.

⁴ Meaning writings; literally, ‘the son of the assisting pigment.’

the grandson of Lo-sung; he learned it from Shan-ming; he learned it from Nieh-hsü; he, from Hsü-yî; he, from Wû-âo; he, from Hsüan-ming; he, from 3han-lião; and he learned it from Î-shih.'

9. 3ze-sze¹, 3ze-yü¹, 3ze-lî¹, and 3ze-lâi¹, these four men, were talking together, when some one said, 'Who can suppose the head to be made from nothing, the spine from life, and the rump-bone from death? Who knows how death and birth, living on and disappearing, compose the one body? —I would be friends with him².' The four men looked at one another and laughed, but no one seized with his mind the drift of the questions. All, however, were friends together.

Not long after 3ze-yü fell ill, and 3ze-sze went to inquire for him. 'How great,' said (the sufferer), 'is the Creator³! That He should have made me the deformed object that I am!' He was a crooked hunchback; his five viscera were squeezed into the

We are not to suppose that by this and the other names that follow individuals are intended. Kwang-3ze seems to have wished to give, in his own fashion, some notion of the genesis of the idea of the Tão from the first speculations about the origin of things.

¹ We need not suppose that these are the names of real men. They are brought on the stage by our author to serve his purpose. Hwâi-nan makes the name of the first to have been 3ze-shui (子水).

² Compare the same representation in Bk. XXIII, par. 10. Kû Teh-kih says on it here, 'The head, the spine, the rump-bone mean simply the head and tail, the beginning and end. All things begin from nothing and end in nothing. Their birth and their death are only the creations of our thought, the going and coming of the primary ether. When we have penetrated to the non-reality of life and death, what remains of the body of so many feet?'

³ The 'Creator' or 'Maker' (造物者) is the Tão.

upper part of his body; his chin bent over his navel; his shoulder was higher than his crown; on his crown was an ulcer pointing to the sky; his breath came and went in gasps¹:—yet he was easy in his mind, and made no trouble of his condition. He limped to a well, looked at himself in it, and said, 'Alas that the Creator should have made me the deformed object that I am!' 3ze said, 'Do you dislike your condition?' He replied, 'No, why should I dislike it? If He were to transform my left arm into a cock, I should be watching with it the time of the night; if He were to transform my right arm into a cross-bow, I should then be looking for a hsiào to (bring down and) roast; if He were to transform my rump-bone into a wheel, and my spirit into a horse, I should then be mounting it, and would not change it for another steed. Moreover, when we have got (what we are to do), there is the time (of life) in which to do it; when we lose that (at death), submission (is what is required). When we rest in what the time requires, and manifest that submission, neither joy nor sorrow can find entrance (to the mind)². This would be what the ancients called loosing the cord by which (the life) is suspended. But one hung up cannot loose himself;—he is held fast by his bonds³. And that creatures cannot overcome

¹ Compare this description of 3ze-yü's deformity with that of the poor Shû, in IV, 8.

² Such is the submission to one's lot produced by the teaching of Taoism.

³ Compare the same phraseology in III, par. 4, near the end. In correcting Mr. Balfour's mistranslation of the text, Mr. Giles himself falls into a mistranslation through not observing that the 解

Heaven (the inevitable) is a long-acknowledged fact;—why should I hate my condition?’

10. Before long 3ze-lâi fell ill, and lay gasping at the point of death, while his wife and children stood around him wailing¹. 3ze-lî went to ask for him, and said to them, ‘Hush! Get out of the way! Do not disturb him as he is passing through his change.’ Then, leaning against the door, he said (to the dying man), ‘Great indeed is the Creator! What will He now make you to become? Where will He take you to? Will He make you the liver of a rat, or the arm of an insect²?’ 3ze-lâi replied, ‘Wherever a parent tells a son to go, east, west, south, or north, he simply follows the command. The Yin and Yang are more to a man than his parents are. If they are hastening my death, and I do not quietly submit to them, I shall be obstinate and rebellious. There is the great Mass (of nature);—I find the support of my body in it; my life is spent in toil on it; my old age seeks ease on it; at death I find rest on it:—what has made my life a good will make my death also a good.

‘Here now is a great founder, casting his metal. If the metal were to leap up (in the pot), and say, “I must be made into a (sword like the) Mo-yeh³,”

is passive, having the 懸 that precedes as its subject (observe the force of the 也 after 解 in the best editions), and not active, or governing the 懸 that follows.

¹ Compare the account of the scene at Lâo-3ze’s death, in III, par. 4.

² Here comes in the belief in transformation.

³ The name of a famous sword, made for Ho-lü, the king of

the great founder would be sure to regard it as uncanny. So, again, when a form is being fashioned in the mould of the womb, if it were to say, "I must become a man; I must become a man," the Creator would be sure to regard it as uncanny. When we once understand that heaven and earth are a great melting-pot, and the Creator a great founder, where can we have to go to that shall not be right for us? We are born as from a quiet sleep, and we die to a calm awaking.'

II. 3ze-sang Hù¹, Măng 3ze-fan¹, and 3ze-khin Kang¹, these three men, were friends together. (One of them said), 'Who can associate together without any (thought of) such association, or act together without any (evidence of) such co-operation? Who can mount up into the sky and enjoy himself amidst the mists, disporting beyond the utmost limits (of things)², and forgetting all others as if this were living, and would have no end?' The three men looked at one another and laughed, not perceiving the drift of the questions; and they continued to associate together as friends.

Suddenly, after a time³, 3ze-sang Hù died. Before he was buried, Confucius heard of the event, and

Wû (B. C. 514-494). See the account of the forging of it in the **東周列國志**, ch. 74. The mention of it would seem to indicate that 3ze-lâi and the other three men were of the time of Confucius.

¹ These three men were undoubtedly of the time of Confucius, and some would identify them with the 3ze-sang Po-3ze of Ana. VI, 1, Măng Kih-fan of VI, 13, and the Lâu of IX, vi, 4. This is very unlikely. They were Tâoists.

² Or, 'without end.'

³ Or, 'Some time went by silently, and.'

sent 3ze-kung to go and see if he could render any assistance. One of the survivors had composed a ditty, and the other was playing on his lute. Then they sang together in unison,

‘Ah! come, Sang Hû! ah! come, Sang Hû!

Your being true you’ve got again,

While we, as men, still here remain

Ohone¹!’

3ze-kung hastened forward to them, and said, ‘I venture to ask whether it be according to the rules to be singing thus in the presence of the corpse?’ The two men looked at each other, and laughed, saying, ‘What does this man know about the idea that underlies (our) rules?’ 3ze-kung returned to Confucius, and reported to him, saying, ‘What sort of men are those? They had made none of the usual preparations², and treated the body as a thing foreign to them. They were singing in the presence of the corpse, and there was no change in their countenances. I cannot describe them;—what sort of men are they?’ Confucius replied, ‘Those men occupy and enjoy themselves in what is outside the (common) ways (of the world), while I occupy and enjoy myself in what lies within those ways. There is no common ground for those of such different ways; and when I sent you to condole with those men, I was acting stupidly. They, moreover, make man to be the fellow of the

¹ In accordance with the ancient and modern practice in China of calling the dead back. But these were doing so in a song to the lute.

² Or, ‘they do not regulate their doings (in the usual way).’

Creator, and seek their enjoyment in the formless condition of heaven and earth. They consider life to be an appendage attached, an excrescence annexed to them, and death to be a separation of the appendage and a dispersion of the contents of the excrescence. With these views, how should they know wherein death and life are to be found, or what is first and what is last? They borrow different substances, and pretend that the common form of the body is composed of them¹. They dismiss the thought of (its inward constituents like) the liver and gall, and (its outward constituents), the ears and eyes. Again and again they end and they begin, having no knowledge of first principles. They occupy themselves ignorantly and vaguely with what (they say) lies outside the dust and dirt (of the world), and seek their enjoyment in the business of doing nothing. How should they confusedly address themselves to the ceremonies practised by the common people, and exhibit themselves as doing so to the ears and eyes of the multitude?’

3ze-kung said, ‘Yes, but why do you, Master, act according to the (common) ways (of the world)?’ The reply was, ‘I am in this under the condemning sentence of Heaven². Nevertheless, I will share

¹ The idea that the body is composed of the elements of earth, wind or air, fire, and water.

² A strange description of himself by the sage. Literally, ‘I am (one of) the people killed and exposed to public view by Heaven;’ referring, perhaps, to the description of a living man as ‘suspended by a string from God.’ Confucius was content to accept his life, and used it in pursuing the path of duty, according to his conception of it, without aiming at the transcendental method of the Tâoists. I can attach no other or better meaning to the expression.

with you (what I have attained to).’ 3ze-kung rejoined, ‘I venture to ask the method which you pursue;’ and Confucius said, ‘Fishes breed and grow in the water; man developes in the Táo. Growing in the water, the fishes cleave the pools, and their nourishment is supplied to them. Developing in the Táo, men do nothing, and the enjoyment of their life is secured. Hence it is said, “Fishes forget one another in the rivers and lakes; men forget one another in the arts of the Táo.”’

3ze-kung said, ‘I venture to ask about the man who stands aloof from others¹.’ The reply was, ‘He stands aloof from other men, but he is in accord with Heaven! Hence it is said, “The small man of Heaven is the superior man among men; the superior man among men is the small man of Heaven²!”’

12. Yen Hui asked Kung-nî, saying, ‘When the mother of Măng-sun 3hâi³ died, in all his wailing for her he did not shed a tear; in the core of his heart he felt no distress; during all the mourning rites, he exhibited no sorrow. Without these three things, he (was considered to have) discharged his mourning well;—is it that in the state of Lû one who has not the reality may yet get the reputation of having it? I think the matter very strange.’ Kung-nî

¹ Misled by the text of Hsüang Ying, Mr. Balfour here reads 畸 instead of 畸.

² Here, however, he aptly compares with the language of Christ in Matthew vii. 28.—Kwang-3ze seems to make Confucius praise the system of Táoism as better than his own!

³ Must have been a member of the Măng or Măng-sun family of Lû, to a branch of which Mencius belonged.

said, 'That Mǎng-sun carried out (his views) to the utmost. He was advanced in knowledge; but (in this case) it was not possible for him to appear to be negligent (in his ceremonial observances)¹, but he succeeded in being really so to himself. Mǎng-sun does not know either what purposes life serves, or what death serves; he does not know which should be first sought, and which last². If he is to be transformed into something else, he will simply await the transformation which he does not yet know. This is all he does. And moreover, when one is about to undergo his change, how does he know that it has not taken place? And when he is not about to undergo his change, how does he know that it has taken place³? Take the case of me and you:—are we in a dream from which we have not begun to awake⁴?

'Moreover, Mǎng-sun presented in his body the appearance of being agitated, but in his mind he was conscious of no loss. The death was to him like the issuing from one's dwelling at dawn, and no (more terrible) reality. He was more awake than others were. When they wailed, he also wailed, having in himself the reason why he did so. And we all have our individuality which makes us what we are as compared together; but how do we know that we

¹ The people set such store by the mourning rites, that Mǎng-sun felt he must present the appearance of observing them. This would seem to show that Tāoism arose after the earlier views of the Chinese.

² I adopt here, with many of the critics, the reading of 孰 instead of the more common 就.

³ This is to me very obscure.

⁴ Are such dreams possible? See what I have said on II, par. 9.

determine in any case correctly that individuality? Moreover you dream that you are a bird, and seem to be soaring to the sky; or that you are a fish, and seem to be diving in the deep. But you do not know whether we that are now speaking are awake or in a dream¹. It is not the meeting with what is pleasurable that produces the smile; it is not the smile suddenly produced that produces the arrangement (of the person). When one rests in what has been arranged, and puts away all thought of the transformation, he is in unity with the mysterious Heaven.'

13. Î-ŕ 3ze² having gone to see Hsü Yû, the latter said to him, 'What benefit have you received from Yáo?' The reply was, 'Yáo says to me, You must yourself labour at benevolence and righteousness, and be able to tell clearly which is right and which wrong (in conflicting statements).' Hsü Yû rejoined, 'Why then have you come to me? Since Yáo has put on you the brand of his benevolence and righteousness, and cut off your nose with his right and wrong³, how will you be able to wander in the way of aimless enjoyment, of unregulated contemplation, and the ever-changing forms (of dispute)?' Î-ŕ 3ze said, 'That may be; but I should

¹ This also is obscure; but Confucius is again made to praise the Táoistic system.

² Î-ŕ is said by Lî Î to have been 'a worthy scholar;' but Î-ŕ is an old name for the swallow, and there is a legend of a being of this name appearing to king Mû, and then flying away as a swallow;—see the Khang-hsî Thesaurus under 而. The personage is entirely fabulous.

³ Dismembered or disfigured you.

like to skirt along its hedges.' 'But,' said the other, 'it cannot be. Eyes without pupils can see nothing of the beauty of the eyebrows, eyes, and other features; the blind have nothing to do with the green, yellow, and variegated colours of the sacrificial robes.' Î-r 3ze rejoined, 'Yet, when Wû-kwang¹ lost his beauty, Kû-liang¹ his strength, and Hwang-Tî his wisdom, they all (recovered them)² under the moulding (of your system);—how do you know that the Maker will not obliterate the marks of my branding, and supply my dismemberment, so that, again perfect in my form, I may follow you as my teacher?' Hsü Yû said, 'Ah! that cannot yet be known. I will tell you the rudiments. O my Master! O my Master! He gives to all things their blended qualities, and does not count it any righteousness; His favours reach to all generations, and He does not count it any benevolence; He is more ancient than the highest antiquity, and does not count Himself old; He overspreads heaven and supports the earth; He carves and fashions all bodily forms, and does not consider it any act of skill;—this is He in whom I find my enjoyment.'

14. Yen Hui said, 'I am making progress.' Kung-nî replied, 'What do you mean?' 'I have ceased to think of benevolence and righteousness,' was the reply. 'Very well; but that is not enough.'

Another day, Hui again saw Kung-nî, and said, 'I am making progress.' 'What do you mean?'

¹ Names of parties, of whom we know nothing. It is implied, we must suppose, that they had suffered as is said by their own inadvertence.

² We must suppose that they had done so.

'I have lost all thought of ceremonies and music.'
'Very well, but that is not enough.'

A third day, Hui again saw (the Master), and said, 'I am making progress.' 'What do you mean?' 'I sit and forget everything¹.' Kung-nî changed countenance, and said, 'What do you mean by saying that you sit and forget (everything)?' Yen Hui replied, 'My connexion with the body and its parts is dissolved; my perceptive organs are discarded. Thus leaving my material form, and bidding farewell to my knowledge, I am become one with the Great Pervader². This I call sitting and forgetting all things.' Kung-nî said, 'One (with that Pervader), you are free from all likings; so transformed, you are become impermanent. You have, indeed, become superior to me! I must ask leave to follow in your steps³.'

15. 3ze-yü⁴ and 3ze-sang⁴ were friends. (Once), when it had rained continuously for ten days, 3ze-yü said, 'I fear that 3ze-sang may be in distress.' So he wrapped up some rice, and went to give it to him to eat. When he came to 3ze-sang's door, there issued from it sounds between singing and wailing;

¹ 'I sit and forget;'—generally thus supplemented (無所不忘). Hui proceeds to set forth the meaning he himself attached to the phrase.

² Another denomination, I think, of the Táo. The 大通 is also explained as meaning, 'the great void in which there is no obstruction (太虛之無碍).'

³ Here is another testimony, adduced by our author, of Confucius's appreciation of Táoism; to which the sage would, no doubt, have taken exception.

⁴ Two of the men in pars. 9, 10.

a lute was struck, and there came the words, 'O Father! O Mother! O Heaven! O Men!' The voice could not sustain itself, and the line was hurriedly pronounced. 3ze-yü entered and said, 'Why are you singing, Sir, this line of poetry in such a way?' The other replied, 'I was thinking, and thinking in vain, how it was that I was brought to such extremity. Would my parents have wished me to be so poor? Heaven overspreads all without any partial feeling, and so does Earth sustain all;—would Heaven and Earth make me so poor with any unkindly feeling? I was trying to find out who had done it, and I could not do so. But here I am in this extremity!—it is what was appointed for me!¹'

¹ Here is the highest issue of Tâoism;—unquestioning submission to what is beyond our knowledge and control.

BOOK VII.

PART I. SECTION VII.

Ying Tî Wang¹, or 'The Normal Course for Rulers and Kings¹.'

I. Nieh *K'üeh*² put four questions to Wang Î², not one of which did he know (how to answer). On this Nieh *K'üeh* leaped up, and in great delight walked away and informed Phû-tze³ of it, who said to him, 'Do you (only) now know it?' He of the line of Yü⁴ was not equal to him of the line of Thái⁵. He of Yü still kept in himself (the idea of) benevolence by which to constrain (the submission of) men; and he did win men, but he had not begun to proceed by what did not belong to him as a man. He of the line of Thái would sleep tranquilly, and awake in contented simplicity. He would consider himself now (merely) as a horse, and now (merely) as an ox⁶. His knowledge was real and untroubled

¹ See pp. 136-138.

² See p. 190, note 5.

³ An ancient Tãoist, of the time of Shun. So, Hwang-fû Mî, who adds that Shun served him as his master when he was eight years old. I suppose the name indicates that his clothes were made of rushes.

⁴ Shun. See p. 245, note 3.

⁵ An ancient sovereign, earlier, no doubt, than Fû-hsî; but nothing is known of him.

⁶ He thought nothing about his being, as a man, superior to the lower creatures. Shun in governing employed his acquired knowledge; Thái had not begun to do so.

by doubts; and his virtue was very true:—he had not begun to proceed by what belonged to him as a man.

2. *Kien Wû*¹ went to see the mad (recluse), *K'ieh-yü*², who said to him, 'What did *Zäh-kung Shih*³ tell you?' The reply was, 'He told me that when rulers gave forth their regulations according to their own views and enacted righteous measures, no one would venture not to obey them, and all would be transformed.' *K'ieh-yü* said, 'That is but the hypocrisy of virtue. For the right ordering of the world it would be like trying to wade through the sea and dig through the Ho, or employing a musquito to carry a mountain on its back. And when a sage is governing, does he govern men's outward actions? He is (himself) correct, and so (his government) goes on;—this is the simple and certain way by which he secures the success of his affairs. Think of the bird which flies high, to avoid being hurt by the dart on the string of the archer, and the little mouse which makes its hole deep under *Shän-k'ü*⁴ to avoid the danger of being smoked or dug out;—are (rulers) less knowing than these two little creatures?'

3. *Thien Kăn*⁵, rambling on the south of (mount) *Yin*⁶, came to the neighbourhood of the *Lião-water*.

¹ See p. 170, note 2.

² See p. 170, note 3.

³ A name;—'a worthy,' it is said.

⁴ Name of some hill, or height.

⁵ A name ('Root of the sky'), but probably mythical. There is a star so called.

⁶ Probably the name of a mountain, though this meaning of *Yin* is not given in the dictionary.

Happening there to meet with the man whose name is not known¹, he put a question to him, saying, 'I beg to ask what should be done² in order to (carry on) the government of the world.' The nameless man said, 'Go away; you are a rude borderer. Why do you put to me a question for which you are unprepared³? I would simply play the part of the Maker of (all) things⁴. When wearied, I would mount on the bird of the light and empty air, proceed beyond the six cardinal points, and wander in the region of non-entity, to dwell in the wilderness of desert space. What method have you, moreover, for the government of the world that you (thus) agitate my mind?' (Thien Kăn), however, again asked the question, and the nameless man said, 'Let your mind find its enjoyment in pure simplicity; blend yourself with (the primary) ether in idle indifference; allow all things to take their natural course; and admit no personal or selfish consideration:—do this and the world will be governed.'

4. Yang 3ze-kü⁵, having an interview with Láo Tan, said to him, 'Here is a man, alert and vigorous

¹ Or, 'a nameless man.' We cannot tell whether Kwang-3ze had any particular Being, so named, in view or not.

² The objectionable point in the question is the supposition that 'doing' was necessary in the case.

³ Or, 'I am unprepared.' But as Thien Kăn repeats the question, it seems better to supply the second pronoun. He had thought on the subject.

⁴ See the same phraseology in VI, par. 11. What follows is merely our author's way of describing the non-action of the Táo.

⁵ The Yang K'ü, whom Mencius attacked so fiercely. He was, perhaps, a contemporary and disciple of Láo-3ze.

in responding to all matters¹, clear-sighted and widely intelligent, and an unwearied student of the Táo;—can he be compared to one of the intelligent kings?' The reply was, 'Such a man is to one of the intelligent kings but as the bustling underling of a court who toils his body and distresses his mind with his various contrivances². And moreover, it is the beauty of the skins of the tiger and leopard which makes men hunt them; the agility of the monkey, or (the sagacity of) the dog that catches the yak, which make men lead them in strings; but can one similarly endowed be compared to the intelligent kings?'

Yang 3ze-kü looked discomposed and said, 'I venture to ask you what the government of the intelligent kings is.' Láo Tan replied, 'In the governing of the intelligent kings, their services overspread all under the sky, but they did not seem to consider it as proceeding from themselves; their transforming influence reached to all things, but the people did not refer it to them with hope. No one could tell the name of their agency, but they made men and things be joyful in themselves. Where they took their stand could not be fathomed, and they found their enjoyment in (the realm of) nonentity.'

5. In Kǎng there was a mysterious wizard³ called

¹ The 嚮 may be taken as = 向, in which case we must understand a 道 as its object; or as = 響, 'an echo,' indicating the quickness of the man's response to things.

² Compare the language of Láo Tan, in Bk. XII, par. 8, near the beginning.

³ 巫 is generally feminine, meaning 'a witch.' We must take

Ki-hsien, He knew all about the deaths and births of men, their preservation and ruin, their misery and happiness, and whether their lives would be long or short, foretelling the year, the month, the decade and the day like a spirit. When the people of K'ang saw him, they all ran out of his way. Lieh-ze went to see him, and was fascinated¹ by him. Returning, he told Hû-ze of his interview, and said, 'I considered your doctrine, my master, to be perfect, but I have found another which is superior to it.' Hû-ze² replied, 'I have communicated to you but the outward letter of my doctrine, and have not communicated its reality and spirit; and do you think that you are in possession of it? However many hens there be, if there be not the cock among them, how should they lay (real) eggs³? When you confront the world with your doctrine, you are sure to show in your countenance (all that is in your mind)⁴, and so enable (this) man to succeed in interpreting your physiognomy. Try and come to me with him, that I may show myself to him.'

On the morrow, accordingly, Lieh-ze came with the man and saw Hû-ze. When they went out, the

it here as masculine (= 覡). The general meaning of the character is 'magical,' the antics of such performers to bring down the spirits.

¹ Literally, 'intoxicated.'

² The teacher in T'aoism of Lieh-ze, called also Hû K'üi, with the name Lin (林). See the remarks on the whole paragraph in the Introductory Notice of the Book.

³ 'The hens' signify the letter of the doctrine; 'the cock,' its spirit; 'the eggs,' a real knowledge of it.

⁴ 信 is here in the first tone, and read as 伸, meaning 'to stretch,' 'to set forth.'

wizard said, 'Alas! your master is a dead man. He will not live;—not for ten days more! I saw something strange about him;—I saw the ashes (of his life) all slaked with water!' When Lieh-ze re-entered, he wept till the front of his jacket was wet with his tears, and told Hû-ze what the man had said. Hû-ze said, 'I showed myself to him with the forms of (vegetation beneath) the earth. There were the sprouts indeed, but without (any appearance of) growth or regularity:—he seemed to see me with the springs of my (vital) power closed up. Try and come to me with him again.'

Next day, accordingly, Lieh-ze brought the man again and saw Hû-ze. When they went out, the man said, 'It is a fortunate thing for your master that he met with me. He will get better; he has all the signs of living! I saw the balance (of the springs of life) that had been stopped (inclining in his favour).' Lieh-ze went in, and reported these words to his master, who said, 'I showed myself to him after the pattern of the earth (beneath the) sky. Neither semblance nor reality entered (into my exhibition), but the springs (of life) were issuing from beneath my feet;—he seemed to see me with the springs of vigorous action in full play. Try and come with him again.'

Next day Lieh-ze came with the man again, and again saw Hû-ze with him. When they went out, the wizard said, 'Your master is never the same. I cannot understand his physiognomy. Let him try to steady himself, and I will again view him.' Lieh-ze went in and reported this to Hû-ze, who said, 'This time I showed myself to him after the pattern of the grand harmony (of the two elemental

forces), with the superiority inclining to neither. He seemed to see me with the springs of (vital) power in equal balance. Where the water wheels about from (the movements of) a dugong¹, there is an abyss; where it does so from the arresting (of its course), there is an abyss; where it does so, and the water keeps flowing on, there is an abyss. There are nine abysses with their several names, and I have only exhibited three of them. Try and come with him again.'

Next day they came, and they again saw Hû-ze. But before he had settled himself in his position, the wizard lost himself and ran away. 'Pursue him,' said Hû-ze, and Lieh-ze did so, but could not come up with him. He returned, and told Hû-ze, saying, 'There is an end of him; he is lost; I could not find him.' Hû-ze rejoined, 'I was showing him myself after the pattern of what was before I began to come from my author. I confronted him with pure vacancy, and an easy indifference. He did not know what I meant to represent. Now he thought it was the idea of exhausted strength, and now that of an onward flow, and therefore he ran away.'

After this, Lieh-ze considered that he had not yet begun to learn (his master's doctrine). He returned to his house, and for three years did not go out. He did the cooking for his wife. He fed the pigs as if he were feeding men. He took no part

¹ One of the dugong. It has various names in Chinese, one being 人魚, 'the Man-Fish,' from a fancied resemblance of its head and face to a human being;—the origin perhaps of the idea of the mermaid.

or interest in occurring affairs. He put away the carving and sculpture about him, and returned to pure simplicity. Like a clod of earth he stood there in his bodily presence. Amid all distractions he was (silent) and shut up in himself. And in this way he continued to the end of his life.

6. Non-action (makes its exemplifier) the lord of all fame; non-action (serves him as) the treasury of all plans; non-action (fits him for) the burden of all offices; non-action (makes him) the lord of all wisdom¹. The range of his action is inexhaustible, but there is nowhere any trace of his presence. He fulfils all that he has received from Heaven², but he does not see that he was the recipient of anything. A pure vacancy (of all purpose) is what characterises him. When the perfect man employs his mind, it is a mirror. It conducts nothing and anticipates nothing; it responds to (what is before it), but does not retain it. Thus he is able to deal successfully with all things, and injures none.

7. The Ruler³ of the Southern Ocean was Shû⁴, the

¹ The four members of this sentence occasion the translator no small trouble. They are constructed on the same lines, and seem to me to be indicative and not imperative. Lin Hsi-kung observes that all the explanations that had been offered of them were inappropriate. My own version is substantially in accordance with his interpretations. The chief difficulty is with the first member, which seems anti-Tâoistic; but our author is not speaking of the purpose of any actor, but of the result of his non-action. 尸 is to be taken in the sense of 主, 'lord,' 'exercising lordship.' The 其 in the third sentence indicates a person or persons in the author's mind in what precedes.

² = the Heavenly or self-determining nature.

³ Perhaps 'god' would be a better translation.

⁴ Meaning 'Heedless.'

Ruler of the Northern Ocean was Hû¹, and the Ruler of the Centre was Chaos. Shû and Hû were continually meeting in the land of Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how they might repay his kindness, and said, 'Men all have seven orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating, and breathing, while this (poor) Ruler alone has not one. Let us try and make them for him.' Accordingly they dug one orifice in him every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died².

¹ Meaning 'Sudden.'

² The little allegory is ingenious and amusing. 'It indicates,' says Lin, 'how action (the opposite of non-inaction) injures the first condition of things.' More especially it is in harmony with the Tâoistic opposition to the use of knowledge in government. One critic says that an 'alas!' might well follow the concluding 'died.' But surely it was better that Chaos should give place to another state. 'Heedless' and 'Sudden' did not do a bad work.

BOOK VIII.

PART II. SECTION I.

Phien Mâu, or 'Webbed Toes'¹

1. A ligament uniting the big toe with the other toes and an extra finger may be natural² growths, but they are more than is good for use. Excrescences on the person and hanging tumours are growths from the body, but they are unnatural additions to it. There are many arts of benevolence and righteousness, and the exercise of them is distributed among the five viscera³; but this is not the correct method according to the characteristics of the Tâo. Thus it is that the addition to the foot is but the attachment to it of so much useless flesh, and the addition to the hand is but the planting on it of a useless finger. (So it is that) the connecting (the virtues) with the five viscera renders, by excess or restraint, the action of benevolence and righteousness bad, and leads to many arts as in the employment of (great) powers of hearing or of vision.

2. Therefore an extraordinary power of vision

¹ See pp. 138, 139.

² 'Come out from the nature,' but 'nature' must be taken here as in the translation. The character is not Tâo.

³ The five viscera are the heart, the liver, the stomach, the lungs, and the kidneys. To the liver are assigned the element 'wood,' and the virtue of benevolence; to the lungs, the element 'metal,' and the virtue of righteousness.

leads to the confusion of the five colours¹ and an excessive use of ornament. (Its possessor), in the resplendence of his green and yellow, white and black, black and green, will not stop till he has become a Lî K'û². An extraordinary power of hearing leads to a confusion of the five notes³, and an excessive use of the six musical accords⁴. (Its possessor), in bringing out the tones from the instruments of metal, stone, silk, and bamboo, aided by the Hwang-k'ung⁴ and Tâ-lü⁴ (tubes), will not stop till he has become a Shih Khwang⁵. (So), excessive benevolence eagerly brings out virtues and restrains its (proper) nature, that (its possessor) may acquire a famous reputation, and cause all the organs and drums in the world to celebrate an unattainable condition; and he will not stop till he has become a 3ǎng (Shǎn)⁶ or a Shih (3hiû)⁷. An ex-

¹ Black, red, azure (green, blue, or black), white, and yellow.

² The same as the Lî Lâu of Mencius (IV, i, 1),—of the time of Hwang-Tî. It is not easy to construe the text here, and in the analogous sentences below. Hsüan Ying, having read on to the 煌煌 as the uninterrupted predicate of the sharp seer, says, 'Is not this a proof of the extraordinary gift?' What follows would be, 'But it was exemplified in Lî K'û.' The meaning that is given in the version was the first that occurred to myself.

³ The five notes of the Chinese musical scale.

⁴ There are twelve of these musical notes, determined by the twelve regulating tubes; six, represented here by Hwang-k'ung, the name of the first tube, giving the sharp notes; and six, represented by Tâ-lü, giving the flat notes.

⁵ See in II, par. 5.

⁶ The famous 3ǎng-3ze, or 3ǎng Shǎn, one of Confucius's ablest disciples.

⁷ An officer of Wei in the sixth century B. C. He belonged to a family of historiographers, and hence the surname Shih (史). Confucius mentions him in the most honourable terms in the

traordinary faculty in debating leads to the piling up of arguments like a builder with his bricks, or a net-maker with his string. (Its possessor) cunningly contrives his sentences and enjoys himself in discussing what hardness is and what whiteness is, where views agree and where they differ, and pressing on, though weary, with short steps, with (a multitude of) useless words to make good his opinion; nor will he stop till he has become a Yang (*K'ü*)¹ or Mo (*Ti*)¹. But in all these cases the parties, with their redundant and divergent methods, do not proceed by that which is the correct path for all under the sky. That which is the perfectly correct path is not to lose the real character of the nature with which we are endowed. Hence the union (of parts) should not be considered redundancy, nor their divergence superfluity; what is long should not be considered too long, nor what is short too short: A duck's legs, for instance, are short, but if we try to lengthen them, it occasions pain; and a crane's legs are long, but if we try to cut off a portion of them, it produces grief. Where a part is by nature long, we are not to amputate, or where it is by nature short, we are not to lengthen it. There is no occasion to try to remove any trouble that it may cause.

3. The presumption is that benevolence and righteousness are not constituents of humanity; for to how much anxiety does the exercise of them give rise! Moreover when another toe is united to the

Analect XV, vi, by the name Shih Yü. 'Righteousness' was his great attribute.

¹ The two heresiarchs so much denounced by Mencius. Both have appeared in previous Books.

great toe, to divide the membrane makes you weep; and when there is an extra finger, to gnaw it off makes you cry out. In the one case there is a member too many, and in the other a member too few; but the anxiety and pain which they cause is the same. The benevolent men of the present age look at the evils of the world, as with eyes full of dust, and are filled with sorrow by them, while those who are not benevolent, having violently altered the character of their proper nature, greedily pursue after riches and honours. The presumption therefore is that benevolence and righteousness are contrary to the nature of man:—how full of trouble and contention has the world been ever since the three dynasties¹ began!

And moreover, in employing the hook and line, the compass and square, to give things their correct form you must cut away portions of what naturally belongs to them; in employing strings and fastenings, glue and varnish to make things firm, you must violently interfere with their qualities. The bendings and stoppings in ceremonies and music, and the factitious expression in the countenance of benevolence and righteousness, in order to comfort the minds of men:—these all show a failure in observing the regular principles (of the human constitution). All men are furnished with such regular principles; and according to them what is bent is not made so by the hook, nor what is straight by the line, nor what is round by the compass, nor what is square by the carpenter's square. Nor is adhesion effected by

¹ Those of Hsiâ, Shang, and K'au;—from the twenty-third century B. C. to our author's own time.

the use of glue and varnish, nor are things bound together by means of strings and bands. Thus it is that all in the world are produced what they are by a certain guidance, while they do not know how they are produced so; and they equally attain their several ends while they do not know how it is that they do so. Anciently it was so, and it is so now; and this constitution of things should not be made of none effect. Why then should benevolence and righteousness be employed as connecting (links), or as glue and varnish, strings and bands, and the enjoyment arising from the Táo and its characteristics be attributed to them?—it is a deception practised upon the world. Where the deception is small, there will be a change in the direction (of the objects pursued); where it is great, there will be a change of the nature itself. How do I know that it is so? Since he of the line of Yü called in his benevolence and righteousness to distort and vex the world, the world has not ceased to hurry about to execute their commands;—has not this been by means of benevolence and righteousness to change (men's views) of their nature?

4. I will therefore try and discuss this matter. From the commencement of the three dynasties downwards, nowhere has there been a man who has not under (the influence of external) things altered (the course of) his nature. Small men for the sake of gain have sacrificed their persons; scholars for the sake of fame have done so; great officers, for the sake of their families; and sagely men, for the sake of the kingdom. These several classes, with different occupations, and different repu-

tations, have agreed in doing injury to their nature and sacrificing their persons. Take the case of a male and female slave¹;—they have to feed the sheep together, but they both lose their sheep. Ask the one what he was doing, and you will find that he was holding his bamboo tablets and reading. Ask the other, and you will find that she was amusing herself with some game². They were differently occupied, but they equally lose their sheep. (So), Po-i³ died at the foot of Shâu-yang⁴ to maintain his fame, and the robber K'ih⁵ died on the top of Tung-ling⁶ in his eagerness for gain. Their deaths were occasioned by different causes, but they equally shortened their lives and did violence to their nature;—why must we approve of Po-i, and condemn the robber K'ih? In cases of such sacrifice all over the world, when one makes it for the sake of benevolence and righteousness, the common people style him 'a superior man,' but when another does it for the sake of goods and riches, they style him 'a small man.' The action of sacrificing is the same, and yet we have 'the superior man' and 'the small man!' In the matter of destroying his life, and doing injury to his nature, the robber K'ih simply did the same as Po-i;—why must we make the distinction of 'superior man' and 'small man' between them?

¹ See the Khang-hsî dictionary under the character 臧.

² Playing at some game with dice.

³ See VI, par. 3.

⁴ A mountain in the present Shan-hsî, probably in the department of Phû-lâu.

⁵ A strange character, but not historical, represented as a brother of Liû-hsiâ Hui. See Bk. XXIX.

⁶ 'The Eastern Height,'= the Thâi mountain in the present Shan-tung.

5. Moreover, those who devote their nature to (the pursuit) of benevolence and righteousness, though they should attain to be like ǰǎng (Shǎn) and Shih (ǰhiû), I do not pronounce to be good; those who devote it to (the study of) the five flavours, though they attain to be like Shû¹, I do not pronounce to be good; those who devote it to the (discrimination of the) five notes, though they attain to be like Shih Khwang, I do not pronounce to be quick of hearing; those who devote it to the (appreciation of the) five colours, though they attain to be like Li K'û, I do not pronounce to be clear of vision. When I pronounce men to be good, I am not speaking of their benevolence and righteousness;—the goodness is simply (their possession of) the qualities (of the Tâo). When I pronounce them to be good, I am not speaking of what are called benevolence and righteousness; but simply of their allowing the nature with which they are endowed to have its free course. When I pronounce men to be quick of hearing, I do not mean that they hearken to anything else, but that they hearken to themselves; when I pronounce them to be clear of vision, I do not mean that they look to anything else, but that they look to themselves. Now those who do not see themselves but see other things, who do not get possession of themselves but get possession of other things, get possession of what belongs to others, and not of what is their own; and they reach forth to what attracts others, and not to that in themselves which should attract them. But

¹ Different from Yih-ya, the famous cook of duke Hwan of K'hi. This is said to have been of the time of Hwang-Ti. But there are different readings of the name.

thus reaching forth to what attracts others and not to what should attract them in themselves, be they like the robber *K'ih* or like *Po-i*, they equally err in the way of excess or of perversity. What I am ashamed of is erring in the characteristics of the *T'ao*, and therefore, in the higher sphere, I do not dare to insist on the practice of benevolence and righteousness, and, in the lower, I do not dare to allow myself either in the exercise of excess or perversity.

BOOK IX.

PART II. SECTION II.

Má Thî, or 'Horses's Hoofs'¹

1. Horses can with their hoofs tread on the hoarfrost and snow, and with their hair withstand the wind and cold; they feed on the grass and drink water; they prance with their legs and leap:—this is the true nature of horses. Though there were made for them grand towers² and large dormitories, they would prefer not to use them. But when Po-lão³ (arose and) said, 'I know well how to manage horses,' (men proceeded)⁴ to singe and mark them, to clip their hair, to pare their hoofs, to halter their heads, to bridle them and hobble them, and to confine them in stables and corrals. (When subjected to this treatment), two or three in every ten of them died. (Men proceeded further) to subject them to hunger and thirst, to gallop them and race them,

¹ See pp. 140, 141.

² Literally, 'righteous towers;' but 義 is very variously applied, and there are other readings. Compare the name of ling thâi, given by the people to the tower built by king Wăn; Shih, III, i, 8.

³ A mythical being, the first tamer of horses. The name is given to a star, where he is supposed to have his seat as superintendent of the horses of heaven. It became a designation of Sun Yang, a famous charioteer of the later period of the Kâu dynasty, but it could not be he whom Kwang-ze had in view.

⁴ Po-lão set the example of dealing with horses as now described; but the supplement which I have introduced seems to bring out better our author's meaning.

and to make them go together in regular order. In front were the evils of the bit and ornamented breast-bands, and behind were the terrors of the whip and switch. (When so treated), more than half of them died.

The (first) potter said, 'I know well how to deal with clay;' and (men proceeded) to mould it into circles as exact as if made by the compass, and into squares as exact as if formed by the measuring square. The (first) carpenter said, 'I know well how to deal with wood;' and (men proceeded) to make it bent as if by the application of the hook, and straight as if by the application of the plumb-line. But is it the nature of clay and wood to require the application of the compass and square, of the hook and line? And yet age after age men have praised Po-lão, saying, 'He knew well how to manage horses,' and also the (first) potter and carpenter, saying, 'They knew well how to deal with clay and wood.' This is just the error committed by the governors of the world.

2. According to my idea, those who know well to govern mankind would not act so. The people had their regular and constant nature¹:—they wove and made themselves clothes; they tilled the ground and got food². This was their common faculty. They were all one in this, and did not form themselves into separate classes; so were they constituted and left to their natural tendencies³. Therefore in the

¹ Compare the same language in the previous Book, par. 3.

² But the weaver's or agriculturist's art has no more title to be called primitive than the potter's or carpenter's.

³ A difficult expression; but the translation, probably, gives its

age of perfect virtue men walked along with slow and grave step, and with their looks steadily directed forwards. At that time, on the hills there were no foot-paths, nor excavated passages; on the lakes there were no boats nor dams; all creatures lived in companies; and the places of their settlement were made close to one another. Birds and beasts multiplied to flocks and herds; the grass and trees grew luxuriant and long. In this condition the birds and beasts might be led about without feeling the constraint; the nest of the magpie might be climbed to, and peeped into. Yes, in the age of perfect virtue, men lived in common with birds and beasts, and were on terms of equality with all creatures, as forming one family;—how could they know among themselves the distinctions of superior men and small men? Equally without knowledge, they did not leave (the path of) their natural virtue; equally free from desires, they were in the state of pure simplicity. In that state of pure simplicity, the nature of the people was what it ought to be. But when the sagely men appeared, limping and wheeling about in (the exercise of) benevolence, pressing along and standing on tiptoe in the doing of righteousness, then men universally began to be perplexed. (Those sages also) went to excess in their performances of music, and in their gesticulations in the practice of ceremonies, and then men began to be separated from one another. If the raw materials

true significance. 'Heaven' here is synonymous with 'the Táo'; but its use shows how readily the minds, even of Láo and Kwang, had recourse to the earliest term by which the Chinese fathers had expressed their recognition of a Supreme and Controlling Power and Government.

had not been cut and hacked, who could have made a sacrificial vase from them? If the natural jade had not been broken and injured, who could have made the handles for the libation-cups from it? If the attributes of the Táo had not been disallowed, how should they have preferred benevolence and righteousness? If the instincts of the nature had not been departed from, how should ceremonies and music have come into use? If the five colours had not been confused, how should the ornamental figures have been formed? If the five notes had not been confused, how should they have supplemented them by the musical accords? The cutting and hacking of the raw materials to form vessels was the crime of the skilful workman; the injury done to the characteristics of the Táo in order to the practice of benevolence and righteousness was the error of the sagely men.

3. Horses, when living in the open country, eat the grass, and drink water; when pleased, they intertwine their necks and rub one another; when enraged, they turn back to back and kick one another;—this is all that they know to do. But if we put the yoke on their necks, with the moon-like frontlet displayed on all their foreheads, then they know to look slily askance, to curve their necks, to rush viciously, trying to get the bit out of their mouths, and to filch the reins (from their driver);—this knowledge of the horse and its ability thus to act the part of a thief is the crime of Po-lão. In the time of (the Tí) Ho-hsü¹, the people occupied

¹ An ancient sovereign; but nothing more definite can be said about him. Most of the critics identify him with Shǎn-nǎng, the

their dwellings without knowing what they were doing, and walked out without knowing where they were going. They filled their mouths with food and were glad; they slapped their stomachs to express their satisfaction. This was all the ability which they possessed. But when the sagely men appeared, with their bendings and stoppings in ceremonies and music to adjust the persons of all, and hanging up their benevolence and righteousness to excite the endeavours of all to reach them, in order to comfort their minds, then the people began to stump and limp about in their love of knowledge, and strove with one another in their pursuit of gain, so that there was no stopping them:—this was the error of those sagely men.

Father of Husbandry, who occupies the place in chronological tables after Fû-hsî, between him and Hwang-Tî. In the Tables of the Dynastic Histories, published in 1817, he is placed seventh in the list of fifteen reigns, which are placed without any specification of their length between Fû-hsî and Shân-năng. The name is written as 合胥 and 赫胥.

BOOK X.

PART II. SECTION III.

Khü Khieh, or 'Cutting open Satchels¹.'

1. In taking precautions against thieves who cut open satchels, search bags, and break open boxes, people are sure to cord and fasten them well, and to employ strong bonds and clasps; and in this they are ordinarily said to show their wisdom. When a great thief comes, however, he shoulders the box, lifts up the satchel, carries off the bag, and runs away with them, afraid only that the cords, bonds, and clasps may not be secure; and in this case what was called the wisdom (of the owners) proves to be nothing but a collecting of the things for the great thief. Let me try and set this matter forth. Do not those who are vulgarly called wise prove to be collectors for the great thieves? And do not those who are called sages prove to be but guardians in the interest of the great thieves?

How do I know that the case is so? Formerly, in the state of *Khi*, the neighbouring towns could see one another; their cocks and dogs never ceased to answer the crowing and barking of other cocks and dogs (between them). The nets were set (in the water and on the land); and the ploughs and hoes were employed over more than a space of two thousand li square. All within its four boundaries, the

¹ See pp. 141, 142.

establishment of the ancestral temples and of the altars of the land and grain, and the ordering of the hamlets and houses, and of every corner in the districts, large, medium, and small, were in all particulars according to the rules of the sages¹. So it was; but yet one morning, Thien *Khăng-ze*² killed the ruler of *Khi*, and stole his state. And was it only the state that he stole? Along with it he stole also the regulations of the sages and wise men (observed in it). And so, though he got the name of being a thief and a robber, yet he himself continued to live as securely as Yáo and Shun had done. Small states did not dare to find fault with him; great states did not dare to take him off; for twelve generations (his descendants) have possessed the state of *Khi*³. Thus do we not have a case in which not only did (the party) steal the state of *Khi*,

¹ The meaning is plain; but to introduce the various geographical terms would make the translation cumbrous. The concluding 曲 is perplexing.

² This event is mentioned in the Analects, XIV, xxii, where the perpetrator of the murder is called *Khăn Khăng-ze*, and *Khăn Hăng*. Hăng was his name, and *Khăng* the honorary title given to him after his death. The family to which he belonged had originally taken refuge in *Khi* from the state of *Khăn* in B. C. 672. Why and when its chiefs adopted the surname Thien instead of *Khăn* is not well known. The murder took place in 482. Hăng did not immediately usurp the marquisate; but he and his successors disposed of it at their pleasure among the representatives of the old House till 386, when Thien Ho was recognised by the king of *Kâu* as the marquis; and his next successor but one took the title of king.

³ The kingdom of *Khi* came to an end in B. C. 221, the first year of the dynasty of *K'in*, after it had lasted through five reigns. How *Kwang-ze* made out his 'twelve generations' we cannot tell. There may be an interpolation in his text made in the time of *K'in*, or subsequently.

but at the same time the regulations of its sages and wise men, which thereby served to guard the person of him, thief and robber as he was ?

2. Let me try to set forth this subject (still further). Have not there been among those vulgarly styled the wisest, such as have collected (their wealth) for the great chief? and among those styled the most sage such as have guarded it for him? How do I know that it has been so? Formerly, Lung-fāng¹ was beheaded; Pí-kan² had his heart torn out; K'hang Hung³ was ripped open; and 3ze-hsü⁴ was reduced to pulp (in the K'iang). Worthy as those four men were, they did not escape such dreadful deaths. The followers of the robber K'ih⁵ asked him, saying, 'Has the robber also any method or principle (in his proceedings)?' He replied, 'What profession is there which has not its principles? That the robber in his recklessness comes to the conclusion that there are valuable deposits in an apartment shows his sageness; that he is the first to enter it shows his bravery; that he is the last to quit it shows his righteousness; that he knows whether (the robbery) may be attempted or not shows his wisdom; and that he makes an equal

¹ See on Book IV, par. 1.

² See on Book IV, par. 1.

³ A historiographer of K'au, with whom Confucius is said to have studied music. He was weakly and unjustly put to death, as here described by king K'ang, in B. C. 492.

⁴ Wú 3ze-hsü, the hero of revenge, who fled from K'au to Wú, which he long served. He was driven at last to commit suicide, and his body was then put into a leathern wine-sack, and thrown into the K'iang near the present Sû-k'au;—about B. C. 475.

⁵ See on Book VIII, par. 4.

division of the plunder shows his benevolence. Without all these five qualities no one in the world has ever attained to become a great robber.' Looking at the subject in this way, we see that good men do not arise without having the principles of the sages, and that *Kih* could not have pursued his course without the same principles. But the good men in the world are few, and those who are not good are many;—it follows that the sages benefit the world in a few instances and injure it in many. Hence it is that we have the sayings, 'When the lips are gone the teeth are cold¹;' 'The poor wine of *Lû* gave occasion to the siege of *Han-tan*²;' 'When sages are born great robbers arise³.' When the stream is dried, the valley is empty; when the mound is levelled, the deep pool (beside it) is filled up. When the sages have died, the great robbers will not arise; the world would be at peace, and there would be no more troubles. While the sagely men have not died, great robbers will not cease to appear. The more right that is attached to (the views of) the sagely men for the government of the world, the more advantage will accrue to (such men as) the robber *Kih*. If we make for men pecks and bushels

¹ This is an instance of cause and effect naturally happening.

² At a meeting of the princes, presided over by king *Hsüan* of *Khû* (B.C. 369–340), the ruler of *Lû* brought very poor wine for the king, which was presented to him as wine of *Kão*, in consequence of a grudge against that kingdom by his officer of wines. In consequence of this king *Hsüan* ordered siege to be laid to *Han-tan*, the capital of *Kão*. This is an instance of cause and effect occurring irregularly.

³ There seems to be no connexion of cause and effect here; but *Kwang-ze* goes on in his own way to make out that there is such a connexion.

to measure (their wares), even by means of those pecks and bushels should we be teaching them to steal¹; if we make for them weights and steelyards to weigh (their wares), even by means of those weights and steelyards shall we be teaching them to steal. If we make for them tallies and seals to secure their good faith, even by means of those tallies and seals shall we be teaching them to steal. If we make for them benevolence and righteousness to make their doings correct, even by means of benevolence and righteousness shall we be teaching them to steal. How do I know that it is so? Here is one who steals a hook (for his girdle);—he is put to death for it: here is another who steals a state;—he becomes its prince. But it is at the gates of the princes that we find benevolence and righteousness (most strongly) professed;—is not this stealing benevolence and righteousness, sagemess and wisdom? Thus they hasten to become great robbers, carry off principedoms, and steal benevolence and righteousness, with all the gains springing from the use of pecks and bushels, weights and steelyards, tallies and seals:—even the rewards of carriages and coronets have no power to influence (to a different course), and the terrors of the axe have no power to restrain in such cases. The giving of so great gain to robbers (like) *K'ih*, and making it impossible to restrain them;—this is the error committed by the sages.

3. In accordance with this it is said, 'Fish should

¹ The verb 'to steal' is here used transitively, and with a hiphil force.

not be taken from (the protection of) the deep waters; the agencies for the profit of a state should not be shown to men¹. But those sages (and their teachings) are the agencies for the profit of the world, and should not be exhibited to it. Therefore if an end were put to sageness and wisdom put away, the great robbers would cease to arise. If jade were put away and pearls broken to bits, the small thieves would not appear. If tallies were burned and seals broken in pieces, the people would become simple and unsophisticated. If pecks were destroyed and steelyards snapped in two, the people would have no wrangling. If the rules of the sages were entirely set aside in the world, a beginning might be made of reasoning with the people. If the six musical accords were reduced to a state of utter confusion, organs and lutes all burned, and the ears of the (musicians like the) blind Khwang² stopped up, all men would begin to possess and employ their (natural) power of hearing. If elegant ornaments were abolished, the five embellishing colours disused, and the eyes of (men like) Li K'ü³ glued up, all men would begin to possess and employ their (natural) power of vision. If the hook and line were destroyed, the compass and square thrown away, and the fingers of men (like) the artful K'zui⁴ smashed, all men would begin to possess and employ their (natural) skill;—as it is said, 'The greatest art is

¹ See the T'ao Teh King, ch. 36. Our author's use of it throws light on its meaning.

² Note 1, p. 186.

³ Note 2, p. 269.

⁴ A skilful maker of arrows of the time of Y'ao,—the Kung-kung of the Sh'ü, II, i, 21; V, xxii, 19.

like stupidity¹. If conduct such as that of 3ǎng (Shǎn)² and Shih (*K'hiû*)³ were discarded, the mouths of Yang (*K'û*)⁴ and Mo (Tî) gagged, and benevolence and righteousness seized and thrown aside, the virtue of all men would begin to display its mysterious excellence. When men possessed and employed their (natural) power of vision, there would be no distortion in the world. When they possessed and employed their (natural) power of hearing, there would be no distractions in the world. When they possessed and employed their (natural) faculty of knowledge, there would be no delusions in the world. When they possessed and employed their (natural) virtue, there would be no depravity in the world. Men like 3ǎng (Shǎn), Shih (*K'hiû*), Yang (*K'û*), Mo (Tî), Shih Khwang (the musician), the artist *K'kui*, and Li *K'û*, all display their qualities outwardly, and set the world in a blaze (of admiration) and confound it;—a method which is of no use!

4. Are you, Sir, unacquainted with the age of perfect virtue? Anciently there were Yung-*k'hang*, Tâ-thing, Po-hwang, Kang-yang, Li-lû, Li-*k'hiû*, Hsien-yüan, Ho-hsü, 3un-lû, *K'û-yung*, Fû-hsî, and Shǎn-nǎng⁵. In their times the people made

¹ The Táo Teh King, ch. 45.

² Note 6, p. 269.

³ Note 7, p. 269.

⁴ Note 5, p. 261.

⁵ Of the twelve names mentioned here the reader is probably familiar with those of Fû-hsî and Shǎn-nǎng, the first and second of the Tî in chronology. Hsien-yüan is another name for Hwang-Tî, the third of them. *K'û-yung* was, perhaps, a minister of Hwang-Tî. Ho-hsü has occurred before in Book IV. Of the other seven, five occur among the fifteen sovereigns placed in the 'Compendium

knots on cords in carrying on their affairs. They thought their (simple) food pleasant, and their (plain) clothing beautiful. They were happy in their (simple) manners, and felt at rest in their (poor) dwellings. (The people of) neighbouring states might be able to descry one another; the voices of their cocks and dogs might be heard (all the way) from one to the other; they might not die till they were old; and yet all their life they would have no communication together¹. In those times perfect good order prevailed.

Now-a-days, however, such is the state of things that you shall see the people stretching out their necks, and standing on tiptoe, while they say, 'In such and such a place there is a wise and able man.' Then they carry with them whatever dry provisions they may have left, and hurry towards it, abandoning their parents in their homes, and neglecting the service of their rulers abroad. Their footsteps may be traced in lines from one state to another, and the ruts of their chariot-wheels also for more than a thousand li. This is owing to the error of their superiors in their (inordinate) fondness for knowledge. When those superiors do really love knowledge, but do not follow the (proper) course, the whole world is thrown into great confusion.

How do I know that the case is so? The knowledge shown in the (making of) bows, cross-bows, hand-nets, stringed arrows, and contrivances with springs is great, but the birds are troubled by them

of History' between Fû-hsî and Shăn-năng. The remaining two may be found, I suppose, in the Lû Shih of Lo Pî.

¹ See the eightieth chapter of the Táo Teh King.

above; the knowledge shown in the hooks, baits, various kinds of nets, and bamboo traps is great, but the fishes are disturbed by them in the waters; the knowledge shown in the arrangements for setting nets, and the nets and snares themselves, is great, but the animals are disturbed by them in the marshy grounds. (So), the versatility shown in artful deceptions becoming more and more pernicious, in ingenious discussions as to what is hard and what is white, and in attempts to disperse the dust and reconcile different views, is great, but the common people are perplexed by all the sophistry. Hence there is great disorder continually in the world, and the guilt of it is due to that fondness for knowledge. Thus it is that all men know to seek for the knowledge that they have not attained to; and do not know to seek for that which they already have (in themselves); and that they know to condemn what they do not approve (in others), and do not know to condemn what they have allowed in themselves;—it is this which occasions the great confusion and disorder. It is just as if, above, the brightness of the sun and moon were darkened; as if, beneath, the productive vigour of the hills and streams were dried up; and as if, between, the operation of the four seasons were brought to an end:—in which case there would not be a single weak and wriggling insect, nor any plant that grows up, which would not lose its proper nature. Great indeed is the disorder produced in the world by the love of knowledge. From the time of the three dynasties downwards it has been so. The plain and honest-minded people are neglected, and the plausible representations of restless spirits

received with pleasure; the quiet and unexciting method of non-action is put away, and pleasure taken in ideas garrulously expressed. It is this garrulity of speech which puts the world in disorder.

BOOK XI.

PART II. SECTION IV.

3âi Yû, or 'Letting Be, and Exercising Forbearance'¹

1. I have heard of letting the world be, and exercising forbearance; I have not heard of governing the world. Letting be is from the fear that men, (when interfered with), will carry their nature beyond its normal condition; exercising forbearance is from the fear that men, (when not so dealt with), will alter the characteristics of their nature. When all men do not carry their nature beyond its normal condition, nor alter its characteristics, the good government of the world is secured.

Formerly, Yâo's government of the world made men look joyful; but when they have this joy in their nature, there is a want of its (proper) placidity. The government of the world by Kieh, (on the contrary), made men look distressed; but when their nature shows the symptoms of distress, there is a want of its (proper) contentment. The want of placidity and the want of contentment are contrary to the character (of the nature); and where this obtains, it is impossible that any man or state should anywhere abide long. Are men exceedingly joyful?—the Yang or element of expansion in them is too much developed. Are they exceedingly

¹ See pp. 142, 143.

irritated?—the Yin or opposite element is too much developed. When those elements thus predominate in men, (it is as if¹) the four seasons were not to come (at their proper times), and the harmony of cold and heat were not to be maintained;—would there not result injury to the bodies of men? Men's joy and dissatisfaction are made to arise where they ought not to do so; their movements are all uncertain; they lose the mastery of their thoughts; they stop short midway, and do not finish what they have begun. In this state of things the world begins to have lofty aims, and jealous dislikes, ambitious courses, and fierce animosities, and then we have actions like those of the robber *Kih*, or of ǰǎng (Shǎn) and Shih (ǰhiû)². If now the whole world were taken to reward the good it would not suffice, nor would it be possible with it to punish the bad. Thus the world, great as it is, not sufficing for rewards and punishments, from the time of the three dynasties downwards, there has been nothing but bustle and excitement. Always occupied with rewards and punishments, what leisure have men had to rest in the instincts of the nature with which they are endowed?

2. Moreover, delight in the power of vision leads

¹ I supply the 'it is as if,' after the example of the critic *Lû Shû-kih*, who here introduces a 猶 in his commentary (猶四時之氣乖其序云云). What the text seems to state as a fact is only an illustration. Compare the concluding paragraphs in all the Sections and Parts of the fourth Book of the *Lî Kî*.

² Our moral instincts protest against Tâoism which thus places in the same category such sovereigns as *Yáo* and *Kieh*, and such men as the brigand *Kih* and ǰǎng and Shih.

to excess in the pursuit of (ornamental) colours; delight in the power of hearing, to excess in seeking (the pleasures of) sound; delight in benevolence tends to disorder that virtue (as proper to the nature); delight in righteousness sets the man in opposition to what is right in reason; delight in (the practice of) ceremonies is helpful to artful forms; delight in music leads to voluptuous airs; delight in sageness is helpful to ingenious contrivances; delight in knowledge contributes to fault-finding. If all men were to rest in the instincts of their nature, to keep or to extinguish these eight delights might be a matter of indifference; but if they will not rest in those instincts, then those eight delights begin to be imperfectly and unevenly developed or violently suppressed, and the world is thrown into disorder. But when men begin to honour them, and to long for them, how great is the deception practised on the world! And not only, when (a performance of them) is once over, do they not have done with them, but they prepare themselves (as) with fasting to describe them, they seem to kneel reverentially when they bring them forward, and they go through them with the excitements of music and singing; and then what can be done (to remedy the evil of them)? Therefore the superior man, who feels himself constrained to engage in the administration of the world will find it his best way to do nothing¹. In (that policy of) doing nothing, he can rest in the instincts of the nature with which he is endowed. Hence he who will administer (the government of) the world

¹ Here is the Tâoistic meaning of the title of this Book.

honouring it as he honours his own person, may have that government committed to him, and he who will administer it loving it as he loves his own person, may have it entrusted to him¹. Therefore, if the superior man will keep (the faculties lodged in) his five viscera unemployed, and not display his powers of seeing and hearing, while he is motionless as a representative of the dead, his dragon-like presence will be seen; while he is profoundly silent, the thunder (of his words) will resound; while his movements are (unseen) like those of a spirit, all heavenly influences will follow them; while he is (thus) unconcerned and does nothing, his genial influence will attract and gather all things round him:—what leisure has he to do anything more for the government of the world?

3. Zhui K'ü² asked Lâu Tan, saying, 'If you do not govern the world, how can you make men's minds good?' The reply was, 'Take care how you meddle with and disturb men's minds. The mind, if pushed about, gets depressed; if helped forward, it gets exalted. Now exalted, now depressed, here it appears as a prisoner, and there as a wrathful fury. (At one time) it becomes pliable and soft, yielding to what is hard and strong; (at another), it is sharp as the sharpest corner, fit to carve or chisel (stone or jade). Now it is hot as a scorching fire, and anon it is cold as ice. It is so swift that while one is bending down and lifting up his head, it shall twice

¹ A quotation, but without any indication that it is so, from the Tâu Teh King, ch. 13.

² Probably an imaginary personage.

have put forth a soothing hand beyond the four seas. Resting, it is still as a deep abyss; moving, it is like one of the bodies in the sky; in its resolute haughtiness, it refuses to be bound;—such is the mind of man ¹ !'

Anciently, Hwang-Tî was the first to meddle with and disturb the mind of man with his benevolence and righteousness ². After him, Yáo and Shun wore their thighs bare and the hair off the calves of their legs, in their labours to nourish the bodies of the people. They toiled painfully with all the powers in their five viscera at the practice of their benevolence and righteousness; they tasked their blood and breath to make out a code of laws;—and after all they were unsuccessful. On this Yáo sent away Hwan Táu to *Khung* hill, and (the Chiefs of) the Three Miáo to San-wei, and banished the Minister of Works to the Dark Capital; so unequal had they been to cope with the world ³. Then we are carried on to the kings of the Three (dynasties), when the world was in a state of great distraction. Of the lowest type of character there were *Kieh* and *Kih*; of a higher type there were *3ǎng* (Shǎn) and *Shih* (*3hiú*). At the same time there arose the classes of

¹ I must suppose that the words of Láo-3ze stop here, and that what follows is from *Kwang-3ze* himself, down to the end of the paragraph. We cannot have Láo-3ze referring to men later than himself, and quoting from his own Book.

² Hitherto Yáo and Shun have appeared as the first disturbers of the rule of the Táo by their benevolence and righteousness. Here that innovation is carried further back to Hwang-Tî.

³ See these parties, and the way they were dealt with, in the *Shû* King, Part II, Book I, 3. The punishment of them is there ascribed to Shun; but Yáo was still alive, and Shun was acting as his viceroy.

the Literati and the Mohists. Hereupon, complacency in, and hatred of, one another produced mutual suspicions; the stupid and the wise imposed on one another; the good and the bad condemned one another; the boastful and the sincere interchanged their recriminations;—and the world fell into decay. Views as to what was greatly virtuous did not agree, and the nature with its endowments became as if shrivelled by fire or carried away by a flood. All were eager for knowledge, and the people were exhausted with their searchings (after what was good). On this the axe and the saw were brought into play; guilt was determined as by the plumb-line and death inflicted; the hammer and gouge did their work. The world fell into great disorder, and presented the appearance of a jagged mountain ridge. The crime to which all was due was the meddling with and disturbing men's minds. The effect was that men of ability and worth lay concealed at the foot of the crags of mount Thâi, and princes of ten thousand chariots were anxious and terrified in their ancestral temples. In the present age those who have been put to death in various ways lie thick as if pillowed on each other; those who are wearing the cangue press on each other (on the roads); those who are suffering the bastinado can see each other (all over the land). And now the Literati and the Mohists begin to stand, on tiptoe and with bare arms, among the fettered and manacled crowd! Ah! extreme is their shamelessness, and their failure to see the disgrace! Strange that we should be slow to recognise their sageness and wisdom in the bars of the cangue, and their benevolence and righteousness in the rivets of the fetters and handcuffs! How do we know that

3ǎng and Shih are not the whizzing arrows of *Kieh* and *Kih*¹? Therefore it is said, 'Abolish sageness and cast away knowledge, and the world will be brought to a state of great order².'

4. Hwang-Tî had been on the throne for nineteen years³, and his ordinances were in operation all through the kingdom, when he heard that Kwang *Khǎng-ze*⁴ was living on the summit of *Khung-thung*⁵, and went to see him. 'I have heard,' he said, 'that you, Sir, are well acquainted with the perfect *Táo*. I venture to ask you what is the essential thing in it. I wish to take the subtlest influences of heaven and earth, and assist with them the (growth of the) five cereals for the (better) nourishment of the people. I also wish to direct the (operation of the) Yin and Yang, so as to secure the comfort of all living beings. How shall I proceed to accomplish those objects?' Kwang *Khǎng-ze* replied, 'What you wish to ask about is the original substance of all things⁶; what you

¹ Compare this picture of the times after Yáo and Shun with that given by Mencius in III, ii, ch. 9 et al. But the conclusions arrived at as to the causes and cure of their evils by him and our author are very different.

² A quotation, with the regular formula, from the *Táo Teh King*, ch. 19, with some variation of the text.

³ ? in B. C. 2678.

⁴ Another imaginary personage; apparently, a personification of the *Táo*. Some say he was *Láo-ze*,—in one of his early states of existence; others that he was 'a True Man,' the teacher of Hwang-Tî. See Ko Hung's 'Immortals,' I, i.

⁵ Equally imaginary is the mountain *Khung-thung*. Some critics find a place for it in the province of Ho-nan; the majority say it is the highest point in the constellation of the Great Bear.

⁶ The original ether, undivided, out of which all things were formed.

wish to have the direction of is that substance as it was shattered and divided¹. According to your government of the world, the vapours of the clouds, before they were collected, would descend in rain; the herbs and trees would shed their leaves before they became yellow; and the light of the sun and moon would hasten to extinction. Your mind is that of a flatterer with his plausible words;—it is not fit that I should tell you the perfect Táo.’

Hwang-Ti withdrew, gave up (his government of) the kingdom, built himself a solitary apartment, spread in it a mat of the white mào grass, dwelt in it unoccupied for three months, and then went again to seek an interview with (the recluse). Kwang K’hăng-ze was then lying down with his head to the south. Hwang-Ti, with an air of deferential submission, went forward on his knees, twice bowed low with his face to the ground, and asked him, saying, ‘I have heard that you, Sir, are well acquainted with the perfect Táo;—I venture to ask how I should rule my body, in order that it may continue for a long time.’ Kwang K’hăng-ze hastily rose, and said, ‘A good question! Come and I will tell you the perfect Táo. Its essence is (surrounded with) the deepest obscurity; its highest reach is in darkness and silence. There is nothing to be seen; nothing to be heard. When it holds the spirit in its arms in stillness, then the bodily form of itself will become correct. You must be still; you must be pure; not subjecting your body to toil, not agitating your vital force;—then you may live for long. When

¹ The same ether, now in motion, now at rest, divided into the Yin and Yang.

your eyes see nothing, your ears hear nothing, and your mind knows nothing, your spirit will keep your body, and the body will live long. Watch over what is within you, shut up the avenues that connect you with what is external;—much knowledge is pernicious. I (will) proceed with you to the summit of the Grand Brilliance, where we come to the source of the bright and expanding (element); I will enter with you the gate of the Deepest Obscurity, where we come to the source of the dark and repressing (element). There heaven and earth have their controllers; there the Yin and Yang have their Repositories. Watch over and keep your body, and all things will of themselves give it vigour. I maintain the (original) unity (of these elements), and dwell in the harmony of them. In this way I have cultivated myself for one thousand and two hundred years, and my bodily form has undergone no decay¹.

Hwang-Tî twice bowed low with his head to the ground, and said, 'In Kwang *Khăng-ze* we have an example of what is called Heaven².' The other said, 'Come, and I will tell you:—(The perfect Tâo) is something inexhaustible, and yet men all think it has an end; it is something unfathomable, and yet men all think its extreme limit can be reached. He who attains to my Tâo, if he be in a high position, will be one of the August ones, and in a low position, will be a king. He who fails in attaining it, in his highest attainment will see the light, but will

¹ It seems very clear here that the earliest Tâoism taught that the cultivation of the Tâo tended to prolong and preserve the bodily life.

² A remarkable, but not a singular, instance of *Kwang-ze*'s application of the name 'Heaven.'

descend and be of the Earth. At present all things are produced from the Earth and return to the Earth. Therefore I will leave you, and enter the gate of the Unending, to enjoy myself in the fields of the Illimitable. I will blend my light with that of the sun and moon, and will endure while heaven and earth endure. If men agree with my views, I will be unconscious of it; if they keep far apart from them, I will be unconscious of it; they may all die, and I will abide alone¹!

5. Yün K'iang², rambling to the east, having been borne along on a gentle breeze³, suddenly encountered Hung Mung², who was rambling about, slapping his buttocks⁴ and hopping like a bird. Amazed at the sight, Yün K'iang stood reverentially, and said to the other, 'Venerable Sir, who are you? and why are you doing this?' Hung Mung went on slapping his buttocks and hopping like a bird, but replied, 'I am enjoying myself.' Yün K'iang said, 'I

¹ A very difficult sentence, in interpreting which there are great differences among the critics.

² I have preferred to retain Yün K'iang and Hung Mung as if they were the surnames and names of two personages here introduced. Mr. Balfour renders them by 'The Spirit of the Clouds,' and 'Mists of Chaos.' The Spirits of heaven or the sky have still their place in the Sacrificial Canon of China, as 'the Cloud-Master, the Rain-Master, the Baron of the Winds, and the Thunder Master.' Hung Mung, again, is a name for 'the Great Ether,' or, as Dr. Medhurst calls it, 'the Primitive Chaos.'

³ Literally, 'passing by a branch of Fû-yâo;' but we find fû-yâo in Book I, meaning 'a whirlwind.' The term 'branch' has made some critics explain it here as 'the name of a tree,' which is inadmissible. I have translated according to the view of Lû Shû-ñih.

⁴ Or 'stomach,'—according to another reading.

wish to ask you a question.' Hung Mung lifted up his head, looked at the stranger, and said, 'Pooh!' Yün K'iang, however, continued, 'The breath of heaven is out of harmony; the breath of earth is bound up; the six elemental influences¹ do not act in concord; the four seasons do not observe their proper times. Now I wish to blend together the essential qualities of those six influences in order to nourish all living things;—how shall I go about it?' Hung Mung slapped his buttocks, hopped about, and shook his head, saying, 'I do not know; I do not know!'

Yün K'iang could not pursue his question; but three years afterwards, when (again) rambling in the east, as he was passing by the wild of Sung, he happened to meet Hung Mung. Delighted with the rencontre, he hastened to him, and said, 'Have you forgotten me, O Heaven? Have you forgotten me, O Heaven?²' At the same time, he bowed twice with his head to the ground, wishing to receive his instructions. Hung Mung said, 'Wandering listlessly about, I know not what I seek; carried on by a wild impulse, I know not where I am going. I wander about in the strange manner (which you have seen), and see that nothing proceeds without method and order³;—what more should I know?' Yün K'iang replied, 'I also seem carried on by an aimless influence, and yet the people follow me wherever I go. I cannot help their doing so. But now as they thus

¹ Probably, the yin, the yang, wind, rain, darkness, and light;—see *Mayers*, p. 323.

² See *Introduction*, pp. 17, 18.

³ Compare in *Book XXIII*, par. 1.

imitate me, I wish to hear a word from you (in the case).' The other said, 'What disturbs the regular method of Heaven, comes into collision with the nature of things, prevents the accomplishment of the mysterious (operation of) Heaven, scatters the herds of animals, makes the birds all sing at night, is calamitous to vegetation, and disastrous to all insects;—all this is owing, I conceive, to the error of governing men.' 'What then,' said Yün Kiang, 'shall I do?' 'Ah,' said the other, 'you will only injure them! I will leave you in my dancing way, and return to my place.' Yün Kiang rejoined, 'It has been a difficult thing to get this meeting with you, O Heaven! I should like to hear from you a word (more).' Hung Mung said, 'Ah! your mind (needs to be) nourished. Do you only take the position of doing nothing, and things will of themselves become transformed. Neglect your body; cast out from you your power of hearing and sight; forget what you have in common with things; cultivate a grand similarity with the chaos of the plastic ether; unloose your mind; set your spirit free; be still as if you had no soul. Of all the multitude of things every one returns to its root. Every one returns to its root, and does not know (that it is doing so). They all are as in the state of chaos, and during all their existence they do not leave it¹. If

¹ They never show any will of their own.—On the names Yün Kiang and Hung Mung, Lû Shû-kih makes the following remarks:—'These were not men, and yet they are introduced here as questioning and answering each other; showing us that our author frames and employs his surnames and names to serve his own purpose. Those names and the speeches made by the parties are all from him. We must believe that he introduces Confucius, Yáo, and Shun just in the same way.'

they knew (that they were returning to their root), they would be (consciously) leaving it. They do not ask its name; they do not seek to spy out their nature; and thus it is that things come to life of themselves.'

Yün K'iang said, 'Heaven, you have conferred on me (the knowledge of) your operation, and revealed to me the mystery of it. All my life I had been seeking for it, and now I have obtained it.' He then bowed twice, with his head to the ground, arose, took his leave, and walked away.

6. The ordinary men of the world¹ all rejoice in men's agreeing with themselves, and dislike men's being different from themselves. This rejoicing and this dislike arise from their being bent on making themselves distinguished above all others. But have they who have this object at heart so risen out above all others? They depend on them to rest quietly (in the position which they desire), and their knowledge is not equal to the multitude of the arts of all those others²! When they wish again to administer a state for its ruler, they proceed to employ all the methods which the kings of the three dynasties considered profitable without seeing the evils of such a course. This is to make the state depend on the peradventure of their luck. But how seldom it is that that peradventure does not issue in the ruin of the state! Not once in ten thousand instances will such men preserve a state. Not once will they succeed, and in more than ten thousand cases will they

¹ Meaning eccentric thinkers not T'aoists, like Hui-ze, Kung-sun Lung, and others.

² The construing and connexion of this sentence are puzzling.

ruin it. Alas that the possessors of territory,—(the rulers of states),—should not know the danger (of employing such men)! Now the possessors of territory possess the greatest of (all) things. Possessing the greatest of all things,—(possessing, that is, men),—they should not try to deal with them as (simply) things. And it is he who is not a thing (himself) that is therefore able to deal with (all) things as they severally require. When (a ruler) clearly understands that he who should so deal with all things is not a thing himself, will he only rule the kingdom? He will go out and in throughout the universe (at his pleasure); he will roam over the nine regions¹, alone in going, alone in coming. Him we call the sole possessor (of this ability); and the sole possessor (of this ability) is what is called the noblest of all.

The teaching of (this) great man goes forth as the shadow from the substance, as the echo responds to the sound. When questioned, he responds, exhausting (from his own stores) all that is in the (enquirer's) mind, as if front to front with all under heaven. His resting-place gives forth no sound; his sphere of activity has no restriction of place. He conducts every one to his proper goal, proceeding to it and bringing him back to it as by his own movement. His movements have no trace; his going forth and his re-enterings have no deviation; his course is like that of the sun without beginning (or ending).

¹ 'The nine regions' generally means the nine provinces into which the Great Yü divided the kingdom. As our author is here describing the grand Tâoist ruler after his fashion in his relation to the universe, we must give the phrase a wider meaning; but I have not met with any attempt to define it.

If you would praise or discourse about his personality, he is united with the great community of existences. He belongs to that great community, and has no individual self. Having no individual self, how should he have anything that can be called his? If you look at those who have what they call their own, they are the superior men of former times; if you look at him who has nothing of the kind, he is the friend of heaven and earth.

7. Mean, and yet demanding to be allowed their free course;—such are Things. Low, and yet requiring to be relied on;—such are the People. Hidden (as to their issues), and yet requiring to be done;—such are Affairs. Coarse, and yet necessary to be set forth;—such are Laws. Remote, and yet necessary to have dwelling (in one's self);—such is Righteousness. Near, and yet necessary to be widely extended;—such is Benevolence. Restrictive, and yet necessary to be multiplied;—such are Ceremonies. Lodged in the centre, and yet requiring to be exalted;—such is Virtue. Always One, and yet requiring to be modified;—such is the Táo. Spirit-like, and yet requiring to be exercised;—such is Heaven¹.

Therefore the sages contemplated Heaven, but did not assist It. They tried to perfect their virtue, but did not allow it to embarrass them. They proceeded according to the Táo, but did not lay any plans. They associated benevolence (with all their doings), but did not rely on it. They pursued right-

¹ All these sentences are understood to show that even in the non-action of the Master of the Táo there are still things he must do.

eousness extensively, but did not try to accumulate it. They responded to ceremonies, but did not conceal (their opinion as to the troublesomeness of them). They engaged in affairs as they occurred, and did not decline them. They strove to render their laws uniform, but (feared that confusion) might arise from them. They relied upon the people, and did not set light by them. They depended on things as their instruments, and did not discard them¹.

They did not think things equal to what they employed them for, but yet they did not see that they could do without employing them. Those who do not understand Heaven are not pure in their virtue. Those who do not comprehend the Tâo have no course which they can pursue successfully. Alas for them who do not clearly understand the Tâo!

What is it that we call the Tâo²? There is the Tâo, or Way of Heaven; and there is the Tâo, or Way of Man. Doing nothing and yet attracting all honour is the Way of Heaven; Doing and being embarrassed thereby is the Way of Man. It is the Way of Heaven that plays the part of the Lord; it is the Way of Man that plays the part of the Servant. The Way of Heaven and the Way of Man are far apart. They should be clearly distinguished from each other.

¹ Antithetic to the previous sentences, and showing that what such a Master does does not interfere with his non-action.

² This question and what follows shows clearly enough that, even with *Kwang-ze*, the character Tâo (道) retained its proper meaning of the Way or Course.

BOOK XII.

PART II. SECTION V.

Thien Tî, or 'Heaven and Earth'¹.

1. Notwithstanding the greatness of heaven and earth, their transforming power proceeds from one lathe; notwithstanding the number of the myriad things, the government of them is one and the same; notwithstanding the multitude of mankind, the lord of them is their (one) ruler². The ruler's (course) should proceed from the qualities (of the Tâo) and be perfected by Heaven³, when it is so, it is called 'Mysterious and Sublime.' The ancients ruled the world by doing nothing;—simply by this attribute of Heaven⁴.

If we look at their words⁵ in the light of the Tâo, (we see that) the appellation for the ruler of the

¹ See pp. 143, 144.

² Implying that that ruler, 'the Son of Heaven,' is only one.

³ 'Heaven' is here defined as meaning 'Non-action, what is of itself (無爲自然);' the teh (德) is the virtue, or qualities of the Tâo;—see the first paragraph of the next Book.

⁴ This sentence gives the thesis, or subject-matter of the whole Book, which the author never loses sight of.

⁵ Perhaps we should translate here, 'They looked at their words,' referring to 'the ancient rulers.' So Gabelentz construes:—'Dem Tâo gemäss betrachteten sie die reden.' The meaning that I have given is substantially the same. The term 'words' occasions a difficulty. I understand it here, with most of the critics, as 稱名之言, 'the words of appellation.'

world¹ was correctly assigned; if we look in the same light at the distinctions which they instituted, (we see that) the separation of ruler and ministers was right; if we look at the abilities which they called forth in the same light, (we see that the duties of) all the offices were well performed; and if we look generally in the same way at all things, (we see that) their response (to this rule) was complete². Therefore that which pervades (the action of) Heaven and Earth is (this one) attribute; that which operates in all things is (this one) course; that by which their superiors govern the people is the business (of the various departments); and that by which aptitude is given to ability is skill. The skill was manifested in all the (departments of) business; those departments were all administered in righteousness; the righteousness was (the outflow of) the natural virtue; the virtue was manifested according to the Tâo; and the Tâo was according to (the pattern of) Heaven.

Hence it is said³, 'The ancients who had the nourishment of the world wished for nothing and the world had enough; they did nothing and all things were transformed; their stillness was abysmal, and the people were all composed.' The Record says⁴, 'When the one (Tâo) pervades it, all business

¹ Meaning, probably, his appellation as Thien 3ze, 'the Son of Heaven.'

² That is, 'they responded to the Tâo,' without any constraint but the example of their rulers.

³ Here there would seem to be a quotation which I have not been able to trace to its source.

⁴ This 'Record' is attributed to Lâo-ze; but we know nothing of it. In illustration of the sentiment in the sentence, the critics

is completed. When the mind gets to be free from all aim, even the Spirits submit.'

2. The Master said¹, 'It is the Tâo that over-spreads and sustains all things. How great It is in Its overflowing influence! The Superior man ought by all means to remove from his mind (all that is contrary to It). Acting without action is what is called Heaven(-like). Speech coming forth of itself is what is called (a mark of) the (true) Virtue. Loving men and benefiting things is what is called Benevolence. Seeing wherein things that are different yet agree is what is called being Great. Conduct free from the ambition of being distinguished above others is what is called being Generous. The possession in himself of a myriad points of difference is what is called being Rich. Therefore to hold fast the natural attributes is what is called the Guiding Line (of government)²; the perfecting of those attributes is what is called its Establishment; accordance with the Tâo is what is called being Complete; and not allowing anything external to affect the will is what is called being Perfect. When the Superior man understands these ten things, he keeps all matters as it were sheathed in himself, showing the greatness of his mind; and through the outflow of his doings, all things move (and come to him). Being such, he lets the gold lie hid in the hill, and the pearls in the deep; he considers not

refer to par. 34 in the fourth Appendix to the Yî King; but it is not to the point.

¹ Who is 'the Master' here? Confucius? or Lâo-ze? I think the latter, though sometimes even our author thus denominates Confucius;—see par. 9.

² ? the Tâo.

property or money to be any gain; he keeps aloof from riches and honours; he rejoices not in long life, and grieves not for early death; he does not account prosperity a glory, nor is ashamed of indigence; he would not grasp at the gain of the whole world to be held as his own private portion; he would not desire to rule over the whole world as his own private distinction. His distinction is in understanding that all things belong to the one treasury, and that death and life should be viewed in the same way¹.

3. The Master said, 'How still and deep is the place where the Tâo resides! How limpid is its purity! Metal and stone without It would give forth no sound. They have indeed the (power of) sound (in them), but if they be not struck, they do not emit it. Who can determine (the qualities that are in) all things?

'The man of kingly qualities holds on his way unoccupied, and is ashamed to busy himself with (the conduct of) affairs. He establishes himself in (what is) the root and source (of his capacity), and his wisdom grows to be spirit-like. In this way his attributes become more and more great, and when his mind goes forth, whatever things come in his way, it lays hold of them (and deals with them). Thus, if there were not the Tâo, the bodily form would not have life, and its life, without the attributes (of the Tâo), would not be manifested. Is not he who preserves the body and gives the fullest development to the life, who establishes the attri-

¹ Balfour :—'The difference between life and death exists no more;' Gabelentz :—'Sterben und Leben haben gleiche Erscheinung.'

butes of the Tâo and clearly displays It, possessed of kingly qualities? How majestic is he in his sudden issuings forth, and in his unexpected movements, when all things follow him!—This we call the man whose qualities fit him to rule.

‘He sees where there is the deepest obscurity; he hears where there is no sound. In the midst of the deepest obscurity, he alone sees and can distinguish (various objects); in the midst of a soundless (abyss), he alone can hear a harmony (of notes). Therefore where one deep is succeeded by a greater, he can people all with things; where one mysterious range is followed by another that is more so, he can lay hold of the subtlest character of each. In this way in his intercourse with all things, while he is farthest from having anything, he can yet give to them what they seek; while he is always hurrying forth, he yet returns to his resting-place; now large, now small; now long, now short; now distant, now near¹.’

4. Hwang-Ti, enjoying himself on the north of the Red-water, ascended to the height of the Khwăn-lun (mountain), and having looked towards the south, was returning home, when he lost his dark-coloured pearl². He employed Wisdom to search for it, but he could not find it. He employed (the clear-sighted) Li Kû to search for it, but he

¹ I can hardly follow the reasoning of Kwang-3ze here. The whole of the paragraph is obscure. I have translated the two concluding characters 修遠, as if they were 遠近, after the example of Lin Hsî-yî, whose edition of Kwang-3ze was first published in 1261.

² Meaning the Tâo. This is not to be got or learned by wisdom, or perspicacity, or man’s reasoning. It is instinctive to man, as the Heavenly gift or Truth (天真).

could not find it. He employed (the vehement debater) *K'ieh K'âu*¹ to search for it, but he could not find it. He then employed Purposeless¹, who found it; on which Hwang-Ti said, 'How strange that it was Purposeless who was able to find it!'

5. The teacher of Yâo was Hsü Yü²; of Hsü Yü, Nieh K'üeh²; of Nieh K'üeh, Wang Î²; of Wang Î, Phei-î². Yâo asked Hsü Yü, saying, 'Is Nieh K'üeh fit to be the correlate of Heaven³? (If you think he is), I will avail myself of the services of Wang Î to constrain him (to take my place).' Hsü Yü replied, 'Such a measure would be hazardous, and full of peril to the kingdom! The character of Nieh K'üeh is this;—he is acute, perspicacious, shrewd and knowing, ready in reply, sharp in retort, and hasty; his natural (endowments) surpass those of other men, but by his human qualities he seeks to obtain the Heavenly gift; he exercises his discrimination in suppressing his errors, but he does not know what is the source from which his errors arise. Make him the correlate of Heaven! He would employ the human qualities, so that no regard would be paid to the Heavenly gift. Moreover, he would assign different functions to the different parts of the one person⁴.

¹ The meaning of the characters shows what is the idea emblemated by this name; and so with Hsiang Wang,—'a Semblance,' and 'Nonentity'; = 'Mindless,' 'Purposeless.'

² All these names have occurred, excepting that of Phei-î, who heads Hwang-fü Mî's list of eminent Taoists. We shall meet with him again. He is to be distinguished from Phü-î.

³ 'Match Heaven;' that is, be sovereign below, as Heaven above ruled all.

⁴ We are referred for the meaning of this characteristic to 肝膽楚越, in Bk. V, par. 1.

Moreover, honour would be given to knowledge, and he would have his plans take effect with the speed of fire. Moreover, he would be the slave of everything he initiated. Moreover, he would be embarrassed by things. Moreover, he would be looking all round for the response of things (to his measures). Moreover, he would be responding to the opinion of the multitude as to what was right. Moreover, he would be changing as things changed, and would not begin to have any principle of constancy. How can such a man be fit to be the correlate of Heaven? Nevertheless, as there are the smaller branches of a family and the common ancestor of all its branches, he might be the father of a branch, but not the father of the fathers of all the branches¹. Such government (as he would conduct) would lead to disorder. It would be calamity in one in the position of a minister, and ruin if he were in the position of the sovereign.'

6. Yáo was looking about him at Hwâ², the border-warden of which said, 'Ha! the sage! Let me ask blessings on the sage! May he live long!'

¹ That is, Nieh might be a minister, but could not be the sovereign. The phraseology is based on the rules for the rise of sub-surnames in the same clan, and the consequent division of clans under different ancestors;—see the *Lí K'í*, Bk. XIII, i, 10-14, and XIV, 8.

² 'Hwâ' is evidently intended for the name of a place, but where it was can hardly be determined. The genuineness of the whole paragraph is called in question; and I pass it by, merely calling attention to what the border-warden is made to say about the close of the life of the sage (Táoist), who after living a thousand years, ascends among the Immortals (僊 = 仙), and arrives at the place of God, and is free from the three evils of disease, old age, and death; or as some say, after the Buddhists, water, fire, and wind!

Yáo said, 'Hush!' but the other went on, 'May the sage become rich!' Yáo (again) said, 'Hush!' but (the warden) continued, 'May the sage have many sons!' When Yáo repeated his 'Hush,' the warden said, 'Long life, riches, and many sons are what men wish for;—how is it that you alone do not wish for them?' Yáo replied, 'Many sons bring many fears; riches bring many troubles; and long life gives rise to many obloquies. These three things do not help to nourish virtue; and therefore I wish to decline them.' The warden rejoined, 'At first I considered you to be a sage; now I see in you only a Superior man. Heaven, in producing the myriads of the people, is sure to have appointed for them their several offices. If you had many sons, and gave them (all their) offices, what would you have to fear? If you had riches, and made other men share them with you, what trouble would you have? The sage finds his dwelling like the quail (without any choice of its own), and is fed like the fledgling; he is like the bird which passes on (through the air), and leaves no trace (of its flight). When good order prevails in the world, he shares in the general prosperity. When there is no such order, he cultivates his virtue, and seeks to be unoccupied. After a thousand years, tired of the world, he leaves it, and ascends among the immortals. He mounts on the white clouds, and arrives at the place of God. The three forms of evil do not reach him, his person is always free from misfortune;—what obloquy has he to incur?'

With this the border-warden left him. Yáo followed him, saying, 'I beg to ask—;' but the other said, 'Begone!'

7. When Yáo was ruling the world, Po-*khǎng* 3ze-káo¹ was appointed by him prince of one of the states. From Yáo (afterwards) the throne passed to Shun, and from Shun (again) to Yü; and (then) Po-*khǎng* 3ze-káo resigned his principality and began to cultivate the ground. Yü went to see him, and found him ploughing in the open country. Hurrying to him, and bowing low in acknowledgment of his superiority, Yü then stood up, and asked him, saying, 'Formerly, when Yáo was ruling the world, you, Sir, were appointed prince of a state. He gave his sovereignty to Shun, and Shun gave his to me, when you, Sir, resigned your dignity, and are (now) ploughing (here);—I venture to ask the reason of your conduct.' 3ze-káo said, 'When Yáo ruled the world, the people stimulated one another (to what was right) without his offering them rewards, and stood in awe (of doing wrong) without his threatening them with punishments. Now you employ both rewards and punishments, and the people notwithstanding are not good. Their virtue will from this time decay; punishments will from this time prevail; the disorder of future ages will from this time begin. Why do you, my master, not go away, and not interrupt my work?' With this he resumed his ploughing with his head bent down, and did not (again) look round.

8. In the Grand Beginning (of all things) there was nothing in all the vacancy of space; there was nothing that could be named². It was in this state

¹ Some legends say that this Po-*khǎng* 3ze-káo was a pre-incarnation of Láo-3ze; but this paragraph is like the last, and cannot be received as genuine.

² This sentence is differently understood, according as it is

that there arose the first existence¹;—the first existence, but still without bodily shape. From this things could then be produced, (receiving) what we call their proper character². That which had no bodily shape was divided³; and then without intermission there was what we call the process of conferring⁴. (The two processes) continuing in operation, things were produced. As things were completed, there were produced the distinguishing lines of each, which we call the bodily shape. That shape was the body preserving in it the spirit⁵, and each had its peculiar manifestation, which we call its Nature. When the Nature has been cultivated, it returns to its proper character; and when that has been fully reached, there is the same condition as at the Beginning. That sameness is pure vacancy, and the vacancy is great. It is like the closing of the beak and silencing the singing (of a bird). That closing and silencing is like the union of heaven and earth (at the beginning)⁶. The union, effected, as it

punctuated;—有無無, 有無名, or 有無, 無有無名. Each punctuation has its advocates. For myself, I can only adopt the former; the other is contrary to my idea of Chinese composition. If the author had wished to be understood so, he would have written differently, as, for instance, 無未有名.

¹ Probably, the primary ether, what is called the *Thâi K'ih*.

² This sentence is anticipatory.

³ Into what we call the yin and the yang;—the same ether, now at rest, now in motion.

⁴ The conferring of something more than what was material. By whom or what? By Heaven; the Tâoist understanding by that term the Tâo.

⁵ So then, man consists of the material body and the immaterial spirit.

⁶ The potential heaven and earth, not yet fashioned from the primal ether.

is, might seem to indicate stupidity or darkness, but it is what we call the 'mysterious quality' (existing at the beginning); it is the same as the Grand Submission (to the Natural Course).

9. The Master¹ asked Láo Tan, saying, 'Some men regulate the Táo (as by a law), which they have only to follow;—(a thing, they say,) is admissible or it is inadmissible; it is so, or it is not so. (They are like) the sophists who say that they can distinguish what is hard and what is white as clearly as if the objects were houses suspended in the sky. Can such men be said to be sages²?' The reply was, 'They are like the busy underlings of a court, who toil their bodies and distress their minds with their various artifices;—dogs, (employed) to their sorrow to catch the yak, or monkeys³ that are brought from their forests (for their tricksiness). *K'hiù*, I tell you this;—it is what you cannot hear, and what you cannot speak of:—Of those who have their heads and feet, and yet have neither minds nor ears, there are multitudes; while of those who have their bodies, and at the same time preserve that which has no bodily form or shape, there are really none. It is not in their movements or stoppages, their dying or living, their falling and rising again, that this is to be found. The regulation of the course lies in (their dealing with) the human element in them. When they have forgotten external things,

¹ This 'Master' is without doubt Confucius.

² The meaning and point of Confucius's question are not clear. Did he mean to object to Láo-tze that all his disquisitions about the Táo as the one thing to be studied and followed were unnecessary?

³ Compare in Bk. VII, par. 4.

and have also forgotten the heavenly element in them, they may be named men who have forgotten themselves. The man who has forgotten himself is he of whom it is said that he has become identified with Heaven¹.

10. At an interview with *K'î K'hêh*², *Kiang-lü Mien*² said to him, 'Our ruler of Lû asked to receive my instructions. I declined, on the ground that I had not received any message³ for him. Afterwards, however, I told him (my thoughts). I do not know whether (what I said) was right or not, and I beg to repeat it to you. I said to him, "You must strive to be courteous and to exercise self-restraint; you must distinguish the public-spirited and loyal, and repress the cringing and selfish;—who among the people will in that case dare not to be in harmony with you?"' *K'î K'hêh* laughed quietly and said, 'Your words, my master, as a description of the right course for a Tî or King, were like the threatening movement of its arms by a mantis which would thereby stop the advance of a carriage;—inadequate to accomplish your object. And moreover, if he guided himself by your directions, it would be as if he were to increase the dangerous height of his towers

¹ Their action is like that of Heaven, silent but most effective, without motive from within or without, simply from the impulse of the Táo.

² These two men are only known by the mention of them here. They must have been officers of Lû, *K'î K'hêh* a member of the great *K'î* or *K'î-sun* family of that state. He would appear also to have been the teacher of the other; if, indeed, they were real personages, and not merely the production of *K'wang-ze's* imagination.

³ That is any lessons or instructions from you, my master, which I should communicate to him.

and add to the number of his valuables collected in them;—the multitudes (of the people) would leave their (old) ways, and bend their steps in the same direction.'

K'iang-lü Mien was awe-struck, and said in his fright, 'I am startled by your words, Master, nevertheless, I should like to hear you describe the influence (which a ruler should exert).' The other said, 'If a great sage ruled the kingdom, he would stimulate the minds of the people, and cause them to carry out his instructions fully, and change their manners; he would take their minds which had become evil and violent and extinguish them, carrying them all forward to act in accordance with the (good) will belonging to them as individuals, as if they did it of themselves from their nature, while they knew not what it was that made them do so. Would such an one be willing to look up to Yáo and Shun in their instruction of the people as his elder brothers? He would treat them as his juniors, belonging himself to the period of the original plastic ether¹. His wish would be that all should agree with the virtue (of that early period), and quietly rest in it.'

11. 3ze-kung had been rambling in the south in *K'ü*, and was returning to 3in. As he passed (a place) on the north of the Han, he saw an old man who was going to work on his vegetable garden. He had dug his channels, gone to the well, and was bringing from it in his arms a jar of water to pour into them. Toiling away, he expended a great deal

¹ The Chinese phrase here is explained by Dr. Williams :—
'A vivifying influence, a vapour or aura producing things.'

of strength, but the result which he accomplished was very small. 3ze-kung said to him, 'There is a contrivance here, by means of which a hundred plots of ground may be irrigated in one day. With the expenditure of a very little strength, the result accomplished is great. Would you, Master, not like (to try it)?' The gardener looked up at him, and said, 'How does it work?' 3ze-kung said, 'It is a lever made of wood, heavy behind, and light in front. It raises the water as quickly as you could do with your hand, or as it bubbles over from a boiler. Its name is a shadoof.' The gardener put on an angry look, laughed, and said, 'I have heard from my teacher that, where there are ingenious contrivances, there are sure to be subtle doings; and that, where there are subtle doings, there is sure to be a scheming mind. But, when there is a scheming mind in the breast, its pure simplicity is impaired. When this pure simplicity is impaired, the spirit becomes unsettled, and the unsettled spirit is not the proper residence of the Táo. It is not that I do not know (the contrivance which you mention), but I should be ashamed to use it.'

(At these words) 3ze-kung looked blank and ashamed; he hung down his head, and made no reply. After an interval, the gardener said to him, 'Who are you, Sir?' 'A disciple of Khung K'hiú,' was the reply. The other continued, 'Are you not the scholar whose great learning makes you comparable to a sage, who make it your boast that you surpass all others, who sing melancholy ditties all by yourself, thus purchasing a famous reputation throughout the kingdom? If you would (only) forget the energy of your spirit, and neglect the care of

your body, you might approximate (to the Tâo). But while you cannot regulate yourself, what leisure have you to be regulating the world? Go on your way, Sir, and do not interrupt my work.'

3ze-kung shrunk back abashed, and turned pale. He was perturbed, and lost his self-possession, nor did he recover it, till he had walked a distance of thirty li. His disciples then said, 'Who was that man? Why, Master, when you saw him, did you change your bearing, and become pale, so that you have been all day without returning to yourself?' He replied to them, 'Formerly I thought that there was but one man¹ in the world, and did not know that there was this man. I have heard the Master say that to seek for the means of conducting his undertakings so that his success in carrying them out may be complete, and how by the employment of a little strength great results may be obtained, is the way of the sage. Now (I perceive that) it is not so at all. They who hold fast and cleave to the Tâo are complete in the qualities belonging to it. Complete in those qualities, they are complete in their bodies. Complete in their bodies, they are complete in their spirits. To be complete in spirit is the way of the sage. (Such men) live in the world in closest union with the people, going along with them, but they do not know where they are going. Vast and complete is their simplicity! Success, gain, and ingenious contrivances, and artful cleverness, indicate (in their opinion) a forgetfulness of the (proper) mind of man. These men will not go where their mind does not carry them, and will do

¹ Confucius.

nothing of which their mind does not approve. Though all the world should praise them, they would (only) get what they think should be loftily disregarded; and though all the world should blame them, they would but lose (what they think) fortuitous and not to be received;—the world's blame and praise can do them neither benefit nor injury. Such men may be described as possessing all the attributes (of the Táo), while I can only be called one of those who are like the waves carried about by the wind.' When he returned to Lû, (3ze-kung) reported the interview and conversation to Confucius, who said, 'The man makes a pretence of cultivating the arts of the Embryonic Age¹. He knows the first thing, but not the sequel to it. He regulates what is internal in himself, but not what is external to himself. If he had intelligence enough to be entirely unsophisticated, and by doing nothing to seek to return to the normal simplicity, embodying (the instincts of) his nature, and keeping his spirit (as it were) in his arms, so enjoying himself in the common ways, you might then indeed be afraid of him! But what should you and I find in the arts of the embryonic time, worth our knowing?'

12. *Kun Mâng*², on his way to the ocean, met with *Yüan Fung*² on the shore of the eastern sea, and

¹ The 'arts of the Embryonic Age' suggests the idea of the earliest men in their struggles for support; not the Táo of Heaven in its formation of the universe. But the whole of the paragraph, not in itself uninteresting, is believed to be a spurious introduction, and not the production of *Kwang-3ze*.

² These are not names of men, but like *Yün Kiang* and *Hung Mung* in the fifth paragraph of the last Book. By *Kun Mâng*, it is said, we are to understand 'the great primal ether,' and by *Yüan*

was asked by him where he was going. 'I am going,' he replied, 'to the ocean;' and the other again asked, 'What for?' *Kun Mâng* said, 'Such is the nature of the ocean that the waters which flow into it can never fill it, nor those which flow from it exhaust it. I will enjoy myself, rambling by it.' *Yüan Fung* replied, 'Have you no thoughts about mankind¹? I should like to hear from you about sagely government.' *Kun Mâng* said, 'Under the government of sages, all offices are distributed according to the fitness of their nature; all appointments are made according to the ability of the men; whatever is done is after a complete survey of all circumstances; actions and words proceed from the inner impulse, and the whole world is transformed. Wherever their hands are pointed and their looks directed, from all quarters the people are all sure to come (to do what they desire):—this is what is called government by sages.'

'I should like to hear about (the government of) the kindly, virtuous men²,' (continued *Yüan Fung*). The reply was, 'Under the government of the virtuous, when quietly occupying (their place), they have no thought, and, when they act, they have no anxiety; they do not keep stored (in their minds) what is right and what is wrong, what is good and

Fung, 'the east wind.' Why these should discourse together as they are here made to do, only *Kwang-3ze* himself could tell.

¹ Literally, 'men with their cross eyes;' an appellation for mankind, men having their eyes set across their face more on the same plane than other animals;—an extraordinary application of the characters,' says *Lin Hsî-kung*.

² The text is simply 'virtuous men;' but the reply justifies us in giving the meaning as 'kindly' as well. 德 has often this signification.

what is bad. They share their benefits among all within the four seas, and this produces what is called (the state of) satisfaction; they dispense their gifts to all, and this produces what is called (the state of) rest. (The people) grieve (on their death) like babies who have lost their mothers, and are perplexed like travellers who have lost their way. They have a superabundance of wealth and all necessities, and they know not whence it comes; they have a sufficiency of food and drink, and they know not from whom they get it:—such are the appearances (under the government) of the kindly and virtuous.'

'I should like to hear about (the government of) the spirit-like men,' (continued Yüan Fung once more).

The reply was, 'Men of the highest spirit-like qualities mount up on the light, and (the limitations of) the body vanish. This we call being bright and ethereal. They carry out to the utmost the powers with which they are endowed, and have not a single attribute unexhausted. Their joy is that of heaven and earth, and all embarrassments of affairs melt away and disappear; all things return to their proper nature:—and this is what is called (the state of) chaotic obscurity¹.'

13. Mǎn Wû-kwei² and K'ih-kang Man-k'hi² had been looking at the army of king Wû, when the latter said, 'It is because he was not born in the time of the Lord of Yü³, that therefore he is in-

¹ When no human element had come in to mar the development of the Táo.

² If these be the names of real personages, they must have been of the time of king Wû, about B. C. 1122.

³ Generally understood to mean 'He is not equal to the Lord of

volved in this trouble (of war).' Mǎn Wû-kwei replied, 'Was it when the kingdom was in good order, that the Lord of Yü governed it? or was it after it had become disordered that he governed it?' The other said, 'That the kingdom be in a condition of good order, is what (all) desire, and (in that case) what necessity would there be to say anything about the Lord of Yü? He had medicine for sores; false hair for the bald; and healing for those who were ill:—he was like the filial son carrying in the medicine to cure his kind father, with every sign of distress in his countenance. A sage would be ashamed (of such a thing)¹.

'In the age of perfect virtue they attached no value to wisdom, nor employed men of ability. Superiors were (but) as the higher branches of a tree; and the people were like the deer of the wild. They were upright and correct, without knowing that to be so was Righteousness; they loved one another, without knowing that to do so was Benevolence; they were honest and leal-hearted, without knowing that it was Loyalty; they fulfilled their engagements, without knowing that to do so was Good Faith; in their simple movements they employed the services of one another, without thinking that they were conferring or receiving any gift. Therefore their actions left no trace, and there was no record of their affairs.'

14. The filial son who does not flatter his father,

Yü,' or Shun. The meaning which I have given is that propounded by Hû Wan-ying, and seems to agree better with the general purport of the paragraph.

¹ Ashamed that he had not been able to keep his father from getting sick, and requiring to be thus attended to.

and the loyal minister who does not fawn on his ruler, are the highest examples of a minister and a son. When a son assents to all that his father says, and approves of all that his father does, common opinion pronounces him an unworthy son; when a minister assents to all that his ruler says, and approves of all that his ruler does, common opinion pronounces him an unworthy minister. Nor does any one reflect that this view is necessarily correct¹. But when common opinion (itself) affirms anything and men therefore assent to it, or counts anything good and men also approve of it, then it is not said that they are mere consenters and flatterers;—is common opinion then more authoritative than a father, or more to be honoured than a ruler? Tell a man that he is merely following (the opinions) of another, or that he is a flatterer of others, and at once he flushes with anger. And yet all his life he is merely following others, and flattering them. His illustrations are made to agree with theirs; his phrases are glossed:—to win the approbation of the multitudes. From first to last, from beginning to end, he finds no fault with their views. He will let his robes hang down², display the colours on them, and arrange his movements and bearing, so as to win the favour of his age, and yet not call himself a flatterer. He is but a follower of those others, approving and dis-

¹ We can hardly tell whether this paragraph should be understood as a continuation of *K'ih-tang's* remarks, or as from *Kwang-ze* himself. The meaning here is that every one feels that this opinion is right, without pausing to reason about it.

² See the *Yi King*, Appendix III, ii, 15, where this letting his robes hang down is attributed to Shun. Ought we to infer from this that in this paragraph we have *K'ih-tang* still speaking about and against the common opinion of Shun's superiority to king Wü?

approving as they do, and yet he will not say that he is one of them. This is the height of stupidity.

He who knows his stupidity is not very stupid; he who knows that he is under a delusion is not greatly deluded. He who is greatly deluded will never shake the delusion off; he who is very stupid will all his life not become intelligent. If three men be walking together, and (only) one of them be under a delusion (as to their way), they may yet reach their goal, the deluded being the fewer; but if two of them be under the delusion, they will not do so, the deluded being the majority. At the present time, when the whole world is under a delusion, though I pray men to go in the right direction, I cannot make them do so;—is it not a sad case?

Grand music does not penetrate the ears of villagers; but if they hear 'The Breaking of the Willow,' or 'The Bright Flowers¹,' they will roar with laughter. So it is that lofty words do not remain in the minds of the multitude, and that perfect words are not heard, because the vulgar words predominate. By two earthenware instruments the (music of) a bell will be confused, and the pleasure that it would afford cannot be obtained. At the present time the whole world is under a delusion, and though I wish to go in a certain direction, how can I succeed in doing so? Knowing that I cannot do so, if I were to try to force my way, that would be another delusion. Therefore my best course is to let my purpose go, and no more pursue it. If I do not pursue it, whom shall I have to share in my sorrow²?

¹ The names of two songs, favourites with the common people.

² I shall only feel the more that I am alone without any to sympathise with me, and be the more sad.

If an ugly man¹ have a son born to him at midnight, he hastens with a light to look at it. Very eagerly he does so, only afraid that it may be like himself.

15². From a tree a hundred years old a portion shall be cut and fashioned into a sacrificial vase, with the bull figured on it, which is ornamented further with green and yellow, while the rest (of that portion) is cut away and thrown into a ditch. If now we compare the sacrificial vase with what was thrown into the ditch, there will be a difference between them as respects their beauty and ugliness; but they both agree in having lost the (proper) nature of the wood. So in respect of their practice of righteousness there is a difference between (the robber) *Kih* on the one hand, and *Ǵǵng* (*Shǵn*) or *Shih* (*Ǵhiú*) on the other; but they all agree in having lost (the proper qualities of) their nature.

Now there are five things which produce (in men) the loss of their (proper) nature. The first is (their fondness for) the five colours which disorder the eye, and take from it its (proper) clearness of vision; the second is (their fondness for) the five notes (of music), which disorder the ear and take from it its

¹ 厲人 should perhaps be translated 'a leper.' The illustration is edited by *Kiǵo Hung* and others as a paragraph by itself. They cannot tell whether it be intended to end the paragraph that precedes or to introduce the one that follows.

² This paragraph must be our author's own. *Kih-kang*, of the time of king *Wú*, could not be criticising the schemes of life propounded by *Mo* and *Yang*, whose views were so much later in time. It breathes the animosity of *Lǵo* and *Kwang* against all schemes of learning and culture, as contrary to the simplicity of life according to the *Tǵo*.

(proper) power of hearing; the third is (their fondness for) the five odours which penetrate the nostrils, and produce a feeling of distress all over the forehead; the fourth is (their fondness for) the five flavours, which deaden the mouth, and pervert its sense of taste; the fifth is their preferences and dislikes, which unsettle the mind, and cause the nature to go flying about. These five things are all injurious to the life; and now Yang and Mo begin to stretch forward from their different standpoints, each thinking that he has hit on (the proper course for men).

But the courses they have hit on are not what I call the proper course. What they have hit on (only) leads to distress;—can they have hit on what is the right thing? If they have, we may say that the dove in a cage has found the right thing for it. Moreover, those preferences and dislikes, that (fondness for) music and colours, serve but to pile up fuel (in their breasts); while their caps of leather, the bonnet with kingfishers' plumes, the memorandum tablets which they carry, and their long girdles, serve but as restraints on their persons. Thus inwardly stuffed full as a hole for fuel, and outwardly fast bound with cords, when they look quietly round from out of their bondage, and think they have got all they could desire, they are no better than criminals whose arms are tied together, and their fingers subjected to the screw, or than tigers and leopards in sacks or cages, and yet thinking that they have got (all they could wish).

BOOK XIII.

PART II. SECTION VI.

Thien Táo, or 'The Way of Heaven'.¹

1. The Way of Heaven operates (unceasingly), and leaves no accumulation² (of its influence) in any particular place, so that all things are brought to perfection by it; so does the Way of the Tís operate, and all under the sky turn to them (as their directors); so also does the Way of the Sages operate, and all within the seas submit to them. Those who clearly understand (the Way of) Heaven, who are in sympathy with (that of) the sages, and familiar through the universe and in the four quarters (of the earth) with the work of the Tís and the kings, yet act spontaneously from themselves:—with the appearance of being ignorant they are yet entirely still.

The stillness of the sages does not belong to them as a consequence of their skilful ability³; all things are not able to disturb their minds;—it is on this account that they are still. When water is still, its clearness shows the beard and eyebrows (of him

¹ See pp. 144, 145.

² That is, its operation is universal. The Chinese critics generally explain 'accumulation' here by 'rest,' which is not quite the idea.

³ Such is the meaning here of the 善, as in the Táo Teh King, chaps. 2, 8, and often.

who looks into it). It is a perfect Level¹, and the greatest artificer takes his rule from it. Such is the clearness of still water, and how much greater is that of the human Spirit! The still mind of the sage is the mirror of heaven and earth, the glass of all things.

Vacancy, stillness, placidity, tastelessness, quietude, silence, and non-action ;—this is the Level of heaven and earth, and the perfection of the Tão and its characteristics². Therefore the Tis, Kings, and Sages found in this their resting-place³. Resting here, they were vacant ; from their vacancy came fullness ; from their fullness came the nice distinctions (of things). From their vacancy came stillness ; that stillness was followed by movement ; their movements were successful. From their stillness came their non-action. Doing-nothing, they devolved the cares of office on their employés. Doing-nothing was accompanied by the feeling of satisfaction. Where there is that feeling of satisfaction, anxieties and troubles find no place ; and the years of life are many.

Vacancy, stillness, placidity, tastelessness, quietude, silence, and doing-nothing are the root of all things. When this is understood, we find such a ruler on the throne as Yáo, and such a minister as Shun. When with this a high position is occupied, we find the attributes of the Tis and kings,—the sons of Heaven ; with this in a low position, we find the mysterious

¹ 準 here, is contracted in many editions into 准, which some have mistaken for 淮.

² Such are the natural characteristics of the Tãoistic mind.

³ Implying cessation from all thought and purpose.

sages, the uncrowned kings, with their ways. With this retiring (from public life), and enjoying themselves at leisure, we find the scholars who dwell by the rivers and seas, among the hills and forests, all submissive to it; with this coming forward to active life and comforting their age, their merit is great, and their fame is distinguished;—and all the world becomes united in one.

2. (Such men) by their stillness become sages; and by their movement, kings. Doing-nothing, they are honoured; in their plain simplicity, no one in the world can strive with them (for the palm of) excellence. The clear understanding of the virtue of Heaven and Earth is what is called 'The Great Root,' and 'The Great Origin; '—they who have it are in harmony with Heaven, and so they produce all equable arrangements in the world;—they are those who are in harmony with men. Being in harmony with men is called the Joy of men; being in harmony with Heaven is called the Joy of Heaven. *Kwang-ze* said, 'My Master! my Master! He shall hash and blend all things in mass without being cruel; he shall dispense his favours to all ages without being benevolent. He is older than the highest antiquity, and yet is not old. He overspreads the heavens and sustains the earth; from him is the carving of all forms without any artful skill¹! This is what is called the Joy of Heaven. Hence it is said, "Those who know the Joy of Heaven during their life, act like Heaven, and at death undergo transformation like (other) things²; in their stillness

¹ Compare in Bk. VI, pars. 13 and 7.

² They do not cease to be, but only become transformed or changed.

they possess the quality of the Yin, and in their movement they flow abroad as the Yang. Therefore he who knows the Joy of Heaven has no murmuring against Heaven, nor any fault-finding with men; and suffers no embarrassment from things, nor any reproof from ghosts. Hence it is said, 'His movements are those of Heaven; his stillness is that of Earth; his whole mind is fixed, and he rules over the world. The spirits of his dead do not come to scare him; he is not worn out by their souls. His words proceeding from his vacancy and stillness, yet reach to heaven and earth, and show a communication with all things:—this is what is called the Joy of Heaven. This Joy of Heaven forms the mind of the sage whereby he nurtures all under the sky¹.'''

3. It was the Way² of the Tis and Kings to regard Heaven and Earth as their Author, the Tão and its characteristics as their Lord, and Doing-nothing as their constant rule. Doing-nothing, they could use the whole world in their service and might have done more; acting, they were not sufficient for the service required of them by the world. Hence the men of old held non-inaction in honour. When superiors do nothing and their inferiors also do nothing, inferiors and superiors possess the same virtue; and when inferiors and superiors possess the same virtue, there are none to act as ministers. When inferiors act, and their superiors also act, then superiors and inferiors possess the same Tão; and when superiors and inferiors possess the same

¹ I suppose that from 'It is said' to this is all quotation, but from what book we do not know.

² 'The virtue,' or attribute; = the way.

Tão, there is none to preside as Lord. But that the superiors do nothing and yet thereby use the world in their service, and that the inferiors, while acting, be employed in the service of the world, is an unchangeable principle. Therefore the ancient kings who presided over the world, though their knowledge embraced (all the operations of) Heaven and Earth, took no thought of their own about them; though their nice discrimination appreciated the fine fashioning of all things, they said not a word about it; though their power comprehended all within the seas, they did nothing themselves. Heaven produces nothing, yet all things experience their transformations; Earth effects no growth, yet all things receive their nurture; the Tis and Kings did nothing, yet all the world testified their effective services. Hence it is said, 'There is nothing more spirit-like than Heaven; there is nothing richer than Earth; there are none greater than the Tis and Kings.' Hence it is said (further), 'The attributes of the Tis and kings corresponded to those of Heaven and Earth.' It was thus that they availed themselves of (the operations of) Heaven and Earth, carried all things on unceasingly (in their courses), and employed the various classes of men in their service.

4. Originating belongs to those in the higher position; details (of work) to those who are in the lower. The compendious decision belongs to the lord; the minutiae of execution, to his ministers. The direction of the three hosts¹ and their men with the five weapons² is but a trifling quality; rewards

¹ 'Three hosts' constituted the military force of one of the largest states.

² The bow, the club, the spear, the lance, the javelin. Other

and penalties with their advantages and sufferings, and the inflictions of the five punishments¹ are but trivial elements of instruction; ceremonies, laws, measures, and numbers, with all the minutiae of jurisprudence², are small matters in government; the notes of bells and drums, and the display of plumes and flags are the slightest things in music, and the various grades of the mourning garments are the most unimportant manifestations of grief. These five unimportant adjuncts required the operation of the excited spirit and the employment of the arts of the mind, to bring them into use. The men of old had them indeed, but they did not give them the first place.

The ruler precedes, and the minister follows; the father precedes, and the son follows; the elder brother precedes, and the younger follows; the senior precedes, and the junior follows; the male precedes, and the female follows; the husband precedes, and the wife follows.

This precedence of the more honourable and sequence of the meaner is seen in the (relative) action of heaven and earth, and hence the sages took them as their pattern. The more honourable position of heaven and the lower one of earth are equivalent to a designation of their spirit-like and intelligent qualities. The precedence of spring and summer and the sequence of autumn and winter mark the

enumerations of them are given. See the 'Officers of *Kâu*,' Bk. XXXII.

¹ Branding, cutting off the nose, cutting off the feet, castration, death.

² I read here 刑 (not 形) 名.

order of the four seasons. In the transformations and growth of all things, every bud and feature has its proper form ; and in this we have their gradual maturing and decay, the constant flow of transformation and change. Thus since Heaven and Earth, which are most spirit-like, are distinguished as more honourable and less, and by precedence and sequence, how much more must we look for this in the ways of men ! In the ancestral temple it is to kinship that honour is given ; in court, to rank ; in the neighbourhoods and districts, to age ; in the conduct of affairs, to wisdom ; such is the order in those great ways. If we speak of the course (to be pursued in them), and do not observe their order, we violate their course. If we speak of the course, and do not observe it, why do we apply that name to it ?

5. Therefore the ancients who clearly understood the great Tâo first sought to apprehend what was meant by Heaven¹, and the Tâo and its characteristics came next. When this was apprehended, then came Benevolence and Righteousness. When these were apprehended, then came the Distinction of duties and the observance of them. This accomplished, there came objects and their names. After objects and their names, came the employment of men according to their qualities: on this there followed the examination of the men and of their work. This led to the approval or disapproval of them, which again was succeeded by the apportioning of rewards and penalties. After this the stupid and the intelligent understood what was required of them, and the honourable and the mean occupied their several posi-

¹ The meaning, probably, is 'spontaneity.'

tions. The good and the able, and those inferior to them, sincerely did their best. Their ability was distributed; the duties implied in their official names were fulfilled. In this way did they serve their superiors, nourish their inferiors, regulate things, and cultivate their persons. They did not call their knowledge and schemes into requisition; they were required to fall back upon (the method of) Heaven:—this was what is called the Perfection of the Rule of Great Peace. Hence it is said in the Book ¹, ‘There are objects and there are their names.’ Objects and their names the ancients had; but they did not put them in the foremost place.

When the ancients spoke of the Great Tâo, it was only after four other steps that they gave a place to ‘Objects and their Names,’ and after eight steps that they gave a place to ‘Rewards and Penalties.’ If they had all at once spoken of ‘Objects and their Names,’ they would have shown an ignorance of what is the Root (of government); if they had all at once spoken of ‘Rewards and Penalties,’ they would have shown an ignorance of the first steps of it. Those whose words are thus an inversion of the (proper) course, or in opposition to it, are (only fit to be) ruled by others;—how can they rule others? To speak all at once of ‘Objects and their Names,’ and of ‘Rewards and Penalties,’ only shows that the speaker knows the instruments of government, but does not know the method of it, is fit to be used as an instrument in the world, but not fit to use others as his instruments:—he is what we call a mere sophist, a man of one small idea.

¹ We cannot tell what book or books.

Ceremonies, laws, numbers, measures, with all the minutiae of jurisprudence, the ancients had ; but it is by these that inferiors serve their superiors ; it is not by them that those superiors nourish the world.

6. Anciently, Shun asked Yâo, saying, 'In what way does your Majesty by the Grace of Heaven¹ exercise your mind?' The reply was, 'I simply show no arrogance towards the helpless ; I do not neglect the poor people ; I grieve for those who die ; I love their infant children ; and I compassionate their widows.' Shun rejoined, 'Admirable, as far as it goes ; but it is not what is Great.' 'How then,' asked Yâo, 'do you think I should do?' Shun replied, 'When (a sovereign) possesses the virtue of Heaven, then when he shows himself in action, it is in stillness. The sun and moon (simply) shine, and the four seasons pursue their courses. So it is with the regular phenomena of day and night, and with the movement of the clouds by which the rain is distributed.' Yâo said, 'Then I have only been persistently troubling myself ! What you wish is to be in harmony with Heaven, while I wish to be in harmony with men.' Now (the Way of) Heaven and Earth was much thought of of old, and Hwang-Ti, Yâo, and Shun united in admiring it. Hence the kings of the world of old did nothing, but tried to imitate that Way.

7. Confucius went to the west to deposit (some) writings in the library of K'âu², when 3ze-lû coun-

¹ So, in the 'Spring and Autumn' Chronicle, the rightful reigning sovereign is ordinarily designated, 'Heaven's King.' It is not a Tâoistic mode of speaking of him.

² It is supposed that Confucius, disappointed by his want of

sold him, saying, 'I have heard that the officer in charge of this *K'ang*¹ Repository of *K'au* was one *L'ao Tan*, who has given up his office, and is living in his own house. As you, Master, wish to deposit these writings here, why not go to him, and obtain his help (to accomplish your object)².' Confucius said, 'Good;' and he went and saw *L'ao Tan*, who refused his assistance. On this he proceeded to give an abstract of the Twelve Classics³ to bring the other over to his views⁴. *L'ao Tan*, however, interrupted him while he was speaking, and said, 'This is too vague; let me hear the substance of them in brief.' Confucius said, 'The substance of them is occupied with Benevolence and Righteousness.' The other said, 'Let me ask whether you consider Benevolence and Righteousness to constitute the nature of man?' 'I do,' was the answer. 'If the superior man be not benevolent, he will not fulfil his character; if he be not righteous, he might as well not have been born. Benevolence and Righteousness are truly the nature of man.' *L'ao Tan* continued, 'Let me ask you what you mean by Benevolence and Righteousness.' Confucius said, 'To be in one's inmost heart in kindly sympathy

success, wished to deposit the writings or books which he prized so much in the Royal Library, that they might not be lost, and be available for some future teacher, more fortunate than himself.

¹ The name of the Royal Library (徵); meaning, perhaps, 'Approved.'

² That is, help him to get his books deposited in the Library.

³ Meaning, perhaps, the 'Spring and Autumn,' containing a chronicle of twelve marquises of *L'û*. We know of no collection in the time of Confucius which could be styled the 'Twelve Classics.'

⁴ 說 is to be read shui.

with all things; to love all men; and to allow no selfish thoughts;—this is the nature of Benevolence and Righteousness.’ Lâu Tan exclaimed, ‘Ah! you almost show your inferiority by such words! “To love all men!” is not that vague and extravagant? “To be seeking to allow no selfish thoughts!”—that is selfishness¹! If you, Master, wish men not to be without their (proper) shepherding, think of Heaven and Earth, which certainly pursue their invariable course; think of the sun and moon, which surely maintain their brightness; think of the stars in the zodiac, which preserve their order and courses; think of birds and beasts, which do not fail to collect together in their flocks and herds; and think of the trees, which do not fail to stand up (in their places). Do you, Master, imitate this way and carry it into practice; hurry on, following this course, and you will reach your end. Why must you further be vehement in putting forward your Benevolence and Righteousness, as if you were beating a drum, and seeking a fugitive son, (only making him run away the more)? Ah! Master, you are introducing disorder into the nature of man!’

8. Shih-khăng K’hi², having an interview with Lâu-tze, asked him, saying, ‘I heard, Master, that you were a sage, and I came here, wishing to see you, without grudging the length of the journey. During the stages of the hundred days, the soles of my feet became quite callous, but I did not dare to stop and rest. Now I perceive that you are not

¹ The unselfishness was not spontaneous.

² We know nothing of this personage, but what is related here; nor does the whole paragraph serve to advance the argument of the Book.

a sage. Because there was some rice left about the holes of the rats, you sent away your younger sister, which was unkind; when your food, whether raw or cooked, remains before you not all consumed, you keep on hoarding it up to any extent¹. Lâo-ze looked indifferent, and gave him no answer.

Next day *Khi* again saw Lâo-ze, and said, 'Yesterday I taunted you; but to-day I have gone back to a better mood of mind. What is the cause (of the change)²?' Lâo-ze replied, 'I consider that I have freed myself from the trammels of claiming to be artfully knowing, spirit-like, and sage. Yesterday if you had called me an ox, you might have done so; or if you had called me a horse, you might have done so³. If there be a reality (corresponding to men's ideas), and men give it a name, which another will not receive, he will in the sequel suffer the more. My manner was what I constantly observe;—I did not put it on for the occasion.'

Shih-khăng *Khi* sidled away out of Lâo's shadow; then he retraced his steps, advanced forward, and asked how he should cultivate himself. The reply was, 'Your demeanour is repelling; you stare with your eyes; your forehead is broad and yet tapering; you bark and growl with your mouth; your appearance is severe and pretentious; you are like a horse held by its tether, you would move, but are restrained, and (if let go) would start off like an

¹ These seem strange charges to bring against Lâo-ze, and no light is thrown on them from other sources.

² The change had been produced by the demeanour of Lâo-ze; the other could not tell how. Other explanations of the question are given by some of the critics.

³ Compare in the first paragraph of Book VII.

arrow from a bow; you examine all the minutiae of a thing; your wisdom is artful, and yet you try to look at ease. All these are to be considered proofs of your want of sincerity. If on the borders one were to be found with them, he would be named a Thief.'

9. The Master¹ said, 'The Táo does not exhaust itself in what is greatest, nor is it ever absent from what is least; and therefore it is to be found complete and diffused in all things. How wide is its universal comprehension! How deep is its unfathomableness! The embodiment of its attributes in benevolence and righteousness is but a small result of its spirit-like (working); but it is only the perfect man who can determine this. The perfect man has (the charge of) the world;—is not the charge great? and yet it is not sufficient to embarrass him. He wields the handle of power over the whole world, and yet it is nothing to him. His discrimination detects everything false, and no consideration of gain moves him. He penetrates to the truth of things, and can guard that which is fundamental. So it is that heaven and earth are external to him, and he views all things with indifference, and his spirit is never straitened by them. He has comprehended the Táo, and is in harmony with its characteristics; he pushes back benevolence and righteousness (into their proper place), and deals with ceremonies and music as (simply) guests:—yes, the mind of the perfect man determines all things aright.'

¹ No doubt, Láo-ze. In the 'Complete Works of the Ten Philosophers,' the text is 老子 and not 夫子.

10. What the world thinks the most valuable exhibition of the Tâo is to be found in books. But books are only a collection of words. Words have what is valuable in them;—what is valuable in words is the ideas they convey. But those ideas are a sequence of something else;—and what that something else is cannot be conveyed by words. When the world, because of the value which it attaches to words, commits them to books, that for which it so values them may not deserve to be valued;—because that which it values is not what is really valuable.

Thus it is that what we look at and can see is (only) the outward form and colour, and what we listen to and can hear is (only) names and sounds. Alas! that men of the world should think that form and colour, name and sound, should be sufficient to give them the real nature of the Tâo. The form and colour, the name and sound, are certainly not sufficient to convey its real nature; and so it is that 'the wise do not speak and those who do speak are not wise.' How should the world know that real nature?

Duke Hwan¹, seated above in his hall, was (once) reading a book, and the wheelwright Phien was making a wheel below it². Laying aside his hammer and chisel, Phien went up the steps, and said, 'I venture to ask your Grace what words you are reading?' The duke said, 'The words of the sages.' 'Are those sages alive?' Phien con-

¹ No doubt, duke Hwan of *Khî*, the first of the five presiding chiefs of the *Kâu* dynasty.

² See in Mencius I, i, vii, 4 a similar reference to the hall and the courtyard below it.

tinued. 'They are dead,' was the reply. 'Then,' said the other, 'what you, my Ruler, are reading are only the dregs and sediments of those old men.' The duke said, 'How should you, a wheelwright, have anything to say about the book which I am reading? If you can explain yourself, very well; if you cannot, you shall die!' The wheelwright said, 'Your servant will look at the thing from the point of view of his own art. In making a wheel, if I proceed gently, that is pleasant enough, but the workmanship is not strong; if I proceed violently, that is toilsome and the joinings do not fit. If the movements of my hand are neither (too) gentle nor (too) violent, the idea in my mind is realised. But I cannot tell (how to do this) by word of mouth;—there is a knack in it. I cannot teach the knack to my son, nor can my son learn it from me. Thus it is that I am in my seventieth year, and am (still) making wheels in my old age¹. But these ancients, and what it was not possible for them to convey, are dead and gone :—so then what you, my Ruler, are reading is but their dregs and sediments!'

¹ Compare the story in Book III about the ruler Wăn-hui and his butcher; and other passages.

BOOK XIV.

PART II. SECTION VII.

Thien Yün, or 'The Revolution of Heaven'.¹

1. How (ceaselessly) heaven revolves! How (constantly) earth abides at rest! And do the sun and moon contend about their (respective) places? Who presides over and directs these (things)? Who binds and connects them together? Who is it that, without trouble or exertion on his part, causes and maintains them? Is it, perhaps, that there is some secret spring, in consequence of which they cannot be but as they are? Or is it, perhaps, that they move and turn as they do, and cannot stop of themselves?

(Then) how the clouds become rain! And how the rain again forms the clouds! Who diffuses them so abundantly? Who is it that, without trouble or exertion on his part, produces this elemental enjoyment, and seems to stimulate it?

The winds rise in the north; one blows to the west, and another to the east; while some rise upwards, uncertain in their direction. By whose breathing are they produced? Who is it that, without any trouble and exertion of his own, effects all their undulations? I venture to ask their cause².

¹ See pp. 145, 146.

² Down to this we have a description of the phenomena of heaven and earth and of nature generally as proceeding regularly

Wû-hsien Thiáo¹ said, 'Come, and I will tell you. To heaven there belong the six Extreme Points, and the five Elements². When the Tîs and Kings acted in accordance with them, there was good government; when they acted contrary to them, there was evil. Observing the things (described) in the nine divisions (of the writing) of Lo³, their government was perfected and their virtue was complete. They inspected and enlightened the kingdom beneath them, and all under the sky acknowledged and sustained them. Such was the condition under the august (sovereigns⁴) and those before them.'

2. Tang⁵, the chief administrator of Shang⁵, asked Kwang-ze about Benevolence⁶, and the answer was, 'Wolves and tigers are benevolent.' 'What do you mean?' said Tang. Kwang-ze replied, 'Father and son (among them) are affectionate to one another. Why should they be considered as not bene-

and noiselessly, without any apparent cause; which is the chief subject of the Book. As the description is not assigned to any one, we must suppose it to be from Kwang-ze himself; and that it is he who asks the question in the last three characters.

¹ This is said by the critics to have been a minister of the Shang dynasty, under Thái-mâu in the seventeenth century B.C.; but even Kwang-ze would hardly so violate the unity of time.

² Generally means 'the Five Regular Virtues;' supposed to mean here 'the Five Elements.'

³ Probably the 'Nine Divisions of the Great Plan,' in the Shû King, V, iv, fancied to be derived from the writing, which a tortoise from the Lo river exhibited to the great Yü.

⁴ Possibly Fû-hsî, Shân Năng, and Hwang-Tî.

⁵ 'Shang' must be taken as the duchy of Sung, assigned by king Wû to the representative of the kings of the dynasty of Shang. 'Tang' would be a principal minister of it in the time of Kwang-ze.

⁶ The chief of all the virtues according to Confucianism.

volent?' 'Allow me to ask about perfect benevolence,' pursued the other. *Kwáng-3ze* said, 'Perfect benevolence¹ does not admit (the feeling) of affection.' The minister said, 'I have heard that, without (the feeling of) affection there is no love, and without love there is not filial duty;—is it permissible to say that the perfectly benevolent are not filial?' *Kwáng-3ze* rejoined, 'That is not the way to put the case. Perfect Benevolence is the very highest thing;—filial duty is by no means sufficient to describe it. The saying which you quote is not to the effect that (such benevolence) transcends filial duty;—it does not refer to such duty at all. One, travelling to the south, comes (at last) to Ying², and there, standing with his face to the north, he does not see mount Ming³. Why does he not see it? Because he is so far from it. Hence it is said, "Filial duty as a part of reverence is easy, but filial duty as a part of love is difficult. If it be easy as a part of love, yet it is difficult to forget⁴ one's parents. It may be easy for me to forget my parents, but it is difficult to make my parents forget me. If it were easy to make my parents forget me, it is difficult for me to forget all men in the world. If it were easy to forget all men in the world, it is difficult to make them all forget me."

'This virtue might make one think light of Yáo and Shun, and not wish to be they⁵. The profit

¹ A denomination here for the Táo, employed by *Kwáng-3ze* for the purpose of his argument.

² The capital of the state of *K'áu* in the south.

³ Name of a hill in the extreme north.

⁴ The Táo requires such forgetfulness on the part of both giver and receiver; it is a part of its 'doing-nothing.'

⁵ I think this is the meaning.

and beneficial influences of it extend to a myriad ages, and no one in the world knows whence they come. How can you simply heave a great sigh, and speak (as you do) of benevolence and filial duty? Filial duty, fraternal respect, benevolence, righteousness, loyalty, sincerity, firmness, and purity;—all these may be pressed into the service of this virtue, but they are far from sufficient to come up to it. Therefore it is said, “To him who has what is most noble¹, all the dignities of a state are as nothing²; to him who has what is the greatest riches, all the wealth of a state is as nothing; to him who has all that he could wish, fame and praise are as nothing.” It is thus that the Tâo admits of no substitute.’

3. Pei-măn *Khăng*³ asked Hwang-Ti, saying, ‘You were celebrating, O Ti, a performance of the music of the Hsien-*khih*⁴, in the open country near the Thung-thing lake. When I heard the first part of it, I was afraid; the next made me weary; and the last perplexed me. I became agitated and unable to speak, and lost my self-possession.’ The Ti said, ‘It was likely that it should so affect you! It was performed with (the instruments of) men, and all attuned according to (the influences of) Heaven. It

¹ The Tâo.

² This free version takes 并 as = 屏. So the Khang-hsi dictionary explains it.

³ Only heard of, so far as I know, in this passage.

⁴ The name of Hwang-Ti’s music; I do not venture to translate it. In his elaborate description of it, our author intended to give an idea of the Tâo, and the effect which the study of it was calculated to produce on the mind; as appears from the concluding sentence of the paragraph.

proceeded according to (the principles of) propriety and righteousness, and was pervaded by (the idea of) the Grand Purity.

‘The Perfect Music first had its response in the affairs of men, and was conformed to the principles of Heaven; it indicated the action of the five virtues, and corresponded to the spontaneity (apparent in nature). After this it showed the blended distinctions of the four seasons, and the grand harmony of all things;—the succession of those seasons one after another, and the production of things in their proper order. Now it swelled, and now it died away, its peaceful and military strains clearly distinguished and given forth. Now it was clear, and now rough, as if the contracting and expanding of the elemental processes blended harmoniously (in its notes). Those notes then flowed away in waves of light, till, as when the hibernating insects first begin to move, I commanded the terrifying crash of thunder. Its end was marked by no formal conclusion, and it began again without any prelude. It seemed to die away, and then it burst into life; it came to a close, and then it rose again. So it went on regularly and inexhaustibly, and without the intervention of any pause:—it was this which made you afraid.

‘In the second part (of the performance), I made it describe the harmony of the Yin and Yang, and threw round it the brilliance of the sun and moon. Its notes were now short and now long, now soft and now hard. Their changes, however, were marked by an unbroken unity, though not dominated by a fixed regularity. They filled every valley and ravine; you might shut up every crevice, and guard your spirit (against their entrance), yet

there was nothing but gave admission to them. Yea, those notes resounded slowly, and might have been pronounced high and clear. Hence the shades of the dead kept in their obscurity; the sun and moon, and all the stars of the zodiac, pursued their several courses. I made (my instruments) leave off, when (the performance) came to an end, and their (echoes) flowed on without stopping. You thought anxiously about it, and were not able to understand it; you looked for it, and were not able to see it; you pursued it, and were not able to reach it. All-amazed, you stood in the way all open around you, and then you leant against an old rotten dryandra-tree and hummed. The power of your eyes was exhausted by what you wished to see; your strength failed in your desire to pursue it, while I myself could not reach it. Your body was but so much empty vacancy while you endeavoured to retain your self-possession¹:—it was that endeavour which made you weary.

‘In the last part (of the performance), I employed notes which did not have that wearying effect. I blended them together as at the command of spontaneity. Hence they came as if following one another in confusion, like a clump of plants springing from one root, or like the music of a forest produced by no visible form. They spread themselves all around without leaving a trace (of their cause); and seemed to issue from deep obscurity where there was no sound. Their movements came from nowhere; their home was in the deep darkness;—

¹ See the usage of the two characters 委蛇 in the Shih King, I, ii, Ode 3.

conditions which some would call death, and some life ; some, the fruit, and some, (merely) the flower. Those notes, moving and flowing on, separating and shifting, and not following any regular sounds, the world might well have doubts about them, and refer them to the judgment of a sage, for the sages understand the nature of this music, and judge in accordance with the prescribed (spontaneity). While the spring of that spontaneity has not been touched, and yet the regulators of the five notes are all prepared ;—this is what is called the music of Heaven, delighting the mind without the use of words. Hence it is said in the eulogy of the Lord of Pião¹, “You listen for it, and do not hear its sound ; you look for it, and do not perceive its form ; it fills heaven and earth ; it envelopes all within the universe.” You wished to hear it, but could not take it in ; and therefore you were perplexed.

‘I performed first the music calculated to awe ; and you were frightened as if by a ghostly visitation. I followed it with that calculated to weary ; and in your weariness you would have withdrawn. I concluded with that calculated to perplex ; and in your perplexity you felt your stupidity. But that stupidity is akin to the Tão ; you may with it convey the Tão in your person, and have it (ever) with you.’

4. When Confucius was travelling in the west in Wei, Yen Yüan asked the music-master K’in², say-

¹ Some sovereign of antiquity, of whom it is difficult to find any other mention but this. Even in the Lû Shih I have not discovered him. The name is said to be pronounced Pião ; in which case it should consist of three 犬, and not of three 火.

² Only heard of here.

ing, 'How is it, do you think, with the course of the Master?' The music-master replied, 'Alas! it is all over with your Master!' 'How so?' asked Yen Yüan; and the other said, 'Before the grass-dogs¹ are set forth (at the sacrifice), they are deposited in a box or basket, and wrapt up with elegantly embroidered cloths, while the representative of the dead and the officer of prayer prepare themselves by fasting to present them. After they have been set forth, however, passers-by trample on their heads and backs, and the grass-cutters take and burn them in cooking. That is all they are good for. If one should again take them, replace them in the box or basket, wrap them up with embroidered cloths, and then in rambling, or abiding at the spot, should go to sleep under them, if he do not get (evil) dreams, he is sure to be often troubled with the nightmare. Now here is your Master in the same way taking the grass-dogs, presented by the ancient kings, and leading his disciples to wander or abide and sleep under them. Owing to this, the tree (beneath which they were practising ceremonies) in Sung was cut down²; he was obliged to leave Wei³; he was reduced to extremities in Shang³ and K'âu⁴:—were not those experiences like having (evil) dreams? He was kept in a state of siege between K'hân and Zhâi⁵, so that for seven days he had no cooked food to eat, and was in a situation between life and death:—were not those experiences like the nightmare?

¹ See the T'ao Teh King, ch. 5.

² Analects III, xxii.

³ In consequence of the dissoluteness of the court; Analects VI, xxvi; IX, 17.

⁴ Meaning Sung and Wei.

⁵ Analects XI, ii, 1.

‘If you are travelling by water, your best plan is to use a boat; if by land, a carriage. Take a boat, which will go (easily) along on the water, and try to push it along on the land, and all your lifetime it will not go so much as a fathom or two:—are not ancient time and the present time like the water and the dry land? and are not *Kâu* and *Lû* like the boat and the carriage? To seek now to practise (the old ways of) *Kâu* in *Lû* is like pushing along a boat on the dry land. It is only a toilsome labour, and has no success; he who does so is sure to meet with calamity. He has not learned that in handing down the arts (of one time) he is sure to be reduced to extremity in endeavouring to adapt them to the conditions (of another).

‘And have you not seen the working of a shadoof? When (the rope of) it is pulled, it bends down; and when it is let go, it rises up. It is pulled by a man, and does not pull the man; and so, whether it bends down or rises up, it commits no offence against the man. In the same way the rules of propriety, righteousness, laws, and measures of the three Hwangs¹ and five Tis¹ derived their excellence, not from their being the same as those of the present day, but from their (aptitude for) government. We may compare them to haws², pears, oranges,

¹ It is impossible to speak definitely of who these three Hwangs (Augustuses) and five Tis were, or whom the speaker intended by them. The former would seem to lead us to the purely fabulous ages, when twelve (or thirteen) Heavenly Hwangs, eleven Earthly, and nine Human ruled over the young world, for a period of 576,000 years. There is a general agreement of opinion that the five Tis ended with Yâo and Shun.

² See Williams's Dictionary, sub voc. He says it is the Cra-

and pummeloos, which are different in flavour, but all suitable to be eaten. Just so it is that the rules of propriety, righteousness, laws, and measures, change according to the time.

‘If now you take a monkey, and dress it in the robes of the duke of *Kâu*, it will bite and tear them, and will not be satisfied till it has got rid of them altogether. And if you look at the difference between antiquity and the present time it is as great as that between the monkey and the duke of *Kâu*. In the same way, when Hsi Shih¹ was troubled in mind, she would knit her brows and frown on all in her neighbourhood. An ugly woman of the neighbourhood, seeing and admiring her beauty, went home, and also laying her hands on her heart proceeded to stare and frown on all around her. When the rich people of the village saw her, they shut fast their doors and would not go out; when the poor people saw her, they took their wives and children and ran away from her. The woman knew how to admire the frowning beauty, but she did not know how it was that she, though frowning, was beautiful. Alas! it is indeed all over with your Master²!’

5. When Confucius was in his fifty-first year³, he had not heard of the *Táo*, and went south to *Phei*⁴

taegus cuneata and *pinnatifida*, common in China, and much esteemed for its acidity.

¹ A famous beauty,—the concubine of king *Fû-khài* of *Wû*.

² The comparisons in this paragraph are not complimentary to Confucius. Of course the conversation never took place, and must have been made up to ridicule the views of the sage.

³ This would be in B.C. 503 or 502, and *Lão-ze* would be more than a hundred years old.

⁴ Probably in what is now the district of *Phei*, department of *Hsü-kâu*, *Kiang-sü*.

to see Lâu Tan, who said to him, 'You have come, Sir; have you? I have heard that you are the wisest man of the North; have you also got the Táo?' 'Not yet,' was the reply; and the other went on, 'How have you sought it?' Confucius said, 'I sought it in measures and numbers, and after five years I had not got it.' 'And how then did you seek it?' 'I sought it in the Yin and Yang, and after twelve years I have not found it.' Lâu-ze said, 'Just so! If the Táo could be presented (to another), men would all present it to their rulers; if it could be served up (to others), men would all serve it up to their parents; if it could be told (to others), men would all tell it to their brothers; if it could be given to others, men would all give it to their sons and grandsons. The reason why it cannot be transmitted is no other but this,—that if, within, there be not the presiding principle, it will not remain there, and if, outwardly, there be not the correct obedience, it will not be carried out. When that which is given out from the mind (in possession of it) is not received by the mind without, the sage will not give it out; and when, entering in from without, there is no power in the receiving mind to entertain it, the sage will not permit it to lie hid there¹. Fame is a possession common to all; we should not seek to have much of it. Benevolence and righteousness were as the lodging-houses of the former kings; we should only rest in them for a night, and not occupy them for

¹ That is, the sage will not deposit it, where it will lie hidden;—compare Analects XVI, vi.

long. If men see us doing so, they will have much to say against us.

‘The perfect men of old trod the path of benevolence as a path which they borrowed for the occasion, and dwelt in Righteousness as in a lodging which they used for a night. Thus they rambled in the vacancy of Untroubled Ease, found their food in the fields of Indifference, and stood in the gardens which they had not borrowed. Untroubled Ease requires the doing of nothing; Indifference is easily supplied with nourishment; not borrowing needs no outlay. The ancients called this the Enjoyment that Collects the True.

‘Those who think that wealth is the proper thing for them cannot give up their revenues; those who seek distinction cannot give up the thought of fame; those who cleave to power cannot give the handle of it to others. While they hold their grasp of those things, they are afraid (of losing them). When they let them go, they are grieved; and they will not look at a single example, from which they might perceive the (folly) of their restless pursuits:—such men are under the doom of Heaven¹.

‘Hatred and kindness; taking and giving; reproof and instruction; death and life:—these eight things are instruments of rectification, but only those are able to use them who do not obstinately refuse to comply with their great changes. Hence it is said, “Correction is Rectification.” When the minds of

¹ See the same expression used in Book VI, par. 11, used by Confucius of himself. Comparing the two passages together, I must doubt the correctness of my note there (2, p. 252), that ‘Heaven’ is used in the Confucian sense of Tî, or God. The men here pursued and toiled after the pleasures of the world, rather than the quiet satisfactions of the Tâo.

some do not acknowledge this, it is because the gate of Heaven¹ (in them) has not been opened.'

6. At an interview with Lâu Tan, Confucius spoke to him of benevolence and righteousness. Lâu Tan said, 'If you winnow chaff, and the dust gets into your eyes, then the places of heaven and earth and of the four cardinal points are all changed to you. If mosquitoes or gadflies puncture your skin, it will keep you all the night² from sleeping. But this painful iteration of benevolence and righteousness excites my mind and produces in it the greatest confusion. If you, Sir, would cause men not to lose their natural simplicity, and if you would also imitate the wind in its (unconstrained) movements, and stand forth in all the natural attributes belonging to you!—why must you use so much energy, and carry a great drum to seek for the son whom you have lost³? The snow-goose does not bathe every day to make itself white, nor the crow blacken itself every day to make itself black. The natural simplicity of their black and white does not afford any ground for controversy; and the fame and praise which men like to contemplate do not make them greater than they naturally are. When the springs (supplying the pools) are dried up, the fishes huddle together on the dry land. Than that they should moisten one another there by their gasping, and keep one another wet by their milt, it would be better for them to forget one another in the rivers and lakes⁴.'

¹ See Book XXIII, par. 9. The phrase = 靈府.

² The common reading 昔 is a mistake for 夕.

³ Compare the same illustration in the preceding Book, par. 7.

⁴ This illustration is from Book VI, par. 5.

From this interview with Láo Tan, Confucius returned home, and for three days did not speak. His disciples (then) asked him, saying, 'Master, you have seen Láo Tan; in what way might you admonish and correct him?' Confucius said, 'In him (I may say) that I have now seen the dragon. The dragon coils itself up, and there is its body; it unfolds itself and becomes the dragon complete. It rides on the cloudy air, and is nourished by the Yin and Yang. I kept my mouth open, and was unable to shut it;—how could I admonish and correct Láo Tan?'

7. 3ze-kung¹ said, 'So then, can (this) man indeed sit still as a representative of the dead, and then appear as the dragon? Can his voice resound as thunder, when he is profoundly still? Can he exhibit himself in his movements like heaven and earth? May I, 3hze, also get to see him?' Accordingly with a message from Confucius he went to see Láo Tan.

Láo Tan was then about to answer (his salutation) haughtily in the hall, but he said in a low voice, 'My years have rolled on and are passing away, what do you, Sir, wish to admonish me about?' 3ze-kung replied, 'The Three Kings and Five Tîs² ruled

¹ 3ze-kung would seem to have undertaken this expedition to maintain the reputation of the Master and his school;—only to be defeated by Láo-ze more signally than Confucius had been.

² These are different probably, though the text is not quite certain, from the three Hwangs and five Tîs of par. 3. The Hwangs (or August Sovereigns) preceded the Tîs; the Kings (Wangs) came after them. The Three Kings are the three lines of kings commencing with the dynasty of Hsiâ, and following Shun. From the names mentioned by 3ze-kung, we ought certainly so to understand the designation here.

the world not in the same way, but the fame that has accrued to them is the same. How is it that you alone consider that they were not sages?' 'Come forward a little, my son. Why do you say that (their government) was not the same?' 'Yáo,' was the reply, 'gave the kingdom to Shun, and Shun gave it to Yü. Yü had recourse to his strength, and Thang to the force of arms. King Wăn was obedient to Kâu (-hsin), and did not dare to rebel; king Wû rebelled against Kâu, and would not submit to him. And I say that their methods were not the same.' Láo Tan said, 'Come a little more forward, my son, and I will tell you how the Three Hwangs and the Five Tis¹ ruled the world. Hwang-Ti ruled it, so as to make the minds of the people all conformed to the One (simplicity). If the parents of one of them died, and he did not wail, no one blamed him. Yáo ruled it so as to cause the hearts of the people to cherish relative affection. If any, however, made the observances on the death of other members of their kindred less than those for their parents, no one blamed them². Shun ruled it, so as to produce a feeling of rivalry in the minds of the people. Their wives gave birth to their children in the tenth month of their pregnancy, but those children could speak at five months; and before they were three years old, they began to call people by their surnames and names. Then it was that men began to die prematurely. Yü ruled it, so as to cause the minds of the people to become changed. Men's minds became scheming, and they

¹ See note 2, preceding page.

² Referring to some abuses, contrary to the doctrine of relationship.

used their weapons as if they might legitimately do so, (saying that they were) killing thieves and not killing other men. The people formed themselves into different combinations;—so it was throughout the kingdom. Everywhere there was great consternation, and then arose the Literati and (the followers of) Mo (Tt). From them came first the doctrine of the relationships (of society); and what can be said of the now prevailing customs (in the marrying of) wives and daughters? I tell you that the rule of the Three Kings and Five Tis may be called by that name, but nothing can be greater than the disorder which it produced. The wisdom of the Three Kings was opposed to the brightness of the sun and moon above, contrary to the exquisite purity of the hills and streams below, and subversive of the beneficent gifts of the four seasons between. Their wisdom has been more fatal than the sting of a scorpion or the bite of a dangerous beast¹. Unable to rest in the true attributes of their nature and constitution, they still regarded themselves as sages:—was it not a thing to be ashamed of? But they were shameless.’ 3ze-kung stood quite disconcerted and ill at ease.

8. Confucius said to Láo Tan, ‘I have occupied myself with the Shih, the Shû, the Lî, the Yo, the Yî, and the *Khün K’hiû*, those six Books, for what I myself consider a long time², and am thoroughly

¹ What beast is meant here cannot be ascertained from the characters in the text,—鮮規之獸.

² But with the preparation of the *Khün K’hiû* Confucius’s life ended;—it is very plain that no conversation such as Kwang-3ze has fabricated here could ever have taken place.

acquainted with their contents. With seventy-two rulers, all offenders against the right, I have discoursed about the ways of the former kings, and set forth the examples of (the dukes of) *Kâu* and *Shão*; and not one of them has adopted (my views) and put them in practice :—how very difficult it is to prevail on such men, and to make clear the path to be pursued !’

Lão-ze replied, ‘It is fortunate that you have not met with a ruler fitted to rule the age. Those six writings are a description of the vestiges left by the former kings, but do not tell how they made such vestiges; and what you, Sir, speak about are still only the vestiges. But vestiges are the prints left by the shoes;—are they the shoes that produced them? A pair of white herons look at each other with pupils that do not move, and impregnation takes place; the male insect emits its buzzing sound in the air above, and the female responds from the air below, and impregnation takes place; the creatures called *lêi* are both male and female, and each individual breeds of itself¹. The nature cannot be altered; the conferred constitution cannot be changed; the march of the seasons cannot be arrested; the *Táo* cannot be stopped. If you get the *Táo*, there is no effect that cannot be produced; if you miss it, there is no effect that can.’

Confucius (after this) did not go out, till at the end of three months he went again to see *Lão Tan*, and said, ‘I have got it. Ravens produce their young by hatching; fishes by the communication of their milt; the small-waisted wasp by transforma-

¹ Where had *Lão-ze* or his author learned his zoology?

tion¹; when a younger brother comes, the elder weeps². Long is it that I have not played my part in harmony with these processes of transformation. But as I did not play my part in harmony with such transformation, how could I transform men?' Lâo-ze said, 'You will do. *K'hiû*, you have found the Tâo.'

¹ See the Shih King, II, v, Ode II, 3, about the sphex.

² Because, as we say, 'his nose is put out.' But the sentiment, though it is ascribed to Confucius, is rarely according to the fact of the case.

BOOK XV.

PART II. SECTION VIII.

Kho Í, or 'Ingrained Ideas'¹

I. Ingrained ideas and a high estimate of their own conduct; leaving the world, and pursuing uncommon ways; talking loftily and in resentful disparagement of others;—all this is simply symptomatic of arrogance. This is what scholars who betake themselves to the hills and valleys, who are always blaming the world, and who stand aloof like withered trees, or throw themselves into deep pools², are fond of.

Discoursing of benevolence, righteousness, loyalty, and good faith; being humble and frugal, self-forgetful and courteous;—all this is simply symptomatic of (self-)cultivation. This is what scholars who wish to tranquillise the world, teachers and instructors, men who pursue their studies at home and abroad, are fond of.

Discoursing of their great merit and making a great name for themselves; insisting on the ceremonies between ruler and minister; and rectifying the relations between high and low;—all this shows their one object to be the promotion of government. This is what officers of the court, men who honour their lord and would strengthen the state and who

¹ See pp. 146, 147.

² As did Shǎn-thû Tî. See in Book VI, par. 3.

would do their utmost to incorporate other states with their own, are fond of.

Resorting to marshes and lakes ; dwelling in solitary places ; occupying themselves with angling and living at ease ;—all this shows their one object to be to do nothing. This is what gentlemen of the rivers and seas, men who avoid the society of the world and desire to live at leisure, are fond of.

Blowing and breathing with open mouth ; inhaling and exhaling the breath ; expelling the old breath and taking in new ; passing their time like the (dormant) bear¹, and stretching and twisting (the neck) like a bird¹ ;—all this simply shows the desire for longevity. This is what the scholars who manipulate their breath, and the men who nourish the body and wish to live as long as Päng 3û, are fond of.

As to those who have a lofty character without any ingrained ideas ; who pursue the path of self-cultivation without benevolence and righteousness ; who succeed in government without great services or fame ; who enjoy their ease without resorting to the rivers and seas ; who attain to longevity without the management (of the breath) ; who forget all things and yet possess all things ; whose placidity is unlimited, while all things to be valued attend them :—such men pursue the way of heaven and earth, and display the characteristics of the sages. Hence it is said², ‘Placidity, indifference, silence, quietude,

¹ This is probably the meaning. The text is simply :—‘Bear-passing, bird-stretching.’

² ‘It is said :’—where? and by whom? These questions we cannot answer. We have met indeed already with the same characteristics of the Táo ; but Kwang-ze is not likely to be quoting

absolute vacancy, and non-action:—these are the qualities which maintain the level of heaven and earth and are the substance of the Tâo and its characteristics.'

2. In accordance with this it is said, 'The sage is entirely restful, and so (his mind) is evenly balanced and at ease. This even balance and ease appears in his placidity and indifference. In this state of even balance and ease, of placidity and indifference, anxieties and evils do not find access to him, no depraving influence can take him by surprise; his virtue is complete, and his spirit continues unimpaired.'

Therefore it is (also) said, 'The life of the sage is (like) the action of Heaven; and his death is the transformation common to (all) things. In his stillness his virtue is the same as that of the Yin, and in movement his diffusiveness is like that of the Yang. He does not take the initiative in producing either happiness or calamity. He responds to the influence acting on him, and moves as he feels the pressure. He rises to act only when he is obliged to do so. He discards wisdom and the memories of the past; he follows the lines of his Heaven (-given nature); and therefore he suffers no calamity from Heaven, no involvement from things, no blame from men, and no reproof from the spirits of the dead¹. His life seems to float along; his death seems to be a resting. He does not indulge any

himself. On the 'It is said,' and the five recurrences of the phrase below, Lû Shû-kih says that Kwang-3ze is quoting from sentences current among the adherents of Tâoism,—the sentence-makers often drawn on by Lâo-3ze; compare the Tâo Teh K'ing, ch. xli.

¹ See Book XIII, par. 2.

anxious doubts ; he does not lay plans beforehand. His light is without display ; his good faith is without previous arrangement. His sleep is untroubled by dreams ; his waking is followed by no sorrows. His spirit is guileless and pure ; his soul is not subject to weariness. Vacant and without self-assertion, placid and indifferent, he agrees with the virtue of Heaven.'

Therefore it is said (further), 'Sadness and pleasure show a depraving element in the virtue (of those who feel them) ; joy and anger show some error in their course ; love and hatred show a failure of their virtue. Hence for the mind to be free from sorrow and pleasure is the perfection of virtue ; to be of one mind that does not change is the perfection of quietude ; to be conscious of no opposition is the perfection of vacancy ; to have no intercourse with (external) things is the perfection of indifference ; and to have no rebellious dissatisfactions is the perfection of purity.'

3. Therefore it is said (still further), 'If the body be toiled, and does not rest, it becomes worn out ; if the spirit be used without cessation, it becomes toiled ; and when toiled, it becomes exhausted. It is the nature of water, when free from admixture, to be clear, and, when not agitated, to be level ; while if obstructed and not allowed to flow, it cannot preserve its clearness ;—being an image of the virtue of Heaven.' Hence it is said (once again), 'To be guileless and pure, and free from all admixture ; to be still and uniform, without undergoing any change ; to be indifferent and do nothing ; to move and yet to act like Heaven :—this is the way to nourish the spirit. Now he who possesses a

sword made at Kan-yüeh¹ preserves it carefully in a box, and does not dare to use it ;—it is considered the perfection of valuable swords. But the human spirit² goes forth in all directions, flowing on without limit, reaching to heaven above, and wreathing round the earth beneath. It transforms and nourishes all things, and cannot be represented by any form. Its name is “the Divinity (in man)³.” It is only the path of pure simplicity which guards and preserves the Spirit. When this path is preserved and not lost, it becomes one with the Spirit ; and in this ethereal amalgamation, it acts in harmony with the orderly operation of Heaven.’

There is the vulgar saying, ‘The multitude of men consider gain to be the most important thing ; pure scholars, fame ; those who are wise and able value their ambition ; the sage prizes essential purity.’ Therefore simplicity is the denomination of that in which there is no admixture ; purity of that in which the spirit is not impaired. It is he who can embody simplicity and purity whom we call the True Man⁴.

¹ Both of the seaboard states of Wû and Yüeh were famous for the swords produced in them. Kan-yüeh appears to have been the name of a valley or place in Wû, famous for the weapons made in it ; unless indeed we should read 于越, instead of 干越, and take 于越 as equivalent to 於越, which is found in the 30 *Khwan* as the name of Yüeh.

² Might be translated ‘the subtle spirit.’

³ A very remarkable use of Tî (帝) for the human spirit in the sense of God. The subject of the clause, let the reader observe, is that spirit, and not the Tâo. See pp. 146, 147, where I have said something about it.

⁴ See the full account of ‘the True Man’ in Book VI.

BOOK XVI.

PART II. SECTION IX.

Shan Hsing, or 'Correcting the Nature'¹.

1. Those who would correct their nature by means of the vulgar learning², seeking to restore it to its original condition, and those who would regulate³ their desires, by the vulgar ways of thinking, seeking thereby to carry their intelligence to perfection, must be pronounced to be deluded and ignorant people. The ancients who regulated the Tâo nourished their faculty of knowledge by their placidity, and all through life abstained from employing that faculty in action;—they must be pronounced to have (thus also) nourished their placidity by their knowledge⁴.

When the faculty of knowledge and the placidity

¹ See pp. 147, 148.

² 'Vulgar' must mean 'common,' and 'the vulgar learning' is the teaching popular in the time of our author, and which he regarded as contrary to the principles of Tâoism, of which he was an adherent. The Chinese critics say that 'vulgar' here is used as the opposite of 'true.'

³ 滑 is generally explained by 亂, 'to confuse,' but I cannot construe the sentence with that meaning of the term. In the Khang-hsî dictionary which I have followed, the character is defined by 治 with special reference to this passage.

⁴ This sentence is the clue to the author's aim in the whole Book. The 'knowledge' is defined by 覺生, 'the faculty of perception and apprehension.'

(thus) blend together, and they nourish each other, then from the nature there come forth harmony and orderly method. The attributes (of the Táo) constitute the harmony; the Táo (itself) secures the orderly method. When the attributes appear in a universal practice of forbearance, we have Benevolence; when the path is all marked by orderly method, we have Righteousness; when the righteousness is clearly manifested, and (all) things are regarded with affection, we have Leal-heartedness; when the (heart's) core is thus (pure) and real, and carried back to its (proper) qualities, we have Music; when this sincerity appears in all the range of the capacity, and its demonstrations are in accordance with what is elegant, we have Ceremony. If Ceremonies and Music are carried out in an imperfect and one-sided manner, the world is thrown into confusion. When men would rectify others, and their own virtue is beclouded, it is not sufficient to extend itself to them. If an attempt be made so to extend it, they also will lose their (proper) nature.

2. The men of old, while the chaotic condition was yet undeveloped¹, shared the placid tranquillity which belonged to the whole world. At that time the Yin and Yang were harmonious and still; their resting and movement proceeded without any disturbance; the four seasons had their definite times; not a single thing received any injury, and no living being came to a premature end. Men might be

¹ These 'men of old' were what we may call 'primeval men';—men in the lowest stage of development; but which our author considered to be the highest or paradisiacal condition of their nature.

possessed of (the faculty of) knowledge, but they had no occasion for its use. This was what is called the state of Perfect Unity. At this time, there was no action on the part of any one, but a constant manifestation of spontaneity.

This condition (of excellence) deteriorated and decayed, till Sui-zăn and Fû-hsî arose and commenced their administration of the world¹; on which came a compliance (with their methods), but the state of unity was lost. The condition going on to deteriorate and decay, Shăn Năng and Hwang-Ti arose, and took the administration of the world, on which (the people) rested (in their methods), but did not themselves comply with them. Still the deterioration and decay continued till the lords of Thang and Yü² began to administer the world. These introduced the method of governing by transformation, resorting to the stream (instead of to the spring)³, thus vitiating the purity and destroying the simplicity (of the nature). They left the Tâo, and substituted the Good for it, and pursued the course of Haphazard Virtue. After this they forsook their nature and followed (the promptings of) their minds. One mind and another associated their knowledge, but were unable to give rest to the world. Then they added to this knowledge (ex-

¹ Kwang-ze gives no hint of how long he considered this highest condition to have lasted. Sui-zăn, 'the man of the Burning Speculum,' 'the Fire-producer,' whom Williams calls 'the Prometheus of China,' appears before Fû-hsî, as the first in the line of the Rulers of the world, who broke up the Primal Unity.

² These were Yáo and Shun, named from the principalities over which their fathers ruled.

³ 'The streams' were the methods of culture that arose after the simple virtues and spontaneity of the Tâo were lost.

ternal and) elegant forms, and went on to make these more and more numerous. The forms extinguished the (primal) simplicity, till the mind was drowned by their multiplicity. After this the people began to be perplexed and disordered, and had no way by which they might return to their true nature, and bring back their original condition.

3. Looking at the subject from this point of view, we see how the world lost ¹ the (proper) course, and how the course (which it took) only led it further astray¹. The world and the Way, when they came together, being (thus) lost to each other, how could the men of the Way make themselves conspicuous in the world? and how could the world rise to an appreciation of the Way?. Since the Way had no means to make itself conspicuous in the world, and the world had no means of rising to an appreciation of the Way, though sagely men might not keep among the hills and forests, their virtue was hidden;—hidden, but not because they themselves sought to hide it.

Those whom the ancients called 'Retired Scholars' did not conceal their persons, and not allow themselves to be seen; they did not shut up their words, and refuse to give utterance to them; they did not hide away their knowledge, and refuse to bring it forth. The conditions laid on them by the times were very much awry. If the conditions of the times had allowed them to act in the world on a great scale, they would have brought back the state of unity without any trace being perceived (of how

¹ It is the same character in the text which I have been obliged to translate thus differently,—喪.

they did so). When those conditions shut them up entirely from such action, they struck their roots deeper (in themselves), were perfectly still and waited. It was thus that they preserved (the Way in) their own persons.

4. The ancients who preserved (the Way in) their own persons did not try by sophistical reasonings to gloss over their knowledge; they did not seek to embrace (everything in) the world in their knowledge, nor to comprehend all the virtues in it. Solitary and trembling they remained where they were, and sought the restoration of their nature. What had they to do with any further action? The Way indeed is not to be pursued, nor (all) its characteristics to be known on a small scale. A little knowledge is injurious to those characteristics; small doings are injurious to the Way;—hence it is said, ‘They simply rectified themselves.’ Complete enjoyment is what is meant by ‘the Attainment of the Aim.’

What was anciently called ‘the Attainment of the Aim’ did not mean the getting of carriages and coronets¹; it simply meant that nothing more was needed for their enjoyment. Now-a-days what is called ‘the Attainment of the Aim’ means the getting of carriages and coronets. But carriages and coronets belong to the body; they do not affect the nature as it is constituted. When such things happen to come, it is but for a time; being but for a time, their coming cannot be obstructed and their going cannot be stopped². Therefore we should not

¹ That is, worldly distinction.

² Because they depend on others. Compare Mencius VI, i, ch. 17, 2.

because of carriages and coronets indulge our aims, nor because of distress and straitness resort to the vulgar (learning and thinking); the one of these conditions and the other may equally conduce to our enjoyment, which is simply to be free from anxiety. If now the departure of what is transient takes away one's enjoyment, this view shows that what enjoyment it had given was worthless. Hence it is said, 'They who lose themselves in their pursuit of things, and lose their nature in their study of what is vulgar, must be pronounced people who turn things upside down.'

BOOK XVII.

PART II. SECTION X.

K'hiû Shui, or 'The Floods of Autumn ¹.'

1. The time of the autumnal floods was come, and the hundred streams were all discharging themselves into the Ho. Its current was greatly swollen ², so that across its channel from bank to bank one could not distinguish an ox from a horse. On this the (Spirit-) earl of the Ho ³ laughed with delight, thinking that all the beauty of the world was to be found in his charge. Along the course of the river he walked east till he came to the North Sea, over which he looked, with his face to the east, without being able to see where its waters began. Then he began to turn his face round, looked across the expanse, (as if he were) confronting Zo ³, and said with a sigh, 'What the vulgar saying expresses about him who has learned a hundred points (of the T'ao), and thinks that there is no one equal to himself, was surely spoken of me. And moreover, I have heard

¹ See pp. 148, 149.

² 涇 here perhaps means 'turbid.' It has nothing to do with the river *King*.

³ See Mayers's Manual, p. 54. Our author adopts the common beliefs or superstitions of his time, and after his fashion puts his own reasonings into the mouths of these mythological personages. It is more difficult to collect the legends about Zo of the sea, or of the Northern Sea. See the *Khang-hsî Thesaurus* under 海若.

parties making little of the knowledge of *Kung-ni* and the righteousness of *Po-î*, and at first I did not believe them. Now I behold the all-but-boundless extent (of your realms). If I had not come to your gate, I should have been in danger (of continuing in my ignorance), and been laughed at for long in the schools of our great System¹.

Zo, (the Spirit-lord) of the Northern Sea, said, 'A frog in a well cannot be talked with about the sea;—he is confined to the limits of his hole. An insect of the summer cannot be talked with about ice;—it knows nothing beyond its own season. A scholar of limited views cannot be talked with about the *Tâo*;—he is bound by the teaching (which he has received). Now you have come forth from between your banks, and beheld the great sea. You have come to know your own ignorance and inferiority, and are in the way of being fitted to be talked with about great principles. Of all the waters under heaven there are none so great as the sea. A myriad streams flow into it without ceasing, and yet it is not filled; and afterwards² it discharges them (also) without ceasing, and yet it is not emptied. In spring and in autumn it undergoes no change; it takes no notice of floods or of drought. Its superiority over such streams even as the *Kiang* and the

¹ Thus the Confucian learning and its worthies were to the system of the *Tâo* only as the waters of the *Ho* to the great sea.

² I have translated here as if the reading were 尾閭, which is given by Lin Hsi-kung. The correct reading, however, so far as depends on editions and dictionaries, is 尾閭; which is explained in the *Khang-hsi* dictionary as 'a great Rock in *Fû-sang* on the East,' against which the water of the sea collects, and is all evaporated!

Ho cannot be told by measures or numbers ; and that I have never, notwithstanding this, made much of myself, is because I compare my own bodily form with (the greatness of) heaven and earth, and (remember that) I have received my breath from the Yin and Yang. Between heaven and earth I am but as a small stone or a small tree on a great hill. So long as I see myself to be thus small, how should I make much of myself ? I estimate all within the four seas, compared with the space between heaven and earth, to be not so large as that occupied by a pile of stones in a large marsh ! I estimate our Middle States, compared with the space between the four seas, to be smaller than a single little grain of rice in a great granary ! When we would set forth the number of things (in existence), we speak of them as myriads ; and man is only one of them. Men occupy all the nine provinces ; but of all whose life is maintained by grain-food, wherever boats and carriages reach, men form only one portion. Thus, compared with the myriads of things, they are not equal to a single fine hair on the body of a horse. Within this range are comprehended all (the territories) which the five T'is received in succession from one another ; all which the royal founders of the three dynasties contended for ; all which excited the anxiety of Benevolent men ; and all which men in office have toiled for. Po-i was accounted famous for declining (to share in its government), and K'ung-ni was accounted great because of the lessons which he addressed to it. They acted as they did, making much of themselves ;—therein like you who a little time ago did so of yourself because of your (volume of) water !'

2. The earl of the Ho said, 'Well then, may I consider heaven and earth as (the ideal of) what is great, and the point of a hair as that of what is small?' Zo of the Northern Sea replied, 'No. The (different) capacities of things are illimitable; time never stops, (but is always moving on); man's lot is ever changing; the end and the beginning of things never occur (twice) in the same way. Therefore men of great wisdom, looking at things far off or near at hand, do not think them insignificant for being small, nor much of them for being great:—knowing how capacities differ illimitably. They appeal with intelligence to things of ancient and recent occurrence, without being troubled by the remoteness of the former, or standing on tiptoe to lay hold of the latter:—knowing that time never stops in its course. They examine with discrimination (cases of) fulness and of want, not overjoyed by success, nor disheartened by failure:—knowing the inconstancy of man's lot. They know the plain and quiet path (in which things proceed), therefore they are not overjoyed to live, nor count it a calamity to die:—the end and the beginning of things never occurring (twice) in the same way.

'We must reckon that what men know is not so much as what they do not know, and that the time since they were born is not so long as that which elapsed before they were born. When they take that which is most small and try to fill with it the dimensions of what is most great, this leads to error and confusion, and they cannot attain their end. Looking at the subject in this way, how can you know that the point of a hair is sufficient to determine the minuteness of what is most small, or that

heaven and earth are sufficient to complete the dimensions of what is most large ?'

3. The earl of the Ho said, 'The disputers of the world all say, "That which is most minute has no bodily form ; and that which is most great cannot be encompassed ;"—is this really the truth ?' Zo of the Northern Sea replied, 'When from the standpoint of what is small we look at what is great, we do not take it all in ; when from the standpoint of what is great we look at what is small, we do not see it clearly. Now the subtile essence is smallness in its extreme degree ; and the vast mass is greatness in its largest form. Different as they are, each has its suitability,—according to their several conditions. But the subtile and the gross both presuppose that they have a bodily form. Where there is no bodily form, there is no longer a possibility of numerical division ; where it is not possible to encompass a mass, there is no longer a possibility of numerical estimate. What can be discoursed about in words is the grossness of things ; what can be reached in idea is the subtilty of things. What cannot be discoursed about in words, and what cannot be reached by nice discrimination of thought, has nothing to do either with subtilty or grossness.

'Therefore while the actions of the Great Man are not directed to injure men, he does not plume himself on his benevolence and kindness ; while his movements are not made with a view to gain, he does not consider the menials of a family as mean ; while he does not strive after property and wealth, he does not plume himself on declining them ; while he does not borrow the help of others to accomplish his affairs, he does not plume himself on supporting

himself by his own strength, nor does he despise those who in their greed do what is mean; while he differs in his conduct from the vulgar, he does not plume himself on being so different from them; while it is his desire to follow the multitude, he does not despise the glib-tongued flatterers. The rank and emoluments of the world furnish no stimulus to him, nor does he reckon its punishments and shame to be a disgrace. He knows that the right and the wrong can (often) not be distinguished, and that what is small and what is great can (often) not be defined. I have heard it said, "The Man of Tâo does not become distinguished; the greatest virtue is unsuccessful; the Great Man has no thought of self;"—to so great a degree may the lot be restricted.'

4. The earl of the Ho said, 'Whether the subject be what is external in things, or what is internal, how do we come to make a distinction between them as noble and mean, and as great or small?' Zo of the Northern Sea replied, 'When we look at them in the light of the Tâo, they are neither noble nor mean. Looking at them in themselves, each thinks itself noble, and despises others. Looking at them in the light of common opinion, their being noble or mean does not depend on themselves. Looking at them in their differences from one another, if we call those great which are greater than others, there is nothing that is not great, and in the same way there is nothing that is not small. We shall (thus) know that heaven and earth is but (as) a grain of the smallest rice, and that the point of a hair is (as) a mound or a mountain;—such is the view given of them by their relative size. Look-

ing at them from the services they render, allowing to everything the service which it does, there is not one which is not serviceable; and, extending the consideration to what it does not do, there is not one which is not unserviceable. We know (for instance) that East and West are opposed to each other, and yet that the one cannot be without (suggesting the idea of) the other;—(thus) their share of mutual service is determined. Looking at them with respect to their tendencies, if we approve of what they approve, then there is no one who may not be approved of; and, if we condemn what they condemn, there is no one who may not be condemned. There are the cases of Yáo and K'ieh, each of whom approved of his own course, and condemned the other;—such is the view arising from the consideration of tendency and aim.

‘Formerly Yáo and Shun resigned (their thrones), and yet each continued to be Tí; K'ih-khwâi¹ resigned (his marquisate) which led to his ruin. Thang and Wú contended (for the sovereignty), and each became king; the duke of Pâi² contended (for K'û), which led to his extinction. Looking at the subject from these examples of striving by force and of resigning, and from the conduct of Yáo (on the one hand) and of K'ieh (on the other), we see that there is a time for noble acting, and a time for

¹ See Mencius II, ii, ch. 8, and I, ii, chaps. 10, 11, with the notes. 之 is probably a mistake for 子.

² See the last narrative but one in the 30 K'wan, under the sixteenth year of duke Âi of Lû,—the year in which Confucius died. ‘The duke of Pâi’ was merely the chief of a district of K'û; but rebelling against the Ruler of the State, he was defeated, and strangled himself.

mean;—these characteristics are subject to no regular rule.

5. 'A battering ram may be used against the wall of a city, but it cannot be employed to stop up a hole;—the uses of implements are different. The (horses) *K'ih-êi* and *Hwâ-liû*¹ could in one day gallop 1000 *lî*, but for catching rats they were not equal to a wild dog or a weasel;—the gifts of creatures are different. The white horned owl collects its fleas in the night-time, and can discern the point of a hair, but in bright day it stares with its eyes and cannot see a mound or a hill;—the natures of creatures are different.

'Hence the sayings, "Shall we not follow and honour the right, and have nothing to do with the wrong? shall we not follow and honour those who secure good government, and have nothing to do with those who produce disorder?" show a want of acquaintance with the principles of Heaven and Earth, and with the different qualities of things. It is like following and honouring Heaven and taking no account of Earth; it is like following and honouring the Yin and taking no account of the Yang. It is clear that such a course cannot be pursued. Yet notwithstanding they go on talking so:—if they are not stupid, they are visionaries. The *Ti* sovereigns resigned their thrones to others in one way, and the rulers of the three dynasties transmitted their thrones to their successors in another. He who acts differently from the requirements of his time and contrary to its custom is called an usurper; he who complies with the time

¹ Two of king Mu's team of eight famous steeds.

and follows the common practice is said to be righteous. Hold your peace, O earl of the Ho. How should you know what constitutes being noble and being mean, or who are the small and who the great?’

6. The earl of the Ho said, ‘Very well. But what am I to do? and what am I not to do? How am I to be guided after all in regard to what I accept or reject, and what I pursue or put away from me?’ Zo of the Northern Sea replied, ‘From the standpoint of the Tâo, what is noble? and what is mean? These expressions are but the different extremes of the average level. Do not keep pertinaciously to your own ideas, which put you in such opposition to the Tâo. What are few? and what are many? These are denominations which we employ in thanking (donors) and dispensing gifts. Do not study to be uniform in doing so;—it only shows how different you are from the Tâo. Be severe and strict, like the ruler of a state who does not selfishly bestow his favours. Be scrupulous, yet gentle, like the tutelary spirit of the land, when sacrifice is offered to him who does not bestow his blessing selfishly. Be large-minded like space, whose four terminating points are illimitable, and form no particular enclosures. Hold all things in your love, favouring and supporting none specially. This is called being without any local or partial regard; all things are equally regarded; there is no long or short among them.

‘There is no end or beginning to the Tâo. Things indeed die and are born, not reaching a perfect state which can be relied on. Now there is emptiness, and now fulness;—they do not continue in one form. The years cannot be reproduced; time

cannot be arrested. Decay and growth, fulness and emptiness, when they end, begin again. It is thus that we describe the method of great righteousness, and discourse about the principle pervading all things. The life of things is like the hurrying and galloping along of a horse. With every movement there is a change; with every moment there is an alteration. What should you be doing? what should you not be doing? You have only to be allowing this course of natural transformation to be going on.'

7. The earl of the Ho said, 'What then is there so valuable in the Táo?' Zo of the Northern Sea replied, 'He who knows the Táo is sure to be well acquainted with the principles (that appear in the procedures of things). Acquainted with (those) principles, he is sure to understand how to regulate his conduct in all varying circumstances. Having that understanding, he will not allow things to injure himself. Fire cannot burn him who is (so) perfect in virtue, nor water drown him; neither cold nor heat can affect him injuriously; neither bird nor beast can hurt him. This does not mean that he is indifferent to these things; it means that he discriminates between where he may safely rest and where he will be in peril; that he is tranquil equally in calamity and happiness; that he is careful what he avoids and what he approaches;—so that nothing can injure him. Hence it is said, "What is heavenly is internal; what is human is external." The virtue (of man) is in what is Heavenly. If you know the operation of what is Heavenly and what is Human, you will have your root in what is Heavenly and your position in Virtue. You will bend or stretch

(only) after the (necessary) hesitation; you will have returned to the essential, and may be pronounced to have reached perfection.'

'What do you mean,' pursued the earl, 'by the Heavenly, and by the Human?' Zo replied, 'Oxen and horses have four feet;—that is what I call their Heavenly (constitution). When horses' heads are haltered, and the noses of oxen are pierced, that is what I call (the doing of) Man. Hence it is said, "Do not by the Human (doing) extinguish the Heavenly (constitution); do not for your (Human) purpose extinguish the appointment (of Heaven); do not bury your (proper) fame in (such) a pursuit of it; carefully guard (the Way) and do not lose it:—this is what I call reverting to your True (Nature)."'

8. The khwei¹ desires to be like² the millipede¹; the millipede to be like the serpent; the serpent like the wind; the wind to be like the eye; and the eye to be like the mind³.

The khwei said to the millipede, 'With my one leg I hop about, and can hardly manage to go along. Now you have a myriad feet which you can employ; how is it that you are so abundantly furnished?' The millipede said, 'It is not so. Have you not seen one ejecting saliva? The largest portion of it is like a pearl, while the smaller portions fall down like a shower of mist in innumer-

¹ The khwei is 'a sort of dragon (it may be, a worm) with one foot.' The hsien has many feet; one account calls it 'a centipede.'

² Such is the meaning of the lin or lien. The best commentators explain it by hsien (羨), 'to covet and desire.'

³ Compare Book I, par. 3, towards the end.

able drops. Now I put in motion the springs set in me by Heaven, without knowing how I do so.'

The millipede said to the serpent, 'I go along by means of my multitude of feet; and yet how is it that I do not go so fast as you who have no feet at all?' The serpent replied, 'How can the method of moving by the springs set in us by Heaven be changed? How could I make use of feet?'

The serpent said to the wind, 'I get along by moving my backbone and ribs, thus appearing to have some (bodily) means of progression. But now you, Sir, rise with a blustering force in the North Sea, and go on in the same way to the South Sea;—seemingly without any such means. How does it take place?' The wind said, 'Yes. With such a blustering force I rise in the North Sea and go on to the South Sea. But you can point to me, and therein are superior to me, as you are also in treading on me. Yet notwithstanding, it is only I who can break great trees, and blow down great houses. Therefore he whom all that are small cannot overcome is a great overcomer. But it is only he who is the sagely man¹ that is the Great Conqueror (of all).'

9. When Confucius was travelling in Khwang²,

¹ The sagely man is 'the True man,' who embodies the Táo. The Táo has given to the khwei, the millipede, the serpent, and it may be said also to the wind, their means of progression and action. Nothing is said of the eye and the mind;—it was not necessary to dwell on the Táo in them.

² See Confucian Analects, IX, v and XI, xxii. Our author's account of this event is his own, constructed by him to convey his own Táoistic lessons.

some people of Sung (once) surrounded him (with a hostile intention) several ranks deep; but he kept singing to his lute without stopping. 3ze-lû came in, and saw him, and said, 'How is it, Master, that you are so pleased?' Confucius said, 'Come here, and I will tell you. I have tried to avoid being reduced to such a strait for a long time; and that I have not escaped shows that it was so appointed for me. I have sought to find a ruler that would employ me for a long time, and that I have not found one, shows the character of the time. Under Yâo and Shun there was no one in the kingdom reduced to straits like mine; and it was not by their sagacity that men succeeded as they did. Under Kieh and Kâu no (good and able man) in the kingdom found his way to employment; and it was not for (want of) sagacity that they failed to do so. It was simply owing to the times and their character.

'People that do business on the water do not shrink from meeting iguanodons and dragons;—that is the courage of fishermen. Those who do business on land do not shrink from meeting rhinoceroses and tigers;—that is the courage of hunters. When men see the sharp weapons crossed before them, and look on death as going home;—that is the courage of the determined soldier. When he knows that his strait is determined for him, and that the employment of him by a ruler depends on the character of the time, and then meeting with great distress is yet not afraid;—that is the courage of the sagely man. Wait, my good Yû, and you will see what there is determined for me in my lot.' A little afterwards, the leader of the armed men approached and took his leave, saying, 'We thought you were

Yang Hû¹, and therefore surrounded you. Now we see our mistake.' (With this) he begged to take his leave, and withdrew.

10. Kung-sun Lung² asked Mâu of Wei³, saying, 'When I was young, I learned the teachings of the former kings; and when I was grown up, I became proficient in the practice of benevolence and righteousness. I brought together the views that agreed and disagreed; I considered the questions about hardness and whiteness⁴; I set forth what was to be affirmed and what was not, and what was allowable and what was not; I studied painfully the various schools of thought, and made myself master of the reasonings of all their masters. I thought that I had reached a good understanding of every subject; but now that I have heard the words of Kwang-ze, they throw me into a flutter of surprise. I do not know whether it be that I do not come up to him in the power of discussion, or that my knowledge is not equal to his. But now I do not feel able to open my mouth, and venture to ask you what course I should pursue.' Kung-ze Mâu leant forward on his stool, drew a long breath, looked up to heaven, smiled, and

¹ No doubt the Yang Ho of Analects XVII, i.

² The grandson (Kung-sun) of one of the rulers of K'iao (one of the three states into which the great state of Jin had been broken up). He has come down to us as a philosophic sophist, whose views it is not easy to define. See Mayers's Manual, p. 288, and Book XXXIII, par. 7.

³ Wei was another of the divisions of Jin, and Mâu was one of the sons of its ruler at this time, a great admirer, evidently, of Kwang-ze, and more than a match for the sophist Lung.

⁴ Holding, it is supposed, that 'the attributes of material objects, such as hardness and colour, are separate existences:'—so Mayers, after Wylie.

said, ' Have you not heard of the frog of the dilapidated well, and how it said to the turtle of the Eastern Sea, " How I enjoy myself ? I leap upon the parapet of this well. I enter, and having by means of the projections formed by the fragments of the broken tiles of the lining proceeded to the water, I draw my legs together, keep my chin up, (and strike out). When I have got to the mud, I dive till my feet are lost in it. Then turning round, I see that of the shrimps, crabs, and tadpoles there is not one that can do like me. Moreover, when one has entire command of all the water in the gully, and hesitates to go forward, it is the greatest pleasure to enjoy one's self here in this dilapidated well ¹ ;—why do not you, Master, often come and enter, and see it for yourself ? " The turtle of the Eastern Sea (was then proceeding to go forward), but before he had put in his left foot, he found his right knee caught and held fast. On this he hesitated, drew back, and told (the frog) all about the sea, saying, " A distance of a thousand li is not sufficient to express its extent, nor would (a line of) eight thousand cubits be equal to sound its depth. In the time of Yü, for nine years out of ten the flooded land (all drained into it), and its water was not sensibly increased ; and in the time of Thang for seven years out of eight there was a drought, but the rocks on the shore (saw) no diminution of the water because of it. Thus it is that no change is produced in its waters by any cause operating for a short time or a long, and that they do not advance nor recede for any addition or subtraction, whether great or small ; and this is the great pleasure afforded by the Eastern Sea." When

¹ A passage difficult to construe.

the frog of the dilapidated well heard this, he was amazed and terror-struck, and lost himself in surprise.

‘And moreover, when you, who have not wisdom enough to know where the discussions about what is right and what is wrong should end, still desire to see through the words of *Kwang-ze*, that is like employing a mosquito to carry a mountain on its back, or a millipede¹ to gallop as fast as the Ho runs;—tasks to which both the insects are sure to be unequal. Still further, when you, who have not wisdom enough to know the words employed in discussing very mysterious subjects, yet hasten to show your sharpness of speech on any occasion that may occur, is not this being like the frog of the dilapidated well?

‘And that (*Kwang-ze*) now plants his foot on the Yellow Springs (below the earth), and anon rises to the height of the Empyrean. Without any regard to south and north, with freedom he launches out in every direction, and is lost in the unfathomable. Without any regard to east and west, starting from what is abysmally obscure, he comes back to what is grandly intelligible. (All the while), you, Sir, in amazement, search for his views to examine them, and grope among them for matter for discussion;—this is just like peeping at the heavens through a tube, or aiming at the earth with an awl; are not both the implements too small for the purpose? Go your ways, Sir.

‘And have you not heard of the young learners of

¹ A different character from that for a millipede in the last paragraph;—a Shang *K'ü*, evidently some small insect, but we cannot tell what.

Shâu-ling¹, and how they did in Han-tan? Before they had acquired what they might have done in that capital, they had forgotten what they had learned to do in their old city, and were marched back to it on their hands and knees. If now you do not go away, you will forget your old acquirements, and fail in your profession.'

Kung-sun Lung gaped on the speaker, and could not shut his mouth, and his tongue clave to its roof. He slunk away and ran off.

11. *Kwang-ze* was (once) fishing in the river *Phû*², when the king of *Khû*³ sent two great officers to him, with the message, 'I wish to trouble you with the charge of all within my territories.' *Kwang-ze* kept on holding his rod without looking round, and said, 'I have heard that in *Khû* there is a spirit-like tortoise-shell, the wearer of which died 3000 years ago⁴, and which the king keeps, in his ancestral temple, in a hamper covered with a cloth. Was it better for the tortoise to die, and leave its shell to be thus honoured? Or would it have been better for it to live, and keep on dragging its tail through the mud?' The two officers said, 'It would have been better for it to live, and draw its tail after it over the mud⁵.' 'Go your ways. I will keep on drawing my tail after me through the mud.'

¹ A city of *Káo*, as Han-tan was its capital. Of the incident referred to, I have not been able to learn anything. The 'were marched' gives my idea of what it may have been.

² A river, which still gives its name to *Phû-kâu*, department *Khao-kâu*, Shan-tung.

³ Probably king Wei, B. C. 339-330.

⁴ A good antiquity for *Khû*!

⁵ ? A species of *Testudo* *Serpentina*, such as is often seen on pieces of Japanese lacquer-ware.

12. Hui-ze being a minister of state in Liang¹, Kwang-ze went to see him. Some one had told Hui-ze that Kwang-ze was come with a wish to supersede him in his office, on which he was afraid, and instituted a search for the stranger all over the kingdom for three days and three nights. (After this) Kwang-ze went and saw him, and said, 'There is in the south a bird, called "the Young Phoenix";'—do you know it? Starting from the South Sea, it flies to the Northern; never resting but on the bignonia³, never eating but the fruit of the melia azederach⁴, and never drinking but from the purest springs. An owl, which had got a putrid rat, (once), when a phoenix went passing overhead, looked up to it and gave an angry scream. Do you wish now, in your possession of the kingdom of Liang, to frighten me with a similar scream?'

13. Kwang-ze and Hui-ze were walking on the dam over the Hào⁵, when the former said, 'These thryssas come out, and play about at their ease;—that is the enjoyment of fishes.' The other said, 'You are not a fish; how do you know what

¹ Another name for Wei, so called from its capital;—in the present department of Khâi-făng.

² So the critics explain the name. Williams thinks the bird may be 'the argus pheasant,' or 'a variety of the peacock.' But what the bird was does not affect the meaning of our author's reference to it.

³ One of the Eleococcae, the *Dryandra Cordifolia* of Thunberg.

⁴ All the editions I have seen give 練 here, which makes no sense. The character should doubtless be 棟, with the meaning which I have given; and not 'bamboo,' which is found in the critics. It is also called 'the Pride of India.'

⁵ A river in the department and district of Fung-yang, An-hui.

constitutes the enjoyment of fishes¹?' *Kwang-ze* rejoined, 'You are not I. How do you know that I do not know what constitutes the enjoyment of fishes?' *Hui-ze* said, 'I am not you; and though indeed I do not fully know you, you certainly are not a fish, and (the argument) is complete against your knowing what constitutes the happiness of fishes.' *Kwang-ze* replied, 'Let us keep to your original question. You said to me, "How do you know what constitutes the enjoyment of fishes?" You knew that I knew it, and yet you put your question to me;—well, I know it (from our enjoying ourselves together) over the Hào.'

¹ Surely a captious question. We infer the feelings of other creatures from their demonstrations.

CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlevi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.	
	I Class.	II Class.									
		III Class.									
Gutturales.											
1 Tenuis	k	. . .	. . .	क	𐬕	𐬎	𐬎	𐬎	𐬎	𐬎	k
2 " aspirata	kh	. . .	. . .	ख	𐬖	𐬏	𐬏	𐬏	𐬏	𐬏	kh
3 Media	g	. . .	. . .	ग	𐬗	𐬐	𐬐	𐬐	𐬐	𐬐	. . .
4 " aspirata	gh	. . .	. . .	घ	𐬘	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	. . .
5 Gutturo-labialis	q	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
6 Nasalis	ñ (ng)	. . .	. . .	ङ	{ 3 (ng) 𐬙 (N) 𐬛 (ṣhv)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
7 Spiritus asper	h	. . .	. . .	ह	. . .	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	h, hs
8 " lenis	,	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	. . .
9 " asper faucalis	'h	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	. . .
10 " lenis faucalis	'h	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	𐬟	𐬟	. . .
11 " asper fricatus	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
12 " lenis fricatus	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)											
13 Tenuis	. . .	. . .	. . .	च	𐬚	𐬛	𐬛	. . .	. . .	. . .	k
14 " aspirata	. . .	. . .	. . .	छ	. . .	. . .	𐬛	. . .	. . .	. . .	kh
15 Media	. . .	. . .	. . .	ज	𐬛	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	g
16 " aspirata	. . .	. . .	. . .	झ	. . .	. . .	𐬛	. . .	. . .	. . .	gh
17 " Nasalis	. . .	. . .	. . .	ञ	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	ñ

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.				Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlevi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.								
18 Semivocalis	y				य	𐬨	𐬨	ي	ي	י	y
19 Spiritus asper		(y')									
20 " lenis		(y)									
21 " asper assibilatus		s			श	𐬯	𐬯	س	س	ש	z
22 " lenis assibilatus		z									
Dentales.											
23 Tennis	t				त	𐬌	𐬌	ت	ت	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th				थ	𐬎	𐬎	ث	ث	ת	th
25 " assibilata	d		TH		द	𐬔	𐬔	د	د	ד	
26 Media	dh				ध	𐬕	𐬕	ذ	ذ	ז	
27 " aspirata											
28 " assibilata			DH								
29 Nasalis	n				न	𐬨	𐬨	ن	ن	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l				ल	𐬌	𐬌	ل	ل	ל	l
31 " mollis 1		l									
32 " mollis 2			L								
33 Spiritus asper 1	s				स	𐬱	𐬱	س	س	ס	s
34 " asper 2			s (s)								
35 " lenis	z							ز	ز	ז	z
36 " asperrimus 1			z (z)								zh

Dentales modificatae (linguales, &c.)		Labiales.	
38 Tenuis	t	38 Tenuis	p
39 „ aspirata	th	39 „ aspirata	ph
40 Media	d	40 Media	b
41 „ aspirata	dh	41 „ aspirata	bh
42 Nasalis	n	42 Tenuissima	m
43 Semivocalis	r	43 Nasalis	w
44 „ fricata	r	44 Semivocalis	hw
45 „ diacritica	R	45 „ aspirata	f
46 Spiritus asper	sh	46 Spiritus asper	v
47 „ lenis	zh	47 „ lenis	m
		48 Tenuis	h
		49 „ aspirata	
		50 Media	
		51 „ aspirata	
		52 Tenuissima	
		53 Nasalis	
		54 Semivocalis	
		55 „ aspirata	
		56 Spiritus asper	
		57 „ lenis	
		58 Anusvāta	
		59 Visarga	

VOVELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlevi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.		III Class.							
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	0			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ě			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
3 " labialis	ö			...	...	fin.	...	...	...	...
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
5 " longa	ā	(a)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
6 Palatalis brevis	i			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
7 " longa	ī	(i)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
8 Dentalis brevis	h			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
9 " longa	h̄			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
10 Lingualis brevis	ri			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
11 " longa	rī			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
12 Labialis brevis	u			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
13 " longa	ū	(u)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 " longa	é (ai)	(e)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	ái	(ai)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
17 " "	ei (ēi)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
18 " "	oi (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20 " longa	ó (au)	(o)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	áu	(au)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
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23 " "	ou (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
24 Gutturalis fracta	ä			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Labialis fracta	ü			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ö			...	...	...	...	...	...	...



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THE
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THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

TRANSLATED

BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MÜLLER

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THE
SACRED BOOKS OF CHINA

THE TEXTS OF TÂOISM

TRANSLATED BY
JAMES LEGGE

PART II
THE WRITINGS OF KWANG-3ZE
BOOKS XVIII—XXXIII
THE THÂI-SHANG TRACTATE OF ACTIONS
AND THEIR RETRIBUTIONS
APPENDIXES I-VIII

Oxford
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
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THE TEXTS OF TÂOISM.

BOOK XVIII.

PART II. SECTION XI.

K'ih Lo, or 'Perfect Enjoyment'¹.

1. Under the sky is perfect enjoyment to be found or not? Are there any who can preserve themselves alive or not? If there be, what do they do? What do they maintain? What do they avoid? What do they attend to? Where do they resort to? Where do they keep from? What do they delight in? What do they dislike?

What the world honours is riches, dignities, longevity, and being deemed able. What it delights in is rest for the body, rich flavours, fine garments, beautiful colours, and pleasant music. What it looks down on are poverty and mean condition, short life and being deemed feeble². What men consider bitter experiences are that their bodies do not get rest and ease, that their mouths do not get food of rich flavour, that their persons are not finely clothed, that their eyes do not see beautiful colours, and that their ears do not listen to pleasant music. If they do not

¹ See vol. xxxix, pp. 149, 150.

² Of riches, dignities, longevity, and their opposites, enough is said, while the other two qualities are lightly passed over, and referred to only in connexion with 'meritorious officers.' I can only understand them as in the translation.

get these things, they are very sorrowful, and go on to be troubled with fears. Their thoughts are all about the body ;—are they not silly ?

Now the rich embitter their lives by their incessant labours ; they accumulate more wealth than they can use :—while they act thus for the body, they make it external to themselves¹. Those who seek for honours carry their pursuit of them from the day into the night, full of anxiety about their methods whether they are skilful or not :—while they act thus for the body they treat it as if it were indifferent to them². The birth of man is at the same time the birth of his sorrow ; and if he live long he becomes more and more stupid, and the longer is his anxiety that he may not die ; how great is his bitterness !—while he thus acts for his body, it is for a distant result. Meritorious officers are regarded by the world as good ; but (their goodness) is not sufficient to keep their persons alive. I do not know whether the goodness ascribed to them be really good or really not good. If indeed it be considered good, it is not sufficient to preserve their persons alive ; if it be deemed not good, it is sufficient to preserve other men alive. Hence it is said, ‘ When faithful remonstrances are not listened to, (the remonstrant) should sit still, let (his ruler) take his course, and not strive with him.’ Therefore when ʒze-hsü³ strove with (his ruler), he brought on him-

¹ If they did not do so, they would be content when they had enough.

² Wishing to attach it more closely to them.

³ Wû ʒze-hsü, the scourge of Kʒû ; and who perished miserably at last, when the king of Wû would no longer listen to his remonstrances ;—in about B. C. 475.

self the mutilation of his body. If he had not so striven, he would not have acquired his fame :—was such (goodness) really good or was it not ?

As to what the common people now do, and what they find their enjoyment in, I do not know whether the enjoyment be really enjoyment or really not. I see them in their pursuit of it following after all their aims as if with the determination of death, and as if they could not stop in their course ; but what they call enjoyment would not be so to me, while yet I do not say that there is no enjoyment in it. Is there indeed such enjoyment, or is there not ? I consider doing nothing (to obtain it) to be the great enjoyment¹, while ordinarily people consider it to be a great evil. Hence it is said, ' Perfect enjoyment is to be without enjoyment ; the highest praise is to be without praise². ' The right and the wrong (on this point of enjoyment) cannot indeed be determined according to (the view of) the world ; nevertheless, this doing nothing (to obtain it) may determine the right and the wrong. Since perfect enjoyment is (held to be) the keeping the body alive, it is only by this doing nothing that that end is likely to be secured. Allow me to try and explain this (more fully) :—Heaven does nothing, and thence comes its serenity ; Earth does nothing, and thence comes its rest. By the union of these two inactivities, all things are produced. How vast and imperceptible is the process !—they seem to come from

¹ This is the secret of the Táo.

² The last member of this sentence is the reading adopted by Wú K'ang towards the conclusion of the thirty-ninth chapter of the Táo Teh King, instead of the common 致數車無車.

nowhere! How imperceptible and vast!—there is no visible image of it! All things in all their variety grow from this Inaction. Hence it is said, ‘Heaven and Earth do nothing, and yet there is nothing that they do not do¹.’ But what man is there that can attain to this inaction?

2. When *K'wang-tze's* wife died, *Hui-tze* went to condole with him, and, finding him squatted on the ground, drumming on the basin², and singing, said to him, ‘When a wife has lived with her husband, and brought up children, and then dies in her old age, not to wail for her is enough. When you go on to drum on this basin and sing, is it not an excessive (and strange) demonstration?’ *K'wang-tze* replied, ‘It is not so. When she first died, was it possible for me to be singular and not affected by the event? But I reflected on the commencement of her being³. She had not yet been born to life; not only had she no life, but she had no bodily form; not only had she no bodily form, but she had no breath. During the intermingling of the waste and dark chaos³, there ensued a change, and there was breath; another change, and there was the bodily form; another change, and there came birth

¹ Compare similar statements in the *T'ao Teh King*, ch. 48, et al.

² The basin or tub, not ‘a basin.’ The reference is, no doubt, to the basin of ice put down near or under the couch on which the body was laid. I suppose that *K'wang-tze* was squatting so as to have this between his legs.

³ Is the writer referring to the primal creation as we may call it, or development of things out of the chaos, or to some analogous process at the birth of his wife? However that be, birth and death appear to him to be merely changes of the same kind in the perpetual process of evolution.

and life. There is now a change again, and she is dead. The relation between these things is like the procession of the four seasons from spring to autumn, from winter to summer. There now she lies with her face up, sleeping in the Great Chamber¹; and if I were to fall sobbing and going on to wail for her, I should think that I did not understand what was appointed (for all). I therefore restrained myself²!'

3. Mr. Deformed³ and Mr. One-foot³ were looking at the mound-graves of the departed in the wild of Khwăn-lun, where Hwang-Ti had entered into his rest. Suddenly a tumour began to grow on their left wrists, which made them look distressed as if they disliked it. The former said to the other, 'Do

¹ Between heaven and earth.

² Was it necessary he should fall singing to his drumming on the basin? But I subjoin a note here, suggested by the paragraph, which might have found, perhaps, a more appropriate place in the notice of this Book in vol. xxxix, pp. 149, 150.

In Sir John F. Davis' 'Description of the Empire of China and its Inhabitants (edition of 1857),' vol. ii, pp. 74-90, we have the amusing story of 'The Philosopher and his Wife.' The philosopher is Kwang-3ze, who plays the part of a magician; and of his wife it might be said, 'Frailty! thy name is woman!' Sir John Davis says, 'The story was translated into French by Père d'Entrecolles, and supplied the materials of Voltaire's *Zadig*.' I have not met in Chinese with Father d'Entrecolles' original. All of *Zadig* which can be supposed to have been borrowed from his translator is only a few sentences. The whole story is inconsistent with the account in paragraph 2 of the death of Kwang-3ze's wife, and with all which we learn from his writings of his character.

³ We know nothing of these parties but what we are told here. They are called Shû, meaning 'uncle,' often equivalent in China to our 'Mr.' The lesson taught by them is that of submission to pain and death as merely phenomena in the sphere of change. For the phraseology of their names, see Bk. III, par. 3, and Bk. IV, par. 8.

you dread it?' 'No,' replied he, 'why should I dread it? Life is a borrowed thing. The living frame thus borrowed is but so much dust. Life and death are like day and night. And you and I were looking at (the graves of) those who have undergone their change. If my change is coming to me, why should I dislike it?'

4. When *Kwang-ze* went to *K'ü*, he saw an empty skull, bleached indeed, but still retaining its shape. Tapping it with his horse-switch, he asked it, saying, 'Did you, Sir, in your greed of life, fail in the lessons of reason, and come to this? Or did you do so, in the service of a perishing state, by the punishment of the axe? Or was it through your evil conduct, reflecting disgrace on your parents and on your wife and children? Or was it through your hard endurances of cold and hunger? Or was it that you had completed your term of life?'

Having given expression to these questions, he took up the skull, and made a pillow of it when he went to sleep. At midnight the skull appeared to him in a dream, and said, 'What you said to me was after the fashion of an orator. All your words were about the entanglements of men in their lifetime. There are none of those things after death. Would you like to hear me, Sir, tell you about death?' 'I should,' said *Kwang-ze*, and the skull resumed: 'In death there are not (the distinctions of) ruler above and minister below. There are none of the phenomena of the four seasons. Tranquil and at ease, our years are those of heaven and earth. No king in his court has greater enjoyment than we have.' *Kwang-ze* did not believe it, and said, 'If I

could get the Ruler of our Destiny¹ to restore your body to life with its bones and flesh and skin, and to give you back your father and mother, your wife and children, and all your village acquaintances, would you wish me to do so?' The skull stared fixedly at him, knitted its brows, and said, 'How should I cast away the enjoyment of my royal court, and undertake again the toils of life among mankind?'

5. When Yen Yüan went eastwards to *K'hi*, Confucius wore a look of sorrow². *Ze-kung* left his mat, and asked him, saying, 'Your humble disciple ventures to ask how it is that the going eastwards of Hui to *K'hi* has given you such a look of sadness.' Confucius said, 'Your question is good. Formerly *Kwan-ze*³ used words of which I very much approve. He said, "A small bag cannot be made to contain what is large; a short rope cannot be used to draw water from a deep well³." So it is, and man's appointed lot is definitely determined, and his body is adapted for definite ends, so that neither the one nor the other can be augmented or diminished. I am afraid that Hui will talk with the marquis of *K'hi* about the ways of *Hwang-Ti*, *Yáo*, and *Shun*, and go on to relate the words of *Sui-zǎn* and *Shǎn Nǎng*. The marquis will seek (for the correspondence of what he is told) in himself; and, not finding

¹ I suppose the *Táo*; but none of the commentators, so far as I have seen, say anything about the expression.

² Compare the long discourse of Confucius with Yen Hui, on the latter's proposing to go to Wei, in Bk. IV.

³ *Kwan Í-wú* or *Kwan Kung*, the chief minister of duke Hwan of *K'hi*, whom he is supposed to have in view in his 'small bag and short rope.'

it there, will suspect the speaker; and that speaker, being suspected, will be put to death. And have you not heard this?—Formerly a sea-bird alighted in the suburban country of Lû¹. The marquis went out to meet it, (brought it) to the ancestral temple, and prepared to banquet it there. The *Kiû-shão*² was performed to afford it music; an ox, a sheep, and a pig were killed to supply the food. The bird, however, looked at everything with dim eyes, and was very sad. It did not venture to eat a single bit of flesh, nor to drink a single cupful; and in three days it died.

‘The marquis was trying to nourish the bird with what he used for himself, and not with the nourishment proper for a bird. They who would nourish birds as they ought to be nourished should let them perch in the deep forests, or roam over sandy plains; float on the rivers and lakes; feed on the eels and small fish; wing their flight in regular order and then stop; and be free and at ease in their resting-places. It was a distress to that bird to hear men speak; what did it care for all the noise and hubbub made about it? If the music of the *Kiû-shão*³ or the *Hsien-k’ih*⁴ were performed in the wild of the Thung-thing⁴ lake, birds would fly away, and beasts would run off when they heard it, and fishes would dive down to the bottom of the water; while men, when they hear it, would come all round to-

¹ Perhaps another and more ridiculous version of the story told in ‘the Narratives of the States,’ II, i, art. 7.

² The name of Shun’s music;—see the *Shû* (in vol. iii), par. 2.

³ Called also *Tâ Shão*, in Book XXXIII, par. 2.

⁴ Hwang-Ti’s music;—see Bk. XIV, par. 3.—But the genuineness of the whole paragraph is called in question.

gether, and look on. Fishes live and men die in the water. They are different in constitution, and therefore differ in their likes and dislikes. Hence it was that the ancient sages did not require (from all) the same ability, nor demand the same performances. They gave names according to the reality of what was done, and gave their approbation where it was specially suitable. This was what was called the method of universal adaptation and of sure success.'

6. Lieh-ze (once) upon a journey took a meal by the road-side. There he saw a skull a hundred years old, and, pulling away the bush (under which it lay), he pointed to it and said, 'It is only you and I who know that you are not dead, and that (aforetime) you were not alive. Do you indeed really find (in death) the nourishment (which you like)? Do I really find (in life my proper) enjoyment? The seeds (of things) are multitudinous and minute. On the surface of the water they form a membranous texture. When they reach to where the land and water join they become the (lichens which we call the) clothes of frogs and oysters. Coming to life on mounds and heights, they become the plantain; and, receiving manure, appear as crows' feet. The roots of the crow's foot become grubs, and its leaves, butterflies. This butterfly, known by the name of *hsü*, is changed into an insect, and comes to life under a furnace. Then it has the form of a moth, and is named the *k'ü-to*. The *k'ü-to* after a thousand days becomes a bird, called the *kan-yü-kü*. Its saliva becomes the *s'e-mí*, and this again the *shih-hsí* (or pickle-eater). The *í-lo* is produced from the pickle-eater; the *hwang-kwang* from the

kiû-yû; the mâu-zui from the pû-khwan. The ying-hsî uniting with a bamboo, which has long ceased to put forth sprouts, produces the *kking*-ning; the *kking*-ning, the panther; the panther, the horse; and the horse, the man. Man then again enters into the great Machinery (of Evolution), from which all things come forth (at birth), and which they enter at death¹.

¹ A much larger paragraph from which this must have been abbreviated, or which must have been enlarged from this, is found in the first Book of Lieh-tze's works (pp. 4, 5). In no Buddhist treatise is the transrotation of births more fully, and, I must add, absurdly stated.

BOOK XIX.

PART II. SECTION XII.

Tā Shǎng, or 'The Full Understanding of Life'¹.

1. He who understands the conditions of Life does not strive after what is of no use to life; and he who understands the conditions of Destiny does not strive after what is beyond the reach of knowledge. In nourishing the body it is necessary to have beforehand the things (appropriate to its support)²; but there are cases where there is a superabundance of such things, and yet the body is not nourished³. In order to have life it is necessary that it do not have left the body; but there are cases when the body has not been left by it, and yet the life has perished³.

When life comes, it cannot be declined; when it goes, it cannot be detained. Alas! the men of the world think that to nourish the body is sufficient to preserve life; and when such nourishment is not sufficient to preserve the life, what can be done in the world that will be sufficient? Though (all that men can do) will be insufficient, yet there are things which they feel they ought to do, and they do not try to avoid doing them. For those who wish to

¹ See vol. xxxix, pp. 150, 151.

² Wealth will supply abundantly the things that are necessary and fit for the nourishment of the body, but sudden death may render them unavailing.

³ That is, the higher life of the spirit has perished.

avoid caring for the body, their best plan is to abandon the world. Abandoning the world, they are free from its entanglements. Free from its entanglements, their (minds) are correct and their (temperament) is equable. Thus correct and equable, they succeed in securing a renewal of life, as some have done¹. In securing a renewal of life, they are not far from the True (Secret of their being). But how is it sufficient to abandon worldly affairs? and how is it sufficient to forget the (business of) life? Through the renouncing of (worldly) affairs, the body has no more toil; through forgetting the (business of) life, the vital power suffers no diminution. When the body is completed and the vital power is restored (to its original vigour), the man is one with Heaven. Heaven and Earth are the father and mother of all things. It is by their union that the body is formed; it is by their separation that a (new) beginning is brought about. When the body and vital power suffer no diminution, we have what may be called the transference of power. From the vital force there comes another more vital, and man returns to be the assistant of Heaven.

2. My master² Lieh-*ŕze*² asked Yin, (the warden) of the gate², saying, 'The perfect man walks under

¹ I think I have caught the meaning. The phrase signifying 'the renewal of life' has been used to translate 'being born again' in John's Gospel, ch. 3.

² We find here Lieh-*ŕze* (whose name has already occurred several times) in communication with the warden Yin, who was a contemporary of Láo-*ŕze*, and we must refer him therefore to the sixth century B. C. He could not therefore be contemporary with our author, and yet the three characters of the text mean 'My Master, Lieh-*ŕze*;' and the whole of the paragraph is found in Lieh-*ŕze*'s second Book (4^a-5^a) with a good many variants in the text.

water without encountering any obstruction, treads on fire without being burned, and walks on high above all things without any fear; let me ask how he attains to do this¹?' The warden Yin replied, 'It is by his keeping of the pure breath (of life); it is not to be described as an achievement of his skill or daring. Sit down, and I will explain it to you. Whatever has form, semblance, sound, and colour is a thing; how can one thing come to be different from another? But it is not competent for any of these things to reach to what preceded them all;—they are but (form and) visibility. But (the perfect man) attains to be (as it were) without form, and beyond the capability of being transformed. Now when one attains to this and carries it out to the highest degree, how can other things come into his way to stop him? He will occupy the place assigned to him without going beyond it, and lie concealed in the clue which has no end. He will study with delight the process which gives their beginning and ending to all things. By gathering his nature into a unity, by nourishing his vital power, by concentrating his virtue, he will penetrate to the making of things. In this condition, with his heavenly constitution kept entire, and with no crevice in his spirit, how can things enter (and disturb his serenity)?

'Take the case of a drunken man falling from his carriage;—though he may suffer injury, he will not

The gate was at the passage leading from the Royal Domain of those days into the great feudal territory of Jin;—from the north-west of the present province of Ho-nan into Shen-hsi.

¹ Lieh-ze puts an absurd question to the warden, which is replied to at length, and unsatisfactorily. We need not discuss either the question or the answer in this place.

die. His bones and joints are the same as those of other men, but the injury which he receives is different:—his spirit is entire. He knew nothing about his getting into the carriage, and knew nothing about his falling from it. The thought of death or life, or of any alarm or affright, does not enter his breast; and therefore he encounters danger without any shrinking from it. Completely under the influence of the liquor he has drunk, it is thus with him;—how much more would it be so, if he were under the influence of his Heavenly constitution! The sagely man is kept hid in his Heavenly constitution, and therefore nothing can injure him.

‘A man in the pursuit of vengeance would not break the (sword) *Mo-yê* or *Yü-kiang* (which had done the deed); nor would one, however easily made wrathful, wreak his resentment on the fallen brick. In this way all under heaven there would be peace, without the disorder of assaults and fighting, without the punishments of death and slaughter:—such would be the issue of the course (which I have described). If the disposition that is of human origin be not developed, but that which is the gift of Heaven, the development of the latter will produce goodness, while that of the former would produce hurt. If the latter were not wearied of, and the former not slighted, the people would be brought nearly to their True nature.’

3. When *Kung-nî* was on his way to *K'ü*, as he issued from a forest, he saw a hunchback receiving cicadas (on the point of a rod), as if he were picking them up with his hand¹. ‘You are clever!’ said he

¹ This paragraph is also found with variations in *Lieh-ze*,

to the man. 'Is there any method in it?' The hunchback replied, 'There is. For five or six months, I practised with two pellets, till they never fell down, and then I only failed with a small fraction¹ of the cicadas (which I tried to catch). Having succeeded in the same way with three (pellets), I missed only one cicada in ten. Having succeeded with five, I caught the cicadas as if I were gathering them. My body is to me no more than the stump of a broken trunk, and my shoulder no more than the branch of a rotten tree. Great as heaven and earth are, and multitudinous as things are, I take no notice of them, but only of the wings of my cicadas; neither turning nor inclining to one side. I would not for them all exchange the wings of my cicadas;—how should I not succeed in taking them?' Confucius looked round, and said to his disciples, "Where the will is not diverted from its object, the spirit is concentrated;"—this might have been spoken of this hunchback gentleman.'

4. Yen Yüan asked *Kung-ní*, saying, 'When I was crossing the gulf of *Khang-shǎn*², the ferryman handled the boat like a spirit. I asked him whether such management of a boat could be learned, and he replied, "It may. Good swimmers can learn it quickly; but as for divers, without having seen a boat, they can manage it at once." He did not

Bk. II (9^a). The dexterity of the hunchback in catching the cicadas will remind some readers of the account given by the butcher in Book III of his dexterity in cutting up his oxen.

¹ The names of two small weights, used anciently for 'a fraction,' 'a small proportion.'

² This is another paragraph common both to our author and *Lieh-ze*, but in neither is there any intimation of the place.

directly tell me what I asked ;—I venture to ask you what he meant.' *Kung-ni* replied, 'Good swimmers acquire the ability quickly ;—they forget the water (and its dangers). As to those who are able to dive, and without having seen a boat are able to manage it at once, they look on the watery gulf as if it were a hill-side, and the upsetting of a boat as the going back of a carriage. Such upsets and goings back have occurred before them multitudes of times, and have not seriously affected their minds. Wherever they go, they feel at ease on their occurrence.

'He who is contending for a piece of earthenware puts forth all his skill¹. If the prize be a buckle of brass, he shoots timorously ; if it be for an article of gold, he shoots as if he were blind. The skill of the archer is the same in all the cases ; but (in the two latter cases) he is under the influence of solicitude, and looks on the external prize as most important. All who attach importance to what is external show stupidity in themselves.'

5. *Thien Khâi-êih*² was having an interview with duke Wei of *Kâu*², who said to him, 'I have heard that (your master) *Kû Hsin*² has studied the subject of Life. What have you, good Sir, heard from him about it in your intercourse with him?' *Thien Khâi-êih* replied, 'In my waiting on him in the courtyard with my broom, what should I have heard from my master?' Duke Wei said, 'Do not put the question off, Mr. *Thien* ; I wish to hear what

¹ I think this is the meaning. 注 is defined by 射而賭物, 'to compete for anything by archery.'

² We have no information about who these personages and the others below were, and I have missed the story, if it be in *Lieh-tze*. The duke, it will be seen, had the appanage of *Kâu*.

you have to say.' Khâi-ñih then replied, 'I have heard my master say that they who skilfully nourish their life are like shepherds, who whip up the sheep that they see lagging behind¹.' 'What did he mean?' asked the duke. The reply was, 'In Lû there was a Shan Pão, who lived among the rocks, and drank only water. He would not share with the people in their toils and the benefits springing from them; and though he was now in his seventieth year, he had still the complexion of a child. Unfortunately he encountered a hungry tiger, which killed and ate him. There was also a Kang Î, who hung up a screen at his lofty door, and to whom all the people hurried (to pay their respects)². In his fortieth year, he fell ill of a fever and died. (Of these two men), Pão nourished his inner man, and a tiger ate his outer; while Î nourished his outer man, and disease attacked his inner. Both of them neglected whipping up their lagging sheep.'

Kung-nî said, 'A man should not retire and hide himself; he should not push forward and display himself; he should be like the decayed tree which stands in the centre of the ground. Where these three conditions are fulfilled, the name will reach its greatest height. When people fear the dangers of a path, if one man in ten be killed, then fathers and sons, elder brothers and younger, warn one another that they must not go out on a journey without a large number of retainers;—and is it not a mark of wisdom to do so? But there are dangers which

¹ Pay more attention to any part of their culture which they are neglecting.

² It served its purpose there, but had not been put in its place with any special object.

men incur on the mats of their beds, and in eating and drinking ; and when no warning is given against them ;—is it not a mark of error¹ ?

6. The officer of Prayer² in his dark and square-cut robes goes to the pig-pen, and thus counsels the pigs, 'Why should you shrink from dying? I will for three months feed you on grain. Then for ten days I will fast, and keep vigil for three days, after which I will put down the mats of white grass, and lay your shoulders and rumps on the carved stand ;—will not this suit you?' If he had spoken from the standpoint of the pigs, he would have said, 'The better plan will be to feed us with our bran and chaff, and leave us in our pen.' When consulting for himself, he preferred to enjoy, while he lived, his carriage and cap of office, and after death to be borne to the grave on the ornamented carriage, with the canopy over his coffin. Consulting for the pigs, he did not think of these things, but for himself he would have chosen them. Why did he think so differently (for himself and) for the pigs³?

7. (Once), when duke Hwan⁴ was hunting by a marsh, with Kwan Kung⁵ driving the carriage, he saw a ghost. Laying his hand on that of Kwan

¹ This may seem to nourish the body, but in reality injures the life.

² Who had the charge also of the sacrifices.

³ Lin Hsi-kung says that the story shows the many troubles that arise from not renouncing the world. Ensnared by the world, men sacrifice for it their higher life, and are not so wise as pigs are for their life. The short paragraph bristles with difficulties.

⁴ The first of the leading chieftains among the princes ; B. C. 683-642.

⁵ His chief minister.

Kung, he said to him, 'Do you see anything, Father Kung?' 'Your servant sees nothing,' was the reply. The duke then returned, talking incoherently and becoming ill, so that for several days he did not go out. Among the officers of *K'hi* there was a Hwang-ze Kào-ão¹, who said to the duke, 'Your Grace is injuring yourself; how could a ghost injure you? When a paroxysm of irritation is dispersed, and the breath does not return (to the body), what remains in the body is not sufficient for its wants. When it ascends and does not descend, the patient becomes accessible to gusts of anger. When it descends and does not ascend, he loses his memory of things. When it neither ascends nor descends, but remains about the heart in the centre of the body, it makes him ill.' The duke said, 'Yes, but are there ghostly sprites²?' The officer replied, 'There are. About mountain tarns there is the *Lî*; about furnaces, the *K'ieh*; about the dust-heaps inside the door, the *Lei*-thing. In low-lying places in the north-east, the *Pei*-a and *Wa-lung* leap about, and in similar places in the north-west there dwells the *Yî*-yang. About rivers there is the *Wang*-hsiang; about mounds, the *Hsin*; about hills, the *Khwei*; about wilds, the *Fang*-hwang; about marshes, the *Wei*-tho.' 'Let me ask what is the *Wei*-tho like?' asked the duke. Hwang-ze said, 'It is the size of the

¹ An officer introduced here for the occasion, by surname Hwang, and designation Kào-ão. The 3ze simply = Mr.

² The commentators have a deal to say about the folklore of the various sprites mentioned. 'The whole shows that ghostly sprites are the fruit of a disordered mind.' It is a touch of nature that the prince recovers as soon as he knows that the ghost he had seen was of good presage.

nave of a chariot wheel, and the length of the shaft. It wears a purple robe and a red cap. It dislikes the rumbling noise of chariot wheels, and, when it hears it, it puts both its hands to its head and stands up. He who sees it is likely to become the leader of all the other princes.' Duke Hwan burst out laughing and said, 'This was what I saw.' On this he put his robes and cap to rights, and made Hwang-ze sit with him. Before the day was done, his illness was quite gone, he knew not how.

8. *K'î* Hsing-ze was rearing a fighting-cock for the king¹. Being asked after ten days if the bird were ready, he said, 'Not yet; he is still vain and quarrelsome, and relies on his own vigour.' Being asked the same after other ten days, he said, 'Not yet; he still responds to the crow and the appearance of another bird.' After ten days more, he replied, 'Not yet. He still looks angrily, and is full of spirit.' When a fourth ten days had passed, he replied to the question, 'Nearly so. Though another cock crows, it makes no change in him. To look at him, you would say he was a cock of wood. His quality is complete. No other cock will dare to meet him, but will run from him.'

9. Confucius was looking at the cataract near the gorge of Lü², which fell a height of 240 cubits, and

¹ According to the Lieh-ze version of this story (Bk. II, 17^b), the king was king Hsüan, B.C. 827-782. The trainer's rule seems to have been that his bird should meet its antagonist, with all its vigour complete and undisturbed, and not wishing to fight.

² I think that there are two versions of this story in Lieh-ze. In Bk. VIII (4^b, 5^a), it appears that Confucius was on his way from Wei to Lû, when he stopped his carriage or cart at this spot to view the cataract, and the incident occurred, and he took the opportunity to give the lesson to his disciples.

the spray of which floated a distance of forty li, (producing a turbulence) in which no tortoise, gavia, fish, or turtle could play. He saw, however, an old man swimming about in it, as if he had sustained some great calamity, and wished to end his life. Confucius made his disciples hasten along the stream to rescue the man; and by the time they had gone several hundred paces, he was walking along singing, with his hair dishevelled, and enjoying himself at the foot of the embankment. Confucius followed and asked him, saying, 'I thought you were a sprite; but, when I look closely at you, I see that you are a man. Let me ask if you have any particular way of treading the water.' The man said, 'No, I have no particular way. I began (to learn the art) at the very earliest time; as I grew up, it became my nature to practise it; and my success in it is now as sure as fate. I enter and go down with the water in the very centre of its whirl, and come up again with it when it whirls the other way. I follow the way of the water, and do nothing contrary to it of myself;—this is how I tread it.' Confucius said, 'What do you mean by saying that you began to learn the art at the very earliest time; that as you grew up, it became your nature to practise it, and that your success in it now is as sure as fate?' The man replied, 'I was born among these hills and lived contented among them;—that was why I say that I have trod this water from my earliest time. I grew up by it, and have been happy treading it;—that is why I said that to tread it had become natural to me. I know not how I do it, and yet I do it;—that is why I say that my success is as sure as fate.'

10. *K'ing*, the Worker in Rottlera¹ wood, carved a bell-stand², and when it was completed, all who saw it were astonished as if it were the work of spirits. The marquis of Lû went to see it, and asked by what art he had succeeded in producing it. 'Your subject is but a mechanic,' was the reply; 'what art should I be possessed of? Nevertheless, there is one thing (which I will mention). When your servant had undertaken to make the bell-stand, I did not venture to waste any of my power, and felt it necessary to fast in order to compose my mind. After fasting for three days, I did not presume to think of any congratulation, reward, rank, or emolument (which I might obtain by the execution of my task); after fasting five days, I did not presume to think of the condemnation or commendation (which it would produce), or of the skill or want of skill (which it might display). At the end of the seven days, I had forgotten all about myself;—my four limbs and my whole person. By this time the thought of your Grace's court (for which I was to make the thing) had passed away; everything that could divert my mind from exclusive devotion to the exercise of my skill had disappeared. Then I went into the forest, and looked at the natural forms of the trees. When I saw one of a perfect form, then the figure of the bell-stand rose up to my view, and I applied my hand to the work. Had

¹ The *3ze* or *rottlera* was and is a very famous tree, called 'the king of trees,' from its stately appearance and the excellence of its timber.

² The 'bell-stand' is celebrated in the *Shih King*, III, i, Ode 8. A complete peal consisted of twelve bells, suspended in two tiers one above the other.

I not met with such a tree, I must have abandoned the object; but my Heaven-given faculty and the Heaven-given qualities of the wood were concentrated on it. So it was that my spirit was thus engaged in the production of the bell-stand.'

11. Tung-yê *Kî*¹ was introduced to duke *Kwang*² to exhibit his driving. His horses went forwards and backwards with the straightness of a line, and wheeled to the right and the left with the exactness of a circle. The duke thought that the lines and circles could not be surpassed if they were woven with silken strings, and told him to make a hundred circuits on the same lines. On the road Yen Ho³ met the equipage, and on entering (the palace), and seeing the duke, he said, '*Kî*'s horses will break down,' but the duke was silent, and gave him no reply. After a little the horses did come back, having broken down; and the duke then said, 'How did you know that it would be so?' Yen Ho said, 'The horses were exhausted, and he was still urging them on. It was this which made me say that they would break down.'

12. The artisan Shui⁴ made things round (and square) more exactly than if he had used the circle

¹ *Kî* would be the name of the charioteer, a gentleman of Lû, called Tung-yê, 'eastern country,' I suppose from the situation of his estate.

² Duke *Kwang* would be the marquis Thung of Lû, B.C. 693-662.

³ Yen Ho was probably the chief of the Yen family at the time. A scion of it, Yen Hui, afterwards became the favourite disciple of Confucius. He could hardly be the same Yen Ho who is mentioned in Bk. IV, par. 5. *Kî* has had, and still has, his representatives in every country.

⁴ Shui is mentioned in the Shû King, V, xxii, 19, as a famous maker of arrows. Some carry him back to the time of Shun.

and square. The operation of his fingers on (the forms of) things was like the transformations of them (in nature), and required no application of his mind; and so his Intelligence¹ was entire and encountered no resistance.

13. To be unthought of by the foot that wears it is the fitness of a shoe; to be unthought of by the waist is the fitness of a girdle. When one's wisdom does not think of the right or the wrong (of a question under discussion), that shows the suitability of the mind (for the question); when one is conscious of no inward change, or outward attraction, that shows the mastery of affairs. He who perceives at once the fitness, and never loses the sense of it, has the fitness that forgets all about what is fitting.

14. There was a Sun Hsiù² who went to the door of 3ze-pien *K'ing-ze*, and said to him in a strange perturbed way, 'When I lived in my village, no one took notice of me, but all said that I did not cultivate (my fields); in a time of trouble and attack, no one took notice of me, but all said that I had no courage. But that I did not cultivate my fields, was really because I never met with a good year; and that I did not do service for our ruler, was because I did not meet with the suitable opportunity to do so. I have been sent about my business by the villagers, and am driven away by the registrars of the district;—what is my crime? O Heaven! how is it that I have met with such a fate?'

¹ Literally, 'Tower of Intelligence,'—a Táoistic name for the mind.

² A weakling, of whom we know only what we read here.

Pien-ze¹ said to him, 'Have you not heard how the perfect man deals with himself? He forgets that he has a liver and gall. He takes no thought of his ears and eyes. He seems lost and aimless beyond the dust and dirt of the world, and enjoys himself at ease in occupations untroubled by the affairs of business. He may be described as acting and yet not relying on what he does, as being superior and yet not using his superiority to exercise any control. But now you would make a display of your wisdom to astonish the ignorant; you would cultivate your person to make the inferiority of others more apparent; you seek to shine as if you were carrying the sun and moon in your hands. That you are complete in your bodily frame, and possess all its nine openings; that you have not met with any calamity in the middle of your course, such as deafness, blindness, or lameness, and can still take your place as a man among other men;—in all this you are fortunate. What leisure have you to murmur against Heaven? Go away, Sir.'

Sun-ze on this went out, and Pien-ze went inside. Having sitten down, after a little time he looked up to heaven, and sighed. His disciples asked him why he sighed, and he said to them, 'Hsiû came to me a little while ago, and I told him the characteristics of the perfect man. I am afraid he will be frightened, and get into a state of perplexity.' His disciples said, 'Not so. If what he said was right, and what you

¹ This must have been a man of more note. We find him here with a school of disciples in his house, and sought out for counsel by men like Sun Hsiû.

said was wrong, the wrong will certainly not be able to perplex the right. If what he said was wrong, and what you said was right, it was just because he was perplexed that he came to you. What was your fault in dealing with him as you did?' Pien-ze said, 'Not so. Formerly a bird came, and took up its seat in the suburbs of Lû¹. The ruler of Lû was pleased with it, and provided an ox, a sheep, and a pig to feast it, causing also the Kîû-sháo to be performed to delight it. But the bird began to be sad, looked dazed, and did not venture to eat or drink. This was what is called "Nourishing a bird, as you would nourish yourself." He who would nourish a bird as a bird should be nourished should let it perch in a deep forest, or let it float on a river or lake, or let it find its food naturally and undisturbed on the level dry ground. Now Hsiû (came to me), a man of slender intelligence, and slight information, and I told him of the characteristics of the perfect man, it was like using a carriage and horses to convey a mouse, or trying to delight a quail with the music of bells and drums;—could the creatures help being frightened?'

¹ Compare par. 5, Bk. XVIII.

BOOK XX.

PART II. SECTION XIII.

Shan Mû, or 'The Tree on the Mountain'.¹

1. *Kwang-ze* was walking on a mountain, when he saw a great tree² with huge branches and luxuriant foliage. A wood-cutter was resting by its side, but he would not touch it, and, when asked the reason, said, that it was of no use for anything. *Kwang-ze* then said to his disciples, 'This tree, because its wood is good for nothing, will succeed in living out its natural term of years.' Having left the mountain, the Master lodged in the house of an old friend, who was glad to see him, and ordered his waiting-lad to kill a goose and boil it. The lad said, 'One of our geese can cackle, and the other cannot;—which of them shall I kill?' The host said, 'Kill the one that cannot cackle.'

Next day, his disciples asked *Kwang-ze*, saying, 'Yesterday the tree on the mountain (you said) would live out its years because of the uselessness of its wood, and now our host's goose has died because of its want of power (to cackle);—which of these conditions, Master, would you prefer to be in?' *Kwang-ze* laughed and said, '(If I said that) I would prefer to be in a position between being fit to be useful and wanting that fitness, that would

¹ See vol. xxxix, p. 151.

² Compare the accounts of great trees in I, par.6; IV, par.1; et al.

seem to be the right position, but it would not be so, for it would not put me beyond being involved in trouble; whereas one who takes his seat on the Táo and its Attributes, and there finds his ease and enjoyment, is not exposed to such a contingency. He is above the reach both of praise and of detraction; now he (mounts aloft) like a dragon, now he (keeps beneath) like a snake; he is transformed with the (changing) character of the time, and is not willing to addict himself to any one thing; now in a high position and now in a low, he is in harmony with all his surroundings; he enjoys himself at ease with the Author of all things¹; he treats things as things, and is not a thing to them:—where is his liability to be involved in trouble? This was the method of Shǎn Nǎng and Hwang-Ti. As to those who occupy themselves with the qualities of things, and with the teaching and practice of the human relations, it is not so with them. Union brings on separation; success, overthrow; sharp corners, the use of the file; honour, critical remarks; active exertion, failure; wisdom, scheming; inferiority, being despised:—where is the possibility of unchangeableness in any of these conditions? Remember this, my disciples. Let your abode be here,—in the Táo and its Attributes².

2. Í-liáo³, an officer of Shih-nan³, having an in-

¹ The Táo; called 衆父父, in Bk. XII, par. 5.

² But after all it comes to be the same thing in point of fact with those who ground themselves in the Táo, and with others.

³ The Í-liáo here was a scion of the ruling House of K'ü, and is mentioned fortunately in the Supplement to the 30-*hwan*, under the very year in which Confucius died (B. C. 479). His residence was in the south of the 'Market Place' of the city where he lived,

terview with the marquis of Lû¹, found him looking sad, and asked him why he was so. The marquis said, 'I have studied the ways of the former kings, and cultivated the inheritance left me by my predecessors. I reverence the spirits of the departed and honour the men of worth, doing this with personal devotion, and without the slightest intermission. Notwithstanding, I do not avoid meeting with calamity, and this it is which makes me sad.' The officer said, 'The arts by which you try to remove calamity are shallow. Think of the close-furred fox and of the elegantly-spotted leopard. They lodge in the forests on the hills, and lurk in their holes among the rocks;—keeping still. At night they go about, and during day remain in their lairs;—so cautious are they. Even if they are suffering from hunger, thirst, and other distresses, they still keep aloof from men, seeking their food about the *Kiang* and the *Ho*;—so resolute are they. Still they are not able to escape the danger of the net or the trap; and what fault is it of theirs? It is their skins which occasion them the calamity.

'And is not the state of Lû your lordship's skin? I wish your lordship to rip your skin from your body, to cleanse your heart, to put away your desires, and to enjoy yourself where you will be

which is the meaning of the *Shih-nan* in the text. The description of his character is that no offer of gain could win him, and no threatening terrify him. We find him here at the court of Lû in friendly conference with the marquis, and trying to persuade him to adopt the ways of *Táoism*, which he presents to him under the figure of an allegory, an utopia called 'the State of Established Virtue,' in the south of *Yüeh*.

¹ Probably known to us as 'duke *Âi*.'

without the presence of any one. In the southern state of Yüeh, there is a district called "the State of Established Virtue." The people are ignorant and simple; their object is to minimise the thought of self and make their desires few; they labour but do not lay up their gains; they give but do not seek for any return; they do not know what righteousness is required of them in any particular case, nor by what ceremonies their performances should be signalised; acting in a wild and eccentric way as if they were mad, they yet keep to the grand rules of conduct. Their birth is an occasion for joy; their death is followed by the rites of burial. I should wish your lordship to leave your state; to give up your ordinary ways, and to proceed to that country by the directest course.'

The ruler said, 'The way to it is distant and difficult; there are rivers and hills; and as I have neither boat nor carriage, how am I to go?' The officer from Shih-nan rejoined, 'If your lordship abjure your personal state, and give up your wish to remain here, that will serve you for a carriage.' The ruler rejoined, 'The way to it is solitary and distant, and there are no people on it;—whom shall I have as my companions? I have no provisions prepared, and how shall I get food?—how shall I be able to get (to the country)?' The officer said, 'Minimise your lordship's expenditure, and make your wants few, and though you have no provisions prepared, you will find you have enough. Wade through the rivers and float along on the sea, where however you look, you see not the shore, and, the farther you go, you do not see where your journey is to end;—those who escorted you to the shore will

return, and after that you will feel yourself far away. Thus it is that he who owns men (as their ruler) is involved in troubles, and he who is owned by men (as their ruler) suffers from sadness; and hence Yâo would neither own men, nor be owned by them. I wish to remove your trouble, and take away your sadness, and it is only (to be done by inducing you) to enjoy yourself with the Tâo in the land of Great Vacuity.

‘If a man is crossing a river in a boat, and another empty vessel comes into collision with it, even though he be a man of a choleric temper, he will not be angry with it. If there be a person, however, in that boat, he will bawl out to him to haul out of the way. If his shout be not heard, he will repeat it; and if the other do not then hear, he will call out a third time, following up the shout with abusive terms. Formerly he was not angry, but now he is; formerly (he thought) the boat was empty, but now there is a person in it. If a man can empty himself of himself, during his time in the world, who can harm him?’

3. Pei-kung Shê¹ was collecting taxes for duke Ling of Wei, to be employed in making (a peal of) bells. (In connexion with the work) he built an altar outside the gate of the suburban wall; and in three months the bells were completed, even to the suspending of the upper and lower (tiers). The king's son *K'ing-ki*² saw them, and asked what

¹ Pei-kung, ‘Northern Palace,’ must have been the name of Shê's residence, and appears here as if it were his surname.

² A son, probably of king K'ing of K'âu (B.C. 544-529).—On the whole paragraph, see par. 10 of the preceding Book.

arts he had employed in the making of them. Shê replied, 'Besides my undivided attention to them, I did not venture to use any arts. I have heard the saying, "After all the carving and the chiselling, let the object be to return to simplicity." I was as a child who has no knowledge; I was extraordinarily slow and hesitating; they grew like the springing plants of themselves. In escorting those who went and meeting those who came, my object was neither to hinder the comers nor detain the goers. I suffered those who strongly opposed to take their way, and accepted those who did their best to come to terms. I allowed them all to do the utmost they could, and in this way morning and evening I collected the taxes. I did not have the slightest trouble, and how much more will this be the case with those who pursue the Great Way (on a grand scale)!'

4. Confucius was kept (by his enemies) in a state of siege between *K'zăn* and *Zhâi*¹, and for seven days had no food cooked with fire to eat. The *Thâi-kung Zân*² went to condole with him, and said, 'You had nearly met with your death.' 'Yes,' was the reply. 'Do you dislike death?' 'I do.' Then *Zân* continued, 'Let me try and describe a way by which (such a) death may be avoided.—In the eastern sea there are birds which go by the name of *Î-ts*³; they fly low and slowly as if they were deficient in power. They fly as if they were

¹ Compare *Analects* XI, ii.

² We might translate *Thâi-kung* by 'the grand-duke.' We know nothing about him. He tries to convert Confucius to Tâoism just as *Î-liáo* does the marquis of *Lû* in par. 2; and for a time at least, as *K'wang-ze* makes it appear, with more success.

³ Were these *Î-ts* swallows? So some of the critics say.

leading and assisting one another, and they press on one another when they roost. No one ventures to take the lead in going forward, or to be the last in going backwards. In eating no one ventures to take the first mouthful, but prefers the fragments left by others. In this way (the breaks in) their line are not many¹, and men outside them cannot harm them, so that they escape injury.

‘The straight tree is the first to be cut down; the well of sweet water is the first to be exhausted. Your aim is to embellish your wisdom so as to startle the ignorant, and to cultivate your person to show the unsightliness of others. A light shines around you as if you were carrying with you the sun and moon, and thus it is that you do not escape such calamity. Formerly I heard a highly accomplished man say, “Those who boast have no merit. The merit which is deemed complete will begin to decay. The fame which is deemed complete will begin to wane.” Who can rid himself of (the ideas of) merit and fame, and return and put himself on the level of the masses of men? The practice of the Táo flows abroad, but its master does not care to dwell where it can be seen; his attainments in it hold their course, but he does not wish to appear in its display. Always simple and commonplace, he may seem to be bereft of reason. He obliterates the traces of his action, gives up position and power, and aims not at merit and fame. Therefore he does not censure men, and men do not censure him. The perfect man does not seek to be heard of; how is it that you delight in doing so?’

¹ A clause of uncertain meaning.

Confucius said, 'Excellent ;' and thereupon he took leave of his associates, forsook his disciples, retired to the neighbourhood of a great marsh, wore skins and hair cloth, and ate acorns and chestnuts. He went among animals without causing any confusion among their herds, and among birds without troubling their movements. Birds and beasts did not dislike him ; how much less would men do so !

5. Confucius asked 3ze-sang Hû¹, saying, 'I was twice driven from Lû ; the tree was felled over me in Sung ; I was obliged to disappear from Wei ; I was reduced to extreme distress in Shang and Kâu² ; and I was kept in a state of siege between K'ăn and 3hâi. I have encountered these various calamities ; my intimate associates are removed from me more and more ; my followers and friends are more and more dispersed ;—why have all these things befallen me ?' 3ze-sang Hû replied, 'Have you not heard of the flight of Lin Hui of K'ia³ ;—how he abandoned his round jade symbol of rank, worth a thousand pieces of silver, and hurried away with his infant son on his back ? If it be asked, "Was it because of the market value of the child ?" But that value was small (compared with the value of the jade token). If it be asked again, "Was it because of the troubles

¹ Supposed to have been a recluse.

² I do not know the particulars of this distress in Shang and Kâu, or have forgotten them. A still more full recital of the sage's misfortunes occurs in Lieh-ze, VII, 8^a.

³ The text here appears to be somewhat confused. Lin Hui is said to have been a man of the Yin dynasty, and of a state which was called K'ia, and for the verification of such a state I have searched in vain. The explanation of his conduct put here into his mouth is very good.

(of his office)?" But the child would occasion him much more trouble. Why was it then that, abandoning the jade token, worth a thousand pieces of silver, he hurried away with the child on his back? Lin Hui (himself) said, "The union between me and the token rested on the ground of gain; that between me and the child was of Heaven's appointment." Where the bond of union is its profitableness, when the pressure of poverty, calamity, distress, and injury come, the parties abandon one another; when it is of Heaven's appointment, they hold in the same circumstances to one another. Now between abandoning one another, and holding to one another, the difference is great. Moreover, the intercourse of superior men is tasteless as water, while that of mean men is sweet as new wine. But the tastelessness of the superior men leads on to affection, and the sweetness of the mean men to aversion. The union which originates without any cause will end in separation without any cause.'

Confucius said, 'I have reverently received your instructions.' And hereupon, with a slow step and an assumed air of ease, he returned to his own house. There he made an end of studying and put away his books. His disciples came no more to make their bow to him (and be taught), but their affection for him increased the more.

Another day Sang Hû said further to him, 'When Shun was about to die, he charged ¹ Yü, saying, 'Be

¹ The 真冷 of the text here are allowed on all hands to be spurious, and 其命 have been substituted for them. What follows, however, from Shun to Yü, is far from being clear, in itself, or in its connexion.

upon your guard. (The attraction of) the person is not like that of sympathy; the (power of) affection is not like the leading (of example). Where there is sympathy, there will not be separation; where there is (the leading of) example, there will be no toil. Where there is neither separation nor toil, you will not have to seek the decoration of forms to make the person attractive, and where there is no such need of those forms, there will certainly be none for external things.'

6. *Kwang-ze* in a patched dress of coarse cloth, and having his shoes tied together with strings, was passing by the king of Wei, who said to him, 'How great, Master, is your distress?' *Kwang-ze* replied, 'It is poverty, not distress! While a scholar possesses the Tâo and its Attributes, he cannot be going about in distress. Tattered clothes and shoes tied on the feet are the sign of poverty, and not of distress. This is what we call not meeting with the right time. Has your majesty not seen the climbing monkey? When he is among the plane trees, rottleras, oaks, and camphor trees, he grasps and twists their branches (into a screen), where he reigns quite at his ease, so that not even *Î*¹ or *Phăng Măng*¹ could spy him out. When, however, he finds himself among the prickly mulberry and date trees, and other thorns, he goes cautiously, casts sidelong glances, and takes every trembling movement with apprehension;—it is not that his sinews and bones

¹ *Î*;—see Book V, par. 2. *Phăng Măng* was a contemporary of *Î*, learned archery from him, and then slew him, that he might himself be the foremost archer in the kingdom;—see Mencius IV, ii, 24.

are straitened, and have lost their suppleness, but the situation is unsuitable for him, and he cannot display his agility. And now when I dwell under a benighted ruler, and seditious ministers, how is it possible for me not to be in distress? My case might afford an illustration of the cutting out the heart of Pî-kan¹!

7. When Confucius was reduced to great distress between *Khăn* and *Khài*, and for seven days he had no cooked food to eat, he laid hold of a decayed tree with his left hand, and with his right hand tapped it with a decayed branch, singing all the while the ode of Piáo-shih². He had his instrument, but the notes were not marked on it. There was a noise, but no blended melody. The sound of the wood and the voice of the man came together like the noise of the plough through the ground, yet suitably to the feelings of the disciples around. Yen Hui, who was standing upright, with his hands crossed on his breast, rolled his eyes round to observe him. Kung-ni, fearing that Hui would go to excess in manifesting how he honoured himself, or be plunged in sorrow through his love for him, said to him, 'Hui, not to receive (as evils) the inflictions of Heaven is easy; not to receive (as benefits) the favours of men is difficult. There is no beginning which was not an end. The Human and the Heavenly may be one

¹ 'A spurious paragraph, no doubt.' Lin Hsi-kung thus concludes what he has to say on this paragraph; but it is not without its interest and lessons.

² I do not know who this was, nor what his ode or air was. Lû Teh-ming read the character 焄, and says that Piáo-shih was one of the old royal Tîs who did nothing. In all my texts it is wrongly printed with three 火.

and the same. Who, for instance, is it that is now singing¹?’ Hui said, ‘I venture to ask how not to receive (as evils) the inflictions of Heaven is easy.’ Kung-nî said, ‘Hunger, thirst, cold, and heat, and having one’s progress entirely blocked up;—these are the doings of Heaven and Earth, necessary incidents in the revolutions of things. They are occurrences of which we say that we will pass on (composedly) along with them. The minister of another does not dare to refuse his commands; and if he who is discharging the duty of a minister feels it necessary to act thus, how much more should we wait with ease on the commands of Heaven²!’ ‘What do you mean by saying that not to receive (as benefits) the favours of men is difficult?’ Kung-nî said, ‘As soon as one is employed in office, he gets forward in all directions; rank and emolument come to him together, and without end. But these advantages do not come from one’s self;—it is my appointed lot to have such external good. The superior man is not a robber; the man of worth is no filcher;—if I prefer such things, what am I³? Hence it is said, “There is no bird wiser than the swallow.” Where its eye lights on a place that is not suitable for it, it does not give it a second glance. Though it may drop the food from its

¹ This question arose out of the previous statement that man and Heaven might be one,—acting with the same spontaneity.

² Confucius recognises here, as he often does, a power beyond his own, ‘his appointed lot,’ what we call destiny, to which the Tâo requires submission. This comes very near to our idea of God.

³ Human gifts had such an attraction, that they tended to take from man his heavenly spontaneity; and were to be eschewed, or received only with great caution.

mouth, it abandons it, and hurries off. It is afraid of men, and yet it stealthily takes up its dwelling by his; finding its protection in the altars of the Land and Grain ¹.

'What do you mean by saying that there is no beginning which was not an end?' *Kung-ni* said, 'The change—rise and dissolution—of all things (continually) goes on, but we do not know who it is that maintains and continues the process. How do we know when any one begins? How do we know when he will end? We have simply to wait for it, and nothing more ².'

'And what do you mean by saying that the Human and the Heavenly are one and the same?' *Kung-ni* said, 'Given man, and you have Heaven; given Heaven, and you still have Heaven (and nothing more). That man can not have Heaven is owing to the limitation of his nature ³. The sagely man quietly passes away with his body, and there is an end of it.'

8. As *Kwang Kâu* was rambling in the park of *Tiào-ling* ⁴ he saw a strange bird which came from the south. Its wings were seven cubits in width, and

¹ What is said here about the swallow is quite obscure. *Hsi-kung* says that all the old attempts to explain it are ridiculous, and then propounds an ingenious one of his own; but I will leave the passage with my reader to deal with it as he best can.

² Compare with this how in Book XVIII we find *Kwang-ze* singing by the dead body of his wife.

³ That man is man and not Heaven is simply from the limitation of his nature,—his 'appointed lot.'

⁴ *Tiào-ling* might be translated 'Eagle Mount.' Where it was I do not know; perhaps the name originated with *Kwang-ze*, and thus has become semi-historical.

its eyes were large, an inch in circuit. It touched the forehead of *Kâu* as it passed him, and lighted in a grove of chestnut trees. 'What bird is this?' said he, 'with such great wings not to go on! and with such large eyes not to see me!' He lifted up his skirts, and hurried with his cross-bow, waiting for (an opportunity to shoot) it. (Meanwhile) he saw a cicada, which had just alighted in a beautiful shady spot, and forgot its (care for its) body. (Just then), a preying mantis raised its feelers, and pounced on the cicada, in its eagerness for its prey, (also) forgetting (its care for) its body; while the strange bird took advantage of its opportunity to secure them both, in view of that gain forgetting its true (instinct of preservation)¹. *Kwang Kâu* with an emotion of pity, said, 'Ah! so it is that things bring evil on one another, each of these creatures invited its own calamity.' (With this) he put away his cross-bow, and was hurrying away back, when the forester pursued him with terms of reproach.

When he returned and went into his house, he did not appear in his courtyard² for three months². (When he came out), *Lan 3ü*³ (his disciple) asked him, saying, 'Master, why have you for this some time avoided the courtyard so much?' *Kwang-ze* replied, 'I was guarding my person, and forgot myself; I was looking at turbid water, till I

¹ *Kwang-ze* might now have shot the bird, but we like him the better for letting it alone.

² So then, masters of schools, like *Kwang-ze*, received and taught their disciples in the courtyard of their house;—in China as elsewhere. For three 'months,' it is conjectured, we should read three 'days.'

³ The disciple *Lan 3ü* appears here, but not, so far as I know, elsewhere.

mistook the clear pool. And moreover I have heard the Master say¹, "Going where certain customs prevail, you should follow those customs." I was walking about in the park of Tiáo-ling, and forgot myself. A strange bird brushed past my forehead, and went flying about in the grove of chestnuts, where it forgot the true (art of preserving itself). The forester of the chestnut grove thought that I was a fitting object for his reproach. These are the reasons why I have avoided the courtyard.'

9. Yang-3ze, having gone to Sung, passed the night in a lodging-house, the master of which had two concubines;—one beautiful, the other ugly². The ugly one was honoured, however, and the beautiful one contemned. Yang-3ze asked the reason, and a little boy of the house replied, 'The beauty knows her beauty, and we do not recognise it. The ugly one knows her ugliness, and we do not recognise it.' Yang-3ze said, 'Remember it, my disciples. Act virtuously, and put away the practice of priding yourselves on your virtue. If you do this, where can you go to that you will not be loved³?'

¹ Who was this 'Master?'

² The story here is found in Lieh-3ze II, 15^{a, b}. The Yang-3ze is there Yang K'ü, against whom Mencius so often directed his arguments.

³ See the greater part of this paragraph in Prémare's 'Notitia Linguae Sinicae,' p. 200, with his remarks on the style.

BOOK XXI.

PART II. SECTION XIV.

Thien 3ze-fang¹.

1. Thien 3ze-fang, sitting in attendance on the marquis Wăn of Wei², often quoted (with approbation) the words of *Khi* Kung³. The marquis said, 'Is *Khi* Kung your preceptor?' 3ze-fang replied, 'No. He only belongs to the same neighbourhood. In speaking about the Tâo, his views are often correct, and therefore I quote them as I do.' The marquis went on, 'Then have you no preceptor?' 'I have.' 'And who is he?' 'He is Tung-kwo Shun-ze⁴.' 'And why, my Master, have I never heard you quote his words?' 3ze-fang replied, 'He is a man who satisfies the true (ideal of humanity)⁵; a man in appearance, but (having the mind of) Heaven. Void of any thought of himself, he accommodates himself to others, and nourishes the true ideal that belongs to him. With all his purity, he is forbearing to others. Where they are without the Tâo, he rectifies his demeanour, so that they understand it, and in consequence their own ideas melt

¹ See vol. xxxix, pp. 151, 152.

² B.C. 424-387.

³ Some well-known worthy of Wei.

⁴ A greater worthy still. He must have lived near the outside suburban wall of the capital, and his residence became a sort of surname.

⁵ The Human and the Heavenly were blended in his personality.

away and disappear. How should one like me be fit to quote his words ?'

When 3ze-fang went out, the marquis Wăn continued in a state of dumb amazement all the day. He then called Lung Li-*khăn*, and said to him, 'How far removed from us is the superior man of complete virtue ! Formerly I thought the words of the sages and wise men, and the practice of benevolence and righteousness, to be the utmost we could reach to. Since I have heard about the preceptor of 3ze-fang, my body is all unstrung, and I do not wish to move, and my mouth is closed up, and I do not wish to speak ;—what I have learned has been only a counterfeit of the truth¹. Yes, (the possession of Wei) has been an entanglement to me.'

2. Wăn-po Hsüeh-ze², on his way to *Khî*, stayed some time in *Lû*, where some persons of the state begged to have an interview with him. He refused them, saying, 'I have heard that the superior men of these Middle States³ understand the (subjects of) ceremony and righteousness, but are deplorably ignorant of the minds of men. I do not wish to see them.' He went on to *Khî*; and on his way back (to the south), he again stayed in *Lû*, when the same persons begged as before for an interview. He then said, 'Formerly they asked to see me, and now again they seek an interview. They will afford me

¹ So the Khang-hsî dictionary defines the phrase ;—'a wooden image made of earth,' says *Lû Shû-kih*.

² A Tâoist of note from some region in the south, perhaps from *Khî*, having his own share of the Tâoistic contempt for knowledge and culture.

³ Probably *Lû* and the northern states grouped closely round the royal domain.

some opportunity of bringing out my sentiments.' He went out accordingly and saw the visitors, and came in again with a sigh. Next day the same thing occurred, and his servant said to him, 'How is it that whenever you see those visitors, you are sure to come in again sighing?' 'I told you before,' was the reply, 'that the people of these Middle States understand (the subjects of) ceremony and righteousness, but are deplorably ignorant of the minds of men. Those men who have just seen me, as they came in and went out would describe, one a circle and another a square, and in their easy carriage would be like, one a dragon and another a tiger. They remonstrated with me as sons (with their fathers), and laid down the way for me as fathers (for their sons). It was this which made me sigh.'

Kung-nî saw the man, but did not speak a word to him. *3ze-lû* said, 'You have wished, Sir, to see this *Wăn-po Hsüeh-ze* for a long time; what is the reason that when you have seen him, you have not spoken a word?' *Kung-nî* replied, 'As soon as my eyes lighted on that man, the *Tâo* in him was apparent. The situation did not admit of a word being spoken.'

3. *Yen Yüan* asked *Kung-nî*, saying, 'Master, when you pace quietly along, I also pace along; when you go more quickly, I also do the same; when you gallop, I also gallop; but when you race along and spurn the dust, then I can only stand and look, and keep behind you¹.' The Master said, 'Hui, what do you mean?' The reply was, 'In saying that "when you, Master, pace quietly along, I also pace

¹ They are both supposed to be on horseback.

along," I mean¹ that when you speak, I also speak. By saying, "When you go more quickly, I also do the same," I mean¹ that when you reason, I also reason. By saying, "When you gallop, I also gallop," I mean¹ that when you speak of the Way, I also speak of the Way; but by saying, "When you race along and spurn the dust, then I can only stare, and keep behind you," I am thinking how though you do not speak, yet all men believe you; though you are no partisan, yet all parties approve your catholicity; and though you sound no instrument, yet people all move on harmoniously before you, while (all the while) I do not know how all this comes about; and this is all which my words are intended to express².

Kung-ni said, 'But you must try and search the matter out. Of all causes for sorrow there is none so great as the death of the mind;—the death of man's (body) is only next to it. The sun comes forth in the east, and sets in the extreme west;—all things have their position determined by these two points. All that have eyes and feet wait for this (sun), and then proceed to do what they have to do. When this comes forth, they appear in their places; when it sets, they disappear. It is so with all things. They have that for which they wait, and (on its arrival) they die; they have that for which they wait, and then (again) they live. When once I receive my frame thus completed, I remain unchanged, awaiting the consummation of my course.

¹ In these three cases the 也 of the text should be 者.

² So Hui is made to represent the master as a mental Thaumaturgist, and Confucius is made to try to explain the whole thing to him;—but not to my mind successfully. Still a distinction is maintained between the mind and the body.

I move as acted on by things, day and night without cessation, and I do not know when I will come to an end. Clearly I am here a completed frame, and even one who (fancies that he) knows what is appointed cannot determine it beforehand. I am in this way daily passing on, but all day long I am communicating my views to you; and now, as we are shoulder to shoulder you fail (to understand me);—is it not matter for lamentation? You are able in a measure to set forth what I more clearly set forth; but that is passed away, and you look for it, as if it were still existing, just as if you were looking for a horse in the now empty place where it was formerly exhibited for sale. You have very much forgotten my service to you, and I have very much forgotten wherein I served you. But nevertheless why should you account this such an evil? What you forget is but my old self; that which cannot be forgotten remains with me.'

4. Confucius went to see Láo Tan, and arrived just as he had completed the bathing of his head, and was letting his dishevelled hair get dry. There he was, motionless, and as if there were not another man in the world¹. Confucius waited quietly; and, when in a little time he was introduced, he said, 'Were my eyes dazed? Is it really you? Just now, your body, Sir, was like the stump of a rotten tree. You looked as if you had no thought of anything, as if you had left the society of men, and were standing in the solitude (of yourself).' Láo Tan replied, 'I was enjoying myself in thinking about the commencement

¹ He was in the Táoistic trance, like Nan-kwo 3ze-~~hhi~~, at the beginning of the second Book.

of things¹. 'What do you mean?' 'My mind is so cramped, that I hardly know it; my tongue is so tied that I cannot tell it; but I will try to describe it to you as nearly as I can. When the state of Yin was perfect, all was cold and severe; when the state of Yang was perfect, all was turbulent and agitated. The coldness and severity came forth from Heaven; the turbulence and agitation issued from Earth. The two states communicating together, a harmony ensued and things were produced. Some one regulated and controlled this, but no one has seen his form. Decay and growth; fulness and emptiness; darkness and light; the changes of the sun and the transformations of the moon:—these are brought about from day to day; but no one sees the process of production. Life has its origin from which it springs, and death has its place from which it returns. Beginning and ending go on in mutual contrariety without any determinable commencement, and no one knows how either comes to an end. If we disallow all this, who originates and presides over all these phenomena?'

Confucius said, 'I beg to ask about your enjoyment in these thoughts.' Lâu Tan replied, 'The

¹ This 'commencement of things' was not the equivalent of 'our creation out of nothing,' for Lâu Tan immediately supposes the existence of the primary ether in its twofold state, as Yin and Yang; and also of Heaven and Earth, as a twofold Power working, under some regulation and control, yet invisible; that is, under the Táo. In the same way the process of beginning and ending, growth and decay, life and death go on, no one knows how, or how long. And the contemplation of all this is the cause of unceasing delight to the Perfect man, the possessor of the Táo. Death is a small matter, merely as a change of feature; and Confucius acknowledges his immeasurable inferiority to Lâu-3ze.

comprehension of this is the most admirable and the most enjoyable (of all acquisitions). The getting of the most admirable and the exercise of the thoughts in what is the most enjoyable, constitutes what we call the Perfect man.' Confucius said, 'I should like to hear the method of attaining to it.' The reply was, 'Grass-eating animals do not dislike to change their pastures; creatures born in the water do not dislike to change their waters. They make a small change, but do not lose what is the great and regular requirement (of their nature); joy, anger, sadness, and delight do not enter into their breasts (in connexion with such events). Now the space under the sky is occupied by all things in their unity. When they possess that unity and equally share it, then the four limbs and hundred members of their body are but so much dust and dirt, while death and life, their ending and beginning, are but as the succession of day and night, which cannot disturb their enjoyment; and how much less will they be troubled by gains and losses, by calamity and happiness! Those who renounce the paraphernalia of rank do it as if they were casting away so much mud;—they know that they are themselves more honourable than those paraphernalia. The honour belonging to one's self is not lost by any change (of condition). Moreover, a myriad transformations may take place before the end of them is reached. What is there in all this sufficient to trouble the mind? Those who have attained to the Tâo understand the subject.'

Confucius said, 'O Master, your virtue is equal to that of Heaven and Earth, and still I must borrow

(some of your) perfect words (to aid me) in the cultivation of my mind. Who among the superior men of antiquity could give such expression to them?' Lâo Tan replied, 'Not so. Look at the spring, the water of which rises and overflows;—it does nothing, but it naturally acts so. So with the perfect man and his virtue;—he does not cultivate it, and nothing evades its influence. He is like heaven which is high of itself, like earth which is solid of itself, like the sun and moon which shine of themselves;—what need is there to cultivate it?'

Confucius went out and reported the conversation to Yen Hui, saying, 'In the (knowledge of the) Tâo am I any better than an animalcule in vinegar? But for the Master's lifting the veil from me, I should not have known the grand perfection of Heaven and Earth.'

5. At an interview of *Kwang-ze* with duke Âi¹ of Lû, the duke said, 'There are many of the Learned class in Lû; but few of them can be compared with you, Sir.' *Kwang-ze* replied, 'There are few Learned men in Lû.' 'Everywhere in Lû,' rejoined the duke, 'you see men wearing the dress of the Learned²;—how can you say that they are few?' 'I have heard,' said *Kwang-ze*, 'that those of them who wear round caps know the times of heaven; that those who wear square shoes know the contour of the ground; and that those who saunter about with semicircular stones at their

¹ Duke Âi of Lû died in B.C. 468, a century and more before the birth of *Kwang-ze*. On that, as well as on other grounds, the paragraph cannot be genuine.

² Compare the thirty-eighth Book of the *Lî K'î*, where Confucius denies that there was any dress peculiar to the scholar,

girdle-pendants settle matters in dispute as they come before them. But superior men who are possessed of such knowledge will not be found wearing the dress, and it does not follow that those who wear the dress possess the knowledge. If your Grace think otherwise, why not issue a notification through the state, that it shall be a capital offence to wear the dress without possessing the knowledge.' On this the duke issued such a notification, and in five days, throughout all Lû, there was no one who dared to wear the dress of the Learned. There was only one old man who came and stood in it at the duke's gate. The duke instantly called him in, and questioned him about the affairs of the state, when he talked about a thousand points and ten thousand divergences from them. Kwang-ze said, 'When the state of Lû can thus produce but one man of the Learned class, can he be said to be many?'

6. The ideas of rank and emolument did not enter the mind of Pâi-lî Hsî¹, and so he became a cattle-feeder, and his cattle were all in fine condition. This made duke Mû of K'in forget the meanness of his position, and put the government (of his state) into his hands. Neither life nor death entered into the mind of (Shun), the Lord of Yü, and therefore he was able to influence others².

7. The ruler Yüan³ of Sung wishing to have a map

¹ Pâi-lî Hsî, a remarkable character of the seventh century B.C., who rose to be chief minister to Mû, the earl (or duke) of K'in, the last of the five Leading Princes of the kingdom. Mû died in B.C. 621. Mencius has much to say of Pâi-lî Hsî.

² Shun's parents wished to kill him; but that did not trouble his mind; his filial piety even affected them.

³ His first year as duke of Sung was B.C. 530. The point of the story is not clear.

drawn, the masters of the pencil all came (to undertake the task). Having received his instructions and made their bows, they stood, licking their pencils and preparing their ink. Half their number, however, remained outside. There was one who came late, with an air of indifference, and did not hurry forward. When he had received his instructions and made his bow, he did not keep standing, but proceeded to his shed. The duke sent a man to see him, and there he was, with his upper garment off, sitting cross-legged, and nearly naked. The ruler said, 'He is the man; he is a true draughtsman.'

8. King Wăn was (once) looking about him at 3ang¹, when he saw an old man fishing². But his fishing was no fishing. It was not the fishing of one whose business is fishing. He was always fishing (as if he had no object in the occupation). The king wished to raise him to office, and put the government into his hands, but was afraid that such a step would give dissatisfaction to his great ministers, his uncles, and cousins. He then wished to dismiss the man altogether from his mind, but he could not bear the thought that his people should be without (such a) Heaven (as their Protector). On this, (next) morning, he called together his great officers, and said to them, 'Last night, I dreamt that I saw a good man, with a dark complexion and a

¹ Where 3ang was cannot be told.

² The old fisherman here was, no doubt, the first marquis of *Khî*, after the establishment of the dynasty of *Kâu*, known by various names, as *Lü Shang*, *Thái-kung Wang*, and *Kiang 3ze-yâ*. He did much for the new rule, but his connexion with kings Wăn and Wû is a mass of fables. The fishing as if he were not fishing betokened in him the aimlessness of the *Tào*.

beard, riding on a piebald horse, one half of whose hoofs were red, who commanded me, saying, "Lodge your government in the hands of the old man of 3ang; and perhaps the evils of your people will be cured." The great officers said eagerly, 'It was the king, your father.' King Wăn said, 'Let us then submit the proposal to the tortoise-shell.' They replied, 'It is the order of your father. Let not your majesty think of any other. Why divine about it?' (The king) then met the old man of 3ang, and committed the government to him.

The statutes and laws were not changed by him; not a one-sided order (of his own) was issued; but when the king made a survey of the kingdom after three years, he found that the officers had destroyed the plantations (which harboured banditti), and dispersed their occupiers, that the superintendents of the official departments did not plume themselves on their successes, and that no unusual grain measures were allowed within the different states¹. When the officers had destroyed the dangerous plantations and dispersed their occupants, the highest value was set on the common interests; when the chiefs of departments did not plume themselves on their successes, the highest value was set on the common business; when unusual grain measures did not enter the different states, the different princes had no jealousies. On this king Wăn made the old man his Grand Preceptor, and asked him, with his own face to the north, whether his government might be extended to all the kingdom. The old

¹ That is, that all combinations formed to resist and warp the course of justice had been put an end to.

man looked perplexed and gave no reply, but with aimless look took his leave. In the morning he had issued his orders, and at night he had gone his way; nor was he heard of again all his life. Yen Yüan questioned Confucius, saying, 'Was even king Wăn unequal to determine his course? What had he to do with resorting to a dream?' Kung-nt replied, 'Be silent and do not say a word! King Wăn was complete in everything. What have you to do with criticising him? He only had recourse (to the dream) to meet a moment's difficulty.'

9. Lieh Yü-khâu was exhibiting his archery¹ to Po-hwăn Wû-zăn². Having drawn the bow to its full extent, with a cup of water placed on his elbow, he let fly. As the arrow was discharged, another was put in its place; and as that was sent off, a third was ready on the string. All the while he stood like a statue. Po-hwăn Wû-zăn said, 'That is the shooting of an archer, but not of one who shoots without thinking about his shooting. Let me go up with you to the top of a high mountain, treading with you among the tottering rocks, till we arrive at the brink of a precipice, 800 cubits deep, and (I will then see) if you can shoot.' On this they went up a high mountain, making their way among the tottering rocks, till they came to the brink of a precipice 800 cubits deep. Then Wû-zăn turned round and walked backwards, till his feet were two-

¹ This must be the meaning of the 爲, 'for.' The whole story is found in Lieh-ze, II, p. 5. From Lieh's Book VIII, p. 2, we learn that Lieh-ze's teacher in archery was Yin Hsî, the warden of the pass famous in the history of Láo-ze.

² Mentioned in Book V, par. 2.

thirds of their length outside the edge, and beckoned Yü-khâu to come forward. He, however, had fallen prostrate on the ground, with the sweat pouring down to his heels. Then the other said, 'The Perfect man looks up to the azure sky above, or dives down to the yellow springs beneath, or soars away to the eight ends of the universe, without any change coming over his spirit or his breath. But now the trepidation of your mind appears in your dazed eyes; your inward feeling of peril is extreme!'

10. *Kien Wû* asked *Sun-shû Âo*¹, saying, 'You, Sir, were thrice chief minister, and did not feel elated; you were thrice dismissed from that position, without manifesting any sorrow. At first I was in doubt about you, (but I am not now, since) I see how regularly and quietly the breath comes through your nostrils. How is it that you exercise your mind?' *Sun-shû Âo* replied, 'In what do I surpass other men? When the position came to me, I thought it should not be rejected; when it was taken away, I thought it could not be retained. I considered that the getting or losing it did not make me what I was, and was no occasion for any manifestation of sorrow;—that was all. In what did I surpass other men? And moreover, I did not know whether the honour of it belonged to the dignity, or to myself. If it belonged to the dignity, it was nothing to me; if it belonged to me, it had nothing

¹ *Sun-shû Âo*;—see *Mencius* VI, ii, 15. He was, no doubt, a good and able man, chief minister to king *Kwang* of *Khû*. The legends or edifying stories about him are many; but *Kwang-ze*, I think, is the author of his being thrice raised and thrice dismissed from office.

to do with the dignity. While occupied with these uncertainties, and looking round in all directions, what leisure had I to take knowledge of whether men honoured me or thought me mean ?'

Kung-nî heard of all this, and said, 'The True men of old could not be fully described by the wisest, nor be led into excess by the most beautiful, nor be forced by the most violent robber. Neither *Fû-hsi* nor *Hwang-Ti* could compel them to be their friends. Death and life are indeed great considerations, but they could make no change in their (true) self; and how much less could rank and emolument do so? Being such, their spirits might pass over the *Thâi* mountain and find it no obstacle to them¹; they might enter the greatest gulphs, and not be wet by them; they might occupy the lowest and smallest positions without being distressed by them. Theirs was the fulness of heaven and earth; the more that they gave to others, the more they had.'

The king of *K'û* and the ruler of *Fan*² were sitting together. After a little while, the attendants of the king said, 'Fan has been destroyed three times.' The ruler of Fan rejoined, 'The destruction of Fan has not been sufficient to destroy what we had that was most deserving to be preserved.' Now,

¹ It is difficult to see why this should be predicated of the 'spirits' of the True men.

² Fan was a small state, held at one time by descendants of the famous duke of *K'âu*;—see the *30 K'wan*, I, vii, 6; V, xxiv, 2. But we do not know what had been the relations between the powerful *K'û* and the feeble Fan, which gave rise to and could explain the remarks made at the entertainment, more honourable to Fan than to *K'û*.

if the destruction of Fan had not been sufficient to destroy that which it had most deserving to be preserved, the preservation of *Khû* had not been sufficient to preserve that in it most deserving to be preserved. Looking at the matter from this point of view, Fan had not begun to be destroyed, and *Khû* had not begun to be preserved.

BOOK XXII.

PART II. SECTION XV.

K'ih Pei Yü, or 'Knowledge Rambling in the North¹.'

1. Knowledge² had rambled northwards to the region of the Dark Water³, where he ascended the height of Imperceptible Slope³, when it happened that he met with Dumb Inaction². Knowledge addressed him, saying, 'I wish to ask you some questions:—By what process of thought and anxious consideration do we get to know the Táo? Where should we dwell and what should we do to find our rest in the Táo? From what point should we start and what path should we pursue to make the Táo our own?' He asked these three questions, but Dumb Inaction² gave him no reply. Not only did he not answer, but he did not know how to answer.

Knowledge², disappointed by the fruitlessness of his questions, returned to the south of the Bright

¹ See vol. xxxix, p. 152.

² All these names are metaphorical, having more or less to do with the qualities of the Táo, and are used as the names of personages, devoted to the pursuit of it. It is difficult to translate the name *K'hwang K'ü* (狂屈). An old reading is 諛, which Medhurst explains by 'Bent or Crooked Discourse.' 'Blurter,' though not an elegant English term, seems to express the idea our author would convey by it. Hwang-Ti is different from the other names, but we cannot regard him as here a real personage.

³ These names of places are also metaphorical and Táoistic.

Water¹, and ascended the height of the End of Doubt¹, where he saw Heedless Blurter, to whom he put the same questions, and who replied, 'Ah! I know, and will tell you.' But while he was about to speak, he forgot what he wanted to say.

Knowledge, (again) receiving no answer to his questions, returned to the palace of the Tí², where he saw Hwang-Tí³, and put the questions to him. Hwang-Tí said, 'To exercise no thought and no anxious consideration is the first step towards knowing the Táo; to dwell nowhere and do nothing is the first step towards resting in the Táo; to start from nowhere and pursue no path is the first step towards making the Táo your own.'

Knowledge then asked Hwang-Tí, saying, 'I and you know this; those two did not know it; which of us is right?' The reply was, 'Dumb Inaction³ is truly right; Heedless Blurter has an appearance of being so; I and you are not near being so. (As it is said), "Those who know (the Táo) do not speak of it; those who speak of it do not know it⁴;" and "Hence the sage conveys his instructions without the use of speech⁴." The Táo cannot be made ours by constraint; its characteristics will not come to us (at our call). Benevolence may be practised; Righteousness may be partially attended to; by Ceremonies men impose on one another. Hence it

¹ See note 3, on preceding page.

² Tí might seem to be used here for 'God,' but its juxtaposition with Hwang-Tí is against our translating it so.

³ See note 2, on preceding page.

⁴ See the Táo Teh King, chaps. 56 and 2. Kwang-ze is quoting, no doubt, these two passages, as he vaguely intimates I think by the 夫, with which the sentence commences.

is said, "When the Táo was lost, its Characteristics appeared. When its Characteristics were lost, Benevolence appeared. When Benevolence was lost, Righteousness appeared. When Righteousness was lost, Ceremonies appeared. Ceremonies are but (the unsubstantial) flowers of the Táo, and the commencement of disorder¹." Hence (also it is further said), "He who practises the Táo, daily diminishes his doing. He diminishes it and again diminishes it, till he arrives at doing nothing. Having arrived at this non-inaction, there is nothing that he does not do¹." Here now there is something, a regularly fashioned utensil;—if you wanted to make it return to the original condition of its materials, would it not be difficult to make it do so? Could any but the Great Man accomplish this easily²?

'Life is the follower of death, and death is the predecessor of life; but who knows the Arranger (of this connexion between them)³? The life is due to the collecting of the breath. When that is collected, there is life; when it is dispersed, there is death. Since death and life thus attend on each other, why should I account (either of) them an evil?

'Therefore all things go through one and the same experience. (Life) is accounted beautiful because it is spirit-like and wonderful, and death is accounted ugly because of its foetor and putridity. But the foetid and putrid is transformed again into the spirit-like and wonderful, and the spirit-like and wonderful is transformed again into the foetid and

¹ See the Táo Teh King, chaps. 38 and 48.

² This sentence is metaphorical of the Táo, whose spell is broken by the intrusion of Knowledge.

³ This 'Arranger' is the Táo.

putrid. Hence it is said, "All under the sky there is one breath of life, and therefore the sages prized that unity¹."

Knowledge² said to Hwang-Ti², 'I asked Dumb Inaction², and he did not answer me. Not only did he not answer me, but he did not know how to answer me. I asked Heedless Blurter, and while he wanted to tell me, he yet did not do so. Not only did he not tell me, but while he wanted to tell me, he forgot all about my questions. Now I have asked you, and you knew (all about them);—why (do you say that) you are not near doing so?' Hwang-Ti replied, 'Dumb Inaction² was truly right, because he did not know the thing. Heedless Blurter² was nearly right, because he forgot it. I and you are not nearly right, because we know it.' Heedless Blurter² heard of (all this), and considered that Hwang-Ti² knew how to express himself (on the subject).

2. (The operations of) Heaven and Earth proceed in the most admirable way, but they say nothing about them; the four seasons observe the clearest laws, but they do not discuss them; all things have their complete and distinctive constitutions, but they say nothing about them³.

The sages trace out the admirable operations of Heaven and Earth, and reach to and understand the distinctive constitutions of all things; and thus it is that the Perfect Man (is said to) do nothing and the Greatest Sage to originate nothing, such language showing that they look to Heaven and Earth as

¹ I have not been able to trace this quotation to its source.

² See note 2, p. 57.

³ Compare Analects XVII, xix, 3.

their model¹. Even they, with their spirit-like and most exquisite intelligence, as well as all the tribes that undergo their transformations, the dead and the living, the square and the round, do not understand their root and origin, but nevertheless they all from the oldest time by it preserve their being.

Vast as is the space included within the six cardinal points, it all (and all that it contains) lies within (this twofold root of Heaven and Earth); small as is an autumn hair, it is indebted to this for the completion of its form. All things beneath the sky, now rising, now descending, ever continue the same through this. The Yin and Yang, and the four seasons revolve and move by it, each in its proper order. Now it seems to be lost in obscurity, but it continues; now it seems to glide away, and have no form, but it is still spirit-like. All things are nourished by it, without their knowing it. This is what is called the Root and Origin; by it we may obtain a view of what we mean by Heaven².

3. Nieh K'üeh³ asked about the T'ao from Phei-î³, who replied, 'If you keep your body as it should be, and look only at the one thing, the Harmony of Heaven will come to you. Call in your knowledge, and make your measures uniform, and the spiritual (belonging to you) will come and lodge with you; the Attributes (of the T'ao) will be your beauty, and the T'ao (itself) will be your dwelling-place. You will have the simple look of a new-born calf, and

¹ Compare the T'ao Teh King, ch. 25.

² The binomial 'Heaven and Earth' here gives place to the one term 'Heaven,' which is often a synonym of T'ao.

³ See his character in Book XII, par. 5, where Phei-î also is mentioned.

will not seek to know the cause (of your being what you are).' Phei-t had not finished these words when the other dozed off into a sleep.

Phei-t was greatly pleased, and walked away, singing as he went,

'Like stump of rotten tree his frame,
Like lime when slaked his mind became¹.
Real is his wisdom, solid, true,
Nor cares what's hidden to pursue.
O dim and dark his aimless mind!
No one from him can counsel find.
What sort of man is he?'

4. Shun asked (his attendant) *Khǎng*², saying, 'Can I get the Táo and hold it as mine?' The reply was, 'Your body is not your own to hold;—how then can you get and hold the Táo?' Shun resumed, 'If my body be not mine to possess and hold, who holds it?' *Khǎng* said, 'It is the bodily form entrusted to you by Heaven and Earth. Life is not yours to hold. It is the blended harmony (of the Yin and Yang), entrusted to you by Heaven and Earth. Your nature, constituted as it is, is not yours to hold. It is entrusted to you by Heaven and Earth to act in accordance with it. Your grandsons and sons are not yours to hold. They are the exuviae³ entrusted to you by Heaven and Earth. Therefore when we walk, we should not know where we are going; when we stop and rest, we should not know what to occupy ourselves with;

¹ See the account of Nan-kwo *Ze-khi* in Book II, par. 1.

² Not the name of a man, but an office.

³ The term in the text denotes the cast-off skin or shell of insects, snakes, and crabs. See the account of death and life in par. 1.

when we eat, we should not know the taste of our food;—all is done by the strong Yang influence of Heaven and Earth¹. How then can you get (the Tâo), and hold it as your own?’

5. Confucius asked Lâu Tan, saying, ‘Being at leisure to-day, I venture to ask you about the Perfect Tâo.’ Lâu Tan replied, ‘You must, as by fasting and vigil, clear and purge your mind, wash your spirit white as snow, and sternly repress your knowledge. The subject of the Tâo is deep, and difficult to describe;—I will give you an outline of its simplest attributes.

‘The Luminous was produced from the Obscure; the Multiform from the Unembodied; the Spiritual from the Tâo; and the bodily from the seminal essence. After this all things produced one another from their bodily organisations. Thus it is that those which have nine apertures are born from the womb, and those with eight from eggs². But their coming leaves no trace, and their going no monument; they enter by no door; they dwell in no apartment³:—they are in a vast arena reaching in all directions. They who search for and find (the Tâo) in this are strong in their limbs, sincere and far-reaching in their thinking, acute in their hearing, and clear in their seeing. They exercise their minds without being toiled; they respond to everything aright without regard to place or circumstance. Without this heaven would not be high, nor earth

¹ It is an abstruse point why only the Yang is mentioned here, and described as ‘strong.’

² It is not easy to see the pertinence of this illustration.

³ Hû Wăn-ying says, ‘With this one word our author sweeps away the teaching of Purgatorial Sufferings.’

broad; the sun and moon would not move, and nothing would flourish:—such is the operation of the Tâo.

‘Moreover, the most extensive knowledge does not necessarily know it; reasoning will not make men wise in it;—the sages have decided against both these methods. However you try to add to it, it admits of no increase; however you try to take from it, it admits of no diminution;—this is what the sages maintain about it. How deep it is, like the sea! How grand it is, beginning again when it has come to an end! If it carried along and sustained all things, without being overburdened or weary, that would be like the way of the superior man, merely an external operation; when all things go to it, and find their dependence in it;—this is the true character of the Tâo.

‘Here is a man (born) in one of the middle states¹. He feels himself independent both of the Yin and Yang², and dwells between heaven and earth; only for the present a mere man, but he will return to his original source. Looking at him in his origin, when his life begins, we have (but) a gelatinous substance in which the breath is collecting. Whether his life be long or his death early, how short is the space between them! It is but the name for a moment of time, insufficient to play the part of a good Yâo or a bad Kieh in.

‘The fruits of trees and creeping plants have their distinctive characters, and though the relation-

¹ The commentators suppose that by ‘the man’ here there is intended ‘a sage;’ and they would seem to be correct.

² Compare the second sentence in the Tâo Teh King, ch. 42.

ships of men, according to which they are classified, are troublesome, the sage, when he meets with them, does not set himself in opposition to them, and when he has passed through them, he does not seek to retain them ; he responds to them in their regular harmony according to his virtue ; and even when he accidentally comes across any of them, he does so according to the Táo. It was thus that the Tis flourished, thus that the kings arose.

‘Men’s life between heaven and earth is like a white¹ colt’s passing a crevice, and suddenly disappearing. As with a plunge and an effort they all come forth ; easily and quietly they all enter again. By a transformation they live, and by another transformation they die. Living things are made sad (by death), and mankind grieve for it ; but it is (only) the removal of the bow from its sheath, and the emptying the natural satchel of its contents. There may be some confusion amidst the yielding to the change ; but the intellectual and animal souls are taking their leave, and the body will follow them :—This is the Great Returning home,

‘That the bodily frame came from incorporeity, and will return to the same, is what all men in common know, and what those who are on their way to (know) it need not strive for. This is what the multitudes of men discuss together. Those whose (knowledge) is complete do not discuss it ;—such discussion shows that their (knowledge) is not complete. Even the most clear-sighted do not meet

¹ Why is it the colt here is ‘white?’ Is it to heighten the impression made by his speedy disappearing? or is it merely the adoption of the phrase from the Shih, II, iv, 2?

(with the Táo);—it is better to be silent than to reason about it. The Táo cannot be heard with the ears;—it is better to shut the ears than to try and hear it. This is what is called the Great Attainment.'

6. Tung-kwo 3ze¹ asked Kwang-ze, saying, 'Where is what you call the Táo to be found?' Kwang-ze replied, 'Everywhere.' The other said, 'Specify an instance of it. That will be more satisfactory.' 'It is here in this ant.' 'Give a lower instance.' 'It is in this panic grass.' 'Give me a still lower instance.' 'It is in this earthenware tile.' 'Surely that is the lowest instance?' 'It is in that excrement².' To this Tung-kwo 3ze gave no reply.

Kwang-ze said, 'Your questions, my master, do not touch the fundamental point (of the Táo). They remind me of the questions addressed by the superintendents of the market to the inspector about examining the value of a pig by treading on it, and testing its weight as the foot descends lower and lower on the body³. You should not specify any particular thing. There is not a single thing without (the Táo). So it is with the Perfect Táo. And if we call it the Great (Táo), it is just the same. There are the three terms,—“Complete,” “All-embracing,” “the Whole.” These names are differ-

¹ Perhaps the Tung-kwo Shun-ze of Bk. XXI, par. 1.

² A contemptuous reply, provoked by Tung-kwo's repeated interrogation as to where the Táo was to be found, the only question being as to what it was.

³ We do not know the practices from which our author draws his illustrations here sufficiently to make out his meaning clearly. The signification of the characters 正 and 獲 may be gathered indeed from the Î Lî, Books 7-9; but that is all.

ent, but the reality (sought in them) is the same ; referring to the One thing¹.

‘Suppose we were to try to roam about in the palace of No-where;—when met there, we might discuss (about the subject) without ever coming to an end. Or suppose we were to be together in (the region of) Non-action;—should we say that (the Táo was) Simplicity and Stillness? or Indifference and Purity? or Harmony and Ease? My will would be aimless. If it went nowhere, I should not know where it had got to; if it went and came again, I should not know where it had stopped; if it went on going and coming, I should not know when the process would end. In vague uncertainty should I be in the vastest waste. Though I entered it with the greatest knowledge, I should not know how inexhaustible it was. That which makes things what they are has not the limit which belongs to things, and when we speak of things being limited, we mean that they are so in themselves. (The Táo) is the limit of the unlimited, and the boundlessness of the unbounded.

‘We speak of fulness and emptiness; of withering and decay. It produces fulness and emptiness, but is neither fulness nor emptiness; it produces withering and decay, but is neither withering nor decay. It produces the root and branches, but is neither root nor branch; it produces accumulation and dispersion, but is itself neither accumulated nor dispersed.’

7. A-ho Kan² and Shăn Năng studied together

¹ The meaning of this other illustration is also very obscure to me; and much of what follows to the end of the paragraph.

² We can hardly be said to know anything more of the first and third of these men than what is mentioned here.

under Lǎo-lung K'1. Shǎn Nǎng¹ was leaning forward on his stool, having shut the door and gone to sleep in the day time. At midday A-ho Kan pushed open the door and entered, saying, 'Lǎo-lung is dead.' Shǎn Nǎng leant forward on his stool, laid hold of his staff and rose. Then he laid the staff aside with a clash, laughed and said, 'That Heaven knew how cramped and mean, how arrogant and assuming I was, and therefore he has cast me off, and is dead. Now that there is no Master to correct my heedless words, it is simply for me to die!' Yen Kang, (who had come in) to condole, heard these words, and said, 'It is to him who embodies the Táo that the superior men everywhere cling. Now you who do not understand so much as the tip of an autumn hair of it, not even the ten-thousandth part of the Táo, still know how to keep hidden your heedless words about it and die;—how much more might he who embodied the Táo do so! We look for it, and there is no form; we hearken for it, and there is no sound. When men try to discuss it, we call them dark indeed. When they discuss the Táo, they misrepresent it.'

Hereupon Grand Purity² asked Infinitude², saying, 'Do you know the Táo?' 'I do not know it,' was the reply. He then asked Do-nothing², who replied, 'I know it.' 'Is your knowledge of it de-

¹ Shǎn Nǎng is well known, as coming in the chronological list between Fû-hsî and Hwang-Tî; and we are surprised that a higher place is not given to him among the Táoist patriarchs than our author assigns to him here.

² These names, like those in the first paragraph of the Book, are metaphorical, intended, no doubt, to set forth attributes of the Táo, and to suggest to the reader what it is or what it is not.

terminated by various points?' 'It is.' 'What are they?' Do-nothing¹ said, 'I know that the Táo may be considered noble, and may be considered mean, that it may be bound and compressed, and that it may be dispersed and diffused. These are the marks by which I know it.' Grand Purity took the words of those two, and asked No-beginning¹, saying, 'Such were their replies; which was right? and which was wrong? Infinitude's saying that he did not know it? or Do-nothing's saying that he knew it?' No-beginning said, 'The "I do not know it" was profound, and the "I know it" was shallow. The former had reference to its internal nature; the latter to its external conditions. Grand Purity looked up and sighed, saying, 'Is "not to know it" then to know it? And is "to know it" not to know it? But who knows that he who does not know it (really) knows it?' No-beginning replied, 'The Táo cannot be heard; what can be heard is not It. The Táo cannot be seen; what can be seen is not It. The Táo cannot be expressed in words; what can be expressed in words is not It. Do we know the Formless which gives form to form? In the same way the Táo does not admit of being named.'

No-beginning (further) said, 'If one ask about the Táo and another answer him, neither of them knows it. Even the former who asks has never learned anything about the Táo. He asks what does not admit of being asked, and the latter answers where answer is impossible. When one asks what does not admit of being asked, his questioning is in (dire)

¹ See note 2 on last page.

extremity. When one answers where answer is impossible, he has no internal knowledge of the subject. When people without such internal knowledge wait to be questioned by others in dire extremity, they show that externally they see nothing of space and time, and internally know nothing of the Grand Commencement¹. Therefore they cannot cross over the Khwăn-lun², nor roam in the Grand Void.³

8. Starlight³ asked Non-entity³, saying, 'Master, do you exist? or do you not exist?' He got no answer to his question, however, and looked steadfastly to the appearance of the other, which was that of a deep void. All day long he looked to it, but could see nothing; he listened for it, but could hear nothing; he clutched at it, but got hold of nothing⁴. Starlight then said, 'Perfect! Who can attain to this? I can (conceive the ideas of) existence and non-existence, but I cannot (conceive the ideas of) non-existing non-existence, and still there be a non-existing existence. How is it possible to reach to this?'

9. The forger of swords for the Minister of War had reached the age of eighty, and had not lost a hair's-breadth of his ability⁵. The Minister said to

¹ The first beginning of all things or of anything.

² The Khwăn-lun may be considered the Sacred Mountain of Taoism.

³ The characters Kwang Yáo denote the points of light all over the sky, 'dusted with stars.' I can think of no better translation for them, as personified here, than 'starlight.' 'Non-entity' is a personification of the Táo; as no existing thing, but the idea of the order that pervades and regulates throughout the universe.

⁴ A quotation from the Táo Teh K'ing, ch. 14.

⁵ Compare the case of the butcher in Bk. III, and other similar passages.

him, 'You are indeed skilful, Sir. Have you any method that makes you so?' The man said, 'Your servant has (always) kept to his work. When I was twenty, I was fond of forging swords. I looked at nothing else. I paid no attention to anything but swords. By my constant practice of it, I came to be able to do the work without any thought of what I was doing. By length of time one acquires ability at any art; and how much more one who is ever at work on it! What is there which does not depend on this, and succeed by it?'

10. *Zăn K'hiû*¹ asked *Kung-nî*, saying, 'Can it be known how it was before heaven and earth?' The reply was, 'It can. It was the same of old as now.' *Zăn K'hiû* asked no more and withdrew. Next day, however, he had another interview, and said, 'Yesterday I asked whether it could be known how it was before heaven and earth, and you, Master, said, "It can. As it is now, so it was of old." Yesterday, I seemed to understand you clearly, but to-day it is dark to me. I venture to ask you for an explanation of this.' *Kung-nî* said, 'Yesterday you seemed to understand me clearly, because your own spiritual nature had anticipated my reply. To-day it seems dark to you, for you are in an unspiritual mood, and are trying to discover the meaning. (In this matter) there is no old time and no present; no beginning and no ending. Could it be that there were grandchildren and children before there were (other) grandchildren and children²?'

¹ One of the disciples of Confucius;—*Analects* VI, 3.

² *Hû Wăn-ying* says, 'Before there can be grandsons and sons there must be grandfathers and fathers to transmit them, so before

Zăn K'hiu had not made any reply, when *Kung-ni* went on, 'Let us have done. There can be no answering (on your part). We cannot with life give life to death; we cannot with death give death to life. Do death and life wait (for each other)? There is that which contains them both in its one comprehension¹. Was that which was produced before Heaven and Earth a thing? That which made things and gave to each its character was not itself a thing. Things came forth and could not be before things, as if there had (previously) been things; —as if there had been things (producing one another) without end. The love of the sages for others, and never coming to an end, is an idea taken from this².'

11. Yen Yüan asked *Kung-ni*, saying, 'Master, I have heard you say, "There should be no demonstration of welcoming; there should be no movement to meet;"—I venture to ask in what way this affection of the mind may be shown.' The reply was, 'The ancients, amid (all) external changes, did not change internally; now-a-days men change internally, but take no note of external changes. When one only notes the changes of things, himself continuing one and the same, he does not change. How should there be (a difference between) his changing and not changing? How should he put himself in contact with (and come under the influence of) those external changes? He is sure, however,

there were (the present) heaven and earth, there must have been another heaven and earth.' But I am not sure that he has in this remark exactly caught our author's meaning.

¹ Meaning the *Táo*.

² An obscure remark.

to keep his points of contact with them from being many. The park of Shih-wei¹, the garden of Hwang-Ti, the palace of the Lord of Yü, and the houses of Thang and Wû;—(these all were places in which this was done). But the superior men (so called, of later days), such as the masters of the Literati and of Mohism, were bold to attack each other with their controversies; and how much more so are the men of the present day! Sages in dealing with others do not wound them; and they who do not wound others cannot be wounded by them. Only he whom others do not injure is able to welcome and meet men.

‘Forests and marshes make me joyful and glad; but before the joy is ended, sadness comes and succeeds to it. When sadness and joy come, I cannot prevent their approach; when they go, I cannot retain them. How sad it is that men should only be as lodging-houses for things, (and the emotions which they excite)! They know what they meet, but they do not know what they do not meet; they use what power they have, but they cannot be strong where they are powerless. Such ignorance and powerlessness is what men cannot avoid. That they should try to avoid what they cannot avoid, is not this also sad? Perfect speech is to put speech away; perfect action is to put action away; to digest all knowledge that is known is a thing to be despised.’

¹ This personage has occurred before in Bk. VI, par. 7,—at the head of the most ancient sovereigns, who were in possession of the Táo. His ‘park’ as a place for moral and intellectual inquiry is here mentioned;—so early was there a certain quickening of the mental faculties in China.

BOOK XXIII.

PART III. SECTION I.

Kǎng-sang K'û¹.

1. Among the disciples² of Láo Tan there was a Kǎng-sang K'û, who had got a greater knowledge than the others of his doctrines, and took up his residence with it in the north at the hill of Wei-lêi³. His servants who were pretentious and knowing he sent away, and his concubines who were officious and kindly he kept at a distance; living (only) with those who were boorish and rude, and employing (only) the bustling and ill-mannered⁴. (After three years there was great prosperity⁵ in Wei-lêi, and the people said to one another, 'When Mr. Kǎng-sang first came here, he alarmed us, and we thought him strange; our estimate of him after a short acquaintance was that he could not do us much good; but now that we have known him for years, we find him a more than ordinary benefit. Must he not be near being a sage? Why should you not

¹ See vol. xxxix, p. 153.

² The term in the text commonly denotes 'servants.' It would seem here simply to mean 'disciples.'

³ Assigned variously. Probably the mount Yü in the 'Tribute of Yü,'—a hill in the present department of Tǎng-káu, Shan-tung.

⁴ The same phraseology occurs in Bk. XI, par. 5; and also in the Shih, II, vi, 1, q. v.

⁵ That is, abundant harvests. The 壤 of the common text should, probably, be 穰.

unite in blessing him as the representative of our departed (whom we worship), and raise an altar to him as we do to the spirit of the grain¹?' K'ang-sang heard of it, kept his face indeed to the south², but was dissatisfied.

His disciples thought it strange in him, but he said to them, 'Why, my disciples, should you think this strange in me? When the airs of spring come forth, all vegetation grows; and, when the autumn arrives, all the previous fruits of the earth are matured. Do spring and autumn have these effects without any adequate cause? The processes of the Great T'ao have been in operation. I have heard that the Perfect man dwells idly in his apartment within its surrounding walls³, and the people get wild and crazy, not knowing how they should repair to him. Now these small people of Wei-l'ei in their opinionative way want to present their offerings to me, and place me among such men of ability and virtue. But am I a man to be set up as such a model? It is on this account that I am dissatisfied when I think of the words of L'ao Tan⁴.'

2. His disciples said, 'Not so. In ditches eight cubits wide, or even twice as much, big fishes cannot turn their bodies about, but minnows and eels find them sufficient for them⁵; on hillocks six or

¹ I find it difficult to tell what these people wanted to make of K'ang, further than what he says himself immediately to his disciples. I cannot think that they wished to make him their ruler.

² This is the proper position for the sovereign in his court, and for the sage as the teacher of the world. K'ang accepts it in the latter capacity, but with dissatisfaction.

³ Compare the L'ao K'ang, Bk. XXXVIII, par. 10, et al.

⁴ As if he were one with the T'ao.

⁵ I do not see the appropriateness here of the 制 in the text.

seven cubits high, large beasts cannot conceal themselves, but foxes of evil omen find it a good place for them. And moreover, honour should be paid to the wise, offices given to the able, and preference shown to the good and the beneficial. From of old Yáo and Shun acted thus;—how much more may the people of Wei-lêi do so! O Master, let them have their way!’

Kǎng-sang replied, ‘Come nearer, my little children. If a beast that could hold a carriage in its mouth leave its hill by itself, it will not escape the danger that awaits it from the net; or if a fish that could swallow a boat be left dry by the flowing away of the water, then (even) the ants are able to trouble it. Thus it is that birds and beasts seek to be as high as possible, and fishes and turtles seek to lie as deep as possible. In the same way men who wish to preserve their bodies and lives keep their persons concealed, and they do so in the deepest retirement possible. And moreover, what was there in those sovereigns to entitle them to your laudatory mention? Their sophistical reasonings (resembled) the reckless breaking down of walls and enclosures and planting the wild rubus and wormwood in their place; or making the hair thin before they combed it; or counting the grains of rice before they cooked them¹. They would do such things with careful discrimination; but what was there in them to benefit the world? If you raise the men of talent to office, you will create disorder; making the people strive with one

¹ All these condemnatory descriptions of Yáo and Shun are eminently Táoistic, but so metaphorical that it is not easy to appreciate them.

another for promotion ; if you employ men for their wisdom, the people will rob one another (of their reputation)¹. These various things are insufficient to make the people good and honest. They are very eager for gain ;—a son will kill his father, and a minister his ruler (for it). In broad daylight men will rob, and at midday break through walls. I tell you that the root of the greatest disorder was planted in the times of Yáo and Shun. The branches of it will remain for a thousand ages ; and after a thousand ages men will be found eating one another².’

3. (On this) Nan-yung *K’ü*³ abruptly sat right up and said, ‘What method can an old man like me adopt to become (the Perfect man) that you have described?’ Kǎng-sang 3ze said, ‘Maintain your body complete ; hold your life in close embrace ; and do not let your thoughts keep working anxiously :—do this for three years, and you may become the man of whom I have spoken.’ The other rejoined, ‘Eyes are all of the same form, I do not know any difference between them :—yet the blind have no power of vision. Ears are all of the same form ; I do not know any difference between them :—yet the deaf have no power of hearing. Minds are all of the same nature, I do not know any difference between them ;—yet the mad cannot make the minds of other men their own. (My) personality is indeed like (yours), but things seem to separate

¹ Compare the Táo Teh *K’ing*, ch. 3.

² *K’ü* is in all this too violent.

³ A disciple of Kǎng-sang *K’ü* ;—‘a sincere seeker of the Táo, very much to be pitied,’ says Lin Hst-ñung.

between us¹. I wish to find in myself what there is in you, but I am not able to do so¹. You have now said to me, "Maintain your body complete; hold your life in close embrace; and do not let your thoughts keep working anxiously." With all my efforts to learn your Way, (your words) reach only my ears.' Käng-sang replied, 'I can say nothing more to you,' and then he added, 'Small flies cannot transform the bean caterpillar²; Yüeh³ fowls cannot hatch the eggs of geese, but Lû fowls³ can. It is not that the nature of these fowls is different; the ability in the one case and inability in the other arise from their different capacities as large and small. My ability is small and not sufficient to transform you. Why should you not go south and see Láo-ze?'

4. Nan-yung K'ü hereupon took with him some rations, and after seven days and seven nights arrived at the abode of Láo-ze, who said to him, 'Are you come from K'ü's?' 'I am,' was the reply. 'And why, Sir, have you come with such a multitude of attendants⁴?' Nan-yung was frightened, and turned his head round to look behind him. Láo-ze said, 'Do you not understand my meaning?' The other held his head down and was ashamed, and then he lifted it up, and sighed, saying, 'I forgot at the moment what I should reply to your

¹ The 辟 in the former of these sentences is difficult. I take it in the sense of 譬, and read it phî.

² Compare the Shih, II, v, Ode 2, 3.

³ I believe the fowls of Shan-tung are still larger than those of Kih-kiang or Fû-kien.

⁴ A good instance of Láo's metaphorical style.

question, and in consequence I have lost what I wished to ask you.' 'What do you mean?' 'If I have not wisdom, men say that I am stupid¹, while if I have it, it occasions distress to myself. If I have not benevolence, then (I am charged) with doing hurt to others, while if I have it, I distress myself. If I have not righteousness, I (am charged with) injuring others, while if I have it, I distress myself. How can I escape from these dilemmas? These are the three perplexities that trouble me; and I wish at the suggestion of *K'û* to ask you about them.' Láo-ze replied, 'A little time ago, when I saw you and looked right into your eyes², I understood you, and now your words confirm the judgment which I formed. You look frightened and amazed. You have lost your parents, and are trying with a pole to find them at the (bottom of) the sea. You have gone astray; you are at your wit's end. You wish to recover your proper nature, and you know not what step to take first to find it. You are to be pitied!'

5. Nan-yung *K'û* asked to be allowed to enter (the establishment), and have an apartment assigned to him³. (There) he sought to realise the qualities which he loved, and put away those which he hated. For ten days he afflicted himself, and then waited again on Láo-ze, who said to him, 'You must purify yourself thoroughly! But from your symptoms of

¹ In the text 朱愚. The 朱 must be an erroneous addition, or probably it is a mistake for the speaker's name 趙.

² Literally, 'between the eye-brows and eye-lashes.'

³ Thus we are as it were in the school of Láo-ze, and can see how he deals with his pupils.

distress, and signs of impurity about you, I see there still seem to cling to you things that you dislike. When the fettering influences from without become numerous, and you try to seize them (you will find it a difficult task); the better plan is to bar your inner man against their entrance. And when the similar influences within get intertwined, it is a difficult task to grasp (and hold them in check); the better plan is to bar the outer door against their exit. Even a master of the Táo and its characteristics will not be able to control these two influences together, and how much less can one who is only a student of the Táo do so!' Nan-yung *K'ü* said, 'A certain villager got an illness, and when his neighbours asked about it, he was able to describe the malady, though it was one from which he had not suffered before. When I ask you about the Grand Táo, it seems to me like drinking medicine which (only serves to) increase my illness. I should like to hear from you about the regular method of guarding the life;—that will be sufficient for me.' Láo-ze replied, '(You ask me about) the regular method of guarding the life;—can you hold the One thing fast in your embrace? Can you keep from losing it? Can you know the lucky and the unlucky without having recourse to the tortoise-shell or the divining stalks? Can you rest (where you ought to rest)? Can you stop (when you have got enough)? Can you give over thinking of other men, and seek what you want in yourself (alone)? Can you flee (from the allurements of desire)? Can you maintain an entire simplicity? Can you become a little child? The child will cry all the day, without its throat becoming hoarse;—so perfect is the harmony (of

its physical constitution). It will keep its fingers closed all the day without relaxing their grasp;—such is the concentration of its powers. It will keep its eyes fixed all day, without their moving;—so is it unaffected by what is external to it. It walks it knows not whither; it rests where it is placed, it knows not why; it is calmly indifferent to things, and follows their current. This is the regular method of guarding the life ¹.

6. Nan-yung *K'û* said, 'And are these all the characteristics of the Perfect man?' Lâu-ze replied, 'No. These are what we call the breaking up of the ice, and the dissolving of the cold. The Perfect man, along with other men, gets his food from the earth, and derives his joy from his Heaven (-conferred nature). But he does not like them allow himself to be troubled by the consideration of advantage or injury coming from men and things; he does not like them do strange things, or form plans, or enter on undertakings; he flees from the allurements of desire, and pursues his way with an entire simplicity. Such is the way by which he guards his life.' 'And is this what constitutes his perfection?' 'Not quite. I asked you whether you could become a little child. The little child moves unconscious of what it is doing, and walks unconscious of whither it is going. Its body is like the branch of a rotten tree, and its mind is like slaked lime ². Being such, misery does not come to it, nor happiness. It has

¹ In this long reply there are many evident recognitions of passages in the *Tâu Teh King*;—compare chapters 9, 10, 55, 58.

² See the description of *3ze-khi's* Tâuistic trance at the beginning of the second Book.

neither misery nor happiness;—how can it suffer from the calamities incident to men¹?’

7. ² He whose mind³ is thus grandly fixed emits a Heavenly light. In him who emits this heavenly light men see the (True) man. When a man has cultivated himself (up to this point), thenceforth he remains constant in himself. When he is thus constant in himself, (what is merely) the human element will leave him⁴, but Heaven will help him. Those whom their human element has left we call the people of Heaven⁴. Those whom Heaven helps we call the Sons of Heaven. Those who would by learning attain to this⁵ seek for what they cannot

¹ Nan-yung *K'ü* disappears here. His first master, Käng-sang *K'ü*, disappeared in paragraph 4. The different way in which his name is written by Sze-mâ *K'hien* is mentioned in the brief introductory note on p. 153. It should have been further stated there that in the Fourth Book of Lieh-*zse* (IV, 2^b-3^b) some account of him is given with his name as written by *K'hien*. A great officer of *K'än* is introduced as boasting of him that he was a sage, and, through his mastery of the principles of Láo Tan, could hear with his eyes and see with his ears. Hereupon Khäng-*zhang* is brought to the court of the marquis of Lú to whom he says that the report of him which he had heard was false, adding that he could dispense with the use of his senses altogether, but could not alter their several functions. This being reported to Confucius, he simply laughs at it, but makes no remark.

² I suppose that from this to the end of the Book we have the sentiments of *K'wang-*zse** himself. Whether we consider them his, or the teachings of Láo-*zse* to his visitor, they are among the depths of Taoism, which I will not attempt to elucidate in the notes here.

³ The character which I have translated ‘mind’ here is 宇, meaning ‘the side walls of a house,’ and metaphorically used for ‘the breast,’ as the house of the mind. Hû explains it by 心胸.

⁴ He is emancipated from the human as contrary to the heavenly.

⁵ The Táo.

learn. Those who would by effort attain to this, attempt what effort can never effect. Those who aim by reasoning to reach it reason where reasoning has no place. To know to stop where they cannot arrive by means of knowledge is the highest attainment. Those who cannot do this will be destroyed on the lathe of Heaven.

8. Where things are all adjusted to maintain the body; where a provision against unforeseen dangers is kept up to maintain the life of the mind; where an inward reverence is cherished to be exhibited (in all intercourse) with others;—where this is done, and yet all evils arrive, they are from Heaven, and not from the men themselves. They will not be sufficient to confound the established (virtue of the character), or be admitted into the Tower of Intelligence. That Tower has its Guardian, who acts unconsciously, and whose care will not be effective, if there be any conscious purpose in it¹. If one who has not this entire sincerity in himself make any outward demonstration, every such demonstration will be incorrect. The thing will enter into him, and not let go its hold. Then with every fresh demonstration there will be still greater failure. If he do what is not good in the light of open day, men will have the opportunity of punishing him; if he do it in darkness and secrecy, spirits² will inflict the punishment. Let a man understand this—his relation both to men and spirits, and then he will do what is good in the solitude of himself.

¹ This Guardian of the Mind or Tower of Intelligence is the Táo.

² One of the rare introductions of spiritual agency in the early Táoism.

He whose rule of life is in himself does not act for the sake of a name. He whose rule is outside himself has his will set on extensive acquisition. He who does not act for the sake of a name emits a light even in his ordinary conduct; he whose will is set on extensive acquisition is but a trafficker. Men see how he stands on tiptoe, while he thinks that he is overtopping others. Things enter (and take possession of) him who (tries to) make himself exhaustively (acquainted with them), while when one is indifferent to them, they do not find any lodgment in his person. And how can other men find such lodgment? But when one denies lodgment to men, there are none who feel attachment to him. In this condition he is cut off from other men. There is no weapon more deadly than the will¹;—even Mû-yê² was inferior to it. There is no robber greater than the Yin and Yang, from whom nothing can escape of all between heaven and earth. But it is not the Yin and Yang that play the robber;—it is the mind that causes them to do so.

9. The Táo is to be found in the subdivisions (of its subject); (it is to be found) in that when complete, and when broken up. What I dislike in considering it as subdivided, is that the division leads to the multiplication of it;—and what I dislike in that multiplication is that it leads to the (thought of) effort to secure it. Therefore when (a man)

¹ That is, the will, man's own human element, in opposition to the Heavenly element of the Táo.

² One of the two famous swords made for Ho-lü, the king of Wû. See the account of their making in the seventy-fourth chapter of the 'History of the Various States;' very marvellous, but evidently, and acknowledged to be, fabulous.

comes forth (and is born), if he did not return (to his previous non-existence), we should have (only) seen his ghost; when he comes forth and gets this (return), he dies (as we say). He is extinguished, and yet has a real existence:—(this is another way of saying that in life we have) only man's ghost. By taking the material as an emblem of the immaterial do we arrive at a settlement of the case of man. He comes forth, but from no root; he re-enters, but by no aperture. He has a real existence, but it has nothing to do with place; he has continuance, but it has nothing to do with beginning or end. He has a real existence, but it has nothing to do with place, such is his relation to space; he has continuance, but it has nothing to do with beginning or end, such is his relation to time; he has life; he has death; he comes forth; he enters; but we do not see his form;—all this is what is called the door of Heaven. The door of Heaven is Non-Existence. All things come from non-existence. The (first) existences could not bring themselves into existence; they must have come from non-existence. And non-existence is just the same as non-existing. Herein is the secret of the sages.

10. Among the ancients there were those whose knowledge reached the extreme point. And what was that point? There were some who thought that in the beginning there was nothing. This was the extreme point, the completest reach of their knowledge, to which nothing could be added. Again, there were those who supposed that (in the beginning) there were existences, proceeding to consider life to be a (gradual) perishing, and death a returning (to the original state). And there they stopped,

making, (however), a distinction between life and death. Once again there were those who said, 'In the beginning there was nothing; by and by there was life; and then in a little time life was succeeded by death. We hold that non-existence was the head, life the body, and death the os coccygis. But of those who acknowledge that existence and non-existence, death and life, are all under the One Keeper, we are the friends.' Though those who maintained these three views were different, they were so as the different branches of the same ruling Family (of *K'ü*)¹,—the *K'âos* and the *K'ings*, bearing the surname of the lord whom they honoured as the author of their branch, and the *K'îas* named from their appanage;—(all one, yet seeming) not to be one.

The possession of life is like the soot that collects under a boiler. When that is differently distributed, the life is spoken of as different. But to say that life is different in different lives, and better in one than in another, is an improper mode of speech. And yet there may be something here which we do not know. (As for instance), at the *lâ* sacrifice the paunch and the divided hoofs may be set forth on separate dishes, but they should not be considered as parts of different victims; (and again), when one is inspecting a house, he goes over it all, even the adytum for the shrines of the temple, and visits also the most private apartments; doing this, and setting a different estimate on the different parts.

Let me try and speak of this method of appor-

¹ Both *Lâo* and *K'wang* belonged to *K'ü*, and this illustration was natural to them.

tioning one's approval:—life is the fundamental consideration in it; knowledge is the instructor. From this they multiply their approvals and disapprovals, determining what is merely nominal and what is real. They go on to conclude that to themselves must the appeal be made in everything, and to try to make others adopt them as their model; prepared even to die to make good their views on every point. In this way they consider being employed in office as a mark of wisdom, and not being so employed as a mark of stupidity, success as entitling to fame, and the want of it as disgraceful. The men of the present day who follow this differentiating method are like the cicada and the little dove¹;—there is no difference between them.

II. When one treads on the foot of another in the market-place, he apologises on the ground of the bustle. If an elder tread on his younger brother, he proceeds to comfort him; if a parent tread on a child, he says and does nothing. Hence it is said, 'The greatest politeness is to show no special respect to others; the greatest righteousness is to take no account of things; the greatest wisdom is to lay no plans; the greatest benevolence is to make no demonstration of affection; the greatest good faith is to give no pledge of sincerity.'

Repress the impulses of the will; unravel the errors of the mind; put away the entanglements to virtue; and clear away all that obstructs the free course of the Táo. Honours and riches, distinctions and austerity, fame and profit; these six things produce the impulses of the will. Personal appearance

¹ See in Bk. I, par. 2.

and deportment, the desire of beauty and subtle reasonings, excitement of the breath and cherished thoughts; these six things produce errors of the mind. Hatred and longings, joy and anger, grief and delight; these six things are the entanglements to virtue. Refusals and approachments, receiving and giving, knowledge and ability; these six things obstruct the course of the Táo. When these four conditions, with the six causes of each, do not agitate the breast, the mind is correct. Being correct, it is still; being still, it is pellucid; being pellucid, it is free from pre-occupation; being free from pre-occupation, it is in the state of inaction, in which it accomplishes everything.

The Táo is the object of reverence to all the virtues. Life is what gives opportunity for the display of the virtues. The nature is the substantive character of the life. The movement of the nature is called action. When action becomes hypocritical, we say that it has lost (its proper attribute).

The wise communicate with what is external to them and are always laying plans. This is what with all their wisdom they are not aware of;—they look at things askance. When the action (of the nature) is from external constraint, we have what is called virtue; when it is all one's own, we have what is called government. These two names seem to be opposite to each other, but in reality they are in mutual accord.

12. ¹ was skilful in hitting the minutest mark, but stupid in wishing men to go on praising him without end. The sage is skilful Heavenwards, but stupid

¹ See on V, par. 2.

manwards. It is only the complete man who can be both skilful Heavenwards and good manwards.

Only an insect can play the insect, only an insect show the insect nature. Even the complete man hates the attempt to exemplify the nature of Heaven. He hates the manner in which men do so, and how much more would he hate the doing so by himself before men!

When a bird came in the way of Î, he was sure to obtain it;—such was his mastery with his bow. If all the world were to be made a cage, birds would have nowhere to escape to. Thus it was that Thang caged Î Yin by making him his cook¹, and that duke Mû of K~~h~~in caged Pâi-lî Hsî by giving the skins of five rams for him². But if you try to cage men by anything but what they like, you will never succeed.

A man, one of whose feet has been cut off, discards ornamental (clothes);—his outward appearance will not admit of admiration. A criminal under sentence of death will ascend to any height without fear;—he has ceased to think of life or death.

When one persists in not reciprocating the gifts (of friendship), he forgets all others. Having forgotten all others, he may be considered as a Heaven-like man. Therefore when respect is shown to a man, and it awakens in him no joy, and when contempt awakens no anger, it is only one who shares in the Heaven-like harmony that can be thus. When he would display anger and yet is not angry, the anger comes out in that repression of it. When he would put forth action, and yet does not do so,

¹ See Mencius V, i, 7.

² Mencius V, i, 9.

the action is in that not-acting. Desiring to be quiescent, he must pacify all his emotions ; desiring to be spirit-like, he must act in conformity with his mind. When action is required of him, he wishes that it may be right ; and it then is under an inevitable constraint. Those who act according to that inevitable constraint pursue the way of the sage.

BOOK XXIV.

PART III. SECTION II.

Hsü Wû-kwei¹.

I. Hsü Wû-kwei having obtained through Nü Shang² an introduction to the marquis Wû of Wei³, the marquis, speaking to him with kindly sympathy⁴, said, 'You are ill, Sir; you have suffered from your hard and laborious toils⁴ in the forests, and still you have been willing to come and see poor me⁵.' Hsü Wû-kwei replied, 'It is I who have to comfort your lordship; what occasion have you to comfort me? If your lordship go on to fill up the measure of your sensual desires, and to prolong your likes and dislikes, then the condition of your mental nature will be diseased, and if you discourage and repress those desires, and deny your likings and dislikings, that will be an affliction to your ears and eyes

¹ See vol. xxxix, pp. 153, 154.

² A favourite and minister of the marquis Wû.

³ This was the second marquis of Wei, one of the three principalities into which the great state of Jin had been broken up, and which he ruled as the marquis K'î for sixteen years, B. C. 386-371. His son usurped the title of king, and was the 'king Hui of Liang,' whom Mencius had interviews with. Wû, or 'martial,' was K'î's honorary, posthumous epithet.

⁴ The character (勞) which I thus translate, has two tones, the second and fourth. Here and elsewhere in this paragraph and the next, it is with one exception in the fourth tone, meaning 'to comfort or reward for toils endured.' The one exception is its next occurrence,—'hard and laborious toils.'

⁵ The appropriate and humble designation of himself by the ruler of a state.

(deprived of their accustomed pleasures);—it is for me to comfort your lordship, what occasion have you to comfort me?' The marquis looked contemptuous, and made no reply.

After a little time, Hsü Wû-kwei said, 'Let me tell your lordship something:—I look at dogs and judge of them by their appearance¹. One of the lowest quality seizes his food, satiates himself, and stops;—he has the attributes of a fox. One of a medium quality seems to be looking at the sun. One of the highest quality seems to have forgotten the one thing,—himself. But I judge still better of horses than I do of dogs. When I do so, I find that one goes straight-forward, as if following a line; that another turns off, so as to describe a hook; that a third describes a square as if following the measure so called; and that a fourth describes a circle as exactly as a compass would make it. These are all horses of a state; but they are not equal to a horse of the kingdom. His qualities are complete. Now he looks anxious; now to be losing the way; now to be forgetting himself. Such a horse prances along, or rushes on, spurning the dust and not knowing where he is.' The marquis was greatly pleased and laughed.

When Hsü Wû-kwei came out, Nü Shang said to him, 'How was it, Sir, that you by your counsels produced such an effect on our ruler? In my counsellings of him, now indirectly, taking my subjects from the Books of Poetry, History, Rites, and Music; now directly, from the Metal Tablets², and the six Bow-cases², all calculated for the service (of the

¹ Literally, 'I physiognomise dogs.'

² The names of two Books, or Collections of Tablets, the former

state), and to be of great benefit ;—in these counsellings, repeated times without number, I have never seen the ruler show his teeth in a smile :—by what counsels have you made him so pleased to-day ?’ Hsü Wû-kwei replied, ‘ I only told him how I judged of dogs and horses by looking at their appearance.’ ‘ So ?’ said Nü Shang, and the other rejoined, ‘ Have you not heard of the wanderer ¹ from Yüeh ? when he had been gone from the state several days, he was glad when he saw any one whom he had seen in it ; when he had been gone a month, he was glad when he saw any one whom he had known in it ; and when he had been gone a round year, he was glad when he saw any one who looked like a native of it. The longer he was gone, the more longingly did he think of the people ;—was it not so ? The men who withdraw to empty valleys, where the hellebore bushes stop up the little paths made by the weasels, as they push their way or stand amid the waste, are glad when they seem to hear the sounds of human footsteps ; and how much more would they be so, if it were their brothers and relatives talking and laughing by their side ! How long it is since the words of a True ² man were heard as he talked and laughed by our ruler’s side !’

2. At (another) interview of Hsü Wû-kwei with the marquis Wû, the latter said, ‘ You, Sir, have been dwelling in the forests for a long time, living

containing Registers of the Population, the latter treating of military subjects.

¹ Kwo Hsiang makes this ‘ a banished criminal.’ This is not necessary.

² Wû-kwei then had a high opinion of his own attainments in Tâoism, and a low opinion of Nü Shang and the other courtiers.

on acorns and chestnuts, and satiating yourself with onions and chives, without thinking of poor me. Now (that you are here), is it because you are old? or because you wish to try again the taste of wine and meat? or because (you wish that) I may enjoy the happiness derived from the spirits of the altars of the Land and Grain?' Hsü Wû-kwei replied, 'I was born in a poor and mean condition, and have never presumed to drink of your lordship's wine, or eat of your meat. My object in coming was to comfort your lordship under your troubles.' 'What? comfort me under my troubles?' 'Yes, to comfort both your lordship's spirit and body.' The marquis said, 'What do you mean?' His visitor replied, 'Heaven and Earth have one and the same purpose in the production (of all men). However high one man be exalted, he should not think that he is favourably dealt with; and however low may be the position of another, he should not think that he is unfavourably dealt with. You are indeed the one and only lord of the 10,000 chariots (of your state), but you use your dignity to embitter (the lives of) all the people, and to pamper your ears, eyes, nose, and mouth. But your spirit does not acquiesce in this. The spirit (of man) loves to be in harmony with others and hates selfish indulgence¹. This selfish indulgence is a disease, and therefore I would comfort you under it. How is it that your lordship more than others brings this disease on yourself?' The marquis said, 'I have wished to see you, Sir, for a long time. I want to love my people, and by the exercise of righteous-

¹ Wû-kwei had a high idea of the constitution of human nature.

ness to make an end of war ;—will that be sufficient ?' Hsü Wû-kwei replied, ' By no means. To love the people is the first step to injure them¹. By the exercise of righteousness to make an end of war is the root from which war is produced¹. If your lordship try to accomplish your object in this way, you are not likely to succeed. All attempts to accomplish what we think good (with an ulterior end) is a bad contrivance. Although your lordship practise benevolence and righteousness (as you propose), it will be no better than hypocrisy. You may indeed assume the (outward) form, but successful accomplishment will lead to (inward) contention, and the change thence arising will produce outward fighting. Your lordship also must not mass files of soldiers in the passages of your galleries and towers, nor have footmen and horsemen in the apartments about your altars². Do not let thoughts contrary to your success lie hidden in your mind ; do not think of conquering men by artifice, or by (skilful) plans, or by fighting. If I kill the officers and people of another state, and annex its territory, to satisfy my selfish desires, while in my spirit I do not know whether the fighting be good, where is the victory that I gain ? Your lordship's best plan is to abandon (your purpose). If you will cultivate in your breast the sincere purpose (to love the people), and so respond to the feeling of Heaven and Earth, and not (further) vex yourself, then your people will already have escaped death ;—what

¹ Tâoistic teaching, but questionable.

² We need more information about the customs of the feudal princes fully to understand the language of this sentence.

occasion will your lordship have to make an end of war ?'

3. Hwang-Tî was going to see Tâ-kwei¹ at the hill of K'ü-ghze. Fang Ming was acting as charioteer, and K'hang Yü was occupying the third place in the carriage. Kang Zo and Hsi Phăng went before the horses; and Khwăn Hwun and K'û K'hi followed the carriage. When they arrived at the wild of Hsiang-khăng, the seven sages were all perplexed, and could find no place at which to ask the way. Just then they met with a boy tending some horses, and asked the way of him. 'Do you know,' they said, 'the hill of K'ü-ghze?' and he replied that he did. He also said that he knew where Tâ-kwei was living. 'A strange boy is this!' said Hwang-Tî. 'He not only knows the hill of K'ü-ghze, but he also knows where Tâ-kwei is living. Let me ask him about the government of mankind.' The boy said, 'The administration of the kingdom is like this (which I am doing);—what difficulty should there be in it? When I was young, I enjoyed myself roaming over all within the six confines of the world of space, and then I began to suffer from indistinct sight. A wise elder taught me, saying, "Ride in the chariot of the

¹ Tâ (or Thâi)-kwei (or wei) appears here as the name of a person. It cannot be the name of a hill, as it is said by some to be. The whole paragraph is parabolic or allegorical; and Tâ-kwei is probably a personification of the Great Tâo itself, though no meaning of the character kwei can be adduced to justify this interpretation. The horseherd boy is further supposed to be a personification of the 'Great Simplicity,' which is characteristic of the Tâo, the spontaneity of it, unvexed by the wisdom of man. The lesson of the paragraph is that taught in the eleventh Book, and many other places.

sun, and roam in the wild of Hsiang-K'hang." Now the trouble in my eyes is a little better, and I am again enjoying myself roaming outside the six confines of the world of space. As to the government of the kingdom, it is like this (which I am doing);—what difficulty should there be in it?' Hwang-Ti said, 'The administration of the world is indeed not your business, my son; nevertheless, I beg to ask you about it.' The little lad declined to answer, but on Hwang-Ti putting the question again, he said, 'In what does the governor of the kingdom differ from him who has the tending of horses, and who has only to put away whatever in him would injure the horses?'

Hwang-Ti bowed to him twice with his head to the ground, called him his 'Heavenly Master¹,' and withdrew.

4. If officers of wisdom do not see the changes which their anxious thinking has suggested, they have no joy; if debaters are not able to set forth their views in orderly style, they have no joy; if critical examiners find no subjects on which to exercise their powers of vituperation, they have no joy:—they are all hampered by external restrictions.

Those who try to attract the attention of their age (wish to) rise at court; those who try to win the regard of the people² count holding office a glory; those who possess muscular strength boast of doing what is difficult; those who are bold and daring exert themselves in times of calamity; those who are able

¹ This is the title borne to the present day by the chief or pope of T'aoism, the representative of K'ang T'ao-ling of our first century.

² Taking the initial *kung* in the third tone. If we take it in the first tone, the meaning is different.

swordmen and spearmen delight in fighting; those whose powers are decayed seek to rest in the name (they have gained); those who are skilled in the laws seek to enlarge the scope of government; those who are proficient in ceremonies and music pay careful attention to their deportment; and those who profess benevolence and righteousness value opportunities (for displaying them).

The husbandmen who do not keep their fields well weeded are not equal to their business, nor are traders who do not thrive in the markets. When the common people have their appropriate employment morning and evening, they stimulate one another to diligence; the mechanics who are masters of their implements feel strong for their work. If their wealth does not increase, the greedy are distressed; if their power and influence is not growing, the ambitious are sad.

Such creatures of circumstance and things delight in changes, and if they meet with a time when they can show what they can do, they cannot keep themselves from taking advantage of it. They all pursue their own way like (the seasons of) the year, and do not change as things do. They give the reins to their bodies and natures, and allow themselves to sink beneath (the pressure of) things, and all their lifetime do not come back (to their proper selves):— is it not sad¹?

5. *Kwang-tze* said, 'An archer, without taking aim beforehand, yet may hit the mark. If we say that he is a good archer, and that all the world may

¹ All the parties in this paragraph disallow the great principle of Tâoism, which does everything by doing nothing.

be *Is*¹, is this allowable?' Hui-ze replied, 'It is.' Kwang-ze continued, 'All men do not agree in counting the same thing to be right, but every one maintains his own view to be right; (if we say) that all men may be *Yâos*, is this allowable?' Hui-ze (again) replied, 'It is;' and Kwang-ze went on, 'Very well; there are the literati, the followers of Mo (Ti), of Yang (*Kü*), and of Ping²;—making four (different schools). Including yourself, Master, there are five. Which of your views is really right? Or will you take the position of *Lü Kü*³? One of his disciples said to him, "Master, I have got hold of your method. I can in winter heat the furnace under my tripod, and in summer can produce ice." *Lü Kü* said, "That is only with the Yang element to call out the same, and with the Yin to call out the yin;—that is not my method. I will show you what my method is." On this he tuned two citherns, placing one of them in the hall, and the other in one of the inner apartments. Striking the note *Kung*⁴ in the one, the same note vibrated in the other, and so it was with the note *Kio*⁴; the two instruments being tuned in the same way. But if he had differently tuned them on other strings different

¹ The famous archer of the Hsiâ dynasty, in the twenty-second century B. C.

² The name of Kung-sun Lung, the Lung Li-*hân* of Bk. XXI, par. I.

³ Only mentioned here. The statement of his disciple and his remark on it are equally obscure, though the latter is partially illustrated from the twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and other hexagrams of the *Yih King*.

⁴ The sounds of the first and third notes of the Chinese musical scale, corresponding to our A and E. I know too little of music myself to pronounce further on *Lü Kü*'s illustration.

from the normal arrangement of the five notes, the five-and-twenty strings would all have vibrated, without any difference of their notes, the note to which he had tuned them ruling and guiding all the others. Is your maintaining your view to be right just like this ?'

Hui-ze replied, 'Here now are the literati, and the followers of Mo, Yang, and Ping. Suppose that they have come to dispute with me. They put forth their conflicting statements; they try vociferously to put me down; but none of them have ever proved me wrong:—what do you say to this?' Kwang-ze said, 'There was a man of *K'hi* who cast away his son in Sung to be a gate-keeper there, and thinking nothing of the mutilation he would incur; the same man, to secure one of his sacrificial vessels or bells, would have it strapped and secured, while to find his son who was lost, he would not go out of the territory of his own state:—so forgetful was he of the relative importance of things. If a man of *K'hi*, going to another state as a lame gate-keeper, at midnight, at a time when no one was nigh, were to fight with his boatman, he would not be able to reach the shore, and he would have done what he could to provoke the boatman's animosity¹.'

6. As Kwang-ze was accompanying a funeral, when passing by the grave of Hui-ze², he looked

¹ The illustrations in this last member of the paragraph are also obscure. Lin Hsi-kung says that all the old explanations of them are defective; his own explanation has failed to make itself clear to me.

² The expression in the last sentence of the paragraph, 'the Master,' makes it certain that this was the grave of Kwang-ze's friend with whom he had had so many conversations and arguments.

round, and said to his attendants, 'On the top of the nose of that man of Ying¹ there is a (little) bit of mud like a fly's wing.' He sent for the artisan Shih to cut it away. Shih whirled his axe so as to produce a wind, which immediately carried off the mud entirely, leaving the nose uninjured, and the (statue of) the man of Ying¹ standing undisturbed. The ruler Yüan of Sung² heard of the feat, called the artisan Shih, and said to him, 'Try and do the same thing on me.' The artisan said, 'Your servant has been able to trim things in that way, but the material on which I have worked has been dead for a long time.' Kwang-3ze said, 'Since the death of the Master, I have had no material to work upon. I have had no one with whom to talk.'

7. Kwan Kung being ill, duke Hwan went to ask for him, and said, 'Your illness, father Kung, is very severe; should you not speak out your mind to me? Should this prove the great illness, to whom will it be best for me to entrust my State?' Kwan Kung said, 'To whom does your grace wish to entrust it?' 'To Pão Shû-yâ³,' was the reply. 'He will not do. He is an admirable officer, pure and incorruptible, but with others who are not like himself he will not associate. And when he once hears

¹ Ying was the capital of K'hi. I have seen in China about the graves of wealthy and distinguished men many life-sized statues of men somehow connected with them.

² Yüan is called the 'ruler' of Sung. That duchy was by this time a mere dependency of K'hi. The sacrifices of its old ruling House were finally extinguished by K'hi in B. C. 206.

³ Pão Shû-yâ had been the life-long friend of the dying premier, and to him in the first place had been owing the elevation of Hwan to the marquise.

of another man's faults, he never forgets them. If you employ him to administer the state, above, he will take the leading of your Grace, and, below, he will come into collision with the people;—in no long time you will be holding him as an offender.' The duke said, 'Who, then, is the man?' The reply was, 'If I must speak, there is Hsí Phǎng¹;—he will do. He is a man who forgets his own high position, and against whom those below him will not revolt. He is ashamed that he is not equal to Hwang-Tí, and pities those who are not equal to himself. Him who imparts of his virtue to others we call a sage; him who imparts of his wealth to others we call a man of worth. He who by his worth would preside over others, never succeeds in winning them; he who with his worth condescends to others, never but succeeds in winning them. Hsí Phǎng has not been (much) heard of in the state; he has not been (much) distinguished in his own clan. But as I must speak, he is the man for you.'

8. The king of Wú, floating about on the *Kiang*, (landed and) ascended the Hill of monkeys, which all, when they saw him, scampered off in terror, and hid themselves among the thick hazels. There was one, however, which, in an unconcerned way, swung about on the branches, displaying its cleverness to the king, who thereon discharged an arrow at it. With a nimble motion it caught the swift arrow, and the king ordered his attendants to hurry forward and shoot it; and thus the monkey was seized and killed. The king then, looking round, said to his friend Yen

¹ For a long time a great officer of *K'ín*, but he died in the same year as Kwan Kung himself.

Pû-t¹, 'This monkey made a display of its artfulness, and trusted in its agility, to show me its arrogance;—this it was which brought it to this fate. Take warning from it. Ah! do not by your looks give yourself haughty airs!' Yen Pû-t¹, when he returned home, put himself under the teaching of Tung Wû¹, to root up² his pride. He put away what he delighted in and abjured distinction. In three years the people of the kingdom spoke of him with admiration.

9. Nan-po 3ze-k³ was seated, leaning forward on his stool, and sighing gently as he looked up to heaven. (Just then) Yen K³h³ang-ze³ came in, and said, when he saw him, 'Master, you surpass all others. Is it right to make your body thus like a mass of withered bones, and your mind like so much slaked lime?' The other said, 'I formerly lived in a grotto on a hill. At that time Thien Ho⁴ once came to see me, and all the multitudes of K³h³ congratulated him thrice (on his having found the proper man). I must first have shown myself, and so it was that he knew me; I must first have been selling (what I had), and so it was that he came to buy. If I had not shown what I possessed, how should he have known it; if I had not been selling (myself), how should he have come to buy me? I pity

¹ We know these names only from their occurrence here. Tung Wû must have been a professor of Tâoism.

² The text here is 助, 'to help'; but it is explained as = 鋤, 'a hoe.' The Khang-hsî dictionary does not give this meaning of the character, but we find it in that of Yen Yüan.

³ See the first paragraph of Bk. II.

⁴ 田禾 must be the 田和 of Sze-mâ K³hien, who became marquis of K³h³ in B. C. 389.

the men who lose themselves¹; I also pity the men who pity others (for not being known); and I also pity the men who pity the men who pity those that pity others. But since then the time is long gone by; (and so I am in the state in which you have found me)².

10. *Kung-nî*, having gone to *Khû*, the king ordered wine to be presented to him. *Sun Shû-áo*³ stood, holding the goblet in his hand. *Î-lião* of *Shih-nan*³, having received (a cup), poured its contents out as a sacrificial libation, and said, 'The men of old, on such an occasion as this, made some speech.' *Kung-nî* said, 'I have heard of speech without words; but I have never spoken it; I will do so now. *Î-lião* of *Shih-nan* kept (quietly) handling his little spheres,

¹ In seeking for worldly honours.

² That is, I have abjured all desire for worldly honour, and desire attainment in the *Tão* alone.

³ See *Mencius* VI, ii, 15. *Sun Shû-áo* was chief minister to king *Khwang* who died in B. C. 591, and died, probably, before Confucius was born, and *Î-lião* (p. 28, n. 3) appears in public life only after the death of the sage. The three men could not have appeared together at any time. This account of their doing so was devised by our author as a peg on which to hang his own lessons in the rest of the paragraph. The two historical events referred to I have found it difficult to discover. They are instances of doing nothing, and yet thereby accomplishing what is very great. The action of *Î-lião* in 'quietly handling his balls' recalls my seeing the same thing done by a gentleman at *Khû-fâu*, the city of Confucius, in 1873. Being left there with a companion, and not knowing how to get to the Grand Canal, many gentlemen came to advise with us how we should proceed. Among them was one who, while tendering his advice, kept rolling about two brass balls in one palm with the fingers of the other hand. When I asked the meaning of his action, I was told, 'To show how he is at his ease and master of the situation.' I mention the circumstance because I have nowhere found the phrase in the text adequately explained.

and the difficulties between the two Houses were resolved; Sun Shû-âo slept undisturbed on his couch, with his (dancer's) feather in his hand, and the men of Ying enrolled themselves for the war. I wish I had a beak three cubits long¹.

In the case of those two (ministers) we have what is called 'The Way that cannot be trodden²;' in (the case of *Kung-ni*) we have what is called 'the Argument without words³.' Therefore when all attributes are comprehended in the unity of the Tâo, and speech stops at the point to which knowledge does not reach, the conduct is complete. But where there is (not)³ the unity of the Tâo, the attributes cannot (always) be the same, and that which is beyond the reach of knowledge cannot be exhibited by any reasoning. There may be as many names as those employed by the Literati and the Mohists, but (the result is) evil. Thus when the sea does not reject the streams that flow into it in their eastward course, we have the perfection of greatness. The sage embraces in his regard both Heaven and Earth; his beneficent influence extends to all under the sky; and we do not know from whom it comes. Therefore though when living one may have no rank, and when dead no honorary epithet; though the reality (of what he is) may not be acknowledged and his name not established; we have in him what is called 'The Great Man.'

A dog is not reckoned good because it barks well; and a man is not reckoned wise because he speaks

¹ This strange wish concludes the speech of Confucius. What follows is from *Kwang-ze*.

² Compare the opening chapters of the Tâo Teh King.

³ The Tâo is greater than any and all of its attributes.

skilfully;—how much less can he be deemed Great! If one thinks he is Great, he is not fit to be accounted Great;—how much less is he so from the practice of the attributes (of the Tâo)¹! Now none are so grandly complete as Heaven and Earth; but do they seek for anything to make them so grandly complete? He who knows this grand completion does not seek for it; he loses nothing and abandons nothing; he does not change himself from regard to (external) things; he turns in on himself, and finds there an inexhaustible store; he follows antiquity and does not feel about (for its lessons);—such is the perfect sincerity of the Great Man.

11. 3ze-*khi*² had eight sons. Having arranged them before him, he called Kîu-fang Yǎn³, and said to him, 'Look at the physiognomy of my sons for me;—which will be the fortunate one?' Yǎn said, 'Khwǎn is the fortunate one.' 3ze-*khi* looked startled, and joyfully said, 'In what way?' Yǎn replied, 'Khwǎn will share the meals of the ruler of a state to the end of his life.' The father looked uneasy, burst into tears, and said, 'What has my son done that he should come to such a fate?' Yǎn replied, 'When one shares the meals of the ruler of a state, blessings reach to all within the three branches of his kindred⁴, and how much more to his father and mother! But you, Master, weep when you hear this;—you oppose (the idea of) such happiness. It is the good fortune of your son, and

¹ See note 3 on previous page.

² This can hardly be any other but Nan-kwo 3ze-*khi*.

³ A famous physiognomist; some say, of horses. Hwâi-nan 3ze calls him Kîu-fang Káo (皇).

⁴ See Mayers's Manual, p. 303.

you count it his misfortune.' 3ze-*khi* said, 'O Yǎn, what sufficient ground have you for knowing that this will be Khwǎn's good fortune? (The fortune) that is summed up in wine and flesh affects only the nose and the mouth, but you are not able to know how it will come about. I have never been a shepherd, and yet a ewe lambed in the south-west corner of my house. I have never been fond of hunting, and yet a quail hatched her young in the south-east corner. If these were not prodigies, what can be accounted such? Where I wish to occupy my mind with my son is in (the wide sphere of) heaven and earth; I wish to seek his enjoyment and mine in (the idea of) Heaven, and our support from the Earth. I do not mix myself up with him in the affairs (of the world); nor in forming plans (for his advantage); nor in the practice of what is strange. I pursue with him the perfect virtue of Heaven and Earth, and do not allow ourselves to be troubled by outward things. I seek to be with him in a state of undisturbed indifference, and not to practise what affairs might indicate as likely to be advantageous. And now there is to come to us this vulgar recompense. Whenever there is a strange realisation, there must have been strange conduct. Danger threatens;—not through any sin of me or of my son, but as brought about, I apprehend, by Heaven. It is this which makes me weep!'

Not long after this, 3ze-*khi* sent off Khwǎn to go to Yen¹, when he was made prisoner by some robbers on the way. It would have been difficult to sell him if he were whole and entire, and they thought

¹ The state so called.

their easiest plan was to cut off (one of his) feet first. They did so, and sold him in *K'hi*, where he became Inspector of roads for a Mr. *K'hi*¹. Nevertheless he had flesh to eat till he died.

12. Nieh *K'üeh* met Hsü Yü (on the way), and said to him, 'Where, Sir, are you going to?' 'I am fleeing from Yáo,' was the reply. 'What do you mean?' 'Yáo has become so bent on his benevolence that I am afraid the world will laugh at him, and that in future ages men will be found eating one another². Now the people are collected together without difficulty. Love them, and they respond with affection; benefit them, and they come to you; praise them, and they are stimulated (to please you); make them to experience what they dislike, and they disperse. When the loving and benefiting proceed from benevolence and righteousness, those who forget the benevolence and righteousness, and those who make a profit of them, are the many. In this way the practice of benevolence and righteousness comes to be without sincerity and is like a borrowing of the instruments with which men catch birds³. In all this the one man's seeking to benefit the world by his decisions and enactments (of such a nature) is as if he were to cut through (the nature of all) by one operation;—Yáo knows how wise and superior men can benefit the world, but he does not

¹ One expert supposes the text here to mean 'duke *K'ü*;' but there was no such duke of *K'hi*. The best explanation seems to be that *K'ü* was a rich gentleman, inspector of the roads of *K'hi*, or of the streets of its capital, who bought Khwän to take his duties for him.

² Compare in Bk. XXIII, par. 2.

³ A scheming for one's own advantage.

also know how they injure it. It is only those who stand outside such men that know this ¹.

There are the pliable and weak; the easy and hasty; the grasping and crooked. Those who are called the pliable and weak learn the words of some one master, to which they freely yield their assent, being secretly pleased with themselves, and thinking that their knowledge is sufficient, while they do not know that they have not yet begun (to understand) a single thing. It is this which makes them so pliable and weak. The easy and hasty are like lice on a pig. The lice select a place where the bristles are more wide apart, and look on it as a great palace or a large park. The slits between the toes, the overlappings of its skin, about its nipples and its thighs,—all these seem to them safe apartments and advantageous places;—they do not know that the butcher one morning, swinging about his arms, will spread the grass, and kindle the fire, so that they and the pig will be roasted together. So do they appear and disappear with the place where they harboured:—this is why they are called the easy and hasty.

Of the grasping and crooked we have an example in Shun. Mutton has no craving for ants, but ants have a craving for mutton, for it is rank. There was a rankness about the conduct of Shun, and the people were pleased with him. Hence when he thrice changed his residence, every one of them became a capital city ². When he came to the wild

¹ I suppose that the words of Hsü Yü stop with this sentence, and that from this to the end of the paragraph we have the sentiments of Kwang-ze himself. The style is his,—graphic but sometimes coarse.

² See note on Mencius V, i, 2, 3.

of Tăng¹, he had 100,000 families about him. Yáo having heard of the virtue and ability of Shun, appointed him to a new and uncultivated territory, saying, 'I look forward to the benefit of his coming here.' When Shun was appointed to this new territory, his years were advanced, and his intelligence was decayed;—and yet he could not find a place of rest or a home. This is an example of being grasping and wayward.

Therefore (in opposition to such) the spirit-like man dislikes the flocking of the multitudes to him. When the multitudes come, they do not agree; and when they do not agree, no benefit results from their coming. Hence there are none whom he brings very near to himself, and none whom he keeps at a great distance. He keeps his virtue in close embrace, and warmly nourishes (the spirit of) harmony, so as to be in accordance with all men. This is called the True man². Even the knowledge of the ant he puts away; his plans are simply those of the fishes³; even the notions of the sheep he discards. His seeing is simply that of the eye; his hearing that of the ear; his mind is governed by its general exercises. Being such, his course is straight and level as if marked out by a line, and its every change is in accordance (with the circumstances of the case).

13. The True men of old waited for the issues of events as the arrangements of Heaven, and did not by their human efforts try to take the place of Heaven. The True men of old (now) looked on

¹ Situation unknown.

² The spirit-like man and the true man are the same.

³ Fishes forget everything in the water.

success as life and on failure as death; and (now) on success as death and on failure as life. The operation of medicines will illustrate this:—there are monk's-bane, the *k'ieh-k'ang*, the tribulus fruit, and china-root; each of these has the time and case for which it is supremely suitable; and all such plants and their suitabilities cannot be mentioned particularly. Kâu-kien¹ took his station on (the hill of) Kwâi-k'hi with 3,000 men with their buff-coats and shields:—(his minister) Kung knew how the ruined (Yüeh) might still be preserved, but the same man did not know the sad fate in store for himself¹. Hence it is said, 'The eye of the owl has its proper fitness; the leg of the crane has its proper limit, and to cut off any of it would distress (the bird).' Hence (also) it is (further) said, 'When the wind passes over it, the volume of the river is diminished, and so it is when the sun passes over it. But let the wind and sun keep a watch together on the river, and it will not begin to feel that they are doing it any injury;—it relies on its springs and flows on.' Thus, water does its part to the ground with undeviating exactness; and so does the shadow to the substance; and one thing to another. Therefore there is danger from the power of vision in the eyes, of hearing in the ears, and of the inordinate thinking of the mind; yea, there is danger from the exercise of every power of which man's constitution is the depository.

¹ See the account of the struggle between Kâu-kien of Yüeh and Fû-k'hai of Wû in the eightieth and some following chapters of the 'History of the various States of the Eastern Kâu (Lieh Kwo K'ih).' We have sympathy with Kâu-kien, till his ingratitude to his two great ministers, one of whom was Wân Kung (the Kung of the text), shows the baseness of his character.

When the danger has come to a head, it cannot be averted, and the calamity is perpetuated, and goes on increasing. The return from this (to a state of security) is the result of (great) effort, and success can be attained only after a long time; and yet men consider (their power of self-determination) as their precious possession:—is it not sad? It is in this way that we have the ruin of states and the slaughtering of the people without end; while no one knows how to ask how it comes about.

14. Therefore, the feet of man on the earth tread but on a small space, but going on to where he has not trod before, he traverses a great distance easily; so his knowledge is but small, but going on to what he does not already know, he comes to know what is meant by Heaven¹. He knows it as The Great Unity; The Great Mystery; The Great Illuminator; The Great Framer; The Great Boundlessness; The Great Truth; The Great Determiner. This makes his knowledge complete. As The Great Unity, he comprehends it; as The Great Mystery, he unfolds it; as the Great Illuminator, he contemplates it; as the Great Framer, it is to him the Cause of all; as the Great Boundlessness, all is to him its embodiment; as The Great Truth, he examines it; as The Great Determiner, he holds it fast.

Thus Heaven is to him all; accordance with it is the brightest intelligence. Obscurity has in this its pivot; in this is the beginning. Such being the

¹ This paragraph grandly sets forth the culmination of all inquiries into the Táo as leading to the knowledge of Heaven; and the means by which it may be attained to.

case, the explanation of it is as if it were no explanation; the knowledge of it is as if it were no knowledge. (At first) he does not know it, but afterwards he comes to know it. In his inquiries, he must not set to himself any limits, and yet he cannot be without a limit. Now ascending, now descending, then slipping from the grasp, (the Táo) is yet a reality, unchanged now as in antiquity, and always without defect:—may it not be called what is capable of the greatest display and expansion? Why should we not inquire into it? Why should we be perplexed about it? With what does not perplex let us explain what perplexes, till we cease to be perplexed. So may we arrive at a great freedom from all perplexity!

BOOK XXV.

PART III. SECTION III.

Jeh-yang¹.

1. Jeh-yang having travelled to *K'ü*, ¹ *Kieh* ² spoke of him to the king, and then, before the king had granted him an interview, (left him, and) returned home. Jeh-yang went to see Wang Kwo ³, and said to him, 'Master, why do you not mention me to the king?' Wang Kwo replied, 'I am not so good a person to do that as Kung-yüeh Hsiü ⁴.' 'What sort of man is he?' asked the other, and the reply was, 'In winter he spears turtles in the *Kiang*, and in summer he rests in shady places on the mountain. When passers-by ask him (what he is doing there), he says, "This is my abode." Since ¹ *Kieh* was not able to induce the king to see you, how much less should I, who am not equal to him, be able to do so! ¹ *Kieh*'s character is this:—he has no (real) virtue, but he has knowledge. If you do not freely yield yourself to him, but employ him to carry on his spirit-like influence (with you), you will certainly get upset and benighted in the region of riches and honours. His help will not be of a virtuous character, but will go to make your virtue

¹ See vol. xxxix, pp. 154, 155.

² A native of *K'ü*, and, probably, a parasite of the court.

³ An officer of *K'ü*, 'a worthy man.'

⁴ A recluse of *K'ü*, but not keeping quite aloof from the court.

less;—it will be like heaping on clothes in spring as a protection against cold, or bringing back the cold winds of winter as a protection against heat (in summer). Now the king of *K'û* is of a domineering presence and stern. He has no forgiveness for offenders, but is merciless as a tiger. It is only a man of subtle speech, or one of correct virtue, who can bend him from his purpose¹.

‘But the sagely man², when he is left in obscurity, causes the members of his family to forget their poverty; and, when he gets forward to a position of influence, causes kings and dukes to forget their rank and emoluments, and transforms them to be humble. With the inferior creatures, he shares their pleasures, and they enjoy themselves the more; with other men, he rejoices in the fellowship of the Táo, and preserves it in himself. Therefore though he may not speak, he gives them to drink of the harmony (of his spirit). Standing in association with them, he transforms them till they become in their feeling towards him as sons with a father. His wish is to return to the solitude of his own mind, and this is the effect of his occasional intercourse with them. So far-reaching is his influence on the minds of men; and therefore I said to you, “Wait for Kung-yüeh Hsiü.”’

2. The sage comprehends the connexions between himself and others, and how they all go to constitute him of one body with them, and he does not know how it is so;—he naturally does so. In fulfilling his constitution, as acted on and acting, he

¹ Much of the description of *Î K'ieh* is difficult to construe.

² Kung-yüeh Hsiü.

(simply) follows the direction of Heaven; and it is in consequence of this that men style him (a sage). If he were troubled about (the insufficiency of) his knowledge, what he did would always be but small, and sometimes would be arrested altogether;—how would he in this case be (the sage)? When (the sage) is born with all his excellence, it is other men who see it for him. If they did not tell him, he would not know that he was more excellent than others. And when he knows it, he is as if he did not know it; when he hears it, he is as if he did not hear it. His source of joy in it has no end, and men's admiration of him has no end;—all this takes place naturally¹. The love of the sage for others receives its name from them. If they did not tell him of it, he would not know that he loved them; and when he knows it, he is as if he knew it not; when he hears it, he is as if he heard it not. His love of others never has an end, and their rest in him has also no end:—all this takes place naturally¹.

3. When one sees at a distance his old country and old city, he feels a joyous satisfaction². Though it be full of mounds and an overgrowth of trees and grass, and when he enters it he finds but a tenth part remaining, still he feels that satisfaction. How much more when he sees what he saw, and hears what he heard before! All this is to him like a tower eighty cubits high exhibited in the sight of all men.

¹ That is, 'he does so in the spontaneity of his nature.' The 性 requires the employment of the term 'nature' here, not according to any abstract usage of the term, but meaning the natural constitution. Compare the 性之 in Mencius VII, i, 30.

² So does he rejoice in attaining to the knowledge of his nature.

(The sovereign) *Zăn-hsiang*¹ was possessed of that central principle round which all things revolve², and by it he could follow them to their completion. His accompanying them had neither ending nor beginning, and was independent of impulse or time. Daily he witnessed their changes, and himself underwent no change; and why should he not have rested in this? If we (try to) adopt Heaven as our Master, we incapacitate ourselves from doing so. Such endeavour brings us under the power of things. If one acts in this way, what is to be said of him? The sage never thinks of Heaven nor of men. He does not think of taking the initiative, nor of anything external to himself. He moves along with his age, and does not vary or fail. Amid all the completeness of his doings, he is never exhausted. For those who wish to be in accord with him, what other course is there to pursue?

When Thang got one to hold for him the reins of government, namely, *Măn-yin Tăng-hăng*³, he employed him as his teacher. He followed his master, but did not allow himself to be hampered by him, and so he succeeded in following things to their completion. The master had the name; but that name was a superfluous addition to his laws, and the twofold character of his government was made apparent⁴. *Kung-ni*'s 'Task your thoughts to the utmost' was his expression of the duties of a

¹ A sage sovereign prior to the three Hwang or August ones.

² See the same phraseology in Book II, par. 3.

³ I have followed Lin Hsi-kung in taking these four characters as the name of one man.

⁴ There was a human element in it instead of the Heavenly only; but some critics think the text here is erroneous or defective.

master. Yung-khăng said, 'Take the days away and there will be no year; without what is internal there will be nothing external¹.'

4. (King) Yung² of Wei made a treaty with the marquis Thien Mâu³ (of *K'hi*), which the latter violated. The king was enraged, and intended to send a man to assassinate him. When the Minister of War⁴ heard of it, he was ashamed, and said (to the king), 'You are a ruler of 10,000 chariots, and by means of a common man would avenge yourself on your enemy. I beg you to give me, Yen, the command of 200,000 soldiers to attack him for you. I will take captive his people and officers, halter (and lead off) his oxen and horses, kindling a fire within him that shall burn to his backbone. I will then storm his capital; and when he shall run away in terror, I will flog his back and break his spine.' *K'î-ze*⁵ heard of this advice, and was ashamed of it, and said (to the king), 'We have been raising the wall (of our capital) to a height of eighty cubits, and the work has been completed. If we now get it thrown down, it will be a painful toil to the convict builders. It is now seven years

¹ Said to have been employed by Hwang-Tî to make the calendar.

² B.C. 370-317.

³ I do not find the name Mâu as belonging to any of the Thien rulers of *K'hi*. The name of the successor of Thien Ho, who has been before us, was 午, Wû, for which 牟, Mâu, may be a mistake; or 'the marquis Mâu' may be a creation of our author.

⁴ Literally, 'the Rhinoceros' Head,' the title of 'the Minister of War' in Wei, who was at this time a Kung-sun Yen. See the memoir of him in Sze-mâ *K'zien*, Book IX of his Biographies.

⁵ I do not know that anything more can be said of *K'î* and Hwâ than that they were officers of Wei.

since our troops were called out, and this is the foundation of the royal sway. Yen would introduce disorder;—he should not be listened to.’ Hwâ-ze¹ heard of this advice, and, greatly disapproving of it, said (to the king), ‘He who shows his skill in saying “Attack *K’hi*” would produce disorder; and he who shows his skill in saying “Do not attack it” would also produce disorder. And one who should (merely) say, “The counsellors to attack *K’hi* and not to attack it would both produce disorder,” would himself also lead to the same result.’ The king said, ‘Yes, but what am I to do?’ The reply was, ‘You have only to seek for (the rule of) the T’ao (on the subject).’

Hui-ze, having heard of this counsel, introduced to the king T’ai J’in-zăn², who said, ‘There is the creature called a snail; does your majesty know it?’ ‘I do.’ ‘On the left horn of the snail there is a kingdom which is called Provocation, and on the right horn another which is called Stupidity. These two kingdoms are continually striving about their territories and fighting. The corpses that lie on the ground amount to several myriads. The army of one may be defeated and put to flight, but in fifteen days it will return.’ The king said, ‘Pooh! that is empty talk!’ The other rejoined, ‘Your servant begs to show your majesty its real significance. When your majesty thinks of space—east, west, north, and south, above and beneath—can you set any limit to it?’ ‘It is illimitable,’ said the king; and his visitor went on, ‘Your majesty knows

¹ See note 5 on preceding page.

² Evidently a man of considerable reach of thought.

how to let your mind thus travel through the illimitable, and yet (as compared with this) does it not seem insignificant whether the kingdoms that communicate one with another exist or not?' The king replies, 'It does so;' and Tái Ĵin-zǎn said, finally, 'Among those kingdoms, stretching one after another, there is this Wei; in Wei there is this (city of) Liang¹; and in Liang there is your majesty. Can you make any distinction between yourself, and (the king of that kingdom of) Stupidity?' To this the king answered, 'There is no distinction,' and his visitor went out, while the king remained disconcerted and seemed to have lost himself.

When the visitor was gone, Hui-Ĵze came in and saw the king, who said, 'That stranger is a Great man. An (ordinary) sage is not equal to him.' Hui-Ĵze replied, 'If you blow into a flute, there come out its pleasant notes; if you blow into a sword-hilt, there is nothing but a wheezing sound. Yáo and Shun are the subjects of men's praises, but if you speak of them before Tái Ĵin-zǎn, there will be but the wheezing sound.'

5. Confucius, having gone to *Khû*, was lodging in the house of a seller of Congee at Ant-hill. On the roof of a neighbouring house there appeared the husband and his wife, with their servants, male and female². Ĵze-lû said, 'What are those people doing,

¹ Liang, the capital, came to be used also as the name of the state;—as in Mencius.

² 'They were on the roof, repairing it,' say some. 'They had got on the roof, to get out of the way of Confucius,' say others. The sequel shows that this second interpretation is correct; but we do not see how the taking to the roof facilitated their departure from the house.

collected there as we see them ?' *Kung-nî* replied, 'The man is a disciple of the sages. He is burying himself among the people, and hiding among the fields. Reputation has become little in his eyes, but there is no bound to his cherished aims. Though he may speak with his mouth, he never tells what is in his mind. Moreover, he is at variance with the age, and his mind disdains to associate with it ;—he is one who may be said to lie hid at the bottom of the water on the dry land. Is he not a sort of *Î Lião* of *Shih-nan* ?' *Ûze-lû* asked leave to go and call him, but *Confucius* said, 'Stop. He knows that I understand him well. He knows that I am come to *K'û*, and thinks that I am sure to try and get the king to invite him (to court). He also thinks that I am a man swift to speak. Being such a man, he would feel ashamed to listen to the words of one of voluble and flattering tongue, and how much more to come himself and see his person! And why should we think that he will remain here ?' *Ûze-lû*, however, went to see how it was, but found the house empty.

6. The Border-warden of *K'ang-wû*¹, in questioning *Ûze-lão*², said, 'Let not a ruler in the exercise of his government be (like the farmer) who leaves the clods unbroken, nor, in regulating his people, (like one) who recklessly plucks up the shoots. Formerly, in ploughing my corn-fields, I left the clods unbroken, and my recompense was in the rough unsatisfactory crops ; and in weeding, I destroyed and tore up (many good plants), and my recompense was in the scantiness of my harvests. In subse-

¹ Probably the same as the *K'ang-wû* *Ûze* in Book II, par. 9.

² See *Analects* IX, vi, 4.

quent years I changed my methods, ploughing deeply and carefully covering up the seed; and my harvests were rich and abundant, so that all the year I had more than I could eat.' When *Kwang-ze* heard of his remarks, he said, 'Nowadays, most men, in attending to their bodies and regulating their minds, correspond to the description of the Border-warden. They hide from themselves their Heaven(-given being); they leave (all care of) their (proper) nature; they extinguish their (proper) feelings; and they leave their spirit to die:—abandoning themselves to what is the general practice. Thus dealing with their nature like the farmer who is negligent of the clods in his soil, the illegitimate results of their likings and dislikings become their nature. The bushy sedges, reeds, and rushes, which seem at first to spring up to support our bodies, gradually eradicate our nature, and it becomes like a mass of running sores, ever liable to flow out, with scabs and ulcers, discharging in flowing matter from the internal heat. So indeed it is!'

7. Po *Kü*¹ was studying with *Lão Tan*, and asked his leave to go and travel everywhere. *Lão Tan* said, 'Nay;—elsewhere it is just as here.' He repeated his request, and then *Lão Tan* said, 'Where would you go first?' 'I would begin with *Khi*,' replied the disciple. 'Having got there, I would go to look at the criminals (who had been executed). With my arms I would raise (one of) them up and set him on his feet, and, taking off my court robes, I would cover him with them, appealing at

¹ We can only say of Po *Kü* that he was a disciple of *Lão-ze*.

the same time to Heaven and bewailing his lot, while I said¹, "My son, my son, you have been one of the first to suffer from the great calamities that afflict the world²." (Láo Tan) said¹, '(It is said), "Do not rob. Do not kill." (But) in the setting up of (the ideas of) glory and disgrace, we see the cause of those evils; in the accumulation of property and wealth, we see the causes of strife and contention. If now you set up the things against which men fret; if you accumulate what produces strife and contention among them; if you put their persons in such a state of distress, that they have no rest or ease, although you may wish that they should not come to the end of those (criminals), can your wish be realised?

'The superior men (and rulers) of old considered that the success (of their government) was to be found in (the state of) the people, and its failure to be sought in themselves; that the right might be with the people, and the wrong in themselves. Thus it was that if but a single person lost his life, they retired and blamed themselves. Now, however, it is not so. (Rulers) conceal what they want done, and hold those who do not know it to be stupid; they require what is very difficult, and condemn those who do not dare to undertake it; they impose heavy burdens, and punish those who are unequal to them; they require men to go far, and put them to death when they cannot accomplish the distance. When the people know that the utmost of their

¹ There are two 曰 here, and the difficulty in translating is to determine the subject of each.

² The 離 of the text here is taken as = 罹.

strength will be insufficient, they follow it up with deceit. When (the rulers) daily exhibit much hypocrisy, how can the officers and people not be hypocritical? Insufficiency of strength produces hypocrisy; insufficiency of knowledge produces deception; insufficiency of means produces robbery. But in this case against whom ought the robbery and theft to be charged?'

8. When *Kü Po-yü* was in his sixtieth year, his views became changed in the course of it¹. He had never before done anything but consider the views which he held to be right, but now he came to condemn them as wrong; he did not know that what he now called right was not what for fifty-nine years he had been calling wrong. All things have the life (which we know), but we do not see its root; they have their goings forth, but we do not know the door by which they depart. Men all honour that which lies within the sphere of their knowledge, but they do not know their dependence on what lies without that sphere which would be their (true) knowledge:—may we not call their case one of great perplexity? Ah! Ah! there is no escaping from this dilemma. So it is! So it is!

9. *Kung-ní* asked the Grand Historiographer² *Tá Tháo*, (along with) *Po Khang-khien* and *Khíh-wei*, saying, 'Duke Ling of Wei was so addicted to

¹ Confucius thought highly of this *Kü Po-yü*, and they were friends (*Analects*, XIV, 26; XV, 6). It would seem from this paragraph that, in his sixtieth year, he adopted the principles of Táoism. Whether he really did so we cannot tell. See also Book IV, par. 5.

² We must translate here in the singular, for in the historiographer's department there were only two officers with the title of 'Grand;' *Po Khang-khien* and *Khíh-wei* would be inferior members of it.

drink, and abandoned to sensuality, that he did not attend to the government of his state. Occupied in his pursuit of hunting with his nets and bows, he kept aloof from the meetings of the princes. In what was it that he showed his title to the epithet of Ling¹? Tá Tháo said, 'It was on account of those very things.' Po *Khang-khien* said, 'Duke Ling had three mistresses with whom he used to bathe in the same tub. (Once, however), when Shih-jhiû came to him with presents from the imperial court, he made his servants support the messenger in bearing the gifts². So dissolute was he in the former case, and when he saw a man of worth, thus reverent was he to him. It was on this account that he was styled "Duke Ling."' *Khih-wei* said, 'When duke Ling died, and they divined about burying him in the old tomb of his House, the answer was unfavourable; when they divined about burying him on Shâ-khiû, the answer was favourable. Accordingly they dug there to the depth of several fathoms, and found a stone coffin. Having washed and inspected it, they discovered an inscription, which said,

"This grave will not be available for your posterity;
Duke Ling will appropriate it for himself."

¹ Ling (靈), as a posthumous epithet, has various meanings, none of them very bad, and some of them very good. Confucius ought to have been able to solve his question himself better than any of the historiographers, but he propounded his doubt to them for reasons which he, no doubt, had.

² We are not to suppose that the royal messenger found him in the tub with his three wives or mistresses. The two incidents mentioned illustrate two different phases of his character, as some of the critics, and even the text itself, clearly indicate.

Thus that epithet of Ling had long been settled for the duke¹. But how should those two be able to know this?’

10. Shào K'ih² asked Thâi-kung Thiào², saying, ‘What do we mean by “The Talk of the Hamlets and Villages?”’ The reply was, ‘Hamlets and Villages are formed by the union—say of ten surnames and a hundred names, and are considered to be (the source of) manners and customs. The differences between them are united to form their common character, and what is common to them is separately apportioned to form the differences. If you point to the various parts which make up the body of a horse, you do not have the horse; but when the horse is before you, and all its various parts stand forth (as forming the animal), you speak of “the horse.” So it is that the mounds and hills are made to be the elevations that they are by accumulations of earth which individually are but low. (So also rivers like) the K'iang and the Ho obtain their greatness by the union of (other smaller) waters with them. And (in the same way) the Great man exhibits the common sentiment of humanity by the union in himself of all its individualities. Hence when ideas come to him from without, though he

¹ This explanation is, of course, absurd.

² These two names are both metaphorical, the former meaning ‘Small Knowledge,’ and the latter, ‘The Grand Public and Just Harmonizer.’ Small Knowledge would look for the T'ao in the ordinary talk of ordinary men. The other teaches him that it is to be found in ‘the Great man,’ blending in himself what is ‘just’ in the sentiments and practice of all men. And so it is to be found in all the phenomena of nature, but it has itself no name, and does nothing.

has his own decided view, he does not hold it with bigotry ; and when he gives out his own decisions, which are correct, the views of others do not oppose them. The four seasons have their different elemental characters, but they are not the partial gifts of Heaven, and so the year completes its course. The five official departments have their different duties, but the ruler does not partially employ any one of them, and so the kingdom is governed. (The gifts of) peace and war (are different), but the Great man does not employ the one to the prejudice of the other, and so the character (of his administration) is perfect. All things have their different constitutions and modes of actions, but the Tào (which directs them) is free from all partiality, and therefore it has no name. Having no name, it therefore does nothing. Doing nothing, there is nothing which it does not do.

‘Each season has its ending and beginning ; each age has its changes and transformations ; misery and happiness regularly alternate. Here our views are thwarted, and yet the result may afterwards have our approval ; there we insist on our own views, and looking at things differently from others, try to correct them, while we are in error ourselves. The case may be compared to that of a great marsh, in which all its various vegetation finds a place, or we may look at it as a great hill, where trees and rocks are found on the same terrace. Such may be a description of what is intended by “The Talk of the Hamlets and Villages.”’

Shào Kih said, ‘Well, is it sufficient to call it (an expression of) the Tào ?’ Thài-kung Thiào said, ‘It is not so. If we reckon up the number of things,

they are not 10,000 merely. When we speak of them as "the Myriad Things," we simply use that large number by way of accommodation to denominate them. In this way Heaven and Earth are the greatest of all things that have form; the Yin and Yang are the greatest of all elemental forces. But the Táo is common to them. Because of their greatness to use the Táo or (Course) as a title and call it "the Great Táo" is allowable. But what comparison can be drawn between it and "the Talk of the Hamlets and Villages?" To argue from this that it is a sufficient expression of the Táo, is like calling a dog and a horse by the same name, while the difference between them is so great.'

11. Sháo Kih said, 'Within the limits of the four cardinal points, and the six boundaries of space, how was it that there commenced the production of all things?' Thái-kung Thiáo replied, 'The Yin and Yang reflected light on each other, covered each other, and regulated each the other; the four seasons gave place to one another, produced one another, and brought one another to an end. Likings and dislikings, the avoidings of this and movements towards that, then arose (in the things thus produced), in their definite distinctness; and from this came the separation and union of the male and female. Then were seen now security and now insecurity, in mutual change; misery and happiness produced each other; gentleness and urgency pressed on each other; the movements of collection and dispersion were established:—these names and processes can be examined, and, however minute, can be recorded. The rules determining the order in which they follow one another, their mutual influence

now acting directly and now revolving, how, when they are exhausted, they revive, and how they end and begin again ; these are the properties belonging to things. Words can describe them and knowledge can reach to them ; but with this ends all that can be said of things. Men who study the Táo do not follow on when these operations end, nor try to search out how they began :—with this all discussion of them stops.’

Sháo K’ih said, ‘*K’i K’án*¹ holds that (the Táo) forbids all action, and *K’ieh-ze*¹ holds that it may perhaps allow of influence. Which of the two is correct in his statements, and which is one-sided in his ruling?’ Thái-kung Thiáo replied, ‘Cocks crow and dogs bark ;—this is what all men know. But men with the greatest wisdom cannot describe in words whence it is that they are formed (with such different voices), nor can they find out by thinking what they wish to do. We may refine on this small point ; till it is so minute that there is no point to operate on, or it may become so great that there is no embracing it. “Some one caused it ;” “No one did it ;” but we are thus debating about things ; and the end is that we shall find we are in error. “Some one caused it ;”—then there was a real Being. “No one did it ;”—then there was mere vacancy. To have a name and a real existence,—that is the condition of a thing. Not to have a name, and not

¹ Two masters of schools of Táoism. Who the former was I do not know ; but Sze-mâ K’ien in the seventy-fourth Book of his Records mentions several Táoist masters, and among them *K’ieh-ze*, a native of *K’hi*, ‘a student of the arts of the Táo and its Characteristics, as taught by Hwang-T’i and Láo-ze, and who also published his views on the subject.’

to have real being;—that is vacancy and no thing. We may speak and we may think about it, but the more we speak, the wider shall we be of the mark. Birth, before it comes, cannot be prevented; death, when it has happened, cannot be traced farther. Death and life are not far apart; but why they have taken place cannot be seen. That some one has caused them, or that there has been no action in the case are but speculations of doubt. When I look for their origin, it goes back into infinity; when I look for their end, it proceeds without termination. Infinite, unceasing, there is no room for words about (the Tâo). To regard it as in the category of things is the origin of the language that it is caused or that it is the result of doing nothing; but it would end as it began with things. The Tâo cannot have a (real) existence; if it has, it cannot be made to appear as if it had not. The name Tâo is a metaphor, used for the purpose of description¹. To say that it causes or does nothing is but to speak of one phase of things, and has nothing to do with the Great Subject. If words were sufficient for the purpose, in a day's time we might exhaust it; since they are not sufficient, we may speak all day, and only exhaust (the subject of) things. The Tâo is the extreme to which things conduct us. Neither speech nor silence is sufficient to convey the notion of it. Neither by speech nor by silence can our thoughts about it have their highest expression.

¹ A very important statement with regard to the meaning of the name Tâo.

BOOK XXVI.

PART III. SECTION IV.

Wâi Wû, or 'What comes from Without'.¹

1. What comes from without cannot be determined beforehand. So it was that Lung-fǎng² was killed; Pi-kan immolated; and the count of K'î (made to feign himself) mad, (while) O-lâi died³, and Kieh and K'âu both perished. Rulers all wish their ministers to be faithful, but that faithfulness may not secure their confidence; hence Wû Yün became a wanderer along the K'iang⁴, and K'hang Hung died in Shû, where (the people) preserved his blood for three years, when it became changed into green jade⁵. Parents all wish their sons to be filial, but that filial duty may not secure their love; hence

¹ See vol. xxxix, p. 155.

² The name of Kwan Lung-fǎng, a great officer of Kieh, the tyrant of Hsiâ;—see Bk. IV, par. 1, et al.

³ A scion of the line of K'hin whose fortunes culminated in Shih Hwang-Tî. O-lâi assisted the tyrant of Shang, and was put to death by king Wû of K'âu.

⁴ The famous Wû 3ze-hstü, the hero of Revenge, who made his escape along the K'iang, in about B. C. 512, to Wû, after the murder of his father and elder brother by the king of K'hi.

⁵ See Bk. X, par. 2. In the 3o-kwan, under the third year of duke Âi, it is related that the people of K'âu killed K'hang Hung; but nothing is said of this being done in Shû, or of his blood turning to green jade! This we owe to the K'zun K'hiü of Lü.

Hsiáo-~~ki~~¹ had to endure his sorrow, and ǰǰng Shǎn his grief².

When wood is rubbed against wood, it begins to burn; when metal is subjected to fire, it (melts and) flows. When the Yin and Yang act awry, heaven and earth are greatly perturbed; and on this comes the crash of thunder, and from the rain comes fire, which consumes great locust trees³. (The case of men) is still worse. They are troubled between two pitfalls⁴, from which they cannot escape. Chrysalis-like, they can accomplish nothing. Their minds are as if hung up between heaven and earth. Now comforted, now pitied, they are plunged in difficulties. The ideas of profit and of injury rub against each other, and produce in them a very great fire. The harmony (of the mind) is consumed in the mass of men. Their moonlike intelligence cannot overcome the (inward) fire. They thereupon fall away more and more, and the Course (which they should pursue) is altogether lost.

2. The family of Kwang Káu being poor, he went to ask the loan of some rice from the Marquis Superintendent of the Ho⁵, who said, 'Yes, I shall be

¹ Said to have been 'the eldest son of king Wú Ting or Káu Tung of the Yin dynasty. I do not know the events in his experience to which our author must be referring.

² The well-known disciple of Confucius, famous for his filial piety.

³ The lightning accompanying a thunderstorm.

⁴ The ideas of profit and injury immediately mentioned.

⁵ In another version of this story, in Liú Hsiang's Shwo Yüan, XI, art. 13, the party applied to is 'duke Wǎn of Wei;' but this does not necessarily conflict with the text. The genuineness of the paragraph is denied by Lin Hsi-kung and others; but I seem to see the hand of Kwang-~~ze~~ in it.

getting the (tax-) money from the people (soon), and I will then lend you three hundred ounces of silver;—will that do?’ *Kwang K’au* flushed with anger, and said, ‘On the road yesterday, as I was coming here, I heard some one calling out. On looking round, I saw a goby in the carriage rut, and said to it, “Goby fish, what has brought you here?” The goby said, “I am Minister of Waves in the Eastern Sea. Have you, Sir, a gallon or a pint of water to keep me alive?” I replied, “Yes, I am going south to see the kings of *Wû* and *Yüeh*, and I will then lead a stream from the Western *Kiang* to meet you;—will that do?” The goby flushed with anger, and said, “I have lost my proper element, and I can here do nothing for myself; but if I could get a gallon or a pint of water, I should keep alive. Than do what you propose, you had better soon look for me in a stall of dry fish.”’

3. A son of the duke of *Zăn*¹, having provided himself with a great hook, a powerful black line, and fifty steers to be used as bait, squatted down on (mount) *Kwâi K’i*, and threw the line into the Eastern Sea. Morning after morning he angled thus, and for a whole year caught nothing. At the end of that time, a great fish swallowed the bait, and dived down, dragging the great hook with him. Then it rose to the surface in a flurry, and flapped with its fins, till the white waves rose like hills, and the waters were lashed into fury. The noise was like that of imps and spirits, and spread terror

¹ I suppose this was merely a district of *K’û*, and the duke of it merely the officer in charge of it;—according to the practice of the rulers of *K’û*, after they usurped the title of King.

for a thousand li. The prince having got such a fish, cut it in slices and dried them. From the *Keh* river¹ to the east, and from *ᅒhang-wû*² to the north, there was not one who did not eat his full from that fish; and in subsequent generations, story-tellers of small abilities have all repeated the story to one another with astonishment. (But) if the prince had taken his rod, with a fine line, and gone to pools and ditches, and watched for minnows and gobies, it would have been difficult for him to get a large fish. Those who dress up their small tales to obtain favour with the magistrates are far from being men of great understanding; and therefore one who has not heard the story of this scion of *Zăn* is not fit to take any part in the government of the world;—far is he from being so³.

4. Some literati, students of the Odes and Ceremonies, were breaking open a mound over a grave⁴. The superior among them spoke down to the others, 'Day is breaking in the east; how is the thing going on?' The younger men replied, 'We have not yet opened his jacket and skirt, but there is a pearl in the mouth. As it is said in the Ode,

"The bright, green grain
Is growing on the sides of the mound.

¹ The 制河 of the text = the 浙江, still giving its name to the province so called.

² Where Shun was buried.

³ This last sentence is difficult to construe, and to understand.—The genuineness of this paragraph is also questioned, and the style is inferior to that of the preceding.

⁴ I can conceive of *Kwang-ᅒze* telling this story of some literati who had been acting as resurrectionists, as a joke against their class; but not of his writing it to form a part of his work.

While living, he gave nothing away;
 Why, when dead, should he hold a pearl in his
 mouth¹?"'

Thereupon they took hold of the whiskers and pulled at the beard, while the superior introduced a piece of fine steel into the chin, and gradually separated the jaws, so as not to injure the pearl in the mouth.

5. A disciple of Láo Lái-ze², while he was out gathering firewood, met with *Kung-ní*. On his return, he told (his master), saying, 'There is a man there, the upper part of whose body is long and the lower part short. He is slightly hump-backed, and his ears are far back. When you look at him, he seems occupied with the cares of all within the four seas; I do not know whose son he is.' Láo Lái-ze said, 'It is *K'hiû*; call him here;' and when *Kung-ní* came, he said to him, '*K'hiû*, put away your personal conceit, and airs of wisdom, and show yourself to be indeed a superior man.' *Kung-ní* bowed and was retiring, when he abruptly changed his manner, and asked, 'Will the object I am pursuing be thereby advanced?' Láo Lái-ze replied, 'You cannot bear the sufferings of this one age, and are stubbornly regardless of the

¹ This verse is not found, so far as I know, anywhere else.

² Láo Lái-ze appears here as a contemporary of Confucius, and the master of a Táoistic school, and this also is the view of him which we receive from the accounts in *Sze-mâ K'ien* and *Hwang-fû Mí*. *Sze-mâ* says he published a work in fifteen sections on the usefulness of Táoism. Some have imagined that he was the same as Láo-ze himself, but there does not appear any ground for that opinion. He is one of the twenty-four examples of Filial Piety so celebrated among the Chinese; but I suspect that the accounts of him as such are fabrications. He certainly lectures Confucius here in a manner worthy of Láo Tan.

evils of a myriad ages :—is it that you purposely make yourself thus unhappy? or is it that you have not the ability to comprehend the case? Your obstinate purpose to make men rejoice in a participation of your joy is your life-long shame, the procedure of a mediocre man. You would lead men by your fame; you would bind them to you by your secret art. Than be praising Yáo and condemning Kieh, you had better forget them both, and shut up your tendency to praise. If you reflect on it, it does nothing but injury; your action in it is entirely wrong. The sage is full of anxiety and indecision in undertaking anything, and so he is always successful. But what shall I say of your conduct? To the end it is all affectation.'

6. The ruler Yüan of Sung¹ (once) dreamt at midnight that a man with dishevelled hair peeped in on him at a side door and said, 'I was coming from the abyss of 3âi-lû, commissioned by the Clear Kiang to go to the place of the Earl of the Ho; but the fisherman Yü 3ü has caught me.' When the ruler Yüan awoke, he caused a diviner to divine the meaning (of the dream), and was told, 'This is a marvellous tortoise.' The ruler asked if among the fishermen there was one called Yü 3ü, and being told by his attendants that there was, he gave orders that he should be summoned to court. Accordingly the man next day appeared at court, and the ruler said, 'What have you caught (lately) in fishing?' The reply was, 'I have caught in my net a white tortoise, sieve-like, and five cubits round.' 'Present the prodigy here,' said the ruler; and, when it came, once and

¹ Compare in Bk. XXI, par. 7.

again he wished to kill it, once and again he wished to keep it alive. Doubting in his mind (what to do), he had recourse to divination, and obtained the answer, 'To kill the tortoise for use in divining will be fortunate.' Accordingly they cut the creature open, and perforated its shell in seventy-two places, and there was not a single divining slip which failed¹.

Kung-nt said, 'The spirit-like tortoise could show itself in a dream to the ruler *Yüan*, and yet it could not avoid the net of *Yü 3ü*. Its wisdom could respond on seventy-two perforations without failing in a single divination, and yet it could not avoid the agony of having its bowels all scooped out. We see from this that wisdom is not without its perils, and spirit-like intelligence does not reach to everything. A man may have the greatest wisdom, but there are a myriad men scheming against him. Fishes do not fear the net, though they fear the pelican. Put away your small wisdom, and your great wisdom will be bright; discard your skilfulness, and you will become naturally skilful. A child when it is born needs no great master, and yet it becomes able to speak, living (as it does) among those who are able to speak.'

7. *Hui-ze* said to *Kwang-ze*, 'You speak, Sir, of what is of no use.' The reply was, 'When a man knows what is not useful, you can then begin to speak to him of what is useful. The earth for instance is certainly spacious and great; but what a

¹ The story of this wonderful tortoise is found at much greater length, and with variations, in *Sze-mâ K'ien's* Records, Bk. LXVIII, q. v. The moral of it is given in the concluding remarks from *Confucius*.

man uses of it is only sufficient ground for his feet. If, however, a rent were made by the side of his feet, down to the yellow springs, could the man still make use of it?' Hui-ze said, 'He could not use it,' and K'wang-ze rejoined, 'Then the usefulness of what is of no use is clear ¹.'

8. K'wang-ze said, 'If a man have the power to enjoy himself (in any pursuit), can he be kept from doing so? If he have not the power, can he so enjoy himself? There are those whose aim is bent on concealing themselves, and those who are determined that their doings shall leave no trace. Alas! they both shirk the obligations of perfect knowledge and great virtue. The (latter) fall, and cannot recover themselves; the (former) rush on like fire, and do not consider (what they are doing). Though men may stand to each other in the relation of ruler and minister, that is but for a time. In a changed age, the one of them would not be able to look down on the other. Hence it is said, "The Perfect man leaves no traces of his conduct."

'To honour antiquity and despise the present time is the characteristic of learners ²; but even the disciples of K'ih-wei ³ have to look at the present age; and who can avoid being carried along by its course? It is only the Perfect man who is able to enjoy himself in the world, and not be deflected from the right,

¹ See Bk. I, par. 6, and XXIV, par. 14. The conversations between our author and Hui-ze often turned on this subject.

² Does our author mean by 'learners' the literati, the disciples of Confucius?

³ K'ih-wei,—see Bk. VI, par. 7. Perhaps 'the disciples of K'ih-wei' are those who in our author's time called themselves such, but were not.

to accommodate himself to others and not lose himself. He does not learn their lessons ; he only takes their ideas into consideration, and does not discard them as different from his own.

9. 'It is the penetrating eye that gives clear vision, the acute ear that gives quick hearing, the discriminating nose that gives discernment of odours, the practised mouth that gives the enjoyment of flavours, the active mind that acquires knowledge, and the far-reaching knowledge that constitutes virtue. In no case does the connexion with what is without like to be obstructed ; obstruction produces stoppage ; stoppage, continuing without intermission, arrests all progress ; and with this all injurious effects spring up.

'The knowledge of all creatures depends on their breathing¹. But if their breath be not abundant, it is not the fault of Heaven, which tries to penetrate them with it, day and night without ceasing ; but men notwithstanding shut their pores against it. The womb encloses a large and empty space ; the heart has its spontaneous and enjoyable movements. If their apartment be not roomy, wife and mother-in-law will be bickering ; if the heart have not its spontaneous and enjoyable movements, the six faculties of perception² will be in mutual collision. That

¹ There seems to underlie this statement the Tâoist dogma about the regulation of the 'breath,' as conducive to long life and mental cultivation.

² Probably what in Buddhist literature are called 'the Six Entrances (六入),' what Mayers denominates 'The Six Organs of Admittance, or Bodily Sensations,' the *Shaḍāyatana*, the eye, ear, nose, mouth, body, and mind,—one of the twelve *Nidānas* in the Buddhist system.

the great forests, the heights and hills, are pleasant to men, is because their spirits cannot overcome (those distracting influences). Virtue overflows into (the love of) fame; (the love of) fame overflows into violence; schemes originate in the urgency (of circumstances); (the show of) wisdom comes from rivalry; the fuel (of strife) is produced from the obstinate maintenance (of one's own views); the business of offices should be apportioned in accordance with the approval of all. In spring, when the rain and the sunshine come seasonably, vegetation grows luxuriantly, and sickles and hoes begin to be prepared. More than half of what had fallen down becomes straight, and we do not know how.

10. 'Stillness and silence are helpful to those who are ill; rubbing the corners of the eyes is helpful to the aged; rest serves to calm agitation; but they are the toiled and troubled who have recourse to these things. Those who are at ease, and have not had such experiences, do not care to ask about them. The spirit-like man has had no experience of how it is that the sagely man keeps the world in awe, and so he does not inquire about it; the sagely man has had no experience of how it is that the man of ability and virtue keeps his age in awe, and so he does not inquire about it; the man of ability and virtue has had no experience of how it is that the superior man keeps his state in awe, and so he does not inquire about it. The superior man has had no experience of how it is that the small man keeps himself in agreement with his times that he should inquire about it.'

11. The keeper of the Yen Gate¹, on the death of

¹ The name of one of the gates in the wall of the capital of Sung.

his father, showed so much skill in emaciating his person¹ that he received the rank of 'Pattern for Officers.' Half the people of his neighbourhood (in consequence) carried their emaciation to such a point that they died. When Yâo wished to resign the throne to Hsü Yû, the latter ran away. When Thang offered his to Wû Kwang², Wû Kwang became angry. When Kî Thâ³ heard it, he led his disciples, and withdrew to the river Kho, where the feudal princes came and condoled with him, and after three years, Shăn Thû-tî⁴ threw himself into the water. Fishing-stakes⁵ are employed to catch fish; but when the fish are got, the men forget the stakes. Snares are employed to catch hares, but when the hares are got, men forget the snares. Words are employed to convey ideas; but when the ideas are apprehended, men forget the words. Fain would I talk with such a man who has forgot the words!

¹ The abstinences and privations in mourning were so many that there was a danger of their seriously injuring the health;—which was forbidden.

² See Bk. VI, par. 3; but in the note there, Wû Kwang is said to have been of the time of Hwang-Tî; which is probably an error.

³ See IV, par. 3; but I do not know who Kî Thâ was, nor can I explain what is said of him here.

⁴ See again IV, par. 3.

⁵ According to some, 'baskets.' This illustration is quoted in the Inscription on the Nestorian Monument, II, 7.

BOOK XXVII.

PART III. SECTION V.

Yü Yen, or 'Metaphorical Language'¹.

1. Of my sentences nine in ten are metaphorical ; of my illustrations seven in ten are from valued writers. The rest of my words are like the water that daily fills the cup, tempered and harmonised by the Heavenly element in our nature².

The nine sentences in ten which are metaphorical are borrowed from extraneous things to assist (the comprehension of) my argument. (When it is said, for instance), 'A father does not act the part of matchmaker for his own son,' (the meaning is that) 'it is better for another man to praise the son than for his father to do so.' The use of such metaphorical language is not my fault, but the fault of men (who would not otherwise readily understand me).

Men assent to views which agree with their own, and oppose those which do not so agree. Those which agree with their own they hold to be right, and those which do not so agree they hold to be wrong. The seven out of ten illustrations taken from valued writers are designed to put an end to disputations. Those writers are the men of hoary eld, my predecessors in time. But such as are un-

¹ See vol. xxxix, pp. 155, 156.

² See Bk. II, par. 10.

versed in the warp and woof, the beginning and end of the subject, cannot be set down as of venerable eld, and regarded as the predecessors of others. If men have not that in them which fits them to precede others, they are without the way proper to man, and they who are without the way proper to man can only be pronounced defunct monuments of antiquity.

Words like the water that daily issues from the cup, and are harmonised by the Heavenly Element (of our nature), may be carried on into the region of the unlimited, and employed to the end of our years. But without words there is an agreement (in principle). That agreement is not effected by words, and an agreement in words is not effected by it. Hence it is said, 'Let there be no words.' Speech does not need words. One may speak all his life, and not have spoken a (right) word; and one may not have spoken all his life, and yet all his life been giving utterance to the (right) words. There is that which makes a thing allowable, and that which makes a thing not allowable. There is that which makes a thing right, and that which makes a thing not right. How is a thing right? It is right because it is right. How is a thing wrong? It is wrong because it is wrong. How is a thing allowable? It is allowable because it is so. How is a thing not allowable? It is not allowable because it is not so. Things indeed have what makes them right, and what makes them allowable. There is nothing which has not its condition of right; nothing which has not its condition of allowability. But without the words of the (water-) cup in daily use, and harmonised by the Heavenly Element (in our

nature), what one can continue long in the possession of these characteristics ?

All things are divided into their several classes, and succeed to one another in the same way, though of different bodily forms. They begin and end as in an unbroken ring, though how it is they do so be not apprehended. This is what is called the Lathe of Heaven ; and the Lathe of Heaven is the Heavenly Element in our nature.

2. *Kwang-ze* said to *Hui-ze*, 'When Confucius was in his sixtieth year, in that year his views changed¹. What he had before held to be right, he now ended by holding to be wrong ; and he did not know whether the things which he now pronounced to be right were not those which he had for fifty-nine years held to be wrong.' *Hui-ze* replied, 'Confucius with an earnest will pursued the acquisition of knowledge, and acted accordingly.' *Kwang-ze* rejoined, 'Confucius disowned such a course, and never said that it was his. He said, "Man receives his powers from the Great Source² (of his being), and he should restore them to their (original) intelligence in his life. His singing should be in accordance with the musical tubes, and his speech a model for imitation. When profit and righteousness are set before him, and his liking (for the latter) and dislike (of the

¹ Compare this with the same language about *Kü Po-yü* in Bk. XXV, par. 8. There is no proof to support our author's assertion that the views of Confucius underwent any change.

² 'The Great Source (Root)' here is generally explained by 'the Grand Beginning.' It is not easy to say whether we are to understand an ideal condition of man designed from the first, or the condition of every man as he is born into the world. On the 'powers' received by man, see *Mencius* VI, i, 6.

former), his approval and disapproval, are manifested, that only serves to direct the speech of men (about him). To make men in heart submit, and not dare to stand up in opposition to him; to establish the fixed law for all under heaven:—ah! ah! I have not attained to that.”’

3. *Ǟng-ze* twice took office, and on the two occasions his state of mind was different. He said, ‘While my parents were alive I took office, and though my emolument was only three *fû*¹ (of grain), my mind was happy. Afterwards when I took office, my emolument was three thousand *kung*²; but I could not share it with my parents, and my mind was sad.’ The other disciples asked *Kung-ni*, saying, ‘Such an one as *Shăn* may be pronounced free from all entanglement:—is he to be blamed for feeling as he did³?’ The reply was, ‘But he was subject to entanglement⁴. If he had been free from it, could he have had that sadness? He would have looked on his three *fû* and three thousand *kung* no more than on a heron or a mosquito passing before him.’

4. Yen *Khăng Ǟze-yû* said to Tung-kwo *Ǟze-khi*⁵, ‘When I (had begun to) hear your instructions, the first year, I continued a simple rustic; the second

¹ A *fû* = ten *tâu* and four *shing*, or sixty-four *shing*, the *shing* at present being rather less than an English pint.

² A *kung* = sixty-four *tâu*; but there are various accounts of its size.

³ This sentence is difficult to construe.

⁴ But Confucius could not count his love for his parents an entanglement.

⁵ We must suppose this master to be the same as the Nan-kwo *Ǟze-khi* of Bk. II.

year, I became docile; the third year, I comprehended (your teaching); the fourth year, I was (plastic) as a thing; the fifth year, I made advances; the sixth year, the spirit entered (and dwelt in me); the seventh year, (my nature as designed by) Heaven was perfected; the eighth year, I knew no difference between death and life; the ninth year, I attained to the Great Mystery¹.

'Life has its work to do, and death ensues, (as if) the common character of each were a thing prescribed. Men consider that their death has its cause; but that life from (the operation of) the Yang has no cause. But is it really so? How does (the Yang) operate in this direction? Why does it not operate there?

'Heaven has its places and spaces which can be calculated; (the divisions of) the earth can be assigned by men. But how shall we search for and find out (the conditions of the Great Mystery)? We do not know when and how (life) will end, but how shall we conclude that it is not determined (from without)? and as we do not know when and how it begins, how should we conclude that it is not (so) determined?

'In regard to the issues of conduct which we deem appropriate, how should we conclude that there are no spirits presiding over them; and where those issues seem inappropriate, how should we conclude that there are spirits presiding over them?'

¹ In illustration of the text here Lû Shû-kih refers to the use of Miào (妙), in the account of the term 'Spirit,' in the fifth Appendix to the Yî, par. 10, as meaning 'the subtle (presence and operation of God) with all things.' 3ze-yü's further exposition of his attainments is difficult to understand fully.

5. The penumbræ (once) asked the shadow¹, saying, 'Formerly you were looking down, and now you are looking up; formerly you had your hair tied up, and now it is dishevelled; formerly you were sitting, and now you have risen up; formerly you were walking, and now you have stopped:—how is all this?' The shadow said, 'Venerable Sirs, how do you ask me about such small matters? These things all belong to me, but I do not know how they do so. I am (like) the shell of a cicada or the cast-off skin of a snake²;—like them, and yet not like them. With light and the sun I make my appearance; with darkness and the night I fade away. Am not I dependent on the substance from which I am thrown? And that substance is itself dependent on something else! When it comes, I come with it; when it goes, I go with it. When it comes under the influence of the strong Yang, I come under the same. Since we are both produced by that strong Yang, what occasion is there for you to question me?'

6. Yang 3ze-kü³ had gone South to Phei⁴, while Láo Tan was travelling in the west in K'in⁵. (He thereupon) asked (Láo-3ze) to come to the border (of Phei), and went himself to Liang, where he met him. Láo-3ze stood in the middle of the way, and, looking up to heaven, said with a sigh, 'At first I thought that you might be taught, but now I see that you cannot be.' Yang 3ze-kü made no reply;

¹ Compare Bk. II, par. 11.

² Such is the reading of Jiáo Hung.

³ No doubt the Yang K'ü of Lieh-3ze and Mencius.

⁴ See in XIV, 26 b.

⁵ In the borders of Phei; can hardly be the great State.

and when they came to their lodging-house, he brought in water for the master to wash his hands and rinse his mouth, along with a towel and comb. He then took off his shoes outside the door, went forward on his knees, and said, 'Formerly, your disciple wished to ask you, Master, (the reason of what you said); but you were walking, and there was no opportunity, and therefore I did not presume to speak. Now there is an opportunity, and I beg to ask why you spoke as you did.' Láo-ze replied, 'Your eyes are lofty, and you stare;—who would live with you? The purest carries himself as if he were soiled; the most virtuous seems to feel himself defective.' Yang 3ze-kü looked abashed and changed countenance, saying, 'I receive your commands with reverence.'

When he first went to the lodging-house, the people of it met him and went before him. The master of it carried his mat for him, and the mistress brought the towel and comb. The lodgers left their mats, and the cook his fire-place (as he passed them). When he went away, the others in the house would have striven with him about (the places for) their mats¹.

¹ So had his arrogant superciliousness given place to humility.

BOOK XXVIII.

PART III. SECTION VI.

Zang Wang, or 'Kings who have wished to resign the Throne¹.'

1. Yáo proposed to resign the throne to Hsü Yü, who would not accept it. He then offered it to 3ze-káu K'ih-fû², but he said, 'It is not unreasonable to propose that I should occupy the throne, but I happen to be suffering under a painful sorrow and illness. While I am engaged in dealing with it, I have not leisure to govern the kingdom.' Now the throne is the most important of all positions, and yet this man would not occupy it to the injury of his life; how much less would he have allowed any other thing to do so! But only he who does not care to rule the kingdom is fit to be entrusted with it.

Shun proposed to resign the throne to 3ze-káu K'ih-po², who declined in the very same terms as K'ih-fû had done. Now the kingdom is the greatest of all concerns, and yet this man would not give his life in exchange for the throne. This shows how they who possess the Táo differ from common men.

¹ See vol. xxxix, pp. 156, 157.

² We know nothing of this man but what is related here. He is, no doubt, a fictitious character. K'ih-fû and K'ih-po are supposed to be the same individual. See Hwang-fû Mí, I, 7.

Shun proposed to resign the throne to Shan K'üan¹, who said, 'I am a unit in the midst of space and time. In winter I wear skins and furs; in summer, grass-cloth and linen; in spring I plough and sow, my strength being equal to the toil; in autumn I gather in my harvest, and am prepared to cease from labour and eat. At sunrise I get up and work; at sunset I rest. So do I enjoy myself between heaven and earth, and my mind is content:—why should I have anything to do with the throne? Alas! that you, Sir, do not know me better!' Thereupon he declined the proffer, and went away, deep among the hills, no man knew where.

Shun proposed to resign the throne to his friend, a farmer of Shih-hü². The farmer, however, said (to himself), 'How full of vigour does our lord show himself, and how exuberant is his strength! If Shun with all his powers be not equal (to the task of government, how should I be so?).' On this he took his wife on his back, led his son by the hand, and went away to the sea-coast, from which to the end of his life he did not come back.

When Thâi-wang Than-fü³ was dwelling in Pin³, the wild tribes of the North attacked him. He tried to serve them with skins and silks, but they were not satisfied. He tried to serve them with dogs and horses, but they were not satisfied, and then

¹ Nor do we know more of Shan K'üan, though Mî relates a visit of Yâo to him.

² Name of a place; where it was is very uncertain.

³ An ancestor of the House of K'âu, who about B.C. 1325 removed from Pin (in the present small department so called of Shen-hsi), and settled in the district of K'hi-shan, department of Fäng-jiang. He was the grandfather of king Wăn.

with pearls and jade, but they were not satisfied. What they sought was his territory. Thâi-wang Than-fû said (to his people), 'To dwell with the elder brother and cause the younger brother to be killed, or with the father and cause the son to be killed,—this is what I cannot bear to do. Make an effort, my children, to remain here. What difference is there between being my subjects, or the subjects of those wild people? And I have heard that a man does not use that which he employs for nourishing his people to injure them.' Thereupon he took his staff and switch and left, but the people followed him in an unbroken train, and he established a (new) state at the foot of mount *Khi*¹. Thus Thâi-wang Than-fû might be pronounced one who could give its (due) honour to life. Those who are able to do so, though they may be rich and noble, will not, for that which nourishes them, injure their persons; and though they may be poor and mean, will not, for the sake of gain, involve their bodies (in danger). The men of the present age who occupy high offices and are of honourable rank all lose these (advantages) again, and in the prospect of gain lightly expose their persons to ruin:—is it not a case of delusion?

The people of Yüeh three times in succession killed their ruler, and the prince Sâu², distressed by it, made his escape to the caves of Tan, so that Yüeh was left without a ruler. The people sought

¹ See note 3, p. 150.

² Sze-mâ *Khien* takes up the history of Yüeh at a later period, and we have from him no details of this prince Sâu. Tan-hsüeh was the name of a district in the south of Yüeh, in which was a valley with caves containing cinnabar;—the fabled home of the phoenix.

for the prince, but could not find him, till (at last) they followed him to the cave of Tan. The prince was not willing to come out to them, but they smoked him out with moxa, and made him mount the royal chariot. As he took hold of the strap, and mounted the carriage, he looked up to heaven, and called out, 'O Ruler, O Ruler, could you not have spared me this?' Prince Sâu did not dislike being ruler;—he disliked the evil inseparable from being so. It may be said of him that he would not for the sake of a kingdom endanger his life; and this indeed was the reason why the people of Yüeh wanted to get him for their ruler.

2. Han¹ and Wei¹ were contending about some territory which one of them had wrested from the other. 3ze-hwâ 3ze² went to see the marquis K'ao-hsi (of Han)³, and, finding him looking sorrowful, said, 'Suppose now that all the states were to sign an agreement before you to the effect that "Whoever should with his left hand carry off (the territory in dispute) should lose his right hand, and whoever should do so with his right hand should lose his left hand, but that, nevertheless, he who should carry it off was sure to obtain the whole kingdom;" would your lordship feel yourself able to carry it off?' The marquis said, 'I would not carry it off,' and 3ze-hwâ rejoined, 'Very good. Looking at the thing from this point of view, your two arms are of more value to you than the whole kingdom. But

¹ Two of the three states into which the great state of 3in was divided about the beginning of the fifth century B.C.

² A native, we may call him a philosopher, of Wei.

³ Began his rule in B.C. 359.

your body is of more value than your two arms, and Han is of much less value than the whole kingdom. The territory for which you are now contending is further much less important than Han :—your lordship, since you feel so much concern for your body, should not be endangering your life by indulging your sorrow.'

The marquis *K'ao-hsi* said, 'Good! Many have given me their counsel about this matter; but I never heard what you have said.' 3ze-hwâ 3ze may be said to have known well what was of great importance and what was of little.

3. The ruler of Lû, having heard that Yen Ho¹ had attained to the T'ao, sent a messenger, with a gift of silks, to prepare the way for further communication with him. Yen Ho was waiting at the door of a mean house, in a dress of coarse hempen cloth, and himself feeding a cow². When the messenger arrived, Yen Ho himself confronted him. 'Is this,' said the messenger, 'the house of Yen Ho?' 'It is,' was the reply; and the other was presenting the silks to him, when he said, 'I am afraid you heard (your instructions) wrongly, and that he who sent you will blame you. You had better make sure.' The messenger on this returned, and made sure that he was right; but when he came back, and sought for Yen Ho, he was not to be found.

Yes; men like Yen Ho do of a truth dislike riches and honours. Hence it is said, 'The true

¹ Perhaps the Yen Ho of IV, 5.

² The same thing is often seen at the present day. The party in charge of the cow pours its prepared food down its throat from a joint of bamboo.

object of the Táo is the regulation of the person. Quite subordinate to this is its use in the management of the state and the clan; while the government of the kingdom is but the dust and refuse of it.' From this we may see that the services of the Tis and Kings are but a surplusage of the work of the sages, and do not contribute to complete the person or nourish the life. Yet the superior men of the present age will, most of them, throw away their lives for the sake of their persons, in pursuing their (material) objects;—is it not cause for grief? Whenever a sage is initiating any movement, he is sure to examine the motive which influences him, and what he is about to do. Here, however, is a man, who uses a pearl like that of the marquis of Sui¹ to shoot a bird at a distance of 10,000 feet. All men will laugh at him; and why? Because the thing which he uses is of great value, and what he wishes to get is of little. And is not life of more value than the pearl of the marquis of Sui?

4. 3ze² Lieh-3ze² was reduced to extreme poverty, and his person had a hungry look. A visitor mentioned the case to 3ze-yang, (the premier) of Kǎng, saying, 'Lieh Yü-khâu, I believe, is a scholar who has attained to the Táo. Is it because our ruler does not love (such) scholars, that he should be living in his state in such poverty?' 3ze-yang immediately ordered an officer to send to him a supply of grain.

¹ Sui was a small feudal state, a dependency of Wei. Its name remains in the Sui-kâu, Teh-an department, Hû-pei. The story is that one of its lords having healed a wounded snake, the creature one night brought him a large pearl in its mouth.

² The phraseology is peculiar. See Introductory Note on Bk. XXXII.

When Lieh-ze saw the messenger, he bowed to him twice, and declined the gift, on which the messenger went away. On Lieh-ze's going into the house, his wife looked to him and beat her breast, saying, 'I have heard that the wife and children of a possessor of the Táo all enjoy plenty and ease, but now we look starved. The ruler has seen his error, and sent you a present of food, but you would not receive it; —is it appointed (for us to suffer thus)?' Ze Lieh-ze laughed and said to her, 'The ruler does not himself know me. Because of what some one said to him, he sent me the grain; but if another speak (differently) of me to him, he may look on me as a criminal. This was why I did not receive the grain.'

In the end it did come about, that the people, on an occasion of trouble and disorder, put Ze-yang to death.

5. When king K'áo of K'ú¹ lost his kingdom, the sheep-butcher Yüeh followed him in his flight. When the king (recovered) his kingdom and returned to it, and was going to reward those who had followed him, on coming to the sheep-butcher Yüeh, that personage said, 'When our Great King lost his kingdom, I lost my sheep-killing. When his majesty got back his kingdom, I also got back my sheep-killing. My income and rank have been recovered; why speak further of rewarding me?' The king, (on hearing of this reply), said, 'Force him (to take the reward);' but Yüeh said, 'It was not through any crime of mine that the king lost his kingdom,

¹ B.C. 515-489. He was driven from his capital by an invasion of Wú, directed by Wú Ze-hsi.

and therefore I did not dare to submit to the death (which would have been mine if I had remained in the capital). And it was not through any service of mine that he recovered his kingdom, and therefore I do not dare to count myself worthy of any reward from him.'

The king (now) asked that the butcher should be introduced to him, but Yüeh said, 'According to the law of *K'ü*, great reward ought to be given to great service, and the recipient then be introduced to the king; but now my wisdom was not sufficient to preserve the kingdom, nor my courage sufficient to die at the hands of the invaders. When the army of *Wü* entered, I was afraid of the danger, and got out of the way of the thieves;—it was not with a distinct purpose (of loyalty) that I followed the king. And now he wishes, in disregard of the law, and violations of the conditions of our social compact, to see me in court;—this is not what I would like to be talked of through the kingdom.' The king said to *Ze-k'ü*, the Minister of War, 'The position of the sheep-butcher Yüeh is low and mean, but his setting forth of what is right is very high; do you ask him for me to accept the place of one of my three most distinguished nobles¹.' (This being communicated to Yüeh), he said, 'I know that the place of such a distinguished noble is nobler than a sheep-butcher's stall, and that the salary of 10,000 *lung* is more than its profits. But how should I, through my greed of rank and emolument, bring on our ruler the name of an unlawful dispensation of his gifts? I dare not

¹ Literally, 'My three banners or flags,' emblems of the favour of the sovereign.

respond to your wishes, but desire to return to my stall as the sheep-butcher.' Accordingly he did not accept (the proffered reward).

6. Yüan Hsien¹ was living in Lû. His house, whose walls were only a few paces round, looked as if it were thatched with a crop of growing grass; its door of brushwood was incomplete, with branches of a mulberry tree for its side-posts; the window of each of its two apartments was formed by an earthenware jar (in the wall), which was stuffed with some coarse serge. It leaked above, and was damp on the ground beneath; but there he sat composedly, playing on his guitar. 3ze-kung, in an inner robe of purple and an outer one of pure white, riding in a carriage drawn by two large horses, the hood of which was too high to get into the lane (leading to the house), went to see him. Yüan Hsien, in a cap made of bark, and slippers without heels, and with a stalk of hellebore for a staff, met him at the door. 'Alas! Master,' said 3ze-kung, 'that you should be in such distress!' Yüan Hsien answered him, 'I have heard that to have no money is to be poor, and that not to be able to carry one's learning into practice is to be distressed. I am poor but not in distress.' 3ze-kung shrank back, and looked ashamed, on which the other laughed and said, 'To act with a view to the world's (praise); to pretend to be public-spirited and yet be a partisan; to learn in order to please men; to teach for the sake of one's own gain; to conceal one's wickedness under the garb of

¹ A disciple of Confucius, called also Yüan Sze;—see Confucian Analects VI, iii, 3. With the description of his house or hut, compare in the Lî K'î, XXVIII, 10.

benevolence and righteousness; and to be fond of the show of chariots and horses:—these are things which Hsien cannot bear to do.'

Žǎng-ze was residing in Wei. He wore a robe quilted with hemp, and had no outer garment; his countenance looked rough and emaciated; his hands and feet were horny and callous; he would be three days without lighting a fire; in ten years he did not have a new suit; if he put his cap on straight, the strings would break; if he drew tight the overlap of his robe, his elbow would be seen; in putting on his shoes, the heels would burst them. Yet dragging his shoes along, he sang the 'Sacrificial Odes of Shang' with a voice that filled heaven and earth as if it came from a bell or a sounding stone. The Son of Heaven could not get him to be a minister; no feudal prince could get him for his friend. So it is that he who is nourishing his mind's aim forgets his body, and he who is nourishing his body discards all thoughts of gain, and he who is carrying out the Tâo forgets his own mind.

Confucius said to Yen Hui, 'Come here, Hui. Your family is poor, and your position is low; why should you not take office?' Hui replied, 'I have no wish to be in office. Outside the suburban district I possess fields to the extent of fifty acres, which are sufficient to supply me with congee; and inside it I have ten acres, which are sufficient to supply me with silk and flax. I find my pleasure in playing on my lute, and your doctrines, Master, which I study, are sufficient for my enjoyment; I do not wish to take office.' Confucius looked sad, changed countenance, and said, 'How good is the mind of Hui! I have heard that he who is con-

tented will not entangle himself with the pursuit of gain, that he who is conscious of having gained (the truth) in himself is not afraid of losing other things, and that he who cultivates the path of inward rectification is not ashamed though he may have no official position. I have long been preaching this; but to-day I see it realised in Hui :—this is what I have gained.'

7. Prince Mâu¹ of *Kung-shan*¹ spoke to *Kan-ze*², saying, 'My body has its place by the streams and near the sea, but my mind dwells at the court of Wei ;—what have you to say to me in the circumstances ?' *Kan-ze* replied, 'Set the proper value on your life. When one sets the proper value on his life, gain seems to him unimportant.' The prince rejoined, 'I know that, but I am not able to overcome (my wishes).' The reply was, 'If you cannot master yourself (in the matter), follow (your inclinations so that) your spirit may not be dissatisfied. When you cannot master yourself, and try to force yourself where your spirit does not follow, this is what is called doing yourself a double injury; and those who so injure themselves are not among the long-lived.'

Mâu of Wei was the son of a lord of ten thousand chariots. For him to live in retirement among crags and caves was more difficult than for a scholar who had not worn the dress of office. Although he

¹ Prince Mâu was a son of the marquis of Wei, and had been appointed to the appanage of *Kung-shan*,—corresponding to part of the present Ting Kâu in Pei Kih-lî.

² A worthy officer or thinker of Wei. One is not sure that his advice was altogether good.

had not attained to the Tâo, he may be said to have had some idea of it.

8. When Confucius was reduced to extreme distress between *Khăn* and *Zhâi*, for seven days he had no cooked meat to eat, but only some soup of coarse vegetables without any rice in it. His countenance wore the appearance of great exhaustion, and yet he kept playing on his lute and singing inside the house. Yen Hui (was outside), selecting the vegetables, while *Ze-lû* and *Ze-kung* were talking together, and said to him, 'The Master has twice been driven from Lû; he had to flee from Wei; the tree (beneath which he rested) was cut down in Sung; he was reduced to extreme distress in Shang and *Kâu*; he is held in a state of siege here between *Khăn* and *Zhâi*; any one who kills him will be held guiltless; there is no prohibition against making him a prisoner. And yet he keeps playing and singing, thrumming his lute without ceasing. Can a superior man be without the feeling of shame to such an extent as this?' Yen Hui gave them no reply, but went in and told (their words) to Confucius, who pushed aside his lute, and said, 'Yû and *Zhze* are small men. Call them here, and I will explain the thing to them.'

When they came in, *Ze-lû* said, 'Your present condition may be called one of extreme distress.' Confucius replied, 'What words are these! When the Superior man has free course with his principles, that is what we call his success; when such course is denied, that is what we call his failure. Now I hold in my embrace the principles of benevolence and righteousness, and with them meet the evils of a disordered age;—where is the proof of my being

in extreme distress? Therefore looking inwards and examining myself, I have no difficulties about my principles; though I encounter such difficulties (as the present), I do not lose my virtue. It is when winter's cold is come, and the hoar-frost and snow are falling, that we know the vegetative power of the pine and cypress. This strait between *Khăn* and *Zhâi* is fortunate for me.' He then took back his lute so that it emitted a twanging sound, and began to play and sing. (At the same time) *3ze-lû*, hurriedly, seized a shield, and began to dance, while *3ze-kung* said, 'I did not know (before) the height of heaven nor the depth of the earth.'

The ancients who had got the *Tâo* were happy when reduced to extremity, and happy when having free course. Their happiness was independent of both these conditions. The *Tâo* and its characteristics!—let them have these and distress and success come to them as cold and heat, as wind and rain in the natural order of things. Thus it was that *Hsü Yû* found pleasure on the north of the river *Ying*, and that the earl of *Kung* enjoyed himself on the top of mount (*Kung*)¹.

9. *Shun* proposed to resign the throne to his friend, the Northerner *Wû-k'ai*², who said, 'A strange man you are, O sovereign! You (first) lived among the channeled fields, and then your

¹ This takes us to the famous *Kung-ho* period (B.C. 842–828), but our author evidently follows the account of it found in the 'Bamboo Books';—see the prolegomena to the *Shû King*, p. 154.

² We found, in Book XXI (see vol. xxxix, p. 133), *Wû-k'ai* as the name of *Thien 3ze-fang*. Here is the same name belonging to a much earlier man, 'a man of the north.'

place was in the palace of Yáo. And not only so:—you now further wish to extend to me the stain of your disgraceful doings. I am ashamed to see you.' And on this he threw himself into the abyss of *K'ing-lăng*¹.

When Thang was about to attack *Kieh*, he took counsel with Pien Sui, who said, 'It is no business of mine.' Thang then said, 'To whom should I apply?' And the other said, 'I do not know.' Thang then took counsel with Wû Kwang, who gave the same answer as Pien Sui; and when asked to whom he should apply, said in the same way, 'I do not know.' 'Suppose,' Thang then said, 'I apply to Í Yin, what do you say about him?' The reply was, 'He has a wonderful power in doing what is disgraceful, and I know nothing more about him!'

Thang thereupon took counsel with Í Yin, attacked *Kieh*, and overcame him, after which he proposed to resign the throne to Pien Sui, who declined it, saying, 'When you were about to attack *Kieh*, and sought counsel from me, you must have supposed me to be prepared to be a robber. Now that you have conquered *Kieh*, and propose to resign the throne to me, you must consider me to be greedy. I have been born in an age of disorder, and a man without principle twice comes, and tries to extend to me the stain of his disgraceful proceedings!—I cannot bear to hear the repetition of his proposals.' With this he threw himself into the *K'âu*² water and died.

¹ At the foot of a hill in the present department of Nan-yang, Ho-nan.

² The reading uncertain.

Thang further made proffer of the throne to Wû Kwang¹, saying, 'The wise man has planned it; the martial man has carried it through; and the benevolent man should occupy it:—this was the method of antiquity. Why should you, Sir, not take the position?' Wû Kwang refused the proffer, saying, 'To depose the sovereign is contrary to right; to kill the people is contrary to benevolence. When another has encountered the risks, if I should accept the gain of his adventure, I should violate my disinterestedness. I have heard it said, "If it be not right for him to do so, one should not accept the emolument; in an age of unprincipled (government), one should not put foot on the soil (of the) country:"—how much less should I accept this position of honour! I cannot bear to see you any longer.' And with this he took a stone on his back, and drowned himself in the Lü water².

10. Formerly, at the rise of the *Kâu* dynasty, there were two brothers who lived in *Kû-kû*³, and were named *Po-i* and *Shû-khi*. They spoke together and said, 'We have heard that in the west there is one who seems to rule according to the Right Way; let us go and see.' (Accordingly) they came to the south of (mount) *K'hi*; and when king Wû heard of them, he sent (his brother) *Shû Tan* to see them, and make a covenant with them, engaging that their wealth should be second (only to that of the king), and that their offices should be of the first rank,

¹ Not elsewhere heard of, save in the same connexion.

² In the west of Lião-tung.

³ A small principality, in the present Lwan-kâu, department of Yung-phing *K'ih-lí*.

and instructing him to bury the covenant with the blood of the victim after they had smeared the corners of their mouths with it¹. The brothers looked at each other and laughed, saying, 'Ah! How strange! This is not what we call the Right Way. Formerly, when Shăn Năng had the kingdom, he offered his sacrifices at the proper seasons and with the utmost reverence, but without praying for any blessing. Towards men he was leal-hearted and sincere, doing his utmost in governing them, but without seeking anything for himself. When it was his pleasure to use administrative measures, he did so; and a sterner rule when he thought that would be better. He did not by the ruin of others establish his own power; he did not exalt himself by bringing others low; he did not, when the time was opportune, seek his own profit. But now *Kâu*, seeing the disorder of Yin, has suddenly taken the government into its hands; with the high it has taken counsel, and with those below employed bribes; it relies on its troops to maintain the terror of its might; it makes covenants over victims to prove its good faith; it vaunts its proceedings to please the masses; it kills and attacks for the sake of gain:—this is simply overthrowing disorder and changing it for tyranny. We have heard that the officers of old, in an age of good government, did not shrink from their duties, and in an age of disorder did not recklessly seek to remain in office. Now the kingdom is in a state of darkness; the virtue of *Kâu* is decayed. Than to join with it and

¹ According to the usual forms in which a covenant was made and established. The translation is free and diffuse.

lay our persons in the dust, it is better for us to abandon it, and maintain the purity of our conduct.'

The two princes then went north to the hill of Shâu-yang¹, where they died of starvation. If men such as they, in the matter of riches and honours, can manage to avoid them, (let them do so); but they must not depend on their lofty virtue to pursue any perverse course, only gratifying their own tendencies, and not doing service in their time:—this was the style of these two princes.

¹ In the present department of Phû-kau, Shan-hsi,

BOOK XXIX.

PART III. SECTION VII.

Táo Kih, or 'The Robber Kih¹.'

1. Confucius was on terms of friendship with Liû-hsiâ Kî², who had a brother named Táo Kih. This Táo Kih had 9,000 followers, who marched at their will through the kingdom, assailing and oppressing the different princes. They dug through walls and broke into houses; they drove away people's cattle and horses; they carried off people's wives and daughters. In their greed to get, they forgot the claims of kinship, and paid no regard to their parents and brethren. They did not sacrifice to their ancestors. Wherever they passed through the country, in the larger states the people guarded their city walls, and in the smaller the people took to their strongholds. All were distressed by them.

Confucius spoke to Liû-hsiâ Kî, saying, 'Fathers should be able to lay down the law to their sons,

¹ See vol. xxxix, pp. 157, 158.

² Better known as Liû-hsiâ Hui, under which designation he is mentioned both in the Confucian Analects and in Mencius, but it is an anachronism to say that Confucius was on terms of friendship with him. He was a scion of the distinguished family of Kan in Lô, and was called Kan Hwo and Kan K'in. We find, in the 30 Kwan, a son of his employed in an important expedition in B.C. 634, so that he, probably, had passed away before Confucius was born in B.C. 551, and must certainly have deceased before the death of 3ze-lû (480), which is mentioned in the Book.

and elder to instruct their younger brothers. If they are unable to do so, they do not fulfil the duties of the relationships which they sustain. You, Sir, are one of the most talented officers of the age, and your younger brother is this Robber Kih. He is a pest in the kingdom, and you are not able to instruct him better; I cannot but be ashamed of you, and I beg to go for you and give him counsel.' Liû-hsiâ Kî replied, 'You say, Sir, that fathers must be able to lay down the law to their sons, and elder to instruct their younger brothers, but if sons will not listen to the orders of their fathers, nor the younger receive the lessons of their elder brothers, though one may have your powers of persuasion, what is to be done? And, moreover, Kih is a man whose mind is like a gushing fountain, and his will like a whirlwind; he is strong enough to resist all enemies, and clever enough to gloss over his wrong-doings. If you agree with him, he is glad; if you oppose him, he is enraged; and he readily meets men with the language of abuse. You must not go to him.'

Confucius, however, did not attend to this advice. With Yen Hui as his charioteer, and 3ze-kung seated on the right, he went to see Tào Kih, whom he found with his followers halted on the south of Thâi-shan, and mincing men's livers, which he gave them to eat. Confucius alighted from his carriage, and went forward, till he saw the usher, to whom he said, 'I, Khung K'hiû of Lû, have heard of the general's lofty righteousness,' bowing twice respectfully to the man as he said so. The usher went in and announced the visitor. But when Tào Kih heard of the arrival, he flew into a great

rage; his eyes became like blazing stars, and his hair rose up and touched his cap. 'Is not this fellow,' said he, 'Khung *K'ziû*, that artful hypocrite of Lû? Tell him from me, "You invent speeches and babble away, appealing without ground to (the examples of) Wăn and Wû. The ornaments on your cap are as many as the branches of a tree, and your girdle is (a piece of skin) from the ribs of a dead ox. The more you talk, the more nonsense you utter. You get your food without (the labour of) ploughing, and your clothes without (that of) weaving. You wag your lips and make your tongue a drum-stick. You arbitrarily decide what is right and what is wrong, thereby leading astray the princes throughout the kingdom, and making its learned scholars not occupy their thoughts with their proper business. You recklessly set up your filial piety and fraternal duty, and curry favour with the feudal princes, the wealthy and the noble. Your offence is great; your crime is very heavy. Take yourself off home at once. If you do not do so, I will take your liver, and add it to the provision for to-day's food."'

But Confucius sent in another message, saying, 'I enjoy the good will of (your brother) *K'î*, and I wish and hope to tread the ground beneath your tent¹. When the usher had communicated this message, Tâo *K'ih* said, 'Make him come forward.' On this Confucius hastened forwards. Declining to take a mat, he drew hastily back, and bowed twice to Tâo *K'ih*, who in a great rage stretched

¹ That is, I wish to have an interview with you, to see and speak to you face to face.

his legs apart, laid his hand on his sword, and with glaring eyes and a voice like the growl of a nursing tigress, said, 'Come forwards, *K'hiû*. If what you say be in accordance with my mind, you shall live; but, if it be contrary to it, you shall die.' Confucius replied, 'I have heard that everywhere under the sky there are three (most excellent) qualities. To be naturally tall and large, to be elegant and handsome without a peer, so that young and old, noble and mean, are pleased to look upon him;—this is the highest of those qualities. To comprehend both heaven and earth in his wisdom, and to be able to speak eloquently on all subjects;—this is the middle one of them. To be brave and courageous, resolute and daring, gathering the multitudes round him, and leading on his troops;—this is the lowest of them. Whoever possesses one of these qualities is fit to stand with his face to the south¹, and style himself a Prince. But you, General, unite in yourself all the three. Your person is eight cubits and two inches in height; there is a brightness about your face and a light in your eyes; your lips look as if stained with vermilion; your teeth are like rows of precious shells; your voice is attuned to the musical tubes, and yet you are named "The Robber *K'ih*." I am ashamed of you, General, and cannot approve of you. If you are inclined to listen to me, I should like to go as your commissioner to Wû and Yüeh in the south; to *K'hi* and Lû in the north; to Sung and Wei in the east; and to Jin and *K'hi* in the west. I will get them to build for you a great city several hundred li in size, to

¹ To take the position of a ruler in his court.

establish under it towns containing several hundred thousands of inhabitants, and honour you there as a feudal lord. The kingdom will see you begin your career afresh; you will cease from your wars and disband your soldiers; you will collect and nourish your brethren, and along with them offer the sacrifices to your ancestors¹:—this will be a course befitting a sage and an officer of ability, and will fulfil the wishes of the whole kingdom.'

'Come forward, *K'hiù*,' said Táo *K'ih*, greatly enraged. 'Those who can be persuaded by considerations of gain, and to whom remonstrances may be addressed with success, are all ignorant, low, and ordinary people. That I am tall and large, elegant and handsome, so that all who see me are pleased with me;—this is an effect of the body left me by my parents. Though you were not to praise me for it, do I not know it myself? And I have heard that he who likes to praise men to their face will also like to speak ill of them behind their back. And when you tell me of a great wall and a multitudinous people, this is to try to persuade me by considerations of gain, and to cocker me as one of the ordinary people. But how could such advantages last for long? Of all great cities there is none so great as the whole kingdom, which was possessed by Yáo and Shun, while their descendants (now) have not so much territory as would admit an awl². Thang and Wû were both set up as the Sons of Heaven, but in after ages (their posterity) were cut

¹ It is said near the beginning that *K'ih* and his followers had ceased to offer such sacrifices;—they had no religion.

² The descendants of those worthies were greatly reduced; but they still had a name and a place.

off and extinguished ;—was not this because the gain of their position was so great a prize¹?

‘And moreover I have heard that anciently birds and beasts were numerous, and men were few, so that they lived in nests in order to avoid the animals. In the daytime they gathered acorns and chestnuts, and in the night they roosted on the trees ; and on account of this they are called the people of the Nest-builder. Anciently the people did not know the use of clothes. In summer they collected great stores of faggots, and in winter kept themselves warm by means of them ; and on account of this they are called the people who knew how to take care of their lives. In the age of Shǎn Nǎng, the people lay down in simple innocence, and rose up in quiet security. They knew their mothers, but did not know their fathers. They dwelt along with the elks and deer. They ploughed and ate ; they wove and made clothes ; they had no idea of injuring one another :—this was the grand time of Perfect virtue². Hwang-Ti, however, was not able to perpetuate this virtuous state. He fought with K’ih-yü³ in the wild of Ko-lü⁴ till the blood flowed over a hundred li. When Yáo and Shun arose, they instituted their crowd of ministers. Thang banished his lord. King Wü killed K’áu. Since that time the strong have oppressed the weak, and the many tyrannised over the few. From Thang and Wü downwards, (the

¹ See note 2, p. 170.

² Compare the description of this primeval time in Book X, par. 4.

³ Commonly spoken of as ‘the first rebel.’ See Mayers’s Manual, p. 36.

⁴ Perhaps in the present Páo-an K’áu, department of Hsüan-hwá, K’ih-li.

rulers) have all been promoters of disorder and confusion. You yourself now cultivate and inculcate the ways of Wăn and Wû; you handle whatever subjects are anywhere discussed for the instruction of future ages. With your peculiar robe and narrow girdle, with your deceitful speech and hypocritical conduct, you delude the lords of the different states, and are seeking for riches and honours. There is no greater robber than you are;—why does not all the world call you the Robber *Khîu*, instead of styling me the Robber *Kih*?

‘You prevailed by your sweet speeches on 3ze-lû, and made him your follower; you made him put away his high cap, lay aside his long sword, and receive your instructions, so that all the world said, “Khung *Khîu* is able to arrest violence and repress the wrong-doer;” but in the end, when 3ze-lû wished to slay the ruler of Wei, and the affair proved unsuccessful, his body was exhibited in pickle over the eastern gate of the capital;—so did your teaching of him come to nothing.

‘Do you call yourself a scholar of talent, a sage? Why, you were twice driven out of Lû; you had to run away from Wei; you were reduced to extremity in *Khî*; you were held in a state of siege between *Khân* and 3hâi; there is no resting-place for your person in the kingdom; your instructions brought 3ze-lû to pickle. Such have been the misfortunes (attending your course). You have done no good either for yourself or for others;—how can your doctrines be worth being thought much of?

‘There is no one whom the world exalts so much as it does Hwang-Ti, and still he was not able to perfect his virtue, but fought in the wilderness of

Ko-lû, till the blood flowed over a hundred li. *Yáo* was not kind to his son¹. *Shun* was not filial². *Yü* was paralysed on one side³. *Thang* banished his sovereign. King *Wû* smote *Káu*. King *Wăn* was imprisoned in *Yü-li*⁴. These are the six men of whom the world thinks the most highly, yet when we accurately consider their history, we see that for the sake of gain they all disallowed their true (nature), and did violence to its proper qualities and tendencies:—their conduct cannot be thought of but with deep shame.

‘Among those whom the world calls men of ability and virtue were (the brothers) *Po-Í* and *Shû-khi*. They declined the rule of *Kû-kû*, and died of starvation on the hill of *Sháu-yang*, leaving their bones and flesh unburied. *Pão 3iáo* vaunted his conduct, and condemned the world, but he died with his arms round a tree⁵. When *Shăn-thû* *Ti*’s remonstrances were not listened to, he fastened a stone on his back, and threw himself into the *Ho*, where he was eaten by the fishes and turtles⁶. *Kieh 3ze-thui* was the most devoted (of followers), and cut a piece from his thigh as food for duke *Wăn*. But when the duke afterwards overlooked him (in

¹ Referring to his setting aside his unworthy son, *Tan-kû*, and giving the throne to *Shun*.

² See in *Mencius*, V, i, 1. 3, 4.

³ This, I think, is the meaning; the fact was highly honourable to *Yü*, and brought on by his devotion to his labours.

⁴ In the present district of *Thang-yin*, department *Khang-teh*, *Ho-nan*. There king *Wăn* pursued his labours on the *Yi* King.

⁵ A recluse of the time of *Confucius*, according to *Han Ying* (I, art. 27). After a dispute with *3ze-kung*, he committed suicide in the way described.

⁶ See art. 26, in the same *Book of Han Ying*.

his distribution of favours), he was angry, and went away, and was burned to death with a tree in his arms¹. Wei Shǎng had made an appointment with a girl to meet him under a bridge; but when she did not come, and the water rose around him, he would not go away, and died with his arms round one of the pillars². (The deaths of) these four men were not different from those of the dog that is torn in pieces, the pig that is borne away by a current, or the beggar (drowned in a ditch) with his alms-gourd in his hand. They were all caught as in a net by their (desire for) fame, not caring to nourish their life to its end, as they were bound to do.

‘Among those whom the world calls faithful ministers there have been none like the prince Pī-kan and Wú 3ze-hsü. But 3ze-hsü’s (dead) body was cast into the Kiang, and the heart of Pī-kan was cut out. These two were what the world calls loyal ministers, but the end has been that everybody laughs at them. Looking at all the above cases, down to those of 3ze-hsü and Pī-kan, there is not one worthy to be honoured; and as to the admonitions which you, K’hiū, wish to impress on me, if you tell me about the state of the dead, I am unable to know anything about it; if you tell me about the things of men (alive), they are only such as I have stated, what I have heard and know all about. I will now tell you, Sir, my views about the condition of man. The eyes wish to look on beauty; the ears to hear music; the mouth to enjoy flavours; the will to be gratified. The greatest longevity man

¹ See Mayers’s Manual, p. 80.

² Supposed to be the same with the Wei-shǎng Káo, mentioned in Analects, V, 23;—see Mayers’s Manual, p. 251.

can reach is a hundred years; a medium longevity is eighty years; the lowest longevity is sixty. Take away sickness, pining, bereavement, mourning, anxieties, and calamities, the times when, in any of these, one can open his mouth and laugh, are only four or five days in a month. Heaven and earth have no limit of duration, but the death of man has its (appointed) time. Take the longest amount of a limited time, and compare it with what is unlimited, its brief existence is not different from the passing of a crevice by one of king Mû's horses¹. Those who cannot gratify their will and natural aims, and nourish their appointed longevity, are all unacquainted with the (right) Way (of life). I cast from me, *K'hiû*, all that you say. Be quick and go. Hurry back and say not a word more. Your Way is only a wild recklessness, deceitful, artful, vain, and hypocritical. It is not available to complete the true (nature of man); it is not worth talking about!

Confucius bowed twice, and hurried away. He went out at the door, and mounted his carriage. Thrice he missed the reins as he tried to take hold of them. His eyes were dazed, and he could not see; and his colour was that of slaked lime. He laid hold of the cross-bar, holding his head down, and unable to draw his breath. When he got back, outside the east gate of (the capital of) Lû, he encountered Liû-hsiâ *Kî*, who said to him, 'Here you are, right in the gate. For some days I have not seen you. Your carriage and horses are travel-stained;—have you not been to see Tâo *K'ih*?' Con-

¹ King Mû had eight famous horses, each having its own name. The name of only one—*K'ih-kî*—is given here. See Bk. XVII, par. 5.

fucius looked up to heaven, sighed, and said, 'Yes.' The other went on, 'And did he not set himself in opposition to all your views, as I said he would do?' 'He did. My case has been that of the man who cauterised himself without being ill. I rushed away, stroked the tiger's head, played with his whiskers, and narrowly escaped his mouth.'

2. *3ze-kang*¹ asked *Mân Kâu-teh*², saying, 'Why do you not pursue a (righteous) course? Without such a course you will not be believed in; unless you are believed in, you will not be employed in office; and if not employed in office, you will not acquire gain. Thus, if you look at the matter from the point of reputation, or estimate it from the point of gain, a righteous course is truly the right thing. If you discard the thought of reputation and gain, yet when you think over the thing in your own mind, you will see that the scholar should not be a single day without pursuing a (righteous) course.' *Mân Kâu-teh* said, 'He who has no shame becomes rich, and he in whom many believe becomes illustrious. Thus the greatest fame and gain would seem to spring from being without shame and being believed in. Therefore if you look at the matter from the point of reputation, or estimate it from the point of gain, to be believed in is the right thing. If you discard the thought of fame and gain, and think over the thing in your own mind, you will see that the scholar in the course which he pursues is (simply) holding fast his Heavenly (nature, and gaining nothing).'

¹ We are told (*Analects*, II, 18) that *3ze-kang* 'studied with a view to official emolument.' This is, probably, the reason why he appears as interlocutor in this paragraph.

² A fictitious name, meaning, 'Full of gain recklessly got.'

3ze-kang said, 'Formerly Kieh and Kâu each enjoyed the honour of being the sovereign, and all the wealth of the kingdom was his; but if you now say to a (mere) money-grabber, "Your conduct is like that of Kieh or Kâu," he will look ashamed, and resent the imputation:—(these two sovereigns) are despised by the smallest men. Kung-nî and Mo Tî (on the other hand) were poor, and common men; but if you say to a Prime Minister that his conduct is like that of Kung-nî or Mo Tî, then he will be put out and change countenance, and protest that he is not worthy (to be so spoken of):—(these two philosophers) are held to be truly noble by (all) scholars. Thus it is that the position of sovereign does not necessarily connect with being thought noble, nor the condition of being poor and of common rank with being thought mean. The difference of being thought noble or mean arises from the conduct being good or bad.' Mân Kâu-teh replied, 'Small robbers are put in prison; a great robber becomes a feudal lord; and in the gate of the feudal lord your righteous scholars will be found. For instance, Hsião-po¹, the duke Hwan, killed his elder brother, and took his sister-in-law to himself, and yet Kwan Kung became his minister; and Thien K'hang, styled K'hang-ze, killed his ruler, and usurped the state², and yet Confucius received a present of silks from him. In their discussions they would condemn the men, but

¹ The name of duke Hwan.

² Compare the account of the same transaction in Book X, par. 1. See also Analects, XIV, 22. But there is no evidence but rather the contrary, that Confucius ever received a gift from Thien or K'han Hăng.

in their conduct they abased themselves before them. In this way their words and actions must have been at war together in their breasts;—was it not a contradiction and perversity? As it is said in a book, “Who is bad? and who is good? The successful is regarded as the Head, and the unsuccessful as the Tail.”’

3ze-kang said, ‘If you do not follow the usual course of what is held to be right, but observe no distinction between the near and remote degrees of kin, no difference between the noble and the mean, no order between the old and the young, then how shall a separation be made of the fivefold arrangement (of the virtues), and the six parties (in the social organisation)?’ Mân Kâu-teh replied, ‘Yáo killed his eldest son, and Shun banished his half-brother¹:—did they observe the rules about the different degrees of kin? Thang deposed Kieh; king Wû overthrew Kâu:—did they observe the righteousness that should obtain between the noble and the mean? King Kî took the place of his elder brother², and the duke of Kâu killed his³:—did they observe the order that should obtain between the elder and the younger? The Literati make hypocritical speeches; the followers of Mo hold that all should be loved equally:—do we find in them the separation of the fivefold arrangement (of the

¹ Exaggerations or misrepresentations.

² King Kî was the so-called king Kî-lî, the father of king Wân. His elder brother, that the state of Kâu might descend to him, left it, and withdrew south to what was then the wild region of Wû. See Analects, VIII, 1; the Shih King, III, i, Ode 7. 3, 4.

³ Who had joined with Wû-käng, son of the tyrant of Yin, in rebellion, thus threatening the stability of the new dynasty of Kâu.

virtues)¹, and the six parties (in the social organisation)²? And further, you, Sir, are all for reputation, and I am all for gain; but where the actual search for reputation and gain may not be in accordance with principle and will not bear to be examined in the light of the right way, let me and you refer the matter to-morrow³ to the decision of Wû-yo⁴.

(This Wû-yo) said, 'The small man pursues after wealth; the superior man pursues after reputation. The way in which they change their feelings and alter their nature is different; but if they were to cast away what they do, and replace it with doing nothing, they would be the same. Hence it is said, "Do not be a small man;—return and pursue after the Heavenly in you. Do not be a superior man;—follow the rule of the Heavenly in you. Be it crooked, be it straight, view the thing in the light of Heaven as revealed in you. Look all round on every side of it, and as the time indicates, cease your endeavours. Be it right, be it wrong, hold fast the ring in yourself in which all conditions converge. Alone by yourself, carry out your idea; ponder over the right way. Do not turn your course; do not try to complete your righteousness. You will fail in what you do. Do not haste to be rich; do not follow after your perfection. If you do, you will lose the heavenly in you."

¹ Probably what are called 'the five constant virtues.'

² The parties in the 'Three Bonds of Society,' or Three Cardinal Objects of Duty.

³ So Lû Shû-ñih (日 = 明日).

⁴ If we take Wû-yo as a name, which is the simplest construction, we must still recognise its meaning as denoting 'one who is unbound by the conventionalities of opinion.' Much of what he is made to say is in rhyme, and might also be so translated.

‘Pi-kan had his heart cut out; 3ze-hsü had his eyes gouged out:—such were the evil consequences of their loyalty. The upright person¹ bore witness against his father; Wei Shǎng was drowned:—such were the misfortunes of good faith. Pao-3ze stood till he was dried up; Shǎn-3ze would not defend himself²:—such were the injuries brought on by disinterestedness. Confucius did not see his mother³; Khwang-3ze⁴ did not see his father:—such were the failures of the righteous. These are instances handed down from former ages, and talked about in these later times. They show us how superior men, in their determination to be correct in their words and resolute in their conduct, paid the penalty of these misfortunes, and were involved in these distresses.’

3. Mr. Dissatisfied⁵ asked Mr. Know-the-Mean⁵, saying, ‘There is no man after all who does not strive for reputation and pursue after gain. When men are rich, then others go to them. Going to them, they put themselves beneath them. In that position they do honour to them as nobler than themselves. But to

¹ See the Analects, XIII, 18.

² The reading of the name here is not certain. The best identification perhaps is with Shan Shǎng (申生), the eldest son of duke Hsien of Jin, who was put to death on a false charge of having put poison into his father’s food, from which he would not defend himself.

³ A false charge.

⁴ The Khwang K’ang of Mencius, IV, ii, 30, q.v.

⁵ Both of these names are fictitious. About the meaning of the first, there can be no difference of opinion. I have given that of the second according to my understanding of it,—see in the *Lí K’i*, Book XXVIII, section I.

see others taking that position and doing honour to us is the way to prolong life, and to secure the rest of the body and the satisfaction of the mind. You alone, Sir, however, have no idea of this. Is it that your knowledge is deficient? Is it that you have the knowledge, but want the strength to carry it into practice? Or is it that your mind is made up to do what you consider right, and never allow yourself to forget it?' Know-the-Mean replied, 'Here now is this man judging of us, his contemporaries, and living in the same neighbourhood as himself, that we consider ourselves scholars who have abjured all vulgar ways and risen above the world. He is entirely without the thought of submitting to the rule of what is right. He therefore studies ancient times and the present, and the differing questions about the right and wrong, and agrees with the vulgar ideas and influences of the age, abandoning what is most important and discarding what is most honourable, in order to be free to act as he does. But is he not wide of the mark when he thinks that this is the way to promote long life, and to secure the rest of the body and the satisfaction of the mind? He has his painful afflictions and his quiet repose, but he does not inquire how his body is so variously affected; he has his apprehensive terrors, and his happy joys, but he does not inquire how his mind has such different experiences. He knows how to pursue his course, but he does not know why he does so. Even if he had the dignity of the Son of Heaven, and all the wealth of the kingdom were his, he would not be beyond the reach of misfortunes and evils.' Dissatisfied rejoined, 'But riches are in every way advantageous to man.

With them his attainment of the beautiful and mastery of every art become what the perfect man cannot obtain nor the sagely man reach to; his appropriation of the bravery and strength of others enables him to exercise a powerful sway; his availing himself of the wisdom and plans of others makes him be accounted intelligent and discriminating; his taking advantage of the virtues of others makes him be esteemed able and good. Though he may not be the holder of a state, he is looked to with awe as a ruler and father. Moreover, music, beauty, with the pleasures of the taste and of power, are appreciated by men's minds and rejoiced in without any previous learning of them; the body reposes in them without waiting for the example of others. Desire and dislike, avoidance and pursuit, do not require any master;—this is the nature of man. Though the world may condemn one's indulgence of them, who can refrain from it?' Know-the-Mean replied, 'The action of the wise is directed for the good of the people, but they do not go against the (proper) rule and degree. Therefore when they have enough, they do not strive (for more); they have no further object, and so they do not seek for one. When they have not enough, they will seek for it; they will strive for it in every quarter, and yet not think of themselves as greedy. If they have (already) a superfluity, they will decline (any more); they will decline the throne, and yet not think of themselves as disinterested:—the conditions of disinterestedness and greediness are (with them) not from the constraint of anything external. Through their exercise of introspection, their power may be that of the sovereign, but they will not in

their nobility be arrogant to others; their wealth may be that of the whole kingdom, but they will not in their possession of it make a mock of others. They estimate the evils to which they are exposed, and are anxious about the reverses which they may experience. They think how their possessions may be injurious to their nature, and therefore they will decline and not accept them;—but not because they seek for reputation and praise.

‘Yáo and Shun were the sovereigns, and harmony prevailed. It did so, not because of their benevolence towards the people;—they would not, for what was (deemed) admirable, injure their lives. Shan Küan and Hsü Yü might have been the sovereigns, but they would not receive the throne;—not that they declined it without purpose, but they would not by its occupancy injure themselves. These all followed after what was advantageous to them, and declined what was injurious, and all the world celebrates their superiority. Thus, though they enjoy the distinction, they did what they did, not for the sake of the reputation and praise.’

Dissatisfied (continued his argument), saying, ‘In thus thinking it necessary for their reputation, they bitterly distressed their bodies, denied themselves what was pleasant, and restricted themselves to a bare sustenance in order to sustain their life; but so they had life-long distress, and long-continued pressure till their death arrived.’ Know-the-Mean replied, ‘Tranquil ease is happiness; a superfluity is injurious:—so it is with all things, and especially it is so, where the superfluity is of wealth. The ears of the rich are provided with the music of bells, drums, flageolets and flutes; and their mouths are

stuffed with the flesh of fed beasts and with wine of the richest flavour ; so are their desires satisfied, till they forget their proper business :—theirs may be pronounced a condition of disorder. Sunk deeply in their self-sufficiency, they resemble individuals ascending a height with a heavy burden on their backs :—their condition may be pronounced one of bitter suffering. They covet riches, thinking to derive comfort from them ; they covet power, and would fain monopolise it ; when quiet and retired, they are drowned in luxurious indulgence ; their persons seem to shine, and they are full of boasting :—they may be said to be in a state of disease. In their desire to be rich and striving for gain, they fill their stores, and, deaf to all admonition, refuse to desist from their course. They are even more elated, and hold on their way :—their conduct may be pronounced disgraceful. When their wealth is amassed till they cannot use it, they clasp it to their breasts and will not part with it ; when their hearts are distressed with their very fulness, they still seek for more and will not desist :—their condition may be said to be sad. In-doors they are apprehensive of pilfering and begging thieves, and out-of-doors they are afraid of being injured by plundering robbers ; in-doors they have many chambers and partitions, and out-of-doors they do not dare to go alone :—they may be said to be in a state of (constant) alarm.

‘ These six conditions are the most deplorable in the world, but they forget them all, and have lost their faculty of judgment. When the evil comes, though they begged it with all the powers of their nature, and by the sacrifice of all their wealth, they could

not bring back one day of untroubled peace. When they look for their reputation, it is not to be seen; when they seek for their wealth, it is not to be got. To task their thoughts, and destroy their bodies, striving for (such an end as) this;—is it not a case of great delusion?’

BOOK XXX.

PART III. SECTION VIII.

Yüeh Kien, or 'Delight in the Sword-fight'¹.

Formerly, king Wăn of K'ao² delighted in the sword-fight. More than three thousand men, masters of the weapon, appeared as his guests, lining the way on either side of his gate, and fighting together before him day and night. Over a hundred of them would die or be (severely) wounded in the course of a year, but he was never weary of looking on (at their engagements), so fond was he of them. The thing continued for three years, when the kingdom began to decay, and other states to plan measures against it.

The crown-prince Khwei³ was distressed, and laid the case before his attendants, saying, 'If any one can persuade the king, and put an end to these swordsmen, I will give him a thousand ounces of

¹ See vol. xxxix, pp. 158, 159.

² Probably king Hui-wăn (B. C. 298-265) of K'ao, one of the states into which the great state of Jin was subdivided, and which afterwards all claimed the sovereignty of the kingdom. In this Book Kwang-ze appears as a contemporary of king Wăn, which makes the 'formerly' with which the paragraph commences seem strange.

³ Sze-mâ K'ien says nothing of king Wăn's love of the sword-fight, nor of this son Khwei. He says that in 265 Wăn was succeeded by his son Tan (丹), who appears to have been quite young.

silver.' His attendants said, '(Only) *Kwang-ze* is able to do this.' Thereupon the prince sent men with a thousand ounces of silver to offer to *Kwang-ze*, who, however, would not accept them, but went with the messengers. When he saw the prince, he said, 'O prince, what have you to say to *K'âu*, and why would you give me the silver?' The prince replied, 'I have heard that you, master, are sagacious and sage. I sent you respectfully the thousand ounces of silver, as a prelude to the silks and other gifts¹. But as you decline to receive them, how dare I now tell you (what I wished from you)?' *Kwang-ze* rejoined, 'I have heard, O prince, that what you wanted me for was to wean the king from what is his delight. Suppose that in trying to persuade his Majesty I should offend him, and not fulfil your expectation, I shall be punished with death;—and could I then enjoy this silver? Or suppose that I shall succeed in persuading his Majesty, and accomplish what you desire, what is there in the kingdom of *K'áo* that I might ask for which I would not get?'

The crown-prince said, 'Yes; but my (father), the king, will see none but swordsmen.' *Kwang-ze* replied, 'I know; but I am expert in the use of the sword.' 'That is well,' observed the prince; 'but the swordsmen whom his Majesty sees all have their hair in a tangle, with whiskers projecting out. They wear slouching caps with coarse and unornamented tassels, and their coats are cut short behind. They have staring eyes, and talk about the hazards of

¹ This, I think, is the meaning. It may possibly mean 'for presents to your followers in attendance on you.'

their game. The king is delighted with all this; but now you are sure to present yourself to him in your scholar's dress, and this will stand greatly in the way of your success.'

Kwang-ze said, 'I will then, with your leave, get me a swordsman's dress.' This was ready in three days, and when he appeared in it before the prince, the latter went with him to introduce him to the king, who then drew his sword from its scabbard and waited for him. When *Kwang-ze* entered the door of the hall, he did not hurry forward, nor, when he saw the king, did he bow. The king asked him, 'What do you want to teach me, Sir, that you have got the prince to mention you beforehand?' The reply was, 'I have heard that your Majesty is fond of the sword-fight, and therefore I have sought an interview with you on the ground of (my skill in the use of) the sword.' 'What can you do with your sword against an opponent?' 'Let me meet with an opponent every ten paces, my sword would deal with him, so that I should not be stopped in a march of a thousand li.' The king was delighted with him, and said, 'You have not your match in the kingdom.' *Kwang-ze* replied, 'A good swordsman first makes a feint (against his opponent), then seems to give him an advantage, and finally gives his thrust, reaching him before he can return the blow. I should like to have an opportunity to show you my skill.' The king said, 'Stop (for a little), Master. Go to your lodging, and wait for my orders. I will make arrangements for the play, and then call you.'

The king accordingly made trial of his swordsmen for seven days, till more than sixty of them were

killed, or (severely) wounded. He then selected five or six men, and made them bring their swords and take their places beneath the hall, after which he called *Kwang-3ze*, and said to him, 'To-day I am going to make (you and) these men show what you can do with your swords.' 'I have long been looking for the opportunity,' replied *Kwang-3ze*. The king then asked him what would be the length of the sword which he would use; and he said, 'Any length will suit me, but I have three swords, any one of which I will use, as may please your Majesty. Let me first tell you of them, and then go to the arena.' 'I should like to hear about the three swords,' said the king; and *Kwang-3ze* went on, 'There is the sword of the Son of Heaven; the sword of a feudal prince; and the sword of a common man.'

'What about the sword of the Son of Heaven?'

'This sword has *Yen-khi*¹ and *Shih-khang*² for its point; *Khi* and (Mount) *Tai*³ for its edge; *3in* and *Wei* for its back; *Kau* and *Sung* for its hilt; *Han* and *Wei* for its sheath. It is embraced by the wild tribes all around; it is wrapped up in the four seasons; it is bound round by the Sea of *Po*⁴; and its girdle is the enduring hills. It is regulated by the five elements; its wielding is by means of Punishments and Kindness; its unsheathing is like that of

¹ Some noted place in the state of Yen, the capital of which was near the site of the present Peking.

² A wall, north of Yen, built as a barrier of defence against the northern tribes.

³ Mount *Thai*.

⁴ A region lying along the present gulf of *Kih-lí*, between the *Pei-ho* and the *K'ing-ho* in Shan-tung.

the Yin and Yang ; it is held fast in the spring and summer ; it is put in action in the autumn and winter. When it is thrust forward, there is nothing in front of it ; when lifted up, there is nothing above it ; when laid down, there is nothing below it ; when wheeled round, there is nothing left on any side of it ; above, it cleaves the floating clouds ; and below, it penetrates to every division of the earth. Let this sword be once used, and the princes are all reformed, and the whole kingdom submits. This is the sword of the Son of Heaven ¹.

King Wăn looked lost in amazement, and said again, 'And what about the sword of a feudal lord ?' (*Kwang-ze*) replied, 'This sword has wise and brave officers for its point ; pure and disinterested officers for its edge ; able and honourable officers for its back ; loyal and sage officers for its hilt ; valiant and eminent officers for its sheath. When this sword is thrust directly forward, as in the former case, there is nothing in front of it ; when directed upwards, there is nothing above it ; when laid down, there is nothing below it ; when wheeled round, there is nothing on any side of it. Above, its law is taken from the round heaven, and is in accordance with the three luminaries ; below, its law is taken from the square earth, and is in accordance with the four seasons ; between, it is in harmony with the minds of the people, and in all the parts of the state there is peace. Let this sword be once used, and you seem to hear the crash of the thunder-peal. Within

¹ By this sword *Kwang-ze* evidently means the power of the sovereign, supported by the strength of the kingdom, and directed by good government.

the four borders there are none who do not respectfully submit, and obey the orders of the ruler. This is the sword of the feudal lord.'

'And what about the sword of the common man?' asked the king (once more). (*Kwang-ze*) replied, 'The sword of the common man (is wielded by) those who have their hair in a tangle, with whiskers projecting out; who wear slouching caps with coarse and unornamented tassels, and have their coats cut short behind; who have staring eyes, and talk (only) about the hazards (of their game). They hit at one another before you. Above, the sword slashes through the neck; and below, it scoops out the liver and lungs. This is the sword of the common man. (The users of it) are not different from fighting cocks; any morning their lives are brought to an end; they are of no use in the affairs of the state. Your Majesty occupies the seat of the Son of Heaven, and that you should be so fond of the swordsmanship of such common men, is unworthy, as I venture to think, of your Majesty.'

On this the king drew *Kwang-ze* with him, and went up to the top of the hall, where the cook set forth a meal, which the king walked round three times (unable to sit down to it). *Kwang-ze* said to him, 'Sit down quietly, Great King, and calm yourself. I have said all I wished to say about swords.' King Wăn, thereafter, did not quit the palace for three months, and the swordsmen all killed themselves in their own rooms¹.

¹ *Kwang-ze's* parables had had their intended effect. It was not in his mind to do anything for the swordsmen. The commentators say:—'Indignant at not being treated as they had been before, they all killed themselves.'

BOOK XXXI.

PART III. SECTION IX.

Yü-fû, or 'The Old Fisherman'.¹

Confucius, rambling in the forest of 3ze-wei², stopped and sat down by the Apricot altar. The disciples began to read their books, while he proceeded to play on his lute, singing as he did so. He had not half finished his ditty when an old fisherman stepped

¹ See vol. xxxix, p. 159.

² A forest or grove in the neighbourhood of the capital of Lû. 3ze-wei means 'black silken curtains;' and I do not know why the forest was so denominated. That I have correctly determined its position, however, may be inferred from a quotation in the Khang-hsî dictionary under the character thân (= 'altar') to the effect that 'Confucius, leaving (the capital of) Lû by the eastern gate, on passing the old apricot altar, said, "This is the altar reared by 3ang Wăn-kung to solemnise covenants.'" Dr. Morrison under the same thân defines the second phrase—hsing thân—as 'The place where Confucius taught,' which Dr. Williams, under hsing, has amplified into 'The place where Confucius had his school.' But the text does not justify so definite a conclusion. The picture which the Book raises before my mind is that of a forest, with a row or clump of apricot trees, along which was a terrace, having on it the altar of 3ang Wăn-kung, and with a lake or at least a stream near to it, to which the ground sloped down. Here the writer introduces us to the sage and some of his disciples, on one occasion, when they were attracted from their books and music by the appearance of the old fisherman. I visited in 1873, not far from the Confucian cemetery, a ruined building called 'the College of K'û-Sze,' which was pointed out as the site of the School of Confucius. The place would suit all the demands of the situation in this Book.

down from his boat, and came towards them. His beard and eyebrows were turning white; his hair was all uncombed; and his sleeves hung idly down. He walked thus up from the bank, till he got to the dry ground, when he stopped, and, with his left hand holding one of his knees, and the right hand at his chin, listened. When the ditty was finished, he beckoned to 3ze-kung and 3ze-lû, who both responded and went to him. Pointing to Confucius, he said, 'Who is he?' 3ze-lû replied, 'He is the Superior Man of Lû.' 'And of what family is he?' 'He is of the Khung family.' 'And what is the occupation of this Mr. Khung?' To this question 3ze-lû gave no reply, but 3ze-kung replied, 'This scion of the Khung family devotes himself in his own nature to leal-heartedness and sincerity; in his conduct he manifests benevolence and righteousness; he cultivates the ornaments of ceremonies and music; he pays special attention to the relationships of society; above, he would promote loyalty to the hereditary lords; below, he seeks the transformation of all classes of the people; his object being to benefit the kingdom:—this is what Mr. Khung devotes himself to.'

The stranger further asked, 'Is he a ruler possessed of territory?' 'No,' was 3ze-kung's reply. 'Is he the assistant of any prince or king?' 'No;' and on this the other began to laugh and to retrace his steps, saying as he went, 'Yes, benevolence is benevolence! But I am afraid he will not escape (the evils incident to humanity). By embittering his mind and toiling his body, he is imperilling his true (nature)! Alas! how far removed is he from the proper way (of life)!'

3ze-kung returned, and reported (what the man had said) to Confucius, who pushed his lute aside, and arose, saying, 'Is he not a sage?' and down the slope he went in search of him. When he reached the edge of the lake, there was the fisherman with his pole, dragging the boat towards him. Turning round and seeing Confucius, he came back towards him and stood up. Confucius then drew back, bowed to him twice, and went forward. 'What do you want with me, Sir?' asked the stranger. The reply was, 'A little while ago, my Master, you broke off the thread of your remarks and went away. Inferior to you, I do not know what you wished to say, and have ventured here to wait for your instructions, fortunate if I may but hear the sound of your words to complete the assistance that you can give me!' 'Ah!' responded the stranger, 'how great is your love of learning!'

Confucius bowed twice, and then rose up, and said, 'Since I was young, I have cultivated learning till I am now sixty-nine years old; but I have not had an opportunity of hearing the perfect teaching;—dare I but listen to you with a humble and unprejudiced mind?' The stranger replied, 'Like seeks to like, and (birds) of the same note respond to one another;—this is a rule of Heaven. Allow me to explain what I am in possession of, and to pass over (from its standpoint) to the things which occupy you. What you occupy yourself with are the affairs of men. When the sovereign, the feudal lords, the great officers, and the common people, these four classes, do what is correct (in their several positions), we have the beauty of good order; and when they leave their proper duties, there ensues the greatest

disorder. When the officials attend to their duties, and the common people are anxiously concerned about their business, there is no encroachment on one another's rights.

'Fields running to waste; leaking rooms; insufficiency of food and clothing; taxes unprovided for; want of harmony among wives and concubines; and want of order between old and young;—these are the troubles of the common people.

'Incompetency for their charges; inattention to their official business; want of probity in conduct; carelessness and idleness in subordinates; failure of merit and excellence; and uncertainty of rank and emolument:—these are the troubles of great officers.

'No loyal ministers at their courts; the clans in their states rebellious; want of skill in their mechanics; articles of tribute of bad quality; late appearances at court in spring and autumn; and the dissatisfaction of the sovereign:—these are the troubles of the feudal lords.

'Want of harmony between the Yin and Yang; unseasonableness of cold and heat, affecting all things injuriously; oppression and disorder among the feudal princes, their presuming to plunder and attack one another, to the injury of the people; ceremonies and music ill-regulated; the resources for expenditure exhausted or deficient; the social relationships uncared for; and the people abandoned to licentious disorder:—these are the troubles of the Son of Heaven and his ministers.

'Now, Sir, you have not the high rank of a ruler, a feudal lord, or a minister of the royal court, nor are you in the inferior position of a great minister, with his departments of business, and yet you take

it on you to regulate ceremonies and music, and to give special attention to the relationships of society, with a view to transform the various classes of the people :—is it not an excessive multiplication of your business ?

‘And moreover men are liable to eight defects, and (the conduct of) affairs to four evils ; of which we must by all means take account.

‘To take the management of affairs which do not concern him is called monopolising. To bring forward a subject which no one regards is called loquacity. To lead men on by speeches made to please them is called sycophancy. To praise men without regard to right or wrong is called flattery. To be fond of speaking of men’s wickedness is called calumny. To part friends and separate relatives is called mischievousness. To praise a man deceitfully, or in the same way fix on him the character of being bad, is called depravity. Without reference to their being good or bad, to agree with men with double face, in order to steal a knowledge of what they wish, is called being dangerous. Those eight defects produce disorder among other men and injury to one’s self. A superior man will not make a friend of one who has them, nor will an intelligent ruler make him his minister.

‘To speak of what I called the four evils :—To be fond of conducting great affairs, changing and altering what is of long-standing, to obtain for one’s self the reputation of meritorious service, is called ambition ; to claim all wisdom and intrude into affairs, encroaching on the work of others, and representing it as one’s own, is called greediness ; to see his errors without changing them, and to go on

more resolutely in his own way when remonstrated with, is called obstinacy; when another agrees with himself, to approve of him, and, however good he may be, when he disagrees, to disapprove of him, is called boastful conceit. These are the four evils. When one can put away the eight defects, and allow no course to the four evils, he begins to be capable of being taught.'

Confucius looked sorrowful and sighed. (Again) he bowed twice, and then rose up and said, 'I was twice driven from Lû. I had to flee from Wei; the tree under which I rested was cut down in Sung; I was kept in a state of siege between K'zân and Zhâi. I do not know what errors I had committed that I came to be misrepresented on these four occasions (and suffered as I did).' The stranger looked grieved (at these words), changed countenance, and said, 'Very difficult it is, Sir, to make you understand. There was a man who was frightened at his shadow and disliked to see his footsteps, so that he ran to escape from them. But the more frequently he lifted his feet, the more numerous his footprints were; and however fast he ran, his shadow did not leave him. He thought he was going too slow, and ran on with all his speed without stopping, till his strength was exhausted and he died. He did not know that, if he had stayed in a shady place, his shadow would have disappeared, and that if he had remained still, he would have lost his footprints:—his stupidity was excessive! And you, Sir, exercise your judgment on the questions about benevolence and righteousness; you investigate the points where agreement and difference touch; you look at the changes from

movement to rest and from rest to movement ; you have mastered the rules of receiving and giving ; you have defined the feelings of liking and disliking ; you have harmonised the limits of joy and anger :—and yet you have hardly been able to escape (the troubles of which you speak). If you earnestly cultivated your own person, and carefully guarded your (proper) truth, simply rendering to others what was due to them, then you would have escaped such entanglements. But now, when you do not cultivate your own person, and make the cultivation of others your object, are you not occupying yourself with what is external ?’

Confucius with an air of sadness said, ‘ Allow me to ask what it is that you call my proper Truth.’ The stranger replied, ‘ A man’s proper Truth is pure sincerity in its highest degree ;—without this pure sincerity one cannot move others. Hence if one (only) forces himself to wail, however sadly he may do so, it is not (real) sorrow ; if he forces himself to be angry, however he may seem to be severe, he excites no awe ; if he forces himself to show affection, however he may smile, he awakens no harmonious reciprocation. True grief, without a sound, is yet sorrowful ; true anger, without any demonstration, yet awakens awe ; true affection, without a smile, yet produces a harmonious reciprocation. Given this truth within, it exercises a spiritual efficacy without, and this is why we count it so valuable. In our relations with others, it appears according to the requirements of each case :—in the service of parents, as gentle, filial duty ; in the service of rulers, as loyalty and integrity ; in festive drinking, as pleasant enjoyment ; in the performance

of the mourning rites, as sadness and sorrow. In loyalty and integrity, good service is the principal thing ; in festive drinking, the enjoyment ; in the mourning rites, the sorrow ; in the service of parents, the giving them pleasure. The beauty of the service rendered (to a ruler) does not require that it always be performed in one way ; the service of parents so as to give them pleasure takes no account of how it is done ; the festive drinking which ministers enjoyment does not depend on the appliances for it ; the observance of the mourning rites with the proper sorrow asks no questions about the rites themselves. Rites are prescribed for the practice of the common people ; man's proper Truth is what he has received from Heaven, operating spontaneously, and unchangeable. Therefore the sages take their law from Heaven, and prize their (proper) Truth, without submitting to the restrictions of custom. The stupid do the reverse of this. They are unable to take their law from Heaven, and are influenced by other men ; they do not know how to prize the proper Truth (of their nature), but are under the dominion of ordinary things, and change according to the customs (around them) :—always, consequently, incomplete. Alas for you, Sir, that you were early steeped in the hypocrisies of men, and have been so late in hearing about the Great Way !'

(Once more), Confucius bowed twice (to the fisherman), then rose again, and said, 'That I have met you to-day is as if I had the happiness of getting to heaven. If you, Master, are not ashamed, but will let me be as your servant, and continue to teach me, let me venture to ask where your dwelling is. I will

then beg to receive your instructions there, and finish my learning of the Great Way.' The stranger replied, 'I have heard the saying, "If it be one with whom you can walk together, go with him to the subtlest mysteries of the Táo. If it be one with whom you cannot walk together and he do not know the Táo, take care that you do not associate with him, and you will yourself incur no responsibility." Do your utmost, Sir. I must leave you,—I must leave you!' With this he shoved off his boat, and went away among the green reeds.

Yen Yüan (now) returned to the carriage, where 3ze-lû handed to him the strap; but Confucius did not look round, (continuing where he was), till the wavelets were stilled, and he did not hear the sound of the pole, when at last he ventured to (return and) take his seat. 3ze-lû, by his side in the carriage, asked him, saying, 'I have been your servant for a long time, but I have never seen you, Master, treat another with the awe and reverence which you have now shown. I have seen you in the presence of a Lord of ten thousand chariots or a Ruler of a thousand, and they have never received you in a different audience-room, or treated you but with the courtesies due to an equal, while you have still carried yourself with a reserved and haughty air; but to-day this old fisherman has stood erect in front of you with his pole in his hand, while you, bent from your loins in the form of a sounding-stone, would bow twice before you answered him;—was not your reverence of him excessive? Your disciples will all think it strange in you, Master. Why did the old fisherman receive such homage from you?'

Confucius leant forward on the cross-bar of the

carriage, heaved a sigh, and said, 'Difficult indeed is it to change you, O Yû! You have been trained in propriety and righteousness for long, and yet your servile and mean heart has not been taken from you. Come nearer, that I may speak fully to you. If you meet one older than yourself, and do not show him respect, you fail in propriety. If you see a man of superior wisdom and goodness, and do not honour him, you want the great characteristic of humanity. If that (fisherman) did not possess it in the highest degree, how could he make others submit to him? And if their submission to him be not sincere, they do not attain to the truth (of their nature), and inflict a lasting injury on their persons. Alas! there is no greater calamity to man than the want of this characteristic; and you, O Yû, you alone, would take such want on yourself.

'Moreover, the Tâo is the course by which all things should proceed. For things to fail in this is death; to observe it, is life. To oppose it in practice is ruin; to conform it, is success. Therefore wherever the sagely man finds the Tâo, he honours it. And that old fisherman to-day might be said to possess it;—dared I presume not to show him reverence?'

BOOK XXXII.

PART III. SECTION X.

Lieh Yü-khâu¹.

1. Lieh Yü-khâu had started to go to *Khi*, but came back when he was half-way to it. He met Po-hwăn Wû-zăn², who said, 'Why have you come back?' His reply was, 'I was frightened.' 'What frightened you?' 'I went into ten soup-shops³ to get a meal, and in five of them the soup was set before me before (I had paid for it)⁴.' 'But what was there in that to frighten you?' (Lieh-ze) said, 'Though the inward and true purpose be not set forth, the body like a spy gives some bright display of it. And this outward demonstration overawes men's minds, and makes men on light grounds treat one as noble or as aged, from which evil to him will be produced. Now vendors of soup supply their commodity simply as a matter of business, and however much they may dispose of, their profit is but little,

¹ See vol. xxxix, pp. 160-162.

² The same teacher, no doubt, who is mentioned in II, par. 2, and XXI, par. 2, though the Wû in Wû-zăn is here 務, and there 無.

³ Like the tea and congee shanties, I suppose, which a traveller in China finds still on the road-side.

⁴ The meaning is not plain. There must have been something in the respect and generosity of the attendants which made Lieh-ze feel that his manner was inconsistent with his profession of Táoism.

and their power is but slight; and yet they treated me as I have said :—how much more would the lord of ten thousand chariots do so ! His body burdened with (the cares of his) kingdom, and his knowledge overtaken by its affairs, he would entrust those affairs to me, and exact from me the successful conduct (of its government). It was this which frightened me.’ Po-hwăn Wû-zăn replied, ‘Admirable perspicacity ! But if you carry yourself as you do, men will flock to you for protection.’

Not long after, Po-hwăn Wû-zăn went (to visit Lieh-ze), and found the space outside his door full of shoes¹. There he stood with his face to the north, holding his staff upright, and leaning his chin on it till the skin was wrinkled. After standing so for some time, and without saying a word, he was going away, when the door-keeper² went in, and told Lieh-ze. The latter (immediately) took up his shoes, and ran barefoot after the visitor. When he overtook him at the (outer) gate, he said, ‘Since you, Sir, have come, are you going away without giving me some medicine³?’ The other replied, ‘It is of no use. I did tell you that men would flock to you, and they do indeed do so. It is not that you can cause men to flock to you, but you cannot keep them from not so coming ;—of what use is (all my warning)? What influences them and makes them glad is the display of your extraordinary (qualities); but you must also be influ-

¹ See the *Lî Kî* (vol. xxvii, pp. 70, 71). It is still the custom in Japan for visitors to leave their shoes outside, in order not to soil the mats.

² Whose business it was to receive and announce the guests.

³ Good advice.

enced in your turn, and your proper nature be shaken, and no warning can be addressed to you. Those who associate with you do not admonish you of this. The small words which they speak are poison to a man. You perceive it not; you understand it not;—how can you separate yourself from them?

‘The clever toil on, and the wise are sad. Those who are without ability seek for nothing. They eat to the full, and wander idly about. They drift like a vessel loosed from its moorings, and aimlessly wander about¹.’

2. A man of *K'ang*, called Hwan, learned² his books in the neighbourhood of *K'hiu-shih*³, and in no longer time than three years became a Confucian scholar, benefiting the three classes of his kindred⁴ as the Ho extends its enriching influence for nine li. He made his younger brother study (the principles of) Mo⁵, and then they two—the scholar and the Mohist—disputed together (about their respective systems), and the father took the side of the younger⁶. After ten years Hwan killed himself. (By and by) he appeared to his father in a dream, saying, ‘It was I who made your son become a

¹ Was this then Wû-zăn's idea of how the Taoist should carry himself? From ‘those who associate with you’ Wû-zăn's address might be rhymed.

² Read them aloud, and so committed them to memory;—as Chinese schoolboys do still.

³ The name of a place, or, perhaps, of Hwan's schoolmaster.

⁴ Probably, the kindred of his father, mother, and wife;—through his getting office as a scholar.

⁵ Or Mih Tî;—Mencius's heresiarch.

⁶ Literally, ‘of Tî,’ as if that had been the name of the younger brother, as it was that of the heresiarch.

Mohist; why did you not recognise that good service¹? I am become (but) the fruit of a cypress in autumn².’ But the Creator³, in apportioning the awards of men, does not recompense them for their own doings, but recompenses them for the (use of the) Heavenly in them. It was thus that Hwan’s brother was led to learn Mohism. When this Hwan thought that it was he who had made his brother different from what he would have been, and proceeded to despise his father, he was like the people of *K’hi*, who, while they drank from a well, tried to keep one another from it. Hence it is said, ‘Now-a-days all men are Hwans⁴.’ From this we perceive that those who possess the characteristics (of the Tâo) consider that they do not know them; how much more is it so with those who possess the Tâo itself! The ancients called such (as Hwan) ‘men who had escaped the punishment of Heaven.’

3. The sagely man rests in what is his proper rest; he does not rest in what is not so;—the multitude of men rest in what is not their proper rest; they do not rest in their proper rest⁵.

4. *K’wang-ze* said, ‘To know the Tâo is easy; not to say (that you know it) is difficult. To know it and not to speak of it is the way to attain to the

¹ The character for this in the text (良) is explained as meaning ‘a grave,’ with special reference to this passage, in the *Khang-hsi* dictionary.

² The idea of a grave is suggested by the ‘cypress,’ and we need not try to find it in 良.

³ The creator was, in *K’wang-ze*’s mind, the Tâo.

⁴ Arrogating to themselves what was the work of the Tâo.

⁵ The best editions make this sentence a paragraph by itself.

Heavenly; to know and to speak of it, is the way to show the Human. The ancients pursued the Heavenly (belonging to them), and not the Human.'

5. *K'û Phing-man*¹ learned how to slaughter the dragon² from *K'ih-lí Yt*, expending (in doing so) all his wealth of a thousand ounces of silver. In three years he became perfect in the art, but he never exercised his skill.

6. The sage looks on what is deemed necessary as unnecessary, and therefore is not at war³ (in himself). The mass of men deem what is unnecessary to be necessary, and therefore they are often at war (in themselves). Therefore those who pursue this method of (internal) war, resort to it in whatever they seek for. But reliance on such war leads to ruin.

7. The wisdom of the small man does not go beyond (the minutiae of) making presents and writing memoranda, wearying his spirits out in what is trivial and mean. But at the same time he wishes to aid in guiding to (the secret of) the *Táo* and of (all) things in the incorporeity of the Grand Unity. In this way he goes all astray in regard to (the mysteries of) space and time. The fetters of embodied matter keep him from the knowledge of the Grand Beginning. (On the other hand), the perfect man directs the energy of his spirit to what was before the Beginning, and finds pleasure in the mysteriousness

¹ These are names fashioned by our author.

² 'Slaughtering the dragon' means 'learning the *Táo*,' by expending or putting away all doing and knowledge, till one comes to the perfect state of knowing the *Táo* and not speaking of it.

³ Being 'at war' here is not the conflict of arms, but of joy, anger, and desire in one's breast. See *Sião Hung* in loc.

belonging to the region of nothingness. He is like the water which flows on without the obstruction of matter, and expands into the Grand Purity.

Alas for what you do, (O men)! You occupy yourselves with things trivial as a hair, and remain ignorant of the Grand Rest!

8. There was a man of Sung, called ʒhào Shang, who was sent by the king of Sung on a mission to *Khin*. On setting out, he had several carriages with him; and the king (of *Khin*) was so pleased with him that he gave him another hundred. When he returned to Sung, he saw *Kwang-ʒze*, and said to him, 'To live in a narrow lane of a poor mean hamlet, wearing sandals amid distress of poverty, with a weazen neck and yellow face¹;—that is what I should find it difficult to do. But as soon as I come to an understanding with the Lord of a myriad carriages, to find myself with a retinue of a hundred carriages,—that is wherein I excel.' *Kwang-ʒze* replied, 'When the king of *Khân* is ill, the doctor whom he calls to open an ulcer or squeeze a boil receives a carriage; and he who licks his piles receives five. The lower the service, the more are the carriages given. Did you, Sir, lick his piles? How else should you have got so many carriages? Begone!'

9. Duke *Âi* of *Lû* asked *Yen Ho*, saying, 'If I employ *Kung-nî* as the support of my government, will the evils of the state be thereby cured?' The

¹ The character for 'face' generally means 'ears;' but the *Khang-hsi* dictionary, with special reference to this paragraph, explains it by 'face.'—The whole paragraph is smart and bitter, but *Lin Hsi-kung* thinks it too coarse to be from *Kwang-ʒze*'s pencil.

reply was, ' (Such a measure) would be perilous ! It would be full of hazard ! *Kung-nî*, moreover, will try to ornament a feather and paint it ; in the conduct of affairs he uses flowery speeches. A (mere) branch is to him more admirable (than the root) ; he can bear to misrepresent their nature in instructing the people, and is not conscious of the unreality of his words. He receives (his inspiration) from his own mind, and rules his course from his own spirit ; —what fitness has he to be set over the people ? Is such a man suitable for you (as your minister) ? Could you give to him the nourishment (of the people) ? You would do so by mistake (but not on purpose, for a time, but not as a permanency). To make the people leave what is real, and learn what is hypocritical—that is not the proper thing to be shown to them ; if you take thought for future ages, your better plan will be to give up (the idea of employing Confucius). What makes government difficult, is the dealing with men without forgetting yourself ; this is not according to the example of Heaven in diffusing its benefits. Merchants and traffickers are not to be ranked (with administrative officers) ; if on an occasion you so rank them, the spirits (of the people) do not acquiesce in your doing so. The instruments of external punishment are made of metal and wood ; those of internal punishment are agitation (of the mind) and (the sense of) transgression. When small men become subject to the external punishment, the (instruments of) metal and wood deal with them ; when they become liable to the internal punishments, the Yin and Yang¹ con-

¹ Compare the use of 'the Yin and the Yang' in XXIII, par. 8.—Yen Ho does not flatter Confucius in his description of him.

sume them. It is only the true man who can escape both from the external and internal punishment.'

10. Confucius said, 'The minds of men are more difficult of approach than (the position defended by) mountains and rivers, and more difficult to know than Heaven itself. Heaven has its periods of spring and autumn, of winter and summer, and of morning and evening; but man's exterior is thickly veiled, and his feelings lie deep. Thus the demeanour of some is honest-like, and yet they go to excess (in what is mean); others are really gifted, and yet look to be without ability; some seem docile and impressible, but yet they have far-reaching schemes; others look firm, and yet may be twisted about; others look slow, and yet they are hasty. In this way those who hasten to do what is right as if they were thirsty will anon hurry away from it as if it were fire. Hence the superior man looks at them when employed at a distance to test their fidelity, and when employed near at hand to test their reverence. By employing them on difficult services, he tests their ability; by questioning them suddenly, he tests their knowledge; by appointing them a fixed time, he tests their good faith; by entrusting them with wealth, he tests their benevolence; by telling them of danger, he tests their self-command in emergencies; by making them drunk, he tests their tendencies¹; by placing them in a variety of society, he tests their chastity:—by these nine tests the inferior man is discovered.'

11. When Khâu-fû, the Correct ², received the first

¹ Is this equivalent to the adage 'In vino veritas?'

² A famous ancestor of Confucius in the eighth century B. C.,

grade of official rank, he walked with head bowed down ; on receiving the second, with bent back ; on receiving the third, with body stooping, he ran and hurried along the wall :—who would presume not to take him as a model ? But one of those ordinary men, on receiving his first appointment, goes along with a haughty stride ; on receiving his second, he looks quite elated in his chariot ; and on receiving the third, he calls his uncles by their personal names ;—how very different from Hsü (Yü) in the time (of Yáo of) Thang !

Of all things that injure (men) there is none greater than the practising of virtue with the purpose of the mind, till the mind becomes supercilious. When it becomes so, the mind (only) looks inwards (on itself), and such looking into itself leads to its ruin. This evil quality has five forms, and the chief of them is that which is the central. What do we mean by the central quality ? It is that which appears in a man's loving (only) his own views, and reviling whatever he does not do (himself).

Limiting (men's advance), there are eight extreme conditions ; securing (that advance), there are three things necessary ; and the person has its six repositories. Elegance ; a (fine) beard ; tallness ; size ; strength ; beauty ; bravery ; daring ; and in all these excelling others :—(these are the eight extreme conditions) by which advance is limited. Depending on and copying others ; stooping in order to rise ; and being straitened by the fear of not equalling others :—

before the Khung family fled from Sung. See the account of him, with some verbal alterations, in the 30 *K'wan*, under the seventh year of duke *K'ao*.

these are the three things that lead to advancing. Knowledge seeking to reach to all that is external; bold movement producing many resentments; benevolence and righteousness leading to many requisitions; understanding the phenomena of life in an extraordinary degree; understanding all knowledge so as to possess an approach to it; understanding the great condition appointed for him, and following it, and the smaller conditions, and meeting them as they occur:—(these are the six repositories of the person)¹.

12. There was a man who, having had an interview with the king of Sung, and been presented by him with ten carriages, showed them boastfully to *Kwang-sze*, as if the latter had been a boy. *Kwang-sze* said to him, 'Near the Ho there was a poor man who supported his family by weaving rushes (to form screens). His son, when diving in a deep pool, found a pearl worth a thousand ounces of silver. The father said, "Bring a stone, and break it in pieces. A pearl of this value must have been in a pool nine *k'kung* deep², and under the chin of the Black Dragon. That you were able to get it must have been owing to your finding him asleep. Let him awake, and the consequences to you will not be small!' Now the kingdom of Sung is deeper than any pool of nine *k'kung*, and its king is fiercer than the Black Dragon. That you were able to get the

¹ These eight words are supplied to complete the structure of the paragraph; but I cannot well say what they mean, nor in what way the predicates in the six clauses that precede can be called 'the stores, or repositories of the body or person.'

² = in a pool deeper than any nine pools. Compare the expression 九重天.

chariots must have been owing to your finding him asleep. Let him awake, and you will be ground to powder¹.

13. Some (ruler) having sent a message of invitation to him, *Kwang-ze* replied to the messenger, 'Have you seen, Sir, a sacrificial ox? It is robed with ornamental embroidery, and feasted on fresh grass and beans. But when it is led into the grand ancestral temple, though it wished to be (again) a solitary calf, would that be possible for it²?'

14. When *Kwang-ze* was about to die, his disciples signified their wish to give him a grand burial. 'I shall have heaven and earth,' said he, 'for my coffin and its shell; the sun and moon for my two round symbols of jade; the stars and constellations for my pearls and jewels; and all things assisting as the mourners. Will not the provisions for my burial be complete? What could you add to them?' The disciples replied, 'We are afraid that the crows and kites will eat our master.' *Kwang-ze* rejoined, 'Above, the crows and kites will eat me; below, the mole-cricket and ants will eat me:—to take from those and give to these would only show your partiality³.'

The attempt, with what is not even, to produce what is even will only produce an uneven result; the attempt, with what is uncertain, to make the uncertain certain will leave the uncertainty as it

¹ Compare paragraph 8. But Lin again denies the genuineness of this.

² Compare XVII, par. 11.

³ We do not know whether *Kwang-ze* was buried according to his own ideal or not. In the concluding sentences we have a strange descent from the grandiloquence of what precedes.

was. He who uses only the sight of his eyes is acted on by what he sees ; it is the (intuition of the) spirit, that gives the assurance of certainty. That the sight of the eyes is not equal to that intuition of the spirit is a thing long acknowledged. And yet stupid people rely on what they see, and will have it to be the sentiment of all men ;—all their success being with what is external :—is it not sad ?

BOOK XXXIII.

PART III. SECTION XI.

Thien Hsiâ¹.

1. The methods employed in the regulation of the world² are many; and (the employers of them) think each that the efficiency of his own method leaves nothing to be added to it.

But where is what was called of old 'the method of the Táo²?' We must reply, 'It is everywhere.' But then whence does the spiritual³ in it come down? and whence does the intelligence⁴ in it come forth? There is that which gives birth to the Sage, and that which gives his perfection to the King:—the origin of both is the One⁵.

Not to be separate from his primal source constitutes what we call the Heavenly man; not to be separate from the essential nature thereof constitutes what we call the Spirit-like man; not to be separate from its real truth constitutes what we call the Perfect man⁶.

¹ See vol. xxxix, pp. 162, 163.

² All the methods of educational training and schemes of governmental policy, advocated by 'the hundred schools' of human wisdom in contradistinction from the method or art of the Táo. Fang Shû has little more meaning than our word 'nostrum.'

³ Which forms the sage.

⁴ Which forms the sage king.

⁵ Or, one and the same.

⁶ Compare the three definitions in Book I, par. 3.

To regard Heaven as his primal Source, Its Attributes as the Root (of his nature), and the Tâo as the Gate (by which he enters into this inheritance), (knowing also) the prognostics given in change and transformation, constitutes what we call the Sagely man¹.

To regard benevolence as (the source of all) kindness, righteousness as (the source of all) distinctions, propriety as (the rule of) all conduct, and music as (the idea of) all harmony, thus diffusing a fragrance of gentleness and goodness, constitutes what we call the Superior man².

To regard laws as assigning the different (social) conditions, their names as the outward expression (of the social duties), the comparison of subjects as supplying the grounds of evidence, investigation as conducting to certainty, so that things can be numbered as first, second, third, fourth (and so on):—(this is the basis of government). Its hundred offices are thus arranged; business has its regular course; the great matters of clothes and food are provided for; cattle are fattened and looked after; the (government) stores are filled; the old and weak, orphans and solitaries, receive anxious consideration:—in all these ways is provision made for the nourishment of the people.

How complete was (the operation of the Tâo) in the men of old! It made them the equals of spiritual beings, and subtle and all-embracing as heaven and earth. They nourished all things, and produced

¹ Here we have five definitions of the 'Man of Tâo.'

² Still within the circle of the Tâo, but inferior to the five above.

harmony all under heaven. Their beneficent influence reached to all classes of the people. They understood all fundamental principles, and followed them out to their graduated issues; in all the six directions went their penetration, and in the four quarters all things were open to them. Great and small, fine and coarse;—all felt their presence and operation. Their intelligence, as seen in all their regulations, was handed down from age to age in their old laws, and much of it was still to be found in the Historians. What of it was in the Shih, the Shû, the Lî, and the Yo, might be learned from the scholars of 3âu¹ and Lû¹, and the girdled members of the various courts. The Shih describes what should be the aim of the mind; the Shû, the course of events; the Lî is intended to direct the conduct; the Yo, to set forth harmony; the Yî, to show the action of the Yin and Yang; and the *Khun Khiú*, to display names and the duties belonging to them.

Some of the regulations (of these men of old), scattered all under heaven, and established in our Middle states, are (also) occasionally mentioned and described in the writings of the different schools.

There ensued great disorder in the world, and sages and worthies no longer shed their light on it. The Táo and its characteristics ceased to be regarded as uniform. Many in different places got

¹ These scholars were pre-eminently Confucius and Mencius. In this brief phrase is the one recognition, by our author, of the existence and work of Mencius, who was 'the scholar of 3âu.' But one is not prepared for the comparatively favourable judgment passed on those scholars, and on what we call the Confucian classics. The reading 3âu has not been challenged, and can only be understood of Mencius.

one glimpse of it, and plumed themselves on possessing it as a whole. They might be compared to the ear, the eye, the nose, or the mouth. Each sense has its own faculty, but their different faculties cannot be interchanged. So it was with the many branches of the various schools. Each had its peculiar excellence, and there was the time for the use of it; but notwithstanding no one covered or extended over the whole (range of truth). The case was that of the scholar of a corner who passes his judgment on all the beautiful in heaven and earth, discriminates the principles that underlie all things, and attempts to estimate the success arrived at by the ancients. Seldom is it that such an one can embrace all the beautiful in heaven and earth, or rightly estimate the ways of the spiritual and intelligent; and thus it was that the Táo, which inwardly forms the sage and externally the king¹, became obscured and lost its clearness, became repressed and lost its development. Every one in the world did whatever he wished, and was the rule to himself. Alas! the various schools held on their several ways, and could not come back to the same point, nor agree together. The students of that later age unfortunately did not see the undivided purity of heaven and earth, and the great scheme of truth held by the ancients. The system of the Táo was about to be torn in fragments all under the sky.

2. To leave no example of extravagance to future generations; to show no wastefulness in the use of

¹ Compare 'the spiritual' and 'the intelligence' near the commencement, and the notes 3 and 4.

anything; to make no display in the degree of their (ceremonial) observances; to keep themselves (in their expenditure) under the restraint of strict and exact rule, so as to be prepared for occurring emergencies;—such regulations formed part of the system of the Tâo in antiquity, and were appreciated by Mo Tî, and (his disciple) *K'hin Hwa-lî*¹. When they heard of such ways, they were delighted with them; but they enjoined them in excess, and followed them themselves too strictly. (Mo) made the treatise 'Against Music,' and enjoined the subject of another, called 'Economy in Expenditure,' on his followers. He would have no singing in life, and no wearing of mourning on occasions of death. He inculcated Universal Love, and a Common Participation in all advantages, and condemned Fighting. His doctrine did not admit of Anger. He was fond also of Learning, and with it all strove not to appear different from others. Yet he did not agree with the former kings, but attacked the ceremonies and music of the ancients.

Hwang-Tî had his Hsien-*k'ih*; Yâo, his Tâ Kang; Shun, his Tâ Shâo; Yü, his Tâ Hsiâ; Thang, his Tâ Hû; king Wăn, his music of the Phi-yung²; and king Wû and the duke of Kâu made the Wû.

¹ Thus Mohism appears as an imperfect Taoism. Mo (or Meh) Tî was a great officer of the state of Sung, of the period between Confucius and Mencius. He left many treatises behind him, of which only a few, but the most important, survive. *K'hin Hwa-lî* seems to have been his chief disciple. He says, in one place, '*K'hin Hwa-lî* and my other disciples,—300 men.'

² The name of the great hall built by king Wăn, and still applied to the examination hall of the Han-lin graduates in Peking.

In the mourning rites of the ancients, the noble and mean had their several observances, the high and low their different degrees. The coffin of the Son of Heaven was sevenfold; of a feudal lord, fivefold; of a great officer, threefold; of other officers, twofold. But now Mo-ze alone, would have no singing during life, and no wearing of mourning after death. As the rule for all, he would have a coffin of elaeococca wood, three inches thick, and without any enclosing shell. The teaching of such lessons cannot be regarded as affording a proof of his love for men; his practising them in his own case would certainly show that he did not love himself; but this has not been sufficient to overthrow the views of Mo-ze. Notwithstanding, men will sing, and he condemns singing; men will wail, and he condemns wailing; men will express their joy, and he condemns such expression:—is this truly in accordance with man's nature? Through life toil, and at death niggardliness:—his way is one of great unkindliness. Causing men sorrow and melancholy, and difficult to be carried into practice, I fear it cannot be regarded as the way of a sage. Contrary to the minds of men everywhere, men will not endure it. Though Mo-ze himself might be able to endure it, how can the aversion of the world to it be overcome? The world averse to it, it must be far from the way of the (ancient) kings.

Mo-ze, in praise of his views, said, 'Anciently, when Yü was draining off the waters of the flood, he set free the channels of the *Kiang* and the *Ho*, and opened communications with them from the

What the special music made for it by Wăn was called, I do not know.

regions of the four Î and the nine provinces. The famous hills with which he dealt were 300, the branch streams were 3000, and the smaller ones innumerable. With his own hands he carried the sack and wielded the spade, till he had united all the streams of the country (conducting them to the sea). There was no hair left on his legs from the knee to the ankle. He bathed his hair in the violent wind, and combed it in the pelting rain, thus marking out the myriad states. Yü was a great sage, and thus he toiled in the service of the world.' The effect of this is that in this later time most of the Mohists wear skins and dolychos cloth, with shoes of wood or twisted hemp, not stopping day or night, but considering such toiling on their part as their highest achievement. They say that he who cannot do this is acting contrary to the way of Yü, and not fit to be a Mohist.

The disciples of *K'in* of Hsiang-lî¹, the followers of the various feudal lords²; and Mohists of the south, such as Khû Hu³, *Ki K'ih*³, and Täng Ling-ze³, all repeated the texts of Mo, but they differed in the objections which they offered to them, and in their deceitful glosses they called one another Mohists of different schools. They had their disputations, turning on 'what was hard,' and 'what was white,' what constituted 'sameness' and what 'difference,' and their expressions about the difference between 'the odd' and 'the even,' with which they answered one another. They regarded

¹ Some say this *K'in* was the preceptor of Mo Tî.

² Easily translated; but the statement has not been historically illustrated.

³ Known only by the mention of them here.

their most distinguished member as a sage, and wished to make him their chief, hoping that he would be handed down as such to future ages. To the present day these controversies are not determined.

The idea of Mo Tî and *K'hin* Hwa-lî was good, but their practice was wrong. They would have made the Mohists of future ages feel it necessary to toil themselves, till there was not a hair on their legs, and still be urging one another on; (thus producing a condition) superior indeed to disorder, but inferior to the result of good government. Nevertheless, Mo-ze was indeed one of the best men in the world, which you may search without finding his equal. Decayed and worn (his person) might be, but he is not to be rejected,—a scholar of ability indeed!

3. To keep from being entangled by prevailing customs; to shun all ornamental attractions in one's self; not to be reckless in his conduct to others; not to set himself stubbornly against a multitude; to desire the peace and repose of the world in order to preserve the lives of the people; and to cease his action when enough had been obtained for the nourishment of others and himself, showing that this was the aim of his mind;—such a scheme belonged to the system of the Táo in antiquity¹, and it was appreciated by Sung Hsing² and Yin Wăn².

¹ It is difficult to understand the phases of the Táo here referred to.

² Both these men are said to have been of the time of king Hsüan of *K'hi*. In the Catalogue of the Imperial Library of Han, Yin Wăn appears, but not among the Táoist writers, as the author

When they heard of such ways, they were delighted with them. They made the Hwa-shan cap, and wore it as their distinguishing badge¹. In their intercourse with others, whatever their differences might be, they began by being indulgent to them. Their name for 'the Forbearance of the Mind' was 'the Action of the Mind.' By the warmth of affection they sought the harmony of joy, and to blend together all within the four seas; and their wish was to plant this everywhere as the chief thing to be pursued. They endured insult without feeling it a disgrace; they sought to save the people from fighting; they forbade aggression and sought to hush the weapons of strife, to save their age from war. In this way they went everywhere, counselling the high and instructing the low. Though the world might not receive them, they only insisted on their object the more strongly, and would not abandon it. Hence it is said, 'The high and the low might be weary of them, but they were strong to show themselves.'

Notwithstanding all this, they acted too much out of regard to others, and too little for themselves. It was as if they said, 'What we request and wish is simply that there may be set down for us five pints of rice;—that will be enough.' But I fear the Master would not get his fill from this; and the disciples, though famishing, would still have to be mindful of the world, and, never stopping day or night, have to say, 'Is it necessary I should preserve

of 'one Treatise.' He is said also to have been the preceptor of Kung-sun Lung.

¹ I cannot fashion the shape of this cap or of the Hwa mountain in my own mind,—'flat both above and below.'

my life? Shall I scheme how to exalt myself above the master, the saviour of the age?’

It was moreover as if they said, ‘The superior man does not censoriously scrutinize (the faults of others); he does not borrow from others to supersede his own endeavours; when any think that he is of no use to the world, he knows that their intelligence is inferior to his own; he considers the prohibition of aggression and causing the disuse of arms to be an external achievement, and the making his own desires to be few and slight to be the internal triumph.’ Such was their discrimination between the great and the small, the subtle and the coarse; and with the attainment of this they stopped.

4. Public-spirited, and with nothing of the partizan; easy and compliant, without any selfish partialities; capable of being led, without any positive tendencies; following in the wake of others, without any double mind; not looking round because of anxious thoughts; not scheming in the exercise of their wisdom; not choosing between parties, but going along with all;—all such courses belonged to the Tâoists of antiquity, and they were appreciated by Phăng Măng¹, Thien Phien¹, and Shăn Tâo¹. When they heard of such ways, they were delighted with them. They considered that the first thing for them to do was to adjust the controversies about different things. They said, ‘Heaven can cover, but it cannot sustain; Earth can contain, but it can-

¹ Thien Phien is mentioned in the Han Catalogue, among the Tâoist writers, as a native of Kêi, and an author of twenty-five phien. Shăn Tâo also appears among the legal writers, as author of forty-two phien. He is mentioned by Han Fei.

not cover. The Great Tâo embraces all things, but It does not discriminate between them.'

They knew that all things have what they can do and what they cannot do. Hence it is said, 'If you select, you do not reach all; if you teach some things, you must omit the others; but the Tâo neglects none.' Therefore Shân Tâo discarded his knowledge and also all thought of himself, acting only where he had no alternative, and pursued it as his course to be indifferent and pure in his dealings with others. He said that the best knowledge was to have no knowledge, and that if we had a little knowledge it was likely to prove a dangerous thing. Conscious of his unfitness, he undertook no charge, and laughed at those who valued ability and virtue. Remiss and evasive, he did nothing, and disallowed the greatest sages which the world had known. Now with a hammer, now with his hand, smoothing all corners, and breaking all bonds, he accommodated himself to all conditions. He disregarded right and wrong, his only concern being to avoid trouble; he learned nothing from the wise and thoughtful, and took no note of the succession of events, thinking only of carrying himself with a lofty disregard of everything. He went where he was pushed, and followed where he was led, like a whirling wind, like a feather tossed about, like the revolutions of a grindstone.

What was the reason that he appeared thus complete, doing nothing wrong? that, whether in motion or at rest, he committed no error, and could be charged with no transgression? Creatures that have no knowledge are free from the troubles that arise from self-assertion and the entanglements that spring from the use of knowledge. Moving and at

rest, they do not depart from their proper course, and all their life long they do not receive any praise. Hence (Shăn Táo) said, 'Let me come to be like a creature without knowledge. Of what use are the (teachings of the) sages and worthies?' But a clod of earth never fails in the course (proper for it), and men of spirit and eminence laughed together at him, and said, 'The way of Shăn Táo does not describe the conduct of living men; that it should be predicable only of the dead is strange indeed!'

It was just the same with Thien Phien. He learned under Phăng Măng, but it was as if he were not taught at all. The master of Phăng Măng said, 'The Táoist professors of old came no farther than to say that nothing was absolutely right and nothing absolutely wrong.' His spirit was like the breath of an opposing wind; how can it be described in words? But he was always contrary to (the views of) other men, which he would not bring together to view, and he did not escape shaving the corners and bonds (of which I have spoken). What he called the Táo was not the true Táo, and what he called the right was really the wrong.

Phăng Măng, Thien Phien, and Shăn Táo did not in fact know the Táo; but nevertheless they had heard in a general way about it.

5. To take the root (from which things spring) as the essential (part), and the things as its coarse (embodiment); to see deficiency in accumulation; and in the solitude of one's individuality to dwell with the spirit-like and intelligent;—such a course belonged to the Táo of antiquity, and it was appre-

ciated by Kwan Yin¹ and Lâo Tan². When they heard of such ways, they were delighted with them. They built their system on the assumption of an eternal non-existence, and made the ruling idea in it that of the Grand Unity. They made weakness and humility their mark of distinction, and considered that by empty vacuity no injury could be sustained, but all things be preserved in their substantiality.

Kwan Yin¹ says, 'To him who does not dwell in himself the forms of things show themselves as they are. His movement is like that of water; his stillness is like that of a mirror; his response is like that of the echo. His tenuity makes him seem to be disappearing altogether; he is still as a clear (lake), harmonious in his association with others, and he counts gain as loss. He does not take precedence of others, but follows them.' Lâo Tan² says, 'He knows his masculine power, but maintains his female weakness,—becoming the channel into which all streams flow. He knows his white purity, but keeps his disgrace,—becoming the valley of the world. Men all prefer to be first; he alone chooses to be last, saying, "I will receive the offscourings of the world." Men all choose fulness; he alone chooses emptiness. He does not store, and therefore he has a superabundance; he looks solitary, but has a multitude around him. In his conducting

¹ Kwan Yin;—see Book XIX, par. 2, and vol. xxxix, p. 35. In the Catalogue of the Han Library there is an entry of a work by Kwan Yin in nine *phien*; and there is still a work current in China, called *Kwan Yin-ze* in one *k'üan*, but it is not generally received as genuine.

² See the account of Lâo-ze in vol. xxxix, pp. 34-36.

of himself he is easy and leisurely and wastes nothing. He does nothing, and laughs at the clever and ingenious. Men all seek for happiness, but he feels complete in his imperfect condition, and says, "Let me only escape blame." He regards what is deepest as his root, and what is most restrictive as his rule; and says, "The strong is broken; the sharp and pointed is blunted¹." He is always generous and forbearing with others, and does not encroach on any man;—this may be pronounced the height (of perfection).'

O Kwan Yin, and Lâu Tan, ye were among the greatest men of antiquity; True men indeed!

6. That the shadowy and still is without bodily form; that change and transformation are ever proceeding, but incapable of being determined. What is death? What is life? What is meant by the union of Heaven and Earth? Does the spiritual intelligence go away? Shadowy, where does it go? Subtle, whither does it proceed? All things being arranged as they are, there is no one place which can be fitly ascribed to it. Such were the questions belonging to the scheme of Tâu in antiquity, and they were appreciated by Kwang Kâu. When he heard of such subjects, he was delighted with them. (He discussed them), using strange and mystical expressions, wild and extravagant words, and phrases to which no definite meaning could be assigned. He constantly indulged his own wayward ideas, but did not make himself a partisan, nor look at them as peculiar to himself. Considering that men were

¹ From the 'Lâu Tan says' down to this, may be said to be all quotation, with more or less exactness, from the Tâu Teh King. See chaps. 28, 22, et al.

sunk in stupidity and could not be talked to in dignified style, he employed the words of the cup of endless application, with important quotations to substantiate the truth, and an abundance of corroborative illustrations. He chiefly cared to occupy himself with the spirit-like operation of heaven and earth, and did not try to rise above the myriads of things. He did not condemn the agreements and differences of others, so that he might live in peace with the prevalent views. Though his writings may seem to be sparkling trifles, there is no harm in amusing one's self with them; though his phraseology be ever-varying, its turns and changes are worth being looked at;—the fulness and completeness of his ideas cannot be exhausted. Above he seeks delight in the Maker; below, he has a friendly regard to those who consider life and death as having neither beginning nor end. As regards his dealing with the Root (origin of all things), he is comprehensive and great, opening up new views, deep, vast, and free. As regards the Author and Master (the Great Táo Itself), he may be pronounced exact and correct, carrying our thoughts to range and play on high. Nevertheless on the subject of transformation, and the emancipation of that from (the thralldom of) things, his principles are inexhaustible, and are not derived from his predecessors. They are subtle and obscure, and cannot be fully explained¹.

¹ The question of the genuineness of this paragraph has been touched on in vol. xxxix, p. 163. Whether from himself or from some disciple, it celebrates Kwang-jze as the chief and most interesting of all ancient Táoist writers.

7. Hui Shih¹ had many ingenious notions. His writings would fill five carriages; but his doctrines were erroneous and contradictory, and his words were wide of their mark. Taking up one thing after another, he would say:—‘That which is so great that there is nothing outside it may be called the Great One; and that which is so small that there is nothing inside it may be called the Small One.’ ‘What has no thickness and will not admit of being repeated is 1000 li in size².’ ‘Heaven may be as low as the earth.’ ‘A mountain may be as level as a marsh.’ ‘The sun in the meridian may be the sun declining.’ ‘A creature may be born to life and may die at the same time.’ ‘(When it is said that) things greatly alike are different from things a little alike, this is what is called making little of agreements and differences; (when it is said that) all things are entirely alike or entirely different, this is what is called making much of agreements and differences.’ ‘The south is unlimited and yet has a limit.’ ‘I proceed to Yueh to-day and came to it yesterday.’ ‘Things which are joined together can be separated.’ ‘I know the centre of the world;—it is north of Yen or south of Yueh.’ ‘If all things be regarded with love, heaven and earth are of one body (with me).’

Hui Shih by such sayings as these made himself

¹ Introduced to us in the first Book of our author, and often mentioned in the intervening Books. He was not a Tâoist, but we are glad to have the account of him here given, as enabling us to understand better the intellectual life of China in Kwang-ze's time.

² It is of little use trying to find the answers to these sayings of Hui Shih and others. They are only riddles or paradoxes.

very conspicuous throughout the kingdom, and was considered an able debater. All other debaters vied with one another and delighted in similar exhibitions. (They would say), 'There are feathers in an egg.' 'A fowl has three feet.' 'The kingdom belongs to Ying.' 'A dog might have been (called) a sheep.' 'A tadpole has a tail.' 'Fire is not hot.' 'A mountain gives forth a voice.' 'A wheel does not tread on the ground.' 'The eye does not see.' 'The finger indicates, but needs not touch, (the object).' 'Where you come to may not be the end.' 'The tortoise is longer than the snake.' 'The carpenter's square is not square.' 'A compass should not itself be round.' 'A chisel does not surround its handle.' 'The shadow of a flying bird does not (itself) move.' 'Swift as the arrowhead is, there is a time when it is neither flying nor at rest.' 'A dog is not a hound.' 'A bay horse and a black ox are three.' 'A white dog is black.' 'A motherless colt never had a mother.' 'If from a stick a foot long you every day take the half of it, in a myriad ages it will not be exhausted.'—It was in this way that the debaters responded to Hui Shih, all their lifetime, without coming to an end.

Hwan Twan¹ and Kung-sun Lung² were true members of this class. By their specious representations they threw a glamour over men's minds and altered their ideas. They vanquished men in argument, but could not subdue their minds, only keeping them in the enclosure of their sophistry. Hui Shih daily used his own knowledge and the arguments of others to propose strange theses to all debaters;—

¹ Elsewhere unknown.

² See Book XVII, par. 10.

such was his practice. At the same time he would talk freely of himself, thinking himself the ablest among them, and saying, 'In heaven or earth who is my match?' Shih maintained indeed his masculine energy, but he had not the art (of controversy).

In the south there was a man of extraordinary views, named Hwang Lião¹, who asked him how it was that the sky did not fall nor the earth sink, and what was the cause of wind, rain, and the thunder's roll and crash. Shih made no attempt to evade the questions, and answered him without any exercise of thought, talking about all things, without pause, on and on without end; yet still thinking that his words were few, and adding to them the strangest observations. He thought that to contradict others was a real triumph, and wished to make himself famous by overcoming them; and on this account he was not liked by the multitude of debaters. He was weak in real attainment, though he might seem strong in comparison with others, and his way was narrow and dark. If we look at Hui Shih's ability from the standpoint of Heaven and Earth, it was only like the restless activity of a mosquito or gadfly; of what service was it to anything? To give its full development to any one capacity is a good thing, and he who does so is in the way to a higher estimation of the Táo; but Hui Shih could find no rest for himself in doing this. He diffused himself over the world of things without satiety, till in the end he had only the reputation of being a skilful debater. Alas! Hui Shih, with

¹ Elsewhere unknown.

all his talents, vast as they were, made nothing out; he pursued all subjects and never came back (with success). It was like silencing an echo by his shouting, or running a race with his shadow. Alas!

THE THÂI-SHANG
TRACTATE OF ACTIONS AND THEIR
RETRIBUTIONS.

THE THÂI-SHANG

TRACTATE OF ACTIONS AND THEIR RETRIBUTIONS¹.

1. The Thâi-Shang (Tractate) says, 'There are no special doors for calamity and happiness (in men's lot); they come as men themselves call them. Their recompenses follow good and evil as the shadow follows the substance².

The Thesis.

2. 'Accordingly, in heaven and earth³ there are spirits that take account of men's transgressions, and, according to the lightness or gravity of their offences, take away from their term of life⁴. When that term is curtailed, men become poor and reduced, and meet with many sorrows and afflictions. All (other) men hate them; punishments and calamities attend them; good luck and occasions for felicitation shun them;

Machinery to secure retribution.

¹ See vol. xxxix, pp. 38-40.

² This paragraph, after the first three characters, is found in the 30 *Khwan*, under the tenth and eleventh notices in the twenty-third year of duke Hsiang (B.C. 549),—part of an address to a young nobleman by the officer Min 3ze-mâ. The only difference in the two texts is in one character which does not affect the meaning. Thus the text of this Tâoist treatise is taken from a source which cannot be regarded as Tâoistic.

³ This seems equivalent to 'all through space.'

⁴ The swan in the text here seems to mean 'the whole of the allotted term of life.' Further on, the same character has the special meaning of 'a period of a hundred days.'

evil stars send down misfortunes on them¹. When their term of life is exhausted they die.

‘There also are the Spirit-rulers in the three pairs of the Thái stars of the Northern Bushel² over men’s heads, which record their acts of guilt and wickedness, and take away (from their term of life) periods of twelve years or of a hundred days.

‘There also are the three Spirits of the recumbent body which reside within a man’s person³. As each kǎng-shǎn⁴ day comes round, they forthwith ascend to the court of Heaven, and report men’s deeds of guilt and transgression. On the last day of the moon, the spirit of the Hearth does the same⁵.

‘In the case of every man’s transgressions, when they are great, twelve years are taken from his term of life; when they are small, a hundred days.

‘Transgressions, great and small, are seen in several hundred things. He who wishes to seek for long life⁶ must first avoid these.

¹ This and other passages show how Tâoism pressed astrology into its service.

² The Northern Peck or Bushel is the Chinese name of our constellation of the Great Bear, ‘the Chariot of the Supreme Ruler.’ The three pairs of stars, ι, κ; λ, μ; ν, ξ, are called the upper, middle, and lower Thái, or ‘their three Eminences:’—see Reeves’s *Names of Stars and Constellations*, appended to Morrison’s *Dictionary*, part ii, vol. i.

³ The Khang-hsî Dictionary simply explains san shîh as ‘the name of a spirit;’ but the phrase is evidently plural. The names and places of the three spirits are given, and given differently. Why should we look for anything definite and satisfactory in a notion which is merely an absurd superstition?

⁴ Kǎng-shǎn is the name of the fifty-seventh term of the cycle, indicating every fifty-seventh day, or year. Here it indicates the day.

⁵ The name of this spirit of the fire-place is given by commentators with many absurd details which need not be touched on.

⁶ Long life is still the great quest of the Tâoist.

3. 'Is his way right, he should go forward in it; is it wrong, he should withdraw from it.

'He will not tread in devious by-ways; he will not impose on himself in any secret apartment. He will
 amass virtue and accumulate deeds of
 merit. He will feel kindly towards
 (all) creatures¹. He will be loyal, filial,
 loving to his younger brothers, and submissive to his
 elder. He will make himself correct and (so) trans-
 form others. He will pity orphans, and compas-
 sionate widows; he will respect the old and cherish
 the young. Even the insect tribes, grass, and trees
 he should not hurt.

'He ought to pity the malignant tendencies of
 others; to rejoice over their excellences; to help
 them in their straits; to rescue them from their
 perils; to regard their gains as if they were his
 own, and their losses in the same way; not to
 publish their shortcomings; not to vaunt his own
 superiorities; to put a stop to what is evil, and
 exalt and display what is good; to yield much, and
 take little for himself; to receive insult without
 resenting it, and honour with an appearance of
 apprehension; to bestow favours without seeking
 for a return, and give to others without any subse-
 quent regret:—this is what is called a good man. All
 other men respect him; Heaven in its course pro-
 tects him; happiness and emolument follow him; all
 evil things keep far from him; the spiritual Intelli-
 gences defend him; what he does is sure to succeed²;

¹ In its widest meaning:—Men, creatures, and all living things.

² Here are the happy issues of doing good in addition to long
 life;—compare the Táo Teh King, ch. 50, et al.

he may hope to become Immaterial and Immortal¹.

He who would seek to become an Immortal of Heaven¹ ought to give the proof of 1300 good deeds; and he who would seek to become an Immortal of Earth¹ should give the proof of three hundred.

Happy issues
of his course.

4. 'But if the movements (of a man's heart) are contrary to righteousness, and the (actions of his) conduct are in opposition to reason; if he regard his wickedness as a proof of his ability, and can bear to do what is cruel and injurious; if he secretly harms the honest and good; if he treats with clandestine slight his ruler or parents; if he is disrespectful to his elders and teachers²; if he disregards the authority of those whom he should serve; if he deceives the simple; if he calumniates his fellow-learners; if he vent baseless slanders, practise deception and hypocrisy,

The way of
a bad man.

¹ Here there appears the influence of Buddhism on the doctrine of the Tâo. The *Rîshis* of Buddhism are denoted in Chinese by Hsien Zân (仙人), which, for want of a better term, we translate by 'Immortals.' The famous Nâgârjuna, the fourteenth Buddhist patriarch, counts ten classes of these *Rîshis*, and ascribes to them only a temporary exemption for a million years from transmigration, but Chinese Buddhists and Tâoists view them as absolutely immortal, and distinguish five classes:—first, Deva *Rîshis*, or Heavenly Hsien, residing on the seven concentric rocks round Meru; second, Purusha, or Spirit-like Hsien, roaming through the air; third, Nara, or Human Hsien, dwelling among men; fourth, Bhûmi, or Earth Hsien, residing on earth in caves; and fifth, Preta, or Demon Hsien, roving demons. See Eitel's Handbook to Chinese Buddhism, second edition, p. 130. In this place three out of the five classes are specified, each having its own price in good deeds.

² Literally, 'those born before himself,' but generally used as a designation of teachers.

and attack and expose his kindred by consanguinity and affinity; if he is hard, violent, and without humanity; if he is ruthlessly cruel in taking his own way; if his judgments of right and wrong are incorrect; and his likings and aversions are in despite of what is proper; if he oppresses inferiors, and claims merit (for doing so); courts superiors by gratifying their (evil) desires; receives favours without feeling grateful for them; broods over resentments without ceasing; if he slights and makes no account of Heaven's people¹; if he trouble and throw into disorder the government of the state; bestows rewards on the unrighteous and inflicts punishments on the guiltless; kills men in order to get their wealth, and overthrows men to get their offices; slays those who have surrendered, and massacres those who have made their submission; throws censure on the upright, and overthrows the worthy; maltreats the orphan and oppresses the widow; if he casts the laws aside and receives bribes; holds the right to be wrong and the wrong to be right; enters light offences as heavy; and the sight of an execution makes him more enraged (with the criminal); if he knows his faults and does not change them, or knows what is good and does not do it; throws the guilt of his crimes on others; if he tries to hinder the exercise of an art (for a living); reviles and slanders the sage and worthy; and assails and oppresses (the principles of) reason and virtue²;

¹ A Confucian phrase. See the *Lî K'î*, III, v, 13.

² One is sorry not to see his way to translate here—'Assails and oppresses those who pursue the Táo and its characteristics.' Julien gives for it—'Insulter et traiter avec cruauté ceux qui se livrent à l'étude de la Raison et de la Vertu.' Waters

if he shoots birds and hunts beasts, unearths the burrowing insects and frightens roosting birds, blocks up the dens of animals and overturns nests, hurts the pregnant womb and breaks eggs; if he wishes others to have misfortunes and losses; and defames the merit achieved by others; if he imperils others to secure his own safety; diminishes the property of others to increase his own; exchanges bad things for good ¹; and sacrifices the public weal to his private advantage; if he takes credit to himself for the ability of others; conceals the excellences of others; publishes the things discreditable to others; and searches out the private affairs of others; leads others to waste their property and wealth; and causes the separation of near relatives ²; encroaches on what others love; and assists others in doing wrong; gives the reins to his will and puts on airs of majesty; puts others to shame in seeking victory for himself; injures or destroys the growing crops of others; and breaks up projected marriages; if becoming rich by improper means makes him proud; and by a peradventure escaping the consequences of his misconduct, he yet feels no shame; if he owns to favours (which he did not confer), and puts off his errors (on others); marries away (his own) calamity to another, and sells (for gain) his own wickedness; purchases for himself empty praise; and keeps hidden dangerous purposes in his heart; detracts from the excel-

has—'Insults and oppresses (those who have attained to the practice of) Truth and Virtue.'

¹ It is a serious mistranslation of this which Mr. Balfour gives:— 'returns evil for good,' as if it were the golden rule in its highest expression.

² Literally, 'separates men's bones and flesh.'

lences of others, and screens his own shortcomings ; if he takes advantage of his dignity to practise intimidation, and indulges his cruelty to kill and wound ; if without cause he (wastes cloth) in clipping and shaping it ; cooks animals for food, when no rites require it ; scatters and throws away the five grains ; and burdens and vexes all living creatures ; if he ruins the families of others, and gets possession of their money and valuables ; admits the water or raises fire in order to injure their dwellings ; if he throws into confusion the established rules in order to defeat the services of others ; and injures the implements of others to deprive them of the things they require to use ; if, seeing others in glory and honour, he wishes them to be banished or degraded ; or seeing them wealthy and prosperous, he wishes them to be broken and scattered ; if he sees a beautiful woman and forms the thought of illicit intercourse with her ; is indebted to men for goods or money, and wishes them to die ; if, when his requests and applications are not complied with, his anger vents itself in imprecations ; if he sees others meeting with misfortune, and begins to speak of their misdeeds ; or seeing them with bodily imperfections he laughs at them ; or when their abilities are worthy of praise, he endeavours to keep them back ; if he buries the image of another to obtain an injurious power over him¹ ; or employs poison to kill trees ; if he is indignant and angry with his instructors ; or opposes and thwarts his

¹ The crimes indicated here are said to have become rife under the Han dynasty, when the arts of sorcery and witchcraft were largely employed to the injury of men.

father and elder brother ; if he takes things by violence or vehemently demands them ; if he loves secretly to pilfer, and openly to snatch ; makes himself rich by plunder and rapine ; or by artifice and deceit seeks for promotion ; if he rewards and punishes unfairly ; if he indulges in idleness and pleasure to excess ; is exacting and oppressive to his inferiors ; and tries to frighten other men ; if he murmurs against Heaven and finds fault with men ; reproaches the wind and reviles the rain ; if he fights and joins in quarrels ; strives and raises litigations ; recklessly hurries to join associate fraternities ; is led by the words of his wife or concubine to disobey the instructions of his parents ; if, on getting what is new, he forgets the old ; and agrees with his mouth, while he dissents in his heart ; if he is covetous and greedy after wealth, and deceives and befools his superiors (to get it) ; if he invents wicked speeches to calumniate and overthrow the innocent ; defames others and calls it being straightforward ; reviles the Spirits and styles himself correct ; if he casts aside what is according to right, and imitates what is against it ; turns his back on his near relatives, and his face to those who are distant ; if he appeals to Heaven and Earth to witness to the mean thoughts of his mind ; or calls in the spiritual Intelligences to mark the filthy affairs of his life ; if he gives and afterwards repents that he has done so ; or borrows and does not return ; if he plans and seeks for what is beyond his lot ; or lays tasks (on people) beyond their strength ; if he indulges his lustful desires without measure ; if there be poison in his heart and mildness in his face ; if he gives others filthy food to eat ; or by corrupt doc-

trines deludes the multitude; if he uses a short cubit, a narrow measure, light weights, and a small pint; mixes spurious articles with the genuine; and (thus) amasses illicit gain; if he degrades (children or others of) decent condition to mean positions; or deceives and ensnares simple people; if he is insatiably covetous and greedy; tries by oaths and imprecations to prove himself correct; and in his liking for drink is rude and disorderly; if he quarrels angrily with his nearest relatives; and as a man he is not loyal and honourable; if a woman is not gentle and obedient; if (the husband) is not harmonious with his wife; if the wife does not reverence her husband; if he is always fond of boasting and bragging; if she is constantly jealous and envious; if he is guilty of improper conduct to his wife or sons; if she fails to behave properly to her parents-in-law; if he treats with slight and disrespect the spirits of his ancestors; if he opposes and rebels against the charge of his sovereign; if he occupies himself in doing what is of no use; and cherishes and keeps concealed a purpose other than what appears; if he utter imprecations against himself and against others (in the assertion of his innocence)¹; or is partial in his likes and dislikes; if he strides over the well or the hearth; leaps over the food, or over a man²; kills newly-born children or brings about abortions³; if he does many actions of secret depravity; if he sings and dances on the

¹ The one illustrative story given by Julien under this clause shows clearly that I have rightly supplemented it. He translates it:—*'Faire des imprécations contre soi-même et contre les autres.'*

² Trifling acts and villainous crimes are here mixed together.

last day of the moon or of the year; bawls out or gets angry on the first day of the moon or in the early dawn; weeps, spits, or urinates, when fronting the north; sighs, sings, or wails, when fronting the fire-place; and moreover, if he takes fire from the hearth to burn incense; or uses dirty firewood to cook with; if he rises at night and shows his person naked; if at the eight terms of the year¹ he inflicts punishments; if he spits at a shooting star; points at a rainbow; suddenly points to the three luminaries; looks long at the sun and moon; in the months of spring burns the thickets in hunting; with his face to the north angrily reviles others; and without reason kills tortoises and smites snakes²:—

‘In the case of crimes such as these, (the Spirits) presiding over the Life, according to their lightness or gravity, take away the culprit’s periods of twelve years or of one hundred days. When his term of life is exhausted, death ensues. If at death there remains guilt unpunished, judgment extends to his posterity³.

¹ The commencements of the four seasons, the equinoxes and solstices.

² Many of the deeds condemned in this long paragraph have a ground of reason for their condemnation; others are merely offences against prevailing superstitions.

³ The principle enunciated here is very ancient in the history of the ethical teaching of China. It appears in one of the Appendixes to the *Yî King* (Sacred Books of the East, vol. xvi, p. 419), ‘The family that accumulates goodness is sure to have superabundant happiness; the family that accumulates evil is sure to have superabundant misery.’ We know also that the same view prevailed in the time of Confucius, though the sage himself does not expressly sanction it. This Tractate does not go for the issues of Retribution beyond the present life.

5. 'Moreover, when parties by wrong and violence take the money of others, an account is taken, and set against its amount, of their wives and children, and all the members of their families, when these gradually die. If they do not die, there are the disasters from water, fire, thieves, and robbers, from losses of property, illnesses, and (evil) tongues to balance the value of their wicked appropriations¹. Further, those who wrongfully kill men are (only) putting their weapons into the hands of others who will in their turn kill them².

Conclusion of
the whole
matter.

'To take to one's self unrighteous wealth is like satisfying one's hunger with putrid food³, or one's thirst with poisoned wine. It gives a temporary relief, indeed, but death also follows it.

'Now when the thought of doing good has arisen in a man's mind, though the good be not yet done, the good Spirits are in attendance on him. Or, if the thought of doing evil has arisen, though the evil be not yet done, the bad Spirits are in attendance on him.

'If one have, indeed, done deeds of wickedness, but afterwards alters his way and repents, resolved not to do anything wicked, but to practise reverently

¹ These sentences are rather weak. Nothing is said of any recompense to the parties who have been robbed. The thief is punished by the death of others, or the loss of property.

² A somewhat perplexing sentence. Julien gives for it:—'*Ceux qui font périr des hommes innocens ressemblent à des ennemis qui échangent leurs armes et se tuent les uns les autres*;' and Watters:—'*Those who put others to death wrongly are like men who exchange arms and slay each other.*'

³ Literally, 'soaked food that has been spoiled by dripping water.'

all that is good, he is sure in the long-run to obtain good fortune :—this is called changing calamity into blessing. Therefore the good man speaks what is good, contemplates what is good, and does what is good ; every day he has these three virtues :—at the end of three years Heaven is sure to send down blessing on him ¹. The bad man speaks what is wicked, contemplates what is wicked, and does what is wicked ; every day he has these three vices :—at the end of three years, Heaven is sure to send down misery on him ¹.—How is it that men will not exert themselves to do what is good ?'

¹ The effect of repentance and reformation is well set forth ; but the specification of three years, as the period within which the recompense or retribution will occur, is again an indication of the weakness in this concluding paragraph.

APPENDIXES.

APPENDIX I.

Khing Kăng King, or 'The Classic of Purity¹.'

So I must translate the title of this brochure, as it appears in the 'Collection of the Most Important Treatises of the Tâoist Fathers' (vol. xxxix, p. xvii), in which alone I have had an opportunity of perusing and studying the Text. The name, as given by Wylie (Notes, p. 178), Balfour (Tâoist Texts), and Faber (China Review, vol. xiii, p. 246), is *Khing King King*², and signifies 'The Classic of Purity and Rest.' The difference is in the second character, but both *Khing Kăng* and *Khing King* are well-known combinations in Tâoist writings; and it will be seen, as the translation of the Text is pursued, that neither of them is unsuitable as the title of the little Book.

It is, as Dr. Faber says, one of the 'mystical canons' of Tâoism; but the mysticism of Tâoism is of a nature peculiar to itself, and different from any mental exercises which have been called by that name in connexion with Christianity or Mohammedanism. It is more vague and shadowy than any theosophy or Sûfism, just as the idea of the Tâo differs from the apprehension of a personal God, however uncertain and indefinite that apprehension may be. Mr. Wylie says the work 'treats under very moderate limits of the subjection of the mental faculties.' This indeed is the consummation to which it conducts the student; a

清淨經.

清靜經.

condition corresponding to the nothingness which Láo-¿ze contended for as antecedent to all positive existence, and out of which he said that all existing being came, though he does not indicate how.

I give to the Treatise the first place among our appendixes here because of the early origin ascribed to it. It is attributed to Ko Yüan (or Hsüan)¹, a Taoist of the Wü dynasty (A. D. 222-277), who is fabled to have attained to the state of an Immortal, and is generally so denominated². He is represented as a worker of miracles; as addicted to intemperance, and very eccentric in his ways. When shipwrecked on one occasion, he emerged from beneath the water with his clothes unwet, and walked freely on its surface. Finally he ascended to the sky in bright day³. All these accounts may safely be put down as the figments of a later time.

It will be seen that the Text ascribes the work to Láo-¿ze himself, and I find it impossible to accept the account of its origin which is assigned by Lî Hsî-yüeh to Ko Hsüan. As quoted by Lî in the first of some notes subjoined to his Commentary, Ko is made to say, 'When I obtained the true Táo, I had recited this *K'ing* ten thousand times. It is what the Spirits of heaven practise, and had not been communicated to scholars of this lower world. I got it from the Divine Ruler of the eastern Hwa; he received it from the Divine Ruler of the Golden Gate; he received it from the Royal-mother of the West. In all these cases it was transmitted from mouth to mouth, and was not committed to writing. I now, while I am in the world, have written it out in a book. Scholars of the highest order, understanding it, ascend and become officials of Heaven; those of the middle order, cultivating it, are ranked among the Immortals of the Southern Palace; those of the lowest order, possessing it, get long years of life in the world, roam

¹ 葛元 or 葛玄.

² 葛仙公.

³ See the Accounts of Ko in the Biographical Dictionary of Hsiáo K'ih-han (1793), and Wang K'ü's supplement to the great work of Mâ Twan-lin, ch. 242.

through the Three Regions¹, and (finally) ascend to, and enter, the Golden Gate.'

This quotation would seem to be taken from the preface to our little classic by Ho Hsüan. If there were indeed such a preface during the time of the Wû dynasty, the corruption of the old Tâoism must have been rapid. The Hsi Wang-mû, or Royal-mother of the West, is mentioned once in *Kwang-ze* (Bk. VI, par. 7); but no 'Divine Ruler' disfigures his pages. Every reader must feel that in the *Classic of Purity* he has got into a different region of thought from that which he has traversed in the *Tâo Teh King* and in the writings of *Kwang-ze*.

With these remarks I now proceed to the translation and explanation of the text of our *King*.

Ch. 1. 1. Lâo the Master¹ said, The Great² Tâo has no bodily form, but It produced and nourishes heaven and earth³. The Great Tâo has no passions⁴, but It causes the sun and moon to revolve as they do.

The Great² Tâo has no name⁵, but It effects the growth and maintenance of all things³.

I do not know its name, but I make an effort, and call It the Tâo⁶.

¹ The name here is Lâo Kün (老君). I have stated (vol. xxxix, p. 40) that, with the addition of Thâi Shang, this is the common designation of Lâo-ze as the Father of Tâoism and deifying him, and that it originated probably in the Thang dynasty. It might seem to be used simply here by Ko Hsüan with the same high application; and since in his preface he refers to different 'Divine Rulers,' it may be contended that we ought to translate Lâo Kün by 'Lâo the Ruler.' But I am unwilling to think that the deification of Lâo-ze

¹ 'The three regions (三界)' here can hardly be the trilokya of the Buddhists, the ethical categories of desire, form, and formlessness. They are more akin to the Brahmanic bhuvanatraya, the physical or cosmological categories of bhûr or earth, bhuvaḥ or heaven, and svar or atmosphere.

had taken place so early. The earliest occurrence of the combination *Láo Kün* which has attracted my notice is in the history of Khung Yung, a descendant of Confucius in the twentieth generation,—the same who is celebrated in the *San 3ze King*, for his fraternal deference at the age of four, and who met with a violent death in A. D. 208. While still only a boy, wishing to obtain an interview with a representative of the *Láo* family, he sent in this message to him, 'My honoured predecessor and the honoured *Láo*, the predecessor of your *Lî* family, equally virtuous and righteous, were friends and teachers of each other.' The epithet *Kün* is equally applied to Confucius and *Láo-3ze*, and the combination *Láo Kün* implies no exaltation of the latter above the other.

² See *Táo Teh King*, chaps. 18, 25, 53.

³ *T. T. K.*, chaps. 1, 51, et al.

⁴ See *Kwang-3ze*, Bk. II, par. 2. 'Passions,' that is, feelings, affections; as in the first of the thirty-nine Articles.

⁵ *T. T. K.*, chaps. 1, 25, 32, 51.

⁶ *T. T. K.*, ch. 25.

2. Now, the *Táo* (shows itself in two forms); the Pure and the Turbid, and has (the two conditions of) Motion and Rest¹. Heaven is pure and earth is turbid; heaven moves and earth is at rest. The masculine is pure and the feminine is turbid; the masculine moves and the feminine is still². The radical (Purity) descended, and the (turbid) issue flowed abroad; and thus all things were produced¹.

The pure is the source of the turbid, and motion is the foundation of rest.

If man could always be pure and still, heaven and earth would both revert (to non-existence)³.

¹ This paragraph is intended to set forth 'the production of all things;' but it does so in a way that is hardly intelligible. Comparing what is said here with the utterances in the former paragraph, *Táo* would seem to be used in two

senses; first as an Immaterial Power or Force, and next as the Material Substance, out of which all things come. Lî Hsi-yüeh says that in the first member of par. 1 we have 'the Unlimited (or Infinite) producing the Grand (or Primal) Finite.' On the Tâo in par. 2 he says nothing. The fact is that the subject of creation in the deepest sense of the name is too high for the human mind.

² Compare T. T. K., ch. 61.

³ I do not understand this, but I cannot translate the Text otherwise. Mr. Balfour has:—'If a man is able to remain pure and motionless, Heaven and Earth will both at once come and dwell in him.' Lî explains thus:—天清地靜一齊返入於無矣. Compare T. T. K., ch. 16, and especially Ho-shang Kung's title to it,—歸根.

3. Now the spirit of man loves Purity, but his mind¹ disturbs it. The mind of man loves stillness, but his desires draw it away¹. If he could always send his desires away, his mind would of itself become still. Let his mind be made clean, and his spirit will of itself become pure.

As a matter of course the six desires² will not arise, and the three poisons³ will be taken away and disappear.

¹ Tâoism thus recognises in man the spirit, the mind, and the body.

² 'The six desires' are those which have their inlets in the eyes, ears, nostrils, the tongue, the sense of touch, and the imagination. The two last are expressed in Chinese by shān, 'the body,' and î, 'the idea, or thought.'

³ 'The three poisons' are greed, anger, and stupidity;—see the Khang-hsi Thesaurus, under 毒.

4. The reason why men are not able to attain to this, is because their minds have not been cleansed, and their desires have not been sent away.

If one is able to send the desires away, when he then looks in at his mind, it is no longer his; when he looks out at his body, it is no longer his; and when he looks farther off at external things, they are things which he has nothing to do with.

When he understands these three things, there will appear to him only vacancy. This contemplation of vacancy will awaken the idea of vacuity. Without such vacuity there is no vacancy.

The idea of vacuous space having vanished, that of nothingness itself also disappears; and when the idea of nothingness has disappeared, there ensues serenely the condition of constant stillness.

In this paragraph we have what Mr. Wylie calls 'the subjection of the mental faculties;' and I must confess myself unable to understand what it is. It is probably another way of describing the Táoist trance which we find once and again in *K'wang-₄ze*, 'when the body becomes like a withered tree, and the mind like slaked lime' (Bk. II, par. 1, et al.). But such a sublimation of the being, as the characteristic of its serene stillness and rest, is to me inconceivable.

5. In that condition of rest independently of place how can any desire arise? And when no desire any longer arises, there is the True stillness and rest.

That True (stillness) becomes (a) constant quality, and responds to external things (without error); yea, that True and Constant quality holds possession of the nature.

In such constant response and constant stillness there is the constant Purity and Rest.

He who has this absolute Purity enters gradually into the (inspiration of the) True Táo. And

having entered thereinto, he is styled Possessor of the T'ao.

Although he is styled Possessor of the T'ao, in reality he does not think that he has become possessed of anything. It is as accomplishing the transformation of all living things, that he is styled Possessor of the T'ao.

He who is able to understand this may transmit to others the Sacred T'ao.

This is the consummation of the state of Purity. In explaining the former sentence of the fifth member, Lî Hsî-yüeh uses the characters of T. T. K., ch. 4, 道冲而用之或不盈, with some variation, 一冲而用之, 不自满假.

2. 1. L'ao the Master said, Scholars of the highest class do not strive (for anything); those of the lowest class are fond of striving¹. Those who possess in the highest degree the attributes (of the T'ao) do not show them; those who possess them in a low degree hold them fast (and display them)². Those who so hold them fast and display them are not styled (Possessors of) the T'ao and Its attributes².

¹ Compare the T. T. K., ch. 41, 1.

² Compare the T. T. K., ch. 38, 1.

2. The reason why all men do not obtain the True T'ao is because their minds are perverted. Their minds being perverted, their spirits become perturbed. Their minds being perturbed, they are attracted towards external things. Being attracted towards external things, they begin to seek for them greedily. This greedy quest leads to perplexities and annoyances; and these again result in disordered

thoughts, which cause anxiety and trouble to both body and mind. The parties then meet with foul disgraces, flow wildly on through the phases of life and death, are liable constantly to sink in the sea of bitterness, and for ever lose the True Táo.

3. The True and Abiding Táo! They who understand it naturally obtain it. And they who come to understand the Táo abide in Purity and Stillness.

Our brief Classic thus concludes, and our commentator Lî thus sums up his remarks on it:—‘The men who understand the Táo do so simply by means of the Absolute Purity, and the acquiring this Absolute Purity depends entirely on the Putting away of Desire, which is the urgent practical lesson of the Treatise.’

I quoted in my introductory remarks Lî’s account of the origin of the Classic by its reputed author Ko Hsüan. I will now conclude with the words which he subjoins from ‘a True Man, 3o Hsüan:’—‘Students of the Táo, who keep this Classic in their hands and croon over its contents, will get good Spirits from the ten heavens to watch over and protect their bodies, after which their spirits will be preserved by the seal of jade, and their bodies refined by the elixir of gold. Both body and spirit will become exquisitely ethereal, and be in true union with the Táo!’

Of this ‘True Man, 3o Hsüan,’ I have not been able to ascertain anything. The Divine Ruler of the eastern Hwa, referred to on p. 248, is mentioned in the work of Wang K’i (ch. 241, p. 21^b), but with no definite information about him. The author says his surname was Wang, but he knows neither his name nor when he lived.

APPENDIX II.

Yin Fû King, or 'Classic of the Harmony of the Seen and the Unseen.'

In the *K'ien-lung* Catalogue of the Imperial Library, ch. 146, Part iii, this Book occupies the first place among all Tâoist works, with three notices, which all precede the account of Ho-shang Kung's Commentary on the Tâo Teh King. From the work of Lâo-ze we are conducted along the course of Tâoist literature to the year 1626, when the catalogue of what is called 'the Tâoist Canon'¹ appeared. Ch. 147 then returns to the Yin Fû King, and treats of nine other works upon it, the last being the Commentary of Lî Kwang-lî, one of the principal ministers and great scholars in the time of *K'ien-lung*'s grandfather, known as Khang-hsî from the name of his reign.

In the first of these many notices it is said that the preface of an old copy assigns the composition of the work to Hwang-Tî (in the 27th century B.C.), and says that commentaries on it had been made by Thâi-kung (12th century B.C.), Fan Lî (5th century B.C.), the Recluse of the Kwei Valley (4th century B.C.), Kang Liang (died B.C. 189), Kû Ko Liang (A. D. 181-234), and Lî K'wan of the Thang dynasty (about the middle of our 8th century)². Some writers, going back to the time of Hwang-Tî for the composition of our small classic, attribute it not to that sovereign himself, but to his teacher Kwang K'ăng-ze³;

¹ 道藏目錄詳註.

² See also Mâ Twan-lin's great work, ch. 211, p. 18^a.

³ See Kwang-ze, Bk. XI, par. 4.

and many of them hold that this Kwang *Kháng-jze* was an early incarnation of *Láo-jze* himself, so that the *Yin Fû* might well be placed before the *Táo Teh King*! *Lî Hsi-yüeh* is one of the scholars who adopt this view.

I will not say that under the *Káu* dynasty there was no book called *Yin Fû*, with a commentary ascribed to *Thái-kung*¹, for *Sze-mâ K'ien*, in his biography of *Sû K'hin* (Bk. lxi), relates how that adventurer obtained 'the *Yin Fû* book of *Káu*,' and a passage in the 'Plans of the Warring States' tells us that the book contained 'the schemes of *Thái-kung*¹.' However this may have been, no such work is now extant. Of all the old commentaries on it mentioned in the *K'ien-lung* Catalogue, the only one remaining is the last,—that of *Lî K'wan*; and the account which we have of it is not to be readily accepted and relied on.

The story goes that in A. D. 441 *Khâu K'ien-k'ih*, who had usurped the dignity and title of Patriarch from the *Kang* family, deposited a copy of the *Yin Fû King* in a mountain cave. There it remained for about three centuries and a half, till it was discovered by *Lî K'wan*, a Taoist scholar, not a little damaged by its long exposure. He copied it out as well as he could, but could not understand it, till at last, wandering in the distant West, he met with an old woman, who made the meaning clear to him, at the foot of mount *Lî*; after which he published the Text with a Commentary, and finally died, a wanderer among the hills in quest of the *Táo*; but the place of his death was never known².

The Classic, as it now exists, therefore cannot be traced higher than our eighth century; and many critics hold that, as the commentary was made by *Lî K'wan*, so the text was forged by him. All that *Hsi-yüeh* has to say in reply to this is that, if the classic be the work of *Lî K'wan*, then

¹ See the *Khang-hsî* Thesaurus under the combination *Yin Fû*.

² See the account of *Lî K'wan* in Wang *K'hi*'s continuation of *Mâ Twan-lin*'s work, ch. 242; and various items in the *K'ien-lung* Catalogue.

he must think of him as another Kwang *Khǎng-ze*; but this is no answer to the charge of forgery.

As to the name of the Treatise, the force of Fû has been set forth in vol. xxxix, p. 133, in connexion with the title of *Kwang-ze's* fifth Book. The meaning which I have given of the whole is substantially that of Lî Hsî-yüeh, who says that the Yin must be understood as including Yang, and grounds his criticism on the famous dictum in the Great Appendix to the *Yi King* (vol. xvi, p. 355), 'The successive movement of the Yin and Yang (their rest and active operation) constitutes what is called the course (of things).' Mr. Balfour translates the title by 'The Clue to the Unseen,' which is ingenious, but may be misleading. The writer reasons rather from the Unseen to the Seen than from the Seen to the Unseen.

Mr. Wylie gives his view of the object of the Treatise in these words:—'This short Treatise, which is not entirely free from the obscurity of Tâoist mysticism, professes to reconcile the decrees of Heaven with the current of mundane affairs.' To what extent the Book does this, and whether successfully or not, the reader will be able to judge for himself from the translation which will be immediately subjoined. Lî Hsî-yüeh, looking at it simply from its practical object, pronounces it 'hsiû lien *k'ih Shû*, a Book of culture and refining¹.' This language suggests the idea of a Tâoist devotee, who has sublimated himself by the study of this Book till he is ready to pass into the state of an Immortal. I must be permitted to say, however, that the whole Treatise appears to me to have come down to us in a fragmentary condition, with passages that are incapable of any satisfactory explanation.

Ch. 1. 1. If one observes the Way of Heaven¹, and maintains Its doings (as his own)², all that he has to do is accomplished.

¹ Dr. Williams explains 'hsiû lien (修鍊 or 修煉)' as meaning 'becoming religious, as a recluse or ascetic.'

¹ To explain 'the Way of Heaven,' Lî Hsi-yüeh adduces the last sentence of the T. T. K., ch. 9, 'When the work is done, and one's name has become distinguished, to withdraw into obscurity is the Way of Heaven.'

² To explain 'the doings of Heaven,' he adduces the first paragraph of the symbolism of the first hexagram of the Yî, 'Heaven in its motion gives the idea of strength. In accordance with this, the superior man nerves himself to ceaseless activity.'

2. To Heaven there belong the five (mutual) foes¹, and he who sees them (and understands their operation) apprehends how they produce prosperity. The same five foes are in the mind of man, and when he can set them in action after the manner of Heaven, all space and time are at his disposal, and all things receive their transformations from his person².

¹ The startling name thieves (= foes, robbers) here is understood to mean the 'five elements,' which pervade and indeed make up the whole realm of nature, the heaven of the text including also earth, the other term in the binomial combination of 'heaven and earth.' According to the Táoist teaching, the element of Earth generates Metal, and overcomes Water; Metal generates Water, and overcomes Wood; Water generates Wood, and overcomes Fire; Wood generates Fire, and overcomes Earth. These elements fight and strive together, now overcoming, now overcome, till by such interaction a harmony of their influences arises, and production goes on with vigour and beauty.

² It is more difficult to give an account of the operation of the five elements in the mind of man, though I have seen them distributed among the five viscera, and the five virtues of Benevolence, Righteousness, Propriety, Knowledge, and Faith. Granting, however, their presence and operation in the mind, what shall be said on the two concluding members of the paragraph? There underlies them

the doctrine of the three coordinate Powers;—Heaven, Earth, and Man, which I have never been able to comprehend clearly.

3. The nature of Heaven belongs (also) to Man; the mind of Man is a spring (of power). When the Way of Heaven is established, the (Course of) Man is thereby determined.

These short and enigmatic sentences seem merely to affirm the general subject of the Treatise,—the harmony between the unseen and the seen.

4. When Heaven puts forth its power of putting to death, the stars and constellations lie hidden in darkness. When Earth puts forth its power of putting to death, dragons and serpents appear on the dry ground. When Man puts forth his power of putting to death, Heaven and Earth resume their (proper course). When Heaven and Man exert their powers in concert, all transformations have their commencements determined.

'The power of putting to death here' seems merely to indicate the 'rest' which succeeds to movement. The paragraph is intended to show us the harmony of the Three Powers, but one only sees its meaning darkly. The language of the third sentence about the influence of Man on Heaven and Earth finds its explanation from the phraseology of the *thwan* of the twenty-fourth hexagram of the *Yi* (vol. xvi, pp. 107, 108).

5. The nature (of man) is here clever and there stupid; and the one of these qualities may lie hidden in the other. The abuse of the nine apertures is (chiefly) in the three most important, which may be now in movement and now at rest. When fire arises in wood, the evil, having once begun, is sure to go on to the destruction of the wood. When

calamity arises in a state, if thereafter movement ensue, it is sure to go to ruin.

When one conducts the work of culture and refining wisely we call him a Sage.

The constitution of man is twofold ;—his mental constitution, quiet and restful, and his physical constitution, restless and fond of movement. The nine apertures are the eyes, ears, nostrils, mouth, and the lower parts, and of these the eyes, ears, and mouth are the most important ; but they all need to be kept in subjection and under restraint. If indulged beyond reason, the ruin of themselves and of the mind and body to which they belong is sure to ensue.

2. 1. For Heaven now to give life and now to take it away is the method of the T'ao. Heaven and Earth are the despoilers of all things ; all things are the despoilers of Man ; and Man is the despoiler of all things. When the three despoilers act as they ought to do, as the three Powers, they are at rest. Hence it is said, 'During the time of nourishment, all the members are properly regulated ; when the springs of motion come into play, all transformations quietly take place.'

Compare ch. I, par. 2. The mutual contention of the five elements in nature only conduces to the nourishment of all its parts ; and so man, as one of the three Powers, consumes only to increase his store, and throws down only to build up.

Where the concluding quotation is taken from is not known. Of course any quotation is inconsistent with the idea of the early origin of the Treatise.

2. Men know the mysteriousness of the Spirit's (action), but they do not know how what is not Spiritual comes to be so. The sun and moon have their definite times, and their exact measures as

large and small. The service of the sages here-upon arises, and the spiritual intelligence becomes apparent.

Compare par. 10 in the fifth Appendix to the *Yi King*.

3. The spring by which the despoilers are moved is invisible and unknown to all under the sky. When the superior man has got it, he strengthens his body by it; when the small man has got it, he makes light of his life.

The thing is good in itself, but its effect will be according to the character of its user, and of the use which is made of it.

3. 1. The blind hear well, and the deaf see well. To derive all that is advantageous from one source is ten times better than the employment of a host; to do this thrice in a day and night is a myriad times better.

That the loss of one sense may be in a manner compensated for by the greater cultivation of another,—in the case especially of the two senses specified,—is a fact; but I fail to perceive how this is illustrated by what follows in the rest of the paragraph. The illustration is taken from the seventh of the hexagrams in the *Yi*, but I have not discovered the nexus of it in the text of that classic or in the Appendixes on the *thwan* or *hsiang* of the hexagram.

It must be from this paragraph that the bearing of the *Treatise on the conduct of military operations* has been maintained.

2. The mind is quickened (to activity) by (external) things, and dies through (excessive pursuit of) them. The spring (of the mind's activity) is in the eyes.

Heaven has no (special feeling of) kindness, but so it is that the greatest kindness comes from It.

The crash of thunder and the blustering wind both come without design.

Mr. Balfour translates the first member here by—‘The mind is produced from matter and dies with matter; the working faculty is in the eye;’ and says that it embodies a bold denial of any future life, or the existence of spirit, apart from matter. The meaning of the Text, however, is only what I have given;—is moral and not metaphysical. The eye is singled out from the three most important apertures of the body in ch. I, par. 5.

The rest of the paragraph has its parallelisms in *Lão-ṣze* and *Kwang-ṣze*.

3. Perfect enjoyment is the overflowing satisfaction of the nature. Perfect stillness is the entire disinterestedness of it. When Heaven seems to be most wrapt up in Itself, Its operation is universal in its character.

A sequel to the preceding paragraph. *Lî Hsî-yüeh* observes that the having no feeling of kindness is equivalent to *Lão-ṣze*’s ‘doing nothing.’ See the *T. T. K.*, ch. 35, ‘The *Táo* does nothing, and so there is nothing which It does not do.’

4. It is by its breath that we control whatever creature we grasp. Life is the root of death, and death is the root of life. Kindness springs from injury, and injury springs from kindness. He who sinks himself in water or enters amidst fire brings destruction on himself.

The first member of this paragraph is very difficult to construe. Mr. Balfour gives for it:—‘The Laws affecting the animal creation reside in the Breath or Vital Fluid.’ The first character of it properly denotes ‘birds.’ It is often found with another denoting ‘quadrupeds;’ and again it is found alone denoting both birds and beasts. It is also interchanged with another of the same name, denoting ‘to

seize or grasp,' in which meaning I have taken it ; but the bearing of the saying on the general meaning of the Treatise I have not apprehended.

The next four sayings are illustrations of Láo-¿ze's 'contraries' of Táoism. The final saying is a truism ;— is it introduced here as illustrating that whatever is done with design is contrary to the Táo?

5. The stupid man by studying the phenomena and laws of heaven and earth becomes sage ; I by studying their times and productions become intelligent. He in his stupidity is perplexed about sageness ; I in my freedom from stupidity am the same. He considers his sageness as being an extraordinary attainment ; I do not consider mine so.

Some scholars have expunged this paragraph as not being genuine ; it is certainly difficult to construe and to understand.

6. The method of spontaneity proceeds in stillness, and so it was that heaven, earth, and all things were produced. The method of heaven and earth proceeds gently and gradually, and thus it is that the Yin and Yang overcome (each other by turns). The one takes the place of the other, and so change and transformation proceed accordingly.

K'ü Hsí praises this paragraph as very good, and the use of the character 3in ('proceeds gently and gradually') as exquisite. After all, what do we learn from it? That Creation proceeded without striving or crying? And that the same Creative Power continues to act in the same way?

7. Therefore the sages, knowing that the method of spontaneity cannot be resisted, take action accordingly and regulate it (for the purpose of culture). The way of perfect stillness cannot be subjected to numerical calculations ; but it would seem that there

is a wonderful machinery, by which all the heavenly bodies are produced, the eight diagrams, and the sexagenary cycle; spirit-like springs of power, and hidden ghostlinesses; the arts of the Yin and Yang in the victories of the one over the other:—all these come brightly forward into visibility.

I cannot say that I fully understand this concluding paragraph of the Yin Fû King. One thing is plain from it,—how the Yî King was pressed into the service of the Táoism that prevailed when it was written. I leave it with the judgment on it, quoted by Lî Hsî-yüeh from a Lû 3hien-hsü. 'The subject-matter of the Yin Fû and Táo Teh is all intended to set forth the action by contraries of the despoiling powers in nature and society. As to finding in them directions for the government of states, the conduct of war, and the mastery of the kingdom, with such expressions as those about a wonderful machinery by which the heavenly bodies are produced, the eight diagrams, the cycle, spirit-like springs, and hidden ghostlinesses:—they all have a deep meaning, but men do not know it. They who go to the Yin Fû for direction in war and use Láo-3ze for guidance in government go far astray from the meaning of both.'

APPENDIX III.

Yü Shû King, or 'The Classic of the Pivot of Jade.'

Mr. Wylie says (Notes, p. 179) that the Pivot of Jade is much used in the ritual services of Tâoism, meaning that it is frequently read in the assemblies of its monks. The object of the Treatise, according to Lî Hsi-yüeh, is 'to teach men to discipline and refine their spirit;' and he illustrates the name by referring to the North Star, which is called 'the Pivot of the Sky,' revolving in its place, and carrying round with it all the other heavenly bodies. So the body of man is carried round his spirit and by it, and when the spirit has been disciplined and refined, till it is freed from every obscuring influence, and becomes solid, soft, and strong as jade, the name, 'the Pivot of Jade,' is appropriate to it.

The name of the Treatise, when given at full length, is—'The True Classic of the Pivot of Jade, delivered by the Heaven-Honoured One, Who produces Universal Transformation by the Sound of His Thunder.' To this personage, as Wylie observes, the Tâoists attribute a fabulous antiquity, but there is little doubt that the author was a Hsüan-yang 3ze, about the time of the Yüan dynasty (A. D. 1280-1367). From the work of Wang K'î (ch. 243), we learn that this Hsüan-yang 3ze was the denomination of Âu-yang Yü-yüen, a scion of the famous Âu-yang family. What he says is to the following effect:—

1. The Heaven-honoured One says, 'All you, Heaven-endowed men, who wish to be instructed \

about the Perfect Táo, the Perfect Táo is very recondite, and by nothing else but Itself can it be described. Since ye wish to hear about it, ye cannot do so by the hearing of the ear :—that which eludes both the ears and eyes is the True Táo ; what can be heard and seen perishes, and only this survives. There is (much) that you have not yet learned, and especially you have not acquired this ! Till you have learned what the ears do not hear, how can the Táo be spoken about at all ?’

‘Heaven-honoured (Thien 3un)’ is a title given by the Táoists to the highest objects of their reverence and worship. Chalmers translates it by ‘Celestial Excellency,’ and observes that it is given to ‘all the Three Pure Ones ;’ but its application is much more extensive, as its use in this Treatise sufficiently proves. No doubt it was first adopted after the example of the Buddhists, by whom Buddha is styled ‘World-honoured,’ or ‘Ever-honoured’ (Shih 3un).

The phrase Thien Zăn, which I have translated here ‘Heaven-endowed Men,’ is common to the three religions of China ; but the meaning of it is very different in each. See the Confucian and the Táoist significations of it in the Khang-hsi Thesaurus, under the phrase. Here it means ‘the men possessed by the Táo ;—Táo-Zăn of the highest class.’ In a Buddhist treatise the meaning would be ‘Ye, devas and men.’

2. The Heaven-honoured One says, ‘Sincerity is the first step towards (the knowledge of) the Táo ; it is by silence that that knowledge is maintained ; it is with gentleness that (the Táo) is employed. The employment of sincerity looks like stupidity ; the employment of silence looks like difficulty of utterance ; the employment of gentleness looks like want of ability. But having attained to this, you may

forget all bodily form ; you may forget your personality ; you may forget that you are forgetting.'

'All this,' says Lî Hst-yüeh, 'is the achievement of vacuity, an illustration of the freedom from purpose which is characteristic of the Táo.' Compare par. 14 in the sixth Book of *Kwang-ïze*.

3. 'He who has taken the first steps towards (the knowledge of) the Táo knows where to stop ; he who maintains the Táo in himself knows how to be diligently vigilant ; he who employs It knows what is most subtle.

'When one knows what is most subtle, the light of intelligence grows (around him) ; when he can know how to be diligently vigilant, his sage wisdom becomes complete ; when he knows where to stop, he is grandly composed and restful.

'When he is grandly composed and restful, his sage wisdom becomes complete ; when his sage wisdom becomes complete, the light of intelligence grows (around him) ; when the light of intelligence grows around him, he is one with the Táo.

'This is the condition which is styled the True Forgetfulness ;—a forgetting which does not forget ; a forgetting of what cannot be forgotten.

'That which cannot be forgotten is the True Táo. The Táo is in heaven and earth, but heaven and earth are not conscious of It. Whether It seem to have feelings or to be without them, It is (always) one and the same.'

4. The Heaven-honoured One says, 'While I am in this world, what shall I do to benefit life ? I occupy myself with this subtle and precious Treatise for the good of you, Heaven-endowed men. Those

who understand it will be allowed to ascend to the happy seats of the Immortals.

‘Students of the Tâo believe that there are (the influences of) the ether and of destiny. But the (conditions of) climate being different, the constitutions received by men are naturally different, and hence they are ascribed to the ether. And the (conditions of) wisdom and stupidity being different, their constitutions as fine and coarse are naturally different, and hence they are ascribed to the destiny. The destiny depends on fate; the ether depends on Heaven.

‘The restraints arising from the ether and destiny are the manacles decreed by Heaven. But if one acquire the True Tâo, though stupid, he may become wise; though coarse, he may become fine;—if there only be the decree of fate.

‘Stupidity the darkest, and coarseness the densest, are consequences of climate; but the suffering of them and the changing of them may take place, when Heaven and Earth quicken the motive spring. When this is done without the knowledge of men, it is said to take place spontaneously. If it be done with a consciousness of that want of knowledge, it is still said to take place spontaneously. The mystery of spontaneity is greater than that of knowledge; but how it comes to be what it is remains a thing unknown. But as to the Tâo, It has not begun to come under the influence of what makes stupid and coarse. Hear this all ye Heaven (-endowed) men; and let all the multitude in all quarters rejoice.’

It may be considered as a proof of the difficulty of the Text that to this long paragraph Lî Hsi-yüeh does not subjoin a single explanatory remark.

APPENDIX IV.

Zăh Yung King, or 'Classic of the Directory for a Day.'

I have nowhere found any mention of the author of this brief composition, or of its date. The use of Buddhistic expressions in it shows that it cannot have had a very early origin. It belongs to the same category of Tăoist writings as the *Kking Kăng King*, which is the first of these appendixes. *Lî Hsi-yüeh* says, 'The Treatise is called "the Directory for a Day," as showing that during all the hours (the *Tăo*) should not be left for a single instant (comp. the words of Confucius at the beginning of the *Kung Yung*). Let the work be done, and there is sure to be the result promised; only there must be the Purity insisted on both of body and mind. In the second paragraph it is said, "During the twelve hours of the day let the thoughts be constantly fixed on absolute Purity;" and in the last paragraph, "During the twelve hours be always pure and undefiled;"—thus showing what the main teaching of the Great Tăoistic system is, and the pre-eminent place which Purity occupies in the "Directory for a Day." The style is so clear and simple that I have left it without note or comment.'

1. As to what should be done in a day, when the eating and drinking has been arranged, let one sit straight with his mouth shut, and not allow a single thought to arise in his mind. Let him forget everything, and keep his spirit with settled purpose. Let

his lips be glued together, and his teeth be firmly pressed against one another. Let him not look at anything with his eyes, nor listen to a single sound with his ears. Let him with all his mind watch over his inward feelings. Let him draw long breaths, and gradually emit them, without a break, now seeming to breathe, and now not. In this way any excitement of the mind will naturally disappear, the water from the kidneys will rise up, the saliva will be produced in the mouth, and the real efficaciousness becomes attached to the body. It is thus that one acquires the way of prolonging life.

2. During the twelve hours of the day let one's thoughts be constantly fixed on absolute Purity. Where one thought (of a contrary kind) does not arise, we have what we call Purity; where nothing (of a contrary kind) enters the Tower of Intelligence (= the mind), we have what we call the Undeified. The body is the house of the breath; the mind is the lodging of the spirit. As the thoughts move, the spirit moves; as the spirit moves, the breath is distributed. As the thoughts rest, the spirit rests; when the spirit rests, the breath is collected.

The true powers of the five elements unite and form the boat-like cup of jade, (after partaking of which), the body seems to be full of delicious harmony. This spreads like the unguent of the chrismal rite on the head. Walking, resting, sitting, sleeping, the man feels his body flexible as the wind, and in his belly a sound like that of thunder. His ears hear the songs of the Immortals, that need no aid from any instrument; vocal without words, and resounding without the drum. The spirit and the breath effect a union and the bloom of

childhood returns. The man beholds scenes unfolded within him; Spirits of themselves speak to him; he sees the things of vacuity, and finds himself dwelling with the Immortals. He makes the Great Elixir, and his spirit goes out and in at its pleasure. He has the longevity of heaven and earth, and the brightness of the sun and moon. He has escaped from the toils of life and death.

Accustomed to the phraseology of the Text all his life, the commentator Lî, as has been seen, did not think it necessary to append here any notes of explanation. A few such notes, however, will be welcome to an English reader. 'The twelve hours of the day:'—a Chinese hour is equal to two of our hours, and their twelve to our twenty-four. The twelve hours are named by the twelve branch terms of the cycle.

'The boat-like cup of jade' seems to be a satisfactory rendering of the Chinese characters *tão kwei* in the Text, which might be translated 'knife, and jade-symbol.' But *tão*, commonly meaning 'knife,' is in the *Shih King* (I, v; VII, 2) used of 'a small boat.' In the *Khang-hsi Thesaurus*, under the phrase, we have the following quotation, as if from *Ko Hung's Biographies of Immortals*:—'*K'zân Hsi*, a native of the territory of *Wû*, was studying the *Tão* in *Shû*, when the master *Lão* sent a beautiful young lady to him with a tray of gold and a cup of jade filled with medicine, and the message, "This is the mysterious elixir; he who drinks it will not die." And on this he and his wife had each a *tão kwei*.' See the account in *Ko Hung's work*, which is much more diffuse.

In the mention of 'the chrismal rite' there is a reference to what Dr. Williams calls 'a kind of Buddhist baptism or holy unction, by sprinkling, which confers goodness,' 'administered to children, idols, &c.' (See under the characters *kwân* and *ting*.)

3. Do not allow any relaxation of your efforts. During all the hours of the day strive always to be

pure and undefiled. The spirit is the child of the breath ; the breath is the mother of the spirit.

As a fowl embraces its eggs, do you preserve the spirit and nourish the breath. Can you do this without intermission ? Wonderful ! wonderful ! The mystery becomes still deeper !

In the body there are seven precious organs, which serve to enrich the state, to give rest to the people, and to make the vital force of the system full to overflowing. Hence we have the heart, the kidneys, the breath, the blood, the brains, the semen, and the marrow. These are the seven precious organs. They are not dispersed when the body returns (to the dust). Refined by the use of the Great Medicine, the myriad spirits all ascend among the Immortals.

If we were sure that we had exactly hit the meaning and spirit of every part of this paragraph, it would hardly be worth while to give more space to its illustration.

A sufficient number of the best of the Treatises of the later Táoism have been placed before the reader to show him how different they are from the writings of Láo and Kwang, and how inferior to them. It might seem as if Kwang-ze, when he ceased to write, had broken the staff of Táoism and buried it many fathoms in the earth. We can hardly wonder that Confucianists, such as K'ü Hsi, should pronounce, 'What the sect of Táo chiefly attend to is,—the preservation of the breath of life ;' and that Buddhists, such as Liú Mî, should say of it, 'Long life being attained, its goal is reached.'

APPENDIX V.

Analyses by Lin Hsi-kung of several of the Books of *Kwang-ze*.

BOOK I.

The Hsiáo-yáo in the title of this Book denotes the appearance of perfect ease and satisfaction. The Yü, which conveys the idea of wandering or rambling about, is to be understood of the enjoyment of the mind. The three characters describe the chief characteristic of our 'Old Kwang's' life, and therefore he placed the Book at the beginning of his more finished compositions or essays.

But when one wishes to enjoy himself in the fullest and freest way, he must first have before him a view like that of the wide sea or of the expanse of the air, in order that his mind may be free from all restraint, and from the entanglements of the world, and that it may respond in the fitting way to everything coming before it:—it is only what is Great that can enter into this enjoyment. Throughout the whole Book, the word Great has a significant force.

In paragraph 1 we are presented with the illustration of the phăng. Long was the journey which it would undertake, when it contemplated removing to the South. That it required a wind of 90,000 *li* to support it, and even then only rested after a flight of six months, was owing to its own Great size, and also because the Southern Ocean was not to be easily reached by a single effort.

What is said, in paragraph 2, about men, when going anywhere, proportioning the provisions which they take

with them to the length of the journey has the same meaning. How should such creatures as the cicada and the little dove be able to know this? Knowledge is great or small, because the years of the parties are many or few:—so it is that one is inferior to another. Have they not heard of the ming-ling and tâ-*k*h^{un}, which make their spring and autumn for themselves? And so does the phăng, as we may understand. Its not resting till the end of six months is really not a long time to it. The case of Phăng 3û is not worth being taken into account.

This description of the greatness of the phăng is not any fabrication of our author's own, nor any statement peculiar to the *K*hî Hsieh. The same things are told in the 'Questions of Thang to *K*î,' as in paragraph 3.

As to the long journey of the phăng and the marsh-quail's laughing at it, that is not different from what the other two little creatures said above;—arising simply from the difference between the great and the small. And what difference is there between this and the case of those who enjoy themselves for a season in the world? Yung-ze of Sung is introduced (and immediately dismissed), as not having planted himself in the right position, and not being Great. Then Lieh-ze is brought forward, and dismissed as not being Great, because he had something to wait for. It is only he who rides on the twofold primal ether of the Yin and Yang, driving along with the six elements through all their changes as they wax and wane, and enjoying himself at the gate of death, that can be pronounced Great. This is what is called the Perfect Man; the Spirit-like Man; and the Sage Man.

In illustration of this, as instances of the Great Man, we have, in paragraph 4, Hsü Yû, regardless of the name; the personage on the hill of Kû-shih, in paragraph 5, with no thought of the services he could perform; and Yáo with his deep-sunk eyes, in paragraph 6, no longer thinking much of his throne, and regardless of himself. All these characteristics could be used, and made their possessor great; but let not this lead to a suspicion of greatness as

incompatible with usefulness. As a caution against this, we have, in paragraph 7, the salve to keep the hands from being chapped;—a Great thing when used properly, but of little value when not so used. Let those who exercise their minds look at this:—should they not seek to be useful, and so become Great? We have also the weasel and the yak, the one of which gets into trouble by its being of use, while the other escapes harm by its being of no use. Let those who have work to do in the world look at this. The Great calabash and the Great tree are, each of them, a phăng:—why may we not abandon ourselves to our natural feeling of enjoyment in connexion with them? Let men be satisfied with their Greatness and seek for nothing more.

As to the style of the Book, the sudden statement and the sudden proof; the sudden illustration and the sudden reasoning; the decision, made to appear as no decision; the connexion, now represented as no connexion; the repetition, turning out to be no repetition:—these features come and go on the paragraphs, like the clouds in the open firmament, changing every moment and delightful to behold.

Lû Fang-hû describes it well:—‘The guiding thread in the unspun floss; the snake sleeping in the grass.’

BOOK II.

In writings intended to throw light on the Tào we find many different views, affirmations on one side and denials on the other. These may be called Controversies, and the reason why they are not adjusted is that every one will hold fast to his own view. But every peculiar view arises from the holder's knowledge. Such knowledge, however, tends to the injury of his mind, and serves no purpose, good or bad, in illustrating the nature of the Tào;—it only increases the confusion of controversy. Hence when we wish to adjust controversies, we must use our knowledge well; and to use our knowledge well, we must stop at the point beyond which it does not extend.

In this whole Book knowing and not knowing is the thread that runs through it, (and binds its parts together). The expressions about men's being 'in darkness,' in paragraph 2, and the Tâo's being 'obscure,' in paragraph 3, indicate the want of knowledge; those, also in paragraph 3, about 'the light of the mind,' and 'throwing that light on a subject,' indicate the good use of knowledge; those, in paragraph 5, about 'the scintillations of light from the midst of confusion and perplexity,' and 'the store of light,' in paragraph 7, indicate the stopping at the point to which our knowledge does not extend. And what is to be done when we stop at this point? Nothing more can be done; we have simply, as it is said in paragraph 6, to stop here.

When Nan-kwo 3ze-khi says, in paragraph 1, 'I had lost myself,' he fully expresses the subject-matter of the Book. If we think that the affirmations and denials made by men's minds are fictions, made out from nothing to be something, that is like the myriad different sounds of the wind, suddenly appearing in their innumerable variations. But who is it that produces all these sounds? As is said in paragraph 2, they are 'the sounds of Earth which are really the notes of Heaven.' The minds of men speak from their possession of knowledge. However great or small their words may be, they are all of their own making. A discourse under a thousand Heads with a myriad Particulars, suddenly arising and as suddenly stopping, may suggest the idea of what we call 'a True Ruler.' But the idea is vague, and though our knowledge does not reach to such a subject, men toil their intelligence to the end of their lives, never stopping till both mind and body are exhausted. What is the reason of this? It is because they have their 'minds completely made up (par. 3).'

Now if words were like the chirpings of very young birds that come upon the ear, there would be no difference between them as regards truth or falsehood, right or wrong; but there is some obscuring influence, through which the different views of the Literati and Mohists are produced, with their confusion and uncertainty. All this is because

the parties do not use their knowledge well. In their controversies each looks at the other's view only from his own standpoint, and throwing on the subject from that the light of Heaven, thus emptily replying to one another without end. And is this purposely intended to make a violent end of their disputations? (It is not so), for the Táo is originally one. High and low, beautiful and ugly, ordinary and strange, success and overthrow, have nothing to do with it. The intelligent know this; those who weary their minds in trying to bring about a unity do not know it. At this point the sages throw on the subject the light of Heaven, also wishing to rest in Heaven, and so they come to a natural union:—this is how they use their knowledge well.

And what are we to consider the highest reach of knowledge (see par. 5)? The ancients thought it necessary to place this in the time before anything began to be. A second class would have it that there had (always) been (some) things; and a third class held that between those things (and men) there had been a relativity. Thus it was that gradually there came differences of opinion, in affirmations and denials; and when these once arose, there could not but be the experiences of success and failure.

But any one-sidedness in controversy is not sufficient to be accounted a proof of success or of failure. Not only is the Táo radically one; but those who employ it, however they may seem to differ, will be found to be substantially one and the same. When the sages, in the midst of slippery confusion and doubtful perplexity, yet find the clearness of conviction, is it not because they place the controversies that we speak of among the things that are not to be used?

But if there were no affirmations and denials, there would be no words. And let me think here. Suppose there were no words of controversy, we must not infer from that that there were no words at all. Is this word correct? Then if I also employ it, I form one class with all who do so? Is it not correct? Then if I also deny it, I form another class with those who do the same. Formerly,

when speaking of men's words, I said that they should change places, and look at things from the different stand-points of each other ; so with reference to my own words, my holding my 'Yea,' does not interfere with my changing my place, and taking my position with those who say 'Nay' in the case. If indeed there be no words of affirmation and denial, what words will there be? We must go back to the beginning when there were no words. We must go back still farther,—to the vacuity before the beginning when there were no words. If we try to go back even farther still, then great and small, long life and short life, heaven and earth and all things, fade away, blending together in the One. But that ONE is also a word. In this way we go on without end, wishing to make an end of controversy, and instead of doing that, our endeavour only serves to increase it. The better plan is to stop, as is proposed in a former paragraph, to stop at this point.—Even this word about having no controversy may be spared.

The sage, by avoiding discussion, reasoning, and the drawing of distinctions, while he availed himself of words, yet retained the advantage of eschewing words, and was also afraid of calling the demarcations (of propositions) by their eight qualities (see par. 7). Still, however, the trace of the use of words remained with him. It is not so in the case of the Great Tào and the Great Argument. The Tào (which is displayed) is not the Tào ; the Argument (which is most subtle) does not reach the point ; the degree of Non-action is very great ; but notwithstanding it is difficult to speak of what is entirely empty of purpose. The way by which the knowledge of the ancients reached the highest point was their stopping when their knowledge extended no farther. If they could know what they did not know, it was by means of the Heavenly Treasure-house ; it was thus they could take their place in the centre of the circle, to which all lines converged, and from which all questions could be answered. If they added what they did know to the sum of what they did not know, they then

possessed the Store of Light; and it was thus that they made provision for the scintillations of slippery doubt.

To the same effect was what Shun told Yáo (end of par. 7). As to the referring what is advantageous and what is hurtful, and the mysteries of life and death, to the sphere of the unknown, that is set forth in the conversation between Nieh K'üeh and Wang Í (par. 8).

As to how it is that rulers and grooms, other men and one's self, do not know each other, that is seen in the conversation between K'ü 3hiáo-3ze and K'ang-wú 3ze.

As to what is said about the substance and shadow waiting on each to make their manifestations, and not knowing how they were brought about, and about the dreamer and the man awake doubting about each other, and not knowing how to distinguish between them, we have knowledge stopping at the point to which it does not extend, and gradually entering into the region of transformation.

Is there anything still remaining to be done for the adjustment of controversy? One idea grows up out of another in the Book, and one expression gives rise to another apparently quite different. There is a mutual connexion and reference between its parts. Suddenly the style is difficult as the slope of Yang-k'ang, and vanishes like the path of a bird; suddenly it looks like so many steep cliffs and successive precipices. When ordinary scholars see this and cannot trace the connexion of thought, if they put it on one side, and did not venture to say anything about it, they might be forgiven. But when they dare to follow their prejudices, and to append their licentious explanations, breaking up the connexion of thought, and bringing down to the dust this wonderful composition, the admiration of thousands of years;—ah! when the old Kwang took his pencil in hand, and proceeded to write down his thoughts, why should we be surprised that such men as these cannot easily understand him?

BOOK VI.

'The Great and most Honoured Master' is the Táo. It appears separately in the Heavenly and Human elements (of our constitution), and exists alone and entire in what is beyond death and life; being, as we say, that which nothing can be without. To describe it as that which stands out superior and alone, we use for it the character *Koh* (卓) (par. 5); to describe it as abiding, we call it the True; to describe it as it vanishes from sight, we apply to it the names of Purity, Heaven, and Unity (par. 12).

When men value it, it is possible to get possession of it. But he who wishes to get it must, with the knowledge which he has attained to, proceed to nourish what that knowledge is still ignorant of. When both of these are (as it were) forgotten, and he comes under the transformation of the Táo, he enters into the region in which there is neither life nor death;—to the Human element (in him) he has added the Heavenly.

Now what knowledge does not know is the time of birth and death, and what it does know is what comes after birth and precedes death. It would seem as if this could be nourished by the exercise of thought; but if we do this after birth and before death, we must wait for the time of birth and death to verify it. If we try to do so before that time, then the circumstances of the Human and the Heavenly have not yet become subject to their Ruler. It is this which makes the knowledge difficult, and it is only the True Man with the True Knowledge who has no anxiety about it.

In the position which the True man occupies, he has his adversities and prosperities, his successes and defeats, his gains and his losses, his seasons of security and of unrest,—all the changes of his circumstances; but his mind forgets them all, and this result is due to his possession of both the Knowledge and the Táo.

As to his bodily conditions, he has his sleeping and

awaking, his eating and resting,—his constant experiences; but his mind (also) forgets them all. For the springs of action which move to the touch of Heaven, and the movements of desire are indeed different in men; but when we advance and examine the proper home of the mind, we find no difference between its place and nature at the time of birth and of death, and no complication in these after birth and before death:—so it is that the Mind, the Tào, the Heavenly, and the Human are simply One. Is not the unconsciousness of the mind the way in which the True man exercises his knowledge and nourishes it? Carrying out this unconsciousness, from the mind to the body and from the body to the world, he comprehends the character of the time and the requirements of everything, without any further qualification. Hence, while the mind has not acquired this oblivion, the great work of life always suffers from some defect of the mind, and is not fit to be commended. But let the mind be able to exercise this quality, and it can be carried out with great and successful merit, and its admirable service be completed. This is the mind of the True man, never exercised one-sidedly in the world, and gaining no one-sided victory either Heavenward or Manward.

Given the True Man with the True Knowledge like this, the nature of death and life may begin to be fully described. Death and life are like the night and the dawn;—is there any power that can command them? Men cannot preside over them. This is what knowledge does not extend to; but within the sphere of knowledge, there is that which is dearer than a Father (par. 5), and more to be honoured than a Ruler; the Eminent, the True, and that moreover over which Heaven cannot preside. Valuable therefore is the nourishing of this Knowledge; and what other art in nourishing it is there but the unconsciousness of which we speak? Why do we say so? The body is born, grows old and dies. This is the common lot. However skilful one may be in hiding it away, it is sure to disappear. Men know that the body is not easily got, but

they do not know that what might seem like man's body never comes to an end. Being hidden away in a place from which there is no escape for anything, it does not disappear. This takes place after birth and before death, and may be verified at the times of birth and death; but how much better it is to consider Heaven good, old age good, the beginning good and the end good, than vainly to think that the nourishing of knowledge is making the body good! The doing this is what is called the Táo. And the sage enjoys himself in this; not only because the Táo itself does not disappear, but also because of all who have got it not a single one has ever passed away from notice.

But it is not easy to describe the getting of the Táo. In the case about which Nü Yü told Nan-po 3ze-khwei (par. 8); the talents of a sage and the Táo of a sage came together in the study of it; three, seven, and nine days are mentioned as the time of the several degrees of attainment; the learner went on from banishing all worldly matters from his mind as foreign to himself till he came to the utter disregard of time. In this way was he led from what was external, and brought inwards to himself; then again from the idea of the Táo's being a thing, it was exhibited as Tranquillity amid all Disturbances, and he was carried out of himself till he understood that neither death nor life is more than a phenomenon. The narrator had learned all this from writings and from Lo-sung, searching them, and ever more the more remote they were. Truly great is the difficulty of getting the Táo!

And yet it need not be difficult. It was not so with 3ze-yü (par. 9), in whose words about one arm being transformed into a fowl, and the other into a cross-bow, we see its result, as also in what he said about his rump-bone being transformed into a wheel, his spirit into a horse, and one loosing the cord by which his life is suspended.

(Again) we have a similar accordance (with the Táo) in 3ze-li's question to 3ze-lâi (par. 10), about his being made the liver of a rat or the arm of an insect, with the latter's reply and his remark about the furnace of a founder.

These were men who had got the Táo; as also were 3ze-fan and *Khin Kang* (par. 11), men after the Maker's mind, and who enjoyed themselves, disporting in the one vital ether of heaven and earth.

The same may be said of Mǎng-sun 3hái (par. 12). If he had undergone a transformation, he would wait for the future transformation of which he did know. So it was that he obtained the Táo. He and all the others were successful through the use of their mental unconsciousness; and they who pursue this method, must have the idea of I-*r* 3ze, who wished to have his branding effaced, and his dismemberment removed by hearing the substance of the Táo (par. 13).

Parties who have not lost the consciousness of their minds and wish to do so must become like Yen Hui (par. 14), who separated the connexion between his body and mind, and put away his knowledge, till he became one with the Great Pervader.

Of such as have lost (in part) the consciousness of their minds and wish to do so entirely, we have an instance in 3ze-sang (par. 15), thinking of Heaven and Earth and of his parents as ignorant of his (miserable) condition, and then ascribing it to Destiny. He exhibited the highest obliviousness:—was he not, with the knowledge which he possessed, nourishing that of which he was ignorant? Such were the True Men, and such was the True Knowledge. ✕

In this Book are to be found the roots of the ideas in the other six Books of this Part. In this they all unite. It exhibits the origin of all life, sets forth the reality of all cultivation, and shows the springs of all Making and Transformation, throwing open the door for the Immortals and Buddhas. Here is the wonderful Elixir produced by the pestle of Jade, the touch of which by a finger produces the feathers of Transformation. As to its style, a vast lake of innumerable wavelets, the mingling of a hundred sparkling eddies, a collection of the oldest achievements in composition, a granary filled with all woods;—it is only in the ✕

power of those who admire the leopard's spots to appreciate it!

BOOK IX.

Governing the world is like governing horses. There is the government, but the only effect of it is injury. Po-lão's management of horses (par. 1) in a way contrary to their true nature was in no respect different from the way of the (first) potter and the (first) carpenter in dealing with their clay and wood in opposition to the nature of those substances, yet the world praises them all because of their skill, not knowing wherein the good government of the world consists.

Now the skilful governors of the world simply caused the people to fulfil the conditions of their regular nature (par. 2). It was their gifts which they possessed in common, and their Heaven-inspired instincts, which constituted the (Early) age of Perfect Virtue. When the sages fashioned their benevolence, righteousness, ceremonies, and music, and the people then began to lose their perfect virtue, it was not that they had themselves become different. For benevolence, righteousness, ceremonies, and music, are not endowments forming a part of their regular nature;—they are practised only after men have laid aside the Táo and its characteristics, and abandoned the guidance of their nature and its feelings. This is what we say that the mechanic does when he hacks and cuts the raw materials to form his vessels. Why should we doubt that it was by Po-lão's dealing with horses that they became wise enough to play the part of thieves (par. 3); and that it was by the sages' government of the people that their ability came to be devoted to the pursuit of gain? The error of the sages in this cannot be denied.

From beginning to end this Book is occupied with one idea. The great point in it grew out of the statement in paragraph 3 of the previous Book, that 'all men are furnished with certain regular principles,' and it is the easiest to construe of all Kwang-ze's compositions; but

the general style and illustrations are full of sparkling vigour. Some have thought that, where the ideas are so few, there is a waste of words about them, and they doubt therefore that the Book was written by some one imitating *Kwang-ze*; but I apprehend no other hand could have shown such a mastery of his style.

BOOK XI.

That the world is not well governed is because there are those who try to govern it. When they try to govern it, they cannot but be 'doing' (to that end). Unable to keep from this 'doing,' they cause the world to be happy or to be miserable, both of which things the instincts of man's nature refuse to accept. Although the arts of governing are many, they only cause and increase disorder. Why so? Because they interfere with men's minds.

Now when men are made to be miserable or happy, they come to have great joy or great dissatisfaction. The condition ministers to the expansive or the opposite element (in nature), and the four seasons, the cold and the heat, all lose their regularity. This causes men everywhere in a contentious spirit to indulge their nature to excess, bringing about a change of its attributes, and originating the practice of good and evil. All unite in bringing this state about; and in the end all receive its consequences. Hence such men as *Kih* the robber, *Žǎng Shǎn*, and *Shih Zhǔi* ought not to be found in a well-governed age. But those who governed the world went on to distinguish between the good and the bad, and occupied themselves with rewarding and punishing. When they wished men to rest in the requirements of their nature, was it not difficult for them to realise the wish?

And how much more was it so when they went on in addition to insist on acute hearing and clear vision, on benevolence, righteousness, ceremonies, music, sageness, and knowledge (par. 2)! They did not know that these eight things were certainly of no use to the world, but injurious to it. Led astray by them, and not perceiving

this, they continued to practise them, and to do this every day more and more. This is what we see indeed in the ordinary men of the world, but not what we should have expected from superior men. The Superior man does nothing, and rests in the instincts of his nature. He values and loves his own person, which fits him to be entrusted with the charge of the world, and thereupon we see things becoming transformed of themselves. Yes, we see indeed that men's minds are not to be interfered with (par. 3).

Let me try to attest this from (the example of) the ancient Tîs and Kings. These in their interference with the minds of men, began with their inculcation of benevolence and righteousness, proceeded to their distinctions of what was right and wrong, and ended with their punishments and penalties. Their government of the world ended with the disordering of it. And the result can be seen, the Literati and the Mohists still thinking how they can remedy them.

But let us ask who it really was that brought things to this pass. The answer is supplied to us in the words of Lâo Tan (see T. T. K., ch. 19), 'Abolish sageness and cast away wisdom, and the world will be brought to a state of good order.' But the issue does not commence with the state of the world. When Kwang K'ăng-ze replied to Hwang-Tî's questions, he said (par. 4), 'Watch over your body, and increase the vigour of things. Maintain the unity, and dwell in the harmony.' What he said, about the rain descending before the clouds collected, about the trees shedding their leaves before they were yellow, about the light (of the sun and moon) hastening to extinction, about Hwang-Tî's mind being that of a flatterer of which he would make no account, and about how he should do nothing but rest in the instincts of his nature, and not interfere with the minds of men:—all these are expressions bearing on the value and love which should be given to the body. And the lesson in his words does not end with the watching over the body.

There are the words addressed by Hung Mung to Yün

K'iang, 'Nourish in your mind a great agreement (with the primal ether). (Things) return to their root, and do not know (that they are doing so). As to what you say, that "the mysterious operations of Heaven are not accomplished, that the birds all sing at night, that vegetation withers under calamity, and that insects are all overtaken by disaster:—about all these things there is no occasion for anxiety." While you do nothing, rest in the promptings of your human nature, and do not interfere with the minds of men;—such is the genial influence that attracts and gathers all things round itself (par. 2).'

But the Superior man's letting the world have its own course in this generous way;—this is what the ordinary men of the world cannot fathom. When such men speak about governing, they examine carefully between others and themselves, and are very earnest to distinguish between differing and agreeing. Their only quest is to find how they may overcome others, and the end is that they are always overcome by others. They do not know that in order to reduce others to the level of things, there must be those who cannot be reduced by others to that level. Those are said to be the sole possessors of the power (par. 6).

The teaching of the Great man, however, is not of this nature. He responds to others according to their qualities, without any selfish purpose. Although he is the sole possessor of the power, that power comes to be nothing in his view. Between having and not having there is to him no difference in the use. Doing nothing, and yet sometimes obliged to act, he forthwith does so; when he acts, yet no one sees that he has acted, and it is the same as if he did not act. So it is according to the Táo; but therein there are both the Heavenly and the Human elements. In accordance with this there are (in actual government) the Lord and the Minister (par. 7). When one discerns this, and knows which element is to be preferred, convinced that it is doing nothing which is valuable, what difficulty has he in governing the world?

The thread of connexion running through this Book is 'Doing Nothing.' Whether it speaks of the promptings of the nature or of the minds of men, it shows how in regard to both there must be this 'doing nothing.' In the end, with much repetition it distinguishes and discusses, showing that what doing there may be in doing nothing need not trouble us, and is not the same as the 'Extinction' of the Buddhists. There is not much difference between the teaching of this Book, and what we read in the Confucian Analects, 'He did nothing and yet governed efficiently (Bk. XV, ch. iv).' This is an instance of the light thrown by our 'old *Kwang*' on the *King*, and shows how an understanding may take place between him and our Literati.

In the style there are so many changes and transformations, so many pauses and rests as in music, conflicting discussions, and subtle disquisitions, the pencil's point now hidden in smoke and now among the clouds, the author's mind teeming with his creations, that no one who has not made himself familiar with a myriad volumes should presume to look and pronounce on this Book.

BOOK XX.

The afflictions of men in the world are great, because their attainments in the *Tao* and Its Attributes are shallow. The *Tao* with Its Attributes is the Author of all things. To follow It in Its transformings according to the time is not like occupying one's self with the qualities of things, and with the practice and teaching of the human relations, which only serve to bring on disaster and blame. He who seeks his enjoyment in It, however, must begin by emptying himself. Hence we have, 'Rip your skin from your body, cleanse your heart, and put away your desires (par. 2);' then afterwards 'you can enjoy yourself in the land of Great Vacuity.' In this way one attains to the status represented by coming across 'an empty vessel' and escapes 'the evils which the close-furred fox and the elegantly-spotted leopard' are preparing for themselves.

These are the ideas in the paragraph about *Î-liào* of

Shih-nan which may help to illustrate, and receive illustration from, what *Kwang-ze* says (par. 1) that 'he would prefer to be in a position between being fit to be useful and wanting that fitness.'

In the case of *Pei-kung Shê* collecting taxes for the making of a peal of bells, we have only the exercise of a small art (par. 3). He could, however, put away all thought of self, and act as the time required. He was 'as a child who has no knowledge,' so slow was he and hesitating in this respect; there escorting those who went, here welcoming those who came. But from all this we may know how far he had advanced (in the knowledge of the *Táo*).

But on consideration I think it was only Confucius of whom this could be spoken. Did not he receive a great share of the world's afflictions (par. 4)? When *Thái-kung Zăn* spoke to him of 'putting away the ideas of merit and fame, and placing himself on the level of the masses of men,' he forthwith put away the idea of himself and complied with the requirements of the time. This was the art by which he enjoyed himself in the *Táo* and Its attributes, and escaped the troubles of the world.

He could put away the idea of self in responding to the world, but he could not do so in determining his associations. In consequence of this, more distant acquaintances did not come to lay further afflictions on him, and his nearer friends perhaps came to cast him off because of those afflictions. What was he to do in these circumstances?

If one be able to comply with the requirements of the time in his relations with men, but cannot do so in his relations to Heaven, then in the world he will indeed do nothing to others contrary to what is right, but he will himself receive treatment contrary to it; and what is to be done in such a case? *Ze-sang Hû* saw the difficulty here and provided for it. What he said about 'a union of Heaven's appointment,' and about 'the intercourse of superior men being tasteless as water,' shows how well he knew the old lessons about a connexion growing out

of external circumstances and one founded in inward feeling. When one has divested himself of the idea of self, there will not again be such an experience as that of Confucius, when his intimate associates were removed from him more and more, and his followers and friends were more and more dispersed.

And Confucius himself spoke of such a case. What he said about its being 'easy not to receive (as evils) the inflictions of Heaven,' and 'difficult not to receive as benefits the favours of men (par. 7),' shows how truly he perceived the connexion between the Heavenly and the Human (in man's constitution), and between 'the beginning and end' of experiences. When one acts entirely according to the requirements of the time, the more he enlarges himself the greater he becomes, and the more he loves himself the more sorrow he incurs. If he do not do so, then we have the case of him who in the prospect of gain forgets the true instinct of his preservation, as shown in the strange bird of the park of Tião-ling (par. 8), and the case of the Beauty of the lodging-house, who by her attempts to show off her superiority made herself contemned. How could such parties so represented occupy themselves with the Táo and Its attributes so as to escape the calamities of life?

This Book sets forth the principles which contribute to the preservation of the body, and keeping harm far off, and may supplement what still needed to be said on this subject in Book IV. The Táo and Its attributes occupy the principal place in it; the emptying of Self, and conforming to the time, are things required by them. The exquisite reasonings and deep meaning of the Book supply excellent rules for getting through the world. Only the sixth paragraph is despicable and unworthy of its place. It is evidently a forgery, and I cannot but blame Kwo 3ze-hsüan for allowing it to remain as the production of K'wang-3ze.

BOOK XXII.

The Táo made Its appearance before Heaven and Earth.
It made things what they are and was Itself no THING,

being what is called their Root and Origin (par. 2). If we consider It something existing, It was not such; if we consider It as something non-existing, that does not fully express the idea of it. The 'I know it (of Hwang-Tî)' is an addition of 'Knowledge' to the idea of it, and (his) 'I will tell you' is the addition of a description of it (par. 1). Therefore he who would embody the Táo can only employ the names of 'Do Nothing' and 'Returning to the Root,' and then go forward to the region of the Unknown and the Indescribable.

Now the Táo originally was a Unity. The collection of the breath, constituting life, and its dispersion, which we call death, proceed naturally. The denominations of the former as 'spirit-like and wonderful' and of the latter as 'foetor and putridity' are the work of man. But those of 'Non-action' and 'Returning to the Root' are intended to do honour to the Unity. Knowledge, Heedless Bluster, and Hwang-Tî, all perceived this, but they also went on to reason about it, showing how not to know is better than to know, and not to talk better than to talk.

As it is said in par. 2, 'the beautiful operations of Heaven and Earth, and the distinctive constitutions of all things,' from the oldest time to the present day, go on and continue without any difference. But who is it that makes them to be what they are? And what expression of doubt or speculation on the point has ever been heard from them? It is plain that the doctrine of the Táo originated with man.

When Phei-î (par. 3) told Nieh K^hüeh, 'Keep your body as it should be; look only at the One thing; call in your knowledge; make your measures uniform:'—all this was saying to him that we are to do nothing, and turn to (the Táo as) our Root. When he further says to him, 'You should have the simple look of a new-born calf; and not ask about the cause of your being what you are:'—this is in effect saying that knowledge is in not knowing, and that speech does not require the use of words.

If you suddenly (like Shun in par. 4) think that the Táo

is yours to hold, not only do you not know what the Táo is, but you do not know yourself. How is this? You are but a thing in the Táo. If your life came to you without its being produced by the Táo, you would yourself be a life-producer. But whether one lives to old age or dies prematurely he comes equally to an end. Your life properly was not from yourself, nor is your death your own act. You did not resist (the coming of your life); you do not keep it (against the coming of death); you are about to return to your original source. This simply is what is meant by the Sage's 'Do nothing, and return to your Root.' As to 'the bodily frame coming from incorporeity and its returning to the same (par. 5),' that certainly is a subject beyond the reach of our seeing and hearing; and how can any one say that the Táo is his to hold?

What Láo-ze (says to Confucius in par. 5), and what *K'äng* tells Shun (in par. 4), have not two meanings; but notwithstanding, it should not be said that the Táo is not to be found anywhere (par. 6). Speaking broadly, we may say that its presence is to be seen in an ant, a stalk of panic grass, an earthenware tile, and in excrement. Seeking for it in what is more delicate and recondite, let us take the ideas of fulness and emptiness, of withering and decay; of beginning and end, of accumulation and dispersion. These are all ideas, and not the names of things; and (the Táo) which makes things what they are has not the limit which belongs to things. No wonder that Tung-kwo Ze should have been so perplexed as he was!

Those who think that the Táo has no positive existence (par. 7), speak of it as 'The Mysterious and Obscure,' and then it would seem to be equivalent to the name 'Mystery,' which cannot be rightly applied to it. And those who think that it has a positive existence speak of it as being considered now noble and now mean, now bound and compressed, now dispersed and diffused, and what is One is divided into the noble and the mean, the compressed and the dispersed;—a mode of dealing with it, of which the Táo will not admit. Better is it to say with No-

beginning, 'There should be no asking about the Táo; any question about it should not be replied to.' The opposite of this would imply a knowledge of what is not known, and the use of words which should not be spoken. In accordance with this, when Star-light puts his question to Non-entity, and it is added, 'To conceive the ideas of Existence and Non-existence is not so difficult as to conceive of a Non-existing non-existence,' this is an advance on speaking of (the Táo) as Non-existent; and when the forger of Swords says to the Minister of War that by long practice he came to the exercise of his art as if he took no thought about it (par. 9), this is an advance on speaking of (the Táo) as existent.

The substance of what we know is to this effect:—The Táo was produced before heaven and earth. It made things what they are and is not itself a thing. It cannot be considered as of ancient origin or of recent, standing as it does in no relation to time. It had no beginning and will have no end. Life and death, death and life equally proceed from It. To speak of It as existing or as non-existing is a one-sided presentation of It. Those who have embodied It, amid all external changes, do not change internally. They welcome and meet all men and things, and none can do them any injury (par. 11). Whatever they do not know and are unequal to, they simply let alone. This is the meaning of 'Doing nothing, and turning in everything to the Root.' Where the want of knowledge and of language is the most complete, *Zăn Khiù* (par. 10) and *Yen-jze* (par. 11) apply to *Kung-nî* for his judgment in the case, and the consideration of it comes to an end.

In this Book the mysteries of the Táo are brought to light; one slight turn of expression after another reveals their successive depths, beyond the reach of Reasoning. *Lû Fang-hû* says, 'Master this Book, and the Mahâyâna of the Tripitaka will open to you at the first application of your knife.'—Well does he express himself!

BOOK XXVI.

Those who practise the Táo know that what is external to themselves cannot be relied on, and that what is internal and belonging to themselves, does not receive any injury (par. 1). They are therefore able to enjoy themselves in the world, emptying their minds of all which would interfere with their pursuing their natural course.

What men can themselves control are their minds; external things are all subject to the requirements and commands of the world. Good and evil cannot be prevented from both coming to men, and loyalty and filial duty may find it hard to obtain their proper recompense. From of old it has been so; and the men of the world are often startled to incessant activity with their minds between the thoughts of profit and injury, and are not able to overcome them (par. 1). But do they know that among the enemies (of their serenity) there are none greater than the Yin and Yang? The water and fire of men's minds produce irregularity in their action, and then again overcome it; but after the harmony of the mind has been consumed, there remains in them no more trace of the action of the Táo.

On this account, when *Kung-ní* was obstinately regardless of a myriad generations (in the future), *Lão Lái-ze* still warned him to have done with his self-conceit (par. 5). His reason for doing so was that wisdom had its perils, and even spirit-like intelligence does not reach to everything (par. 6). It was so with the marvellous tortoise, and not with it only. The sage is full of anxiety and indecision (par. 5), and thereby is successful in his undertakings; the man of the greatest knowledge puts away (the idea of) skill, and without any effort shows his skill:—they can both look on what seems to have no use and pronounce it useful, and allow their nature while it is able to enjoy itself to take its course without being anxious about its issue in advantage or injury (par. 1).

And moreover, it is not necessary that they should leave

the world in order to enjoy themselves. There are the distinctions of antiquity and the present day indelibly exhibited in the course of time (par. 8). The way in which the Perfect man enjoys himself is by his passing through the world of men without leaving any trace of himself. His way is free and encounters no obstruction (par. 9); his mind has its spontaneous and enjoyable movements, and so his spirit is sure to overcome all external obstructions. Very different is this from the way of him who is bent on concealing himself, and on extinguishing all traces of his course (par. 8). He will seek his enjoyment in the great forest with its heights and hills, and not be able to endure the trouble of desiring fame, having recourse also to violence, laying plans, seeking to discharge the duties of office so as to secure general approval.

Thus the Perfect man obtains the harmony of his Heaven (-given nature), and his satisfactions spring up, he knows not how, as when the growing grain in spring has been laid by the rains (par. 9). As to the arts of curing illness, giving rest to old age, and restraining hasty measures to remedy the effects of errors, he can put them on one side, and not discuss them; thus playing the part of one who has apprehended the ideas and then forgets the words in which they were conveyed (par. 11). Let him who occupies himself with the Táo beware of 'seeking the fish-baskets and hare-snares,' and falling into such mistakes as are instanced in the cases of emaciation to death, or suicide by drowning.

This Book points out the true form of substances, and gave rise to the talk in subsequent ages about the Khân and Lî hexagrams, and about the lead and quicksilver. Nearly the whole of it has been called in question, and the second, third, and fourth paragraphs are so marked by the shallowness of their style, and the eccentricity of their sentiments, that it may be doubted if they are genuine. I suspect they were written and introduced by some imitator of *Kwang-jze*, and therefore call attention to them and cast them out of my analysis.

BOOK XXXII.

Lin Hsi-kung omits Books XXVIII, XXIX, XXX, and XXXI from his edition of *Kwang-ze's* Writings. Our Book XXXII, the *Lieh Yü-khâu*, is with him Book XXVIII. He explains and comments on its various paragraphs as he does in the case of all the previous Books. Instead of subjoining an Analysis and Summary of the Contents in his usual way, he contents himself with the following note:—

In the Notice given by *Sû 3ze-kan*¹ of the Sacrificial Hall to *Kwang-ze*, he says that after reading the last paragraph of Book XXVII (the *Yü Yen*, or 'Metaphorical Words'), about Yang 3ze-kü, and how (when he left the inn) the other visitors would have striven with him about the places for their mats, he forthwith discarded the four Books that followed,—the *Zang Wang*, the *Táo Kih*, the *Yüeh Kien*, and the *Yü-fû*; making the *Lieh Yü-khâu* immediately follow that paragraph. Having done so, he fully saw the wisdom of what he had done, and said with a laugh, 'Yes, they do indeed belong to one chapter!'

So did the old scholar see what other eyes for a thousand years had failed to see. No subsequent editor and commentator, however, ventured to take it on him to change the order of the several Books which had been established, following therein the Critical Canon laid down by Confucius about putting aside subjects concerning which doubts are entertained²; but we ought not to pass the question by without remark.

The subject of the last paragraph of the *Lieh Yü-khâu* is *Kwang-ze*, 'when he was about to die.' It clearly

¹ *Sû Shih* (蘇軾), styled 3ze-kan (子瞻) and also, and more frequently, Tung-pho (東坡), one of the most celebrated statesmen and scholars of the eleventh century (1036–1101). The notice of the Sacrificial Hall of *Kwang-ze* was written in 1078. See Appendix viii.

² See the Confucian *Analects* II, xviii:—'Learn much and put aside the points of which you stand in doubt, while you speak cautiously at the same time of the others.'

intimates how he, the man of *K'hi-yüan*, from that time ceased to use his pencil, just as the appearance of the *Lin* (in the *3o-kwan*) did in the case of Confucius. Not a single character therefore should appear as from him after this. We have no occasion therefore to enter into any argument about the *Thien Hsiâ* (Book XXXIII). We may be sure that it was made, not by *Kwang-ze*, but by some editor of his writings. Later writers, indeed, contend vehemently for *Kwang-ze*'s own authorship of it. We can only say, Great is the difficulty in treating of the different views of Scholars¹!

¹ The arguments both of *Sü Shih* and *Lin Hsi-kung* as set forth in this note are far from conclusive.

APPENDIX VI.

List of Narratives, Apologues, and Stories of various kinds in the Writings of *Kwang-ze*.

BOOK I.

Paragraph 1. The enjoyment of the Tào by such vast creatures as the Khwăn and the Phăng.

2. The enjoyment and foolish judgments of smaller creatures. Big trees and Phăng 3û.

3. Questions put by Thang to Kî. The Tào in different men:—Yung-ze; Lieh-ze; and an ideal Tàoist. The Perfect man, the Spirit-like man, and the Sagely-minded man.

4. Yáo wishing to resign the throne to Hsü Yû.

5. Kien Wû and Lien Shû on the ideal Tàoist.

6. A cap-seller of Sung. Yáo after visiting the four Perfect ones.

7. Hui-ze and Kwang-ze:—the great calabashes; the hand-protecting salve; and the great Ailantus tree.

BOOK II.

Par. 1. Nan-kwo 3ze-khî in a trance, and his disciple. The notes of heaven, earth, and man.

4. 'In the morning three:—the monkeys and their acorns.

7. Yáo and Shun,—on the wish of the former to smite some small states.

9. Li Kî before and after her marriage.

10. The penumbra and the shadow. Kwang-ze's dream that he was a butterfly.

BOOK III.

Par. 2. King Wăn-hui and his cook ;—how the latter cut up his oxen.

3. Kung-wăn Hsien and the Master of the Left who had only one foot.

4. The death of Lâu-ze; and adverse judgment on his life.

BOOK IV.

Pars. 1, 2. Yen Hui and Confucius ;—on the proposal of the former to go and convert the ruler of Wei.

3, 4. Ze-kão and Confucius ;—on the mission of the former from K'hi to K'hi.

5. Yen Ho and K'ü Po-yü ;—on the former's undertaking to be tutor to the wayward son of duke Ling of Wei.

6. The master-mechanic and the great tree ;—so large and old through its uselessness.

7. Nan-po Ze-k'hi and the great tree, preserved by its uselessness. Trees of Sung cut down because of their good timber. Peculiarities exempting from death as sacrificial victims.

8. The deformed object Shû and his worth.

9. Rencontre between Confucius and the madman of K'hi.

BOOK V.

Par. 1. Confucius explains the influence of the cripple Wang Thái over the people of Lû.

2. The fellow-students Ze-k'hi and the cripple Shân-thû K'hi.

3. Confucius and Toeless of Shû-shan. Judgment of Toeless and Lâu-ze on Confucius.

4. Duke Ai of Lû and Confucius ;—on the ugly but most able and fascinating man, Ai-thai Tho. Admiration for Confucius of duke Ai.

5. The deformed favourites of duke Ling of Wei and duke Hwan of K'hi. Argument between Kwang-ze and Hui-ze, growing out of the former's account of them.

BOOK VI.

Par. 8. Nan-po 3ze-khwei and the long-lived Nü Yü. How Pù-liang Í learned the Táo.

9. Four Táoists, and the submission of 3ze-yü, one of them, a poor deformed hunchback, to his lot, when he was very ill.

10. The submission of 3ze-lái, another of the four, as his life was ebbing away.

11. Three Táoists, and the ways of two of them on the death of the third. Conversation on the subject between Confucius and 3ze-kung.

12. Confucius and Yen Hui on the mourning of Măng-sun 3hái.

13. Í-r 3ze and Hsü Yü. How the Táo will remove the injuries of error, and regenerate the mind.

14. Confucius and Yen Hui. The growth of the latter in Táoism.

15. 3ze-yü and 3ze-sang. The penury of the latter and submission to his fate.

BOOK VII.

Par. 1. Nieh K'üeh, Wang Í, and Phû-î-ze. That Shun was inferior in his Táoistic attainments to the more ancient sovereign, Thái.

2. Kien Wû and the recluse K'ieh-yü;—on the ideal of government.

3. Thien Kăn and a nameless man;—that non-action is the way to govern the world.

4. Yang 3ze-kü and Láo Tan on the nameless government of the Intelligent Kings.

5. Lieh-ze and his master Hû-ze. How the latter defeated the wizard of K'äng.

6. The end of Chaos, wrought by the gods of the southern and northern seas.

BOOK VIII.

Par. 4. How two shepherd slaves lose their sheep in

different ways. The corresponding cases of the righteous Po-î and the robber Kih.

BOOK X.

Par. 1. Murder of the ruler of *Khi* by Thien *Khăng-ze*, and his usurpation of the State.

2. How the best and ablest of men, such as Lung-făng, Pî-kan, *Khang Hung*, and *Ze-hsü*, may come to a disastrous end, and only seem to have served the purposes of such men as the robber *Kih*.

3. Evils resulting from such able men as *Žăng Shăn*, Shih *Khiu*, Yang *Ku*, Mo *Ti*, Shih *Khwang*, *Khui*, and *Lî Ku*.

4. Character of the age of Perfect Virtue, and sovereigns who flourished in it in contrast with the time of *Kwang-ze*.

BOOK XI.

Par. 3. *Žhui Khiu* and *Lăo-ze*. The latter denounces the meddling with the mind which began with *Hwang-Ti*, and the spread of knowledge, as productive of all evil.

4. *Hwang-Ti* and *Kwang Khăng-ze*, his master, who discourses on the mystery of the *Tăo*, and how it promotes long life.

5. *Yün Kiang* and *Hung Mung*, or the Leader of the Clouds and the Great Ether;—the wish of the former to nourish all things, and how they would be transformed by his doing nothing.

BOOK XII.

Par. 4. The loss and recovery by *Yăo* of his dark-coloured Pearl;—the *Tăo*.

5. *Hsü Yü*'s reply to *Yăo* on the character of *Nieh Khüeh* and his unfitness to take the place of Sovereign.

6. *Yăo* rejects the good wishes for him of the Border-warden of *Hwă*.

7. *Yü* and *Po-khăng Ze-kăo*. The latter vindicates his resignation of dignity and taking to farming.

9. Confucius and *Lăo-ze*;—on the attitude to the *Tăo* of a great sage and ruler.

10. *K'iang-lü Mien* and *K'î K'hêh*;—on the counsel which the former had given to the ruler of *Lû*.

11. *3ze-kung* and the old gardener;—argument of the latter in favour of the primitive simplicity, and remarks thereon by *Confucius*.

12. *Kun Mâng* and *Yüan Fung*;—on the government of the sage; of the virtuous and kindly man; and of the spirit-like man.

13. *Măn Wû-kwei* and *K'ih-kang Man-k'hi*;—that there had been confusion and disorder before the time of *Shun*; and the character of the age of Perfect Virtue.

BOOK XIII.

Par. 6. *Yáo* and *Shun*;—on the former's method of government.

7. *Confucius*, wishing to deposit some writings in the royal Library, is repulsed by *Láo-ze*. Argument between them on Benevolence and Righteousness in relation to the nature of man.

8. *Shih-k'hang K'hi* and *Láo-ze*;—the strange conferences between them, and the charges brought by the one against the other.

10. Duke *Hwan* and the wheelwright *Phien*;—that the knack of an art cannot be conveyed to another, and the spirit of thought cannot be fully expressed in writing.

BOOK XIV.

Par. 2. *Tang*, a minister of *Shang*, and *Kwang-ze* on the nature of Benevolence.

3. *Pei-măn K'hang* and *Hwang-Ti*;—a description of *Hwang-Ti*'s music, the *Hsien-k'hih*.

4. *Yen Yüan* and *Kin*, the music-master of *Lû*, on the course of *Confucius*;—the opinion of the latter that it had been unsuccessful and was verging to entire failure.

5. *Confucius* and *Láo-ze*. The former has not yet got the *Táo*, and *Láo-ze* explains the reason.

6. *Confucius* and *Láo-ze*. *Confucius* talks of Benevolence

and Righteousness ; and how the tables are turned on him. He is deeply impressed by the other.

7. 3ze-kung, in consequence of the Master's report of his interview, goes also to see Láo-3ze ; and is nonplussed and lectured by him.

8. Confucius sees Láo-3ze again, and tells him how he has profited from his instructions. The other expresses his satisfaction with him.

BOOK XVI.

Par. 2. The state of Perfect Unity, and its gradual Decay.

BOOK XVII.

Pars. 1-7. The Spirit-earl of the Ho and Zo of the Northern Sea ;—on various metaphysical questions growing out of the doctrine of the Táo.

8. The khwei, the millipede, the serpent, the wind, the eye, and the mind ;—how they had their several powers, but did not know how.

9. Confucius in peril in Khwang is yet serene and hopeful.

10. Kung-sun Lung and Máu of Wei. The Frog of the dilapidated well, and the Turtle of the Eastern Sea. The greatness of Kwang-3ze's teachings.

11. Kwang-3ze refuses the invitation of the king of K'û to take office. The wonderful tortoise-shell of the king.

12. Hui-3ze and Kwang-3ze. The young phoenix and the owl.

13. Hui-3ze and Kwang-3ze ;—how Kwang-3ze understood the enjoyment of fishes.

BOOK XVIII.

Par. 2. Hui-3ze and Kwang-3ze ;—vindication by the latter of his behaviour on the death of his wife.

3. Mr. Deformed and Mr. One-foot ;—their submission under pain and in prospect of death.

4. Kwang-3ze and the skull ;—what he said to it, and its appearance to him at night in a dream.

5. The sadness of Confucius on the departure of Yen Hui for *K'hi*; and his defence of it to *3ze-kung*. The appearance of a strange bird in *Lú*, and his moralizings on it.

6. *Lieh-3ze* and the skull. The transmutations of things.

BOOK XIX.

Par. 2. *Lieh-3ze* and *Kwan Yin*;—on the capabilities of the Perfect man.

3. Confucius and the hunchback, who was skilful at catching cicadas with his rod.

4. The boatman on the gulf of *K'ang-shǎn*, and his skill.

5. *Thien Khái-k'ih* and duke *Wei* of *K'áu*;—on the best way to nourish the higher life. How it was illustrated by *Thien's* master, and how enforced by Confucius.

6. The officer of sacrifice and his pigs to be sacrificed.

7. Duke *Hwan* gets ill from seeing a ghostly sprite, and how he was cured.

8. The training of a fighting-cock.

9. Confucius and the swimmer in the gorge of *Lü*.

10. *K'ing*, the worker in rottlera wood, and the bell-frame;—how he succeeded in making it as he did.

11. *Tung-yê K'î* and his chariot-driving;—how his horses broke down.

12. The skill of the artisan *Shui*.

14. The weakling *Sun Hsiû* and the Master *3ze-pien K'ing-3ze*, with his disciples.

BOOK XX.

Par. 1. *K'wang-3ze* and his disciples;—the great tree that was of no use, and the goose that could not cackle.

2. *Î-liáo* of *Shih-nan* and the marquis of *Lû*;—how the former presses it on the marquis to go to an Utopia of Táoism in the south, to escape from his trouble and sorrow.

3. *Pei-kung Shê* and prince *K'ing-k'î*;—how the former collected taxes and made a peal of bells.

4. How the *Thái-kung Zǎn* condoled with Confucius on his distresses, and tried to convert him to Táoism.

5. Confucius and 3ze-sang Hû. The Táoistic effect of their conversation on the former. The dying charge of Shun to Yü.

6. Kwang-3ze in rags before the king of Wei. The apologue of the climbing monkey.

7. Confucius and Yen Hui;—on occasion of the perilous situation between *Khăn* and 3hái. Confucius expounds the principles that supported him.

8. Kwang-3ze's experiences in the park of Tiáo-ling;—has the character of an apologue.

9. The Innkeeper's two concubines;—the beauty disliked and the ugly one honoured.

BOOK XXI.

Par. 1. Thien 3ze-fang and the marquis Wăn of Wei.

2. Wăn-po Hsüeh-3ze and the scholars of the Middle States.

3. Confucius and Yen Hui;—on the incomprehensibleness to the latter of the Master's course.

4. Conversation between Confucius and Láo-3ze on the beginning of things.

5. Kwang-3ze and duke Âi of Lû;—on the dress of the scholar.

6. Pâi-lî Hsi.

7. The duke of Sung and his map-drawers.

8. King Wăn and the old fisherman of 3ang. Confucius and Yen Hui on king Wăn's dream about the fisherman.

9. The archery of Lieh-3ze and Po-hwăn Wû-zăn.

10. Kien Wû, and Sun Shû-áo, the True man. Confucius's account of the True man. The king of *Khû* and the ruler of Fan.

BOOK XXII.

Par. 1. Knowledge, Dumb Inaction, Head-strong Stammerer, and Hwang-Tî on the Táo.

3. Nieh *Khüeh* questioning Phei-î about the Táo.

4. Shun and his minister *Khăng*;—that man is not his own.

5. Confucius and Láo Tan ;—on the Perfect Táo.
6. Tung-kwo 3ze's question to Kwang-ze about where the Táo was to be found, and the reply.
7. Á-ho Kan, Shán Nǎng, Láo-lung K'i, Yen Kang ;—Grand Purity, Infinitude, Do-nothing, and No-beginning :—on what the Táo is.
8. Star-light and Non-entity.
9. The Minister of War and his forger of swords.
10. Zǎn K'hiú and Confucius ;—how it was before heaven and earth.
11. Confucius and Yen Hui :—No demonstration to welcome, no movement to meet.

BOOK XXIII.

- Par. 1. Kǎng-sang K'hiú and the people about Wei-lêi hill.
2. Kǎng-sang K'hiú and his disciples. He repudiates being likened by them to Yáo and Shun.
 3. Kǎng-sang K'hiú and the disciple Nan-yung K'hiú.
 - 4-12. Láo-ze lessoning Nan-yung K'hiú on the principles of Taoism.

BOOK XXIV.

- Pars. 1, 2. Hsü Wû-kwei, Nü Shang, and the marquis Wû of Wei :—Hsü's discourses to the marquis.
3. Hwang-Ti, with six attending sages, in quest of the Táo, meets with a wise boy herding horses.
 5. Debate between Kwang-ze and Hui-ze, illustrating the sophistry of the latter.
 6. The artisan Shih cleans the nose of a statue with the wind of his axe ; but declines to try his ability on a living subject.
 7. Advice of Kwan Kung on his death-bed to duke Hwan of K'hi about his choice of a successor to himself.
 8. The king of Wû and the crafty monkey. His lesson from its death to Yen Pü-i.
 9. Nan-po 3ze-k'hi and his attendant Yen K'hǎng-ze.

The trance is the highest result of the Táo. Practical lesson to be drawn from it.

10. Confucius at the court of *Khú* along with Sun Shû-áo and Í-liáo.

11. 3ze-*khi*, and his eight sons, with the physiognomist *Kiú-fang Yăn*.

12. Nieh *Khüeh* meets Hsü Yü fleeing from the court of Yáo.

BOOK XXV.

Par. 1. 3eh-yang seeking an introduction to the king of *Khú*. Í Kieh, Wang Kwo, and the recluse Kung-yüeh Hsiü.

3. The ancient sovereign Zăn-hsiang; Thang, the founder of the Shang dynasty; Confucius; and Yung-*khang* 3ze.

4. King Yung of Wei and his counsellors:—on his desire and schemes to be revenged on Thien Máu of *Khi*. Tái 3in-zăn and his apologue about the horns of a snail.

5. Confucius and the Recluse at Ant-hill in *Khú*.

6. The Border-warden of *Khang-wú*'s lessons to 3ze-láo. Kwang-3ze's enforcement of them.

7. Láo-3ze and his disciple Po Kü:—that the prohibitions of Law provoke to transgression.

8. The conversion to Taoism of Kü Po-yü.

9. Confucius and the historiographers;—about the honorary title of duke Ling of Wei.

10. Little Knowledge and the Correct Harmonizer:—on the Talk of the Hamlets and Villages.

11. On the namelessness of the Táo; and that Táo is but a borrowed or metaphorical name.

BOOK XXVI.

Par. 2. Against delaying to do good when it is in one's power to do it. The apologue of Kwang-3ze meeting with a goby on the road.

3. The big fish caught by the son of the duke of Zăn.

4. The Resurrectionist Students.

5. How Láo Lái-ze admonished Confucius.
6. The dream of the ruler Yüan of Sung about a tortoise.
7. Hui-ze and Kwang-ze;—on the use of being useless.
11. Illustrations of the evil accruing from going to excess in action, or too suddenly taking action.

BOOK XXVII.

Par. 2. Kwang-ze and Hui-ze on Confucius;—did he change his views in his sixtieth year?

3. Confucius and his other disciples:—on Ǵǻng-ze and his twice taking office with different moods of mind.
4. Yen Kǻng Ǵze-yü tells his Master Tung-kwo Ǵze-khi of his gradual attainments.
5. The penumbrae and the shadows.
6. Láo-ze's lessoning of Yang Ǵze-kü, and its effects on him.

BOOK XXVIII.

Par. 1. Yáo's proffers of the throne to Hsü Yü and Ǵze-káu Kih-fü. Shun's proffers of it to Ǵze-káu Kih-po, to Shan Küan, and to the farmer of Shih-hü. Thâi-wang Than-fü and the northern tribes. Prince Sâu of Yüeh.

2. Counsel of Ǵze-hwâ Ǵze to the marquis Káo of Han.
3. The ruler of Lû and the Taoist Yen Ho, who hides himself from the advances of the other.
4. Lieh-ze and his wife, on his declining a gift from the ruler of Kǻng.
5. The high-minded and resolute sheep-butcher Yüeh, and king Káo of Kǻü.
6. The poor Yüan Hsien and the wealthy Ǵze-kung. Ǵǻng-ze, in extreme poverty, maintaining his high and independent spirit. The satisfaction of Confucius in Yen Hui refusing, though poor, to take any official post.
7. Prince Mâu of Kung-shan, living in retirement, was not far from the Táo.
8. Confucius and the disciples Yen Hui, Ǵze-lü, and Ǵze-kung, during the perilous time between Kǻn and Ǵhái.

9. Shun and the northerner Wû-k'ai who refuses the throne. Thang, and Pien Sui and Wû Kwang, who both refused it.

10. The case of the brothers Po-i and Shû-k'hi, who refused the proffers of king Wû.

BOOK XXIX.

Par. 1. The visit of Confucius to the robber Kih, and interview between them.

2. 3ze-kang and Mân Kâu-teh (Mr. Full of Gain-recklessly-got) on the pursuit of wealth.

3. Mr. Dissatisfied and Mr. Know-the-Mean;—on the pursuit and effect of riches.

BOOK XXX.

How Kwang-ze dealt with the king of K'ao and his swordsmen, curing the king of his love of the sword-fight. The three Swords.

BOOK XXXI.

Confucius and the Old Fisherman;—including the story of the man who tried to run away from his shadow.

BOOK XXXII.

Par. 1. Lieh-ze and the effect of his over-manifestation of his attractive qualities. Failure of the warnings of his master.

2. The sad fate of Hwan of K'ang, a Confucianist, who resented his father's taking part with his Mohist brother.

5. K'û Phing-man and his slaughtering the dragon.

8. Kwang-ze's rebuke of 3h'ao Shang for pandering to the king of Sung, and thereby getting gifts from him.

9. Description to duke Ai of Lû of Confucius by Yen Ho as unfit to be entrusted with the government.

11. Kh'ao-fû the Correct, and his humility.

12. Kwang-ze's rebuke of the man who boasted of having received chariots from the king of Sung, and comparison of him to the boy who stole a pearl from under the chin of the Black Dragon when he was asleep.

13. *Kwang-ze* declines the offer of official dignity. The apologue of the sacrificial ox.

14. *Kwang-ze*, about to die, opposes the wish of his disciples to give him a grand burial. His own description of what his burial should be.

BOOK XXXIII.

Par. 1. The method of the Táo down to the time of Confucius.

2. The method of Mo Tì and his immediate followers.

3, 4. The method of Mo's later followers.

5. The method of Kwan Yin and Láo-ze.

6. The method of *Kwang-ze*.

7. The ways of Hui Shih, Kung-sun Lung, and other sophists.

APPENDIX VII.

I.

THE STONE TABLET IN THE TEMPLE OF LÂO-3ZE. BY HSIEH TÂO-HĂNG OF THE SUI DYNASTY¹.

1. After the Thái Kî (or Primal Ether) commenced its action, the earliest period of time began to be unfolded.

¹ Hsieh Tâo-hăng 薛道衡, called also Hsüan-k'ing (玄卿), was one of the most famous scholars and able ministers of the Sui dynasty (581-618), and also an eloquent writer. His biography is given at considerable length in the fifty-seventh chapter of the Books of Sui.

For about 200 years after the end of the 3in dynasty, the empire had been in a very divided and distracted state. The period is known as the epoch of 'The Southern and Northern Dynasties,' no fewer than nine or ten of which co-existed, none of them able to assert a universal sway till the rise of Sui. The most powerful of them towards the end of the time was 'The Northern K'au,' in connexion with the Wû-k'hang (武成) reign of which (558-561) the name of our Hsieh first appears. In the Wû-phing (武平) reign of 'The Northern K'hi (570-576),' we find him member of a committee for revising the rules of 'The Five Classes of Ceremonial Observances,' and gaining distinction as a poet.

When the emperor Wăn (文帝), by name Yang K'ien (楊堅), a scion of the ruling House of Sui, a small principality in the present Hû-pei, and founder of the dynasty so called, had succeeded in putting down the various conflicting dynasties, and claimed the sovereignty of the empire in 581, Hsieh freely yielded his allegiance to him, and was employed in the conduct of various affairs. The important paper, of the translation of the greater part of which a translation is here attempted, was the outcome of one of them. Wăn Tî regularly observed the Confucian worship of God, but also kept up the ceremonies of Buddhism and T'aoism. Having repaired the dilapidated temple of Lâo-3ze at his birth-place, he required from Hsieh an inscription for the commemorative tablet in it, the composition of which is referred to the year 586, 'the sixth year of Sui's rule over all beneath the sky.'

Hsieh appears to have been a favourite with the emperor Wăn, but when Wăn was succeeded in 605 by his son, known as Yang Tî (煬帝), his relations with

The curtain of the sky was displayed, and the sun and moon were suspended in it; the four-cornered earth was established, and the mountains and streams found their places in it. Then the subtle influences (of the Ether) operated like the heaving of the breath, now subsiding and again expanding; the work of production went on in its seasons above and below; all things were formed as from materials, and were matured and maintained. There were the (multitudes of the) people; there were their rulers and superiors.

2. As to the august sovereigns of the highest antiquity, living as in nests on trees in summer, and in caves in winter, silently and spirit-like they exercised their wisdom. Dwelling like quails, and drinking (the rain and dew) like newly-hatched birds, they had their great ceremonies like the great terms of heaven and earth, not requiring to be regulated by the dishes and stands; and (also) their great music corresponding to the common harmonies of heaven and earth, not needing the guidance of bells and drums.

3. By and by there came the loss of the T'ao, when its Characteristics took its place. They in their turn were lost, and then came Benevolence. Under the Sovereigns and Kings that followed, now more slowly and anon more rapidly, the manners of the people, from being good and simple, became bad and mean. Thereupon came the Literati and the Mohists with their confused contentions; names and

the throne became less happy. Offended by a memorial which Hsieh presented, and the ground of offence in which we entirely fail to perceive, the emperor ordered him to put an end to himself. Hsieh was surprised by the sentence, and hesitated to comply with it, on which an executioner was sent to strangle him. Thus ended the life of Hsieh T'ao-h'ang in his seventieth year. His death was regretted and resented, we are told, by the people generally. A collection of his writings was made in seventy chapters, and was widely read. I do not know to what extent these have been preserved; if many of them have been lost, and the paper, here in part submitted to the reader, were a fair specimen of the others, the loss must be pronounced to be great. Of this paper I have had two copies before me in translating it. One of them is in *Giáo Hung's* 'Wings to L'ao-tze;' the other is in 'The Complete Works of the Ten Philosophers.' Errors of the Text occur now in the one copy, now in the other. From the two combined a Text, which must be exactly correct or nearly so, is made out.

rules were everywhere diffused. The 300 rules¹ of ceremony could not control men's natures; the 3000 rules¹ of punishment were not sufficient to put a stop to their treacherous villainies. But he who knows how to cleanse the current of a stream begins by clearing out its source, and he who would straighten the end of a process must commence with making its beginning correct. Is not the Great Tào the Grand Source and the Grand Origin of all things?

4. The Master Láo was conceived under the influence of a star. Whence he received the breath (of life) we cannot fathom, but he pointed to the (plum-) tree (under which he was born), and adopted it as his surname²; we do not understand² whence came the musical sounds (that were heard), but he kept his marvellous powers concealed in the womb for more than seventy years. When he was born, the hair on his head was already white, and he took the designation of 'The Old Boy' (or Láo-3ze). In his person, three gateways and two (bony) pillars formed the distinctive marks of his ears and eyes; two of the symbols for five, and ten brilliant marks were left by the wonderful tread of his feet and the grasp of his hands. From the time of Fû-hsí down to that of the Káu dynasty, in uninterrupted succession, dynasty after dynasty, his person appeared, but with changed names. In the times of kings Wăn and Wú he discharged the duties, (first), of Curator of the Royal Library³, and (next), of the Recorder under the Pillar³. Later on in that dynasty he filled different offices, but did

¹ Compare vol. xxviii, p. 323, par. 38.

² Lî (李), a plum-tree. For this and many of the other prodigies mentioned by Hsieh, see what Julien calls 'The Fabulous Legend of Láo-3ze,' and has translated in the Introduction to his version of the Tào Teh King. Others of them are found in the Historical, or rather Legendary, Introduction in the 'Collection of Tàoist Treatises,' edited by Lû Yü in 1877.

³ The meaning of the former of these offices may be considered as settled;—see the note in Wang K'ân-k'ai's edition of the 'Historical Records (1870),' under the Biography of Láo-3ze. The nature of the second office is not so clearly ascertained. It was, I apprehend, more of a literary character than the curatorship.

not change his appearance. As soon as Hsüan Nî¹ saw him, he sighed over him as 'the Dragon,' whose powers are difficult to be known². Yin (Hsî), keeper of the (frontier) gate, keeping his eyes directed to every quarter, recognised 'the True Man' as he was hastening into retirement. (By Yin Hsî he was prevailed on) to put forth his extraordinary ability, and write his Book in two Parts³,—to lead the nature (of man) back to the Tâo, and celebrating the usefulness of 'doing nothing.' The style of it is very condensed, and its reasoning deep and far-reaching. The hexagram which is made up of the 'dragons on the wing'⁴ is not to be compared with it in exquisite subtlety. (The 30 *Kwan*) which ends with the capture of the Lin, does not match it in its brightness and obscurity. If employed to regulate the person, the spirit becomes clear and the will is still. If employed to govern the state, the people return to simplicity, and become sincere and good. When one goes on to refine his body in accordance with it, the traces of material things are rolled away from it; in rainbow-hued robes and mounted on a stork he goes forwards and backwards to the purple palace; on its juice of gold and wine of jade⁵ he feasts in the beautiful and pure capital. He is lustrous as the sun and moon; his ending and beginning are those of heaven and earth. He who crosses its stream, drives away the dust and noise of the world; he who finds its gate, mounts prancing up on the misty clouds. It is not for the ephemeral fly to know the fading and luxuriance of the Tâ-*k*hun⁶, or for a Fäng-î⁷ to fathom the depth of an Arm of the sea. Vast indeed (is the Tâo)! words are not sufficient to describe its excellence and powers!

5. *Kwang Kâu* tells us, that, 'when Lâo Tan died,

¹ Confucius, who was styled after the beginning of our era for several centuries 'Duke Nî, the Illustrious.'

² See vol. xxxix, pp. 34, 35.

³ See vol. xxxix, p. 35.

⁴ The *K'ien* or first of all the hexagrams of the *Yî K'ing*; but the sentence is to be understood of all the hexagrams,—of the *Yî* as a whole.

⁵ Compare Pope's line, 'The juice nectareous, and the balmy dew.'

⁶ Vol. xxxix, p. 166.

⁷ Vol. xxxix, p. 244.

Khin Shih went to condole (with his son), but after crying out three times, immediately left the house¹. This was what is called the punishment for his neglecting his Heaven (-implanted nature), and although it appears as one of the metaphorical illustrations of the supercilious officer, yet there is some little indication in the passage of the reappearance of the snake after casting its exuviae².

[At this point the author leaves the subject of the *Táo* and its prophet, and enters on a long panegyric of the founder of the Sui dynasty and his achievements. This sovereign was the emperor *Wăn* (文帝), the founder of Sui (隋高祖), originally *Yang Kien*, a scion of the House of Sui, a principality whose name remains in *Sui-kâu*, of the department *Teh-an* in *Hû Pei*. He was certainly the ablest man in the China of his day, and deserves a portion of the praise with which Mr. *Hsieh* celebrates him after his extravagant fashion. He claimed the throne from the year 581. While doing honour to Confucianism, he did not neglect the other two religions in the empire, *Táoism* and Buddhism; and having caused the old temple of *Láo-sze* to be repaired in grand style in 586, he commissioned *Hsieh Táo-hăng* to superintend the setting up in it a commemorative Tablet of stone.

I pass over all this, which is related at great length, and proceed to give the inscription. It occupies no fewer than 352 characters in 88 lines, each consisting of four characters. The lines are arranged in what we may call eleven stanzas of equal length, the second, fourth, sixth, and eighth lines of each rhyming together. There is a good deal of art in the metrical composition. In the first six stanzas the rhyming finals are in the even tone and one of the deflected tones alternately. In the last five stanzas this arrangement is reversed. The rhymes in 7, 9, and 11 are deflected, and in 8 and 10 even. The measure of four characters is the most common in the *Shih King* or Ancient Book of Poetry.

¹ Vol. xxxix, p. 201.

² Referring, I suppose, to the illustration of the fire and the faggots.

It continued to be a favourite down to the Thang dynasty, after which it fell very much into disuse. Through the many assonances of the Chinese characters, and the attention paid to the tones, we have in Chinese composition much of the art of rhyming, but comparatively little of the genius of poetry.]

II.

THE INSCRIPTION.

- St. 1. Back in the depths of ancient time ;
 Remote, before the Tîs began ;
 Four equal sides defined the earth,
 And pillars eight the heaven sustained.
 All living things in classes came,
 The valleys wide, and mighty streams.
 The Perfect Tâo, with movement wise,
 Unseen, Its work did naturally.
- St. 2. Its power the elements¹ all felt ;
 The incipient germs of things² appeared.
 Shepherd and Lord established were,
 And in their hands the ivory bonds³.
 The Tîs must blush before the Hwangs⁴;
 The Wangs must blush before the Tîs⁴.
 More distant grew Tâo's highest gifts,
 And simple ways more rare became.
- St. 3. The still placidity was gone,
 And all the old harmonious ways.
 Men talents prized, and varnished wit ;
 The laws displayed proved but a net.

¹ 'The five essences ;' meaning, I think, the subtle power and operation of the five elements.

² So Williams, under Wei (微). See also the Khang-hsi Thesaurus under the phrase 三微.

³ 'Bonds' with written characters on them superseded the 'knotted cords' of the primitive age. That the material of the bonds should be, as here represented, slips of ivory, would seem to anticipate the progress of society.

⁴ The Hwangs (皇) preceded the Tîs in the Tâoistic genesis of history ; and as being more simple were Tâoistically superior to them ; so it was with the Tîs and the Wangs or Kings.

Wine-cups and stands the board adorned,
And shields and spears the country filled.
The close-meshed nets the fishes scared:
And numerous bows the birds alarmed.

- St. 4. Then did the True Man¹ get his birth,
As 'neath the Bear the star shone down².
All dragon gifts his person graced;
Like the stork's plumage was his hair.
The complicated he resolved³, the sharp made blunt³,
The mean rejected, and the generous chose;
In brightness like the sun and moon,
And lasting as the heaven and earth³.
- St. 5. Small to him seemed the mountains five⁴,
And narrow seemed the regions nine⁴;
About he went with lofty tread,
And in short time he rambled far.
In carriage by black oxen drawn⁵,
Around the purple air was bright.
Grottoes then oped to him their sombre gates,
And thence, unseen, his spirit power flowed forth.
- St. 6. The village near the stream of Ko⁶
Traces of him will still retain⁶;
But now, as in the days of old,
With changed times the world is changed.

¹ This of course was Lâo-3ze.

² See above, p. 313, par. 4.

³ In the *Tào Teh King*, p. 50, par. 2, and p. 52, par. 1. The reading of line 7 is different in my two authorities: — in the one 日角月角; in the other 乃前月角. I suppose the correct reading should be— 日前月角, and have given what I think is the meaning.

⁴ Two well-known numerical categories. See Mayers's *Manual*, pp. 320, 321, and p. 340.

⁵ So it was, according to the story, that Lâo-3ze drew near to the barrier gate, when he wished to leave China.

⁶ The Ko is a river flowing from Ho-nan into An-hui, and falling into the Hwâi, not far from the district city of Hwâi-yüan. It enters the one province from the other in the small department of Po (亳州), in which, according to a Chinese map in my possession, Lâo-3ze was born. The *Khang-hsi Thesaurus* also gives a passage to the effect that the temple of his mother was hereabouts, at a bend in the Ko.

His stately temple fell to ruin ;
 His altar empty was and still ;
 By the nine wells dryandras grew¹,
 And the twin tablets were but heaps of stone.

St. 7. But when our emperor was called to rule,
 All spirit-like and sage was he.
 Earth's bells reverberated loud,
 And light fell on the heavenly mirror down.
 The universe in brightness shone,
 And portents all were swept away ;
 (All souls), or bright or dark², revered,
 And spirits came to take from him their law.

St. 8. From desert sands³ and where the great trees grow³,
 From phoenix caves, and from the dragon woods,
 All different creatures came sincere ;
 Men of all regions gave their hearts to him.
 Their largest vessels brought their gifts,
 And kings their rarest things described ;
 Black clouds a thousand notes sent forth ;
 And in the fragrant winds were citherns heard⁴.

St. 9. Through his transforming power, the tripods were
 made sure ;
 And families became polite and courteous.

¹ The nine wells, or bubbling springs, near the village where Láo was born, are mentioned by various writers ; but I fail to see how the growth of the trees about them indicated the ruin of his temple.

² I have introduced the 'all souls' in this line, because of the 鬼 in the second character. Williams defines the first character, yao (曜), as 'the effulgence of the sun,' and of 'heavenly bodies generally ;' the second (魄) is well known as meaning 'the animal soul,' and 'the dark disk of the moon.' The Thesaurus, however, explains the two characters together as a name for the pole star (北辰 ; see Analects I, i) ; and perhaps I had better have followed this meaning.

³ The 'desert sands' were, no doubt, what we call 'the desert of Gobi.' The trees referred to were 'in the extreme East.' The combination phan-mû is not described more particularly.

⁴ This and the three preceding lines are not a little dark.

Ever kept he in mind (the sage) beneath the Pillar¹,
 Still emulous of the sovereigns most ancient².
 So has he built this pure temple,
 And planned its stately structure;
 Pleasant, with hills and meadows around,
 And lofty pavilion with its distant prospect.

St. 10. Its beams are of plum-tree, its ridge-pole of cassia;
 A balustrade winds round it; many are its pillars;
 About them spreads and rolls the fragrant smoke³;
 Cool and pure are the breezes and mists.
 The Immortal officers come to their places⁴;
 The Plumaged guests are found in its court⁴,
 Numerous and at their ease,
 They send down blessing, bright and efficacious.

St. 11. Most spirit-like, unfathomable,
 (Tão's) principles abide, with their symbolism at-
 tached⁵.
 Loud is Its note, but never sound emits⁶,
 Yet always it awakes the highest echoes.
 From far and near men praise It;
 In the shades, and in the realms of light, they look
 up for Its aid;
 Reverently have we graven and gilt this stone
 And made our lasting proclamation thereby to heaven
 and earth.

¹ 'The (sage) beneath the Pillar' must be Lâo-ze. See above in the Introductory notice, p. 313.

² See the note on the meaning of the epithet 太上, vol. xxxix, p. 40.

³ 'The smoke,' I suppose, 'of the incense, and from the offerings.'

⁴ Tãoist monks are called 'Plumaged or Feathered Scholars (羽士),' from the idea that by their discipline and pills, they can emancipate themselves from the trammels of the material body, and ascend (fly up) to heaven. Arrived there, as Immortals or Hsien (仙), it further appears they were constituted into a hierarchy or society, of which some of them were 'officers,' higher in rank than others.

⁵ An allusion to the text of the hexagrams of the Yî K'ing, where the explanations of them by king Wăn,—his thwan, are followed by the symbolism of their different lines by the duke of K'âu,—his hsiang.

⁶ See the Tão Teh K'ing, ch. xli, par. 2.

APPENDIX VIII.

RECORD FOR THE SACRIFICIAL HALL OF KWANG-3ZE.

BY SÔ SHIH¹.

1. *Kwang-3ze* was a native (of the territory) of Măng and an officer in (the city of) *Khi-yüan*. He had been dead for more than a thousand years, and no one had up to this time sacrificed to him in Măng. It was Wang King, the assistant Secretary of the Prefect, who superintended the erection of a Sacrificial Hall (to *Kwang-3ze*), and (when the building was finished) he applied to me for

¹ The elder of two brothers, both famous as scholars, poets, and administrators in the history of their country, and sons of a father hardly less distinguished. The father (A. D. 1009-1066) was named Sû Hsün (蘇洵), with the designation of Ming-yun (明允), and the two names of locality, Láo-khwan (老泉) and Mei-shân (眉山). Of the two brothers the elder (1036-1101), author of the notice here adduced, was the more celebrated. His name was Shih (軾), and his designation 3ze-kân (子瞻); but he is more frequently styled Tung-pho (東坡), from the situation of a house which he occupied at one time. His life was marked by several vicissitudes of the imperial favour which was shown to him and of the disgrace to which he was repeatedly subjected. He was versed in all Chinese literature, but the sincerity of his Confucianism has not been called in question. His brother (1039-1112), by name K'eh (轍), by designation 3ze-yü (子由), and by locality Ying-pin (穎濱), has left us a commentary on the T'ao Teh K'ing, nearly the whole of which is given by 3iao Hung, under the several chapters. It seems to have been K'eh's object to find a substantial unity under the different forms of Confucian, Buddhistic, and T'aoist thought.

The short essay, for it is more an essay than 'a record,' which is here translated is appended by 3iao Hung to his 'Wings to *Kwang-3ze*.' It is hardly worthy of Shih's reputation.

a composition which might serve as a record of the event ; (which I made as follows) :—

2. According to the Historical Records (of Sze-mâ *K'ien*), Kwang-3ze lived in the time of the kings Hui of Liang (B.C. 370–333 [?])¹ and Hsüan of *K'hi* (B.C. 332–314). There was no subject of study to which he did not direct his attention, but his preference was for the views of Lâo-3ze ; and thus it was that of the books which he wrote, containing in all more than ten myriad characters, the greater part are metaphorical illustrations of those views. He made 'The Old Fisherman,' 'The Robber *K'ih*,' and 'The Cutting Open Satchels,' to deride the followers of Confucius, and to set forth the principles of Lâo-3ze. (So writes Sze-mâ *K'ien*, but) his view is that of one who had only a superficial knowledge of Kwang-3ze. My idea is that Kwang wished to support the principles of Khung-3ze, though we must not imitate him in the method which he took to do so. (I will illustrate my meaning by a case of a different kind):—A prince of *K'hi*² was once hurrying away from the city in disguise³, when the gate-keeper refused to let him pass through. On this his servant threatened the prince with a switch, and reviled him, saying, 'Slave, you have no strength !' On seeing this, the gate-keeper allowed them to go out. The thing certainly took place in an irregular way, and the prince escaped by an inversion of what was right ;—he seemed openly to put himself in opposition, while he was secretly maintaining and supporting. If we think that his servant did not love the prince, our judgment will be wrong ; if we think that his action was a model for imitation in serving a prince, in that also we shall be wrong. In the same way the words of Kwang-3ze are thrown out in a contradictory manner, with which the tenor of his writing does not agree. The correct interpre-

¹ Compare vol. xxxix, pp. 36, 37, 39. Sze-mâ *K'ien* enters king Hui's death in this year. The 'Bamboo Books' place it sixteen years later, see 'The General Mirror of History,' under the thirty-fifth year of king Hsien of *K'au*.

² I suppose this incident is an invention of Sû Shih's own. I have not met with it anywhere else. In *3iao*'s text for the 'in disguise' of the translation, however, there is an error. He gives 徽服 instead of 微服.

tation of them shows them to be far from any wish to defame Khung-ze.

3. And there is that in the style which slightly indicates his real meaning. (In his last Book for instance), when discussing the historical phases of Táoism, he exhibits them from Mo Tí, *K'ín* Hwá-lí, Pháng Mǎng, Shǎn Táo, Thien Pien, Kwan Yin, and Láo Tan, down even to himself, and brings them all together as constituting one school, but Confucius is not among them¹. So great and peculiar is the honour which he does to him!

4. I have had my doubts, however, about 'The Robber *K'ih* (Bk. XXIX),' and 'The Old Fisherman (Bk. XXXI),' for they do seem to be really defamatory of Confucius. And as to 'The Kings who have wished to Resign the Throne (Bk. XXVIII)' and 'The Delight in the Sword-fight (Bk. XXX);' they are written in a low and vulgar style, and have nothing to do with the doctrine of the Táo. Looking at the thing and reflecting on it, there occurred to me the paragraph at the end of Book XXVII ('Metaphorical Language'). It tells us that 'when Yang 3ze-kü had gone as far as *K'ín*, he met with Láo-ze, who said to him, "Your eyes are lofty, and you stare; who would live with you? The purest carries himself as if he were defiled, and the most virtuous seems to feel himself defective." Yang 3ze-kü looked abashed and changed countenance. When he first went to his lodging-house, the people in it met him and went before him. The master of it carried his mat for him, and the mistress brought to him the towel and comb. The lodgers left their mats and the cook his fire-place, as he went past them. When he went away, the others in the house would have striven with him about (the places for) their mats.'

After reading this paragraph, I passed over the four intermediate Books,—the *Zang Wang*, the *Yüeh Kien*, the *Yü Fú*, and the *Táo K'ih*, and joined it on to the first paragraph of the *Lieh Yü-kháu* (Book XXXII). I then read how *Lieh-ze* had started to go to *K'ín* but came back

¹ See Book XXXII, pars. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

when he had got half-way to it. (When asked why he had done so), he replied, 'I was frightened, I went into ten soup-shops to get a meal, and in five of them the soup was set before me before I had paid for it.' Comparing this with the paragraph about Yang 3ze-kü, the light flashed on me. I laughed and said, 'They certainly belong to one chapter!'

The words of *Kwang-3ze* were not ended; and some other stupid person copied in (these other four Books) of his own among them. We should have our wits about us, and mark the difference between them. The division of paragraphs and the titles of the Books did not proceed from *Kwang-3ze* himself, but were introduced by custom in the course of time¹.

Recorded on the 19th day of the 11th month of the first year of the period Yüan Fǎng (1078-1085).

¹ Few of my readers, I apprehend, will appreciate this article, which is to me more a *jeu d'esprit* than 'a record.' It is strange that so slight and fantastic a piece should have had the effect attributed to it of making the four Books which they call in question be generally held by scholars of the present dynasty to be apocryphal, but still Sū Shih avows in it his belief in Book XXXIII. Compare the quotation from Lin Hsi-kung on pp. 296, 297.

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- Wû-wei (= Mr. Do-nothing), ii, 68, 69.
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- Wû-yü (= Mr. Non-existence), ii, 70.
- Wû Yün (i. q. Wû 3ze-hsü), ii, 131, 174.

- Wylie, Mr. A., i, 9, 39; ii, 257, 265, et al.
- Yak (the bosgrunniens of Thibet), i, 174, 317.
- Yang (the emperor of the Sui dynasty), ii, 311.
- Yang (the heresiarch Yang Kû), i, 270, 287; ii, 99, 100.
- Yang Hû (a bad officer), i, 387.
- Yang 3ze-kû (a contemporary of Lâu-3ze; perhaps the same as the above; but the surname Yang is a different character), i, 261; ii, 99, 100. Yang-3ze, ii, 41, 147, 148. This is Yang-kû in Lieh-3ze; but the Yang is that of Yang 3ze-kû.
- Yáo (the ancient sovereign), i, 169, 172, 190, 206, 225, 242, 282, 291, 295, 312, 313, 314, 315, 338, 347, 359, 386; ii, 31, 108, 110, 120, 136, 141, 149, 162, 170, 171, 173, 178, 183.
- Yen (the state so called), ii, 107, 229.
- Yen (name of the above), i, 176.
- Yen (name of minister of War in Wei), ii, 118.
- Yen Ho (a worthy of Lû in Wei, as teacher of its ruler's son), i, 215. (The same, or another of the same name in Lû), ii, 23, 153, 207.
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- Ying (a river), ii, 161.
- Yo (the classic so called), ii, 216, 218.
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- Yü-li (where king Wân was confined), ii, 173.
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- Yü Shih (the master of the Right, who had lost a foot), i, 200.
- Yü Tû (the dark capital, in the north), i, 295.
- Yü 3ü kih shan (a hill in Wû), ii, 102.
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- Zäh-kung Shih (a teacher of Confucius's time), i, 260.

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- Zăh Kung King** (the Treatise so called), ii, 269-272.
- Zăn** (name of a region in the South; probably a district of *Kbû*), ii, 133, 134. In ii, 32, the Zăn in *Thâi-kung Zăn* may indicate a different quarter, or the Zăn there may be simply a name.
- Zăn-hsiang** (a prehistoric sovereign), ii, 117.
- Zăn Kbiû** (disciple of Confucius), ii, 71, 72.
- Zo** (Spirit-lord of the Northern sea), i, 374, 375, 377, 378, 379, 382, 383, 384.
- Zû and Zû-kê** (Literati, = Confucianists), i, 182, 296, 360; ii, 73, 100.
-

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CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.					Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.			II Class.	III Class.							
Gutturales.												
1 Tenuis	k					क	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	k
2 " aspirata	kh					ख	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	kh
3 Media	g					ग	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	. . .
4 " aspirata	gh					घ	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	. . .
5 Gutturo-labialis	q						𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	. . .
6 Nasalis	h (ng)					ङ	{ 𐬚 (ng) 𐬛 (N) 𐬜 (xho)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
7 Spiritus asper	h					ह	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	h, hs
8 " lenis	,						. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
9 " asper faucalis	'h						. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
10 " lenis faucalis	'h						. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
11 " asper fricatus	. . .	'h					. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
12 " lenis fricatus	. . .	'h					. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)												
13 Tenuis	k					च	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	k
14 " aspirata	kh					छ	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	kh
15 Media	g					ज	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	. . .
16 " aspirata	gh					झ	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	. . .
17 " Nasalis	ñ					ञ	𐬢	𐬢	𐬢	𐬢	𐬢	. . .

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y	. . .		य	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	י	y
19 Spiritus asper	. . .	(y')		. . .	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	. . .	. . .
20 " lenis	. . .	(y)		. . .	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	. . .	. . .
21 " asper assibilatus	. . .	s		श	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	. . .	. . .
22 " lenis assibilatus	. . .	z		. . .	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	. . .	z
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t	. . .		त	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th	. . .		थ	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	ת	th
25 " assibilata	. . .	. . .	TH	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
26 Media	d	. . .		द	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	. . .	. . .
27 " aspirata	dh	. . .		ध	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	. . .	. . .
28 " assibilata	. . .	. . .	DH	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
29 Nasalis	n	. . .		न	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l	. . .		ल	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	ל	l
31 " mollis 1	. . .	l		ळ	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	. . .	. . .
32 " mollis 2	. . .	. . .	L	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
33 Spiritus asper 1	s	. . .	s (s)	स	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	ש	s
34 " asper 2	. . .	. . .		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
35 " lenis	z	. . .	z (z)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	z
36 " asperimus 1	. . .	. . .		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	zh
37 " asperimus 2	. . .	. . .	z (z)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .

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